Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Sufferings of Serbs in Sarajevo between 1991 and 1995

The Government of Republika Srpska

Banja Luka

30 September, 2020

Ref: The Concluding Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Suffering of Serbs in Sarajevo Between 1991 and 1995

I have the distinct honour to present to you on behalf of all six members of the Commission who authored this Report, this summation of the 18 month work of research, investigation, discussion, debate and analysis since we were appointed by your Government in March, 2019 to carry out this task.

This document will be seconded by a somewhat abbreviated form (in format and apparatus, not contents) that is to be published parallelly in the United States so as to make it available simultaneously to wider world audiences.

We have recommended to the Secretariat of the Commission that a permanent Internet site be erected to encompass the wealth of materials that were gathered, consulted and most often referenced throughout the Report (documents, photographs, charts, statistics, books, articles and memoranda) for the future use of researchers or any other interested individuals and organizations.

We wish to express our gratitude to you and your office, to the Secretariat, to the assistants of the Commission's Esteemed Members and to all the agencies and individuals who relentlessly assisted throughout this period to complete this daunting job.

Please consider this cover letter as an integral part of the Report, designed to lend the legal stamp of approval and validation to its entire wording by the Chairman of the Commission on behalf of all its Members.

Truly Yours

Raphael Israeli

Chairman (President, in terms of the original letter of entitlement)

CONCLUDING REPORT

OF
THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE SUFFERING OF SERBS IN SARAJEVO BETWEEN 1991 TO 1995

Raphael Israeli, State of Israel (Chair)

*Viktor Bezruchenko, Russian Federation (*Vice-Chair*)*

Darko Tanaskovic, Republic of Serbia (Esteemed Member)

Laurence French, United States of America (Esteemed Member)

Giuseppe Zaccaria, Italian Republic (Esteemed Member)

Patrick Barriot, French Republic (Esteemed Member)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	FULL NAME
ABC	American Broadcasting Company
AD	Anno Domini
ADA	Americans for Democratic Action
AFL	American Federation of Labor
AID	Agencija za Istraživanje i Dokumentaciju (Agency for Investigation and Documentation)
AIM	Armed Islamic Movement
AIO	Aktivna Islamska Omladina (Active Islamic Youth)
AKOS	Asocijacija za Kulturu, Obrazovanje i Sport (Association of Culture, Education and Sports in Zenica)
ALA	Arab Liberation Army
AMSE	Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers
AMSS	Association of Muslim Social Scientists
ANZAC	The name of the Australia and New Zealand Corps
AOL	America Online
	ARBiH/ABiH Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
ASD	Acute Stress Disorder
AT&T	American Telephone and Telegraph
AVNOJ	Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije (Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia)
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
B/H MUP	Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova Bosne i Hercegovine (Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation

BIF	Benevolence International Foundation
BiH / BH /B&H	Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service)
BSA	Bosnian Serb Army
CAPS-5	Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-5
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CCF	Congress for Cultural Freedom
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
CSB	State Security Center
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	US Defense Intelligence Agency
DIGOS	General Investigations and Special Operations Division
DIY	Do it yourself
DM/DEM	Deutsche Mark (or Deutschmark)
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic acid
DSM	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
DU	Depleted Uranium
EC	European Community
ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
ECFR	European Council for Fatwa and Research
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMDR	Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing
EU	European Union
EUAIS	European Union of Arabic Islamic Schools
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FAS	Federation of American Scientists

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBiH	Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
FEMYSO	Federation of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations
FF	French Franc
FIOE	Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe
FNRJ	Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija (Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia)
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
G1	Group 1
G2	Group 2
G3	Group 3
GATT	General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
GIA	Group Islamic of Algeria
GmbH	Abbreviation for Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, meaning 'a company with limited liability'
H.O.	Humanitarian Organization
HAI	Human Appeal International
HASIP	Headquarters for Aid and Support of Iranian people
HDZ	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)
HNO	Hrvatski Narodni Otpor (Croatian National Resistance)
HOS	Hrvatske Odbrambene Snage (Croatian Defense Forces)
HRAE	Humanitarian Relief Agency of Egypt
HRI	Human Relief International
HUA	Pakistani terrorist group Harkat ul-Ansar
HV	Hrvatska Vojska (Croatian Army)
HVO	Hrvatsko Vijeće odbrane (Croatian Defense Council)
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICD	International Classification of Diseases

ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ID	Identity
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGASA/IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organization
IGC	Inter-Governmental Conference
IHH	International Humanitarian Hifsorganization
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRCA	Iran Center for Reconstruction and Development
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
IRNA/SiCG	Iranian News Agency
IRO	International Refugee Organization
ISESCO	Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
ISGAP	Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISNA	Islamic Society of North America
ITN	Independent Television News
ITV	Independent Television
IVZ	Islamska Vjerska Zajednica (Islamic Religious Community)
IWG	Interagency Working Group
IZBA	Islamska Zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji (Regular Islamic Bosnian Community in Austria)
JDC	American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (“The Joint”)
JMO	Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija (Yugoslav Muslim Organization)
JNA	Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People’s Army)

KFOR	Kosovo Force
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KOS	Kontraobavještajna Služba Armije Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Yugoslav People's Army Counterintelligence Service)
KPJ	Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije (Communist Party of Yugoslavia)
LAX	Los Angeles International Airport
LIFG	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LIWC	Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
LM	This acronym is variously said to be short for Leisure Magazine, Leisure Monthly, or the pseudonymous Lloyd Mangram
LSE	The London School of Economics
LTD	Limited
MA	Master of Arts
MBO	Muslimanska Bošnjačka Organizacija (Muslim Bosniak Organization)
MDM	Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World)
MDMA	3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine
MGM	Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
MGM/UA	Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists
MHM	Menschen Helfen Menschen
MI6	Secret Intelligence Service/Military Intelligence
MIT	National Intelligence Organization (Turkey)
MMPI	Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory
MNO	Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija (Muslim National Organization)
MP	Member of Parliament
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated

MSA	Muslim Student Association
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)
MSI	Marital Satisfaction Inventory
MUP	Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova (Ministry of the Interior)
N.N.	Nomen Nescio
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NCFE	National Committee for Free Europe
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDH / ISC	Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia)
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOB	Narodnooslobodilačka Borba (People's Liberation Struggle)
NSA	National Security Agency of the United States
NSC	National Security Council
OG	Operative Group
OHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OSA	Obavještajno-bezbjednosna Agencija Bosne i Hecegovine (Bosnia and Herzegovina National Security Agency)
OSCE	Organization for Economic Co-operation in Europe
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
PAIC	Popular Arab Islamic Conference
PBS	Public Broadcasting Service
PCL-5	The Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist for DSM-5
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PL	Patriotic League
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization

PM	Prime Minister
PMC	Private Military Company
PR	Public Relations
PRI	Partner/Relationship Inventory
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
QCS	Qatar Charitable Society
RAND	Research and development
RBiH	Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
RCIRZ	Republički centar za istraživanje rata, ratnih zločina i traženje nestalih lica (Center for the Research of War and War Crimes and the Tracing of Missing Persons of Republika Srpska)
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RFL	Radio Free Liberty
RL	Radio Liberty
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RS	Republika Srpska (Republic of Srpska)
RTS	Radio Televizija Srbije (Radio Television of Serbia)
RTV IRIB	Iranian Radio and TV Service
SANU	Srpska Akademija Nauke i Umjetnosti (Serbian Academy of Science and Arts)
SAS	Scandinavian Airlines
SD	Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service)
SDA	Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action)
SDB	Službe Državne Bezbednosti (State Security Service)
SDECE	Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service, French Republic)

SDGT	Specially Designated Global Terrorist
SDP	Socijaldemokratska Partija (Social Democratic Party)
SDS	Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party)
SETA	Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SFRJ / SFRY	Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
SGV	Srpsko Građansko Vijeće (Serb Civic Council)
SJRC	Saudi Joint Relief Committee
SKJ	Savez Komunista Jugoslavije (League of Communists of Yugoslavia)
SLPI-360	Slavic-Language Personality Inventory-360
SQ	Second Questionnaire
SR BIH	Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SRK	Srajevsko-Romanijski Korpus (Sarajevo-Romanija Corps)
SRS BIH	Savez Reformskih Snaga u Bosni i Hercegovini (Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SS	Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron)
SUP	Sekretarijat Unutrašnjih Poslova (Secretariat of the Interior)
SVB	Služba Vojne Bezbijednosti (Military Security Service)
TBS	Turner Broadcasting System
TNC	Transnational corporation
TNT	Turner Network Television
TO	Teritorijalna odbrana (Territorial Defense Forces)
TV	Television
TWRA	Third World Relief Agency
UK / U.K.	United Kingdom
UAE	United Arab Emirates

UDA	Union of Democratic Americans
UDBA	Upravadržavne Bezbijednosti Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (State Security Administration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia)
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UPI	United Press International
US / U.S. / USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United State Dollar
USIA	United States Information Agency
USS	United States Ship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VEVAK / MOIS	Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar (Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran)
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VOA	Voice of America
VRS	Vojska Republike Srpske (Army of Republika Srpska)
WAMY	World Assembly of Muslim Youth
WTBS	Turner Broadcasting System
WWII	World War II
ZAVNOBIH	Zemaljsko Antifašističko Veće Narodnog Oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine (National Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of B&H)

GSPC	French acronym for Algerian terrorist faction Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (translated from Arabic - The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (الجماعة السلفية للدعوة والقتال)
PTT	Post, telephone, and telegraph
ICI / I.C.I	Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan

PREAMBLE

We, the members of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Suffering of the Serbs in Sarajevo between 1991 and 1995, established under the resolution of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, No. 02/1-021-847/18, dated August 14, 2018, by Conclusions of the Government of Republika Srpska, No. 04/1-012-2-2164/18, dated August 18, 2018 and No. 04/1-012-2-2715/18, dated October 11, 2018, and by the Government of Republika Srpska Decision, No. 04/1-012-2-346/19, dated February 7, 2019, signatories of this Concluding Report, hereby confirm that since having been appointed to this Commission in March, 2019, we have held plenary meetings of the entire team and distributed tasks amongst us for the purpose of producing a concluding report within one year of our appointment. Our inability to complete the task within one year has necessitated the extension to our mandate by another six months, to October 1, 2020.

The six members of the Commission were selected and appointed by the Government of Republika Srpska and at its discretion, based on consultations and negotiations with each member separately and without any special acquaintance with any of them or any previous familiarity among them that may have otherwise suggested an early collective prejudice or common grounds that could have shaped a uniform viewpoint or way of thinking. Our very understanding and sharing of each other's thinking and reasoning has in fact crystallized as we have progressed, and this process has enriched and cross-fertilized our lengthy debates, discussions and analyses. The six members are: (please see Appendix G for members' complete biographies):

1. Raphael Israeli, Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel, and a retired historian of Islam and China, who has written extensively about various manifestations of Islam, including Islamic radicalism and Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, Asia and Europe, and has made a number of investigative research forays into the Balkans. He directed the preparation Chapter 3
2. Viktor Bezruchenko from Saint Petersburg, Russia. United Nations Civil Affairs Coordinator for Region Sarajevo between 1996 and 2002. United Nations Military and Security Analyst between 2002 and 2016. Mr. Bezruchenko has an M.A. in Political Science from Sarajevo University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Kiev. He is the author of numerous publications in the field of political science, military history and international law. He has directed the preparation of Chapter 5.

3. Darko Tanasković, retired professor of Oriental Studies at the University of Belgrade and former diplomat. He directed the preparation of Chapter 1.
4. Larry French, a retired American marine, Professor Emeritus of Psychology from Western New Mexico University and a Life Status member and Fellow of the American Psychological Association, who has written extensively on the psychology of war. Mr. French completed a Fulbright Specialist project on "War Crimes and Missing Persons" for Republika Srpska's Minister of Interior, Bosnia-Herzegovina at the Police College of the University of Banja Luka, February 22–April 3, 2016. He directed the preparation of Chapter 2.
5. Patrick Barriot, MD, specialist in anaesthesiology, intensive care and disaster medicine. Mr. Barriot has participated in and completed the international training course of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team. Mr. Barriot has also participated in numerous relief and humanitarian aid operations during armed conflicts and natural disasters. He served as a member of the French UNPROFOR contingent in the former territory of Yugoslavia. He directed the preparation of Chapter 6.
6. Giuseppe Zaccaria, a journalist from Rome, Italy, has specialized in depicting wars and their horrors in the Balkans. For over 30 years, he has worked as a war correspondent for prestigious Italian media such as La Stampa and others covering different conflicts, including the former Yugoslavia crisis in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Zaccaria served as a witness at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. He directed the preparation of Chapter 4.

The considerable amount of work involved in producing the information reflected in this Report was accomplished in a relatively short period of time by the highly dedicated collective of members and its staff of aides who dedicated a prodigious amount of time amassing and analyzing an immense volume of materials in order to accomplish their assigned task. Each of the members appointed aides of their choosing, either working steadily throughout the report period to facilitate collection of materials, translations, research and other logistical and technical duties, or working on an ad hoc basis to perform specific tasks, engage in visits to the field, or perform other assigned duties. It is hard to imagine how any of us could have performed the daunting nature of the work without the devoted, skilled and tireless contribution of these aides, who were helped and supported by the equally effective and assistance continuously proffered by the technical and secretarial staff provided by the Secretariat. We would like to gratefully acknowledge the support and assistance of

the Republican Center for War, War Crimes and Searching for Missing Persons.We would also like to express our sincere gratitude to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Gazi Husrev-bey Library in Sarajevo, the Peace Palace Library in the Hague, and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich for all available materials and documents stored in their archives and made accessible for public use in accordance with the democratic principles of transparency and accountability.

We hereby declare that although the Government of Republika Srpska has assisted us technically to complete the investigation and has enabled us to obtain the relevant materials in response to our needs and discretion, we have remained totally removed from any views or policies embraced by any official authority so as to preserve our strict neutrality and independence. To reinforce our neutral position, we have completed our task without any remuneration.

Although each individual member of the Commission has focused principally on that aspect of this Report closest to his expertise, the entire team of the Commission collectively assumes full responsibility and accountability for this Report in its entirety. The choice and collection of the materials needed for the writing of this Report, as well as the process of formulating the various versions and drafts were all carried out in close consultation among all members of the Commission. All sources that we consulted were made available to all of us, so that we based our collective judgment on the same data base. Those sources included:

1. A vast array of official documents from various governmental departments and archives. In addition, our Chair directed the Commission to send official letters of request to obtain relevant information to several governmental bodies: the Cantonal Prosecutor's Office of the Sarajevo Canton; the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); the Security Agency of BiH; the Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Sarajevo Canton; the Court of BiH; and the State Investigation and Protection Agency of BiH (SIPA). Official answers denying access were sent from the Cantonal Prosecutor's Office of the Sarajevo Canton, the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court of BiH, the State Investigation and Protection Agency of BiH (SIPA) and the Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Sarajevo Canton. The Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) also denied access, declaring that it was not within its authority to make a decision regarding access to the data requested. It therefore forwarded the request to the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina

as the competent institution under the Rulebook on the Automated Case Management System in Prosecutors' Offices (TCMS). This Council also declined the request and provided no access to relevant information requested as needed for the work of the Independent Commission. An official answer from the Security Agency of BiH is still pending;

2. Memoirs and testimonies from individual eyewitnesses or active actors in the the Civil War in Bosnian and Herzegovina, whether during its preparatory stages, during its unfolding and or during its aftermath, including the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), when trials were held of some members of the leadership of the rival contenders. Among the interviewed eye-witnesses willing to share their war-time experiences publicly are the following: Aleksa and Ljubinka Barjaktarević, Momir Čolić, Milanka Đuričić Tomanić, Slavica Hart, Dr. Miodrag Lazić, Mile Poparić, Ljiljana Samardžić, Blažo Vujović, and others;
3. A variety of books and articles, commentaries and reports by private individuals, national and international organizations, NGOs, academics and others were consulted and will be included in our extensive bibliography;
4. Eyewitnesses and active participants in the war from a variety of backgrounds were invited to present their personal testimony and understanding of the events that led to the war, of how it was conducted and on the impact of its aftermath. We invited numerous speakers to testify before the Commission, including several Muslim parties to the conflict, but many did not appear, declining to go on record as witnesses. Nonetheless, the following witnesses provided us with important insights and enriched our findings and conclusions, and we are greatly obliged to them (transcripts of their testimonies before the Commission are to be available in the electronic database of the International Commission). They are:
    1. Steven Mayer, former Deputy Chief of the CIA's Interagency Balkan Task Force, is Dean of the Daniel Morgan School Graduate Studies and Chairman of its National Security Program;
    2. Dževad Galjašević, is a political scientist, a specialist on Islam and Islamic terrorism, and the author of the books: Epitaph for Bosnia: Bosnia after Alija Izetbegovic and Bin Laden; Terrorism in Austria: Vienna, the European Center of Wahhabism; and The Era of Terrorism in BiH. He is a former member and officer of the Third Corps of the Army of BiH, and was mayor of Maglaj municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 2000–2004.

3. Albert Benabou is the co-author of *Savagery in the Heart of Europe: The Bosnian War (1992–1995)*, written in collaboration with Raphael Israeli, the Chair of this Commission. As a former senior official of the Israeli Government, he was appointed by the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to the position of Civil Officer to the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war and witnessed and responded to the atrocities of the war for an entire year. In his capacity as a Civil Officer during the Bosnia War, Mr. Benabou travelled throughout the country to meet representatives of all three parties and directly learn about wartime developments in the field;
4. Dušan Šehovac, is the President of the Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs, Director of the Human Rights Bureau, a project writer, project manager, lecturer, facilitator and mediator. Before the war, he was an assistant professor at the Department of Sociology at the University of Sarajevo and a leading member of the academic community. He spent much of the wartime in Sarajevo, where he witnessed and responded to many aspects of the war. He is a former member of the Board of Directors of the Missing Persons Institute of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5. Prof. Nenad Kecmanović**,** is Professor Emeritus at the Faculty of Political Science in Banja Luka, a Member of the Russian Academy of Political Science in Moscow, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, and, since 1999, a member of the Senate of Republika Srpska. He was a highly respected member of the Yugoslav academic community before the war and a rector at the University of Sarajevo. In 1992 Mr. Kecmanović, together with Alija Izetbegović, was a member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina before managing to escape from the Muslim part of Sarajevo in the summer of the same year.

During the course of its investigation and research, the Commission created an extensive archive of records, official documents and materials used as supporting evidence and sources for the preparation of the Report. All of these records and materials have been catalogued, categorized and archived in the official database of the Commission. The electronic version of this database will be stored at the Commission's official website in a form of an electronic library and made permanently accessible for all interested parties and future generations.

We do not purport to present a totally objective and detached account of the horrors of the Civil War in Bosnian and Herzegovina, nor do we claim that we are presenting a pure, unadulterated truth or making pronouncements of absolute justice. Rather, by examining the sufferings of Serbs in Sarajevo during the war, an important dimension of the conflict that has hitherto been neglected, we seek to present a more factual and balanced account depicting both the horrors that all parties perpetrated and suffered as well as the more rare acts of humanity and generosity that were performed.

There have been numerous studies of many aspects of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This inquiry seeks to make an important contribution to the knowledge about this conflict by shedding light on the many developments that occurred in Sarajevo during the war, which, while crucial, have nevertheless been neglected to date. We consider it our responsibility to present a broader and more comprehensive account that reflects the wartime sufferings of the Serb people, while in no way minimizing the significance of the sufferings of the other parties. On the contrary, we have the deepest respect and profoundest sympathy for all the victims who tragically lost their lives and suffered during the devastation of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We firmly believe that only through an objective perception of what really happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Sarajevo from 1991 there can be created an accurate historical account, enabling those who suffered and lost their lives to be remembered, and have homage paid to them.

FOREWORD

According to Article 2 of the Rules of Procedure adopted by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Sufferings of the Serbs in Sarajevo Between 1991 and 1995, at the session held on 25th of March 2019, the establishment, authority, method of electing members, structure, and the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Suffering of the Serbs in Sarajevo between 1991 and 1995 (The Commission) were determined by the Conclusion of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, No. 02/1-021-847/18, dated August 14, 2018, by Conclusions of the Government of Republika Srpska, No. 04/1-012-2-2164/18, dated August 18, 2018 and No. 04/1-012-2-2715/18 dated October 11, 2018, and by the Government of Republika Srpska Decision No. 04/1-012-2-346/19 dated February 7, 2019.

The Commission is composed of specialists chosen on the basis of professional expertise and regional balance and includes representatives from the United States, Russia, France, Italy, Serbia, and Israel. Collectively, they represent the world's major geographical regions: North America, Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. As stated in Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission has a Chair and Vice-Chair. The Chair was appointed by the Government of Republika Srpska Decision, according to Article 3, Paragraph 3 of the Rules of Procedure, and the Vice-Chair was elected by the Commission members.

Article 26, Paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure provides that coordination of the activities connected to the preparation of the sessions of the Commission, delivering materials, communication between members of the Commission, cooperation with other bodies, and other logistic tasks necessary for the work of the Commission, shall be performed by the Commission Secretariat. Article 26, Paragraph 2 provides that the Secretariat is run by the Secretary.

This Concluding Report was prepared by the Chair, based on the monthly progress reports submitted by all members, and consequently reviewed, amended as required, approved and signed by all members of the Commission in September, 2020. This Concluding Report was adopted *at the final plenary session of the Commission* by consensus of all members, taking into account all personal dissenting and minority opinions within the final formulation of the text. The text, which was prepared completely independently and without the influence of any outside parties, was taken note of by the Government of the Republika Srpska at its session on October 23, 2020

Consequently, the Commission's findings are presented in this Concluding Report on the basis of its investigations and research done within the scope of its mandate. All members of the Commission are collectively responsible for the final text of Concluding Report and they have expressed that responsibility by signing it. While each one of the members was assigned a specific chapter in the Report, they all assume collective responsibility, individually and severally, for the final text in its entirety, and there is no significance attached to the individual authorship.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This report is the culmination of an 18-month period of intensive work which consisted of:

1. Periodic three-day plenary sessions of all members of the Commission, who convened in Banja Luka, at the Seat of the Parliament of Republika Srpska, where the Secretariat of the Commission was also located. The Secretariat facilitated the logistics of the gatherings and provided the secretarial and technical aspects of its operation;
2. Periodic audio and video consultations between all members either to consult on various issues as they arose or to summarize ongoing discussions;
3. Daily queries addressed by the Chair to the members, or vice versa;
4. Daily or occasional circulars distributed by the Chair to all members, emphasizing the importance of abiding by Committee rules, reminding them about deadlines, correcting the output of individual members and then circulating this to all members;
5. Asking all members to produce a monthly progress report and share it with the entire team, so that the progress of each of member could be monitored and all members could be kept up-to-date about the progress of each member;
6. Repeatedly drafting and correcting specialized chapters written by the members, ensuring that all members reviewed the material and made their corrections, amendments and suggestions at every session; and
7. Asking all members to prepare an oral summary report of their overall progress in their particular chapter, and holding wide-ranging discussions, so that each member could not only measure his own progress relative to that of others, but also contribute his own insights to the work of others.

The Report has been written in English, the *lingua franca* of the Commission, but could be translated as needed into other languages and made available in as many copies as needed. Since many organizations have already learned of the upcoming Report, even before its completion and release, and are eager to obtain its details, we have determined that in order to maintain the pace, nature and content of the publications within manageable and responsible bounds, the Chair and Vice-Chair, in close collaboration with all members, will be responsible for managing open channels to the media and to any institution or organization which seeks additional information beyond the distribution plans detailed above.

CHAPTER I

General Historical Introduction

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this brief General Historical Introduction is to highlight the events and processes from the past that have significantly contributed to the shaping of the structure of the society with which Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) entered the 1992 war. Given the function of this introduction, the focus is on highlighting the elements from the past that are most relevant to understanding the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995 rather than on providing a comprehensive and complete account of the past. The medieval history of Bosnia and Herzegovina until the Ottoman conquest has not been specifically addressed here, as it unfolded in the context of the general developments of that time in southeastern Christian Europe. However, the existence of the heretical Bogomil Bosnian Church, particularly its interpretations, had certain indirect repercussions in later periods of Bosnia and Herzegovina's history. Therefore, the phenomenon of the Bosnian Church has been given an appropriate place in the discussion of the Ottoman occupation. The Ottoman conquest and occupation (1463–1878) caused a great historical upheaval and left lasting consequences on the entire social, economic, cultural and spiritual character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to Orthodoxy and Catholicism, Islam entered the country as a religion. However, Islam also brought with it a foreign system of values, of society's organization, and of legal norms. Islam also introduced a basis of economic relations and a cultural pattern to the country. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina was a frontier province of the Ottoman Empire, events within its territory became very intense at all stages throughout the centuries-long confrontation between the Muslim East and the Christian West. Within the Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in accordance with the principled Islamic division of all people into Muslims and non-Muslims, the Muslim population was privileged and non-Muslims and Christians were discriminated against, with certain local variations. On this basis, a distinct property inequality was established within the system of specific Ottoman

feudalism, especially with respect to the possession of arable land and real estate. The repercussions of these changes have long resounded throughout the post-Islamic era and had a role in determining the social (inter-religious and inter-ethnic), political and economic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The most far-reaching consequence of the Ottoman occupation of the country was, without any doubt, the relatively mass Islamization of the local Slavic population, both urban and rural. This created a new group in the population which made religious, ethnic, and later, national relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina even more complex. Therefore, particular attention has been paid to the process of Islamization in this historical overview.

Compared to the centuries of Ottoman rule, the four-decade-long Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was incomparably shorter, but it brought about major changes and left lasting consequences, both within the country and in its external relations with its neighbors. As an extremely well-organized state with clear strategic goals (*Drang nach Osten*) and clearly detailed methods of operation in all fields, as well as a well-functioning and organized administrative apparatus, Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina operated systematically in all domains of political, social and economic life. Its priorities were the comprehensive Europeanization of the backward Ottoman province, its stronger attachment to the new metropolis of Vienna, demographic engineering for the benefit of the Catholic population, the search for a formula for pacifying Muslim Bosniaks, alleviating their aversion to infidel authority, and thwarting the national ambitions, primarily of the Serbs, in the context of hostility toward Serbia and Montenegro. Of special interest for our inquiry was the attempt to create an integrated Bosnian nation through which the Austro-Hungarian Governor Benjamin Kállay had aimed to insulate Bosnia and Herzegovina from the influence of national ideas and movements emanating from Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia.

After the defeat of Austria-Hungary in the bloody battles of the First World War and the subsequent disintegration of its empire, Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia. This represented yet again a fundamental change for all its inhabitants. Serbs were now more favorably positioned than were Muslims and Croats, and political struggles were taking place within and outside the Parliament. The main confrontation was between the centralist aspirations of King Alexander and the federalist or separatist demands of the Croats. The tactics of the Muslims, who were closer to the Croats, were to join alliances and coalitions, seeking to protect their interests in the best way possible. A vision of an autonomous Bosnia and Herzegovina always persisted in the background of whatever political activities they undertook.

The Second World War began with the occupation of Yugoslavia, whose territory was divided among Germany, Italy and their Balkan allies. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of the quisling, extremely nationalist Independent State of Croatia (NDH), with one part controlled by Germany and the other by Italy. During the course of the war, a genocidal state project to annihilate Serbs, Jews, and Roma was implemented throughout the NDH, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the significant involvement of local Muslims. At the same time, in the civil war between the Serbian monarchists (Chetniks) and Tito's Communist movement (Partisans), there were multiple waves of retaliation for the crimes committed against the civilian population, with many casualties on both the Serb and Muslim sides. The heaviest battles of World War II were fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Long before the end of the fighting, in 1943, the soon to be victorious Communist forces laid the constitutional foundations of the post-war Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and within it, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a community of equal nationalities: Serbs, Croats and Muslims. As such, Bosnia and Herzegovina was unique in being a republic without a specific national designation.

The period from the end of World War II until the disintegration of Yugoslavia can be roughly divided into two periods. The first lasted from the end of the World War II until the mid-1960s, and was marked by spirit of the "brotherhood and unity" policy of the Yugoslav people. The following period was marked by a process of awakening republican nationalisms and conflicts over political and economic development, with the movement toward disintegration strengthening and accelerating. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, given that there was no single majoritarian nation, the republican leadership sought to maintain a model of supranational unity, with the greatest reliance on Muslims. In the meantime, it was decided to officially adopt the religious term *muslim* as the national name *Muslim*. Muslim national emancipation was accompanied by social affirmation of Islam and its values, followed by Islamist politicization. Immediately before the final breakup of Yugoslavia during 1991–1992, a multi-party system was introduced, leading to the creation of national parties of Muslims, Serbs and Croats. These national parties overwhelmingly won the first free elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990. After a short period of a cooperative coalition, these parties entered into an irreconcilable conflict due to differing views on the future of Yugoslavia. Representatives of Muslims and Croats, despite opposition from Serbian delegates, adopted a *Bosnia and Herzegovina Memorandum of Independence* in the Parliament, and, shortly thereafter, decided to hold a referendum on independence, again in the face of Serbian opposition. The Serbs boycotted this controversial referendum, as well as the declaration of independence and the ensuing international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These events served as a political *casus belli*, and a civil war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992.

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina During the Ottoman Rule (1436–1878)

1.1. Ottoman Conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The territories that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina today were part of the Ottoman Empire for over four centuries. The Ottoman Era left some deep and lasting marks on the entire social, spiritual and cultural being and identity of the population of these countries.[1] This applies particularly to the entire population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of national and religious affiliation. For the Muslim Bosniaks, the Ottoman heritage was a decisive factor in their ethnogenesis, in their differentiation in relation to the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats, and in the gradual formation of their modern national self-awareness. Therefore, in order to fully explain and understand the historical roots of the contemporary phenomena and processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the basic characteristics of the Ottoman rule must be examined. From the historiographical point of view, despite some gaps in our knowledge of certain aspects of the what transpired during the Ottoman conquest and in the early decades of the Ottoman rule, there is nonetheless a fairly clear and well-known historical account about Ottoman Bosnia. Therefore, this history will be reviewed only briefly here, with reference to the relevant sources in the literature. However, what is more important and interesting in terms of this report are the facts and phenomena involving the social structure in the development of Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, which ultimately determined the mutual perceptions and interrelationships of the three main components of its present population: Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. Furthermore, the values, ideas and emotional criteria upon which these three religious and national communities established their positions within the West-East global civilizational dichotomy, as well as toward the countries and nations in the immediate and regional environment, originate from the Ottoman period.

Vladimir Ćorović, a distinguished Serbian historian, pointed to the singularity of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to other neighboring countries as early as 1925:

> Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro had been ethnically and religiously homogeneous for a long time, and in all our other areas, in Croatia. Dalmatia, Vojvodina and Southern Serbia, there are religious groups, mainly consisting only of two types: Orthodox and Catholic, or Orthodox and Muslim. Because of this, what particularly characterizes life in Bosnia was not present in their life, *with that*

> *struggle of the three*, with a lot of personal, sensitive and twisted, in a special, locally nurtured way; when every action was mostly guided by only one hand and when the skills were often more necessary than the virtues. (Ćorović, 1925, p. 6)

Ćorović made his assessment of the uniqueness of Bosnia and Herzegovina from a Yugoslav conceptual and political perspective, at a time of optimism regarding the final resolution of the interethnic misunderstandings and conflicts between the Slavic brothers of the same language within the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia. His observation is a particularly indicative assessment of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the disintegration of Federal Yugoslavia, where the tri-religious and tri-national structure resulted in a gruesome fate for the central Yugoslav republic.

During the period preceding the decisive Ottoman campaign against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country was in a chaotic state of feudal anarchy. The once powerful kingdom had broken down into several small states with independent rulers, confined to their small territories, fighting one another in their quest for survival and dominance, and constantly changing their foreign allies. As related by the historians Čedomir Antić and Nenad Kecmanović:

> Over 70 years passed between the death of Tvrtko I (1391) and the fall of medieval Bosnia (1463). Nine kings sat on the country's throne in this interval. Constantly at odds with the powerful noblemen rulers, these kings were forced to deal with the Turkish invasions from the very beginning of their reign. Less capable of resisting these invasions than their eastern neighbours, they were more concerned with conflicts within their realm, in which the Turks and the Hungarians played an increasingly important role. Religion was also a great source of discord: the kings had adopted Catholicism, but their persecution of the Bogomils in the central areas of the kingdom did not prove successful. (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, p. 61)

Religion always played an extremely important role in the life of the medieval Bosnian state. When the central government was still strong, Bosnia began to believe that it could become an equal competitor to its neighboring states, which, at one point of time in the fourteenth century, it indeed was. During this period, the Bosnian kings sought to elevate the Bogomil Bosnian Church as the state religion, threatening the position of the Catholic Church. With the passage of time, and in face of the growing danger posed by the Ottomans, Bosnian rulers came to realize that they needed to rely on their Western neighbors and on the papacy in order to defend themselves from the Ottoman threat. This shift in policy led to the suppression of the "heretical" Bogomilism, a move which was a priority for the Catholic Church and Rome. Thus, King Stefan Tomaš (1443–1461) converted to the Catholic faith and created the conditions for the undisturbed missionary activities of the Franciscans to bring the Manichaean

heretics back to the true religion of Catholicism. Other noblemen in Bosnia followed the king's move, so that by the mid-15th century, almost all regional lords had declared themselves Catholic. For the most part, these conversions were not the result of any real change in religious consciousness, but rather pragmatic acts conditioned by a combination of political considerations and power relations at a given moment. Indeed, communications with the Catholic and Orthodox neighbors of Bosnia, which considered Bogomils as renegades from Christianity, were often impeded by the existence and stigma of these "heretics." Consequently, there were cases in which the individual noblemen simultaneously felt and declared themselves as the followers of two or even three religious creeds. Thus, for example, Duke Sandalj Hranić was an Orthodox and a Bogomil, and according to the historian of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Nićifor Dučić, Duke Stefan Vukčić Kosača was an "Orthodox in the soul, a Bogomil on the outside, and he was conveying to the Pope that he would convert to the Catholic faith." In addition, the Duke's attendants were followers of all three faiths (Nilević, 1991, pp. 337–39). Such religious relativism reflected the absence of a firm and unified state as well as a religious arrangement incapable of resisting the well-prepared military campaign of Sultan Mehmed II.[2] Bosnia was devastated by this blow, and the conquest of its entire territory lasted for more than one and a half centuries, until 1592 and the occupation of the Bihać region.

The campaign against Bosnia was "a textbook example of Ottoman methods of conquest: brilliantly organized, rapidly concluded, and successful in both its military and political objectives" (Heywood, 1994, p. 24). It was a period of great success for the Ottomans in the wars against the Christian states, when, Serbia, among others, was conquered in 1459.

1.2. Ottoman Feudal System and Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the conquered areas, including Bosnia, the Ottomans introduced and established institutions and social relations characteristic of their specific administrative-territorial, judicial, military and agrarian systems. This process lasted for several decades, during which the socio-economic and political structure of the medieval Bosnian state was dismantled and replaced by the Ottoman system of government and economic structure (Imamović, 1998, p. 105). In line with their Islamic ideology and practice, the new Ottoman rulers undertook the process of destroying the previous government and its leaders, including the high nobility, and introduced the feudal, *sipahi-timar* system based on imposing Muslim dominance and discriminating against Christians of all three confessional groups (*Enciklopedija Jugoslavije,* Socijalistička, 1983, Republika Bosna i Hercegovina entry). As is well known, the Ottoman feudal

order was based on the Sultan, as supreme head of state, enjoying unlimited rights of ownership, with all arable land belonging to the state. The Sultan granted estates called *timari* to military and civilian servants as a payment from a state land fund. These estates, or *leno,*[3] could be used but not inherited.

These feudal land arrangements of the Ottoman state served as the basis of what was called the *timar* system. This system is considered one of the pillars not only of the military, but also of the entire socio-economic system of the Ottoman Empire. The *timar* system was developed to meet the Empire's need to maintain a large army, using already established medieval methods of doing business and making money. When creating their *timar* system, the Ottomans drew on certain solutions from the experience of the Eastern states (Persian, Seljuk and others), as well as from the Byzantine heritage (*pronia*). Under the *timar* system, land or estates owned by the state, known as *ziyamet*, or *has*, along with the peasants living on them, i.e., a subordinate production element (*reaya, raja*), were assigned for use originally to soldiers, horsemen, and minor military nobility (*spahi*), and later to senior officials and civilians. Those receiving these estates had the right to collect taxes from them as prescribed by custom and *sharia* law. In effect, the *spahi* were not the landowners in the full sense of the word, but only had the authority to use and to collect the prescribed amount of state revenue from the land allotted to them. The peasants on that land (*chiftlik* if the farmer was Muslim, *bashtina* if Christian) had the status of hereditary tenants. Much of what these tenant peasants produced was used to pay all the fees which were imposed on them. The right to work the land could be passed from father to son, but could not be transferred to a third party. One of the most important causes and symptoms and of the subsequent breakdown of the Ottoman feudal order, and thereby the state, starting in the seventeenth century, was a growing disregard of the injunction against non-transferability of the right over cultivated land to third parties. This process, known as *čiftlučenje*, was not limited to Bosnia, but also affected other provinces of the Empire, some of them even more intensely. The purchase of deeds on land by those who had control of the assets but were not *raya*[4] disturbed the relationship between production and consumption in the agrarian sphere, and the actual agricultural producers were placed in an increasingly difficult position. The *sipahis* were, in fact, taking over the *raya's* land and becoming dual owners.

In order for the Ottoman authorities to be able to establish a *timar* system in the newly conquered countries, they first had to create the necessary preconditions, as this system was feasible only in those areas where the *sanjak* (*sandžak*) system, Ottoman law and the Ottoman administration had already been stabilized. This process was undergone in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. The administrative organization was set up to meet the needs of the High or Sublime Porte, the central government of the Empire, and, at the same time, to impose military and political order, as the

Ottoman state was based on the complete domination by the military administration. In other respects, the Ottomans did not make any significant changes to the administrative divisions of the countries in the occupied areas. Indeed, wherever possible, they maintained the existing structures. In this sense, since the Ottoman conquest, the territory of Bosnia had become a separate one, the Bosnian Sandžak (1463), based in Sarajevo. Later, the Herzegovina Sandžak (1470), with its headquarters in Foča, and the Zvornik Sandžak (1477), with its headquarters in Zvornik, were formed (Vranješ and Vlaški, 2005, p. 100).

In order to fully understand the structure of the society and its stratification in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Ottoman rule, the basic *sharia* division and class dichotomy of subjects of the state into Muslims and non-Muslims must be clarified, as well as the *millet*[5] system based on the *sharia* divisions. The Muslims throughout the Empire were privileged, and non-Muslims were discriminated against, a division which is characteristic of all societies and states formed according to the basic Qur'anic division of the world into "the best community of Allah:" that is, the only true believers on the one hand, and all those who are not, on the other. The holy task of the former is to save others from sinful errors and lead them to obey the will of Allah.

However, in the concrete organization of society and regulation of life in the Ottoman Empire, this sharp division in principle was adjusted and somewhat mitigated to enable the complex organism of the Empire to function. In fact, the driving justification for categorizing social strata and classes in the structure of Ottoman feudalism was the need to fund the state. For this purpose, there were two large classes of subjects of the Ottoman Sultan. The first included the military, to which religious officials and senior government officials (*ulema*) were added. The second class included subordinate taxpayers (*raya*). In effect, the society was divided into those who ruled and enjoyed all status and material privileges and those who were subordinate to them and produced the goods necessary for the functioning of the state mechanism and for supporting the members of the privileged class. In practice, the dividing line of this class macro-dichotomy did not completely correspond with the basic religious division into Muslims and non-Muslims. As mentioned earlier, in the 15th century, many Christians served the Sultan as the *sipahi* and soldiers, and there were other cases where certain Christian and Jewish groups and *esnafs* (guilds) were exempted from the system of strict taxation, in the context of certain specific circumstances. On the other hand, subordinate tax payers (*raya)* were both non-Muslims and Muslims, not just non-Muslims, as has been often believed.

Two characteristics of the *timar-sipahi* system in Bosnia and Herzegovina influenced the relations in society during the Ottoman period, each in its own way. Although the Ottoman state was based on a unique and highly centralized model of

organization, it nonetheless was also characterized by a high degree of pragmatism and willingness to adapt the "morphology" of its institutions to regional circumstances and established customs, without relinquishing the essence of its imperial purposes. Thus, as already mentioned, by the end of the 15th century, Christians were able to become *sipahis* without abandoning their religion, provided that they were fully loyal to the Ottoman Empire and fulfilled all the obligations which their status entailed (Malcolm, 1994, p. 48). In later periods, as the Ottoman Empire began weakening and the first hints appeared of the Empire facing an internal crisis and external challenges, Islamic regulations were more rigorously administered and *sharia* restrictions on the rights of the non-Muslims were more consistently enforced.

Another important feature of Ottoman feudalism in Bosnia can be found in the *Kanun-name* (literally, the Ottoman Book of Law) provisions for the Bosnian Sandžak from 1516, according to which the *timars* in Bosnia could only be assigned to people of domestic descent. This was the basis for the appearance and legitimization (1593) of the so-called *odžakluk-timars*, hereditary family feudal estates (Imamović, 1998, p. 118). Their owners were Bosnian Muslims, often an Islamized Christians. It was important for the Empire to strengthen its frontier provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, originally as a starting point and support for invading Europe, and later as a defensive bastion against attacks from Europe. It was also critical that the Empire strengthen this region in such a way that the loyalty of domestic Muslim forces could be assured. To this end, the Ottomans formed a privileged class of Bosnian Muslim nobility, who persistently defended their local and personal interests against the encroachments and abuses of provincial governors and clerks, who became increasingly arrogant and greedy over time. As a rule, members of the governing hierarchy and senior officials of the Empire governing provinces and smaller territorial-administrative units did not remain in office for long, and were moved around the vast Empire according to the Sultan's will. These functionaries felt no particular attachment to the areas that were temporarily handed over to them to be managed, so they easily succumbed to the temptation to maximize their personal material gain during their relatively short, temporary periods of service. They had no aversion to corruption or other forms of abuses of power, including violence. The local Bosnian Muslim nobility (*begovat*), who were firmly and permanently tied to their home territory and possessions, strongly and persistently resisted these abuses, and, working together, presented themselves as a sort of patriotic force. At the same time, these same *begovat* defended the boundaries of the Empire, thereby securing their own positions and privileges, as well as their general reputation. In fact, much later, in the 18th century, the Bosnian *begovat*, motivated by internal interest-based coalitions, and having unlawfully usurped power locally, began to oppose any attempts by the central Ottoman authority to restore order in Bosnia and limit their powers.

1.3. Resistance and Uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina Against Tanzimat Reforms

In the nineteenth century, the *ayans* and *captains* (carriers of informally institutionalized but efficient local government) fiercely resisted the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), aimed at centralizing the state administration, modernizing the military, and crushing the arbitrariness of the provincial feudal elites. They ideologically justified their conservatism, claiming that the effort to transform the Ottoman Empire to more resemble a powerful, centralized European state was non-Islamic and even infidel in nature. Among their efforts to resist reform, the Bosnian notables expressed solidarity with the rebellion of the Janissaries when the Sultan disbanded these formerly elite units of the Empire in 1826. Throughout the period, known as the *Tanzimat*,[6] when far-reaching reforms were being introduced in the Ottoman Empire, the Bosnian *begovat* did not remain idle. Due to the resistance and the constant turmoil the *begovat* incited, the *Tanzimat* reforms were only partially implemented, and even then, often only on a formal and not a *de facto* level. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the *sipahi* and *beys* preserved their privileges. An important goal of the reform, a regular army with a new organization, was not introduced. In a sense, the outlying region of Bosnia had become a "state within a state" with respect to its resistance to instituting reforms.

The border position of Bosnia and Herzegovina also influenced the fact that its territory suffered from all the consequences of the turbulent events occurring in its surroundings, as well as the instability that, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, had resulted from rebellions and uprisings in Serbia. Discontent was also transmitted over the Drina river, enticing local Christians in Bosnia to resist Ottoman rule. Concerned for their future, Bosnian Muslims, mostly of Slavic descent, participated in the suppression of insurgencies and uprisings in the neighboring Serbian countries, or in the Smederevo Sandžak, or the Belgrade Pashalik. This activity left a deep mark on the historical consciousness of the Serb people. The memory of brothers by blood and language, but separated by religion and politics, becoming ardent enemies at the beginning of the liberation fight against the Ottomans was rekindled in all subsequent wars on the Drina River, even in the last one in the 1990s. At the core of the Muslim perception and interpretation of the motive for clashing with the Serbian rebels was the persecution of their co-religionists in Serbia. For the Serbs, these were "Turks" and for the Bosnian Muslims, they were "Bosniaks." This division was inevitable, because for the Serbs, the fight was one for liberations, while for the Muslims, the conflict prevented the liberation of the Christian *raya*.

The situation created after the signing of the *Treaty of Adrianople* between Russia and Turkey (1829) can serve as an illustration of the extent to which Muslim leaders in Bosnia saw the success of Serbia's state-building efforts as a direct threat to their own territorial interests. With this document, the Ottoman Empire guaranteed to implement without delay the eighth point of the *Bucharest Treaty* (1812), which recommended that Serbia should be given autonomy and that those six *nahiyes* (districts) that Karađorđe, the Serbian revolutionary, had conquered and held during the First Serbian Uprising, and which, after the collapse of the First Serbian Uprising, did not become part of the Miloš state, must be restored. These *nahiyes* were: Krajina, Crna Rijeka, Paraćin, Kruševac, Stari Vlah and Jadar. Two of them, Stari Vlah and Jadar, were part of the Zvornik Sandžak, i.e., Bosnian *Pashalik/Ejalet*.[7] The Sultan's willingness to fulfil this obligation caused outrage among Bosnian feudal lords and the Muslim population in general. They believed that such a move should not have been made without their participation. This reaction indicates a seriously impaired awareness of the undisputed imperial power and demonstrates that the local population assumed that they had the right to decide the fate of their country, although, according to the original Ottoman concept, all the countries belong to *Padishah*. As explained by the historian Mehmedalija Bojić:

> This Porte's commitment to expand Serbia at the expense of Bosnia was strongly rejected by the Bosnian captains, especially those from the Drina, Bosnia and Vrbas River and north-eastern Posavina. They considered themselves the heirs and guardians of the compactness of Bosnia and Bosnian Pashalik, especially because their ancestors continually fought difficult and long wars against even powerful forces like the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic. (Bojić, 2001, p. 91)

Most Bosnian feudal lords held a meeting in Tuzla in late 1831 and early 1832, and decided to oppose the Sultan's reform of the army and tax system by force, if necessary, and, primarily, to oppose the intention to hand over the disputed *nahiyes* to Serbia. The renowned and ambitious captain from Gradačac, Husein-beg Gradaščević, led the rebellion, by whose name this significant event in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is well known. Still, many aspects of this broad movement against the central government have not yet been fully analyzed. Gradašćević's ideas seemed contradictory, but the rebellion he led was by no means merely a fight against a certain sultan's measures and intentions. Rather, it reflected the already well-formed awareness of collective regional identity. Gradaščević, moreover, made contact with some Muslim (Skadar Sandžak's Deputy Mustafa Bušatlija and others) and non-Muslim opponents of the Porte, including Montenegrin Bishop Petar II and Petrović Njegoš, and maintained contact with Prince Miloš of Serbia directly. Gradaščević considered

himself a genuine Muslim, but not an Ottoman, and this perception of identity was widespread among Bosnian Muslims, not just among members of the upper classes. Although he lacked support from some prominent and influential *beys*, especially in Herzegovina, Gradaščević's uprising created significant troubles for the Ottoman administration and authorities in Istanbul for a year. As early as March 1831, the rebels occupied the vizier's seat of Travnik and ousted the vizier Namik-Pasha. The Sultan, whom the rebels even called a *djaur* (unbeliever), had been delivered a series of demands, including the heretofore unthinkable demand of abolishing the position of a State Deputy in Bosnia and allowing local Muslims to elect their own leader. By defeating the Sultan's forces in several battles, Gradaščević gained immense popularity with the people, who conferred upon him the approbatory appellation, the "Dragon of Bosnia."[8] At one point, there was a huge territory, from Bihać to Sandžak and from Sava to the Adriatic, under the control of rebels. Gradaščević proclaimed himself a vizier of this territory, and toward the end of 1831, he demanded autonomy for Bosnia, similar to the one Miloš Obrenović had obtained for Serbia. In Porte, of course, such a request was dismissed without hesitation, and a decisive offensive was launched against Gradaščević and his supporters. The rebels put up a very strong, and ultimately desperate, resistance to the Sultan's troops, but, by the middle of 1832, they were completely defeated. When assessing Gradaščević's uprising against the imperial rule, most Muslim historians consider it to have "the characteristics of a national liberation movement,"[9] with some claiming that he was advocating the independence of Bosnia, a position which is certainly exaggerated.

It is indisputable, however, that Gradaščević's aim was some form of autonomy within the Empire, and that his movement represented the existence of a developed awareness of a certain collective regional identity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even the prominent Serbian scholar Vladimir Ćorović, who writes that it is "completely wrong to think that this movement had some national motives and was preparing the restoration of the Bosnian state," estimates that Gradaščević's rebellion was autonomist, not separatist (Ćorović, 1925, p. 71). Another Serbian historian, Milorad Ekmečić, however, notes that "the Bosnian rebels were no exception in this," comparing the logic of Gradaščević's approach toward Porte with that of his allies, the Albanian rebels (Ekmečić, 1997, p.19). Ahmed Aličić, who devoted an entire monograph to Gradaščević's uprising, concluded that it was a movement "for Bosnia's autonomy and independence," and that it was based on "the unique Bosniak people of a multi-confessional composition: Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox" (Aličić, 1996, p. 22). This conclusion is difficult to accept because the Bosniak people can by no means be multi-confessional, since Islam is a *differentia specifica* with respect to Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. Nedim Filipović, the prominent Ottomanist, discussed the interpretation according to which Gradaščević's uprising was driven

by a recognized need to unite for the purpose of pursuing the patriotic mission of defending the Bosnian identity. Filipović shares the generally accepted view in the literature that the uprising occurred primarily in reaction to the central government's reform measures, and not because the rebels were conservative provincials, which was often thought at the time. Filipović contends that the Bosniaks rejected the reforms because they believed that the reforms would strengthen and extend Ottoman rule in Bosnia and would stand in the way of the Bosniaks' intention to first gain autonomy and, later, their own state. (Redžić, 2000, p. 58)

The dissatisfaction of the Bosnian feudal lords with the centralist reforms did not abate with time, and new uprisings ensued (1849, 1850), albeit smaller in scope. After each defeat of reform opponents, the Porte was able to introduce reform measures over time, sending energetic governors who were given clear instructions to use even brutal force to impose the new measures. This centralization of administration was implemented in all provinces of the Empire, but in Bosnia, it encountered particularly great resistance, both passive and active. After the codification of land law in the Ottoman state (1858), the central government issued a decree concerning the *chiftliks*, or large estates, in Bosnia, which effectively ended the complex Ottoman feudal arrangements and the local deviations from them specific to Bosnia. As a result, the situation that had been illegally created by Bosnian feudal lords over the decades, was, in fact, legalized, and the position of the *raya* did not change at all. In fact, after assuming rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, Austria-Hungary confirmed the validity of the existing agrarian regulations, and these remained in force until the end of Austria-Hungary's rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1918. (Imamović, 1998, p. 340)

The *Decree on the Organization of the Bosnian Vilayet* (1865) consolidated all the *Tanzimat* reform measures, which, for the most part, made it possible, at least on paper, to modernize the Ottoman Empire and to adopt European models of legal, administrative, military and economic organization and functioning, even in this complicated border province of Bosnia and Herzegonvina. The Christian population, however, continued to be dissatisfied with its position and the fact that the abuse of power by Ottoman officials and economic exploitation continued in various ways in the region. Thus, paradoxically, at one time, the Principality of Serbia supported the changes in the regulation of the situation in the region and the administrative reforms implemented in Bosnia by the famous Omer Pasha Latas, while these same changes and reforms posed new difficulties for the Serb population across the Drina River.

However, the strengthening of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the constant pressure on the Ottoman Empire from Europe, made the Orthodox population begin to articulate national sentiments more clearly, expressing their hope for liberation from foreign rule in general. As a result of the *Tanzimat* reforms, the position of the

non-Muslims in the Empire was undoubtedly improved, to the extent that at the local level, their representatives were even formally consulted in the decision-making processes that concerned them. Nevertheless, non-Muslims remained second-class citizens, because the fundamental Islamic division into believers and unbelievers, that is, "errating believers," was inviolable.

Some Turkish historians have a tendency to express amazement at the growing Christian dissatisfaction and strengthening wave of resistance at a time when greater rights were beginning to be guaranteed to them. These historians also conjecture about the possible role of agents of European states in agitating among the Christian subjects of the Empire and fostering national ambitions among them. However, these historians fail to take into account that nationalist awakenings were occurring throughout the world at that time, that any rights granted to Christians were limited in the context of principally discriminatory Islamic tolerance, and that Christians were not content to be tolerated but wanted to be free. Aware of the danger of nationalist awakening among their subjects in the multi-ethnic empire, the creators of the first Ottoman Constitution (1876) declared all subjects to be Ottomans, without any religious affiliation, thus introducing into the state ideology the concept of the Ottoman political people or nation. This constitutional equalization of the subjects of the Empire as citizens dealt a political blow to the system of religious segregation on the basis of the Islamic *millet* system, but the traditional order remained deeply intact, socially, psychologically and even practically for quite some time. In addition, the adoption of the concept of the Ottoman nation also posed an official barrier to any potential institutionalization of regional "Bosnianhood."

1.4. Period of Instability Before the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire

The historians Čedomir Antić and Nenad Kecmanović relate that, "From the 1840s onwards, Herzegovina became the epicenter of many rebellions and uprisings of the Serbian population. Adjacent to Montenegro, which had in the previous decades significantly enlarged its territory to the north and the west, Herzegovina now became fertile soil for a long rebellion" (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, p. 104). The rebellions and uprisings of Serbs in Herzegovina, but also in other parts of the country (Posavina, Bosnian Krajina, etc.), continued until the end of the Ottoman rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina. They significantly contributed to the destabilization of internal circumstances, as well as to the objective weakening of the Empire vis-à-vis its most serious foreign opponents, although the great powers of that time did behave in accordance with their shared and changing state interests. This meant that they

did not always support the national liberation fight of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, but occasionally supported the Sultan for varying lengths of time. The entire period from the 1840s until the Berlin Congress of 1878, which effectively marked the end of the Ottoman Era, was marked by fierce competition and shifting alliances among the great powers to obtain spheres of influence in the Balkans. This created intense internal turmoil and increasingly weakened the political and geostrategic position of the Ottoman Empire.[10]

The first major uprising in Herzegovina broke out in 1852 east of Trebinje and quickly spread to the Montenegrin regions. The immediate cause of the rebellion was the attempt by Omer-Pasha Latas to disrupt the established local government in these areas, inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs, and to directly collect taxes and seize weapons from the people. This uprising affected other regions as well. Led by Luka Vukalović in association with Montenegro, it recorded significant military successes. The conflict was extremely cruel and caused great civilian casualties. At one point, Omer Pasha Latas even expressed his willingness to offer autonomy to the Serb population, causing a split between the rebels and the Montenegrin Prince Nikola I, which facilitated the crushing of the rebellion in 1864. The Turkish authorities entered into negotiations with the rebels and granted them partial concessions.

The peace did not last long, and, in 1875, the next spark of rebellion was ignited in the vicinity of Nevesinje in Herzegovina, which would eventually grow into a large-scale uprising. The immediate cause was greatly increased taxation in the impoverished state, which the *raya* could no longer bear. This uprising turned into general regional warfare, and is considered the central event of a process known as the "Great Eastern Crisis," which greatly accelerated the Ottoman Empire's downfall. Unlike previous uprisings, which primarily, though not exclusively, had the characteristics of social uprisings, this Herzegovina Uprising took on a pronounced political and national character. Austria-Hungary was therefore very interested in crushing it, because it did not want a Serb or South Slavic state created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an area which had long been seen as playing a part in Austria-Hungary's doctrine of penetration to the east (*Drang nach Osten*). While Montenegro sought to prevent the rebels from becoming too independent and tried to gain full control over them, Serbia assisted the rebels as much as possible. This assistance gradually evolved into direct involvement and even some leadership role in the uprising. Serbia's entry into the war with Turkey (1876) encouraged the rebels, who even proclaimed their unification with Serbia, which they considered the national motherland of all Serbs.

From 1877, when Russia entered the war with the Ottoman Empire, the uprising in Herzegovina and in some parts of Bosnia began to be seen as part of the pan-Slavic movement. Although Serbia was successful in the war, and gained independence in

the peace imposed by Russia in the 1878 *Treaty of San Stefano*, it was not able to retain all the territorial gains it had achieved during the conflict. This was due to Russia preferring the creation of a Greater Bulgaria, through which it believed it could more successfully pursue its interests in the Balkans. However, Austria-Hungary and England, dissatisfied with Russia's agreement with the Ottomans, soon sought to revise the *San Stefano Treaty*, leading to the Berlin Congress of 1878, where decisions were made with far-reaching significance for the future of the Balkans, and in particular of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the Congress, Serbia fared much better than Bulgaria, which was indirectly interpreted as a Russian retreat. Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose population had been greatly affected by the years of war. While it is not possible to accurately determine the precise numbers of the members of the three major religious-ethnic groups on the basis of the last Ottoman and first Austro-Hungarian censuses of the country, it is clear from the censuses that all three groups suffered enormous human losses as the result of death and emigration. According to the 1870 *Salname* (census)[11] of the Bosnian Vilayet, approximately 870,000 Muslims, 636,000 Orthodox and 220,000 Catholics were living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Twenty-five years later, the 1895 Austro-Hungarian Census indicates that there were 449,000 Muslims, 496,000 Orthodox, and 209,000 Catholics in the same region. Obviously, the Muslims had the highest rate of loss and the Catholics the smallest (McCarthy, 1994, pp. 58, 81).

The Herzegovina Uprising is also significant in that its Orthodox Serb leadership sought to motivate both the Bosnian Muslims and Catholics to unite in a joint action against the Ottoman authorities, seeing them as the Serbs of "three laws" or three faiths.[12] The Austro-Hungarians, of course, opposed such ideas, and took steps to prevent the Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina from joining in or supporting the uprisings. In fact, Austria-Hungary even encouraged the Catholics to actively oppose the rebels, although the influential Croatian Roman Catholic Bishop Strossmayer, who supported Yugoslavian nationalists, had a more nuanced view of the situation. However, the nationalists in Croatia widely viewed Bosnia as Croatian land. For the rebels, the relationship with the local Muslims was far more important. The Muslims, whom the rebels did not consider part of the Ottoman population, were sent declarations about the need for unification in the fight against the foreign Ottoman rule.

This vision of national unity in spite of religious and cultural differences was a reflection of ideas emanating from a newly liberated Serbia about a possible pan-Serbian national program. One of the more well-known declarations of this vision was the *Načertanije* (Plan) of Serbia's Minister of the Interior, Ilija Garašanin, from 1844. This document, which was never actually implemented at the time outside Serbia,

and it is tendentiously interpreted as a fundamental programmatic manifestation of Greater Serbian nationalism, especially among Bosniaks and Croats. In fact, the idea that Orthodox Serbs, Muslim Bosniaks, and Catholic Croats could unite as members of one Serb people in the struggle for liberation from the Ottoman rule was objectively anachronistic and utopian, already at the time when it was suggested by the leaders of the Herzegovina uprising. However, it represented a desperate opposition to the growing influence of the Austro-Hungarian emissaries among the Catholics and the attempts to promote the idea of a separate regional (proto-national) Muslim "Bosnianhood" identity within the Ottoman Empire among the Bosnian Muslims. The Serbs later abandoned this model of inclusive nationalism, replacing it with the idea of exclusive nationalism; that is, equating Serbianhood with the Orthodox religious affiliation, which actually reflected the dominant trend among the Southern Yugoslav peoples.

The preceding material has covered the most significant aspects of the centuries-long Ottoman rule of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the fact that most permanently changed the face of this country is the entry of the youngest monotheistic religion, Islam, into the previously Orthodox and Catholic region through the "big door" (the Porte) of the Ottoman Empire, creating a domestic human base through the process of mass Islamization of the local people. Considering the far-reaching consequences of the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina became a tri-religious country in the Ottoman period, and bearing in mind, as the historian Milorad Ekmečić argued, that religion was a crucial element in the formation of modern nations, and that precisely the "religious type of nationalism …" was the "source of the 1992 Civil War," (Ekmečić, 1999, pp. 395–429),[13] the proceeding sections will examine the phenomenon of Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1.5. Process of Islamization and its Consequences

The most significant lasting consequence of many centuries of Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina is undoubtedly the mass Islamization of the native Slavic population. Given the mass conversion to Islam of the local population, both urban and rural, Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a specific case in regional contexts. Although a great deal of literature has been devoted to the issue thus far, there is still no consensus about the reasons for the mass Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, the issue is complex, and historical resources are not fully available for study. However, it is arguable that a more serious obstacle is

the ideological tendencies found in a considerable number of papers on this subject matter. Researchers and interpreters of Muslim origin, especially those from Bosnia and Herzegovina, tend to portray Islamization as a nonviolent process, conditioned by different objective circumstances, while most non-Muslim, especially Serbian and Croatian, historians contend that Islamization involved a violent process. This is why Muslim historians propose that the generally accepted term "Islamization," which in their view carries the connotation of forced or violent conversion to Islam, be replaced by the purportedly neutral phrase, "the spreading or the expansion of Islam."[14] Given such two opposing points of view, it is not surprising that the importance of certain factors often become considered absolute. As a result, this extremely complex process of Islamization becomes interpreted in a selective manner, making it impossible to create a balanced picture. Given that the conflicting views about the nature of Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether it was violent or nonviolent, have been formalized in conflicting national narratives established and further developed during the Yugoslav crisis, and subsequently during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to take a critical approach to the issue of Islamization. It is not our intention to give a definitive answer to the question of the nature and the course of the process of Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will only try, as objectively and impartially as possible, to present the proven facts and the conclusions that we believe can be logically drawn from them in fulling the task with which this Commission was entrusted.

As pointed out earlier, within the Balkan region, the mass Islamization of all categories of Slavic people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a unique case. This exceptionality of the Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led many researchers to search for its causes in the specificity of the pre-Ottoman spiritual and social situation in this region. This quest led to the creation of the so-called "Bogomil thesis," which was very popular and nearly official in Muslim circles for a while. According to the Bogomil thesis, the decisive factor in the speed and extent of Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the willing acceptance of a new religion by the Bogomils (*Pataria*), followers of the heretical, dualistic Bosnian Church. This church had many followers in medieval Bosnia and can be considered a separate spiritual current in relation to Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Given this distance between the religion of the Bogomils and Catholicism and Orthodoxy, the theory posits, adopting Islam would be a logical solution for the Bogomils. Instead of their distinctive third, disputed Christian path, the gates of a new, foreign religion of relatively simple dogma and rituals were opened, one that no one was forcibly pushing them into, according to those supporting the position that Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina was peaceful in nature. Some Muslim authors have even posited a certain degree of dogmatic similarity between the Bogomilism and Islam, a thesis that supported

favoring an alleged ethnic continuity between the original inhabitants of Bosnia, who over time became the "Bosnians" of the important figure Benjamin Kállay, and more recently, unitary "Bosnians," and the modern Bosniak nation.[15] This interpretation suggests that Bosniaks are, in fact, the nucleus of the primordial indigenous ethnic element, thereby marginalizing and delegitimizing Serbs and Croats as peoples, despite the fact that they were also historically present in and could lay claim to being indigenous inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[16]

Consequently, the "Bogomil thesis" has received sharp criticism, both historical and ideological, among Serbs and Croats. Their challenge to the credibility of the "Bogomil thesis" is based primarily on the history of Catholic and Orthodox churches' persecution of the Bogomils as apostates from Orthodoxy, with Rome spearheading that persecution. It is believed that at the beginning of the second half of the 15th century, under the pressure from the papal authority, the Bosnian Church was virtually destroyed and its members subjected to persecution and forced to convert to Christianity. Some of them fled to Herzegovina at that point, and thus, when Bosnia fell under the Ottoman rule in 1463, there was not, in fact, a significant number of Bogomils still in the country. The argument goes that because there were no longer many Bogomils in the country, they could not have been the subjects of mass Islamization.[17]

Although there is generally a consensus among historians today that the specific case of mass Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be adequately explained by the "Bogomil thesis," the complete rejection of the indirect effect of the Bogomil factor is not justified either. To begin with, it is impossible that the Bosnian Church, with all its many followers, disappeared in just a few years, as well as that such a large number of them (40,000) left the country in such a short time. The Bogomil thesis cannot, therefore, be rejected in all its aspects. Bogomils, indeed, were just one element of the compound complex of political and social factors that enabled the rapid and successful Ottoman expansion, the consolidation of foreign power and the widespread conversion to Islam (Желязкова, Антонина [Zelyaskova, Antonina]1990, pp. 123–24). However, by no means could they have been the decisive factor in the mass Islamization that occurred gradually over several centuries.[18] There is no doubt that unstable religious conditions and a certain spiritual vacuum preceding the arrival of the Ottoman/Islamic wave had made it easier to accept the new faith, especially in the central and eastern parts of the country.

A comprehensive understanding of the Bosnian case of Islamization can be ascertained only by taking into account all the components of the complex of demographic, spiritual, social, and political factors that conditioned and shaped the character of medieval Bosnia. Given its central position in the South Slavic area, at the crossroads

of countries and religions, the structure of the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been formed through a long process of population movements and shifts in religions. This dynamic was accompanied by fluctuating political and church loyalties. The conflict between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, which did not subside in Bosnia and Herzegovina even after it had come under Ottoman rule, contributed to the fragmentation and disorientation of the Slavic Christian people. Neither the Catholic nor the Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina were monolithic or strong enough to provide stable spiritual and moral support for the subjugated Slavic population, as, for example, was the Serbian Orthodox Church in the areas over which it had full religious jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered great losses during the Ottoman conquests, due both to enslavement and to the intensive imposition of the so-called "blood tax" (*devşirme*),[19] as well as from emigration from the border regions. At the same time, peoples of the Balkans who had been Islamized immigrated to Bosnia from Serbia, Macedonia, Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria. Also arriving in Bosnia were many converts to Islam from the Hungarian, Croatian, and Slovenian areas. It is characteristic that, in addition to the places where the Bogomil population had been concentrated earlier, Islamization was particularly pronounced in the regions bordering Christian countries. That was the case with the central areas of the former Bosnian state, which for some time represented the border between the Ottoman Empire and Hungary. Also, the areas in the west of the country around Bihać were extensively Islamized when they became the *limes*, or fortified border zones, after the Great Vienna War (1683–1699). At that time, a large number of Muslims and Turks who had been driven from the Hungarian estates poured into those areas. Finally, it was not until the 19th century, when the Serbian countries of Serbia and Montenegro were emerging, that the parts of eastern Bosnia along the Drina River became largely Muslim, which likely led to the emigration of Christians from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the immigration of Muslims into the region.

Increasingly, Christians began seeking relief from the difficult situation they found themselves by converting to Islam.[20] On the other hand, the mass Islamization of the indigenous population contributed to the progressive assimilation and acculturation, or "Bosniakization" of the descendants of colonized Turks and other Muslim settlers from the east, which was far less pronounced in other regions of the Balkans. Thus, the proportion of Muslims in the population was increasing while the Muslim community was becoming more homogenous. The spreading of Islam among the local population was also stimulated by urbanization, which the Ottoman authorities were systematically advancing. The aim was to establish strong urban centers in the important regions bordering with the west, which would serve as centers of population gravitation and the pillars of lasting stability. The development of Sarajevo and its demographic structure is an example which perfectly illustrates this

tendency. Clearly, a complex set of circumstances contributed to the Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming so widespread and permanent in nature, resulting in approximately 265,000 Muslims, 253,000 Orthodox, and 80,000 Catholics living in the region by the end of the 18th century. To compare, in the 16th century, the number of non-Muslims (predominately Christians) was approximately four times the number of Muslims, but by the end of the 17th century, Muslims constituted a two-thirds majority. Based on Ottoman census tax registries (*defters*) and Western sources, Bosniak researcher Muhamed Hadžijahić created a table with the following approximate changes in ratio between Muslim and Christian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 15th to the 17th century (Hadžijahić, 1990, p, 167):

Period	Muslims	Christians
1468–1469	0.88%	99.12%
1489	15.17%	84.83%
1520–1530	38.7%	61.30%
Late16th century	75%	25%

Within the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a region in which the domestic Muslims, as a result of mass Islamization, grew relatively quickly from a negligible minority into the majority population. That is how Islamization permanently altered the region's religious, ethno-demographic, and cultural map, enabling the youngest monotheistic religion to gain a strong foothold in the Balkans. This process and its nature, particularly whether or not it was inevitable, will be examined further in this chapter, especially with respect to Sarajevo. The following will provide more detailed facts and data that shed more light on the process and help define its nature; that is, whether it can be considered compulsory or not. Special attention will be given to the case of Sarajevo.

As already indicated, the process of Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted from the beginning to the end of the Ottoman rule, i.e., from the second half of the 15th century, and continued into the 19th century, the growth of Islam being most intense during the 16th and 17th centuries. Unlike Christian countries, where the Church organized missionary work, there was no such comparable central institution in the Muslim system and organization of society and state. However, the social order and state structure of the Ottoman Empire possessed all the social, economic, ideological, and political prerequisites for initiating and implementing the process of Islamization. In the Ottoman Empire, all domains of social life and all elements of the religious and the secular were intertwined, which made proselytizing activities more comprehensive and effective, given that they were generated by a kind of "contextual pressure." Many parties were engaged in preaching the benefits of Islam over

Christianity, starting from the *ulama* (a class of Muslim scholars), and the dervishes, who did it most earnestly and convincingly, followed by members of the mystical orders (*tariqa*), administrative and court clerks, and even average Muslims. Clearly, the contention of some Muslim apologists that Islam as such was not characterized by missionary work or proselytizing, is wholly unfounded.

However, the main factors driving Islamization came from the strict division of the population on religious grounds and differences in legal status and real living conditions of Muslims and non-Muslims. According to that general division, Muslims were full subjects of the Empire. In principle, they had guaranteed prerequisites for personal fulfilment in all dimensions of normal life and for social advancement. In contrast, the non-Muslims (Orthodox, Catholics, and Jews) were in a subordinate position. They had the status of "protected" (*zimmi*) and, as such, enjoyed some legal protection with respect to their lives, property, and professions of faith. They were tolerated, but with significant discriminatory restrictions on religious freedom, as well as in political, socio-economic, and cultural aspects of their lives. By converting to Islam, non-Muslims significantly improved their legal status and position in society. Even though a considerable proportion of the Muslim population lived in relative poverty and suffered the burden of social or class inequality in comparison to the privileged military and civil classes of the Ottoman society, it cannot be maintained that Muslims and Christians who had to pay (*reaya*) were in equal subordinate and unfavorable positions. The Muslims, for example, did not pay the head tax (*cizye*),[21] and some other taxes were reduced for them. Furthermore, the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims were also reflected in property law and regulation of clothing and conduct, particularly with respect to contact allowed with the Muslims. Some of those restrictive regulations were extremely degrading.

Among the many factors that influenced the speed and extent of the Islamization process, the most effective ones were economic in nature: the desire to secure a more favorable position in the economy, to obtain protection for one's goods, and to achieve a better position in society overall. Considering such motives, the argument that the individual act of converting to Islam was completely voluntary is something of an illusion (Vasić, 1991, p. 427).[22] True, the decision to convert and the individual act of doing so and the individual act of converting to Islam in many cases were not the result of direct exposure to pressure or violence. However, taking this fact to prove that Islamization was non-violent overlooks the general context of a foreign occupation imposed by military force and maintained by an administrative organization that discriminated against the non-Muslim populations. Therefore, even when an individual voluntarily and upon his or her own initiative decided to convert to Islam, for the sake of personal and family prosperity in certain unfavorable circumstances, the decisions was actually a response to the difficult living conditions endured by

the non-Muslim populations that had been created and imposed under Ottoman rule. It should also be emphasized that Islamization did not always take place in accordance with the *Qur'an* and *sharia* messages that "there is no compulsion in religion." Against the backdrop of historical processes that drove many to convert, numerous coercive means were used, including certain cases where non-Muslim were confronted by cruel intimidation and threats to force them to accept the truth of Allah. Some even lost their lives for refusing to change their religion. In the historical awareness of non-Muslims, Serbs and Croats primarily, Islamization is seen in a very negative light. In contrast, Bosniak Muslims view Islamization mainly as a progressive movement in social and civilizational terms, or even, as an inevitable outcome of the medieval past.

Such differing perceptions of a historically-conditioned apostasy have led to tensions in present-day non-Muslim communities, especially Serb ones, where the descendants of the converts are frequently criticized for "betrayal" of their ancestors, as unjust and unhistorical as that may be. These Muslims of Slavic origin, Bosniaks, have developed an historical memory torn between their adherence to Islam, as the main *differentia specifica* and a defining element of their national identity, on the one hand, and their repressed frustration over abandoning the old religion, on the other. Their position is a typical example of the "neophyte syndrome," a problem common among converts that has withstood the centuries and is promoted and fuelled by new disputes and conflicts.

Apart from the specific demographic, political, social, and religious conditions in pre-Islamic Bosnia, which have been discussed, when considering Islamization in Bosnia, the country's geographical or geostrategic position should always be taken into account. It was a border province from which troops were moved toward Europe, but it also absorbed the attacks that were heading from the direction of Europe toward the Ottoman Empire protectorates in the Balkans. For this reason, the stability of this province was of paramount importance to the central authorities. Among other things, a system of town fortifications with Turkish military crews was created, an effective military-feudal system of troop mobilization and recruitment was established, and a Slavic, predominantly Orthodox element known as Vlachs (*Vlasi*) were used as auxiliary formations, in the military, border, and police services of the Ottoman state (known as *voynuks, martolos*). The Vlachwere originally a nomadic, and then a settled rural population, given a semi-military status and certain privileges which they later lost (1526) when the borders of the Ottoman Empire were moved further west and the internal conditions stabilized. In order to avoid being reduced to the status of the common *reaya*, many Vlachs, farmers and cattle-breeders, converted to Islam, which contributed to the increase in the number of the local Muslim population. This process was particularly intense in Herzegovina.

The leading authorities about the Ottoman past of Bosnia and Herzegovina agree that, together with the feudal system based on property (*timar*), the use of which the Sultan granted to the nobles who were part of the military organization of the Empire (the *timar* system), the towns were the most significant generators of Islamization. As Bosniak Ottomanist Nedim Filipovic, a leading interpreter of the complex phenomenon of Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, related:

The profound change in the nature and the position of towns under the Ottoman rule in Bosnia greatly influenced the Islamization of the urban population. Oriental-Muslim towns were established in place of our towns. Those then continued the classical tradition of Oriental-Muslim cities which commonly represented the lifeblood of the material and spiritual culture of that civilization. The economic role of these towns, based on crafts and trade, rested on the developed formation of trading and moneylender capital and it produced an elaborate sphere of material and spiritual culture. The prerequisite for the emergence and existence of such towns is the existence of vast agrarian regions...those towns were created in convenient locations in the form of junctions of large routes. They served as concentration points and centers of administrative control and economic-governing coordination.

Therefore, under the Turks, in conditions where the state had ownership of the land, such towns were created at the initiative of the state, the sultans, high officials, provincial governors, with the efforts of prominent tenants, craftsmen and merchants...It is natural that the dominant factor in those towns was the Muslim population, and that the Christian population of the conquered towns was eventually Islamised or suppressed into a separate part of the town, called *varoş*, which was a mixture of urban and agrarian economy...

It should also be noted that the towns, once transformed into Oriental-Muslim towns, continued to play a major role in the Islamization of the peasantry in Bosnia, through their economic, cultural, and ideological domination over the subsistent sector of the economy, above all by making the conversion to Islam an indispensable condition for the inhabitants of the villages to come to town and engage equally in crafts and trade, or in the activities of the spiritual and cultural sphere of town (Filipović, 1990, pp. 20–21).

It is possible to use the example of the emergence and development of Sarajevo to paradigmatically consider all the characteristics of Ottoman urbanization in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the role of urban areas in the Islamization of indigenous population.

When the Ottoman conquered Bosnia, there had been a medieval settlement of Tornik, the name of which remained in Turkish sources until 1485, when it was first inscribed as "Pazar Trgovište,[23] known as *saray.*"[24] Thus, there appeared the word *saray* (court, palace), one which would later become the name of the capital city of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is at the site of this settlement of Tornik where Sarajevo would later come to stand. As a typical Oriental-Muslim city, Sarajevo was established just before 1462. That is when the second *sanjak-bey* of Bosnia, Isa-beg Ishaković, erected a mosque and his first endowments, including one *tekke*[25] (a very active center for the spreading of Islam), as well as some other public buildings in what would be the future city center. In the earliest *defter*[26] of the Bosnian Sanjak dating back to 1468, it was recorded that in Trgovište, there were five Muslim households, 65 Christian households, 15 households of unmarried Christian men, and five households of widows. Two hundred and thirty-seven Muslim households were registered in the surrounding villages. In 1485 in Sarajevo, there were 42 Muslim households, 103 Christian households, and eight households of people from Dubrovnik, i.e. 27.45% Muslims and 72.55% Christians. At the same time, in the villages that were part of Sarajevo in both territorial and administrative terms, there were 913 Muslim households, and 1,896 Christian households, 37 of which belonged to unmarried men, which amounts to 33.71% Muslims and 66.83% Christians. The first preserved extensive census conducted in the Bosnian Sanjak is that from 1489. It contains individual data about taxpayers, so it is valuable for determining the origin and population structure of what was then Sarajevo. That year, 82 Muslim households, 89 Christian households, eight of them households of unmarried men, six widows, and two unmarried Muslim men were registered in the town, meaning 43.14% Muslims and 56.86% Christians. At the same time, 1,580 Christian households, 114 of which belonged to unmarried men and 61 to widows, were registered in the villages surrounding Sarajevo, compared to 947 Muslim homes, with 472 unmarried Muslim men, which amounts to 39.88% Muslims and 60.12% Christians. The overall percentage of the Christian population in Sarajevo and the surrounding area was 59.92%, while the Muslims made up 40.08% of the population. The conversion to Islam is evident when it comes to the villages, yet those new Muslims were not settlers. Rather, they were the local indigenous population, almost all of them direct descendants of Christians.

The next preserved list dates back to 1516. In the 25 years since the previous census, Sarajevo had expanded significantly and its population had multiplied. There were now 884 Muslim households, with 336 unmarried Muslim men and 35 widows, while there were 74 Christian households, 15 widows, and 66 households of people from Dubrovnik, totalling 85.59% Muslims and 14.41% Christians. In the surrounding villages, 2,921 Muslim households were registered, 2,254 of them belonging to unmarried Muslim men, which provides evidence that many young people had converted to Islam, while there were 548 Christian households, with two unmarried Christian men and 85 widows, totalling 76.74% Muslims and 23.26% Christians. The cumulative percentage in the immediate and wider area of Sarajevo was 78.56% Mus-

lims and 21.44% Christians. It is evident that the rapid and wide-ranging economic, spiritual, and cultural development of Sarajevo at that time, together with the rise of the Ottoman Empire, with successful military campaigns toward the north (Suleiman the Magnificent's triumph over the Hungarian king's army near Mohács in 1526) and toward the Adriatic, significantly aided in spreading Islam among its residents.

The 1530 census gives particularly dispositive data on the full impetus of Islamization in Sarajevo. Sarajevo had become a city with an absolute Muslim majority, and the surrounding 60 villages were 100% Muslim. There were 1,112 Muslim households registered in the city, compared to only 15 Christian households! There were a total of 93.75% Muslims in Sarajevo and its surrounding area, and only 5.44% Christians. The number of quarters (*mahalas*) had doubled, even though the number of the population had not significantly increased given the background of large-scale military campaigns. The predominant population in the city was the native Slavic Muslim population, which was the result of both the Islamization of local Christians and of the immigration from closer and more distant areas. Over the next decade, 1530–1540, Gazi Husrev-beg developed his powerful *ktetor*[27] activity, resulting in the extraordinary flourishing of Sarajevo as a regional center. The population also increased by about two thousand. The census of 1540 shows that the population in and around Sarajevo consisted of 91.53% Muslims and 8.47% Christians. The conversion of Christians to Islam continued, with contemporary sources providing more information and indicating that the motives for accepting the state religion were mainly pragmatic, aimed at solving some vital problems, predominantly those concerning property. There were also multiple cases where some members of a Christian family would become Muslims while others would remain Christians. Often, members of large families, both those who had converted and those who had not, would continue to live together.

The following census of 1570 depicts Sarajevo as a large Muslim city with 63 Muslim and two Christian quarters. There was a total of 98.04% Muslims and 1.96% Christians. There had been a mass conversion to Islam among the rural population, and in the city itself, more and more Christian family heirs had been converting in order to be able to legally retain their fathers' properties. At the beginning of the seventeenth century (1604), Sarajevo consisted of 91 Muslim neighborhoods with 3,895 Muslim households and 1,534 households of unmarried men, while there was a total of 140 Christian households. Immigration to the city from suburban settlements and surrounding villages continued. It can be stated that by that point, the process of Islamization in Sarajevo was practically completed. The population living in the city was 96.79% Muslim and 3.21% Christian, which is above the average for Bosnia. As a matter of fact, according to fairly reliable information, at the turn of the 16th to 17th century, 70% of the population in Sarajevo was Muslim, while the Muslim

predominance in the Sarajevo *nahiye*[28] was close to 100%. From this point until the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878, there were no significant changes in the demographics of the city, the largest in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Ottoman sources clearly indicate that the population of Sarajevo was ethnically indigenous, not immigrant, which was characteristic of the majority of the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The overwhelming Muslim majority was created through the Islamization of local Christians, so that the ethnic composition of the population did not change significantly while the religious one underwent a radical change. The Bosnian *pashalik,*[29] as a whole, was not subject to mass colonization by the Turks, other than imperial troops that had temporarily stayed in or moved about its territory during their great war campaigns. This fact contributed to the thesis of the existence of a distinctive "Bosnian substructure" within the Ottoman society, "which played an important role during the era when the Ottoman state was weakening, when in Bosnia both the Ottoman political structure and the Bosnian substructure needed defending" (Filipović, 1990, p. 24). That "Bosnian substructure" serves as a diachronic support for the modern-day conception of integral "Bosnianship," i.e. the "political nation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina transcending ethnicity, which was actualized during the time of the Yugoslav crisis and the declaration of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina During the Austro-Hungarian Occupation

2.1. Occupation and Administrative Organization of the Country

Compared to the centuries of Ottoman rule, the Austro-Hungarian four-decades occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was shorter, but nevertheless brought about major changes and left lasting consequences, both internally and in relationships with the surroundings. An extremely organized state with clear strategic goals and well-defined methods of operation in all fields, as well as a functionally organized administrative apparatus, Austria-Hungary operated systematically in Bosnia and Herzegovina in all domains of political, social and economic life. Its priorities included: the comprehensive Europeanization of the backward Ottoman provinces, which was presented as a lofty "civilization mission"; creating a stronger attachment to the new metropolis of Vienna; demographic engineering for the benefit of the Catholic population; the search for a formula for pacifying Muslim Bosniaks and alleviating their aversion to infidel authority; thwarting national ambitions and organizing, primarily

that of Serbs, in the context of hostility toward Serbia and Montenegro; and, finally, distancing Russia and reducing its influence in the Balkans. All these elements for the management of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the manner described, were part of Austria-Hungary's grand strategy for further eastward penetration (*Drang nach Osten*), which needed a stable, secured hinterland in the Balkans. In perspective, the new rulers expected that Bosnia and Herzegovina would enjoy the most favorable position in the expected division of the Rumelian (Balkan) possessions of the Ottoman Empire, whose days were clearly numbered. In carrying out its intentions, Vienna had to act with caution, respecting the complex structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which no ethno-confessional group had an absolute majority.[30]

In a politically and socially unintegrated society, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the regime had to take into account the aspirations of each religious-national group and respect them in accordance to its own interests. As these aspirations showed divergent directions in political and social terms, the Austro-Hungarian administration sought to give them a direction that would ensure social peace and solid positions of the Monarchy in the country, hence the existing religious triangle was used as a starting element in the choice of measures to ensure the stability of the regime. Within that triangle, a balance of forces was maintained and all tendencies that would disrupt it were suppressed and created conditions for the emergence of a single resistance to the occupying power. (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 15)[31]

The reasons for disregarding the possibility of establishing a broad front of disobedience were quite realistic, as two larger groups of natives, Muslim Bosniaks and Orthodox Christian Serbs, each for their own reasons, viewed their subjugation to the authority of a western Catholic state with aversion and fear. For Muslims, subjugation to Christian "infidels" was a tectonic disorder, overthrowing their entire world, so it is not surprising that many chose to emigrate to Turkey. The Serbs feared being converted to Catholicism in the face of aggressive German Catholicism in collaboration with the Vatican. In addition, the Habsburg monarchy was a sworn enemy of their national motherland, Serbia and Montenegro, regardless of King Milan Obrenović's political turn toward Vienna after the *Peace Treaty* of 1878. During the period of the Austro-Hungarian rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were several times when Muslim Bosniaks and Orthodox Christian Serbs, pursuing similar interests, cooperated in certain ways to oppose Vienna's policies. The occupying power endeavoured to thwart such alliances in every possible way, and always succeeded in doing so in the end.

In pursuit of their objectives, Austria-Hungary implemented a series of well-designed projects and measures that included the establishment of civil law and the rule of law, which objectively improved the overall social structure and functioning.

These advances, combined with significant infrastructure developments, especially construction and communications, marked the period of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina as one remembered as a time of civilization awakening, economic progress, and a rapid rapprochement with the West. This assessment was generally shared even by members of those ethnic and religious groups who faced relative discrimination and impediments to their identity and national affirmation, primarily the Serbs and Muslim Bosniaks. Many elderly people from the region who remembered the days of the Austro-Hungarian rule, which was followed by times of great upheaval and uncertainty, used to say that "the best life was lived under Francis Joseph." This applies even to some Serbs who fought as Austro-Hungarian soldiers during the First World War against their compatriots over the Drina River, which did have some indirect consequences in later events in the (future) Yugoslav territory. However, on the whole, the Austro-Hungarian period created a negative historical awareness and memory in the Serbian nations, and, to a less extended in that of the Bosniaks.

Given the necessarily limited scope of this Report, the following pages will provide only a brief overview of the most important political events and social developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1878 to 1914. The focus of the presentation will be on those phenomena that most influenced the shaping of the particular social morphology, ideological trends, political formations and differentiated collective-psychological notion of the members of the three main ethno-religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The project of creating an integrated "Bosnian nation" (Bosnians), that Benjamin Kállay (1839–1903), the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance, and later governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1882 to 1903, was focused on will be analyzed separately. In proposing the concept of the Bosnian nation, Kállay was certainly guided to some extent by the experience of identifying, or corresponding with, the territory and people in the Hungarian political tradition. Although this idea of creating a Bosnian-Herzegovinian political nation failed and was abandoned relatively quickly, because of its re-actualization in the form of Unitarian "neo-Bosnianism" among Bosniaks in the process of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it warrants some attention.

Based on the decisions of the Berlin Congress (1878), which had far-reaching consequences for relations in Europe and the Balkans, Austria-Hungary was granted the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and establish its power there. Article XXV of the *Berlin Treaty* between the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey reads:

> The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be occupied and governed by Austria-Hungary. Since the Austro-Hungarian government does not want

> to take over management in Novopazarski Sandžak (the present Province of Kosovo), which stretches between Serbia and Montenegro in a southeast direction on the other side of Mitrovica, the Ottoman administration will continue to perform its functions there. However, to ensure the maintenance of the new political situation as well as the freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right to keep its garrisons and to use military and commercial routes all over this part of the former Vilayet of Bosnia. For this purpose, the government of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve the right to agree on the details. (*Treaty of Berlin*, 1878)

The aforementioned provisions of the Treaty resulted in the de facto colonization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was ultimately legally and unilaterally sanctioned by the Austro-Hungarian annexation of the region in 1908. It suited Vienna, especially at first, to retain Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate administrative area in order to avoid potentially threatening the dual Austrian-Hungarian character of the Monarchy by integrating a big province with a large Slovene population. Much later in the Austro-Hungarian rule, Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand was in favor of such integration.

Upon assuming power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary sent troops to the area, believing that not many would be needed to assume power and introduce a new order, but they soon realized that more divisions were indeed called for. According to the so-called *Istanbul Convention of 1879* between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Sultan's rights over the former Ottoman province, but now *de facto* occupied territory, would remain intact. The Sultan's name was still glorified in the mosques and Ottoman flags continued to be displayed. The existing social system was also nominally preserved. Furthermore, it was determined that the revenues in Bosnian and Herzegovina could be used exclusively for local purposes, that the Ottoman money would remain in use, that the officials of the old administration, if qualified, would remain in service, that only local citizens could take their places, and, finally, that all three religions would be completely free to practice according to their traditions.

However, already in 1879 and 1880, Vienna enacted laws violating the main obligations it had undertaken under the *Istanbul Convention*. New laws halted the use of the Ottoman currency, Bosnia and Herzegovina became included in the Austrian-Hungarian customs zone, and the region's inhabitants were declared subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Basic Law on the Administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1880) set forth all the main principles for governing the area, and these principles remained substantially intact until the end of Austro-Hungarian rule. The

Supreme Executive authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina was entrusted to the Joint Ministry of Finance. It, as the Provincial Government, administered on behalf of both components of the Monarchy, guaranteeing a balance between the interests of Vienna and Pest. In the following year, 1881, a military law was also enacted, according to which conscripts from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were obliged to serve outside their home country if required. The introduction of this military conscription provoked strong indignation among the domestic population and was the cause of open rebellion. With the first appearance of hints of imminent occupation, in June 1878, in Sarajevo, at a gathering of eminent Muslims fearing that the Sultan would betray Bosnia, a People's Committee was formed with representatives of all the religious communities in order to organize for the removal of the Ottoman officials, and in order to prepare joint resistance to the threatening Austro-Hungarian occupation. Muslims had a key role in organizing the action, but important, symbolically, and to some extent practically, Serb representatives also took part in the People's Committee. The scholar Draga Mastilović (2019–2020) describes the following:

> When the information about Berlin Congress decisions came on July 5th the chaos reigned in Sarajevo. The merchants shut down shops, Muslim population began arming and preparing for resistance, and they chose as their leader Hadži Lojo, the same who tried to incite Muslim masses and prevent the construction of a new Orthodox church in Sarajevo fifteen years before that. The Christian population of Sarajevo was engulfed by fear, especially when they were forced to active participation in the preparation of armed resistance to the Austro-Hungarian army. (Mandić, 1910, p. 26)

During the month of July 1878, the Muslim population was actively preparing for armed resistance to the Austro-Hungarian occupation, the Orthodox were also agitating against the occupation, but cautiously and secretly, while the Catholics and the Jews were passive (Skarić, 1937, p. 289). Before the occupation began, the rebels in Sarajevo seized power, arrested the last representatives of the Ottoman authorities and then expelled them. A committee of Sarajevo citizens, calling themselves a people's government, seized power. Some of the most prominent Serb citizens in Sarajevo were on the executive board of this governing body. However, the question is whether these representatives of the Serb people at the time had any influence on this governing committee or whether their presence there was more aimed at protecting their lives and property from Muslim masses angered by the Christian occupation of their country, whom the Serb citizens may have feared as a threat to their lives and property. Indeed, the Serb representatives in that People's Committee did not dare to voice opposition even when the Committee decided that *sharia* was the only law

in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notwithstanding that this decision deprived the Serbs of their political and civil rights (Mastilović, 2019–2020, pp.42–43).

Volunteer forces, about 90,000 fighters, who opposed the Austro-Hungarian troops resisted the overwhelming strength of their occupiers for about three months, and the Austrians required nearly 300,000 troops and considerable equipment and prowess to finally break the resistance. Although there was by far a majority of Muslim Bosniaks within Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs also joined their efforts, making this brief defensive action one of the few examples of Bosniak-Serb patriotic cooperation for the sake of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Imamović, 1998, p. 352). The following is an assessment of Serb participation reported by Draga Mastilović:

> There is no doubt that a number of Sarajevo Serbs have actively engaged in the fight against the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, considering Austria-Hungary a new occupier, which was only replacing the Ottoman Empire and preventing liberation and unification of the entire Serb nation. However, the question is how many of these Serb volunteers gathered by Stevo Petranović to fight the Austro-Hungarian army were really ready to fight against the new occupier, and for the survival of the former occupier and the privileges of the Muslims part of the people, which have been enjoyed for centuries at the expense of Christians. (Mastilović, 2019–2020, p. 44)

Muslims and Serbs rebelled against occupation authorities once again in 1882 in Herzegovina, where memories were still fresh of the great uprising of 1875–1876, and additional discontent was triggered by the introduction of new taxes and duties for the poorest, predominantly peasant population, as well as the mentioned law on compulsory military service of all subjects of the Monarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although lacking any help from the outside and very quickly suppressed, this uprising of Muslim Bosniaks and Orthodox Christians/Serbs, who even established a joint command, detachment and administration, caused a serious government crisis in Vienna and the resignation of the former joint finance minister responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, even the possibility of giving up the occupation of the "wild Bosnian land" was mentioned. The authorities in Vienna soon came to realize that agrarian relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be regulated more even-handedly, that the burden of the taxation system inherited from the Ottoman Empire should be reduced, and that more consideration should be given to religious issues, while respecting the rights of all churches and religious communities and their followers, with regard to both freedom of religious beliefs and catechism and to the unhindered disposal of property and endowments. Different opinions were voiced over what measures should be taken. The uncertainty and controversy ended with the decision to send a senior Crown official, the former Consul in Belgrade, an historian

and outstanding expert on Balkans, a polyglot, capable, realistic and enterprising Hungarian politician, the already mentioned Benjamin Kàllay, as the new civilian administrator in Sarajevo. The period of his management left a visible and lasting mark on all aspects of the social and political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Herzegovinian uprising was also a lesson in how dissatisfied subjects should organize themselves for effective resistance to Austro-Hungarian rule:

> The failure of the uprising in 1882 was a clear sign that the new occupier was far more perfidious than the Turks and that the far-reaching and profound consequences of its 'political and cultural' missions in the Balkans, can no longer be opposed with the method of uprisings. Therefore, the leadership of the people was gradually being taken over by Serb citizenry with its methods of long and persistent economic and cultural-educational national struggle. (Mastilović, 2019–2020, p. 56)

The same applies, in essence, to Muslim Bosniaks. They continued to fight for the preservation of religious, educational and property rights in a "civil" way, by organizing into pressure groups and committees and addressing the Provincial Government and Vienna. In this sense, it can be said that a strong occupation regime, efficient administration and organization of society on contemporary legal and political grounds created new, "European" forms and ways of acting in the public space of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.2. Kállay's Administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Ottomans had sought to apply new legal measures and organizational forms in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the modernization reforms that started in 1839 (the so-called *Tanzimat*), although they encountered major obstacles in doing so. On the one hand, the privileged layer of Muslim society, owners of feudal land and other privileges, provided fierce resistance, while on the other hand, the provincial administration suffered from a high degree of corruption, negligence and irresponsibility. With the arrival of Austria-Hungary, this situation changed radically. The Monarchy was an exceptionally well-organized state, with an efficient and disciplined army of clerks and gendarmerie, which meant that all state affairs were carried out conscientiously and meticulously. The occupying authorities could not, nor did they want to, rely on the local, professionally incompetent Muslim population to conduct the civil service. They did not even trust the local Croats, which meant that the bureaucratic

apparatus was filled mostly with outsiders from the Monarchy, together with only a limited, small number of local loyal Serbs. "Out of all the clerks in Bosnia in Herzegovina in 1904, there were only 26.48% of local people. Most of them were Catholics. Only three percent of clerks were Serbs, and five percent were Muslims" (Božić, Ćirković and Dedijer, 1973, p. 362). The immigration of a large number of officials and experts from Austria-Hungary (mainly Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Poland) gradually influenced the changes in the demographic structure of the population, especially in towns. The Provincial Government did not stop there either. Even the peasantry was immigrating according to the plan, albeit in limited numbers. The Serbian historian Milorad Ekmečić wrote that

> It is estimated that 180,000 to 200,000 people were inhabited by 1914, with a constant emigration of the local population (about 140,000 people). The colonists initially settled on the free lands, but there were attempts to use them in building an ethnic wall along the river Drina and in Krajina, which was meant to break the Serb ethnic continuity. Due to immigration, the percentage of Catholics in society rose from 18.08% in 1879 to 22.87% in 1910. The percentage of the Muslims dropped significantly from 38.73% to 32.25% due to emigration, while the Orthodox, thanks to the stability of natural growth, and in spite of emigration, slightly increased their numbers from 42.88% to 43.49% of the entire Bosnian population. When it comes to the Muslims, most of those who left the country were peasants, because they found it too difficult to fit into the new system. (Ibid., p. 325)

This is how the "new inducted realities" reflected on the population structure in Sarajevo during the Austro-Hungarian administration:

> According to the 1910 census, the last one conducted by the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the town of Sarajevo that year had the population of 51,919 people. Out of that number, by religion, there were 8,450 Orthodox Christians (16.27%), 18,460 Muslims (35.55%), 17,992 Roman Catholics (34.65%), 114 Greek Catholics (0.21%), 6,397 Jews (Sephardi and others) (12.32%), 547 evangelists (1.05%) and 29 others (0.05%). That year in Sarajevo, apart from the civilian population mentioned, there were also 5,120 soldiers. If we compare this data with the results of the 1879 census, it is easy to see that the population of Sarajevo has more than doubled during the thirty years of Austro-Hungarian rule. It is obvious that the city underwent dramatic changes during that period, from a drastic change in architecture, which now took on an increasingly European character, to the number and religious affiliation of the populace. What demographic changes Sarajevo experienced during this period can best be seen by comparing the numbers and religious affiliation of the population in 1879 and 1910.

Table 2. Population by religion in Sarajevo in 1879 and 1910

Sarajevo (town)	Orthodox Christians	Muslims	Catholics	Jews	Other
Year 1879	3,747	14,848	698	2,077	7
Year 1910	8,450	18,460	17,992	6,397	0

Demographic changes in Sarajevo, during the thirty years of the Austro-Hungarian administration, are even more evident when comparing the percentage of population by confessional affiliation in 1879 and 1910:

Table 3. Percentage of population by religion in the town of Sarajevo in 1879 and 1910

Sarajevo (town)	Orthodox Christians	Muslims	Catholics	Jews	Other
Year 1879	17.52%	69.45%	3.26%	9.71%	0.03%
Year 1910	16.27%	35.55%	34.65%	12.32%	1.10%

From the above tables it can be seen that in three decades of the Austro-Hungarian governance, the percentage of the Orthodox and Muslim population in Sarajevo had declined, and the percentage of the Muslim population in comparison to 1879 has declined drastically. On the other hand, during that period, the Catholic population increased by an incredible 25 times, which enabled them to make up more than a third of the population of the town of Sarajevo within three decades, from a nearly negligible percentage of the total population in 1879. Between 1879 and 1910, the Jewish population in the town of Sarajevo increased significantly (Mastilović, 2019–2020, pp. 49–50).

As can be seen from the previous figures, the Orthodox Christians/Serbs still represented the relative majority of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in no way suited the occupation authorities' plans. Consequently, they sought to slow down and thwart the development of Serb national awareness, as well as the economic and cultural advancement of Serb citizens, through various discriminatory measures and pressures. Although the vast majority (93%) of Serbs lived in rural areas, it is indicative that in the early 20th century, 17 of the 19 richest people in Sarajevo were Serbs (Bataković [ed.], 2005, p. 231). Serb traders and entrepreneurs were, by and large, more adaptable than their Croat and Muslim compatriots, and made better use of the changed circumstances and the beginnings of capitalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Famous left-wing activist and Marxist theorist Veselin Masleša (1906–1943) put it concisely:

> Muslim begs and Croat citizens did not keep up with the Serb traders. *Begs* and *aghas* were cracking their *hak* (property belonging to them from ancient times). Croats, living more in places that did not represent larger trading centres, were more employed in the state administration and in crafts, but some, however, in relatively small number in relation followed the path of the Serbs. Thus, the Serbs were able to invest all their energy into collecting all the crumbs from the rich colonial table of foreign private and state capital, which were, at that time, quite large for the poor Serb traders. (Masleša, 1945, p. 63)

Masleša's assessment, although made long ago, has essentially lost nothing of its relevance: Serbs were the most propulsive community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the maneuvering space provided by colonial economic policy, which focused on the exploitation of the occupied country and of its resources, was relatively small, but it did exist ("crumbs"). It is worth noting that the emancipation of the Serb merchant and entrepreneurial classes had already started back in the final decades of the Ottoman rule.

The construction of railways and roads introduced mobility and business dynamics across the wider area to the population, which had previously not existed. In addition, the context and instruments of the rule of law, however rigid and hostile, especially toward the Serbs, guaranteed compliance with the law and the establishment of a stable economic environment. These factors favored the development of domestic entrepreneurship. More serious industrialization of Bosnia and Herzegovina began during the Austro-Hungarian period, as well as communications connections between different parts of the country, aided by the new transportation infrastructure and the introduction of the practice of building facilities in towns on the basis of urban plans. Austria-Hungary, which had no overseas colonies, experienced and treated the occupation and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an admission into the colonial powers club, and treated the occupied country and all its resources, especially forests and various mineral ores, as the basis for strengthening its own economic strength. However, not everyone in power in Vienna shared such a unilateral and simplified colonial view about how to position themselves toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of those who believed that, in the interests of successfully managing the new province and ensuring its social stability, a more constructive approach should be designed and implemented, was Benjamin Kàllay himself. He believed that only a reasonable measure of meeting the needs and interests of the domestic population and raising the overall living standard in Bosnia and Herzegovina could ensure Austria-Hungary's ability to create a reliable base for the implementation of its eastern policy, both on the local level and on the territorial level.

Therefore, when Kàllay came to Sarajevo, he began to realize his plan of strengthening the economic structure of the country. Despite facing many internal and external limitations, he was inventive and persistent in his efforts. The speed with which his reforms were implemented was largely determined by the general backwardness and inertia of the Ottoman model of Bosnian society. His reform efforts were also affected by financial limitations, especially concerning available investment funds, as well as the legal provision that all state expenses in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be covered by funds originating within its borders, without donations from Vienna. This latter provision became particularly problematic due to the cumbersome nature of the administration in the province. Comparative data are cited in the literature, according to which the Ottoman Empire had about 120 civil servants at the time of leaving Bosnia in 1878, while the Habsburg Monarchy in 1881 already had about 600, in 1897 about 7,000 civil servants, and in 1908, over 9,500 officials of different ranks (Pinson, [ed.], 1994, pp. 118–19). This bureaucracy placed an enormous drain on the budget, which was not easy to cover from the existing sources of revenue within the country. Although the reduction of taxes and other levies could have had a stimulating and positive effect on the population, they were out of the question. Kàllay was trying to devise various ways to raise the necessary funds for investments, especially for improving the transportation infrastructure, as well as initiating some industrialization, but the lack of the necessary financial resources was a chronic problem during his governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This unenviable state of affairs also placed a burden on the agricultural sector. It could be expected that the industrially developed northern parts of the Monarchy would turn to the predominantly agricultural, newly occupied territory to meet their agricultural needs, thereby leading to dynamic agricultural development and agricultural production improvement. However, this did not occur, and agriculture remained visibly stagnant (Ibid, pp. 114–15). There were several factors that contributed to this lack of agricultural progress, ranging from the absence of technological advancement in agriculture, the prevalence of small estates, relatively complicated transportation of agricultural goods to the larger commercial and consumer centers, and the scarcity of financial support afforded to agricultural workers. Since most of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was engaged in agriculture and lived in rural areas, the problems of the agricultural sector, as well as the widespread dissatisfaction of the peasantry, especially both Christian and Muslim indentured serfs (*kmetovi*) dependent on large landowners, created social tensions that occasionally got out of control and turned into smaller or greater rebellions against the authorities.

The state government endeavored to help by opening up local banks and financing agrarian production, but these moves were insufficient and uncertain. The banking market was unstable, while banking resources from other parts of the Mon-

archy remained largely unavailable for more serious undertakings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The problem of overwhelming debt of dependent peasants (serfs) was aggravated by the religious aspect of this phenomenon. Namely, the serf population, in large part, consisted of Christian peasants, while the owners of the land they cultivated and to which they had debt obligations were mostly Muslim *aghas* and *begs*, a hierarchy remaining from the Ottoman Era. The serfs expected that the arrival of a Christian government would either abolish this hierarchy or regulate it in a way more acceptable to them. However, their hopes were not realized, so serfs increasingly stopped fulfilling their obligations, causing landowners to start complaining to the occupying authorities. This created a vicious circle of sorts, which would, for the remainder of Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, define the relationship between the government, the Muslim landowners and the subordinated peasants, later represented by local political parties with a nationalist, that is, religious orientation. In this political game with ever-changing stakes, the government strived to avoid radical expropriation from members of the Muslim *bey* caste, in order to ensure their cooperativeness, and the national parties' strategies would usually reflect the changing political circumstances, but weres also closer to the interests of their leaderships. However, the animosity of the peasants, even Christians, toward Austria-Hungary was, in general, increasing. At the same time, the existing gap deepened between Serb Orthodox Christians and Bosniak Muslims, because non-Muslims were, objectively speaking, still socially discriminated against.

Overall, to understand the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Austro-Hungarian governance, it is essential to examine and analyze the dimension of multidirectional interaction between the occupying authorities and the three major religious groups, as well as the relationship between the Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Catholics, as expressed in several important areas of social and political life.

2.3. Kállay's Regime and the Catholic Church

Since the moment Napoleon called Austria "the geographic enemy of Serbia" at the beginning of the 19th century, and when it became increasingly entrenched in the thinking of the great powers that Austria's role, in the pan-European interest, should be to penetrate the southeast and stop the Russian influence on Serbs and other southern European Slavs, Vienna declared its imperial *Drang nach Osten* foreign policy doctrine. The Catholic Church played a key role in this policy. Habsburg Foreign Minister Beust (1866–1871) believed that "the Catholic Church and the Monarchy are two sisters that must provide for each other," and, therefore, "the Church needs

the restoration and power of Austria," (Ekmečić, 1999, p. 99) and, with regard to foreign policy, advised his successor Andrássy (1871–1879) to turn to the east and win over the peoples under the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The decisions made at the Berlin Congress, as well as the permission granted to Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, represented the operationalization of such a "division of competencies" in the "European concert of powers." Finding the optimal formula for relations with the three major religious communities in the country — Orthodox, Muslims, and Catholics — was an important component in the organization and implementation of the occupying power. This attitude toward the religious sphere was, therefore, overwhelmingly dominated by political motivations, although, especially toward Muslims, it also represented part of the Austro-Hungarian "civilization mission" in the Balkans. Given the range of circumstances surrounding the specificities of each case, the approaches to the religious communities varied. It was of utmost importance to regulate their status in a way that would most suit the colonial interests of the Monarchy.

Being a Catholic state, Austria-Hungary, from the very beginning of its governance over Bosnia and Herzegovina, took concrete steps to strengthen the position of the Catholic Church in the country. An unavoidable partner in doing so was the Holy See, with which Vienna reached an agreement in June of 1881 on the establishment and organization of a regular hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had not previously existed. Even though the Vatican had achieved some influence over the Catholic population and its local organization through the activities of neighboring Catholic countries, even during the Ottoman period, this was far from enough for the Church. The Franciscan monastic order was the only one firmly established and connected to the faithful in Bosnia since the fourteenth century (*Bosna Argentina*, or Province of Bosnia Srebrena). However, the papacy was skeptical about the Franciscans' dogmatic rigor and theological competence, especially given the spiritual legacy of Bogomilism which had been deeply rooted in the people. Through the agreement with Rome, Austria-Hungary essentially put the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina under full state control, and the Holy See was pleased that its regular and strictly hierarchical structure was also established in this Slavic country. The Vatican hoped that through the implementation of this agreement and through the activities of the Church, it would be able to relativize the provisions of their agreement with the Austro-Hungarian authorities that less suited them. This ushered in a period characterized by unique and frequently contradictory dynamics of cooperation between the Provincial Government and the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which characterized virtually the entire period of the Austro-Hungarian rule.

The fact is that, beyond all doubt, Austria-Hungary and the Catholic Church were allies, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they worked together to implement the same macropolitical and civilizational program. What they differed in, so to speak, were the tactics. Namely, local state authorities were more inclined to solve the problems created by the rather intrusive actions of the Catholic Church through compromise. Faced with problems in implementing certain measures in the field, the authorities had to be more pragmatic and take into account the sensitivities and responses of all religious, ethnic and social groups, and sections of the general population. In contrast, Archbishop Josip Stadler (1843–1918), the head of the Catholic Church in Bosnia for 37 years, had a very proactive and maximalist stance regarding the tasks of the Catholic mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stadler was Slavonian by birth and was first educated at Franciscan seminaries and schools, so he was well-acquainted with the nature of that order. Having studied and received his doctorate at the Jesuit Gregorian University in Rome, he was extraordinarily well educated theologically and philosophically. However, he was rigid about social issues and sympathetic to aggressive proselytism, Pope Leo XIII's unionist campaign, and the idea of a Greater Croatia. Even though he was not a member of the order himself, he brought in a large number of Jesuits to Bosnia and Herzegovina, who worked diligently and skillfully on evangelization and Catholic propaganda. Through his actions, Stadler produced created significant problems for the local Provincial Government, and the authorities in Vienna were not completely pleased with his actions. Tomo Vukšić, an expert on Archbishop Stadler describes the tensions between the Archbishop and the authorities well:

> Due to his public advocacy of the idea of creating a state of Croatia within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which would include Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was liked by the Croats, but resented by the Serbs, as well as the official policy of the Monarchy, especially the Hungarians. In this constellation of power relations, Stadler could not pass as a candidate for the position of Archbishop of Zagreb, even though Pope Leo XIII himself wanted him in that position: Emperor Franz Joseph even publicly reprimanded him for his political views on the creation of a Croatian state. On the other hand, the Orthodox Serbs did not accept any sort of idea regarding either the creation of the Croatian state or the unification of the churches, which Stadler was very interested in, even founding the unifying magazine *Balkan* (1896–1902). (Vukšić, 1999, p. 35)

Even though the Franciscans welcomed Bosnia and Herzegovina's subjugation to the rule of the Catholic Monarchy with great joy and expectations, the formation of a regular Church hierarchy, and particularly the request that the administration of as

many Catholic parishes as possible be controlled by Stadler's Church administration, provoked anxiety and aversion in them. With the mediation of the Vatican and Kállay's activities in the background, a tentative agreement was finally reached at the end of 1883, whereby the Archbishop was granted 35 parishes, while the remaining parishes continued to be Franciscan. Even so, Stadler and the Franciscans had their disputes for various reasons. Even though Kállay, in his negotiations with the Vatican, sought to acknowledge the importance of the Franciscans in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to meet the worries and demands of this order in a reassuring manner, the occupying authorities found ways to formalize their control over the Franciscans as well.

The agreement with the Holy See stipulated that the archbishops and bishops in the province should be appointed by the Emperor himself, after the Vatican had given their opinion on the matter, while the local Provincial Government took on the obligation to support the representatives of the high church hierarchy, thereby essentially making them existentially dependent on the local state budget. In turn:

> The occupation has created the necessary conditions for a strong take-off in building the institutions of the Catholic Church. This was affected favorably by two circumstances. One is that Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the Monarchy, integrated itself into the Catholic world, and the other is that the Monarchy, as a Catholic state, was directly interested in strengthening the Catholic Church in an area oriented towards Orthodoxy and in direct contact with Islam. Hence, the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina receives a wealth of material support from both the State and Catholic corporations and institutions, including prominent individuals. Financial aid comes not only from Austria-Hungary but also from other Catholic countries in Europe. (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 313)

It is clear, and perfectly logical, that under the Austro-Hungarian occupation, the position of the Catholic Church, and therefore of its faithful, was privileged over the other two religious groups, Orthodox and Muslim, and their respective religious institutions. In a material way, this is also evident from the comparative statistics on the relative allocation of funds from the Provincial Government's budget for religious purposes. According to official reports, Kraljačić states that

> In 1883, a total of 162,503 forints were spent from the State's budget for religious purposes, of which 88,878 forints, or just over half, was spent on the Catholic Church. This was in such sharp contrast to the proportional assignment of funds that even Kállay himself claimed that it was difficult to find a similar case of such a privileged position of a religious community in any other country.

> Such assignment of funds was later shifted to the detriment of the Catholic Church, but it still received the most funding until the end of Kállay's administration, taking into account the number of the faithful. From 1878 to 1900, a total of 10,919,982 crowns was spent from State resources for religious purposes. Of that 4,019,915 crowns or 36.8%, was spent on the needs of the Catholic Church. This far surpassed the proportional participation of the Catholic population in the total population of the country, so the Provincial Government was right in claiming that, given the number of the faithful, the Catholic Church receives almost twice as much funding as other religious communities. (Ibid.)

Such privileged material conditions ensured the continued strengthening of the Catholic Church and of the entire Catholic population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were clearly an objective and important factor in the national rise of the Croats, although they were never formally insisted upon.

Significant progress was made in all areas of importance to the life of the Catholic Church and its faithful. Many churches, monasteries, and other sacral objects were built or rebuilt, as well as those that served the Archdiocese of Vrhbosna as auxiliary objects. Catholic propaganda in society was strengthened and intensified, and the network of Catholic educational institutions significantly expanded, both those under Stadler's patronage and Franciscan ones. There were also several Catholic newspapers, the contents and tone of which were censored by the State censorship, as the papers were often prone to expressing religious intolerance and aggressive proselytism. In general, the local Provincial Government systematically sought to relax the provocative rhetoric to which, despite his Jesuit education, Archbishop Stadler himself was inclined. For example, in 1883, the State authorities stopped a broader public distribution of a part of the text of a response Stadler had written in protest to a circular issued by Orthodox Metropolitan Sava Kosanović against inappropriate Catholic propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deeming Stadler's response as contributing to the spread of religious intolerance. In suppressing some of Stadler's writings, Kállay also had a small amount of support from the Vatican, although the Archbishop was essentially reflecting the goals of the Holy See, especially regarding the extremely delicate issue of propagating work to unite all Christians under the Pope's supreme jurisdiction, which was one of the priorities of Pope Leo XIII. For a number of rational reasons, such a union of all Catholics did not suit the monarchy, and Kállay openly declared that there was no realistic prospect for the success of such unification in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that intensifying efforts to create such a union would inevitably deepen even further an already deep inter-confessional gap. It is a known fact that active, "ideological" unification in the Monarchy was forbidden by the decree of Emperor Ferdinand I in 1841, and in 1849, the issue of religious

conversion was regulated by law. The Pope thought otherwise, and when he thought it necessary, he opposed this directive cautiously but decisively. Kállay even tried to get Stadler removed from Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit unsuccessfully.

The first public earthquake over the attempted unification occurred as early as 1881, when Metropolitan Sava Kosanović informed the Austro-Hungarian Minister, the Government of Serbia and the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church that a local Provincial Government official had offered him a large sum of money to bring his faithful into a union with the Roman Pope (Kruševac, 1960, pp. 249–50). General discrimination, with members of the Catholic Church seen as "upper-class citizens," caused dissatisfaction among the Orthodox and Muslim populations, but they nonetheless considered it a necessary evil given that the Monarchy was a Catholic state. Open and concrete attacks on religious identity and freedom, as well as on the property of religious communities, provoked public protests and the organization of movements to oppose Austro-Hungarian policies, particularly moves to baptize Muslims and, to a lesser extent, to convert the Orthodox. Violent conversions or conversions under pressure were experienced as very painful and, as a rule, caused violent reactions from those affected by them.

Anticipating the possible adverse development of events in this sensitive area, in 1879, the Provincial Government issued a decree stating their neutral stance regarding the issue of conversion from one faith to another, considering this a matter within the exclusive competence of the Church. However, as complaints over Catholic priests' aggressive proselytizing behavior multiplied, the authorities were unwillingly forced to intervene in cases where public order and peace were threatened. Stadler was not satisfied with the way the Kállay administration treated the conversions, causing Stadler to write a complaint to the Emperor in 1884, which was evidence that there was indeed a serious dispute between religious and civilian authorities in the country. Kállay tried not to add fuel to the fire, but he made it clear to Vienna that aggressive proselytism, and not evangelistic action itself, carried serious risks to the image of the Monarchy and the Provincial Government in the non-Catholic, majority population, which could potentially cause more serious challenges.

As violent conversions continued to occur and the anger of the Muslims turned into an organized revolt and a collective protest aimed at Kállay, with a demand to decisively intervene and prevent the reckless behavior of Catholic priests, the Provincial Government decided to issue a special, elaborate *Conversion Order*. This *Order* regulated in detail the process of conversion through several stages and checks, in which the civil authority played a significant role. The aim was to prevent any violent conversions from one faith to another. The Order was general in character and governed conversion as a whole, but it was clear to everyone that it was practically related

to receiving the Catholic faith, since other conversions happened only in exceptional cases. Because the provisions of the Order seriously impeded the conversion process, the Catholic clergy did not accept it, deeming it coercive interference of the state in the spiritual and canonical jurisdiction of the Church. Following difficult negotiations between Kállay and Stadler, and with the blessing of the Pope, the implementation of the *Order* regarding the procedure of converting to Catholicism was amended in 1893 by the adoption of internal instructions, but the problem was not definitively resolved. Reports of violations of regulation by Catholic priests continued to be made. Some of these violations alarmed the Muslim community and provided some fuel for the rise of a broader Muslim autonomist movement. This presented a serious challenge for the Provincial Government, making it more determined to stop the problematic conversions. However, the Provincial Government failed to permanently stop these conversions. Stadler had the protection of the Vatican and the support of the cleric-nationalistic wing of Croatian bishops, so all attempts to remove him from Sarajevo failed. Kállay hesitated to openly confront the ambitious and stubborn archbishop, although his proselytizing actions created serious difficulties for him. As a result, Kállay was accused by the disgruntled Muslims and Orthodox of favoring the Catholic element and of being in alliance with Stadler. Caught between two fires, Kállay managed as well as he could.

Even after Kállay's death, the dispute over aggressive Catholic proselytism did not cease until the end of the Austro-Hungarian rule. It should be noted that, in relation to the intensity of the debates and conflicts that it had caused, the actual success of conversion of people of another faith to Catholicism, primarily Muslims, yielded rather modest results, in accordance with Kállay's skeptical predictions. According to official records from the State Administration, only 50 people converted to the Catholic faith from 1878 to 1900 (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 329), reflecting the strong resistance in the Muslim and Orthodox communities. This fact, too, confirms the statement that in Bosnia and Herzegovina "everything that made up life bore the stamp of religion on itself" and that, among peoples that objectively had the same origin and spoke the same language, "religious affiliation was so deep and so far-reaching that differences between the three religious groups were more pronounced than differences between races in the racially mixed societies of the Western world[32] (Ekmečić, 1999, p. 395).

2.4. The Kállay Administration's Attitude Toward Orthodoxy

In general, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had a negative attitude toward Orthodoxy. It considered the Orthodox Church to be one of the main current issues, and especially potential threats regarding its plans in the Balkans. Vienna believed that a

Serbian national movement could emerge from the church circles and activities centered around the church. It saw Serbia as serving as the matrix of such a movement, providing support and guidance so that it would become the gathering center of all Serbs in the region, and subsequently all southern Slavs from the territories of the Monarchy. This is why placing control over the governance and institutions of the Orthodox Church was considered a priority, even more than regulating relations with Catholics and Muslims. The occupying authorities considered this issue a political one *par excellence*, while the Vatican's ambitions in the context of a general Catholic mission and the realization of the dream of a union of all Christians with the Pope as their leader also lurked in the background. It was clear to the new administration that full power could not be exercised in Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as the Orthodox metropolitans or diocesan bishops, "were in the sphere of sovereignty of another country and another ruler, i.e., as long as they were subordinate to the Church outside the Vienna's sphere of influence because the plan was to use the Church governance to exert the strongest influence over the Serb people" (Šoljević, 1999, p.119). It is a known fact that the Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina was under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, while the election of metropolitans among Greek clergy was confirmed by the Sultan via decree. The authorities in Vienna considered bringing the Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Karlovci, which was located in the territory of the Monarchy but was not recognized as a patriarchate by the Patriarchate of Constantinople.[33] Since this idea failed, Austro-Hungarian diplomatic efforts, with the significant involvement of the future civilian administrator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Benjámin Kállay, embarked immediately on negotiations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As early as March 1880, the negotiations gave rise to a Convention (Concordat) that thoroughly and permanently established the principles of the triangular relationship between the occupying power, the Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The essential change from the status quo related to the election of metropolitans, as, under the Convention, the metropolitans were to be elected and appointed by the Emperor rather than by the Patriarch, who would be informed about the name of the elected but could not influence the Emperor's decision (Madžar, 1982, pp. 158–59). Through the same procedure, the Emperor could also dismiss metropolitans who were deemed not to have performed their duties in accordance with state expectations. By taking over the financial support of the highest Orthodox Church governance, as well as by paying for the Patriarchs' Authority in Bosnia, the Monarchy ensured the material dependence of the leaders of the Orthodox Church on the state budget as well. This could actually be considered a kind of non-canonical, practical autonomy of the Orthodox Church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Monarchy

approached the Muslim community in a similar fashion in an effort to separate it from its traditional spiritual center of Istanbul, at least organizationally.

The Provincial Government immediately began to implement the provisions of the Convention. For the government, it was particularly important to quickly remove the Greek/Fanar metropolitans, as they did not have good relationships with the native clergy and the faithful, and replace them with Serbian church governors. By making these governors civil servants, the government could count on their loyalty and was able to assign them the task of implementing government policies among the faithful. To a great extent, the government was successful in this endeavor, often alienating some metropolitans from the faithful. However, not all metropolitans always and in all respects acted in accordance with the instructions and expectations of the occupying authorities. Such individuals would be replaced or forced to withdraw, the latter being much more painless procedurally. The first newly appointed metropolitan, a distinguished religious teacher and respected archimandrite, Sava Kosanović, experienced such a fate (1885). Shortly after taking office, he was forced to step down due to a vigorous protest he registered against aggressive Catholic proselytism, which was causing great discontent among clergy and Orthodox believers. Even the Patriarch of Constantinople tried to stand up for Kosanović, but the Patriarch's efforts were unsuccessful.

The Austro-Hungarian administration was methodical in its implementation of the plan to train and model the overall structure of the Orthodox Church and local clergy for the role they were supposed to play in attracting the Orthodox Serbs to a monarchical "reason of State" (*raison d'état*). A Faculty of Theology (1882) opened in Sarajevo, which was soon relocated to a building with a boarding school especially built for that purpose in nearby Reljevo. The attitude toward the Faculty of Theology in Reljevo was paradigmatic for the ways and forms of control exercised by the Austro-Hungarian administration over Orthodox education:

> The State Government controlled and directed the Faculty (poorly and inappropriately officially named "Eastern Orthodox Priesthood Seminary") and its work since its foundation. The school was supported by the State Government, and the enrollment of candidates from three metropolitan areas was not allowed without the Government's approval for each individual candidate. The State Government prescribed the school curricula, appointed the Head of the Faculty, while the professors were appointed by the joint Ministry of Finance in Vienna. Not only textbooks from Belgrade, but also books from Serbia and Russia were banned. We note that the State Government wanted to remove the liturgical books printed in Serbia and Russia, so they began printing them in Sarajevo (with prayers for the Emperor and King Franz Joseph). Candidates

> who were members of national societies or deemed politically ineligible were not allowed to enroll, while offenses committed by the students were often punished by exclusion from Faculty. (Šoljević, 2015, pp. 127–28)

Metropolitan Kosanović seriously objected to the curriculum of the Seminary, demanding that the language of teaching be called "Serbian" rather than "State", and that future professors should not be educated in Austria-Hungary. In order to prevent the use of church books and textbooks printed in Russia and Serbia, Kállay, therefore, insisted that church books and theological literature be published in Austria-Hungary, with careful verification of their theological correctness. There was also one church newspaper, but without much influence on the clergy and the faithful. Work was also being done to improve the clergy's standard of living at all levels by selectively subsidizing and creating conditions for generating additional income while reducing their dependence on parishioners and their contributions. In this, the government did enjoy some success.

Special attention was also paid to the construction of new churches and the restoration of old ones, in order to prove that the Provincial Government cared for the religious needs of the Orthodox. The objective improvement of accommodations and liturgical conditions in many parishes led some of the Orthodox clergy and the faithful to recognize the new authorities. Some of the Orthodox also expressed gratitude for the new ruler's willingness to concretize and materialize declarative care for the needs of the Orthodox subjects of the Monarchy.

The main obstacle to the efforts to reduce the undesirable activities among Bosnian Orthodox Christians by exercising control and direct influence over the Orthodox Church was not so much the clergy itself, but rather church municipalities. Church municipalities, mostly consisting of the faithful in a parish, with their priest and his assistants, enjoyed considerable autonomy in deciding on matters of importance to the local community, which were not strictly religious affairs. To Benjámin Kállay, highly cognizant of the history of the Balkan Slavs and of the Orthodox Church organization in general, it was quite clear that, through the work of church municipalities in which laymen, usually distinguished locals and wealthy people, took the lead, the Monarchy could realize national work and connect with the national aspirations of Serbia. Kállay explained that "during the course of its historical development, the laymen element in Bosnia and Herzegovina had acquired the entire ecclesiastical power and all the dispositional rights in the church" (Kraljačić, 1987, pp. 346–347). The reasons for such development were, in his opinion, diverse. As Kállay wrote in 1899 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Agenor Gołuchowski, "Driven by secular, i.e. national and political motives, the Slovene laymen element has always used the

Church as the support for all national aspirations. The Church has also been used to link religious-church aspirations closely with the national ones" (Ibid.). The work of church municipalities was governed by statutes approved by the Provincial Government. The statutory provisions gave broad powers to the representative of the authorities within the municipal assemblies, even allowing them to disband the assembly if they determined that the municipality had acted outside of its prescribed scope of its activities. The authorities, however, restricted that scope extremely narrowly and arbitrarily. Having assessed that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had stabilized sufficiently and that the church governance had been placed under satisfactory state control, the Kállay administration decided to draft and formalize a normative outline of a statute for church municipalities, which would be valid for all municipalities. Among the provisions of this model was the determination to organize a separate municipality ("one church - one church municipality") in each parish, no matter how small, and not to authorize two or more parishes to be territorially linked in one church municipality. The intention was twofold: to make the organizational structure of Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina as small as possible so that it could be more easily and efficiently monitored; and to prevent the Orthodox population from engaging in more serious actions. Other provisions including granting both the high church governance (the metropolitan, i.e., his permanent representative) and the lower clergy a mechanism for increased influence on the work of church municipalities, especially in school matters, with the aim of suppressing the contribution of lay people in decision-making in the municipalities as well as their ability to independently manage their actions. Five years after taking control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Provincial Government and Vienna were satisfied with the speed and efficiency with which they had subordinated the Orthodox Church formally, and even practically, in part, to their colonial and assimilationist policies. However, resistance to the imposed solutions grew in proportion to the administrative violence systematically carried out by Austro-Hungarian officials and clerks against the Orthodox and their ecclesiastical and educational institutions, often in violation of the Provincial Government's own legal regulations and obligations under existing agreements. This resistance, known as the Movement for Religious-Educational Autonomy, lasted until 1905 and contributed to the strengthening of Serbian national self-awareness in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with effects that would emerge in the tumultuous times of the annexation crisis and the hints of the onset of World War I.

Representatives of Orthodox church municipalities sporadically voiced their opinions about the discriminatory behavior of the State authorities, and in 1893 decided to fight for religious and educational rights in an organized manner. It was then that 24 municipalities sent a joint delegation to Sarajevo. The delegation carried a petition complaining of aggressive and unacceptable interference in the work of the

church municipalities by the civilian occupation authorities. Even though Metropolitan Đorđe Nikolajević himself was at the forefront of the delegation, it ignored by the Provincial Government, and new discriminatory measures were introduced. Fourteen church municipalities responded to this, with their representatives composing the *First Imperial Memorandum*, which was handed over to the Imperial office in Vienna in December 1896. The petition pointed out that even in the detested Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox's national name and Cyrillic script had not been threatened. It also recalled the Emperor's promises of religious tolerance (1878), as well as the *1879 Convention*, which guaranteed freedom of religion. The text proceeded to provide concrete examples of the State authorities' violations of the rights of the Orthodox. The Emperor was requested to restore:

> The free use of the Serbian name and the Cyrillic script in church, school and beyond, the free holding of church-school municipal assemblies and committee sessions without reporting to the authorities, free choice of priests and teachers, free establishment of church and school funds and receiving legacies, participation of the people in the appointment of metropolitans, free creation of Serb reading rooms, singing and other societies, resolving requests within a fixed time, etc. (Skarić, 1938, pp. 38–39)

These requests were repeated in all subsequent addresses to the Austro-Hungarian state representatives at all levels, with new requests added according to current developments. However, the petitioners were not granted an audience with Emperor Franz Joseph, and the authorities, surprised and angered by such outspoken complaints and demands, further intensified repression against the leaders of the movement. These Orthodox leaders were threatened in various ways, removed them from their offices, and hindered from engaging in their daily lives and normal business. In a section of a Provincial Government report submitted to the Joint Ministry of Finance describing the prevailing mood among the Orthodox, the Provincial Government sought to diminish the importance of the petition's applicants and of the petition's contents. The report also portrayed the movement as a narrowly class-motivated one that merely expressed the dissatisfaction of wealthy Serbs rather than the wider masses. With this, the local government was thereby trying to trigger an antipathy toward the leaders of the movement and to challenge its legitimacy. Kállay deemed this movement as a political rather than a social protest against the interests of the Monarchy, and suggested that there was also an element of foreign influence from Serbia and Montenegro in it. However, the evidence indicates that the movement had actually begun operating quite independently of the government in Belgrade, and that the Serbian president at the time, Stojan Novaković, even thought that "Bosnians and

Herzegovinians could not have chosen a more inconvenient moment than this present one to voice their complaints against the Austrian administration in their countries when all of Europe is struggling to avoid anything that could cause disagreement between certain powers and lead to conflict between them" (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 375).

It is evident that even in Kállay's time, there was a defensive-offensive pattern of blaming Belgrade for all the nationalist political actions of Bosnia and Herzegovina's native Serbs against the local authorities. This *modus operando* reached its climax, but not its finale, when Serbia was accused of the assassination of the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo (1914) and when an ultimatum was sent to its government. Novaković even advised the movement's leaders through a Serb MP in Vienna to use only legal means within the Monarchy in the battle for their rights and to try not to internationalize it. In response, the leaders, although not happy about making such compromises, prepared and signed the *Second Imperial Memorandum* in 1897, which they were able to deliver to the Emperor. But even then, there was no positive official response. Instead, Kállay changed his tactics, pushing the Orthodox metropolitans to the forefront of the battle against the religious-educational autonomy movement, which was, in essence, much more than that, in order to create the impression that this was not a conflict between the authorities and the Orthodox population, but rather an intra-Orthodox disagreement between the laypeople and the highest church governance. From then onwards, the negotiators were metropolitans and leaders of the movement, while Kállay stood in the background, having a crucial influence on the religious leadership Making the metropolitans the executors of orders given by Kállay and the Provincial Government did not help calm the situation and bring the parties closer to compromise, but only deepened the gap between Orthodox laypeople and their religious leaders.

Having seen that they would have to rely primarily on their own forces, several movement leaders decided to draft a comprehensive and detailed "Draft of the Constitution of Church and School Self-Government of the Serb Orthodox People in Bosnia and Herzegovina." They brought it to Kállay's attention, and sought the opinion of the Patriarch of Constantinople, who, under the influence of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, wavered between support and reservation, finally coming out against the "Draft." There was no progress in the long negotiations with the three metropolitans in Sarajevo either, so the leaders of the movement decided to send the Emperor the *Third Imperial Memorandum* (1900), which was brought to Budapest, where Franz Joseph was then present, by a large delegation which included 18 priests. Kállay then prevented the delegates from delivering the memorandum directly through skillful maneuvers, causing delays that would enable him to make several other unpopular decisions. The Emperor saw the representatives of the movement only in May

1901. The new memorandum, in addition to earlier complaints, clearly points out the Catholic Church's aggressive actions and made some political demands, which the Provincial Government linked to the strengthening of Serb nationalism encouraged by Serbia. In the meantime, a new Patriarch of Constantinople, Joachim III, was elected, who, encouraged by the Russians, began to show greater initiative in seeking a solution to the position of Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, for Kállay and the Provincial Government, the issue was complicated even further after the "Serb Academic Youth" sent a sharp, distinctly political memorandum to the Austro-Hungarian government. "The Government noted with indignation that the youth had, through it, decisively rejected 'any union with the Monarchy' and suggested that the Joint Ministry of Finance deny the signatories of the Memorandum admission to the state service since there was no basis for their prosecution, with which the Ministry agreed" (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 397). At the same time, realizing the severity of the situation, Kállay decided to seriously negotiate with the leaders of the movement, and, while ready to make some concessions, he was not in any way willing to depart from the Monarchy's key interest in keeping the main lever of influence on the Orthodox Church under control. Consequently, Kállay was strongly opposed to the idea of abolishing the 1880 Convention, forming a church council, and relinquishing the metropolitan appointment procedure. Nonetheless, the leaders of the religious-educational autonomy movement showed some flexibility and willingness to compromise, and in order to strengthen their positions, sent the *Fourth Imperial Memorandum* to the Habsburg sovereign in Vienna. During the negotiations over this latest *Memorandum*, Benjámin Kállay passed away and was replaced by another Hungarian nobleman, Stephan Burián (1903–1912), as the Minister of Finance and the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Burián ended the negotiations, and despite the failure to agree on a number of points, the situation was resolved by the adoption of the arbitration opinion of the Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1905, Emperor Franz Joseph signed a decree that legally regulated the religious and educational rights of the Orthodox in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The representatives of the religious-educational autonomy movement could not have been completely satisfied with this decree, because some of their important demands, such as the participation of the Orthodox laypeople in the election of metropolitans, were not met. Nevertheless, this latest decree did legally protect the Orthodox Serbs from policies of intrusive assimilation and established rules of conduct in the religious and educational spheres. The most important result of the movement and the last decree however, was the gradual strengthening of national awareness and the organization of a movement capable of taking action and securing an active role in the social and political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These effects would be fully reflected

in the coming, tumultuous period of regional and European relations. Completely eliminating discrimination and achieving equality with the Catholic element could not, in reality, be expected. The Austro-Hungarian authorities, on the other hand, were pleased that by adopting the decree, they, at least temporarily, removed from the agenda an issue that was increasingly burdensome to the management of the occupied province and which could undermine the credibility of the Monarchy's overall project of eastward expansion. Despite being forced to make significant concessions, the state authority did succeed in legally establishing and exercising its control over the country's Orthodox institutions, a goal that was most important for it.

2.5. Policy of Austria-Hungary Toward Muslims

As pointed out earlier, the policy of the Austro-Hungarian administration toward the Muslim segment of the population was to prioritize separating it organizationally from Istanbul, so that Istanbul's nominal sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina would be deprived of any real content. Also, as part of its emphatically declared "civilization mission," the occupying power took steps toward modernizing and Europeanizing the overall social environment, which entailed reforming traditional Muslim institutions: above all, educational ones. Kállay's commitment to reforming primary Muslim education was based on his position that upgrading the very low educational level of the Muslim population was necessary in order for them to become more involved in civil affairs in the Austro-Hungarian interest. Thus, in 1893, Kállay explained to Emperor Franz Joseph why it was important to accept the Muslim proposal for the establishment of new, reformed primary religious schools, the *mekteb-ibtidaijas*, which were needed to replace the traditional and rudimentary *sibjan-mektebs*. Even though the proposed structure and the curricula of these reformed schools, which at the time used only Arabic script and gave no mathematical training, did not entirely satisfy the occupying authorities, Kállay recommended their acceptance because they had been approved by all Muslim authorities. He concluded that even these imperfect measures represented a step in the right direction, emphasizing that

> The education of the Muslim children in Bosnia and Herzegovina has so far not been on par with the education of the Christian children. Even the children that would enroll in primary schools had to quit their schooling due to being too old. This is the reason why Muslims cannot take up positions as the others in the state life because they lack the necessary qualifications. However, "*they are intellectually very gifted, and due to their tradition as a former ruling*

> *class, Muslims are a state-building element. They have preserved this to this day, which is why they represent considerable support to our countries and our government so it is unfortunate that due to lack of education, they are suppressed in the background*" [emphasis added]. (Ćurić, 1983, p. 212)

From this, it is clear that Muslims, as a "fundamental people," were destined to have the main role in the consolidation and implementation of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are also well-founded reasons to believe that support for the supra-confessional/trans-confessional "Bosnian nation," ethnically mostly Muslims, was, in the long run, aimed toward their proselytization and conversion. Thus, a contemporary Bosniak scholar and a senior Muslim religious official, Enes Karić, wrotes: "Kállay wholeheartedly promoted the ideology of Bosnianism in Bosnia among all peoples, but he only wanted to convert Bosnian Muslims from their religion, Islam, by means of Bosnianity" (Karić, 2004, p. 149)

Tomislav Kraljačić also agrees with this stance, concluding that

> He (Kállay) then believed that such conditions should be created in Bosnia and Herzegovina for Muslims to convert to the Catholic religion, thereby establishing a Catholic majority in the country and consolidating the position of the Monarchy in it. He later gave that idea a theoretical explanation in a letter sent to Baron Benko in 1893. In that letter, he stated that in the future, even in the distant one, the Muslims would "unconditionally convert to Christianity and disappear altogether." That would happen shortly after the emancipation of the Muslim woman when she leaves the harem and embraces the European way of life. However, the main reason for the conversion of Muslims to Christianity would be that Mohammedanism does not lie in the essence of the Bosnian nationality, but was artificially grafted by accidental circumstances. The Mohammedans are not foreigners, they are not of another race, as the Ottomans are, but are the pure and true children of the land /Landeskinder/. They have a number of ancient native customs that bind them to other inhabitants of the country. (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 86)

It turned out that Kállay was wrong about this, regardless of the fact that his original premise was partially justified. In addition to the already discussed priorities of the occupying authorities concerning the status of the Bosnian Muslims and their approval of and attachment to the Monarchy, it was also extremely important for the occupying authorities to prevent the formation of an opposition Muslim-Orthodox alliance fighting for religious, educational, and later political autonomy.

The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were extremely distrustful of the plans of the Provincial Government because the Muslims sensed that, regardless of the governing authorities' commitments and rhetoric about protecting the right to freedom of religion and about tolerance, they essentially opposed Islam. The authorities were especially hesitant regarding the reformation and modernization of the *waqfs* (religious endowments) and traditional Islamic education. In order to secure leverage over the Muslim society, Austria-Hungary started by setting up separate governing bodies for the Islamic community. Until 1878, the Istanbul *Mufti,* or *Sheikh-ul-Islam*, was responsible for all religious and *sharia* affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the name of the Sultan, and in 1882, the Provincial Government in Sarajevo introduced the new position of *reis-ul-ulema* (head of the *Ulema*), on whose appointment it had a crucial influence. Also, the *Ulema-majlis*, or the *Ulema* Council, the collective governing body of the Islamic Community, the predecessor of the later Seniority of the Islamic Community, was formed, initially consisting of four members. In order to make a practical impact on the daily life of the Muslim community in all relevant domains, the occupying authorities also implemented a reorganization of the system of governance of the *waqfs*. In the future, all heads of religious and *waqf* affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be appointed by the Provincial Government in Sarajevo, so that the domestic Islamic community would not be able to participate in the election process.

The religious authorities did not have autonomy because the authorized government commissioner could change their decisions. In mid-March 1883, the Joint Ministry of Finance appointed a Temporary Commission for the Regulation of Waqf Affairs in B&H, the president of which was formally appointed: the mayor of Sarajevo Mustajbeg Fadilpašić. In reality, the Commission was managed by two permanent government envoys. That way, the work of the waqfs was entirely under constant government control. (Imamović, 1994, pp. 54–55)

The traditional Muslim intellectual structure, which had evolved under the wing of the Islamic Community, was overwhelmingly unhappy with this structure and considered it an attack on its religious and cultural identity. In all subsequent negotiations with the state authorities, the most controversial points were always the appointment of the *reis-ul-ulema*, the election of *Ulema-majlis* members, and the management of *waqfs* that controlled the Islamic community's assets and funds. It can be observed that, even with the different institutional structures of Islam and Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reasons for dissatisfaction and resistance provided by the Muslims and the Orthodox toward the measures of the new foreign authorities had much in common. It should also be noted that the "so-called pro-Austrian circle of secular intelligentsia, mainly formed between 1890 and 1900" (Karić, 2004, p. 148) and which considered the Austro-Hungarian occupation to be a far lesser evil than coming

under the rule of Serbia or Montenegro,[34] did not join the Muslim fights for the *waqf* and religious-educational autonomy. These intellectuals were predominantly engaged in cultural work, publishing advanced journals, and promoting Europeanization and the reformist approach to Islam. Some of them were advocates of Kállay's idea of "integral Bosnianhood," but with the leading role of the Bosniaks, as the "native people" in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their political, polemical and literary texts were the starting point and conceptual basis of the modern conception of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the supra-ethnic Bosnians as a political nation and bearers of the sovereignty.

More serious Muslim protests began, as noted earlier, in 1899. They were set off by an incident in Mostar, when a girl was abducted and forcibly converted to Catholicism. An assembly was held in Mostar's *kiraethana* (central reading room), which elected a twelve-member committee led by Mostar *Mufti* Ali-Fehmi Džabić. The committee was tasked with submitting a request to the District Chief Baron Benko to urgently address the case of the abducted girl. Thus, the future movement for *waqf* and religious-educational autonomy was born, and its leader, Mostar *Mufti* Džabić, came to the fore. The state government at first underestimated the depth and force of the Muslim complaints, but dissatisfaction spread and soon swept across Herzegovina. At one point, regional *waqf* autonomy was demanded even for Herzegovina, which the authorities considered completely unacceptable. New petitions to Kállay and the Emperor requested that the management of religious schools be returned to the jurisdiction of the local Muslim *ulema* and the end to hostility toward the religious sentiments and honor of followers of Islam. All the Muslim claims were summarily denied. In April 1900, the Provincial Government resorted to the harsh punitive measure of replacing *Mufti* Džabić, which, added fuel to the fire. A wave of Muslim discontent flooded the whole country, and the Provincial Government's attempts to break the movement from within, by relying on loyal Bosniaks, failed.

Moreover, there was a formal political connection and concrete cooperation between the Muslim and Serb resistance movements. The Serb resistance movement at that time already had experience in opposing the authorities, with a well-established organizational framework and elaborate methods of action, on which Muslim leaders willingly relied. This was what the occupying authorities were most afraid of. They sought to prevent the institutionalization and expansion of the fronts of Orthodox and Muslim resistance in any way. This was the reason for the launch of an intense media and social campaign by the authorities.

The first opposition Muslim delegation traveled to Budapest in 1900, where Emperor Franz Joseph was also present because of the session of the Austro-Hungarian Parliament. As in the case of the Orthodox delegation, Kállay prevented them

from obtaining an audience with the Emperor, and Kállay was extremely cold toward them. Still, the Provincial Government had to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the Muslim movement and to examine in detail all the points of the request contained in the proposed *Statute of Religious Autonomy and Memorandum* submitted by Džabić and his associates. The Austro-Hungarian side stalled the negotiations, while at the same time working to weaken the Muslim movement through various measures. Negotiations were terminated without agreement on four key points, including provisions on the process of *Ulema-majlis* members' election and the appointment of *reis-ul-ulema* and *muftis*. In June 1901, Emperor Franz Joseph received Muslim delegates, who blamed the Provincial Government for the failure of the negotiations. At the same time, news emerged of a new agreement between the Muslims and the Orthodox to promote joint action, which further worried Kállay and his associates. Indeed, the Serb representatives offered the Muslims a draft of the political cooperation agreement, thus decisively entering the battle for political, and not just religious-educational autonomy. The agreement was not signed by the Bosniaks because consensus could not be reached on resolving the agrarian issue that was vital for the Muslim gentry. In addition, the Muslims were not satisfied with the provision that the official language in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be called Serbian, and that Cyrillic would still be the official script. Despite this, political cooperation between the Muslim Bosniaks and the Orthodox Serbs continued until 1910, when the first Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina began its work. The historian Mustafa Imamović describes the process:

> A state-legal program was adopted with the request for B&H to obtain self-government under the supreme authority of its sovereign the sultan, which was contained in the draft of the treaty. The Bosniaks considered this program to be their ultimate goal, while the Serbs probably only considered it a transitional stage. The proposed draft of the treaty actually provided a program of joint Serb-Bosniak action in the fight against Austria-Hungary, but also against Croatia's national-political aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Imamović, 1998, p. 395)

At the time of the movement's activities, and even later, there were attempts to present this practical Muslim-Serb cooperation as a successful Serbian maneuver to take advantage of Muslim discontent and naivety, but the facts convincingly disproved such claims. On the other hand, the inability to achieve Serb-Muslim agreement on some of the essential issues of the coordination and organization of the future autonomy is an historical constant in their political relations, despite their shared goal of freeing themselves of foreign rule. This constant is not accidental, but is the consequence of the fundamentally different spiritual and cultural-civilizational

roots of the respective identities of the Muslim Bosniaks and the Orthodox Serbs, which led to inconsistent ultimate socio-political goals of the religious and national aspirations of these two constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Faced with the political articulation of opposition demands, Kállay's Provincial Government increased repressive measures, triggering a new wave of Muslim emigration to Turkey. This did not suit the Austro-Hungarian interests. First, this emigration embarrassed the occupying authorities both domestically and on the foreign front. Second, the emigration reduced the number of Muslims in proportion to the Orthodox Serbs, which disturbed the balance in which Muslims were treated as a counterweight to Serb aspirations. The government, therefore, made wide-ranging efforts to discourage and prevent emigration, with relative success. Using the movement's leader Džabić's stay in Istanbul, the authorities, based on a regulation they had issued in the meantime, declared him an "unauthorized expatriate," i.e., a violator of the procedure for traveling abroad, and forbade his return to the country. Having virtually banished Džabić, the authorities placed another leader of the movement in a small town near Mostar. This was all done in an attempt to strip the movement of its leadership. The authorities also tried to discredit Džabić in Istanbul through various intrigues. In part, they succeeded in doing so, and as a result, the Sublime Porte did not declare his support of the demands of the movement for the *waqf* and religious-legal autonomy.

However, Istanbul did not end its hospitality to the movement's leaders, and it provided them with some logistical aid. In 1902, the Muslims again complained to the Austro-Hungarian Parliament about the Provincial Government, suggesting that a special commission be sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to investigate the reasons for dissatisfaction of a large part of the population. This move sent a signal to Kállay that something concrete must be achieved in negotiations with the Muslim movement, as his previous tactic of delaying while simultaneously trying to win over cooperative Muslim leaders had proved ineffective in the short term. However, no action was taken prior to Kállay's death, because, among other things, the influential Baron Hugo von Kutschera, the head of the Civilian Administration in charge of the negotiations, thought that the delaying tactic was potentially more productive than intensifying the negotiations. Thus, a new move to restore negotiating dynamics had to be awaited, and it came after 1905.

2.6. Project to Create a Bosnian Nation

From the time it first established rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary sought to insulate this three-confessional country without a dominant religion and people from the influence of national ideas and movements radiating from Ser-

bia, Montenegro and Croatia. The enthusiasm for liberation and unification in Serbia was cause for particular concern. Serbia was rapidly liberating and emancipating itself from the Ottoman rule and acting as a potential launching pad to South Slavic statehood and unification in the Balkans. Preventing the creation of a larger South Slavic state in the region was the backbone of Vienna's overall policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. Nonetheless, there was little pressure to implement a plan for the Bosnian nation during the first decade of Austro-Hungarian rule. As a result, the Imperial authorities did not explicitly discuss or take any steps regarding the realization of this national issue. This first decade was meant to serve as a preparatory period during which "our people" (*naš narod*) was supposed to become adjusted to the idea of a unified Bosnian nation. A differentiated policy was pursued toward each of the three ethno-confessional groups, which meant respecting the religious, cultural and traditional differences that existed between them, in order to gain their trust, and to avoid openly favoring any of them at this early stage of implementing the goal of creating a unified Bosnian nation. Given that the Imperial authorities did not believe that the Serbs or Croats, who had their national motherlands and, in relation to Sarajevo, centrifugal national centers in Belgrade and Zagreb, could serve as the core of this envisioned united entity, the government concentrated on trying to please and attract Muslims.

An important tool for reaching the three confessional communities was newspapers, which were deliberately launched for this purpose, with purposefully designed and conducted editorial policies. The first was the one for the Muslims, *Vatan* (*Homeland*), printed in the Turkish language, launched already in 1884. It is significant that the Turkish language was chosen, although most Bosniaks did not know it. One of the arguments justifying the use of Turkish was that the Muslims were mostly unfamiliar with the Latin script or "modern letters." By choosing the language of yesterday's masters of Bosnia, Austria-Hungary wanted to demonstrate some sympathy for the feelings of Muslims, using the Turkish language as a sign of apparent continuity during a great historical and civilizational discontinuity. At the same time, however, the Imperial authorities were taking very concrete measures to cut off the Muslim connection with Istanbul. "With their Turkish language and script, and content that represented Muslim interests in the spirit of the modern times that came with the Austro-Hungarian administration, these publications were a transitional spiritual-educational form and a journalistic link between the pre-occupation era and the occupation era for the Muslims," explained Mushin Rizvić, an expert on this issue (Rizvić, 1973, p. 75). From the beginning, *Vatan* was used, *inter alia*, to emphasize the concern of the Provincial Government for the well-being of the Muslim population. Its editorial position was that the Muslims had had the good fortune to have come under the authority of a civilized Western state and not Serbia and Montenegro, the enemies of Islam and Muslims.

Only one year after the launch of *Vatan*, in 1885, the regime began publishing the first newspaper designed for the Orthodox Christian Serbs, *Prosvjeta*, (*Education*) and Kállay was personally engaged in its launch. A prominent Sarajevo citizen, Risto Đ. Besarović, submitted a petition to Kállay requesting approval to print "an independent political and economic newspaper in Cyrillic alphabet," and consent was soon granted. However, Besarović gave up the project, probably because he suspected that newspapers with a distinct pro-regime orientation would not be accepted among Serbs (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 190). However, another newspaper was soon launched by a Serb from Vojvodina, Jovan Vidić. *Prosvjeta* consistently followed a pro-regime editorial policy, whose goal was, as Kállay explained himself in a letter, to create a loyal, conservative faction among Serbs, which would suppress all incidences and tendencies directed against the authorities and eventually grow into a leading political force among the Serbs. The newspaper was expected to take a "friendly stance" toward the government and not to follow extreme Serbian politics, but to remain independent and act as a mobilizing force among the Serb population (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 190). *Prosvjeta* was exceedingly moderate or, more accurately, skilful and careful in representing the pro-regime line. However, its strong support for resolving the Serb national issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the aegis of the Monarchy starkly contrasted with the dominant perception in Belgrade of Bosnia as a Serb country, and the paper's stance was unable to gain wide acceptance among the Serb population. As a result, the paper was shut down after less than a year of publication. It is indicative that, despite the efforts of the occupying authorities, no Serb newspaper expressing a pro-Bosnian or a pro-Viennese orientation could be successfully launched.

The launch of the Croatian counterpart to *Vatan* and *Prosvjeta* also took place in 1885. The newspaper, *Glas Hercegovca* (*The Voice of Herzegovina*) was published in Mostar.[35] Unlike *Vatan* and *Prosvjeta*, the editorial board of *Glas Hercegovca* addressed "all Herzegovinians" as a target group, not just Muslim Bosniaks, or Serbs. As with the other two newspapers, its political orientation was pro-regime, upholding the authorities' view that only one "people" lives in Herzegovina. However, in the late 1980s, the idea of a Croatian national revival became increasingly visible in Croatian publications, as can be seen in the spirit of the exclusivist Croatianess of the Croatian politician Ante Starčević's *Stranka Prava* (Croation Party of Rights), and *Glas Herzegovca* lost the support and backing of the Provincil Government (Kruševac, 1978, pp. 216–21). What is characteristic is that none of the three pro-regime national newspapers successfully played the role intended for them and did not succeed in influencing the broader circles of public opinion in the direction of greater commitment to and support for the Monarchy and its plans to create a positive climate for the gradual formation of an awareness of the belonging of all the people of Bosnia

and Herzegovina to one political nation, the Bosnian nation. Nevertheless, perhaps because it underestimated the failure of its "national" newspapers, or misjudged the reasons for their ineffectiveness, the Provincial Government did not deviate from implementing Kállay's project of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, ideologically separate from Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia, and based on the concept of the Bosnian nation, with Muslim Bosniaks as the core people in the nation.

In order to succeed in this nation-building venture, the Provincial Government had to take a number of coordinated actions and measures. Above all, the Muslims had to be disabused of any religious subordination or emotional attachment to the idea of an Ottoman state idea in order to gradually become capable of acting as an independent religious-national contingent acting in accordance with the interests and plans of the Monarchy. For this purpose, in 1882, despite the opposition of Constantinople and the dissatisfaction of local Muslims, the Imperial authorities succeeded in creating and imposing the previously non-existent function of the *reis-ul-ulema*, the Bosnian Muslim religious leader, in whose appointment the authorities soon began to play a decisive role. "Austria-Hungary has been working since the beginning of its reign to establish a special Islamic religious hierarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina to separate Muslims from Constantinople and thus consolidate its position in the occupied country," (Šeta, 1991, p. 7)[36] concludes contemporary Bosniak historian Mustafa Imamović. At the same time, the authorities began systematically spreading the idea that the "Bosnian spirit" that had existed under the Ottomans continued in a new form under the Monarchy, still retaining the immutable essence of belonging to a shared separate folk tradition attached to the local land. This tradition was supposed to serve as a major cohesive factor in the formation of a Bosnian nation to which other Bosnia and Herzegovina inhabitants, Orthodox Christians Serbs and Catholics Croats, would necessarily gravitate in the future. This contrived and propagated Bosnianism (*bosanstvo*) could also be called "integral Bosniakism" (*bošnjaštvo*), because it rested on the assumption that Bosniaks were the core element ensuring the continuity of a unique Bosnian identity. This is an:

> Ethno-political conception whose essence is that in the old historic country of Bosnia (and Herzegovina), older than both Serbia and Croatia, as its indigenous population, with unbroken ethnic, cultural, psychological and even state-forming continuity from the early Middle Ages to this day, Bosniaks live, and that this is their only appropriate national and ethnic name. As it is known, Bosniakism diffusely permeates the pre-national collective consciousness of certain parts and segments of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and more broadly and emphatically among Muslim and Catholic, related to Franciscan tradition. This tradition was now elevated to the level of national policy and formulated as a comprehensive political program of shaping the *Bosnian nation*. (Tanasković, 2006, p. 170)

The extent to which the project of the creation of the Bosnian nation was comprehensively constructed and developed, even regarding symbols, is evidenced by the work on the design of the special coat of arms and flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The guiding idea was that this new coat of arms must not contain any artistic or color component present in the Serbian and Croatian heraldic tradition. Thus, after much deliberation and consultation, the emblem officially adopted had as its central symbol an arm in a red sleeve, folded at the elbow, and with a saber in the hand. Historically, this mirrored the coat of arms of Rama in the crown of the Hungarian kings. The area around the Rama River in central Bosnia was at one point identified with the whole of Bosnia (*Rama seu Bosna*). The background on the coat of arms is densely yellow and the silver crown is lily-shaped, thus linking the heraldic design with the old coat of arms of the Bosnian kings of the Kotromanić dynasty.[37] The saber also appears on some tombstones in Muslim cemeteries, and is considered the result of the Ottoman influence, as swords had frequently appeared in relief motifs prior to Ottoman rule. Thus, using elements of Islamic provenance, the design of the emblem suggested the continuity of the pre-Islamic tradition of Bosnia with the Islamic periods of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian past. The artistic design of the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina followed the pattern adopted for the coat of arms, with the coat of arms in the middle of the flag with two horizontal fields, the upper one being red and the lower one yellow.

The intensification of activities for creating a Bosnian nation occurred at the very beginning of the last decade of the 19th century, when the propaganda war between the Serbs and Croats, or Belgrade and Zagreb, was intensifying. Following the abdication of King Milan Obrenović (1889), political forces in Serbia that were not sympathetic to pro-Austro-Hungarian politics emerged and encouraged the press to write more critically about the position of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to direct Serb national ambitions toward the area. In Zagreb, however, under the editorship of the extreme Josip Frank, the newsletter of the Croatian Party of Rights, *Hrvatska*, began to wage a fierce anti-Serb campaign as of 1891, both against the Serbs in Croatia and against alleged national ambitions emanating from Belgrade. It was during this period that the Serb political newspaper *Napredak* was launched in Sarajevo in 1890, with a different editorial orientation than the earlier *Prosvjeta*, but also with the support of the Provincial Government in Sarajevo. *Napredak* openly advocated Serb national sympathies, including the perception of Serbs as representing three faiths or three laws. This position denies the existence of Croats and Muslim Bosniaks as separate nations, and considers Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Serb country. While the authorities did not countenance such views, their main goal was to neutralize the influence of the Serbian press from Serbia and to show that the Orthodox Christians Serbs in Bosnia under Austro-Hungarian rule enjoyed all the rights of

expression. At the same time, *Napredak's* approach to national issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina distanced Muslims from the Serb national idea and opened the space for the affirmation of the Bosnian nation, whose organic essence would be Bosniaks.

The Croats also abhorred the strengthening of the Serb national idea and the movement based on it. As a result, a real media war broke out between *Napredak* and *Glas Hercegovca*, in which the two sides did not spare each other at all. It was in this heated atmosphere of Orthodox-Catholic/Serbo-Croatian clashes that the Provincial Government in l891 decided to respond positively to the request of a prominent Muslim leader and government advisor, Mehmed-beg Ljubušak, and grant him a concession to issue the *Bošnjak* newspaper, which would become the main public instrument of the Bosnian nation project. As Muhsin Rizvić has written, "Kapetanović's conception of Bosniak nationality...which will be more fully formulated in a series of articles in the 'Bošnjak' newspaper...is based on the same, somewhat specialized arguments, that Kállay will also use in explaining his political-national views regarding Bosnia" (Rizvić, 1973, p. 85).

Higher classes of Muslim society and intellectuals with a traditional worldview, caught in the crosswinds between the Serbian and Croatian national programs, and encouraged by the occupying authorities, believed the ethno-confessional tensions in their country could be overcome convincing Orthodox Christian Serbs and Catholic Croats of the efficacy of a supra-religious concept and identity as Bosnians, with Bosnians playing a leading role. The Austro-Hungarian authorities viewed support for the project of a Bosnian political nation as a pragmatic way to immunize Bosnia and Herzegovina from the disruptive, opposing centrifugal national transmissions from Belgrade and Zagreb. The authorities also wanted to calm the inter-confessional/inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts by giving a key role in the country to Bosniaks who, unlike Serbs and Croats, had no national motherland outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for their politically unproductive religious and emotional attachment to Istanbul. Rizvić also notes, with good reason, that the promotion of the idea of some Bosnian nation alongside religious and social ones also opened the front of political confrontation between Serbs and Croats on the one hand, (who were at the same time mutually antagonistic) and Bosniaks, as the advocates of the concept of the Bosnian nation. For Serbs and Croats, "Bosnianism" was unacceptable, as it would lead to their gradual denationalization. Rizvić's analysis and conclusion are important to note because, like a number of other historical and empirical arguments, they must have been well known to those who, in the twentieth century, attempted to renew the doctrine of the Bosnian nation, at first covertly but effectively, during the Communist rule in the Yugoslav federation, and then openly and programmatically, during and after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995).

By examining the contents of the newspaper *Bošnjak*, which enjoyed generous financial and other support from the Provincial Government, it is possible, first, to identify the basic tenets of the doctrine of the "Bosnian nation," the arguments in support of it, as well as the gradual shift from "integral Bosniakism" to "Muslim Bosniakism," because there was hardly any "example that any Orthodox Christian or Catholic accepted and supported 'the national line of this newspaper'" (Bojić, 2001, p. 101). Interestingly, the concept of Bosnian nation is nowhere explicitly declared and explained. Rather, it was launched and disseminated by *Bošnjak*, as well as by occasional statements by Kállay on this issue. Thus, in 1893, at a session with the Austrian delegation, Kállay sought to define his idea by referring to the Bosnian nation as a heritage of historical development.

At the same time, he stressed that the solution of the national question in Bosnia and Herzegovina is impracticable outside the notion of the "Bosnian nation," because the "Serbian-Croatian" name is completely unknown in Bosnia, and those who are called Serbs today will never be called Croats, and those who are calling themselves Croats today will never accept the Serb name. This way Kállay gave the introduction of the Bosnian nation, as a solution to the national question in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a form of measure that was not imposed, but which grew out of circumstances in the country. He thought that working on the affirmation of the Bosnian nation he will encounter less resistance both inside and outside the country (Kraljačić, 1987, p. 230).

Already in the second issue of *Bošnjak*, a well-known Muslim poet, Orientalist and cultural figure, the Austrophile Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934), in the spirit of Kállay's ideas, but also of Bosniak-Muslim exclusivism, published a famous poem "To a Bosniak" ("*Bošnjaku*"). In this poem, he addressed his compatriots and tells the "truth" that until only fifteen years ago, there had been no Serbs or Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Trebinje to the Sava River, and that now both groups were spreading throughout the Bosniak country, and they wanted to hijack the "proud and dear name" from its natives (*Bošnjak*, 2 July 9, 1891). According to the "Bosnian nation's" representatives, Bosniak ancestors had lived in Bosnia (and Herzegovina) since settling in the Balkans, and were distinguished from Serbs and Croats during the Middle Ages by accepting the Bogomil religion professed in the Bosnian state.[38] The holders of the national tradition would therefore be primarily members of the Bosnian nobility who inherited ancient traditions, converted to Islam and became a Muslim "*begs* [nobility]," which qualified them to govern the country in the best interests of all its inhabitants, as well as the country's corporative interests.

In order to enable members of prominent Muslim families to retain a leading position in society, which served the occupying authorities' interest in repressing Serbian and Croatian nationalism, members of prominent Muslim families were pro-

vided with access to modern European education. In the ethnogenetic sense, the so-called Bogomil thesis on the origin of Bosniaks was at the heart of the conception of the integral Bosniakism or unitary Bosnianism. An important element in the strategy of creating a Bosnian nation was choosing an official name of the language spoken in Bosnia and in Herzegovina which is linguistically the same idiom. After initial hesitation, when, besides the name Serbian and Croatian, the neutral term "provincial" (*zemaljski*) language was used, the administration would soon opt for the appellation Bosnian (*bosanski*). The establishment and standardization of the Bosnian language became a priority of the educational and cultural policies of the Provincial Government, so that as early as 1884, the development of the Bosnian language grammar began, which provoked mainly negative reactions in professional Serbo-Croatian linguistic circles. Despite criticism and opposition from the professionals, the Provincial Government persisted and, in 1890, printed the first *Bosnian Grammar for Secondary Schools*. Serbian, and to a lesser extent, Croatian educational institutions resisted the introduction of Bosnian into school practice, but Kállay persisted, especially at the level of official use of the language and its official name. Serbs and Croats have never accepted the appellation of Bosnian for the country's language. However, it has been accepted by Muslims as the most adequate name for the language which they share with Serbs and Croats, on the grounds that the language has always been referred to as such, this name is present in historical documents, and it is only the reference to the country in which is spoken and to the indigenous people who use it in that country. Similarly, in the 1990s, advocacy for the Bosnian language was renewed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an integral part of reaffirming the idea of a unified Bosnian nation.

The educational system, which adopted the Bosnian language and the so-called Bosnian perspective for interpreting and teaching history, become the main channel for suppressing Serbian and Croatian national ideologies and affirming the doctrine of the Bosnian nation. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that Bosnia (and Herzegovina) was the only Ottoman province where a change of religion did not represent a change in national sentiment, and the rebellions of the Bosnian feudal lords against the central government in Istanbul were interpreted as national revolts. It was essential to show the historical development of Bosnia as an uninterrupted, independent continuity with respect to the neighboring Serbian and Croatian regions, and to designate Muslim Bosniaks, descendants of the Bogomils, who had always been the country's indigenous ethnic contingent as the bearers of that continuity. Paradigmatic in this respect is the introduction to Safvet-beg Bašagić's *Brief Reference to the Past of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, in which the author states:

In our humble opinion...Bosnia and Herzegovina did not lose their independence and freedoms in the 15th century but only in the middle of the 19th century, namely:

when Omer Pasha Latas invaded with *nizam*,[39] devastated them, destroyed them, and deprived them of independence and all rights by his Byzantine slyness. Before him, Herceg-Bosna had always been a state in the state which was governed on behalf of Sultan by regents and their sons suitable for Bosniaks.[40] (Bašagić-Redžepašić, 1900, p. 18)

In order to investigate the historical foundations of the specific geo-cultural character of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the occupying authorities established the National Museum in 1888, a specialized scientific institution which published a serious journal, *Herald of the National Museum in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (*Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja Bosne i Hercegovine*).

Notwithstanding the great effort, considerable resources invested and considerable skill in implementing the policy of affirmation of the Bosnian nation, which, according to Kállay's intention, should also encompass the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, separated from their national motherlands, this project failed. As a result, the Provincial Government began abandoning it in the mid-1890s. The Serbs demonstrated a consistent and persistent resistance to the imposition of the Bosnian nation, while the Croats, who, as Catholics, were in many respects objectively privileged, were for some time more willing to accept it, as something that in no way suited the Serbs, but on condition that the Muslim Bosnians accept that they were essentially ethnic Croats. Even Bosnian Franciscans, followers of the cultural-civilizational paradigm of the so-called Bosna Srebrena (*Bosna Argentina*) did not consider it to be the basis for the formation of a Bosnian nation. Thus, one of the most respected leaders of this Catholic spiritual order, Fr. Petar Anđelović clearly separates the regional (homeland) from the national dimension:

> If Bosnia is to be a name for something recognizable, for something that really exists, then the content of that name cannot be found in the algebraic sum of the nations and national cultures, not even in the supranational construction they would all fall into. The content of that name can only be found in the permanent interaction of all that we have itemised. The name Bosnia or Bosnianism is not a concept of national or territorial order. It is above all and more than all the designation for the process of civilization, which through the historical changes and political events has been taking place throughout a millennium. In this interaction process as a constant (its name is Bosnia) national cultures participate as variables, retaining their specific identity. (Anđelović, 2002, pp. 115–16)

Even Muslim Bosniaks, who were the natural building material of transnational and non-confessional Bosnianism according to Kállay's vision, were not accepting such an amalgam with equanimity. As correctly noted by the Croatian writer and

theorist Ivan Lovrenović, also associated with Franciscan interactional and civilizational Bosnianism, the challenges of the brutal Latas breakdown of the rebellion of the Bosnian *beys* against the central government and then of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia (and Herzegovina) were extremely traumatic, because they grossly violated the centuries-old integrity of identity based on four components: religion (Islam), country (Bosnia), the social status as the upper class, and political loyalty to the Sultan and Constantinople. In new circumstances, all elements of such a complexly structured identity clash and dramatically intersect, break and fall apart. It is important, for both principled and methodological reasons, to emphasize a point on which Lovrenović also insists: that the two perceptions of the reason and nature of the rise of the Bosnian nobility against the modernization reforms in the Ottoman Empire were equally unilateral. One he labels vulgarly Marxist, in that their resistance, "was merely a reactionary and retrograde defence of feudal privileges and status. The second perception he considered the Bosniak nationalistic one, as "a struggle for the independence and statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Lovrenović, 2002, pp. 116-117) However, what is certainly true is Lovrenović's conclusion that this political movement, the uprising of the Bosnian *beys* against the central government in Istanbul:

> Because of its essential rejection of the need to reform the country and make others (Christians) to be equalized in social and political rights, deepened the divergence among the Bosnian ethnic groups and, with the Serb and Croatian national ideology – perhaps crucially – acted contrary to the tendencies which in the twilight of the Ottoman domination over Bosnia suggested the possibility of building a common political identity. (Ibid.)

In such an environment of inter-confessional, interethnic and inter-national relations, where endemic mistrust reigned between the three constituent peoples, and where two of these, the Orthodox Christian Serbs and the Catholic Croats openly disdained Muslim Bosniak political and cultural domination, the project of the occupying authorities to realize their own rather than Bosnian interests through the creation of a unified "Bosnian nation," could not be successful. However, that is how the ideological concept of Bosnianism and the pattern of political engineering to implement it were created. These methods, unsuccessfully employed by the Austro-Hungarian regime, were later reconstituted in efforts to construct an objectively non-existent national and state unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These attempts lawfully and inevitably caused and/or exacerbated tensions and conflicts.

2.7. Period from the Annexation Until World War I

After the death of Benjamin Kállay, his successor, Burián, somewhat changed the governance style and exhibited a greater degree of calculated flexibility. However, the goal of Austro-Hungarian policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina did not change substantially. It became increasingly apparent that comprehensive preparations were being made in Vienna for the annexation of the occupied province. At the same time, the local population of all three religious/national communities continued the process of urbanization. The struggle for autonomy began to shift to the economic and political terrain, which brought a new social dynamic to the domestic scene. The first political parties were founded: the Muslim National Organization (1906), the Serbian National Organization (1908), and the Croatian National Community (1908), as well as several smaller parties. Demands increased to adopt a constitution for the country. In conjunction with political mobilization, the foundations were being laid for the institutional union activity of the working class that was being formed. After a short quiescent period, caused by the authorities' repression, the movement for Muslim religious and educational autonomy regained momentum. A number of factors contributed to its revival, including the fact that the Provincial Government considered that it had successfully addressed or swept aside the problem of Serbian demands, and that it was time to put more focus on the Muslim issue overall, which, especially in perspective, was a serious one for the government. Negotiations with the Muslim representatives were conducted during 1907, and the central issues continued to be the means of appointing a *reis-ul-ulema* and regulating property, or agrarian relations. The large landowners, the most influential people in the Muslim movement, wanted to retain their rights over the serfs and the land, but the Provincial Government was not ready to meet all their demands. At the beginning of 1907, elections were held in the Muslim National Organization throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which strengthened the legitimacy of the Muslim negotiators. It is indicative that 15 of the 18 people elected to the Executive Board of the party were members of the upper, *bey* class. The negotiations entered the final phase shortly before the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although they were still awaiting a consultative opinion from Istanbul regarding the appointment of the proposed *reis-ul-ulema*, the country's annexation to the Monarchy had stripped the relationship between the Bosnian Muslims and their spiritual center in Turkey of any political and legal importance.

In April 1909, the Emperor signed a decree to execute the "Statute of the Autonomous Administration of Islamic Religious and Waqf-Mearif Affairs in Bosnia

and Herzegovina" (Imamović, 1998, p. 404). The Austro-Hungarian administration secured crucial powers in the religious and educational life of the Muslim community through this act, and enabled its representatives to participate more actively in the management of the *waqf* and school affairs. In addition to the Muslim National Organization, the leaders of which led the negotiations with the occupying authorities, the Muslim Progressive Party started operating in 1908, and included the previously-mentioned pro-Austrian Muslim intellectual wing. Its means of communication were the *Bošnjak*, *Ogledalo*, and *Behar* journals. Proponents of this orientation of Bosniak cultural and national politics advocated the enlightenment of the populace in the spirit of contemporary values, as well as loyal activity within the state framework and the social order of the Monarchy, and some were even familiar with the idea of Greater Croatia. Nonetheless, Berlin declared that the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was temporary, despite Vienna's ceaseless efforts to include this region in the Monarchy permanently. The decision on annexation was being postponed until the appropriate international circumstances would arise that would "force" Austria-Hungary to take this step.

This moment occurred in July 1908, when the Young Turks seized power in the Ottoman Empire and introduced a constitutional order into the country, effectively eliminating the power of the Sultan. Vienna rushed to preempt the Young Turks' anticipated intention to invoke the formal sovereignty of the Sultan over Bosnia and Herzegovina and to start creating problems internationally. The Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was proclaimed on 5 October of that year, making the region an integral territorial, legal, and administrative part of Austria-Hungary. It was thought that altering the status of the occupied country could prevent any negative repercussions from the changes in Turkey and could preempt any effort by the local population to adopt a constitution through which the country would be regulated in a new way, with possible international legal implications. The prerequisite for the adoption of a fundamental legal act approved by Vienna was that Bosnia and Herzegovina become a part of the Monarchy. The annexation caused a serious international crisis. The United Kingdom and France both determined that Austria-Hungary had violated the *Treaty of Berlin* with this unilateral move, which struck a blow to international confidence. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina provoked furor and negative reactions in Italy and Russia, as well as in Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro. Germany, however, stood by Austria-Hungary and mediated an agreement between Vienna and Istanbul. According to the agreement, Turkey accepted the annexation, received financial compensation and certain economic benefits in trade with Austria-Hungary, while the Monarchy pledged to guarantee the religious rights of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to leave the Novi Pazar *S*anjak, where its troops were stationed. This area, a buffer zone of sort, between

Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Serbia and Montenegro on the other, would inevitably be exposed to stronger attacks by these two Orthodox countries in the altered circumstances, and Vienna planned to occupy it anyway after Serbia's defeat in the war that was imminent.

The annexation ended Bosnia and Herzegovina's centuries-old connection to the Ottoman Empire. Soon, other states, including Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, came to terms with this *fait accompli* and acknowledged the new reality. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the feelings among the domestic populace were divided. A large part of the Muslim and Serb populace was outraged,[41] so the Muslim National Organization and the Serbian National Organization, in their last appearance together, issued a joint statement against the annexation. The Muslim Progressive Party backed Vienna's decision, in support of which a broad campaign was launched in the country. Feeling betrayed by the "mother Turkey" and left at the mercy of the "infidels," the Muslims began to emigrate to the Ottoman territories. Prolonged discussions and attempts to mitigate the tensions by talking to the government led by the Young Turks, the schism between the supporters and the opponents of the annexation among the Muslims was transcended under the pressure of political reality. The Muslim National Organization finally accepted the annexation, hoping that after the country's constitution was adopted, it would be able to successfully fight for its rights through the Parliament. The situation was similar among the Serbs, although the majority of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was against the annexation. Given that no effective support could be expected from Russia or Serbia, the Serb politicians had to accept that in the future, they would be able to act politically only within the constitutional framework and institutional coordinates of Austro-Hungarian Bosnia and Herzegovina. That framework and its coordinates were established in February 1910, with the enactment of the *State Statute for Bosnia and Herzegovina,* and other relevant laws.

With the establishment of the *State Statute*, a "formal, limited parliamentarism in which a social or ethnic majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina could by no means be achieved in the Parliament" (Antić & Kecmanović, 2016, p.144) was also formed. The constitution objectively made very little change in the actual governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it still represented a step forward in the sense of political organization and functioning of the country. The fundamental change was that Bosnia and Herzegovina received its Parliament, "a kind of parliamentary body, albeit with very limited legislative rights under the law." (Imamović, 1998, p.438) The executive power was still exercised by the Joint Ministry of Finance in Vienna, and the presidency of the Parliament was appointed by the Emperor, with the President alternately being chosen from the Muslim Bosniak, Orthodox Serb, and Catholic Croat communities. The Parliament was composed of 92 MPs, 72 of whom were chosen in the election, and 20 were appointed to office by duty. At the election of the

MPs, not all voters were socially equal, because the electorate was divided into *curiae,* or social classes. The first group included landowners (mostly Muslims), clerks, teachers/professors and intellectuals, the second included city dwellers, and the third peasantry. The peasantry, which made up nearly 90% of the total population, was highly discriminated against because it elected only 34 MPs, while the first, extremely minority group elected 18 and the second 20 MPs. In the Parliament, in proportion to their share in the total population of B&H, the Orthodox had 31, Muslims 24, and Catholics 16 MPs. Interestingly, despite the underdeveloped political culture, voter turnout in the first parliamentary elections was massive (among the Orthodox and the Muslims, over 80%). Constructive debates were held in the Parliament, and the changing configurations of inter-ethnic alliances became apparent. At the heart of many debates was, chronic for B&H, the socio-economic agrarian issue articulated in the Parliament in national-political terms. As Mustafa Imamović notes, "the agrarian issue led to the creation of a Croat-Bosniak pact, the emergence of two dissident groups among the Bosniaks, and the breaking up of a unified Serbian Club." (Imamović, 1998, p.446) The observed creation of a Croat-Bosniak pact, due to which the Croatian MPs gave priority to national ambitions over the interests of the majority of the Croatian peasantry, is a characteristic example of a pro-Bosniak, i.e., anti-Serb political activity of the Croat political class in B&H, despite the real, life-related interests that would urge it to intensify cooperation with the Serb block. In general, throughout the entire period of Parliament's work, the state government pragmatically sought to ensure that representatives of all confessional/national communities provide a so-called "working majority," although it politically favored the Bosniak-Croat coalition more. In the context of inter-ethnic strife, and also from the perspective of the country's future, an interesting debate arose about the name of the language in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The government preferred the name Serbo-Croatian, with which the Serbs, but not the Croats, were pleased. The Serb representatives believed that only the Serbs and the Croats were allowed to decide on the name of the language, while the Muslims "have no right to interfere in the matter until they declare whether, nationally, they are Serbs or Croats" (Imamović, 1998, p. 454). At one point, a Bosniak MP, Šerif Arnautović, responded, saying: "I have more rights to the language than you who came here (Ibid.). This situation reflects the Serbian and Croatian view that Muslim Bosniaks should be "nationalized" as either Serbs or Croats, which would go on to characterize the relations between these three ethnic-confessional/national communities in the future state that would emerge after World War I. Also, Arnautović's response reflects the deep belief of the Muslim Bosniaks that they were the original, indigenous population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Serbs and Croats had arrived later, and thus had less rights to a common homeland. This idea was later expressed through the renewal of the idea of integral Bosniakhood, or Bosnianhood.

Legally speaking, Bosnia and Herzegovina had the status of a separate but unequal (*corpus separatum*) state entity within the Monarchy after its annexation and the adoption of the "State Statute," and its citizens had neither Austrian nor Hungarian citizenship. but were treated as "Bosnian state subjects" (Bojić, 2001, pp. 148–9).

2.8. World War I and its Consequence

Notwithstanding the short-term settling of the "annexation crisis" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the period before the outbreak of World War I was marked by growing tensions and political conflagrations in the country. At the same time, the State's repression against all those considered enemies of the Monarchy was intensifying, primarily against politically active Serbs and their associations. In particular, the network of internal espionage and denunciations was expanded, which created a climate of general mistrust and fear in society. The defeat of Turkey in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) reverberated strongly and had a significant impact in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbs perceived it as a decisive sign of a change in the balance of power in the Balkans and the foreshadowing of the ultimate liberation from the Ottoman rule and the unification of Serbian countries. A young generation of secondary school and university students who had studied in Europe or Serbia stepped into the political arena. These students, by having read "subversive" literature, had come into contact with radical socialist, anarchist and revolutionary ideas and movements. This caused serious concern among the Austro-Hungarian authorities, who feared that the "contagion" would spread more widely to the Slavic subjects of the Monarchy. In just six years, from the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the outbreak of World War I, 148 lawsuits were filed against Serbs based on various politically motivated accusations (Bataković [ed.], 2015, p. 238), while, at the same time, intense pressure was exerted on Serb educational, cultural and sports societies. Immediately before the War, in 1913, a state of emergency was declared, which banned the work of most of the 710 associations which were presumed to have acted in accordance with the idea of a Serbian nation. It should be noted that among these associations, there were a few with a mixed national composition, including a small number of Muslim ones, representing that part of the Muslim youth that was pro-Serb oriented. During this turbulent time, a youth organization "Young Bosnia" was formed in 1910, the members of which planned and carried out the assassination of the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand of Austria on 28 June, 1914.

The successes of the Allies (Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria) in the Balkan Wars produced a diametrically opposite effect on Muslim public opinion. It

was difficult for them to accept the defeat of Turkey, and especially the fact that the Novi Pazar Sanjak, a natural eastern extension of the Bosnian territory, extensively populated by the Muslims, was split between Serbia and Montenegro. Following the entry of the victorious troops into Sanjak, particularly that part that fell under Montenegro rule, there was a wave of violence against the Muslim civilian population, which resonated painfully among their coreligionists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any cooperation between Serb and Muslim parties virtually stopped, and antagonism and polarization intensified over all issues related to social and political life.

During 1913 and 1914, all relevant political, security, and military indicators suggested that Austria-Hungary was preparing to invade Serbia, a move which Germany firmly supported. By creating an independent Albania, in opposition to Serbian and Montenegrin interests, Vienna felt it would be creating a more favorable environment for its military operations in the Balkans, and a war with Serbia moved from strategic to operational planning. In this tense situation, it was announced that Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand would personally attend the great Serbian religious and national holiday, Vidovdan, and wouldo oversee large-scale military maneuvers in Bosnia and Herzegovina so he could demonstrate the Monarchy's determination and readiness to face Serbia. A group of youths from the organization Young Bosnia decided to assassinate him in Sarajevo as an act of "tyrannicide." Young Bosnia member Gavrilo Princip killed Franz Ferdinand as he passed through downtown Sarajevo. This act is considered to be the immediate cause of the outbreak of World War I, but it cannot be considered its root.

Given the different interpretations of the nature of the organization Young Bosnia, as well as the connection of the Sarajevo assassins with Belgrade, there are some important points to be made. First, the youth revolutionary-national organization Young Bosnia was one of the associations within a broad movement of secondary school and student youth, inspired by various political and philosophical ideas circulating in Europe at the time. Serbs composed most of the members of Young Bosnia, but there were also Muslim Bosniak and Croat members. Their nationalities fluctuated between Serbs and Yugoslavians and their motives were national and social. In their fight, they advocated "strengthening national consciousness, suppressing foreign influence, fostering a cult of victim and knighthood, combating optimism, spreading the cult of freedom and unity of the people" (Gaćinović, 2018, p. 262). Even if they were not able to reach a singular and clear idea of their ultimate political goal, these rebellious young people were unanimous in their hatred of their main enemy, Austria-Hungary, the occupier and usurper of their homeland. That is why they considered the killing of occupying officials to be a legitimate act in the fight for freedom in accordance with the spirit of the period. After their trial in Sarajevo in October 1914, the assassins were sentenced to death and severe imprisonment.

Although there has been much controversy in this regard, historiography has confidently proven that the idea and initiative to assassinate the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince were born and developed within the organization Young Bosnia, and were not imported from outside. During the preparation for the assassination, the members of Young Bosnia kept in contact with members of the secret Serbian officer organization "Black Hand," which supplied them with weapons. However, all this was done without the knowledge, and even against the then political course of the Serbian government and the General Staff. On the contrary, upon learning of the possible assassination, Belgrade even tried to prevent it through diplomatic channels.[42] There are also opinions that official Belgrade knew about the assassination, but took a passive stance (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, p. 152). In any case, there is no evidence that any part Serbia may have played in the assassination justified Austria-Hungary's swift decision to accuse it of this act of political violence and to issue an unacceptable ultimatum to Belgrade, which could not accept such a humiliating demand. Austria-Hungary then immediately declared war on Serbia.

The main fronts of World War I were outside the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the war within it, as a border province with regard to Serbia and Montenegro, caused great social upheavals and daily difficulties for the entire population, especially for the Serbs. Even though they were subjects of the Monarchy, Serbs were perceived as a hostile "fifth column." Immediately after the assassination, demonstrations against the Serbs and assaults on their property took place in several cities. This is why even a "court-martial" for the brutes was begun in Sarajevo, but it was abandoned just before the declaration of war by Serbia. In addition to living in an atmosphere of fear, pressure, and uncertainty, Serbs were exposed to persecution and internment, especially those who resided along the borders with Serbia and Montenegro. *Reis-ul-ulema* Džemaludin Čaušević, some Muslim politicians and even, very mildly, Archbishop Josip Štadler, publicly opposed this stance toward their Orthodox neighbors, but it was both a spontaneous and a state-orchestrated outburst of hatred toward the Serbian population.

And, indeed, the Serbs were exposed to harassment and pogroms throughout the war. Units of the so-called *Schutzkorps* (auxiliary militia) stood out in particular for acts of terror against the Serbs. These units were initially formed by the Austro-Hungarian authorities after the annexation in 1908 for the purpose of taking preventative action against the possible rebellion of the Serb population, and they were returned to service during the war. These units were made up of Muslim Bosniaks and Croats, and numbered about ten thousand soldiers. They are credited with the ethnic cleansing of the Serb population, especially in the border areas of Herzegovina and the Podrinje Valley. Many Muslim Bosniaks and Croats, as well as Serb servicemen,

were mobilized into the regular units of the Austro-Hungarian Army and fought on all fronts of the Great War, including the Serbian front. Horrifying mass atrocities were committed against the Serbs after the successful Austro-Hungarian counter-offensive and the occupation of Serbia in 1915, especially in Mačva and the Podrinje Valley. As a result, Serbs retain an historical awareness of the dark memories of the involvement of the Muslim Bosniaks and Croats in these criminal attacks. On the other hand, when the Serbian and Montenegrin armies had earlier repelled the initial attack of the enemy in 1914 and penetrated into Eastern Bosnia, almost nearing Sarajevo, the Muslim population had been subjected to violence and repression. This, too, created a psychological basis on the left bank of the Drina for endemic, potential revanchism. In general, the border area of the Podrinje Valley and Herzegovina suffered such profound and lasting war traumas that every armed conflict became the scene of the intense inter-religious and inter-ethnic, fratricidal violence.

The outcome of World War I and the disappearance of two great imperial states from the international scene, the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, led to radical political shifts in the Balkans, a change in the configuration of state borders in the region, and the emergence of a common state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which included Bosnia and Hercegovina. The withdrawal of the Ottomans and the end of the Austro-Hungarian occupation represented a new and tremendous shock to this complex, tri-confessional and tri-national country and its population, with the power and consequences of a true tectonic disturbance.

When it became apparent that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would soon collapse, political preparations were rapidly activated for the realization of the previously existing project of creating a common state among the southern Slavs (Slovenes, Croats, Muslim Bosniaks and Serbs) living in the area. On that basis, in October 1918, a National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the then Austria-Hungary was formed in Zagreb. The Main Committee of the National Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina was constituted in Sarajevo, to which the last Austro-Hungarian governor surrendered power on 1 November, 1918, thus formally ending the rule of the Dual Monarchy over this province. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina was left without the practical executive power capable of ensuring peace and order in the country, an agreement was reached with the commander of the Second Serbian Army, according to which the maintenance and monitoring of the order in the country would be under the Army's control. Based on this agreement, Serbian army units entered Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was no possibility of acknowledging or realizing the idea that the new country of the South Slavs should be organized in some sort of a confederal and democratic manner, given the attitudes of the great powers, inter-

national circumstances, and the reality of the post-war relations of the forces. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, with the Karađorđević dynasty on the throne.

3. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia

3.1. Consolidation of the Kingdom and the Position of Muslims

Following its incorporation into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Bosnia and Herzegovina was, for a time, still governed by the National Government, appointed on 3 November, 1918, which was soon renamed the State Government, by the decision of Prince Regent Aleksandar Karađorđević. It was a temporary administrative authority that lasted until the adoption of the Constitution of the new Yugoslav monarchy. However, Muslim historians tend to regard it as the foundation of statehood of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, p.152). Despite the fact that the Temporary National Representation was created as a parliamentary body by the Act establishing the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (1 December, 1918,) the power in the state was objectively held by Prince Regent Aleksandar Karađorđević (who became King in August of 1921), with the help of the army. In December 1918, he appointed the first Ministerial Council, of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which included, according to "the national key," three ministers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a lawyer and National Council member Mehmed Spaho (1883–1939), who was entrusted with the Ministry of Forests and Ores. Thus, this skillful Muslim politician entered the Yugoslav political arena, and as the leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, played a significant role in the interwar period, being the most influential representative of Bosnian Muslims at the common state level. The Temporary National Representation, the main task of which was to prepare the election for the Constituent Assembly, included 42 representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina, of whom only 11 were Muslims, which was not proportional to their numbers in the population. The mainstream of Muslim politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not satisfied with this representation, nor with that of the elected MPs.

Generally speaking, the position of the Muslim population was not favorable after the creation of the new common monarchical state, neither in Bosnia and Herzegovina nor in other areas where they lived, primarily in Sanjak. A kind of revanchism was manifested toward the Muslim Bosniaks, especially immediately after the end of

World War I. They were perceived as "Turks" and, despite the efforts of the authorities and the regular army to prevent harm to them, they suffered various forms of social ostracism, humiliation, and even open violence. Several severe pogroms were even carried out, such as in the villages of Šahovići and Pavino Polje in the Montenegrin part of Sanjak. *Reis-ul-ulema* Džemaludin Čaušević protested to the authorities about the "terror" carried out against the Muslims, but to no real avail. Transformation of resentment against the Muslims into overt violence was sporadic and appeared mostly in the border areas between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, in which the seeds of inter-religious and inter-ethnic hatred had been sown in the past, during the centuries of Ottoman rule, during the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and especially during World War I. Although Serb nationalism permeated all structures of the Kingdom after the Albanian Golgotha, the ordeal the retreating Serbian Army suffered while crossing the Albanian mountains in 1915, and the victory in the war, discrimination against the Muslim population never became part of Belgrade's official policy. Realizing that the unresolved agrarian issue remained a constant source of social conflicts, which took the form of inter-ethnic clashes in the new three-national country, as it had during Bosnia's post-Ottoman Bosnia history, Prince-Regent Aleksandar Karađorđević expressed very early on, in the *Manifesto to the People* of January 1919, the desire to "immediately solve the agrarian issue in a just manner and to abolish serfdom and large ownership of the land." In the same *Manifesto*, he wrote that "in both cases, the land will be divided among the poor farmers, with fair compensation to its present owners (*Manifest Regenta Aleksandra*, 1919)." With the tone of this announcement, Prince Regent sought to appease the dissatisfaction of the poor peasantry, which often turned into assaults on landowners and their property. Together with this, by announcing "fair compensation," he hoped not to cause undue concern among the landowners.

While the new government sought to implement land reform as fairly as possible, since the end of the Ottoman rule, the very policy itself had been opposed by the Bosnian landowners, who were mostly members of the *bey* class. They had politically struggled to preserve the land they had acquired in the old feudal system. Nevertheless, the agrarian reform was implemented throughout the Kingdom, with its reach being the most extensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina, given that there were larger land ownerships there relative to other regions. After the war, reforms became inevitable because, according to the esteemed British historian Seton-Watson, there was a general feeling among the educated in Eastern European countries that the peasantry deserved to receive part of the national wealth through the implementation of agrarian reform, since: "it endured the brunt of the war, and proved, in the greatest crisis known in human history thus far, that it was, in fact, the backbone of the nation" (Seton-Watson, 1945, p. 79). The landowners did not, of course, share

such beliefs, so they saw the agrarian reform and its effects as a great injustice. This view is shared by some Muslim historians who put agrarian reform in the context of "economic destruction of the Muslims," pointing out that most land was taken from the Muslim landowners, that those from other nations were treated more leniently and selectively, and that even the monetary compensation in the form of state bonds to former landowners in Bosnia and Herzegovina has never been fully completed (Bojić, 2001, pp. 164–65). Contradictory values and ideological views on land reform will certainly never be reconciled, due to differing interest being more important to many than reaching an intellectual consensus. When examining the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the two World Wars, it is important to emphasize that the agrarian issue remained politically unresolved and controversial even after the reform, and that it strained Serb-Muslim relations. In the new national circumstances, these relations were reflected in the attitude of Muslim political parties toward cooperation with Serb parties and toward the government in Belgrade, with the Muslim parties always conditioning their willingness to cooperate with some concessions regarding the agrarian issue.

3.2. The Yugoslav Muslim Organization and its Role in Political Life

The position of the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also burdened by widespread poverty, due to an inadequate educational and professional structure, massive dependence on agriculture, which had been stagnating, and certain discrimination against the Muslims in terms of facilitating participation in public administration. This caused the Muslim *bey* and civic classes to understand that they needed to become more unified in order to become actively and effectively involved in the parliamentary political life of the new state. Thus, in February 1919, all smaller Muslim political organizations were united into a Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), which would be the main advocate of Muslim Bosniak interests in the Kingdom until World War II. Although the party also reflected the interests of the landowners, the most active party members were the educated members of the civic community, while the religious establishment had some, albeit lesser influence. Alexandre Popovic observed that the general characteristic of nominally Muslim parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the two wars was that they were much more political and much less Muslim (A. Popovic, 1923, pp. 328–29). Conclusions adopted in April 1919 by the Central Committee of the JMO show that this party adopted as its main tasks and acting directions: the protection of the personal and property security of the Muslims; payment of monetary compensation to the Muslims for the

losses they had suffered after the "coup; fair resolution of the agrarian issue; the introduction of proportional voting rights in the election for the National Representation; the extension of the religious and educational autonomy of Bosnian Muslims to other parts of the country where the Muslim population lived; and the establishment of *sharia* (religious) tribunal institutions. This JMO document also sought to enable the JMO to operate among the Muslims outside Bosnia and Herzegovina (Purivatra, 1977, p. 59). With occasional tactical changes of priorities, these essentially remained the programmatic goals of the JMO throughout the span of its political life in the common state. It should be noted that the JMO was also suggested as a potential political party of all the Muslims in the territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This indicates that as the central civil Muslim political organization, the JMO focused not on a religious program, but on being an advocate for the interests of the Muslims as a religious group in the wider sense.[43] Izetbegović's Party of Democratic Action had a similar attitude later, during the period of the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At about the same time as the rise of the JMO, the political parties of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also established or renewed. Among the Serbians, the Democratic Party, a branch of the ruling Radical Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Union of Farmers were formed. The Croatians established the Croatian National Community and the Croatian Peasant Party, the most influential Croatian party, based in Zagreb, which operated through its branches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to national parties, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was also active in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its program had an internationalist class, i.e., social character, and it was very attractive to many voters due to the extremely unfavorable economic and social situations and poor standard of living experienced by a large part of the population in the country. The Croatian parties all had an autonomist, or federalist agenda, while the Serbian parties worked toward a centralized and unitarist state model, with the more or less pronounced goal of establishing integral Yugoslavism.

The overall political dynamics in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was dominated by either covert or overt confrontation between the centralized state system, advocated by the most influential part of the Serbian political block and, of course, the court, and the demand for greater autonomy of certain state-national entities and a confederate state system, which motivated the actions of the Croatian block. The Slovene block aligned with the idea of autonomy, albeit with much less force and objective significance. For the Muslims, or the JMO, as their political representative, the autonomist line, and therefore the Croatian direction of operation, was compelling. In this regard, the historian Noel Malcolm draws the following conclusion: "Just as the trend in the first decade of the century had been to side with the Serbs as natural allies against Vienna, so the trend now was to side with the Croats

as natural allies against Belgrade" (Malcolm, 1994, p. 165). This statement is, in its essence, correct, but it would be misleading if it were to be seen as representing and explaining the realpolitikal behavior of the JMO and the majority of Muslim politicians in general. Namely, from the very beginning, the Muslims declared loyalty to the unified country and the Karađorđević dynasty, as well as to the centralized constitution of the Kingdom, but with a demand for greater or lesser decentralization or local self-government.[44] In doing so, on every occasion and during inter-party negotiations, the JMO insisted on preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, "the compactness of the Muslim-inhabited territory" (Imamović, 1998, p. 498). The political situation occasionally required the JMO leadership to deviate from consistent adherence to the programmatic principle of autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina when making coalition agreements with the Serbian centralist parties, but this principle was never abandoned (Purivatra, 1977, p. 410). Interestingly, the JMO leader declared himself a Yugoslav national, while some other influential politicians close to him opted for Croatian nationality. At that time, it was impossible to be a Muslim in a national sense, although the Muslim citizens were objectively organized and acted in the public sphere as a separate population group, in the same way as did the Serbs and Croats (Malcolm, 1994, 166). Although the concept of integral Yugoslavia, on which rested the centralist and unitarist model of the Kingdom, implied that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were "tribes" of the same people, the Slovenes were realistically perceived as a separate ethnolinguistic community, since their language was not Serbo-Croatian.

3.3. Political Struggle between Centralism and Federalism

The fundamental and never resolved internal conflict in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was the constant conflict between Serbian and Croatian policies regarding the organization of their shared state. Notwithstanding some subtle nuances in their actions on occasion, the Croatian parties persistently opposed the centralist and unitarist system, which, with certain programmatic and conceptual differences, were advocated by the Serbian political parties, in accordance with the vision of King Aleksandar Karađorđević to form a Yugoslav state. The so-called "Croatian issue" eventually became fateful for the survival of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In such a situation of permanent unrest and with constant demands to decide whether they were Serbs or Croats, the Muslims, all the while protecting their identity, sought to balance between the two exclusive nationalist options through the careful maneuvering of the JMO. Thus, the JMO program states that the Organization

stands for "full equality of the three tribal names" (i.e., Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian), emphasizing that the Muslims never alienated themselves from their homeland, people and language, but only were not "aware of their tribal name" (Purivatra, 1977, p. 418). There was also the view that "nationalizing" the Muslims "was an area for the cultural work of society, and by no means a matter of daily politics," and that this should be done in a tolerant, cautious and reconciliatory manner, through an evolutionary process. Any violent imposition of one or another tribal name was explicitly condemned, and Yugoslavism was deemed "the most appropriate route of rapprochement and unification" (Ibid.). From the above, it is quite clear why those Bosnian Muslims associated with the JMO consistently declared themselves principally for Yugoslavia, while all the smaller Muslim groups and parties which were established in the meantime and were based on explicit pro-Croatian or pro-Serb affiliation had no possibility of winning wider support. Contrary to the view expressed in the JMO program, the Croatian and Serbian sides, with only a few exceptions, saw the process of "nationalizing" the Muslims as a campaign to get them to accept the Croatian or Serbian national name. Some prominent Muslims participated in this campaign, even acting as its leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For some of these Muslims, their support for Croatianism or Serbianism was sincere, while for others, it was based on obtaining personal benefit. A segment of intellectuals and the *bey* class (*begovat*) was somewhat more consistent in opting for Croatianism. Muhamed Hadžijahić, an expert on the subject, cautiously concluded that "from the first emergence of Muslim intelligence to at least the January 6 Dictatorship, if not later, most Muslim intellectuals were pro-Croatian oriented" (Hadžijahić, 1979, pp. 144, 219). He also observed that "the vast majority of Serb and Croat-oriented Muslims deem Serbianism and Croatianism more as a cultural and political platform for their activities, while their Muslim orientation is still the strongest constant" (Ibid.). Declaratively embracing Yugoslavism, most politically active Bosnian Muslims sought to avoid opting for Serb or Croat ethnicity.

However, the project of integrated Yugoslavism failed, although vigorously promoted by King Aleksandar Karađorđević and imposed as an important component of official politics, particularly after the abolition of the Constitution and the implementation of the sovereign's personal authority on January 1, 1929. The King believed that after ten years of living in a common state, it would be possible to overcome the growing inter-ethnic (primarily Serbian-Croatian) disputes by imposing a unitarist state model with a supranational "political nation," the Yugoslavs, as subjects. This soon turned out to be an illusion. King Aleksandar paid for this illusion with his head, being killed by the Ustashe and pro-Bulgarian terrorists in Marseilles in 1934. The remaining few years until the outbreak of World War II did not provide enough time to establish a desperately-needed equilibrium in this deeply divided state by

acquiescing to nationalist and separatist Croatian pressures. Just as Kállay failed to create a unified "Bosnian nation," similar engineering was not possible given the deep religious and national divides in the Yugoslav context.

The political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first Yugoslav period took place concurrently and simultaneously at the local and state levels. The parties from Bosnia and Herzegovina had to realize and justify the support of their local voters in Belgrade, in a complex parliamentary and non-parliamentary game within the context of the conflicting relations among the powers and interests of other participants in the political life. This too is certainly one of the reasons why the Muslims, especially among the political, intellectual and cultural elite in Sarajevo, developed a uniquely ambiguous attitude toward Belgrade: a kind of fascination, but also an antagonism that easily turned into hatred. In the election for the Constituent Assembly of 28 November, 1920, the JMO affirmed itself not only as the strongest and most influential Muslim party, but also as the strongest and most influential party in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general, which it remained permanently. The Serb parties (Radical, Democratic and Union of Farmers) received a total of 63 MPs, but the JMO, with its 24 seats, was stronger than each of them individually. The Croatian parties won 10 seats in the Assembly, and the Communist Party four. After the heated discussions that preceded the adoption of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the JMO decided to vote for the Fundamental Legal Act of the Common State. In return, it was awarded two portfolios, one of which went to the party leader Mehmed Spaho. The Constitution, symbolically proclaimed on Vidovdan on 28 June, 1921, the Serbian religious and national holiday of remembrance of the Battle of Kosovo, legalized a constitutional order based on one nation, one language and a single state. This made the national Serbian idea a state idea, even though the state was not nationally Serbian, but, ideally, Yugoslavian (Bataković [ed.], 2005, p. 283). Most Croatian and Slovenian MPs boycotted the adoption of the Vidovdan Constitution and launched a systematic parliamentary and non-parliamentary contestation of the state system, which they considered unacceptably unitarist and centralist. This dispute lasted as long as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia existed.

3.4. Abolition of the Constitution and King Aleksandar's Personal Rule

Political life in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was characterized by permanent instability. Between 1921 and 1939, there were 31 governments, and party coalitions were repeatedly established and destroyed. The main actors on the political scene were the Radical and Democratic parties on the Serbian side, opposed by the Croatian block, with the Croatian Peasant Party as its most prominent representative. The

Slovenes were represented by the Slovenian National Party. The Court was given the final word in deciding on the general politics. The Provincial Administration, an administrative relic from the Austro-Hungarian period that did not accord with the centralist state model, was gradually dismantled in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1924. In 1922, a decision was taken to divide the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into 33 areas (*oblast*). Accordingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into six districts (*okrug*). The JMO was forced to accept this change, even though it was contrary to the JMO's commitment to preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. General elections in the Kingdom were held in 1923, 1925 and 1927. These frequent elections did not lead to political stabilization, although, at one point, a short-lived coalition was formed between the Croatian leader Stjepan Radić and the leading Serbian politicians. In the last free election in 1927, the JMO, the National Radical Party and the Croatian Peasant Party won the most parliamentary seats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In response to increasing centralist tendencies and the interference of the Court in political life, in 1927, a Croatian nationalist and separatist, Stjepan Radić, and a Serbian Democratic politician from Croatia, Svetozar Pribičević, an early proponent of the concept of "integral Yugoslavism," formed a strong Peasant-Democratic coalition. They began advocating outside the Parliament for the need to recognize the separate national identities of the Yugoslav nations and to reorganize the state in a federal manner. The JMO nonetheless remained part of the centralist government led by the Slovenian politician Anton Korošec, wanting to participate in the municipal elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina from a position of power (*Enciklopedija Jugoslavije,* 1983, p.117). In addition, the federal system would inevitably put into question the territorial integrity of the tri-national state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since primarily Croatia would contest some border areas. Heightened tensions in the country and a heated parliamentary debate in which the opposition accused the authorities of corruption, culminated in a shooting in the Assembly. One Radical MP killed two opposition MPs, and wounded Stjepan Radić, who later died in hospital. This was the end of the unsuccessful exercise of parliamentarism in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Deeming that there was no possibility of reaching a political agreement between the opposing factions in the country and that only the strong assertion of the authority of the central government could address the problems, on 6 January, 1929, King Aleksandar abolished the Constitution, dissolved the Assembly, and immediately imposed personal power. Given the conditions of general turmoil, political disunity, and the prevailing troubled atmosphere, this abolition of parliamentarism was received relatively calmly and without strong reactions from the political parties.

In accordance with a plan prepared in advance, in October 1929, a law was decreed that renamed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the Kingdom of

Yugoslavia and divided it into new administrative areas, nine *banovinas* and the Administration of the City of Belgrade. The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into four *banovinas*: Vrbas, Zeta, Littoral and Drina. Critics of the King's absolutism claimed that the purpose of the new territorial-administrative division of the state was not only to centralize the administration, but, also, to set "a legal foundation for the complete dismantling of traditional national-historic provinces and the formation of state and national unity" (Imamović, 1998, p. 505). It is not difficult to agree with this claim. This change in the organization of the state met with different reactions, depending on how much one valued the policy of creating a unitary Yugoslavia, as carried out by King Aleksandar. Some historians considered the King's moves advanced, albeit utopian in the historical and civilizational sense. What is certain is that even this attempt to create a unified political people from the nations of the former Yugoslav and Balkan territories failed. The division into *banovinas* shattered the historical notion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a territorial entity. All four *banovinas* created on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina also covered parts of traditionally Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin regions, with the Muslim Bosniak population in all the *banovinas* being the minority, which the Muslim public perceived as a great injustice. With the abolition of areas and counties came a massive dismissal of local officials, mainly from the ranks of the JMO, which effectively undid the results of the 1928 municipal elections. On this occasion, Mehmed Spaho, the leader of the JMO, appealed to the King himself, but to no avail.

The new Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, based on grants of privileges and proclaimed by King Aleksandar in July 1930, set out, in principle, a modified relationship between the state and churches and religious communities. The new Constitution was disposed to give the state greater and more immediate control over the institutionalized religious dimension of citizens' lives. For the Muslims, this meant the establishment of a single Islamic Community for the entire territory of the Kingdom, with *reis-ul-ulema* headquarters in Belgrade, and under the control of the Ministry of Religions. This essentially abolished the religious, educational and *waqf* autonomy the Bosnian Muslims had enjoyed since the Austro-Hungarian period (made official by the Statute of 1909). The Supreme Authority was established in Belgrade. There were two *Ulema-majlises*, one in Sarajevo and the other in Skopje, and nine *muftis* were appointed by the King's decree. A strict hierarchy of all bodies of the Islamic Community was established, and the faithful could made independent decisions only on the matters at the level of local *džemats*, or communities of the faithful gathered around one mosque. The issue of the never fully implemented agrarian reform and its aftermath continued to plague relations in the Kingdom, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 62% of the private land was owned by the Muslim

landowners. The government ultimately decided to undertake the land reform, and vigorously began implementing it in 1931 (Ibid., p. 511). However, even until 1941, no full compensation was paid to the landowners for the confiscated land, which created great dissatisfaction among them. The inevitability that inherited feudal agrarian relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be abolished for the purpose of creating a new European country was accepted in the end. However, Bosniak historians from the period believed that the government sought to achieve national-political goals in addition to socio-economic reforms. Mustafa Imamović concluded that "it was necessary to socio-economically completely destroy the Bosniak landowners, and to destroy the Bosniaks as a whole, nationally and politically" (Ibid., p. 510).[45]

With the new Constitution preventing existing political parties in the Kingdom from operating, the central authorities created a new, ersatz Yugoslav Radical-Peasant-Democratic Party, later renamed the Yugoslav National Party, led by a general and Prime Minister Petar Živković. Facing virtually no competition, this formation won the undemocratic National Assembly election. Although the election was public, its outcome cannot be considered as reflecting the will of the citizens of Yugoslavia. The JMO, together with other civic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Kingdom, did not agree to participate in this election. The opposition was not satisfied only with the boycott of the election, but the Croatian bloc — the Peasant-Democratic Coalition, the Democratic Party and the JMO — made public demands for a state transformation. The Croatian explicitly supported autonomy, even separatism, the Democrats advocated some form of federalism, with four administrative units, one of which would be Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the JMO, in line with the priority of preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina's territorial integrity, insisted on a reorganization of the state so that it would respect and allow for the equality of culturally-historically formed entities. The Communist Party also stood for the "democratic national autonomy" of Bosnia and Herzegovina for ideological reasons. While institutional political life was moribund due to the King's practically unlimited personal authority, there was growing discontent throughout the country. This dissatisfaction was particularly pronounced among Croats and Slovenes.

3.5. Assassination of the King and Attempts to Solve the Political Crisis

The assassination of Aleksandar Karađorđević in 1934 opened a new, albeit short period of easing the centralist and unitarist discipline. Given that the Crown Prince and then King Petar II was a minor at the time of his father's death, a three-member regency assumed power. In essence, the power was held entirely by the King's uncle's son, Prince Pavle. Over the next several years, Prince Pavle and the coalition governments

that emerged after the general elections of 1935 and 1938 sought to alleviate the political crisis in Yugoslavia through various maneuvers. During the time of Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović's rule from 1935 through 1939, the government tried to avoid the federalist demands of the most influential Croatian party, Croatian Peasant Party, first by Stjepan Radić and then by the agile and cunning Vladimir Maček. Stojadinović's government included Spaho's JMO as well. Spaho's main condition for joining the coalition was a revision of the constitutional and legal provisions pertaining to the organization of the Islamic Religious Community. This revision was carried out in 1936, and Mehmed Spaho's brother, Fehim Spaho, President of the Supreme *Sharia* Court in Sarajevo, was elected as the new *reis-ul-ulema* in 1937. Fehim Spaho declared himself a Croat of the Muslim faith and would soon, after initially showing loyalty to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, welcome the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941. Stojadinović indirectly tried to ease the burden of the "Croatian issue" by entering into a Concordat with the Vatican. However, this attempt failed because it was strongly rejected by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the public, and even Maček of the Croatian Peasant Party was dissatisfied with it. Croatian demands for the establishment of a federal organization were based on historical and economic reasons, not primarily religious ones.

Following the electoral failure of the Stojadinović's ruling party in the 1938 election, Prince Pavle realized that he had to change the course of action, and he entered direct negotiations with Maček, which suited Maček too. Objectively, Maček could not achieve lasting successful cooperation with the Serbian opposition parties because he opposed the dictatorship from Croatian nationalist standpoints, while the Serbian opposition civil block opposed it from democratic principles. Negotiations with the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party ended with an agreement signed in August 1939 by Maček and the new Prime Minister, Dragiša Cvetković. Soon the two of them formed a coalition government. During the negotiations, Mehmed Spaho, who remained in this government, warned Cvetković not to make concessions at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Shortly before reaching an agreement, Spaho passed away. The main goal of the agreement was the formation of the new *Banovina* of Croatia. The territory of this *banovina* was the only one to be national by name, while the rest of the *banovinas*, from their establishment, were named after large rivers in order to relativize the lines of national divisions in the country. This was the key concession to Croatian nationalism and its Greater Croatian demands, as the *Banovina* of Croatia was territorially extended to most parts of Dalmatia, Slavonia and some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This gave the Croation *banovina* much more weight in relation to other the others: a true state within a state. Prince Pavle hoped that, with this agreement with Maček, it would be possible to stabilize the country in the midst of increasingly dramatic evidence that Europe was heading for war. The

concept of integral Yugoslavism and state unity had definitely been discarded. The creation of the *Banovina* of Croatia caused outrage in Serbia, both among the military and political class, as well as with the general populace. Ideas about the necessity of an all-Serb union and national demarcation of the united Serb territories from Croats were increasingly given voice and justification. The Serbs in the relatively advanced Vrbas *Banovina*, with its center in Banja Luka, were also dissatisfied, because, with the new territorial disposition, this *banovina* was practically surrounded by the *Banovina* of Croatia. For the Muslims, the new solution was extremely problematic, also because it represented yet another step further away from the goal of preserving the historic territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under these new circumstances, new political alignments were made and heated debates took place about the reorganization of the state.

After Mehmed Spaho's death, the new leader of the JMO became Džafer Kulenović, a politician from a *bey* family, with Croatian national orientation and a decidedly anti-Serb sentiment (Malcolm, 1994, pp. 172–3). In November 1939, Kulenović requested autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, making it impossible for the JMO to remain in the Cvetković-Maček coalition government, and the JMO withdrew from it. These altered conditions of political action required the establishment of a new Muslim party that would more successfully engage in the fight for the protection of the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, at the end of 1939, the Movement for Autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, with Džafer Kulenović as its leader. The movement's program stated, among other things: "We demand the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its historical borders because we believe that such a solution would meet the needs of the people of these provinces, as it would satisfy all the economic and geographical development conditions of these provinces and its population" (Stanišić, 1999, p. 170). In discussions on how to reorganize the territorial and legal structure of the Yugoslav community, Kulenović balanced the positions of the Serbian and Croatian parties. He found it acceptable first to hold a general election and then allow the people to affirm the kind of state he wanted, which was represented by the Serbs. However, he did not reject the previous high-level political arrangement made at the highest levels and modeled on the Cvetković-Maček agreement. In practice, this meant that the circle of Prince Pavle, Maček from the Croatian faction, Korošec of the Slovenian National Party and Kulenović representing Bosnia and Herzegovina autonomy interests, reached an agreement on how to demarcate future federal units, after which elections could be held. Regardless of differences in ideological and tactical views, the idea of the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was strongly rejected by the Serbian politicians because it would leave a large Serb population outside the planned Serbian federal unit. However, the Croats, who had already obtained their federal unit, the *Banovina* of Croatia, were determined not to

relinquish any of the territories that were part of their *banovina*, so they were cautious and indecisive in these discussions. Extreme Croatian nationalists considered Bosnia and Herzegovina a Croatian territory. According to Serbian politicians at the time, Kulenović's understanding of the ideology of Bosnian autonomy started from ethnocentric assimilation, in fact, from the unitarian model, against which he spoke when it came to *Yugoslavism*. He wanted to artificially erase the borders between the ethnicity of the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Instead of *Yugoslavism*, Kulenović propagated *Bosnianism* that is, a new "provincial, particularistic nationalism" that was leading to autonomous unitarism. That is why he treated everyone, Serbs and Muslims and Croats alike, as Bosnians, in fact, as a Bosnian nation (Stanišić, 1999, p. 175).

While futile political debates about reorganizing the country were underway in Yugoslavia, there was increasing pressure on Belgrade from Berlin to join the Axis powers after Romania and Bulgaria had aligned with them. Prince Pavle hesitated for some time, but aware that in the event of a German attack, no one could provide effective military assistance to his country, he decided to sign a pact with Hitler on 25 March, 1941, which provided for the Kingdom's military neutrality. After only two days, on 27 March, Yugoslavia experienced an army officers' coup, major demonstrations in Belgrade, the overthrow of the government, and rejection of the pact, which brought Yugoslavia into World War II.

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina During World War II

4.1. Occupation and Division of Yugoslavia

Unlike World War I, during which the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina remained outside the main war fronts, in World War II, this central Yugoslav area was the scene of the most intense hostilities, and its population, together with Serbs in Croatia and parts of Serbia under Hungarian and Bulgarian occupation, was subject to immense suffering. Given its central position, strategic depth and mountainous terrain configuration, Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as a background zone in the defense doctrine and the plans of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army. However, given the character of the conflicts that followed, the occupation of the country, the simultaneous operation of multiple military formations and, in particular, the civil war, Bosnia and Herzegovina actually experienced a different, tragic fate. The army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia quickly capitulated before the concentrated attack of Nazi Germany and its allies. Yugoslavia was occupied and the territory

of the Kingdom was split among Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Bosnia and Herzegovina was diagonally divided by the demarcation line into the northern part under German control and the southern part under Italian control. In addition, a satellite country, the ultranationalist Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was created under the auspices of Nazi Germany, which was to have a profound and crucial impact on future developments in the region. Before a final agreement on the status of the occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina was reached with Italy, Berlin encouraged extreme Croatian nationalists, Ustashe, who also enjoyed hospitality and logistical assistance from the Mussolini regime on Italian soil, to declare the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) in Zagreb on 10 April, 1941. It is important to recall that it was the Ustashe who assassinated King Aleksandar Karađorđević. The entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was incorporated into the ISC, thus fulfilling the dream of the Greater Croat nationalists who considered Bosnia an "old Croatian land." Germany largely left the civilian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the institutions of the NDH, but retained one division and several other smaller units in the country in order to provide strategically important communication routes and smooth exploitation of the country's economic resources relevant to the German war effort. While the Germans controlled the NDH, but they did not interfere too much, with occasional exceptions regard the NDH's internal organization and functioning, because it was not their priority.

Despite the fact that the NDH was a puppet and quisling entity, it was seen by most Croats as the realization of the millennium-old dream of an independent Croatian state. The NDH enjoyed widespread sympathy among the people, the Catholic Church, and political parties, including the leading Croatian Peasant Party led by Maček (even though this cautious politician kept some distance from the Ustashe movement). Immediately after the establishment of the NDH, Stepinac, the Archbishop of Zagreb, visited the interim Prime Minister, Slavko Kvaternik, and blessed the new state.[46] The structure and the administrative organization of the Ustashe government were established by mid-1941. The largest administrative-territorial units were the large districts (*velike župe*), and below them the counties (*kotari*) and municipalities. There were 22 large parishes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the central of which was Vrhbosanska, with Sarajevo as its capital. The names of the parishes were determined by the names of the respective territorial units in medieval Croatian and Bosnian history, in order to emphasize the purported state and historical right of Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given that there were relatively few Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, local Muslims were officially proclaimed Croats, by being credited with "Aryan racial character" (Imamović, 1998, p. 531). and called "the flowers of the Croatian people." This decision was also in accordance with Greater Croat ideology.

The vast majority of Muslim Bosniaks, of course, did not feel Croatian and did not gain any particular practical benefits from this declaratively privileged designation by the Ustashe state. In addition, during the course of the later complex and changing circumstances of political and military alliances and conflicts in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, many Muslims were subjected to systematic violence which the NDH conducted against all "anti-Croatian factors." Nonetheless, in contrast to the Serbs, Jews and Roma, who were the main targets of Ustashe racism, the Muslims were certainly in a far more favorable position. Immediately after the proclamation of the NDH, a number of Muslim politicians (led by Hakija Hadžić, Alija Šuljak, and Osman Kulenović) and religious leaders (Ismet Muftić and Ademaga Mešić), earlier known for their pro-Croatian views, expressed loyalty to Poglavnik Pavelić. The leader of the Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Džafer Kulenović, even became a deputy prime minister of the NDH. Led by a prominent Sarajevo merchant and pre-war senator, Uzeir-aga Hadžihasanović, a joint Muslim-Serb delegation asked Pavelić's commissioner, Hakija Hadžić, for an autonomous administration for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In response, the Ustashe authorities arrested and executed Serb members of the delegation, while the Muslims were severely threatened and ordered to abandon such subversive anti-Croatian ideas. The leadership of the Islamic religious community also acknowledged the fact that the ISC had become the legal state framework for resolving all its status, organizational and property issues, although, in many respects, they were not satisfied with Pavelić's disinterest and unwillingness to respond positively to their specific requests. To the Ustashe state, the Muslims were important symbolically, declaratively and to the extent that they could and wanted to respond to the purpose of cleansing the state from the Serbs, which was the state's absolute priority. In order to achieve this fundamental national and state goal, the Ustashe genocidal doctrine involved three ways of operationalization: physical destruction, expulsion to Serbia, and forced conversion to Catholicism. The implementation of this monstrous program took place without hesitation in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.2. Genocide of Serbs, Jews and Roma in the Independent State of Croatia

As early as June and July 1941, "thousands of Serbs, including women and children, were killed in mass executions, especially in the areas of Herzegovina, eastern Bosnia, and Bosanska Krajina" (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, p. 196). There were no exceptions, even in the urban areas, including Sarajevo. In Sarajevo, the pogrom against the Jews and Serbs began immediately after German troops occupied the city. According to the documented statements of Draga Mastilović, (2019–2020):

> The German ground forces entered Sarajevo on April 15, 1941, and together with the local Muslim and Croat population, who welcomed them enthusiastically, began terror over the Jews. Already on April 16, that is, one day after entering Sarajevo, Jewish property and places of worship were attacked. However, the real terror in Sarajevo began when the Ustashe seized power. Here is how the situation in Sarajevo after the arrival of the Ustashe is described in the documents of the State Commission for Determining the Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Aides in Bosnia and Herzegovina: "The Ustashe sing the most gruesome songs against Serbs, among which the most often sung is the one about *the Serbs on the willows*. Immediately, there was pressure on the Serbs, which would later turn into persecution and the pogrom of the Serbs. Under the guise of searching for weapons, the Ustashe stormed Serb homes in Sarajevo and surrounding villages, raided, seized money and other valuables. When the mass incarceration began, many Serbs were sent to prison, delivered by the Muslims. The Ustashe broke into houses that Muslims said hid the Chetniks, and after the Ustashe, the Muslim mobs also came in, who would plunder whatever they could." On the eve of the Orthodox holiday of Vidovdan, in June 1941, the first mass arrest happened of 150 Sarajevan Serbs, and after they were arrested, they were either killed immediately in Sarajevo, after horrific torture, or taken to the Ustashe concentration camps where they ended their lives. According to a document from the State Commission for Determining the Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Aides, about 7,000 Serbs were killed by the Croatian and Muslim Ustashe in Sarajevo during World War II [Archiv Jugoslivije, xxxx, Folder 49, Doc. No. 49-37]. However, the document does not contain information on whether this number refers to the Sarajevo district or the city of Sarajevo, or whether all those who died, including the killed and taken to the camps are included here. It is most likely that this number, more precisely an approximate estimate of the death toll, refers to the Serbs killed by the Ustashe in the Sarajevo district and that those who were taken to the camps and killed there are also included in this estimate. (Mastilović, 2019–2020, pp. 104–105)

The Serbs were, simply, outlawed. Such terror was carried out throughout the war in all Serb-populated areas, causing a true demographic catastrophe. As a direct consequence of the unprecedented violence to which they were subjected, the Serbs very quickly began to flee into the forests and organize resistance. At first, this response represented a spontaneous self-defense reflex, and had no ideological background or clear political agenda. It was not until 1942 that, as a reflection of the situation and development of the anti-fascist movements in Serbia, which was relatively quickly and increasingly clearly dividing into Partisan, Communist, and

Chetnik royalist movements, that similar differentiation took place in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the leadership of the Communist Party and its leader, Josip Broz Tito, the Partisan movement and its fighting formations aimed at liberating the country from the occupiers, but simultaneously wanted to incite a revolutionary overthrow of the monarchist order and the introduction of popular rule. The Chetniks, under the command of the Colonel of the Royal Army, Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, in principle also fought against the occupiers, but they also sought to preserve the monarchy, with an emphasis on its Serbian character. Both movements were anti-fascist, and, depending on the situation on the ground and the balance of forces, they occasionally, and sometimes for longer periods, enjoyed agreement or tacit mutual tolerance, including certain forms of cooperation and collaboration with the occupying forces. Thus, during the four war years, heavy and convoluted combat operations and accompanying campaigns of violence against civilians took place in the war-torn Yugoslav area, with particular intensity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though it was part of a worldwide conflagration and therefore an international conflict, the war in the Yugoslav territory was also a civil war, given the roles of the domestic warring parties and their opposing national and political motives, which endowed the conflict in Yugoslavia with certain specific characteristics. This fact should be emphasized, since the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s was in many ways a renewal, or continuation of the civil war of half a century earlier. The Bosniak ruling narrative largely contests this insight, defining what took place as the result of the aggression of Serbia and, in part, Croatia, toward an independent and sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[47]

The Muslims traditionally, and particularly after the experience of living in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, had prevailing attitudes of intolerance, or at least distrust toward the Serbs. The Muslims' pro-Croatian sentiment was largely motivated by these deeply anchored, endemic anti-Serb feelings, even though their relationship with the Croats was an uneasy one due to the Greater Croatian aspirations toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. One could say that, overall, the Muslims and a significant part of their political class expected more from Berlin than from Zagreb. It was suggested that Germany might be willing to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's autonomy within the Third Reich, under direct German authority. One petition was sent to Berlin with such a proposal, but the Germans had other priorities at the time and did not want to complicate their relations with the NDH (Bojić, 2001, pp. 185–86). It should be noted, however, that in even the highest Nazi circles, the idea was circulated of using Bosnian Muslims as a separate element to consolidate German positions in the Balkans and as a human reservoir to replenish Hitler's military force. Aware of hesitation among Muslims, Pavelić and the Ustashe authorities took a series of propaganda and administrative steps designed to align the Bosnian Muslims as closely as possible

with the NDH, while also creating as deep a gap as possible between them and the Serbs. There were instances where the members of the Ustashe units, while committing crimes against the Serbs, intentionally wore fezzes on their heads and called each other by Muslim names, so that the perpetrators of the massacre would appear to be the Muslims. Some expiatory Bosniak authors put particular emphasis on this kind of behavior. However, there is no basis for questioning the fact that the crimes against Serbs were committed by many Muslims as well as by the Ustashe. The ruthlessness and cruelty of the Ustashe pogroms against the Jews, Serbs, and Roma, as well as those Muslims determined to be unreliable and opposed to the NDH regime, provoked resistance in Muslim urban environments, where, despite all the contradicting pressures, a certain level of the culture of coexistence had been maintained. As a protest against the Ustashe rampage, as early as 14 August,1941, members of the Muslim Religious Officers' Organization *Al-Hidaja* passed a resolution condemning violence against civilians and urging Muslims to shun such unacceptable actions. Resolutions with similar content appeared in the Muslim communities in Banja Luka, Mostar, Bijeljina, Tuzla and several other cities. The NDH authorities greeted these resolutions with intense anger and took punitive measures against their initiators. These resolutions were, of course, positive and courageous acts during the time of Ustashe domination. However, their level of concern and sympathy for the Serb sufferings should not be overestimated, since, when read carefully, they are aimed largely at demanding protection for the Muslim population from the revengeful Ustashe crimes of repression against the "rebels" (i.e., Serbs), while the terror against the Serbs is cited only in general terms. These resolutions refer to the Serbs as "Greek Catholics" and "Christians," and only rarely, such as in the Mostar resolution, as "Orthodox Serbs." The emphasis was also on explaining that not all Muslims should be blamed for the crimes committed by a "fistful of so-call Muslims (Ibid., pp.190–97)."[48] Overall, the resolutions were primarily defensive. In some cases, even Communist Party activists were involved in the organization of this form of civil protest. When the fortunes of war had already changed globally, as well as on the Yugoslav military front, a group of prominent Sarajevo Muslims was again forced to address the government in Zagreb in the spring of 1944 with a written appeal, noting the unbearable atmosphere of violence in the city. The increasingly nervous Ustashe savagely abducted the remaining Serbs and Muslims, creating increasing concern among the Muslims that the NDH was also to be feared, despite all the proclamations and solemn declarations.

4.3. Liberation Movements and the Civil War

From 1942, Tito's Partisans and Draža Mihailović's Chetniks, as the Yugoslav army in the homeland loyal to the Monarchy and the exiled government in London, became the fiercest enemies. As a result, during certain periods of the war, fighting against each other became even more important than fighting against the occupiers. This internal conflict made the war extra bloody and devastating for the civilian population who had suffered repression from both sides. The violence against the Muslims was led by the Chetniks, motivated by their desire to retaliate for Ustashe and Muslim crimes, and in accordance with their vision of the post-war Kingdom being increasingly more Serb-oriented, in the national sense. The Chetniks executed the largest massacres and pogroms against Muslims in the second half of 1941 and early 1942, and then in August 1942 and early 1943. Muslim settlements in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Sanjak were most heavily struck, and thousands of Muslims were killed. The events in the town Foča and its surroundings were paradigmatic. The town changed hands between Ustashe-Muslim and Chetnik units ten times during the war, and each time, upon taking control of the territory, the units targeted the Serbs and the Muslim Bosniaks, respectively. The Drina was often bloody for both sides. The situation was similar in many other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the consequences of violence in the Podrinje Valley and neighboring areas was the massive refugee movement of the Muslims (the so-called *Muhajirs*) toward central Bosnia and Posavina, including Sarajevo. Given the expulsion of Serbs in the opposite direction, there was an important demographical change in Bosnia and Herzegovina's largest city. The Chetnik units did not always and everywhere act on orders of the supreme command, with which they could hardly establish contact, but, rather, in accordance with local circumstances and proportion of forces. Thus, for example, the Chetnik units worked closely with the occupiers in parts of the territory under Italian control until 1943. Partisans also occasionally negotiated with the Germans, and locally, even briefly with the Ustashe. However, their actions were predominantly aimed against the Chetnik and German forces. The Communist leadership of the Partisan army, which had been steadily growing in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1943, argued against any nationalism in principle, and called for a joint struggle against the occupiers. This message increasingly resonated with the Muslims over time, whose specific group identity was respected in the Partisan formations. After the NDH started collapsing, and Italy withdrew from the war, the Muslims, also fearing that they would be recruited for the Eastern Front, increasingly opted to join Tito's National Liberation Army, both individually and collectively. There were also Muslims who supported Mihailović's monarchists and who advocated the Serbian

national idea and anti-communist ideology, but they were relatively few and had no real chance of gaining much popular support. Parallel to the increasing alignment with the Partisan side, the idea of autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina was being renewed among the Muslims. Because of this, and for the sake of local self-defense, they started forming the so-called "Muslim militias" outside the structure of the NDH units. Thus, in areas of dense Muslim populations, such as Tuzla (northeastern Bosnia) and Cazin (Cazin Krajina), units were formed of exclusively Muslim fighters, but with different provenances and ideological orientations. In Tuzla, a merchant and a reserve major of the NDH army, Muhamed Hadžiefendić, formed a volunteer "Legion" unit in 1942, which included pro-Ustashe and pro-Partisan, even pro-Chetnik members. However, their joint goal was to defend their territory and homes. Hadžiefendić's "Legion" disintegrated as early as 1943, with 5,000 to 6,000 of its fighters joining the Partisans, in large part, while a smaller number joined the SS Handschar Division. Husein Husko Miljković's Muslim militia or army, formed in 1942 in the Cazin Krajina, showed a greater degree of cohesion and combat willingness, but were also highly unreliable, as they often changed sides. For a while, this militia controlled a rather vast territory. Husko Miljković, a deserter from the Partisan ranks, gave his "army" of several battalions the symbol of a crescent moon and a star, and their battle cry was "for Islam!" Miljković was independent on his territory, negotiating with both the NDH delegates and the Partisans, but most fearing the Germans. A prominent member of the *ulema-majlis* and a distinguished professor of Arabic, Muhamed Pandža, played a significant role in this "army." When Miljković assessed that Tito's National Liberation Movement would emerge victorious from the war and that the Germans and the NDH would be defeated, he joined the Partisans and merged his entire militia with their units, retaining command of his fighters. Because of this "betrayal," the Germans and the Ustashe organized the assassination of Miljković, but his supporters remained in the Partisan army for the most part (Redžić, 1987, pp. 131–33, 161). In northeastern Bosnia in the summer of 1943, a teacher from Tuzla, Nedžad Topčić, formed the so-called "Muslim Green Cadres" mostly from deserters from the NDH army and those who wanted to avoid Ustashe recruiting. Members of these forces relied on the Germans militarily and logistically, and fought mostly against the Partisans, committing "many crimes against the Serb population and Partisan background facilities" (Bojić, 2001, p. 216) in their operations. Topčić's units also cooperated with the 13th SS Handschar Division, certainly the most significant Nazi unit formed during the war in the Yugoslav area, consisting mostly of Muslims. This division was established directly by the Germans, by decision of the highest Nazi leadership. Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler was personally responsible for its organization. This unit was formed in part because of the need of the Nazi forces in Southeast Europe to be filled and strengthened by domestic

fighters, and also because this unit in particular played an important role in the wider context of establishing a collaboration between the Nazis and the worldwide pan-Islamist movement[49] in order to fight the common enemies, Western allies and Russia. The creation of a predominantly Muslim Bosniak SS unit was modeled in accordance with an earlier formed SS Prinz Eugen Division, which included ethnic Germans (so-called *Volksdeutscher*) from Banat (Vojvodina) and other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The NDH authorities were suspicious of the formation of a purely Muslim military unit on their territory outside the Ustashe army structure. However, Himmler insisted that the new unit be purely Muslim. He believed that the Reich should exploit the potential of a population group in Bosnia and Herzegovina that stood apart from purely Croatian national interests. It is also possible that Himmler saw in some of Islam's features as a religion the promising potential of Muslim soldiers. So, for example, in an address to the members of the State Propaganda Office, he said: "I tell you that I have nothing against Islam because it fits this division and its people: it promises them heaven if they fight and fall in this fight; for soldiers, this is a practical and likeable religion!" (Bernwald, 2018, p. 110). Authorities in Zagreb eventually had to agree with the creation of a Muslim SS division and even transferred some of the Croatian officers and Muslims recruited to the NDH army to it. Even when recruitment began, the NDH Deputy Prime Minister, Džafer Kulenović, told the German military commissioner for the NDH, General Glaise von Horstenau, that he doubted there would be enough volunteers among the Bosnian Muslims to fill the unit, saying that 100,000 Muslim youth would easily would have gathered under the German flag in 1941, but that the situation had changed in the meantime (Redžić, 1987, p. 82). Recruiting for the Handschar Division began in April 1943 and did not advance quickly or easily, so the required number of about 20,000 fighters was achieved only with the addition of recruits from Croatia. Upon creation, the new division was named the Croatian SS Volunteer Division, and subsequently, from October 1943, the 13th SS Bosnian Volunteer Mountain Division, and from May 1994 until the end of the war, the 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar. In addition to the standard uniforms and insignia of SS units of the German Army, members of the Handschar Division wore grey-green fezzes on their heads, a Croatian coat of arms on their left sleeves, and a swastika and a hand holding a curved short saber — a *handschar* — on their collar, a heraldic symbol taken from the coat of arms of the medieval Bosnian state, and used during the Austro-Hungarian occupation (Bernwald, 2018, p. 303).[50] Although most of the fighters of the newly formed unit wanted to reside and operate in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and fight against the Chetniks, they were sent first to France and then to Germany, specifically the occupied Polish province of Silesia, for training. It was not until February 1944 that the division was transferred to the territory of the ISC and started fighting in

Slavonia and northeastern Bosnia. The main enemy, against which the 13th Handschar Division fought alongside the Ustashe, Germans, and even the hated Chetniks, were the Partisan units. In their cleansing and "pacifying" of the region, members of the Division committed grave crimes against civilians. Before the final defeat, when the Partisan and Soviet troops advanced, the 13th Handschar Division withdrew together with the Germans deeper into Croatian territory, and then the Division completely disintegrated, with some of its soldiers joining Tito's army.

In addition to fighting fiercely in the Yugoslav front, the Partisan and Chetnik movements were aware of their inability to realize their opposing military and especially ideological and political goals without the support of allies from abroad. As a monarchist, Draža Mihailović counted on the support of the West, primarily the British. After all, the exiled Yugoslav government had its headquarters in London. Tito's partisans certainly could have counted on Soviet help, which they received during the final fighting for the liberation of the country. However, despite ideological disagreements with the Western powers, Tito also sought to win their sympathy, although this did not seem realistic for quite some time. In light of the supremacy of the National Liberation Army on the ground, in 1943, Churchill made the decision to direct not only propaganda, but also very precise, logistical assistance to the Partisans in the future. Thus, Draža Mihailović was left alone with his rather disorganized troops.

The collapse of Nazism on the Yugoslav front also meant the victory of the Communists, with all the exorable consequences for the participants in the bloody civil war. The determination of the winner to achieve legal continuity with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but to establish the state on a federal principle and with a radically altered social order based on the idea of Communist internationalism and the rule of the people, created a new situation for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even during the war, the formation of Muslim units and the equal involvement of Muslim party cadres in political life laid the groundwork for establishing a federal unit, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a community of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The Communist ideologues did not have a clear and unified idea about the nationality or name of the Muslim population during the war and in the first years following it. Almost all, however, agreed that Muslims had separate identity characteristics and a distinct collective self-awareness with respect to Serbs and Croats, which also had to be appropriately expressed in the political area, including the constitutional system of post-war Yugoslavia. As early as the autumn of 1943, the first concrete steps were taken to establish a legal framework for the future federal unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the liberated territory in Mrkonjić Grad, the First Session of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZAVNOBIH) was held on 26 and 27 November, 1943. This, then, served asthe highest political body of the National Liberation Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The delegates at the ZAVNOBIH session declared themselves in favor of the federal organization of the People's Republic Yugoslavia (FNRJ), in which Bosnia and Herzegovina would be an equal, sixth federal unit, without a national distinction. This ZAVNOBIH session and the decisions taken at it are considered the founding acts of the Federal Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were confirmed at the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce on 29 November, 1943, when a constitutional decision was made to create the post-war Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (*Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, 1983, p. 127).

Bosnia and Herzegovina, where some of the greatest battles had been fought and where the civil war had had disastrous effects, emerged from World War II severely devastated, having suffered great human and material losses. It is roughly estimated that approximately 500,000 people were killed in the region. Only in 1951 did Bosnia and Herzegovina reach the population it had enjoyed in 1939. Since completely accurate and complete data do not exist and cannot be obtained, it is estimated that among the casualties, there were 210,000 Serbs, over 100,000 Muslim Bosniaks, approximately 80,000 Croats, 10,000 Jews, and more than 5,000 Roma (Bojić, 2001, p. 224).[51]

5. Bosnia and Herzegovina from the End of World War II Until the Outbreak of the Yugoslav Crisis (1945–1990)

5.1. The Era of Official "Fraternity and Unity"

In order to understand the combination of factors that led to war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and which essentially influenced certain significant characteristics that it took on, it is critical to analyze the period that preceded it, or the period from the end of the Second World War until the end of the 1980s. It may seem paradoxical, but it is also quite easy to explain why the decades during which Bosnia and Herzegovina was as one of the six republics of the federal Yugoslav state are most often avoided or overlooked when interpreting the events of the early 1990s. Most of the authors who have dealt with this topic identify the main factors that created the conditions for the outbreak of a bloody war in Bosnia and Herzegovina outside the pre-war socio-political reality of the central Yugoslav republic. Depending on the ideological starting point, the political interest or the theoretical framework of the individual interpreters, several factors or explanations are proffered to explain the outbreak of the war: the

aggression from Serbia and/or Croatia, which stirred up their compatriots in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the members of other nations and faith; the continuation of the conflict from the time of the World War II, during which more than 380,000 people died in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the awakened antagonistic nationalisms that were suppressed outside of political life during the official socialist "fraternity and unity;" the interests of the great powers that had always shaped the fate of the Balkans; the local manifestation of "the conflict of civilizations," in accordance with the assumptions of Samuel Huntington; and more, including combinations of the aforementioned factors. Although all of these factors are more or less relevant in achieving a comprehensive understanding of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the serious shortcoming of most of the previous interpretations is that they almost completely ignore the social processes and other circumstances that shaped this republic since 1945 until 1990, omitting them from the analytical focus. Therefore, it is very important to objectively investigate precisely this missing, fundamentally important link in the process of establishing an historical and social framework for explaining what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995. It is not reasonable that the roots of how these three peoples, the Muslim Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, behaved toward each other at that time are deemed as having originated outside the reality of the social space of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with everything that was evil suddenly coming from the outside or from some metaphysical sphere. In particular, it is necessary to show how the social and political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina was organized at the time of the Communist rule, how the political elites of all three constituent peoples behaved and how their political positions were transformed into action.

The tendency among outsiders, especially from the West, including among academics, to view the post-war Yugoslav reality with sympathy and fairly uncritically, is well known. Several factors contributed to this sympathy toward Yugoslavia during the Cold War. These included Tito's "no" to Stalin in 1948; Tito's skills as a statesman; the country's distancing from the Communist bloc; the country's building of self-governing socialism "with a human face;" its openness toward the West; the country's relatively less oppressive treatment of human and civil rights than other countries behind the Iron Curtain; as well as some more liberal elements in the economic system. All these factors contributed to Yugoslavia enjoying more favor from the West during the Cold War period. As a result, many in the West closed their eyes to the authoritarianism of the undemocratic Communist regime and its harsh treatment of every kind of alternative political thinking and action. These attitudes toward Yugoslavia were particularly evident with respect to its central republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are real internal reasons for this as well. Namely, unlike the situation in other republics, especially in Serbia and Croatia, as well as in Slovenia,

where the cracks in the federal structure began to appear early, all the fundamental values and principles of the Yugoslav "fraternity and unity" and self-managing socialism were most fully respected and realized in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without major tensions, especially any perceptible from the outside. Toward the end of Tito's rule, since the 1970s, there was an occasional "turning from Tito's way" in Croatia and Serbia, as it was expressed at the time. Nationalists in Croatia, the "liberals" in Serbia, technocrats and "economic nationalists" in Slovenia, created the so-called "affairs" and disturbed the balance based on the Communists' ideological orthodoxy and monolithic image. Even Tito, the undisputed leader, had to intervene in more difficult situations and against some more serious challenges. As the central republic of the three-national country, Bosnia and Herzegovina was called "Small Yugoslavia." As has been seen, crucial battles in the national liberation struggle were waged on its territory, in which, as it was said, "the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav peoples were forged," which was subsequently extended to "nationalities" too (which was the politically correct name for the members of national minorities). It was therefore of particular importance and symbolic significance that precisely in this multinational republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the supranational ideal of "Yugoslav patriotism" was consistently cultivated. How was this accomplished? First, by applying the so-called national key in assigning responsible functions and leadership positions in sensitive state services to political representatives of the Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Immediately after the end of the war, taking into consideration their most massive participation in Tito's People's Liberation Army, the Serbs were relatively the most dominant group holding responsible and influential duties and job. However, following systematic implementation of the human resources "key," a uniform representation of all three constituent peoples was achieved by the 1960s. The principle of equality was established in the war, and in the "Conclusions" of the National Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZAVNOBIH), held on 25 November, 1943, which was formulated as follows:

> Today the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina...want that their country**,** which is neither Serbian, nor Croatian, nor Muslim, but Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim, to be free and integrated Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which full equality and parity of all Serbs, Muslims and Croats will be ensured. (Čaušević, 2005, pp. 420–30)

The formula "neither Serbian, nor Croatian, nor Muslim, but Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim" concisely summed up the political doctrine that was systematically implemented in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Communist "strong hand" through a number of means, from educational and propaganda, through legal and administrative, to disciplinary and repressive actions. Particular attention was paid to not allowing nationalistic tendencies among the members of the three peoples and potentially interconnected strengthening of the "reactionary" religious feelings to manifest themselves. It has long been established that religion, or belonging to one

of the three religions/confessions, was a decisive factor in the formation of nations in the Slovene South. Any manifestation of more pronounced nationalism or religious radicalism, and even its hint, was nipped in the bud, and the individuals who were regarded as responsible for such expressions were removed from political life and excluded from the reliable "nomenclature." Some were even prosecuted for "counterrevolutionary action." All this was carried out by Tito's loyal political leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was jointly composed of representatives of the three constituent peoples, with the established practice of the separate Serb, Muslim and Croat cadres dealing with the black sheep within their respective groups. This approach was consistent with the old Communist rule that "everyone should clean up in his own yard" and carry out differentiation in their ranks. This mechanism functioned for quite some time, leading to minimal turmoil in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to economic advancement from the 1970s through the mid-1980s stemming from and enabled by the centralized state planning and the creation of large economic systems in the country (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, pp. 265–66). In that way, the state of "peaceful Bosnia" was maintained, as it used to be said, and Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoyed evident social prosperity, even more dynamic than that of the more developed republics, Serbia, Croatia, and even Slovenia. In the field of culture, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced great advances. Sarajevo's mixed urban environment provided fruitful ground for original and high-quality projects, and, at the Yugoslav level, it had supplied a greater number of notable artists in various fields of art. This great national advancement and civilizational rise of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the positive influence of the central Yugoslav republic and its capital of Sarajevo culminated in 1984, when the Winter Olympics were successfully organized in Sarajevo. For a short time, this town on the Miljacka River, became more famous in the world for the Olympics than for the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand in 1914, which had lit the already smoldering spark leading to World War I. In the reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then, both in the country and abroad, an almost ideal, realized form of a coherent multinational, multi-religious and multicultural environment was recognized. What lay under this harmony was not seen at that time, although some worrying indications were already there. The static positive stereotype about Bosnia and Herzegovina, combined with the generalized view of the international community, mainly in the West, about the causes of the crisis and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, made the outbreak of the internal war in this republic come as a surprise (Dimitrijević, 1992).

Of all the Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina was most fully integrated into the structure of a unitary and centralized state under the conductor's baton of the monolithic Communist party. First, like Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was multinational and did not have any memory of state independence, as did Serbia

and Montenegro. Nor did Bosnia and Herzegovina express any ambition to achieve such independence, as had Croatia and Slovenia. It should be recalled that while there was a Bosnian state in the territory of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Middle Ages, this could not be objectively identified as having any continuity with any modern nation. The Serbs and Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina considered themselves nationally as parts of the general Serbian or Croatian national corps, and considered Serbia and Croatia as their motherlands. Belgrade and Zagreb were cultural lighthouses, but also political guides, notwithstanding the fact that both the Serbs and the Croats actively participated in a disciplined manner in the realization of a supranational, republican community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslims, for a long time, felt that they were something separate, neither Serbs nor Croats, although they shared the same origins as the modern Muslims, having undergone an Islamization process from the Serb and Croat roots. Consequently, the Muslims were willing to accept the vision of a supranational "republic patriotism," toward which the political elite of all three peoples worked.

5.2. Emergence of "Republican Nationalisms"

Although the rhetoric of "fraternity and unity" was consistently maintained in the Yugoslav federation and quite a great deal of effort was expended to politically preserve state unity at the federal level, it is generally estimated that the first signs threatening "Yugoslavism" through the affirmation of republics' nationalisms appeared already in the early 1960s. The dissatisfaction with the centralized management of the federation was expressed first in the sphere of the economic planning and the developmental plans, as well as in the distribution of the financial power. The more developed republics, first Slovenia, and then Croatia, considered that too large a portion of the resources they generated was going to support the less developed parts of the common state. From early on, the demands for changing the federal funding system had in the background the covert dimension of political and/or national aspirations toward greater autonomy. Following a number of stages and a series of political disputes at the top of the party hierarchy with the advocates of a stronger centralization of the state, the proponents of decentralization, led by influential the Slovenian theoretician of the socialist self-management Edvard Kardelj, finally succeeded in their efforts with the adoption of the *Constitution of Yugoslavia* in 1974. With the new Constitution, which could not have been adopted without Tito's consent, the federal state was objectively dismantled and became a confederal sum of the republics and provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija, all with real state attributes. The struggle, purportedly against the alleged supremacy of the Yugoslav

state, and, as it was said, its unitarism and centralism, gradually and increasingly took on the distinctive features of a movement for exclusive nationalism, with the potential for separatism. The Central Committees of the League of Communists (SKJ)[52] in the republics and provinces actually became the republican governments whose representatives at the federal level were challenging and competing with their colleagues from other republics. The main advocates of the "dying off" of the federal state came from political forces in Croatia and Slovenia, while the strongest resistance to this increasingly obvious tendency came from Serbia. The Serbs were the most numerous people in Yugoslavia and most of them lived outside their homeland, in practically all the republics and provinces, so the survival of the common state was the most logical solution for them. The possible division of Yugoslavia according to previously irrelevant internal republic borders was experienced by the Serbian national corps as a breach of its territorial-ethnic continuity. In addition, they assumed that the process of confederation of the common state could lead to the eventual transformation of these parastatal borders into state and internationally recognized borders. As a result, the Serbs, from the status of an equal constituent people, would be degraded to the position of a national minority, and in the states with not only national but nationalistic characters. The Serbian preference to remain in a single federation was perceived and presented by those who advocated for Yugoslavia's disintegration along the republics' borders as an expression of the "Greater Serbian hegemony" and part of the project of creating a "Greater Serbia," thus threatening their own nationalisms in what they considered a struggle for equality and democracy. From these ideologically and tendentious projections regarding the relative roles of the Yugoslav nations in the process of disintegration of the common state, the interpretative stereotype was created according to which the Serbs (the "Slobodan Milošević policy") were the main destructive factor in the death of Yugoslavia, and that the behavior and actions of all the other nations were primarily reactive. As a consequence of such a simplified perception of an extremely complex and long history of events on the Yugoslav territory, a selective attitude based on their nationalities was assumed toward the victims of the conflicts and wars that the former Yugoslavs fought against each other.

For the political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was focused on countering Serbian, Croatian and Muslim nationalism, as well as all the phenomena that could violate the republic's cohesion based on the equality of the three constituent peoples, the strengthening of the republics as states was a serious temptation. In other republics, primarily in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia, and later in Montenegro and Macedonia, as well as in the autonomous province of Kosovo (and Metohija), insistence on republican statehood led to a closing of national ranks and the rise of authority that encouraged, organized or just followed the drive for statehood. This

was not possible at the republic level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the "Bosnian-Herzegovinian political nation" and supranational Bosnian identity simply did not exist. They could not have been created, regardless of the persistence of the political class in Sarajevo to maximize the affirmation of these values. The Serbs continued to increasingly feel as Serbs, and Croats as Croats, and they turned their eyes toward Belgrade and Zagreb.

The acceptance by the party leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by an ambitious party leader, Branko Mikulić, of the concept of strengthening the republics as antagonistic national states, could not contribute to the internal cohesion of the Republic; on the contrary, it increased the national divisions in the country. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, no one nation constituted a majority of over 50% of the citizens in Bosnia, so no one nation could be considered the natural bearer of a national and state sovereignty. Consequently, propaganda about an allegedly specific, "endemic" civilian habitus of a Bosnian-Herzegovinian for social identity inevitably collided with the reality of a deep inter-ethnic and inter-confessional divide. Only the Yugoslav state framework could provide stability for Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of all the republics, it was the most similar to Yugoslavia, due to the complexity of its demographic structure. The conflict between and the breakup of the Serbs and Croats could not happen without affecting the members of these two nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This reality landed a fatal blow to the unity of the central Yugoslav republic. It was illusory to expect the internal three-national unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be preserved upon the supranational concept of the "Bosnian statehood," relying on the myth of the trans-historical continuity of the "Bosnian spirit" and the Bosnian state. Only the Muslims (43.47% of the population in 1991) were interested in the survival of the unified Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unitary republic. The minority group of Croats (17.38%) essentially were not supportive of unity, but they occasionally and tactically supported it, while the Serbs (31.21%) were decisively against it. It can reasonably be assumed that the option of a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina suited its proportionately numerous groups of citizens (5.54%) who declared themselves as "Yugoslavs" in the 1991 census, and among them were mostly ethnic Serbs and Muslims. In any case, the divisions were so deep that they could not be overcome by the worn-out rhetoric about historical self-sufficiency and the traditional unity of Bosnia (and Herzegovina).

It should be emphasized that the advocates of a synthetic supra-nationalism, as the desirable self-identification of all "Bosnians" (i.e., the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of their ethnicity), in their public discourse largely omitted the regional name of Herzegovina and focused on Bosnia. This omission was certainly consistent with the idea that all the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina should form a political nation, the "Bosnians" (*Bosanci*), on the basis of Kállay's old unsuccessful

project. In Yugoslavia, there was a habit of colloquially calling all the inhabitants of the central republic the "Bosnians," regardless of religion and nation. However, this sobriquet never, neither in Bosnia nor outside, blurred, let alone replaced, the awareness of the different groups in the region that they belonged to three distinct ethno-cultural/national groups.

5.3. Political Consecration of the National Name "Muslim"

The objective convergence of the interests of the Sarajevo Communist nomenclature with those of Bosnia at the time of growing evidence of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, came from the position of the republican statism, on the one hand, and the growing Muslim nationalism. This led to increasing reliance on the Muslim element in official policy. Of course, this tendency additionally undermined the idea of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina among the Serbs and Croats, although the "cadres" recruited from these two peoples continued to participate actively in actively promoting it. Many Serbian and Croatian, but also Muslim intellectuals, aware of their ethnicity, that is, of Serbian or Croatian origin, and being unwilling to accept the imposed "Bosnianism," faced the pressure of a sort of a party "inquisition." These people often left the homeland and went to Belgrade or Zagreb, where they could freely act and express themselves. In the new circumstances, when the rhetoric of "brotherhood and unity," both at the federal and the republican levels, became increasingly strident, yet devoid of sense, the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself at the center of a vortex of social and political processes. Times demanded clear national consciousness and an adequate national name, but Muslim uncertainty about this issue continued, although after the Second World War, the previous campaign of their (Serbian, or Croatian) nationalization was abandoned. Already during the war, in order to recruit them for wider engagement in the national liberation combat against the occupiers and the quisling NDH, and respecting their realistic uniqueness, the Communist leadership treated the members of the Muslim population as an equal Yugoslav nation. ("Bosnian Muslims are not a formed nation, but, in relation to the Orthodox, Serbs and Catholic Croats, they are a distinct *ethnic group*" [Purivatra, 1970, p. 118]). However, there was a concern as to how to name that *ethnic group,* which differed from the ethnically related Serbs and Croats, who spoke the same language, only through their religious and cultural affiliation to Islam. To officially call them "Muslims" in the national sense was not easy for the atheist Communists, for obvious reasons, and it was thought that the process of forming a national consciousness would be followed by a secularist and modernized pattern of

development. The national name "Bosniak," which seemed to be more appropriate to many, was unpleasantly associated with the Austro-Hungarian times, and it was possible to arouse suspicions among the Serbs and Croats that such naming of the citizens of the Muslim faith suggested that the Muslims were the "fundamental" nation to which Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged, and therefore with more property rights than the Serbs and Croats.

The different phases of the search for the most appropriate national name for Yugoslav Muslims was reflected in the post-war censuses. Until 1948, national affiliation was not a part of the census. In the general population census in 1948, the Muslims were given alternative options: to identify themselves as the members of the existing nations (Serbs, Croats, Macedonians) or as the "undeclared Muslims." In the sections for "Serbs" and "Croats," a statistical model of subnational affiliation, "Serb Muslims" and "Croat Muslims" was introduced. Citizens who identified themselves as belonging to these subnational affiliations were added to the total number of Serbs or Croats, based on the proposition that these Muslims were people for whom the national consciousness was greater than the religious, which was considered a positive evolution. In the census in 1953, the previous solution was abandoned and the term "Yugoslavs nationally undeclared" was introduced. It is indicative, for example, that more than 90% of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina marked this section. The next census in 1961 took the novel and significant step of introducing the section "Muslims (ethnic affiliation)," while maintaining the "Yugoslavs ethnically undeclared" option as well.

The crucial move in determining the status of the *muslims* speaking the Serbo-Croatian language in Yugoslavia was made after long discussions in 1967, when the Muslims, with Tito's approval, were recognized as a separate nation. This decision was orthographically endorsed by the fact that the future national affiliation was to be written with a capital initial letter ("Muslims"), and the religious affiliation, as before, with a small initial letter.[53] This pragmatic solution was inherently ambiguous regarding the connection of nationality and religion. Therefore, even for a small number of those for whom this approach solved their problem, the new official national name was, at the beginning, and, for some, remained even permanently, inappropriate. It was especially difficult to explain to foreigners how this religious-national identity, traditionally accepted only for the Jews, could exist. In the following general population censuses of 1971, 1981, 1991, a new section, "Muslim" was found on the lists, without any additional clarification. Thus, at least statistically, the issue of the national name of Yugoslav muslims/Muslims was resolved. But not with any certainty, as became clear afterwards.

5.4. Comprehensive National Emancipation of Muslims

In comparison to other European nations, including their neighbors, the Serbs and the Croats, the process of national awareness among the Slavic Muslims who spoke the Serbo-Croatian language began historically later, so they were perceived as a "belated nation," which, of course, is an extremely relative, and epistemologically irrelevant judgement. In the opinion of a number of theoreticians, this is a typical case of the "synthetic" nation, which was manifested through the components, methods and means of its formation. Unlike the Serbs and Croats who spoke the same language, the Muslims do not have a national motherland, and at the time of the official proclamation as a separate nation, did not even have a national flag, coat of arms, anthem or other distinctive features. Their national history was not written, and they did not have a separate corpus of national literature and art; there was no *Muslim* academy of science. All these national attributes and institutions had yet to be created. In essence, the elements of identity specificity, that purportedly existed, had to be formulated over this new nation, because they had been never articulated or institutionalized at any systemic level other than the traditional one. It is not, therefore, strange that in the national emancipation of the Muslims, Islam, as both a religion and culture, was a crucial formative factor, which essentially distinguished them from the Serbs and the Croats. It was exactly because of that central place of religion, that secularized Muslims, of which there were a significant number among the intellectual elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in Sarajevo and some other urban environments, felt uneasy with a national name identical to the name of a religious affiliation. For them, it was more acceptable to have a national name of Bosniak (Bošnjak), which dissimulated a religious dimension of identity.

Upon its officialization of the Muslim nation, Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into a very delicate period of its planned and systematic affirmation in all domains, on the one hand, and the maintenance of a vigorous ideological attention that the affirmation would not undermine the balance with the other two constituent peoples. In that continuous process of weighing every area of endeavor, from education and culture, to sports and more, on the scales of the cohesion and integrity of the republic state, party-bureaucratic control could not be sustained for long. A broad program of research and publication was launched, through generously subsidized individual editions and entire libraries of the Muslim cultural heritage in the fields of history, literature, language, art, folk creativity, and more. In professional as well as in wider circles, it was soon noticed that in some segments of this "cultural revival," the cultural dimension was being largely identified with the religious one. That is, clearly

Islamic contents were often masked as works of extraordinary cultural value, which, in comparable cases on the Serbian and Croatian sides, would be inconceivable (Popović, 1984, p. 409). Such uncritical favoritism toward everything that was Muslim provoked suspicion in both the Serbian and Croatian environments. However, their reactions were attenuated by the necessity of achieving equality in every sphere for the Muslims with the other two constituent peoples who had previously affirmed themselves nationally and who culturally relied on their motherlands, Serbia and Croatia to be equal in everything. Such "positive discrimination" of Muslims increasingly irritated and agitated the Serbs and Croats, but their resentments were rarely publicly expressed.

Although in every respect the tri-national republican leadership supported the course of the emancipation of the Muslim nation, which was objectively its main ally in advocating for a stable republic statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it remained alert to detecting and stopping any political venture of Muslim intellectuals and artists outside the permissible space of the treatment of Islam as a culture and tradition. They were aware that marginalized Islamists, who had advocated for the introduction of Islam as a platform for political action in society, and with whom they had occasionally come into conflict from the early post-war period, would try to step into the public space opened by the process of national affirmation of the Muslims. The Islamic religious community (IVZ), based in Sarajevo, which was comprised of Muslims at the Yugoslav level, consisted of Islamic communities organized on a territorial basis, where the territories of their jurisdictions did not coincide with the republics' borders. The Communist authorities and their specialized police and secret services generally managed to control the activities of the IVZ and prevent its radicalization and politicization, even at one time influencing the choice of the *reis-ul-ulema*. On the other hand, since the connection between Serbian and Croatian nationalism and the Serbian Orthodox Church, or the Catholic Church in Croatia, was viewed with much more suspicion and as a greater danger for the system, the Islamic religious community had a relatively broader maneuvering space for social action. The only condition was that it should not openly engage in political events and not criticize the secular and atheistic authorities from Islamic positions. The IVZ calculatingly used this position to strengthen their infrastructure, including the building of mosques, and the spread of religious education.

Such a favorable climate was especially strong in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where most Yugoslav Muslims lived. The prominent role of Yugoslavia and President Tito personally in the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, where many countries were Muslim, likely contributed to a greater degree of tolerance toward the Islamic

community and Muslims in general. Yugoslavia had developed friendly relations with Muslim nations, enjoying dynamic cooperation in various areas, which enabled Yugoslav Muslims to establish close two-way links with co-religionists in these countries (Ibid., pp. 35–36). In general, the Islamic community readily welcomed the moment in which a religious-national identity connection would be established among the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in other parts of Yugoslavia, which was secularized to a considerable extent. The Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church did not enjoy a similar privileged status. The prominence and international reputation of the Vatican, despite occasional crisis situations in Yugoslav-Vatican relations, provided the Catholics with somewhat more opportunities for organized, institutional religious activity in the society. However, the Serbian Orthodox Church was in the worst position, with the weakest organization and under the strongest pressure of the state in which the Serbian cadres were ideologically highly disciplined and the most zealous for a "cleaning in their ranks." It is often overlooked that the most influential Serb members of the Communist nomenclature played as an important role as did their Muslim counterparts in consolidating the Muslim religious-national corps in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1980s.[54]

5.5. Islamic Dimension Within the Emancipation Movement

Although para-political activity from Islamist positions was often suppressed on the social and political surface in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was never completely interrupted, running like a river underground, and only occasionally emerging or drawn into the sphere of public attention. A group of Muslims, predominantly young ones, who founded the "Young Muslims" organization before the Second World War, continued to gather in a semi-clandestine way even after the war. These radical pan-Islamists were unhappy with Communist atheism and persecution of religion from all institutional aspects of social life, and they had a very critical attitude toward the functioning of the official Islamic religious community. On several occasions (1946, 1949, 1983) members of the Young Muslim movement were put on trial, resulting in twenty being sentenced to death, and several dozens sentenced to prison. Already immediately after the war, the future Muslim Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegović (1925–2003) began to stand out among his fellow Muslims for his activity and initiative. In the first trial of the Young Muslims in 1946, he was charged with promoting counter-revolutionary positions and issuing an Islamic magazine *Mujahid*, for which he was sentenced to three years in prison. In 1949, the second major con-

flict between the authorities and the Young Muslims occurred, and even the IVZ had to clearly and harshly condemn the Young Muslims' destructive Pan-Islamic activity.

A far-reaching event in the development of the Islamic movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the printing and illegal distribution of Izetbegović's programmatic manifesto of Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Islamism, the *Islamic Declaration* (1970). This vision of the role of Islam in the modern world and its guidelines for the new awakening of Islam has become a permanent inspiration and an ideological guide for the Islamists in Bosnia and Herzegovina: that is, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Although Izetbegović defended himself, arguing that this was a theoretical and principled, general deliberation, that could not have anything to do with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the authorship of the *Islamic Declaration* was the key point of the indictment which was issued against him as the leading defendant in a large trial of the "Islamic fundamentalists" in Sarajevo in 1983.

This trial took place at a time when the inter-republican, and therefore, interethnic relations in Yugoslavia were becoming complicated. The trial attracted great public attention throughout the country. There are serious indications that the indicted Islamists in the Sarajevo process were actually "scapegoats", brought to trial instead of some Muslim members of the Communist leadership, who were criticized for "nationalistic deviations" by the Yugoslav state and party leaders. That is why it was very important for the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to show determination in their fight against nationalism defined as a religious affiliation, in order to confirm the republic's unquestioned unity and consistency, necessary for preserving, as it was then called, "the socialist self-governing community of peoples and nationalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Since the Muslim population after the 1971 census became the most numerous constituent people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (39.57%), tackling negative phenomena in their environment was of particular importance. Members of the Muslim Youth organization were charged with "hostile and counter-revolutionary activity from the positions of the Muslim nationalism" (Filandra, 1998, pp. 325–27). The link between the religious and the national with respect to the Muslim identity is clear from this formulation, since the defendants were, in fact, Islamists by ideology and, in a specific Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, they were perceived and labelled as nationalists. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was always necessary to take into account the inter-ethnic symmetry, especially when prosecuting alleged or actual violations of fundamental social values. There were occasional accusations and prosecutions of unwanted phenomena among the Serbian and Croatian people, but they were never called to account for their "Orthodox" or "Catholic" messages, but only for their Serbian or Croatian nationalism. The targets were primarily not religious, but politically engaged people or undesirable intellectuals. In the Sarajevo process, Alija Izetbegović was sentenced to 14 years in prison, from which he was released in 1988, and in 1990, he was already actively involved in political life.

5.6. Disintegratory Dynamics and Road to War

The social and political situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), even before the 1980s, was rather burdened by the growing rivalry among the republics, and primarily Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, and Serbia, on the other hand. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, the country entered into a phase of fragile stability coupled with latent conflict. The introduction of democracy and a multi-party system was welcomed by all those who found the Yugoslav statist framework and model, as well as the Communist monopoly of power, unsuitable, and they saw this change as an opportunity to realize their long-standing plans. A fierce controversy raged among the republican leaderships, which were still nominally Communist, about who was economically exploiting who in a common state. Each had its own narrative, and each was determined to prove that it was being discriminated against economically in Yugoslavia. Advocacy for the republican economic interests of the republics with a clear majority of members belonging to one nation (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia) was accompanied by the strengthening of previously officially systematically suppressed national feelings. In view of its tri-national composition, the objective growth of nationalism was not noticeable on the political surface in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the republican leadership at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis was in favor of preserving the federation. In general, the federation was supported at that point by both the Muslim and Serbian national corps in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslims did not have a republican motherland ("a reserve state") within Yugoslavia. They had achieved their national emancipation in Yugoslavia, and did not have sufficient numerical superiority to realistically consider having an independent state. The Serbs were interested in preserving the state, possibly in a modified form, because they did not want to become national minorities in the independent republics. The Croatian minority (17%), prone to emigration and in constant demographic decline, were divided. Those in Western Herzegovina, where the Croatian population was the most compact and dependent on Croatia, were traditionally prominent nationalists and their attitudes and positions conformed with those of Zagreb. Their compatriots in Central Bosnia and Sarajevo, some the descendants of the Catholic settlers from the Austrian period, possessed a stronger pronounced Bosnian identity, so they saw their futures linked primarily to a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was objectively impossible outside the Yugoslav framework.

It is important to point out that in the initial phase of the Yugoslav crisis, both Muslims and Serbs, and many Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, favored the preservation of Yugoslavia, although this is often overlooked in light of later events, espe-

cially the war and its outcome. Neither the Muslims nor the Serbs had an articulated alternative plan or a political-administrative model that could satisfactorily replace the republic in which they had lived until that time. The unfavorable development of events, which they were only partially and in a limited way able to influence, led them to another path, that of open conflict and war. In order to understand and balance the interpretation of all aspects of that war, the political climate and the state of mind that preceded it in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be born in mind.

Although the political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the integrity of Yugoslavia for as long as it was able, its society was divided nationally and religiously. Therefore, in the beginning of 1990, Bosnia and Herzegovina forbid the establishment of political parties with a clear national character, which was not seen as a problem in other republics, but as an expression of the democratic liberation from the decades-old Communist non-national conformism. The parties that would have the most significant role in Bosnia and Herzegovina's later political life, both during and after the war, were actually anti-Communist movements or national movements. In contrast, those parties with integrative political programs and civic orientation, such as the Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia led by Ante Marković, and well-represented in Bosnia and Herzegovina, received relatively poor results in the first multi-party elections, and actually lost their presence on the political scene. The first national political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded by the Croats. It was the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), established as a subsidiary of the party with the same name in the motherland republic, from which it received guidelines for its work and with which it coordinated all its important actions, which were sometimes contrary to the objective interests of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In May 1990, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the national party of the Muslim people, was founded. In its Program declaration, the SDA defined itself as the "Political union of citizens belonging to the Muslim cultural and historical circle, as well as other Yugoslav citizens who accept the program and goals of the Party" (Izetbegović, 2001, p. 69). By emphasizing belonging to the "Muslim cultural and historical circle," the party was pointing in an evasive manner to the rootedness of the Islamic religious context, and by expanding party membership to "other citizens of Yugoslavia," the party sought to promote their civic, supranational character and potential, as well as openness for all Muslims in the SFRY. Alija Izetbegović was elected president of the SDA, and would remain active until 2001. Among the founders of the Party, the core were Izetbegović's colleagues from the ranks of the Young Muslims, who, along with him, were sentenced in the trial of the "Islamic fundamentalists" in Sarajevo in 1983 (Bougarel, 2001, p. 87). In addition to them, there were also several prominent "secular Muslim nationalists," mostly ex-Communists, such as Muhamed Filipović, Adil Zulfikarpašić, Fikret Abdić, and others, with whom the Islamist Alija

Izetbegović quickly parted, putting the entire party under his control, relying mainly on older co-militants and their younger Islamist followers.

In July 1990, the Serbs also formed the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). In view of its prominent anti-Communism, the newly formed party could not take on the name of the dominant party in Serbia, Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia as had the HDZ, and it was decided to take the name of the previously established party of Serbs in Croatia. Radovan Karadžić was elected president of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and its leadership included several prominent intellectuals and businessmen. With fewer personnel changes, the leadership of the SDS remained compact and with the same composition until the end of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to opposing Communist ideology, the SDS program emphasized the commitment to preserve the Yugoslav state union and resolutely oppose any attempt to isolate Bosnia and Herzegovina or to have the Serbs in the country politically outvoted. The national parties, therefore, were supporting anti-Communism and striving for the democratization of society, but they had different ideological and political views of the ideal organization of the state territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As time passed, the situation in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina became more complicated, and the differences deepened, soon becoming insurmountable. Immediately after their establishment, the SDA, SDS and HDZ tactically insisted that the restoration of the suppressed national identities of all nations in the context of post-Communist freedom would facilitate their unfettered collaboration for the common good of all. National parties did manage to cooperate constructively for a short period before and immediately after the multi-party elections. Each of them won a victory in their electorate/national constituency and thus achieved the first and only goal that was in fact common to them: the removal of Communists from power. The decades-long bearers of the authority did not, however, give up easily, and at one point it even seemed that they could continue to be a dominant political factor in the multi-party system. The possibility of the Communists continuing to dominate was supported by the most influential media, loyal to the authorities at the time. The League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina changed its name to the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was led by the actual President, the secular Muslim Nijaz Duraković. This party was multinational, but its growing emphasis on strengthening the republican state created a feeling, especially among Serb members, that it had deviated from the principles of full national equality and had moved in the direction of a Muslim political vision for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a loose connection with other republics or even as an independent country. Many Serbs, therefore, abandoned the party. The second multinational and civil party was the Union of Reform Forces (SRS) of Yugoslavia for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was founded by the then Prime Minister of the SFRJ, economist

Ante Marković, a Croat by nationality, who also decided to promote the party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the temporary economic and general recovery of the country from the deep crisis brought on by Marković's economic reform program, as well as the party's democratic rhetoric of maintaining social harmony and the renunciation of any extremism, Marković's party was very appealing for many moderate representatives of the middle classes of the population and members of the intellectual circles who disliked exclusivist nationalism. It failed to position itself in the social environment of Croatia and Serbia, however, where there was no longer any sympathy for a supranational Yugoslavism, so the party began to lose credibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina too. There was a growing question about why Ante Marković, as a Croat and a successful Prime Minister at the level of the SFRJ, did not take the battle for his ideas into the strongest republics, Croatia or Serbia. It was clear that no pro-Yugoslav concept could any longer be accepted in those republics, and without Serbia and Croatia, Marković had no realistic prospects or political justification.

The party configuration of Bosnia and Herzegovina's political territory before the first multi-party elections reflected two very important factors. The first was the unstoppable movement toward national and religious homogenization, despite any hopes or illusions to the contrary. The second was the existence of a significant segment of the population, albeit insufficient in numbers and lacking in orientation, that was attached to the values of unity, officially promoted throughout the entire post-war period in the central, multinational and multi-religious Yugoslav republic. Yugoslavia suffered the most painful death in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, it was indeed sentenced to death.

A relatively short period of time passed from the formation of national parties and the reconfiguration of the political image of Bosnia and Herzegovina until the first multi-party elections held on 18 November, 1990. Nevertheless, this period was marked by an intense, but also relatively confusing campaign. Although the public may have had an impression that national and civil parties entered the elections with equal chances, with the later parties having perhaps even a slight advantage, the results of voting showed that the elections virtually reflected the results of the population census by criterion of national affinity. National parties were aware of the fact that, despite hesitation among voters, time was on their side. They were also aware that they had to be very clear when communicating their pre-election messages. For example, the highest level of SDA politicians suggested that Muslims should declares themselves as "Muslims," choose "Islam" as their religion and choose "Bosnian" as their native language. Since voter turnout was very high, 77.3% out of the 3,033,921 registered voters, the results could be interpreted as an accurate reflection of the political atmosphere among the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the elections, people chose the Members of the Presidency of Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

Herzegovina (seven members) and representatives for both Houses of the People and Representatives of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (240 representatives). The outcome was as follows: as the members of the Presidency, Fikret Abdić, SDA (1,045,539 votes; 32.69%) and Alija Izetbegović, SDA (879,266 votes; 27.49%) were elected from among the Muslim population; from among Serb population, Biljana Plavšić, SDS (573,812 votes; 22.16%) and Nikola Koljević, SDS (556,218 votes; 21.48%); and from among the Croatian population, Stjepan Kljujić, HDZ (473,002 votes; 22.23%) and Franjo Boras, HDZ (416,629 votes; 19.58%); and as a Yugoslav, Ejup Ganić, SDA (709,891 votes; 43.11%). The balance of power in the Civic Council of the Parliament of the Social Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the following: SDA – 711,075 votes, 31.5%, 43 delegates; SDS – 590,431 votes, 26.1%, 34 delegates; HDZ – 362,855 votes, 16.1%, 21 delegates; SDP – 278,027 votes, 12.3%, 15 delegates; and the Union of Reformed Forces for Bosnia and Herzegovina – 201,018 votes, 8.9%, 12 delegates. The results of the elections for the Council of Municipalities: SDA – 788,616 votes, 30.8%, 43 delegates; SDS – 624,951 votes, 24.4%, 38 delegates; HDZ – 383,279 votes, 15.0%, 23 delegates; SDP – 378,198 votes, 14.8%, four delegates; and the SRS for Bosnia and Herzegovina – 281,436 votes, 11.0%, 1 delegate.

Regarding the membership of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is notable that the elected members were exclusively representatives of national parties, as well as one nominal "Yugoslav," Ejup Ganić, a member of SDA, who later turned out to be a decisive and even extreme exponent of Muslim politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also indicative that the Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegović, did not obtain the largest number of votes. The Muslim leader who did was a successful and popular businessman, Fikret Abdić. Based on the number of votes, Fikret Abdić was supposed to become the President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but an internal agreement reached within the SDA, to which Abdić clearly could not object, determined that Alija Izetbegović would serve as an "undisputed national leader." It was not by accident that, at one point during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1993, a serious inter-Muslim conflict broke out in Bosanska Krajina between two forces: those loyal to Izetbegović and those supporting Fikret Abdić and his pacific political path.

After the General Elections held on 18 November, 1990, local elections for the Council of Municipalities were held. These elections results mirrored those of the general elections, with slight deviations regarding the general plan and in the local configurations. It is very interesting to examine the ratio of votes obtained in the three biggest city municipalities in Sarajevo. The outcome in the municipality Stari Grad was the following: SDA, 53%; SDP (Social Democrat Party), 14%; and the SRS for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11%. In the municipality of Centar: SDA, 30%; SDP, 21%;

SRS for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20%; and the SDS, 15%. In the municipality of Novi Grad: SDA, 30%; SDS, 21%; SRS for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16%; and the SRS for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15%. The 1991 population census showed 527,049 citizens in Sarajevo: 259,470 (49.23%) Muslims; 157,143 (29.57%) Serbs; 34,873 (6.61%) Croats; and 56,470 (10.71%) Yugoslavs. Living in the municipality of Stari Grad were 50,744 Muslims, 5,150 Serbs, 1,126 Croats and 3,374 Yugoslavs. In the municipality of Centar: 39,761 Muslims; 16,631 Serbs; and 5,428 Croats. In addition, 13,030 Yugoslavs lived in the municipality of Centar. Novi Grad had 69,430 Muslims, 37,591 Serbs, 8,889 Croats and 15,580 Yugoslavs. These figures show that in multinational Sarajevo, where all the institutions of the republic's authorities were situated, as well as the most developed network of educational and cultural institutions, the percentage of citizens committed to unity and less prone to more intense nationalism, particularly nationalism with an emphasized religious component, was higher than the average of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This explains the relative success of non-national parties and a fairly high number of Yugoslavs elected to office. Furthermore, taking into consideration that Muslims had the numbers in their favor, when analyzing the forthcoming armed conflicts, one should also consider the intra-urban national distribution of citizens in different parts of the city. It must also be asked why the idea of Muslims being "more urban" than Serbs had been created, while the number of Croats was relatively low, but routinely added to the "more urban" ones. It is clear that most citizens of Sarajevo acted nationally, even though they were reluctant to admit publicly that they had voted for national parties, since there was still a strong pull of their previous value systems that looked askance on nationalism in politics. Nonetheless, it is obvious that a significantly high number of citizens were disappointed with the first multi-party election's outcome, but there was still hope that there would not be an open international and inter-religious conflict in the city. From the informal conversations with them, even on the eve of the War, one could notice the existence of faith in the neighborhood's strength and tradition of mutual respect among members of the three national communities in the city, although it was combined with growing fear.

During the first months immediately after the elections, it seemed as if the victorious national parties would manage to pragmatically harmonize and ensure a relatively calm transitional period in Bosnia and Herzegovina after taking over power from the Communists without any problems and incidents, this despite the progressively disintegrational processes and open conflicts in Yugoslavia. The state functions were amicably distributed, so the President of the Republic Presidency was a Muslim (Alija Izetbegović), the President of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Serb (Momčilo Krajišnik) and the Prime Minister was a Croat (Jure Pelivan). Ministerial seats in the cabinet were also distributed without significant disputes. This "marriage

of convenience," however, could not help in overcoming deep divides in the opinions of the three national parties when it came to the main question of the future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding this issue, the SDA was joined by the SDP and other and smaller parties: the Muslim Bosniak-Organization (founded after the split of non-Islamic Bosniak nationalists Muhamed Filipović and Adija Zulfikarpašić on one side and Alija Izetbegović on the other) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the context of the constant deterioration of the situation with respect to the Yugoslav plan and the unsuccessful attempts to reach any kind of agreement among the presidents of the republics regarding the preservation of the federation, and at a time when armed conflicts between Slovenia and the Yugoslav People's Army and Croats and Serbs in Croatia had already begun, Alija Izetbegović, as the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegonia, had supported the preservation of the confederal, reorganized Yugoslavia. Together with Kiro Gligorov, the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Izetbegović even proposed a compromise plan to the other republics in the beginning of June 1991. The plan was meant to overcome the crisis of a federal country by opting for the model of "the asymmetric federation." According to this plan, the four republics, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Republic of Macedonia, would constitute a federation that would place Croatia and Slovenia in a confederal relationship. However, this solution was not welcomed anymore, especially in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. Aware of the dangers to peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina in case of the final split of Yugoslavian republics, Izetbegović asked German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher not to rush with the recognition of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. However, as the tension in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to grow, so did the conflicts when it came to choosing between staying in the reduced common state, without Slovenia and Croatia, a position which the Serbs supported, and creating an independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the position the Muslims approved.

The Muslims' leaders, led by Izetbegović, with the tactical alliance of the Croats, started to inflame the rhetoric. Over the preceding few years, an anti-Serbian atmosphere had been growing rapidly among Muslims, and the "Great Serbian politics" of Slobodan Milošević, whose goal was the alleged creation of "Great Serbia," was presented and perceived as the main danger for non-Serbian citizens in the entire territory of the former federation. As a nation without its own republic/country, and being a relative majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a majority which they hoped would soon become absolute, territorially mixed with Serbs, Muslims were observing the energetic and mostly non-institutional actions of the Serbian leader with anxiety. Undoubtedly, Krajišnik believed that his actions were necessary and legitimate in order to defend the interests of Serbia and Serbian people. On the other hand, bringing

national interests to the forefront of Belgrade's politics encouraged Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and strengthened their determination to resist the circumstances that could transform them into a national minority in a republic in which they would have the status of a constituent nation. The behavior of the Croats, whose vital and objective interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina corresponded with those of the Serbs in many respects, was somewhat reserved, but regarding the most important issues, the Croats' decisions were ultimately dictated by a general conflict with the wider Yugoslavian plan, which led them into a coalition with Muslims. It is this congruence of differing interests that led to a demonstrative binding of the SDA and HDZ flags during the pre-election campaign and which inevitably reminded Serbs of their sufferings in the Second World War during the time of the NDH, when Muslim and Croatian flags were also symbolically bound.

From the late 1990s, international tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina started to degenerate into occasional violent incidents. Coalition political leaders in Sarajevo were still trying to minimize those symptoms of severely damaged inter-national relations, but at the same time, in the Assembly, confrontations between advocates of Bosnia and Herzegovina remaining in the reduced Yugoslavia and supporters of the road to independence of the Republic were more explicitly manifested. In the session of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament of 27 February, 1991, representatives of the SDA and HDZ demanded that the Parliament vote on the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serb representatives managed to drop the proposal from the agenda on procedural grounds by means of the National Equality Council, an assembly organ responsible for reaching consensus in situations threating to seriously damage national harmony in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was then when Alija Izetbegović gave his famous statement: "I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty" (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, p. 300). Sometime later, during his visit to Teheran, the SDA leader was more explicit: "It will either be the Muslims' way, or there is no agreement…" It was clear that the Rubicon had been crossed and that it was only a matter of time until a political conflict would degenerate turn into a civil and inter-national war. While interpreting the reasons for the large-scale armed conflicts, Muslim politics and both domestic and foreign pro-Muslim analysts insist that the main cause was the alleged Serbian and partially Croatian invasion of the "independent and sovereign, democratic country of Bosnia and Herzegovina." There are some differences in determining the specific, concrete violent events that served as the immediate causes of the War. However, one fact usually neglected or analytically underestimated is that the internal disagreement on the direction that Bosnia and Herzegovina should take, at the moment when it became clear that the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia was irreversible, was what actually led the country in

the war conflict. More precisely, the critical reason for the failure of political discussions in the institutions of the system was the determination of Muslim and Croatian representatives to extort illegitimate decisions by outvoting Serbian representatives, which would lead to the recognition of the Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence. The illegitimacy of decisions that were formally presented as ostensibly democratic and justified by having been voted on by the majority of representatives and later by two nationalities voting against the third one, arises from the misuse of the "one man – one vote" principal in the conditions of deep national and religious divisions in the country. By acting or, more accurately, by conspiring in that way, Muslim and Croatian representatives in the Assembly corroborated the validity of Serbs' fear that, in the future, they would be victims of outvoting when making significant decisions about their fate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All political, administrative-organizational and military moves made by the opposing sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina, no matter how they are analyzed and evaluated, were a consequence of the decision that the vital interests, rights and equality of one-third of the citizens should simply be compromised by an "democratically" exercised will of the other two-thirds: more precisely, by their representatives in the common institutions. A theory of the nature of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being the result of outside aggression is unacceptable, since all the military actions were preceded by political decisions made by citizens and their representatives inside the republic. More broadly, the resort to arms in dealing with the disagreement and disputes among the constituent nations demonstrates an historical truth that Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country can hardly survive if it is not a constituent of a bigger and centralized state entity (Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, the two Yugoslavias). Ideologically and politically motivated disregard of this crucial truth is essentially misleading, and has far-reaching consequences. Once again, the history did not manage to be *magistra vitae.*

The initiative for reaching a "historical agreement" between Serbs and Muslims is the proof that, among the Muslim politicians and intellectuals, there were those who realized that the civil and inter-national War in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a great tragedy, primarily for Muslims and Serbs, since they lived together on the most of the Republic's territory.

Two distinguished persons from the Muslim side were discretely working on reaching some kind of agreement with Serbs, both representatives of "secular Bosniak nationalism:" a university professor Muhamed Filipović and a businessman form Switzerland, a descendant of an old *bey* family and active participant in the NOB,[55] Adil Zulfikarpašić. Despite being close associates of Izetbegović in building the Muslim party structure, they split from him and formed the Muslim-Bosniak Organization as a result of their opposition to the strengthening of the Islamic component in the SDA's politics. The most active person in negotiations on the "historical agreement"

on the Serbs' side was the member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the university professor Nikola Koljević. Other participants were the SDA president Radovan Karadžić, who was in permanent consultations with Serbia's President, Slobodan Milošević. The final version of the agreement had met almost all the Muslim requirements, including Alija Izetbegović becoming the first president of a reorganized Yugoslavia. The negotiations were conducted with Izetbegović's knowledge and consent. However, he withdrew at the last moment, when the agreement they reached should have been presented to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, in Sarajevo and Belgrade simultaneously (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, p. 301). This move was consistent with Izetbegović's style of suddenly changing attitudes and betraying already reached agreements, probably because he followed his strong pan-Islamic agenda of the *Islamic Declaration*, thus putting his negotiating partners in an unenviable position. It is obvious that the SDA leader was deciding on the most crucial issues in an informal atmosphere, surrounded by his closest comrades, rather than within the party's organs. This was confirmed in a statement of the former Yugoslavia president and a high-ranking Muslim official Irfan Ajanović, as well by observations from a large number of Izetbegović's followers who had believed him wholeheartedly in the beginning (Hadžiomeragić,1991).

While there was a political conflict escalating in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly between supporters and opponents of the voting regarding the decisions that would lead to the country's sovereignty and, subsequently, its request for the Republic's independence, the security situation in society was progressively deteriorating. Later analyses of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1991 often reflect the national, political and ideological positions of authors, and tend to argue that the author's own national group started organizing its army and preparing for armed conflicts as a *reaction,* as an extorted response to measures and steps already taken by the other sides. What is beyond any doubt is the fact that Muslims, Croats and Serbs started (para)military organizational preparations and arming approximately at the same time, so as to not be caught off guard in case of trouble.

5.7. Referendum for Independence: Political Casus Belli

On 14 October, 1991, a new and radical escalation of the confrontation took place in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina when Muslim and Croat delegates, starting from the *Platform on the Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Future Organization of the Yugoslav Community*, firmly decided to forward at any costs the vote on the *Memorandum*, in which the first paragraph says:

> The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina points to the regulation of the official Amendment LX to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this amendment, according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina (quoting) is a '*democratic sovereign state of equal citizens, peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Muslims, Serbs and Croats and members of other peoples and nationalities living there'*, the constitutional status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, internal relations and its relations with others has been permanently defined. (*Official Gazette of SRBiH*, 1947, p. 987)

The *Memorandum*, then, conditions the participation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina representatives in the work of federal structures and bodies, the Presidency and the Assembly of the SFRY on the participation of the representatives of all republics and provinces in their work. It is emphasised that the decisions of these authorities and bodies that are incomplete would not be binding for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, there is a very important regulation that, considering the national composition of its population, Bosnia and Herzegovina would not accept any constitutional solution of the future Yugoslav state without the inclusion of Serbia and Croatia. Although it was not explicitly stated, due to the fact that at the time of adoption of the *Memorandum,* it was apparent that Croatia would not remain in Yugoslavia, it was logical from the above that Bosnia and Herzegovina would proceed with the *Proclamation of Independence*, which was unacceptable for the Serbs. During the long and heated debate, there was no harmonizing of opposing attitudes, and this time, the representatives of the Muslims and Croats ignored the mechanism of the Council for National Equality. In this situation, the SDS leader Radovan Karadžić warned in a dramatic manner that by voting for the *Memorandum*, Bosnia and Herzegovina was pushing itself into a hell, and the Muslim people maybe into disappearance. Taken out of the context of Karadžić's speech, this certainly unmeasured and unfortunate, but honest, statement was later regularly cited as evidence that the "aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina" was being prepared. Izetbegović immediately calmly replied that from Karadžić's words, it can be clearly understood why Muslims did not want to remain in Yugoslavia and that they certainly would not disappear. In this atmosphere of an overwrought night assembly, the President of the Assembly, Momčilo Krajišnik decided to end the Assembly, which the Muslim and Croat delegates did not accept. Since the SDS delegates left the hall, the Muslims and Croats, contrary to the Parliament's rules of procedure, continued their work after a one-hour break and adopted the disputed *Memorandum*. This decision was the first concrete step toward demanding that the international community recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The course of events then accelerated, dictated by the dynamics of the process of finding a solution to the Yugoslav crisis on the international level, while the internal situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated rapidly in the meanwhile. As is known, the Arbitration Commission, formed by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community, and held within the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia held 27 August, 1991, had the task of helping to find the optimal legal solution for the problems that had arisen from the crisis of the Yugoslav state. The most important opinion of this Commission, headed by the French jurist Robert Badinter, which determined further international legal treatment of all phenomena in the context of the disintegration of the SFRY, was the assessment that, in this case, the solution was not the secession of certain republics, but the dissolution of the Federation. Among the ten opinions formulated by the Commission, one (No. 4) referred to the legal basis of Bosnia and Herzegovina's demand for recognition of independence. Previously, at the end of 1991, the European Community adopted the *Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Declaration on the Criteria for the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (International Legal Materials, 1992, pp. 1485–7). The *Declaration* emphasises that new independent states will be recognized "in accordance with the normal standards of international practice and political reality in each individual case." It is indicative that this regulation does not mention international *law*, but *practice*. This decision provided the general guidance for the Badinter Commission to form its *legal* opinions based less on the basic applicable norms of international law, and more on the basis of pragmatic alignment with the *political* reality. Although this Commission was an *ad hoc* established advisory body outside the existing system of international legal institutions, its non-binding opinions became the main legal criterion for the attitude of the international community toward the actors in the Yugoslav crisis. In mid-December, the European Community asked all the Yugoslav republics, giving them a short deadline, to declare whether they would decide to stay in the common state or move toward gaining independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina, requested to be recognized as an independent and sovereign state.

At the same time and as a response to the activities of Muslims and Croats in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared themselves in favour of the continuity of the Yugoslav state with the plebiscite of November 10, 1991. Then the Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina voted to establish the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 21, 1991), which would remain within the federal state if the Muslim and Croat communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina changed their attitudes about it and decided to definitely opt for its abandonment. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately declared this act as unconstitutional. Republika Srpska was proclaimed on January 9, 1992 (Antić and 2016, pp. 310–11).

The Badinter Commission, declared in its Opinion no. 4 the conditions that had to be fulfilled for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. The Commission exhaustively listed all relevant points for a comprehensive consideration of the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to conclude:

> In such circumstances, the Arbitration Commission considers that expressing the will of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina to constitute the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state cannot be regarded as fully based. This assessment could be reviewed if, in this regard, the guarantees were provided by the republic, which has formulated the request for recognition, possibly through a referendum to which all citizens of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be invited to participate without distinction and under international control. (Ragazzi, 1992, p. 1488)

There is a serious contradiction between the "circumstances" on the basis of which the Commission formed the opinion that "the expression of the will of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina...cannot be regarded as fully based," and the above conclusion, with the suggestion of holding a referendum. The contradiction is in the fact that from the entire Opinion no. 4, it is clear that the Commission reasonably based its reservations regarding the merits of the request for recognition of the Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and independence on the opposition of one of the constituent peoples, the Serbs. As a possible way of overcoming such a situation, it was suggested, however, to organize a referendum in which all *citizens* would be invited. So, in a *nationally* deeply divided country, a *citizens'* referendum was proposed, with a predetermined outcome — one nation being outvoted. This made the Commission an accomplice in turning a deaf ear to the legitimate demands of the representatives of that nation within Bosnia and Herzegovina.[56] The Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina readily responded to the suggestion of the Badinter Commission and scheduled a session. With the participation of delegates from all parliamentary clubs, there was a long, difficult, and, at moments, dramatic debate on calling a referendum. At a very late point during the night, the President of the Assembly M. Krajišnik proposed the termination of the assembly and its resumption on the following day. The Muslim and Croat delegates did not accept this, so the President and delegates from the ranks of the Serb people left the hall in large numbers. According to an already applied scenario, Vice-President Mariofil Ljubić (SDA) gave a one-hour break, after which the Assembly continued, and, without the participation of the Serb delegates, made a decision to call a referendum on 29 February and 1 March 1992. After some uncertainty, the HDZ President Mate Boban informed the Muslim colleagues that the Croats would support the proposed formulation of the referendum question: "Are you for a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state of equal citi-

zens - nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats and members of other peoples who live in it?" (*Official Gazette of SRBiH*, 1992, p.10). That is how a political decision, crucial for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all its citizens, was made.

The referendum was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992. For the municipalities with the majority of Serb population and under political control of the SDS, the reserve ballots were made *ad hoc*. In the period between the Parliamentary Assembly, during which the decision was made on the referendum and its date, an intensive campaign was initiated to persuade the Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens, telling them that there was no future for the state if it did not become sovereign and independent. The campaign was marked by the unprecedented diabolization of Serbs, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the alleged plan for the creation of "Greater Serbia." As many have attested, voters were told: "If you do not give your vote for sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, you will wake up in 'Greater Serbia.'" For the success of the referendum in accordance with the expectations of the organizers, it was crucial to gain the votes of the Croats. The Catholic clergy, including the Archbishop of Sarajevo and the future Cardinal Vinko Puljić, was actively engaged in persuading the voters (Bugeral, 2004, p. 84). Instructions were also received from Zagreb that Croats should go to the referendum and support it. In the end, it is claimed that 95% of Croats voted for sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. The voter's response was 64.31% (2,073,568) registered, while 63.95% voted "yes" (2,061,932), or 99.4% of the respondents (*Official Gazette of SRBiH*, 1992). The constitutionally prescribed two-thirds majority of the total number of registered voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been reached, but no one payed attention to that anymore. After the referendum, the European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April, 1992, the United States on 7 April, 1992 and on 22 May 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted to the UN. The former Vice-President of the SFRY Assembly and one of the most active Muslim politicians in the campaign for independence, Irfan Ajanović, admitted that he was attending the act of admittance of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the UN, since he managed to travel with a forged passport to the United States. In general, on Bosnia and Herzegovina's path to independence and membership in the UN, there were too many forgeries not to lead to serious consequences.

Endnotes

1 Ivan Lovrenović explicitly states: "The emergence of the ethno-confessional and cultural conception of Bosnia and Herzegovina as we have it today and…the entire CNN-determined world are crucially linked to the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in the period 1463... until the year 1527. It was a radical change in the civilization paradigm" (2002, p. 68).

2 In this short review of the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Ottoman rule, the names Bosnia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) are both used, as in most of the sources and literature relating to the more distant past, only the name Bosnia was used, whereas the name Herzegovina is treated separately only when something specifically relates to it. At the time of the Ottoman conquest, Bosnia and Herzegovina was not perceived as a separate territorial-administrative entity. In fact, after the occupation of Herzegovina in 1470, the Ottomans established a separate administrative unit of the Herzegovina Sanjak (*Sandžak*). In recent times, despite the fact that the two-member name has long been made official and has become well-established, only the name of Bosnia is often used to refer to the entire Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory.

3 German word for a type of land/estate which a person obtained under certain conditions from a ruler.

4 *Rayah* or *reaya* were members of the tax-paying lower class of Ottoman society.

5 *Millet*: **"**With the conquest of the territories that had constituted the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman sultans were faced with the problem of governing large non-Muslim populations. The Ottomans confronted the problem of the governance of these large heterodox and polyglot populations by establishing *millets*. These were organized on the basis of religious confession rather than ethnic origin. The ruling *millet* within the empire was made up of the Muslims. Next in importance was the Orthodox Christian Rūm *millet*, which was often called the 'Greek *millet*.' Although its head, the ecumenical patriarch, was invariably of Greek origin, the term Greek *millet* was something of a misnomer, for it included not only Greeks but also Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Aromani, and substantial Arab populations who, as Orthodox Christians, were also members of the Rūm *millet*. There were also Armenian, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant *millet*s" (*Encylopedia Britannica*, Millet entry).

6 "The *Tanzimat-ı Hayriye*, or 'Auspicious Reorderings' was a period of sustained legislation and reform that modernized Ottoman state and society, contributed to the further centralization of administration, and brought increased state participation in Ottoman society between 1839 and 1876" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, p. 55).

7 An *eyalet* (also *pashalik* or *beylerbeylik*) was the territory of office of a *beylerbey*, and was further subdivided into sanjaks.

[8] Interestingly, the same nickname was given to Alija Izetbegović, a Muslim Bosniak leader in the events of the 1990s. During the last war, the newspaper *Zmaj od Bosne* was published in Tuzla, which later folded.

[9] "This movement, by its massiveness (almost all Bosniak-Muslim people participated in it), by its duration (more than a year), and by overthrowing the Ottoman rule and establishing a Bosnian one throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by numerous military successes against the imperial army, even across the Balkans, was the most significant event in the history of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnia and Herzegovina since the fall of the Ottoman Empire," as Bojić enthusiastically exaggerates (Bojić, 2001, p. 91).

[10] In his authoritative account, the Serbian historian Vasilj Popović summmarized the situation at the Berlin Congress as follows: "Russia was pro-Bulgarian, England pro-Greek, Germany was helping Austria to expand in the Balkans, Austria was striving for Bosnia and Herzegovina and opposed the expansion of Serbia in its area of interest, and it was against forming of a large Slavic state in the Balkans, because it would attract the restless Slavs from the Austro-Hungary. Due to the unfortunate war of 1870-1871, France avoided any complication in this crisis, and Italy kept quite low profile" (Popović 2007, p. 144). Although the views of the Western states were not in accord on the surface, concerns were raised from the macro-geopolitical backgrounds about the possible strengthening of the Russian influence and presence in the Balkans, or a decisive breakthrough towards the "warm seas."

[11] *Salname:* the first general yearbook of the Ottoman Empire was made in 1847.

[12] Interestingly, one of the rebel leaders, Mićo Ljubibratić Herzegovac, later even translated the *Qur'an* into the Serbian language, in order to show the Serbs that the faith of their Muslim brothers in blood was not as far removed from Christianity as one might think (*Koran*, Belgrade, 1895).

[13] Ekmečić also points out that "if it is said that religion was the watershed of th e nation in the Serbo-Croatian area, why would it not automatically be applied to its Muslim part?... Failure of the Serbian and Croatian national revival to create a common nation on the basis of one language, and over time to overcome religion as a factor of mutual division, left room for the Muslim part of the nation to later affirm on the same foundations as the first" (Ekmečić, 1999, pp. 139, 141). "Odgovor na neke kritike *Istorije Jugoslavije (XIX vek)*" (Responses to some critics of the *History of Yugoslavia* [19th century]), in: *Srbi na istorijskom raskršću,* 139,141).

[14] In March, 1991 a scientific conference under the name *Širenje islama i islamske kulture u bosanskom ejaletu* (*The Spreading of Islam and the Islamic culture in the Bosnian Eyalet*) was held at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo. The papers from this conference, published in a scientific journal called *Prilozi za orijentalnu Filologiju* (*Contributions to Oriental Philology)* (1991), clearly reflect the formally scientific, while, in fact, ideologically motivated,

polarization in the approach to the issue of Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to Islamization in general.

15 In his *Historija Bošnjaka* (1998), Bosniak jurist and historian Mustafa Imamović wrote that: "Thus, on the basis of the national territory of Bosnia and the Bosnian-Slavic ethnic background, together with the new Shtokavian dialect, through the assimilation of Islam, a new ethnos was eventually formed – the Bosnian-Muslim, or, in short, the Bosnian ethnos, people, or nation, with regard to the other South Slavs speaking the same language (Serbs, Croats, and Montenegrins), but possessing different religious and cultural-political experience" (Imamović, 1998, p. 9). He added that: "Islam, together with medieval Bosnian heresy that preceded it, is the spiritual vertical of Bosnia and Bosniaks and their vital historical determinant" (Ibid. p. 138).

16 For a critical elaboration, see Grivaud and Popovic, (ed.), *Les conversions à l'islam en Asie Mineure et dans les Balkans aux époques seldjoukide et ottomane* (Athènes: Ecole française d' Athène, 2011), pp. 509–12.

17 See elaborated argumentation in studies by Srećko M. Džaja entitled *Konfesionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina. Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463-1804* (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1984) and "Die Bosnische Kirche" und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den *Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1978). Unlike the predominantly Muslim Bosniak historians, who use the "Bogomil thesis" and portray Bosnia as a kind of regional "corpus separatum" in their attempts to prove the existence of some "substratum identity continuity" or "Bosnian substructure" between the pre-Ottoman and the post-Ottoman period, Džaja deems that with the Ottoman occupation, all continuity with the medieval state was destroyed. In fact, that same thesis, but without broader historical elaboration, was presented by the great writer and 1961 Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature, Ivo Andrić (1892–1975) in his doctoral dissertation entitled *Die Entwicklung des geistigen Lebens in Bosnien unter Einwirkung der türkischen Herrschaft*, defended in Graz in 1924.

18 "If the main source of Muslim converts throughout that period had been the membership of the Bosnian Church, one would expect to find evidence of that continuing membership – large at first and gradually diminishing – in the defters; but the defters show fewer than 700 individual members in Bosnia over nearly 150 years" (Malcolm, 1994, p. 56). "The theory of the uniqueness of the Bosnian reception of Islam via a wholesale conversion from Bogomilism, together with the whole 'Bogomil connection' in relation to the late medieval and early post-conquest history of Bosnia, has been shown to be a misinterpretation fostered by Bosnian scholars active in the last decades of Habsburg rule. A belief in the essential continuity of Bosnian history from the medieval to the Ottoman period, the ideological platform of generations of Bosnian scholars since the late nineteenth century, can no longer be held in any way tenable" (Heywood, 1994, p. 39).

[19] "Ottoman term for the periodical levy of Christian children for training to fill the ranks of the Janissaries and to occupy posts in the Palace service and the administration" (*The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* II, s.v.). Muslim historians, Bosniaks included, in reaction to the negative labelling of this violent occupying practice, tend to argue that boys abducted in such manner were actually provided a way to rise to eminence in the Ottoman state. Accordingly, Mehmedalija Bojić wrote: "They were guaranteed a career and all the military and administrative positions in the vast Ottoman Empire were potentially available to them, even those of grand viziers. The only criteria for that rising were their personal capacities and loyalty to the Sultan and the Ottoman state" (2001, p. 48). It is understandable that the non-Muslims reject such valorization of *devşirme* as a sort of "social mobility channel" and consider it cynical.

[20] It should be emphasized that pointing to the interests or economic motives for conversion to Islam does not mean accepting the once widespread thesis that the Bosnian nobles had lightly converted to Islam immediately after the Ottoman conquest in order to preserve their estates, for which there is no confirmation in historical sources.

[21] A capitation tax levied on non-Muslim citizens in an Islamic state.

[22] Muslim colleagues criticized Vasić and other proponents of the thesis on forced Islamization for viewing the spreading of Islam "outside of the process itself." However, the real issue is the mutually opposed value judgements of the historical and social processes within which Islamization is observed. In terms of civilization, the Muslims perceive Islamization as a positive process, while non-Muslims mainly perceive it as negative.

[23] *Pazar Trgovište*: bazaar market town.

[24] See Zlatar (1991, pp. 253–67). I have relied primarily on this thorough paper of Zlatar in summarizing the progress of Islamization in Sarajevo, in addition to insights derived from other sources and relevant literature.

[25] *Tekke:* lodge of a dervish (mystic) order.

[26] *Defter*: a type of tax register and land cadastre in the Ottoman Empire.

[27] *Ktetor, ktitor*: a title given in the Middle Ages to the provider of funds for construction or reconstruction of an Orthodox church or monastery.

[28] *Nahiye*: the smallest territorial and administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire.

[29] *Pashalik (identical to Eyalet)*: the largest territorial and administrative unit; a province in the Ottoman Empire administered by a *pasha*.

[30] According to the Austro-Hungarian Census of 1895, there were 496,761 or 42.88% Orthodox, 448,613 or 38.73% Muslims, and 209,391 or 18.08% Catholics (*Hauptresultate der Volkszählung in Bosnien und der Herzegovina vom 22. April 1895*, Sarajevo, 1896, XXVII).

[31] Kraljačić's study is, by and large, the most comprehensive and reliable description of Kállay's Austro-Hungarian policy in Bosnia and in general. Many of Kraljačić's insights and evaluations were relied upon in this concise presentation of the situation and processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina during Kállay's governance of the country and in general.

[32] Drawing on Churchill's idea that the Irish national movement was religiously motivated and that it would be resolved on the Judgment Day, historian Milorad Ekmečić introduced the term *Doomsday Nationalism* "as a Yugoslav contribution to the typology of nationalisms in the world" and applied it analytically to the study of internal interethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ekmečić, 1999, p. 111).

[33] Binding the Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Patriarchate of Karlovac (the Metropolitan Church) was to be one of the preparatory actions for the annexation of the occupied territories. In this way, the Orthodox in the territory of the Monarchy would be subordinated to religious authority in the same territory and state, and separated from Constantinople and, later, Belgrade. Realizing this, the Orthodox church governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina persistently and successfully resisted this plan.

[34] Opponents of the autonomy movement did not shy away from openly underestimating its leadership and pointing out the backwardness of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, in 1902, an anonymous pamphlet, *Muslim Question in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, was published, in which Džabić's action was vigorously attacked.

[35] On the interesting history of the origin of *Glas Hercegovca* and the nature of this newsletter, see Kruševac, (1978, pp. 117–125).

[36] From an examination of the different attitude towards the obedient leadership of the Islamic Community (*reis-ul-ulema, Ulema Majlis* and *Darul-mualimin*), as well as the real life interests, property and other rights of the Muslim population, it is clear that the Provincial Government viewed the role of the Muslim element as a messenger for the concept of a unified "Bosnian nation" extremely pragmatically and, essentially, as an instrument. Only strategic, imperial interests and goals of Vienna were relevant (Skarić, 1938, p.73).

[37] For the reasons why one element from the crown of the Hungarian kings was adopted as central in Kállay's coat of arms for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the controversies that followed this choice, which lacks any significance in Bosnia's older indigenous heraldic tradition, see Filipović in (Brković [ed.], 2016, pp. 233–63).

[38] "Because we, the Bosnian Muslims, are in the vast majority the descendants of ancient Bogomil Bosnian, who made up the majority or the mass of the Bosnian nation, during the time of national state, and our ancestors realized that the Islamic faith is pure and smart and so they preferred to convert to it, rather than to emigrate" (*Bošnjak,* 16, 21/04/1892). From this statement, it is clear that the conversion of Bogomil ancestors to Islam can be explained by the virtues of the new faith, thus ensuring the continuity of traditional domestic culture.

[39] Regular active army

[40] In 1850, Omer-Paša Latas (1806–1871) was tasked by the Sultan to break the resistance that the Bosnian *beys* provided to the reforms in the Empire, at all costs using the regular troops (*nizam*), which he decisively did. It was, as the Bosniak historian M. Bojić writes, "the collapse of the Muslim-Bosnian nobility" (Bojić, 2001, p. 95). It is indicative that Bašagić attributes Byzantine slyness to this Ottoman Pasha, and otherwise it is enthusiastically pointed out in Muslim works that Omer Paša was of Serb origin, born in Croatia.

[41] According to some estimates made during Baron Burián's visit to Sarajevo one month before the declaration of annexation, about 80% of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were against joining Austria-Hungary (Antić and Kecmanović, 2016, pp. 139–40).

[42] At the end of May 1914, the Serbian emissary in Vienna, Jovan M. Jovanović, warned the Minister for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Austro-Hungarian government that the arrival of Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia and Herzegovina for military maneuvers, on Vidovdan, represented a provocation for the Serb people. The police authorities in Sarajevo assessed the situation similarly as well (Radojević and Dimić, 2014, p. 73).

[43] Even though the political activity of the JMO was primarily directed at "Slavic Muslims" in Sanjak and in other parts of Serbia, as well as in Macedonia, it always took into account the position of other Muslims in the Kingdom (Albanians and Turks), which is clearly reflected in the newspapers close to the organization.

[44] In that respect, there is an indicative statement from Mehmed Spaho's: "When I am out of power, I am for secession, and when I am in power, I am for unification" (Smiljanić, 1966, p. 28).

[45] Imamović's opinion is one-sided and exaggerated, but it reflects the widespread opinion in the Bosniak public, which had an impact on the actions of the Bosniaks in later developments in the Yugoslav area. The dissatisfaction of the landlords with how the agrarian reform was being implemented was intense in other parts of the Kingdom as well, especially in Vojvodina and Slovenia, where there were also large land ownerships.

[46] See Paris, (1961, p. 54). Cardinal A. Stepinac's personality, role and actions have been the subject of much controversy between those who hold him fully responsible for supporting the criminal genocidal policy of the NDH on the one hand, and his apologists, on the other, mostly from Croat and Catholic circles, who deny those claims and even contend that the Archbishop had saved the Serbs and Jews from the Ustashe massacres. The debate took on a new dimension and momentum with the announcement of Stepinac's canonization in the Vatican. There is extensive, contradictory literature on this topic, but today it is objectively confirmed that the Cardinal's stance during World War II was, at the very least, extremely problematic, and that his support to the Ustashe NDH was constant, until the very end of the war. See, e.g, Dimić and Žutić, (2017); Tomasevich, (2001).

47 Even a very pro-Bosniak and anti-Communist-oriented author such as Smail Balić refers to the World War II in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a "civil war" (*Bürgeskrieg*), in which the "biologically endangered" Muslims largely opted for Tito's partisan movement (Balić, 1992, p. 25).

48 Bojić, who gives great importance to Muslim resolutions of 1941, criticizes the Serbs because they never reciprocated toward the Muslims by similarly condemning Chetnik crimes. Demanding such a symmetry loses sight of the reality of the historical context that the Serbs, Jews, and Roma at that time were subjected to unprecedented mass genocide throughout the territory of the NDH. It would be illogical to expect that in such conditions the Serbs could pass any resolutions or send messages to the Ustashe authorities. The Chetnik crimes and pogroms against the Muslims had a regional character, alternating with Ustashe and Muslim violence against the Serbs in the same areas, mostly in Eastern Bosnia, Herzegovina and Sanjak, and partly in the Bosanska Krajina, centuries-old sites of mutual persecution and extermination. The tendency to establish a "politically correct" symmetry between the Ustashe genocide and other forms of violence (Chetnik, Communist, etc.) during the war in the Yugoslav area, with inevitable relativization of the incomparable NDH genocidal program with anything else that happened between 1941 and 1945 was part of the ideologically inspired historiography in the postwar period. Depending on the ideological position and intentions of the author, the sins of "our side" are relativized.

49 This aspect of the Handschar Division phenomenon will be discussed in more detail in the chapter of this *Report* on the role of Islam in the war in B&H.

50 The Muslim military clerics, the imams, played a significant role in the Handschar Division. They had NCO and officer ranks, and it was their duty to look after the morale of the combatants and the fulfilment of their religious duties. Most imams had graduated from Islamic high schools and colleges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and among them, the most prominent was Husein Đozo, a graduate of al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo, an influential theologian and high religious official in the Islamic community after the war. The Grand *Mufti* of Jerusalem and Hitler's ally al-Husseini personally supported the formation of the Handschar Division and therefore visited Zagreb, Banja Luka and Sarajevo in April, 1943. In 1944, he visited the unit while training in the town of Neuhammer am Queis (Świętoszów in Polish).

51 By selectively combining and comparing the human losses of the three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some contemporary Bosniak historians have shown a tendency to conclude that the Muslims proportionately suffered the most. These claims are supported by some tendentious foreign authors (e.g., Malcolm,1994, p.192). Such claims "significantly influence the development of national awareness among contemporary Bosniaks and the

creation of their self-perception as a victimized people that had allegedly endured nine genocides between the 17th and 21st centuries." (Antić & Kecmanović, 2016, pp. 512–13).

52 *Savez komunista Jugoslavije* (League of Communists of Yugoslavia).

53 See, for example, Zaključci XV, XVIII, XIX i XX Sjednice Centralnog komiteta Saveza Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine (Conclusions of the XV, XVIII, XIX and XX Sessions of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Hercegovina), (Sarajevo: CKSKBiH, 1968), 54.

54 Cf., Nenad Kecmanović, "Kratak presek raspadanja: BiH od 1945 do 1990" („Short Conspectus of Desintegration: B&H from 1945 until 1990"), in: *Istorija jedne utopije*/ *History of an Utopia* (Beograd:Catena Mundi, 2018), 228–62.

55 The People's Liberation War.

56 "The Commission has been faulted, *inter alia*, for legitimating prematurely the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the recognition of its republics as sovereign states-especially, and most fatefully, of Bosnia, thus paving the way for the subsequent imbroglio and inferno" (*Pomerance,* 1998, p.58).

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CHAPTER II

The Psychology of Inter-Group Hostilities in the Bosnian War and a Map for Restorative Social Justice: Challenging the Myths of the Sarajevo Siege and Scourge of Serb Atrocities

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter addresses the psychology of inter-group hostilities like those that occurred during the 1991–1995 Bosnian Civil War. It is important to realize that the principles of human and group psychology apply equally to all groups during times of chaos and conflict. Here, we apply these principles to the Bosnian War, with particular focus on the events that transpired in and around Sarajevo during those trying times in an attempt to gain insights into misconceptions that arise during such events. Biased narratives have always surrounded crisis situations, especially those viewed from the perspective of the adversarial justice model, one that tends to exonerate the "winners" while stigmatizing those deemed to be the "losers." Clearly, the adversarial model of justice does little to foster rehabilitation, societal reconstruction, and, most importantly, reconciliation, among the parties involved in the conflict. We offer the restorative justice model, based on American Indian aboriginal social justice.

Social justice is an important component of restorative justice, in that it focuses on how societies treat their members. It addresses formal (manifest/de jure) and informal (latent/de facto) processes that determine the preferred social hierarchy (social stratification). This process determines the relationship between in-groups versus out-groups. The social order, in turn, is determined by rules that articulate the "dynamics of inclusion" (in-groups) versus the "dynamics of exclusion" (out-groups). Race, class, age, gender, social-economic status, and sectarianism are dynamics of stratification and relevant factors to be considered in any viable analysis of restorative justice.

Social justice analysis falls into the two basic categories of distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice addresses how the society and its members view the fairness of the allocation or distribution of what it defines as scarce resources, and primarily reflects the de facto justice model. Procedural justice, on the other hand, examines the formal rules (laws, statutes, customs, etc.) that dictate how these resources are allocated, and primarily reflects the de jure justice model. Social justice addresses the differentiation between procedural and distributive justice. Hence, policies that establish the rules that set the standards for the implementation of criminal, civil, and family or juvenile justice fall into the category of procedural justice. Criminal, civil, and family or juvenile justice adjudication, on the other hand, fall on a continuum between restorative justice and retributive justice. That said, it is important to remember that regardless of the extent of written or customary traditions, the administration of justice, per se, is a human process. Consequently, the psychological processes that influence how individuals, or groups, perceive the fair allocation of justice must be recognized and acknowledged.

Toward this end, the chapter examines the American/Nazi connection regarding the pseudoscience of eugenics that played a significant role in Europe during the last century in stigmatizing Jews, Serbs and Roma. This is followed by a section on the adjudication of inter-group hatreds and injustices, with references to the influence of American cases relevant to the contemporary Bosnian situation. Subsequently, we examine the psychological ramifications of unresolved war-related trauma as it affects all parties involved, along with an overview of the principles of human behavior and the mechanisms of inter-group relations. Finally, the restorative justice model is proffered as a model for social justice, truth, reconciliation and societal healing.

1. Introduction

War trauma affects both combatants and civilians and, if not adequately addressed, can have a lasting impact on future generations, resulting in a phenomenon known as *epigenetic trauma.* Moreover, the collective recollection, or ethnocentric narrative, can serve to heighten out-group hostilities creating a situation of reciprocal antagonism that obviates healing while strengthening inter-group animosities, including hate. This human phenomenon is the sad aftermath of unresolved reconciliation following civil wars.

The Civil War associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia shocked Western cultures more so than other recent violent outbursts emerging from non-white/non-Christian societies, such as Rwanda, Cambodia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, etc.,

due primarily to the generally held, albeit false, perception that white Europeans are superior and more intelligent than other human beings. Given this perspective, white Europeans and North Americans would like to believe that the horrors of the Second World War, along with its 35 million casualties, were attributable to a singular evil element among Europeans (Nazi Germany), coupled with an equally aggressive and savage Asian power (Japan). Indeed, today's WWII narrative is that the good Caucasians — e.g., "the greatest generation" — fought the war to rid the world of such evil influences, hence facilitating the continuing belief in white supremacy as well as the historical justification for the world-wide colonization of non-white indigenous peoples, and the exploitation of their land and resources.

The white supremacy fallacy stratifies humans according to race, culture, and religion, with "purer" Whites (Hitler's Aryans or even Western Europeans) at the top of the intellectual/moral/physical hierarchy; followed by "lesser" Whites (Slavic peoples, Mediterranean groups, white Hispanics, Jews); "near" Whites (Persians, olive-skinned Whites, North Africans, Middle Easterners, Roma, etc.); with non-Whites (Asians, Arabs, Africans, and Indigenous Natives) last in this human ranking. The social structure associated with this philosophy of white supremacy is accompanied by other myths supporting this social strata model, including the idea that these inferior groups lack the same capacity to feel either physical or emotional pain; indeed, that they lack the basic sensitivities of the superior Whites.

Historically, this long-held, unscientific, and completely unfounded assumption, as well as the pseudoscientific foundations of eugenic promoted by respected scholars and intellectuals at leading colleges and universities, were used to justify the physical and psychological abuses associated with the treatment of black slaves and indigenous peoples throughout the European and Asian colonies up to and including the twentieth century. Severe corporal punishment, separation of families through the slave trade, starvation, etc., were considered acceptable practices given the belief that these peoples did not have the mental or moral capacity to experience this treatment with the same level of sensitivity as would the white elite. Accordingly, victims of similar abuses, such as those associated with the Bosnian War, have been viewed through the prism of this white supremacist perspective, with the more acceptable Whites, those associated with Western Europe, such as Slovenians, Croats, Bosniaks, being considered as more vulnerable to suffering than are lesser Whites, such as Serbs, Jews, Roma, etc. According to this point of view, rape, torture, witnessing the murder or torture of one's family has far more of an impact on Western or white Bosnian War victims than on the lesser Whites, such as Serbs, Jews, and Roma.

This hierarchy became well-defined in America during the colonial era, when the concept of white supremacy was expressed in the Protestant Ethic and its doctrine of concept of divine providence (Weber, 1930). Europe, as well, has a long history of

human stratification and classification based on race, class, and color. Hitler promoted his own hierarchy of white supremacy, with northern and western Europeans at the apex. Inferior Whites included Jews, Serbs, and Roma, with the "mentally deficient," all viewed as the lowest level of humanity and thus designated for extermination under his plans for eugenic purity. While Hitler's Final Solution and the ensuing Holocaust shocked the world, the racial and ethnic paradigm he advocated, or at least certain aspects of it, is still adhered to, whether consciously or not, by a substantial number of people. Indeed, today, we see the reemergence of white nationalism, both in the United States and Europe. Increased right-wing anti-migrant furor is being fomented by leaders of nationalist groups in Europe (especially against migrants of color from Africa, the Middle-Eastern and Asia). There are those that argue that these movements are reflecting and simulating what they consider the racist tactics of the Trump administration in the United States. Following Trump's MAGA (Make America Great Again) campaign, along with its signature red baseball caps and other apparel, it would not be surprising to see similar MEPA (Make Europe Pure Again) attire appear in Europe.

2. The American/Nazi Connection Regarding the Pseudoscience of Eugenics

The American Heritage Dictionary defines eugenics as the study of hereditary improvement of the human race by controlled selective breeding. The term itself dates back to the late 19th century, when the British psychologist Sir Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, coined the term and proposed the science of eugenics for the purpose of producing a highly gifted race. Galton's (1869) theory of social Darwinism and its application to the quest to create a superior race gained widespread support in the United States during the early 20th century. Indeed, as previously noted, the concept of white supremacy in the United States dates back to its early history, beginning with its long-held belief in manifest destiny, or the idea that white males were predestined by God to be superior to all others (Stephamson,1966). Nazi Germany took the belief in white supremacy even further by supporting the social engineering of a superior Aryan race. Clearly, eugenics and racism are closely associated, and they provide an ostensibly objective rationale for social discrimination along the lines of race, class, caste and even gender. These ideas have fostered such practices as apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (a concept formulated in 1947 following the Nazi War Trials).

In Nazi-influenced Europe, the classes of human defectives included Jews, Gyp-

sies (Roma), non-Whites and even Whites, such as Serbs, not considered the genetic equivalent of northern and western European Caucasians. The Nazi atrocities were widely publicized due largely to the extremes measures of the Final Solution. What is less known is America's well-kept secrets of its earlier policies of sterilization, institutionalization, and execution of those deemed genetically inferior to the dominant white society since its early days of independence. In the United States, Blacks, American Indians, Asians and other non-Whites and even non-Protestant Whites, as well as those determined to be mentally deficient, were quickly labeled as genetically defective, requiring them to be cleansed from the U.S. population throughout the country. The white elite in U.S. society found a champion for their cause at Stanford University with the psychologist, Lewis M. Terman (1916) and his revision of the original 1908 French Binet-Simon IQ test.

Lewis Terman was influenced by his mentor Francis Galton, who was considered to be the founder of psychometrics, or the science of measuring mental faculties, thus setting the stage for the use of psychological tests to implement the dictates of Social Darwinism. Eugenics, the goal of which was the improvement of the human race through the elimination of what were considered to be defective gene pools (Black, 2003), was seen as the means for achieving successful Social Darwinism in the United States and was implemented partially through involuntary sterilization. It was Terman, confident that his version of the IQ test would accurately weed out the genetically deficient members of American society, or what he termed the serious deviant, who provided the ostensibly objective measure of determining who was unfit. His solution included plans for eliminating these genetic inferiors through their institutionalization and sterilization. Terman proposed his Stanford Binet Test in 1916 as a scientific tool for determining those in society that needed to be controlled and eventually removed from the gene pool. What was not factored into this test was the racial and class bias of his sample: the upper middle-class white faculty and families at Stanford University.

By 1926, 23 states had enacted compulsory sterilization laws and this practice was condoned by the United States Supreme Court in 1927 in its decision, *Buck v. Bell*, based mainly on Terman's theory:

> It is safe to predict that in the near future intelligence tests will bring tens of thousands of these high-grade defectives under the surveillance and protection of society. This will ultimately result in curtailing the reproduction of feeble-mindedness and in the elimination of an enormous amount of crime, pauperism, and industrial inefficiency…. Not all criminals are feeble-minded, but all feeble-minded are at least potential criminals. That every feeble-minded woman is a potential prostitute would hardly be disputed by anyone. …Considering the tremendous cost of vice and crime…it is evident that psychological testing has found here one of its richest applications. (1916, p. 26)

Of course, this assessment by the court and by others of the inevitable threats to society posed by those with lower IQ scores did not take into account the poor educational opportunities afforded blacks and other minorities in American society given the de jure and de facto segregation mandated by laws and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. This approach further fueled existing discriminatory practices that not only produced sub-standard education, but a distorted measurement of an individual's true intelligence, as poor education inevitably resulted in poor IQ test results. Also, the stigma associated with being genetically inferior led to harsh solutions for those falling into this category, even if their only societal offense was procreation. It is estimated that over 60,000 individuals, mainly African-American and American Indian females, were involuntarily sterilized in 35 states, at both the state and federal levels (Indian Country is federally administered), until this practice was challenged during the Civil Rights era of the 1960s, when it was disclosed that those most likely to be subjected to this practice were poor minorities. While California recorded the most cases of involuntary sterilization (20,000), North Carolina continued this practice until 1974. Although the use began to wane in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the practice of ethnic and genetic cleansing continued in American society through other avenues, most notably incarceration and the death penalty.

Barnes and Teeters (1959) noted that sterilization had its roots within the criminal justice system, with the first operation being performed in 1899 at the Jeffersonville Indiana Reformatory. Ironically, the horrors of Nazi eugenics during World War II played a role in ending the practice in the United States. Nonetheless, the eugenics movement in the United States clearly contributed to the general stereotype of racial inferiority, a status often based on flawed testing, and to the belief in the need to control these "inferior" human beings. The controversy over the stigma associated with psychological testing came to a head in 1972 in California, the state that had led the country in forced sterilizations, just as sterilization was being discredited. The issue involved the use of standardized tests to label students within the California public schools as being mentally deficient, a stigma that followed them throughout their lives.

It is interesting that Terman and his Stanford-Binet test played a significant role in this controversy. The legal case, *Larry P. v. Riles,* began in 1972, about the same time that forced sterilization was coming to an end and school integration was being forcibly implemented throughout the United States. Part of the problem with unfounded stereotype of a connection between IQ results and mental deficiency was that it fostered an association between racial inferiority and mental deficiency, along with a potential for violence. This stereotype continued to plague American society into the 21st century, leading to the Black Lives Matter movement, which reinforced the prejudice that these "inferior" people of color also had a greater potential for

violence. The United States offers a prime example of how stigmatizing groups and the ensuing societal discrimination can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The history of ethnic and genetic stigmatization in the United States serves as a basis for the question of how the negative stigma of Bosnian Serbs manifested itself in the school system of the cantons within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to what extent this fostered marginalized self-images and even mental illnesses. The 2009 Rose-Roth report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly alluded to such cross-cultural associations:

> Collective biases are imbued in human socialization and enculturation where we learn "our place", or standing, in society. We come to believe that brutality and hateful vengeance resulting in mass murder of unarmed civilians, rapes, torture, (beheadings, genital mutilations…), mass incarceration under dire conditions, and forceful expulsion from homes and communities…, are attributes associated with the lower tier, inferior peoples and not with the *civilized* superior elites. Yet, unfortunately, these are attributes common to civil wars regardless of race, class, or religion; a situation associated with collective fears and irrationalities. Indeed, the latter, sectarianism and political ideology, often serve to exacerbate the flames of inter-group fears and hatred leading to collective irrational behaviors, e.g., mobs, vigilantism, and riots. Any viable plan for restorative justice in the former Yugoslavia needs to view the turbulent 1990s within its proper perspective – that of a complicated civil war fueled by proxy geo-political interests from Europe, America, and the Middle East. Moreover, it was a media war which, in itself added fuel to the conflict, especially during the quasi-siege of Sarajevo. Indeed, a renewed focus on Sarajevo is needed to see the complicated and convoluted nature of the Bosnian War. (pp. 3,4)

While any reassessment of the Bosnian War is loudly dismissed as falsely based on the views of self-serving revisionists who want to maintain the adversarial victim versus offender model with its intransient polar opposites, the fact remains that accurate assessments were made during the conflict itself only to be ignored or dismissed by the more powerful proxy nations that wanted to promote their own narrative of a singular aggressor forcing its will on a non-violent, innocent victim. Today, for those not having been directly involved in the conflict, the common narrative is that following the fall of the Soviet Union (of which Yugoslavia was never a member), Western Europe and America enticed Slovenia and Croatia, the Yugoslav provinces that strongly aligned themselves with Western Europe, to secede, leading to the ultimate breakup of Yugoslavia. In retaliation, this narrative contends, the evil Serbs then descended upon the peaceful, peasant-like Bosniaks, and engaged in a campaign of killing and rape in their quest for a Greater Serbia. It was now the paternalistic

duty of America, NATO, and the European Union to act as protectors for the hapless Bosniaks.

The fallacy with this scenario is that Yugoslavia was never under the yoke of the more powerful Soviet Union. Moreover, it had its own constitution that accommodated the respective provinces comprising the Socialist Union. This was no Poland, or East Germany needing freedom from oppression. Serbia was not a foreign country trying to invade the once-constituent provinces. Rather, it was an integral part of the former Yugoslavia, not unlike the Union Army during the American Civil War, or the "War between the States." The Balkan War was a "War between the Provinces."

This narrative of a conflict between aggressive Serbs and innocent Bosniaks is still adhered to today, as evidenced by the concerted media effort to constantly remind the world of the evils the Serbs perpetrated upon the peaceful Bosniaks, a narrative with little mention of the role the more so-called "civilized" northern Yugoslavians — the Slovenians and Croats, and their proxies — played in the conflict. Nor is any mention made of the no less important story of how the Slovenians and Croats profited from the continuing war and gained instant wealth from this blood money.

The continued focus on blaming one party only in what was clearly a civil war between two sides is predicated largely on the continued acceptance, albeit even unconsciously, of Hitler's Aryan paradigm, where Serbs are considered an inferior people, like Jews and Roma: those once destined for eugenics. Now, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 11, known as Genocide Day, aka National Day of Remembrance, is essentially the day designated to denigrate Serbs. This date is not an occasion intended to remember significant genocides like those perpetrated by the Nazis, including those aided by the Ustashe, where hundreds of thousands of Jews, Serbs, and Roma were systematically killed at the Jasenovac concentration camps in Yugoslavia. Instead, this day becomes a mass media campaign against the Serbs promoted on numerous outlets, including popular web sites like LinkedIn and Facebook. On July 10, 2019, the banner "Never Forget, Never Forgive Srebrenica – 11.07. 1995" was listed on the *Radio Sarajevo* web sites. The following day, *Radio Sarajevo* ran an item about the Bridge in Mostar as a Tribute to Victims of Genocide in Srebrenica, thus perpetuating a preposterous narrative, given that the Croats were responsible for the "Mostar Siege" and destruction of the bridge.

These prevailing anti-Serb sentiments were reflected by the five-member, UN Appeals Court's March 2019 rejection of the appeal by Radovan Karadžić, the first President of Republika Srpska from 1991–1995 of his 2016 genocide convictions by the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He alone was seen as the main perpetrator of war crimes during the Bosnian War, being blamed not only for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, but also for the four-year quasi-siege of Sarajevo, as well as for war crimes committed in 20 Bosnian communities. He was

found guilty of a campaign of ethnic cleansing that forced Croats and Muslims out of Serb-claimed regions during the 1991–1995 conflict and, most notably, for the 10,000 deaths during the quasi-siege of Sarajevo. Moreover, in the 2019 ruling, Judge Vagn Joensen extended the 73-year-old Karadžić's sentence issued in 2016 from 40-years to life imprisonment, arguing that the 40-year sentence did not adequately reflect the extraordinary gravity of his crimes.

This decision is clearly a biased overreaction, given that Karadžić would be unlikely to live long enough to serve the original 40-year sentence. More significantly, the judgment of the UN Court of no appeal set the stage for an international review of the blatant biases and omissions of the ICTY on which the UN Court of Appeals based its decision. The fact that the genocide charge is leveled against an individual for separate alleged war crimes, in itself, undermines the true significance of the term genocide, meaning an explicit plan to exterminate an entire group: in this case, Bosniaks. Genocide implies a widespread, ongoing campaign, like that in Rwanda or the Nazi Holocaust. To selectively apply it to the actions of a single individual dilutes its significance, doing an injustice to those who suffered under a real genocide.

This UN judgment can be seen as yet another attempt to adjudicate legitimacy to the demonization of Serbs as quasi-Nazis. Clearly, a genocide label, in this case, is designed to stigmatize the entire ethnic group, a process that strengthens the victim status of the other groups involved in the Bosnian War, while diminishing or denying victim status to the officially-labeled perpetrator and aggressor: the Serbs. This scenario was reinforced when the Croatian member of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, Željko Komšić, and the Bosniak member of Bosnia's presidency, Šefik Džaferović, both expressed great satisfaction about this decision, declaring that it would help relatives of these atrocities to heal. As would be expected, the United States and the European Union urged all sides to respect the ruling and work toward reconciliation, somehow failing to acknowledge that reconciliation is hardly possible when one group is exonerated at the expense of another. Instead, such an outcome increases out-group hostilities and inter-group hatreds, further prolonging any viable attempts at healing.

On the same day of the Court's decision, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina publicized their strong support of the decision to strengthen Radovan Karadžić's image as the "poster child" for Serb aggression:

Today's verdict in the case of Radovan Karadžić is another crucial step toward holding accountable those individuals most responsible for genocide and other atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

First and foremost, our thoughts are with the families of the victims, for whom the pursuit of justice has been long and painful. It is a complex and painful process, but a critically important one.

Holding individuals accountable for their criminal actions, even these many years after the war, is essential to building lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, upholding the rule of law and strengthening international jurisprudence.

In tandem with the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the judicial institutions in BiH continue to strive towards these goals, with hundreds of perpetrators of war crimes prosecuted to date in domestic courts. However, these institutions require support to continue their work on war crimes cases in an independent and impartial manner, free from political attacks or attempts at undue influence.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnian and Herzegovina continues to support the judiciary of BiH in its efforts to bring to justice those responsible for atrocity crimes. We strongly urge all citizens in the country and beyond – in particular, political and party leaders, media, local government officials, religious leaders and community activists – to respect today's verdict and avoid inflammatory, divisive rhetoric.

It is only through the joint investment of all the process of reconciliation that stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be achieved (Sule, 2019).

3. Adjudicating Inter-Group Hatreds and Injustices: A U.S.-Bosnian Comparison

Parallels can be made between the recent UN Court of Appeals decision, legally adjudicating Serbs as genocidal villains through its judgment against Radovan Karadžić, with the infamous 1896 United States Supreme Court case *Plessy v. Ferguson* case, that adjudicated American Blacks as inferior to Whites, and legally relegated them to permanent second-class citizenship and another 72 years of discrimination, essentially giving the white community license to intimidate, harass, and even kill Blacks indiscriminately. Ironically, judicial fiat often supersedes both legislative and executive authorities, in that it provides an ultimate interpretation and determination of these cases according to prevailing constitutional and societal norms. The *Plessy* case legitimized the so-called separate-but-equal (Jim Crow) status imposed on Blacks by the southern states that once comprised the Confederacy by upholding the constitutionality of racial segregation in the United States. This decision empowered hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan and implicitly tolerated indiscriminate, vigilante lynchings (killing by hanging, burning, or dismembering) of Blacks without the benefit of due process. It also justified the disproportionate imprisonment of American Blacks, an unfortunate legacy that continues to the present.

Hence, this single decision, in essence, nullified the Confederacy's defeat in the Civil War, permitting the public display of Confederate monuments and flags as constant reminders to both Blacks and Whites of the supremacy of Whites over Blacks and other minorities of color: American Indians, Hispanics, and Asians.

Monuments to the Confederacy proliferated soon after the *Plessy* decision, with statues of Confederate military leaders dominating public and government buildings and parks as a constant reminder of the Whites' supremacy over those of color, who were, in turn, subjected to inferior services, including education, within this social caste system. These inferior services resulted in a self-fulfilling system that guaranteed the inferior status of non-Whites.

Only recently, over a century since the *Plessy* decision, have these totems and monuments been challenged and taken down. For all those years, statutes reflecting the leaders of the brutality of slavery, Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and more, were constant reminders of the inferiority of Blacks and the superiority of Southern Whites. The *Plessy* decision emboldened the radical White right in America, where, today, both the Confederate and Nazi flags are symbols of these hate groups.

The parallel between the *Plessy* decision and its aftermath with the Bosnian War is that while Serbs are singled out and demonized, others involved in the Bosnian War following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, notably Croatia with its Nazi past, openly proclaim their successful ethnic-cleaning victory over those who formerly occupied notorious Nazi death camps: Jews, Roma, and Serbs. There are massive statutes of Tudjman throughout Croatia and even its major airport in Zagreb is named after him; yet there is no Adolf Hitler Airport in Germany, or Harry S. Truman Airport in Japan. These totems and flags symbolize a de facto victory of "good over evil," without any evidence to support such claims of righteousness. Such cultural appropriation of the symbols of victory and superiority is a clear danger resulting from the assignment of blame on the basis of an adversarial judicial system and a massive media campaign rather than on the basis of a restorative justice process based on truth and reconciliation, where all occurrences are reported and proportionately determined. A restorative justice process can be carried out only if the conflict is viewed from the perspective that it was a civil war and not from the perspective of a contrived narrative of unprovoked aggression by a single party.

3.1. Strong Arguments for the Civil War Scenario and Efforts Promoting a "Good Guy"- "Bad Guy" Narrative

The perspective that the Bosnian War was a civil war was clearly articulated by Misha Glenny (1992):

> The British and French regarded the war in Bosnia as a civil war, first and foremost, which had been provoked by the breakdown of Bosnia's constitutional consensus. While recognizing that Belgrade's logistical support for the Bosnian Serb war-machine constituted a form of aggression, the Foreign Office and Lord Owen pointed out that the overwhelming majority of Serbs (and for that matter Croats) fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina were born and bred on the territory. In the United States, the issue was perceived very differently. The war was a straight case of aggression by one state, Serbia, against another, Bosnia-Herzegovina (the role of the Bosnian Croats or Croatia was simply not considered, a fact which caused complete confusion on the news desks of American newspapers when fighting between Croats and Muslims started to run out of control in spring 1993. (pp. 222-223)

The bias against the Serbs was echoed by the leading American diplomats at the time, Richard Holbrook and Madeleine Albright. Holbrook, in his 1998 book, *To End a War,* attempted to blame the breakup of Yugoslavia on two factors: the inherent evilness of Serbian leaders, and Tito's communism:

> [But] the bloodbath and fighting of 1941–45 were a product of the larger struggle and genocide Hitler had unleashed. The rest of Europe found a path to peace and reconciliation, but Yugoslavia suffered a bad case of arrested development under communism. Then demagogic and criminal leaders seized power.
>
> The killers were driven by ethnic prejudice rekindled by ultranationalists and demagogues. How could adults do such things to their neighbors and former classmates? After a while, the search for explanations failed. One simply had to recognize that there was true evil in the world.
>
> The full ferocity of that evil so stunned most Europeans and Americans that they could not at first comprehend it. …There was confusion over whom to blame, and disputes about what was happening; this increased as the war continued, since atrocities were committed by members of all three ethnic groups. But although Croats and Muslims were also guilty of atrocities, the Bosnian Serbs remained the primary perpetrators of the actions that made the

> phrase "ethnic cleansing" a part of the English language.…For more than fifty years, people had debated the degree to which the entire German people shared culpability for the Holocaust, and now a similar question arose: was the entire Serb "nation" responsible for the actions of its leaders and their murderous follows? (p. 367)

Madeleine Albright was also an influential figure in the Clinton administration whose anti-Serb biases not only reinforced those of Richard Holbrook, but also apparently encouraged the 1999 anti-Serb Kosovo intervention. Her anti-Serb bias was widely publicized following an October 2012 rant at a Prague bookstore promoting her latest book, when she screamed: "Get out, disgusting Serbs, you are war criminals," at Serb protestors (Tikkanen, 2019).

In contrast, a clearly Croat-centric perspective on the conflict is taken by Mato Arlović (2017) in his recent *The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia*, which provides a clearly Croat-centric perspective on the conflict. Nonetheless, Arlović does provide a more balanced explanation of the factors leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia:

> The breakup of the former SFRY was one of the biggest surprises of the end of the twentieth century for many theorists of constitutional law, the state and political systems generally. …The surprise was based on the fact that its breakup took place through bloody wars which gave rise to crimes; suffering, torture, destruction, blood, pain, tears, hopelessness, great loss of life and injury which were accompanied by great crudeness, brutality and insensitivity towards others and those who are different, unheard of since the end of the Second World War to this very day, particularly in Europe. The surprise was even greater for many of them because it was considered that the state formation, unlike the countries of the Soviet ideological circle, was, within the communist political matrix, more disposed to freedom. The Yugoslav self-managing utopia, along with all the limitations which arise from the nature of a totalitarian system, was inclined to some form of authentic pseudo-democracy, which enabled the growth of oases of free thinking, writing and action. It was a softer, or, let us call it, soft communism, as opposed to Russian hard-communism…. However, a social paradox of the first degree took place: the countries with firm totalitarian structures adopted or are in the processing of adopting democracy without the use of war, while the SFRY, as a striking zone of liberalized, weakened, softened communism, fell apart into primordial violence…. (p. 235)

Klaus Bade (2003) offered a concise yet more comprehensive description of the basic reasons leading to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in his book, *Migration in European History*:

> After Tito's death the federal union collapsed as a result of constitutional deficiencies, strong regional differences in development, distribution disputes and conflicting social and economic interests. Economic problems that had been growing since then damaged the Yugoslavian economy considerably, as did excessive bureaucratization and mismanagement, bad investments and an increasing technological development gap. Members of the Federal Council blocked each other, which prevented domestic and in particular economic policies from functioning. At the same time, nationalist interests and power politics, with varying degrees of international support, mobilized and exploited old ethnic prejudice, exclusive self-images and hostile images of the other.
>
> Tensions within Yugoslavia need not inevitably have led to war. The conflicts were initially triggered by Slovenian and Croatian efforts to achieve autonomy, which were encouraged by the west, and the rise in nationalist emotions in support of a Greater Serbia since 1987-8 and their manipulation in maintaining the power of the Serbian leadership under Milosevic. (p. 316)

Absent from the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT) process and Judge Vagn Joensen's decision are not only clear evidence of failed attempts at peaceful solutions to the breakup of Yugoslavia, but the role international coverage played in prolonging the war, notably the "Siege of Sarajevo." In some ways, the style of coverage resembled what would become popular reality shows. With the media focused on Sarajevo, all parties — Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, proxy nations, and the world news outlets — played a major role in prolonging the popular media series known as *The Siege of Sarajevo.* This production included a "cast of thousands" with more than 100,000 foreigners, a dozen UN agencies and more than 200 non-governmental agencies (NGOs). Toward the end of the war, it is estimated that two-thirds of all UN blue-helmeted peacekeepers were stationed in Bosnia. Both Misha Glenny (1992) and Peter Andreas (2008) provide graphic examples of this media circus, one that clearly contributed to the rising death count and perpetuated criminal enterprises and political corruption. According to Andreas:

> The siege was formally internationalized through UN monitoring and aid provision, diplomatic initiatives, sanctions and embargoes, an influx of humanitarian workers, and continuous global media coverage. And it was internationalized through smuggling networks and mechanisms used to clandestinely supply and finance the opposing sides and evade UN sanctions and embargoes. These formal and informal dimensions were very much interdependent, representing the front-stage and back-stage action in the long siege drama. (p. 4)

Andreas contrasted the Siege of Sarajevo with the Croat's Siege of Mostar, where the intense infighting and devastation was far less noticed by the outside world because Mostar was simply too dangerous and inaccessible to lend itself to the emotional, real-time coverage Sarajevo received from a "media hungry world." Andreas quotes historian Robert Donia on his interpretation of the siege:

> The daily violence was conducted under the scrutiny of international civil servants, aid workers, "peacekeepers," journalists, and scholars who could travel with relative ease on conveyances not available to the local population. Sarajevo was the lens through which most outsiders viewed the conflict: the agony of Sarajevo became the embodiment of the Bosnia war's savagery and senselessness. At most times, the army of privileged observers could get into and out of the city, stay in relative comfort in the Holiday Inn (the sole hostelry that functioned throughout the war), ride in armored vehicles along the city's most dangerous routes, and send dispatches to the outside world using the latest communications technology. (p. 16)

Andreas points out that the continuation of violence was crucial to maintaining international attention and increasing both political and monetary capital from the siege, given that the high visibility of this victimization served as a crucial weapon for the Sarajevo government and Izetbegović's Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in cultivating international support. Toward these ends, the SDA continued to impose strict restrictions on Sarajevo citizens attempting to leave the city. The SDA also denied meaningful interventions designed to improve the lives of the city's populace. In this way, Izetbegović and the SDA purged the city government of any non-party officials in order to continue profiting from the siege and its international media coverage. Both the Serbs and Croats played a significant role in maintaining the black markets that kept the siege in the world's view. Kiseljak and Ilidža became the main overland routes for the illicit black market trade that provided the Croats a substantial financial stake in keeping the siege going. Even UNPROFOR units participated in the siege trade, with Canadian troops implicated in the black market trade, profiting by selling cigarettes, coffee, alcohol, fuel, clothing, and even weaponry to Bosniaks.

One of the most appalling misdeeds committed by the Izetbegović regime was to obstruct George Soros's and the International Rescue Committee's plan to construct water treatment plants to filter water from the Miljacka River which runs through the middle of Sarajevo. Izetbegović and the Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdžić vetoed this effort, forcing Sarajevo citizens to continue to carry water under fire when they could have been getting it safely at home in their taps. The Sarajevo government's denial of this ready-to-implement plan was seen as a deliberate policy decision to continue allowing Bosniaks to be subjected to sniper fire in the streets so

that these globally televised images would continue to broadcast the heart-wrenching images of a besieged city needing more foreign aid, money that enriched only a few. Unbeknown to many, was that the Saudis, Iranians, and Turks were major sources of clandestine economic support and also provided outside Muslim fighters.

Glenny (1992) noted that both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations were cognizant of and supportive of this clandestine aid being provided under the auspices of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) in blatant violation of UN sanctions, especially those prohibiting military assistance. What the United States and others did not know was that those involved in channeling this clandestine aid included Al-Qaeda and other jihadists from Egypt, Albania, Afghanistan and Yemen. Even John Bolton was shocked by the savagery of the Islamic jihadists, such as the *mujahedeen*, especially their public displays of the decapitation of non-Muslims. What did not emerge from the ensuing "good guy/bad guy" narrative was the role that the Izetbegović administration played in exploiting and victimizing its own people, especially during the siege of Sarajevo. Also complicit in these wartime "get rich" schemes were the Slovenes and Croats, as well as the Serbs. These convoluted relations and interests further complicated the collective healing process those victimized by the conflict had to undergo, including those from all sides: Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, Jews, Roma. Moreover, sectarian-centric narratives only served to intensify hostile divisions among those living in the former Yugoslavia. Another factor affecting victims of the conflict was the culture of corruption that flourished during the conflict, notably in Sarajevo, and still prevails through the region today.

3.2. The Consequences of "Exoneration:" the License for Unchecked Corruption

A 2011 report of the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) on Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that corruption ranks fourth in serious problems facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, following unemployment, government performance, and poverty. Among the findings is the prevalence of corruption even in health care, a situation certain to affect the healing of victims of the Bosnian War and their families. The following are the key findings of the UNODC survey:

- Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina rank corruption as the fourth most important problem facing their country today, after unemployment, the performance of the government and poverty or low standard of living;
- Eight out of ten citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina interact with the public administration at some point during the course of the year;

- In the 12 months prior to this survey, 20.1 percent of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been exposed – either directly or through a household member – to a bribery experience with a public official;
- The bribery prevalence rate – the percentage of citizens paying a bribe among those who had contact with public officials in the 12 months prior to the survey – is 20.7 percent;
- There are no significant differences in the prevalence of bribery in urban and rural areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- The prevalence of bribery is significantly higher in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) (25.3%) than in Republika Srpska (RS) (10.5%); (Italics added for emphasis);
- The bribery prevalence rate is 18.2 percent for women in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as opposed to 23.2 percent for men;
- Everyone who reports the payment of at least one bribe, on average, actually pays five bribes or the equivalent of one bribe every ten weeks;
- Almost 80 percent of bribes are paid in cash, 15 percent as food and drink;
- The average cash bribe paid in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 220 BAM, or the equivalent of approximately 112 Euros;
- In 37 percent of bribery incidents, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina initiate the payment, whereas in more than half the cases the bribe is requested;
- The main reasons for paying bribes in Bosnia and Herzegovina are to avoid the payment of a fine (25 percent) and to speed up a procedure (25 percent);
- More than a half of all bribe-payers in Bosnia and Herzegovina pay kickbacks to doctors (54 percent) and police officers (52 percent), and almost one third to nurses (31 percent);
- Of those citizens turning down the request of a public official to pay a bribe, four out of ten refuse to pay police officers and almost one in five (18 percent) refuse to pay doctors;
- Only 2.4 percent of citizens with corruption experience report the incident. Citizens do not report corruption experiences because they receive a benefit from this (26 percent) or because they think that nobody would care (26 percent);
- Recruitment in the public sector is also an area of concern. Among those hired in the public sector in the preceding three years, a significant percentage (14 percent) secured a job with the help of a bribe;

- The offer of goods, favors and money to attract voters was evidenced during the last national and local elections: fifteen percent of citizens were approached at the last national elections and 13 percent at the last local election; and
- Corruption has a higher prevalence rate than other crimes such as theft, burglary, robbery and assault. This is consistent with the rather low crime rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where citizens feel safe at home after dark and do not use advanced security systems to protect their homes. (Basoglu, 2011, pp. 7–8)

Blaming each other for the war has driven a wedge between the major ethnic and sectarian groups vying for international recognition and financial support. This animosity obviates any realistic progress toward reconciliation, the goal many NGOs purport to support by aligning with one group or the other while rarely being inclusive. Two 2009 reports addressed this problem. Renata Stuebner (2009), examined the current status of religious coexistence and education in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 2009 United States Institute of Peace (USIPEACE) briefing and produced a somewhat discouraging report:

> Executive Summary
>
> This report is intended to examine the status of religious reconciliation and coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
>
> Bosnia and Herzegovina's centuries-old tradition of religious coexistence is rapidly disappearing. Memories of a time when people shared the same schools, office space and living conditions are slowly giving way to a fear of "the others." Some positive interactions still take place due to family ties from mixed marriages, economic interdependence and old, enduring friendships. However, some efforts of top religious leaders, similar to those of the nationalistic politicians, seem to be driving society in the opposite direction.
>
> Religious leaders have a multilayered agenda, only one layer being interreligious dialogue and coexistence. Instead of being an example of true Abrahamic spiritual leaders, they very often meddle in politics and pursue their own separate religious and political interests.
>
> Education in religious understanding is unstructured and, in most areas, nonexistent. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an international organization with education as one of its major foci, suffers from the same weaknesses as other international organizations – no institu-

tional memory, no coordination nor any vision for the future. Goals set and agreements achieved on a high level do not reach the population and have no effect on their lives.

Conclusions

Despite 15 years of sporadic efforts, religion today in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more of a hindrance than a help to promoting peaceful coexistence. Polarization and extremism make religions other than one's own even more distant, strange and threatening. Physical interaction that existed before the last war is now almost completely lost because of political division. Teaching culture of religions, history of religions and a comprehensive approach to different religions have not yet started to be implemented throughout the school system. While the staff of the IRC [International Religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina] is attempting to implement worthwhile programs, most of the top religious leaders are more interested in promoting the interests only of their own co-religionists or in furthering other political agendas. (pp. 1, 13)

4. The Psychological Ramifications of Unresolved War-Related Trauma

In April 2009, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's 70th Rose-Roth Seminar met in Sarajevo to discuss steps needed for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the surrounding Balkan nations of Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro to obtain NATO and/or European Union membership. The seminar concluded that there was increased sectarianism and ethnic divisions described by Stuebner despite the enormous influx of contributions and resources from outside the country directed at bringing the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs together (Jews and Roma are generally marginalized and ignored in these efforts), an evaluation reinforced by later USIPEACE findings (November, 2009). Polls suggest that younger people in the region are more nationalistic and parochial in their outlook than are their parents (NATO, 2009, p. 8).

Following the Rose-Roth report, a further review was conducted by this author at the University of Sarajevo of the relevant literature on this issue at the time (2009–2010). This review made important determinations about the effects of stress among different parts of the population, particularly children and youth:

The Balkans Wars of 1991–2002 were the most destructive conflicts in Europe since the Second World War. Studies on traumatic stress up to this time focused on the Vietnam and Gulf War conflicts (French, 2008). Moreover, this focus was/is mainly on North American, British, Australian, and European military personnel and not on Asian or Arab populations caught up in these

conflicts. Hence, studies on the nature and extent of war trauma associated with the Balkan Wars existed mainly in Slavic-language professional journals and cover both military and civilian victims. A review of these articles was the first step in determining assessment and treatment strategies for dealing with victims who have survived the conflict but continue to suffer from unresolved and untreated symptoms.

The Slavic-language articles dealt with traumatic stress among both veterans and civilians, notably those involved in the forty-four-month-long siege of Sarajevo (April 1992–February 1996); the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now the States of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo) from March to June 1999; as well as the tens-of-thousands of refugees displaced, many still not back in their homeland, during the entire Balkan conflict (1991–1999), (Donev, et. al, 2002; Lazic & Bojanin, 1995). It is important to note that people on all sides of the Balkan conflict, veterans and civilians alike, were subjected to war-related trauma, either directly or indirectly, and that these social/clinical features pertain to anyone, regardless of their ethnic/sectarian origin. Consequently, these articles address clinical research on victims from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia/Montenegro, and Kosovo as well as those working in refugee camps located in Macedonia and throughout Europe (Cavic, 2001; 2008). We present a sampling of these articles especially as they pertain to combat veterans and civilian victims, including women, children and youth.

Many articles focused on the effects of the war on children and youth. A sampling of these studies portrays the complexity of this problem within the Balkans. Milosavljevic and his associates noted that while war is the most significant human stressor, children are the most vulnerable to its effects. They studied the effect of war psychic trauma syndrome (WPTS) among youth aged 10 to 16 residing in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska in November and December 1995. Milosavljevic's team found that the effects of WPTS (psychophysiological, emotional and cognitive impairments) were more frequent among females than males and that these effects were more intense and frequent among those youth who lost somebody close to them in the conflict (Milosavljevic, et al., 1996). Many researchers found that the prolonged nature of the conflict, in conjunction with the unpredictability of their situation, contributed to the intensity of post-traumatic crisis (Basoglu, 2005; Hasanovic, et al, 2005; 2006; Herceg, et al., 1996; Klaric, et al., 2007; 2008; Terzic, et al., 2001).

Petrović (2004), in her study of 1,934 primary school children in Vojvodina, Serbia, compared war-related traumatization (NATO bombings) with that of single-event non-war childhood trauma, finding that repeated (chronic)

stress leads to a higher level of traumatization coupled with serious personality changes. Another study of children and youth in Vojvodina, conducted 14 months following the end of the NATO bombing attacks, found that nearly 60 percent of the children showed signs of trauma that impacted on their everyday coping skills (Zotovic, 2005; Gavriolvic-Jankovic, et al., 1998; Selakovic-Bursic, et al, 2000; 2001). And a study conducted by the University of Novi Sad, found that children (aged 7 at the time of the NATO bombings) from towns that were directly hit by the air campaign showed more marked signs of personal distress five years later, in comparison to those children not directly impacted by these attacks. This phenomenon was more common in male subjects than in females (Nikoloski-Koncar, et al, 2006).

A study of traumatized children in Prishtina in 2000 found similarities among this population to that of a sample from Sarajevo (Barath, 2002). The Kosovo sample differed from the besieged Sarajevo study in that the Prishtina children involved refugees relocated to camps in Macedonia, hence having the additional feature of socio-cultural anomie – a common factor among all groups of refugee children regardless of ethnic/sectarian/national origin. The study reported three major groups of stressors: 1) a lack of cultural and social security resources they once enjoyed in their native homeland; 2) poor mental and physical health conditions; and 3) school-related stressors. The study, conducted by the Canadian International Children's Institute (ICI), warned that environmental, educational and social/cultural circumstances need to be taken into account when addressing traumatized children, especially those who were refugees (Barath, 2002; Donev, et. al, 2002). Similar conclusions were noted by Ajdukovic in her study of children in Croatia. She stated that 969 children were wounded during the war in Croatia (254 killed) while another 4273 children lost one parent and 54 lost both parents. Consequently, many children witnessed violence and death with many displaced from their home environment. A study done by UNICEF indicated that childhood trauma was most intense among those children who were displaced due to the war, especially those who also experienced or witnessed violence (Ajdukovic, 1995). A similar study, comparing refugee children from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with their counterparts who remained home, indicated that refugee victims tended to be plagued by the death of a family member, and forced expulsion in addition to intrusive memories of the bombardments while the non-refugee children were plagued mainly by the bombardments (Herceg, et al., 1996). Intrusive traumatic experiences are true for those youth who are victims of landmines, a problem that continue to plague many communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ceranic, 2003).

The focus on unmet social/cultural and psychological needs of traumatized children and youth is important because not doing so could be costly to the society in terms of later disorganization by this group as they mature. Substance abuse, dysfunctional families, poor educational and employment records are likely to increase among this untreated population. A study of psychological problems in children of war veterans with PTSD in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed more developmental problems with their children indicating problematic long-term effects of the father's PTSD on the family matrix (Klaric, et al., 2008). Collectively, psychological crisis among children and youth serve to impede any reconciliation efforts within the various ethnic/sectarian groups caught up in the Balkan conflicts. Studies on ethnic stereotypes in Bosnia-Herzegovina measured the nature of continued out-group negative images harbored by Bosniak and Serbian youth. One study between youths in Sarajevo (Bosniaks) and Banja Luka (Serbs) showed significant inter-group negative stereotypes between the two groups – a clear reflection of their respective socialization within a polarized society (Turjacanin, 2004). Another study on the ethnical distance of citizens of Repbulika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) indicated a broader spectrum of ethnic dislikes among adults within these two entities. The FBiH sample disliked Romas the most, followed in descending order: Albanians, Macedonians, Serbs and Montenegrians. Slovenians and Croats were the least rejected by the citizens of FBiH. The Croats were most adamant about their ethnic rejections than their more populous Bosniaks within the greater FBiH sample. The RS sample rejected the Bosniaks the most followed in descending order: Romas, Croats, Slovenians, and Macedonians. They rejected Montenegrians the least. The RS sample was more adamantly against inter-ethnic/sectarian marriages as well (Puhalo, 2003).

Research clearly indicates that children and youth are influenced by their interactions with traumatized parents and close family members. Impulsive violence and substance abuse are common attributes among untreated and frustrated veterans (fathers, sons, husbands). Obviously, these behaviors impact greatly on both the immediate and extended family (Jovanovic, et al., 2009; Ilic, et.al., 1998; Gavrilovic-Jankovic, et al., 2005; Kuljic, et al. 2004; Opalic, 2008; Varsek, 1999). Family and personal disruptions also afflict women (mothers, daughters, wives) especially those taken away from their families and subjected to rape, torture and confinement during the conflicts. One study clearly showed that civilian women who experienced long-term exposure to war stressors, coupled with continued postwar stressors (broken families or displaced family members, unemployment, problems with their spouse and/or

children…), suffered serious psychological problems including PTSD (Klaric, et.al., 2007). Even more devastating are studies on the psychological consequences of rape on women during the 1991–1995 war. A substantial number of captive women were raped repeatedly as well as being subjected to torture (Loncar, 2005). It is an understatement to say that wartime rapes left deep psychological scars among this population. Research showed that of veterans, former prisoners, rape victims and refugees; rape victims and former prisoners were shown to have the most severe PTSD symptoms (Drezgic-Vulkic, et al., 1996; Gregurek, et al., 1996; Henigsberg, et al., 2001). Clearly, violated war victims represent a difficult class of traumatized people to treat effectively — suicide often being the final solution to their suffering. Clearly, the burden of finding and treating war trauma victims falls mainly on private NGOs funded by international groups given the continued political and sectarian unrest in all the new states carved out of the old Yugoslavia. Little accurate data is available regarding specific clinical diagnoses. Only gross indicators are available, such as chronic unemployment and/or poverty, substance abuse, family disorganization, problem youth, health problems and suicides (French & Nikolic-Novakovic, 2012).

This author conducted another follow-up study regarding the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Rose-Roth Seminar while serving as a Senior Fulbright Scholar-Psychologist at the University of Sarajevo's Faculty of Criminology and Security Study during the 2009–2010 academic year. The project was designed to objectively measure the inter-generational stress associated with the Balkan Wars, including the 1991–1995 period as well as the 1999 NATO Kosovo liberation conflict. Toward this end, the author and colleagues, Goran Kovacevic (University of Sarajevo) and Lidija Nikolic-Novakovic (International University of Novi Pazar), translated the Problem Oriented Screening Instrument for Teenagers (POSIT) into the Slavic language and applied it to a selective stratified sample as part of its pilot study. The research design and results, indicating significant ongoing problems for and among youth after the war, are as follows:

- The Problem Oriented Screening Instrument for Teenagers (POSIT) was developed in 1991 by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), a component of the United States National Institute of Health.
- It is a 139-item, forced choice ("yes" "da"/"no" "ne") screening questionnaire assessment that measures ten domains: physical health; mental health; substance use/abuse; family relations; peer relations; educational status (learning disabilities/disorders); vocational status; social skills; leisure/recreation; and aggressive behaviors/delinquency.

- The POSIT is designed for use among teens aged 12 to 19. The POSIT is not copyrighted and is free-of-charge readily lending itself to its translation and norming for the Slavic-language population of the former Yugoslavia.
- In the mid-1990s, the author adapted the POSIT for aggregate use among school-aged populations providing a "class profile" that could assist schools in getting a better sense of their student's needs.
- Here, the author devised the minimum mean score (MMS) based on the cutting scores associated with the original POSIT allowing for aggregate comparisons according to age, gender, ethnicity etcetera.
- The POSIT could also be used to measure the effectiveness of a class-wide clinical intervention by administering it as an aggregate pre-test prior to the intervention and later as a post-test once the program ended.
- The POSIT could also be used as an indicator of mass trauma following a school-wide crisis, like a school shooting or suicide or, in this case, that of prolonged exposure to health hazards.
- We administered it to students attending the High School of Mechanical Engineering in Pancevo during the 2010 spring semester.
- The student sample consisted of 39 males and 11 females with a mean age of 16.5.
- The overall MMS (Minimum Mean Score) for the male sample was 44, and was much higher for the female sample at 63. Anything above an MMS of 38 indicates problems.
- Substance abuse, mental and physical health issues, peer relations, educational problems and delinquency were the most serious problems among the female students, while mental health, peer relations, and educational problems were the serious issues with the male students.
- We also conducted similar assessments in the schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempting to provide comparative student profiles from the sectarian schools: Muslim/Bosniak; Orthodox/Bosnian Serbs; and Catholic/Bosnian Croat/Herzegovina.
- The study shows that both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia continue to experience the disruptions of the Balkan wars, especially with the reemergence of nationalists in their respective governments.
- Ironically, one factor found in this study of strong family cohesion, indicates that sectarian separatism is a major factor in school and family socialization, making the postwar teens even more nationalistic than their parents.

- These intergroup tensions result in escapism for these troubled teens, mainly through alcohol use and abuse. Substance abuse and mental health issues are also potential indicators of PTSD.
- These factors provide considerable challenges for mental health and substance abuse treatment facilities, especially those attempting to work with all sectarian groups.

The fact that psychological trauma was not exclusive to any particular group, but affected all those afflicted across the entire spectrum of the Balkans where conflict prevailed was of particular significance. To further study this phenomenon, the author, in conjunction with his Bosnian and Serbian colleagues, developed Slavic-language protocols designed to address a variety of stress-related symptoms like those addressed by the POSIT. At an international conference, *International Police Executive Symposium*, held in Macedonia in June 2009, sponsored by the Minister of the Interior, it became clear that there was a shortage of Slavic-language clinical assessment tools, and that those that did exist were insufficient for the task of addressing the clinical needs of the multitude of untreated victims of the Balkan Wars. Toward this end, we set about translating and norming assessment tools that could be used in addressing these unmet needs in those states with the greatest needs – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. Consultations with psychologists in both Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (most of the psychologist in these states were trained in Belgrade) led to the conclusion that testing protocols would be most beneficial in the areas of: (1) assessing mental health issues associated with traumatic stress; (2) determining the needs of troubled youth; and (3) measuring the quality of adult family relations.

4.1. The Slavic-Language Personality Inventory-360

For the purpose of diagnosing mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and its associated co-morbid clinical features, such as depression, panic-disorders, disassociation, etc., (APA, 2000), we developed the Slavic-Language Personality Inventory-360 (SLPI-360) based on the first 360 items in the original MMPI (Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory) along with an *Interpretation Manual*. The first 360 items of the MMPI are known as the *short form* and adequately measure the three validity scales and the 10 clinical scales. The only advantage to administering the entire 566 items, which can be time-consuming, is to include the three add-on supplementary scales which are not clinical in nature. The short form best lends itself to people suffering from traumatic stress and its related syndromes

because of concentration issues associated with the longer version (Graham, 2000; Green 2000).

Although a Slavic language model of the MMPI exists — the MMPI-201 and -202 — the psychologists we collaborated with on this project felt that these instruments were weak in that they did not correspond with the original MMPI and were therefore lacking the rich predictive material that makes the MMPI a viable and strong assessment tool. The MMPI-201 and -202 profiles do not correspond to the original MMPI sequence of questions and therefore do not lend themselves to the rich resource of "factorial analysis" associated with the original MMPI or the "critical items" or forensic analysis. The MMPI-201 also lacks two critical scales: the #5, Masculine-Feminine Interest Scale and the #10 Introversion/Extroversion Scale. The MMPI 202 does include this latter scale but still does not address scale #5. Moreover, the Slavic-language MMPI 201 and 202 interpretation and diagnostic manuals lack the reliability, validity and predictability of the original MMPI (Biro, 2001; Graham, 2000; Green 2000).

The Slavic-Language Personality Inventory-360 upgraded archaic terminology while, at the same time, making them culturally sensitive to major ethnic populations within the former Yugoslavia: Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians. Test, retest and alternate test validity was conducted with students who understood English at the Faculties of Criminology and Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo in the spring semester 2010, where the same cohort of students took both the first 360 items of the original (English version) MMPI followed later with the SLPI-360. The aggregate profiles were similar for both sets of tests.

By following the format of the original MMPI, over 60 years of profiling and predictability are available associated with both the validity and clinical scales. The inclusion of religious and sex items makes it a stronger measure than its replacement, the MMPI-2, which cleanse the MMPI of these items in a response to the politically correct movement. Clearly, hyper-religiosity and hyper-sexuality are strong indicators of the mental classifications associated with impulse-control dysregulation. Thus, the SLPI-360 allows the clinical practitioner to assess *General Profile Characteristics* based on a combination of validity and clinical scales as well as using the *two-point code types* and the *critical items* (Graham, 2000; Green, 2000). There is also considerable interest in the SLPI-360 from law enforcement agencies in the former Yugoslavia due to the serious problem of police corruption and abuses of authority. The original MMPI is the strongest instrument for sorting out mental illnesses and personality disorders among police personnel (French, 2003).

4.2. Partner/Relationship Inventory (PRI)

The third related area requiring assessment was the parental level. The *Marital Satisfaction Inventory* (MSI) was our choice for this task in that it was revised in 1997 (MSI-R) allowing for the original instrument to be translated and acculturated to the cultures comprising the former Yugoslavia (Snyder, 1979; 1997; Snyder, et al., 1981). The strength of this instrument is that its 11 scales are plotted on a single profile sheet where both participant's profile can be superimposed and, hence, compared based on a T-score format like that of the SLPI-360 profiles, where the mean is 50 and the standard deviation is 10. And like the SLPI-360, this is a forced-choice inventory where the participant marks each of the 280 items either "T" (true) or "F" (false). In general, the 11 scales measure truthfulness in partner disclosures and effective communication, the strength of the relationship, common interests, perceptions regarding finances, sex and domestic role satisfaction, perceptions about having children and agreement or conflict over childrearing. We decided to name this the *Partner/Relationship Inventory* due to the more informal partnership arrangement within the former Yugoslavia, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, where couples often declare their marriage without actually having the relationship formally sanctioned by either civil or religious authorities.

4.3. Summary

Together, the POSIT and Partner/Relationship Inventory (PRI) provide the clinician with a better idea of the overall dynamics of their client's family. Moreover, the training for these two instruments is easier than that for the SLPI-360. Essentially, administration of the POSIT and the PRI provide first-stage assessments from which referrals can be made to doctoral-level psychologists trained in the SLPI-360 for developing a more refined diagnostic and treatment protocol.

The preceding discussion reinforces the contention that inter-group hostilities are more complex than situations where the external aggressor is clearly defined. The latter present a dichotomy between what the people and society perceive as "the good guys" versus "the bad guys." Nonetheless, the human psyche, individual and collectively, seeks out this dichotomy, often ignoring the actual complexities involved in the conflict. It is a natural phenomenon often exploited by parties attempting to present their particular narratives of the conflict. Twenty-four years following the

Dayton Accord ending the Bosnian conflict and the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there remains a prominent narrative characterizing the Serbs as the wayward, truculent aggressors attacking the mostly innocent Bosniaks and Croats. This anti-Serb narrative has emerged as the acceptable, unchallenged version of the Bosnian War, especially in major media outlets (TV, movies, books, academic papers, etc.). This version has also prejudiced "official" agencies, such as courts and supposedly, neutral n NGOs like the OSCE.

5. Understanding Human Behaviors and Inter-Group Relations

The dynamics of human behavior obviously have an impact on collective or group behaviors. Common themes include how we settle quotidian conflicts, like making commonplace choices, or how we resolve seemingly unanswerable questions, such as the meaning of life and what happens in the afterlife: "Who am I? Why am I here? What's my purpose?" These issues lie in the physiology of the evolved human brain, allowing us to contemplate issues that do not necessarily have clear or fixed solutions or answers, thereby causing us to rely on collective interpretations. Nonetheless, questions will constantly surface during the process of our everyday lives. Social psychologists have termed the process of resolving everyday choices as cognitive dissonance, whereby we tend to reduce multiple choices down to an "either"/or" process, much like the binary mechanism of computer machine language. Otherwise, we would spend too much psychic energy ruminating on all possible choices and solutions. Once a choice is made, we tend to skew our perception in such a way that we look favorably at the stimuli associated with the choice we selected and unfavorably at those we did not select. Available choices are rooted within the normative structure of the group to which we belong or with which we identify: our "reference" group. The reference group helps define the audience which we are attempting to influence, the one from which we seek approval. The concept of cognitive dissonance gave rise to the theories of a general attribution bias and its various manifestations such as the "risky-shift phenomenon."

The general attribution bias is rooted in inter-group dynamics whereby a social-cultural distance occurs between the in-group versus out-group(s). George Simmel, the noted German social philosopher, postulated that "out-group hostilities increase in-group cohesion" and that this process is an integral component of boundary maintenance within groups, since reciprocal antagonistic relationships, both within and between groups, provide a valuable function by defining the group's boundaries

of acceptable behavior at any given time. A function of reciprocal animosities between groups within a given society tends to strengthen both groups' internal cohesion while at the same time maintaining the rigid class and/or caste lines and social distances which exist between these groups. Here, the dominant group sets the rules which label those outside the normative boundaries as being deviant. Accordingly, serious deviants are so defined and stigmatized as to warrant the group's most severe sanctions, which in many societies is the death penalty.

Caste and class are common divisions within societies, with lower castes totally excluded from the dominant mainstream. Class, on the other hand, pertains to the stratification within a group regardless of caste. Social stratification, or division among in-group members, is a phenomenon that exists in all groups regardless of the group's manifest ideology, even groups ascribing to a singular status for all members of the group. Hitler designated Jews, Roma, Serbs, and the mentally deficient as outcasts that needed to be exterminated. The French social philosopher, Emile Durkheim (1951), noted that as societies change so do their moral and legal boundaries:

> Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crime, properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousnesses. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such. For the same reason, the perfect and upright man judges his smallest failings with a severity that the majority reserves for acts more truly in the nature of an offense. …Crime is, then, necessary; it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life and by that very fact it is useful, because these conditions of which it is a part are themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law. (p. 9)

The sociologist Howard Becker (1968), termed those members pushed outside the acceptable realm of society as being *outsiders.* Accordingly, social groups tend to label their outsiders as being sinners, heathens, infidels, deviates, terrorists, or criminals. The sanctions directed toward the outsiders — floggings, executions, excommunication, banishment — reinforce the limits of the prohibited social boundaries at any given time. In the past, public humiliation and punishment, including executions, served this purpose. Since the early twentieth century, mass media coverage of these incidents provides the group with the news of the transgressions of these wayward outsiders. Conversely, these public events also help other members to identify with the out-group. Social change often is a result of the out-group membership substantially overwhelming the status quo in-group. William F. Ogburn (1966), one of the founding fathers of American sociology, noted that certain rituals associated with a

cultural practice, especially those rooted in a society's creation myth, often continue as significant social rules long beyond their utility. Maintaining rituals that are not only no longer relevant but may even be counterproductive to the group's quality of life is known as *cultural lag.* The prohibition against contraceptives or abortions by the Catholic Church and Evangelical Christians even into the 21st century is a prime example of a cultural lag. There are also a number of class and gender biases within fundamental Islamic societies today that are rooted in the Middle Ages. These, in effect, discriminate against women and children in order to maintain strong male-dominance and authority in their society. The prohibition against educating females, the forced sterilization of women, and bride murders are still common throughout many third world societies.

Within this framework of group dynamics, human behavior is such that we tend to perceive the actions of in-group members differently than those of out-group member. To illustrate, if someone within our group (in-group) succeeds at a task, we tend to attribute their success to inherent factors. In contrast, if someone in the out-group succeeds along similar lines, we tend to attribute this to external factors, including luck or unfair advantages. Similarly, if someone in the in-group fails, or is caught doing something unacceptable or criminal, we tend to look for external contributing factors and influences to explain their behavior. However, if someone in the out-group fails, members of the in-group commonly attribute this behavior exclusively to the individual, without giving any consideration to mitigating circumstances.

Similarly, *risky-shift behavior* is a form of group-think actions taken against perceived injustices committed by out-group factions. Here, the people involved in the decision-making process transcend their individuality and conform to the group leader's plan with no or minimal objections. In these instances, collectivism overpowers individualism during times of excitement, including war and similar conflicts. This phenomenon is associated not only with impulsive juvenile acts, but with major international confrontations. Classic examples abound, including those leading to conflicts such as the sinking of the Maine in Cuba leading to the Spanish-American War, the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo, eventually leading to the First World War, or more recently, the CIA-planned Bay of Pigs invasion of Castro's Cuba during the Kennedy administration that precipitated the 1962 Cuban Crisis, as well as the "weapons of mass destruction" rationale used to justify the invasion of Iraq during the Gulf War. Absent from these events is any effort to produce a devil's advocate or a viable alternative that could serve to mediate the situation.

The intensity of inter-group antagonism generally follows two scenarios. One is calculating and the other is spontaneous, with both types able to revolve about a single incident. The intensity of these conflict situations generally is proportionate

to the ideological divide between the groups and their members. Either way, the intensity associated with ideological mythology is a strong factor associated with group conflicts and aggression. Social psychological studies have demonstrated how these mechanisms of group divisions evolve in everyday life. Milgram's (1974) work shows how the demands of authority influence and overpower the demands of individual conscience, explaining that phenomena such as the acceptance of racism and discrimination are more prevalent when these policies are endorsed by the government or military. Neal Miller (1941) and Stuart Palmer (1960) addressed the role of socialization in the expression or direction of individual and/or collective frustration to help explain the mistreatment of identified out-groups, such as out-group gangs, civilian prisoners or prisoners-of-war.

6. Social Justice, Truth and Reconciliation: Components of Societal Healing

Social justice is an important component of restorative justice in that it examines how societies treat their members. It addresses formal (manifest or de jure) and informal (latent or de facto) processes that determine the preferred social hierarchy or social stratification. This process determines the relationship between in-groups versus out-groups. The social order, in turn, is determined by rules that articulate the "dynamics of inclusion" (in-groups) versus the "dynamics of exclusion" (out-groups). Race, class, age, gender, social economic status, and sectarianism are dynamics of stratification and relevant factors to be considered in any viable analysis of restorative justice.

Social justice analysis falls into the two basic categories of distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice addresses how the society and its members view the "fairness" of the allocation (distribution) of what it defines as scarce resources. This process falls mainly within the realm of de facto justice. Procedural justice, in contrast, looks at the formal rules (laws, statutes, customs, etc.) that dictate how these resources are allocated, and falls primarily within the realm of de jure justice. Social justice addresses the differences between procedural and distributive justice. Hence, policies that establish the rules that set the standards for the implementation of criminal, civil, and family and juvenile justice fall into the category of procedural justice. Criminal, civil, and family and juvenile justice adjudication, on the other hand, fall between the two extremes of restorative justice and retributive justice. That said, it is important to remember that regardless of the extent of written or customary traditions, the administration of justice, per se, is

a human process. Consequently, we need to recognize the psychological processes that influence how individuals, or groups, perceive the fair allocation of justice.

Accordingly, serious deviants are defined and stigmatized so as to warrant the group's most severe sanctions, which in many societies is the death penalty. Simmel (1955) also identified two types of inter-group conflict situations. Objective, or calculated conflicts, what he termed *realistic conflict,* revolve around issues involving tangible social objectives, such as status, power, and resources. *Non-realistic conflict,* (subjective conflict) in contrast, stems from social frustrations exacerbated by group and/or societal divisions. In the former, conflict is viewed as a rational, calculated process directed toward the accomplishment of a specific goal, while in the latter, aggression becomes an end in itself. Examples of intra-group non-realistic conflict are inter-Christian and/or inter-Islamic conflicts, like the troubles in Northern Ireland and the schism between Islamic faiths in the Arab world.

The nature of an inequitable influence by an outside power needs to be addressed in order to best review the ICTY proceedings. While United States' support was crucial for the ICTY adjudication of war crimes committed during the Bosnian war, basing it on the post-WWII Nuremberg Trials and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), the United States' credibility if not its intentions have been tainted due to questions raised about torture, illegal detention and other wartime abuses in Iraq as well as its support of the ICTY proceedings and findings, especially given that these appear to be deliberate violations of the Geneva Convention and UN proscriptions against torture and illegal detentions. These allegations set the stage for the United States' exit from international justice jurisdictions. Thus, while President Clinton supported the International Criminal Court in 2000, his successor, President George W. Bush, withdrew United States support in 2002, providing sufficient reasons for a comprehensive review of the ICTY and similar war crime prosecutions throughout the former Yugoslavia by an independent panel. These resembled investigations that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as the Kerner Commission about racial unrest in the United States and the Eisenhower Blue Ribbon Commission on the United States' nuclear future. Similar investigations appear to be warranted in order to ascertain the quality of justice doled out by the ICTY.

Problems inherent in the adversarial judicial process are those related to the admission of evidence. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue with respect to the obvious racial bias in the United States regarding imposition of the death penalty. It found old methods discriminatory, outlawing them in 1972, but permitted states that wanted to continue using the death penalty to do so after engaging in a separate jury process following the original trial resulting in a guilty verdict. This separate process is mandated in order to assess mitigating circumstances that might have contributed to the aggravated event leading to a death sentence.

It appears that a combination of the judicial attribution bias, referring to systematic errors judges make when trying to justify their own and others' behaviors, and the assigned weight to either "aggravating" or "mitigating" circumstances played important roles during the ICTY adjudication process, where it became readily apparent that the Serbs would be designated as malicious offenders, the Bosniaks would be considered the maliciously abused victims, and the Croats would be given a "pass." Another factor in determining aggravating versus mitigating circumstances is what Marvin Wolfgang termed *victim precipitation.* This concept looks at what role the alleged victim may have played in the ensuing violence. Related to this is the idea of *proportionality*. This concept would apply not only to the nature of violent acts, but the extent to which the various parties engaged in similar (reciprocal) acts. Any retroactive fact finding and analysis of the ICTY process needs to use these tools for fairly assessing the events that occurred during the heat of collective violence that became the Bosnian War of 1991–1995.

Scoggins Berg's (2015) paper, *Prerequisite for Peace*, written as part of his graduate degree at the University of London, Centre for Development, Environment and Policy (CeDEP), School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) presents three recommendations:

(1) The international community, UN, EU and United States. must acknowledge and show proper respect to victims and families of the Jasenovac Death Camp. Practically speaking, the UN, EU and United States must implement steps that include addressing the historical transgenerational trauma in their social sustainability policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(2) In addition to policy amendments, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established by the UN International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, must extend its truth-telling process to prior to the war in the 1990s to include the WWII Jasenovac Death Camp. Tina Rosenberg, author of *The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism,* explains, "Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia have developed completely different recollections of their common past. If they are not corrected through mechanisms such as an independent truth commission, then selective memories are handed down from generation to generation" (p. 16).

(3) Lastly, Croat and Muslim political and religious leaders should publicly acknowledge and apologize on behalf of the Croat Ustashi for their role in Jasenovac Death Camp. Ideally, Pope Francis could lead the way in this apology, as he has done on behalf of Catholics in other settings (pp. 33–34)

6.1 Toward a Model for Restorative Justice and Reconciliation in the Balkan

This author, in his 2016 Fulbright Specialist deployment, reported the following:

> Restorative social justice, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, like that of the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* of South Africa, first has to fully and objectively articulate all the circumstances of the Bosnian wars (1991-1995; 1999-2002) within both geo-political and human terms – without the emotional biases that have emerged clouding the reality of the actual events. Glossing over the actions of one group while focusing only on the actions of another group will only delay any real reconciliation. The inter-generational labeling of *victims* versus *offenders* only fosters hate, distrust and continued inter-group animosities…
>
> There needs to be an impartial, international review of the ICTY process, discerning obvious biases toward any of the accused. Using the criteria the recent UN Court of Appeals articulated in their enhanced extension of genocidal charges against Radovan Karadžić – ethnic cleansing, siege, killings of civilians, torture, rape, concentration camps, destruction of religious and cultural entities, deliberate provocations that involved complicity in the deaths of their own sectarian group in order to further international investments in their cause – specific indictments that have been articulated by the ITCY need to be uniformly investigated – for all parties, not just the Serbs. (French, 2018, pp. 33)

The March 2019 UN Court of Appeals decision articulated other areas beyond Srebrenica as ones constituting "genocidal culpability," including the ethnic cleansing of ethnic communities and the so-called "Siege of Sarajevo." This alone warrants a thorough investigation of all such incidents by all parties in order for the truth to emerge. An additional category for investigation is the profiteering from the war and continued corruption by those parties conveniently exonerated, especially the Slovenes, Croats and Bosniaks. It is arguably possible to make comparisons between the clandestine provocations by sectarian groups during the Civil War, notably during the "Siege of Sarajevo," to profit from their particular narrative and the current accusations leveled against the "Big Pharm" companies and their role in the tens of thousands of opioid deaths in the United States alone. An investigation and exposure is also needed into the proliferation of bogus degrees and the conferring of other unearned positions and privileges that has contributed to an unfair distribution of wealth, including that unjustifiably garnered from NGOs, the European Council, etc. Such a process would readily demonstrate the impractically of labeling all these war crimes alluded to by all the parties as genocidal.

Lastly, victims and survivors need to form integrated ethnic and sectarian groups so that they can all be equally validated for their sufferings. Women, in particular, would benefit from a gender-specific, integrated therapeutic group structure.

6.2. Clinical Tools for Assessing Trauma

Below we describe the standard clinical protocols relevant to testing individuals for a diagnosis of trauma and related symptoms.

(A) The Mental Status Exam (MSE)

Appearance, Attitude, Activity

Body language, level of consciousness, eye contact, facial expression, dress and hygiene;

Mood

Apathy, anger, apprehensive, euphoria;

Speech & Language

Fluency, repetition, comprehension, naming, reading and writing quality;

Thought Content, Thought Process, Perception

Degree of connectedness, peculiarities, delusions, preoccupations, ruminations, obsessions, suicidal/homicidal ideations, phobias, illusions, hallucinations, and de-personalization;

Affect

Intensity, range, lability, flatness;

Cognition:

Orientation X 4 (self, place, time, situation); attention and concentration, calculations (digit spans forward and backwards); short-term memory, long-term memory, visuospatial and constructive ability, abstraction and concentration;

-

Insight and Judgment

Capacity for age-related insight into life-situations and reason for referral;

Judgment relevant to: (a) reasoning, (b) ideas about decisions or strategies (session outcomes); and (c) evidence from past actions relevant to future behaviors;

-

Supplementary Material in MSE

Wechsler (children or adult) subscales are widely used to determine a number of these indicators. Neurological measures such as "count back from 100 by 7s" and recalling three insignificant items 15 minutes into intake, are common tools employed, among others.

(B) Clinical Assessment Tools:

Gleaning clinical data from the Wechsler IQ Scales; the Bender Gestalt, Rorschach, psycho- pharmacology tests, etc.

The Wechsler Scales

Basic information regarding subtests:

- Verbal IQ (VIQ) and Performance IQ (PIQ) subscales have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15, identical to the full-scale measure;
- A standard deviation differential or more (15 or +) between the VIQ & PIQ warrants additional review;
- A general rule of thumb is that if the PIQ is greater than the VIQ, the language and cultural differences must be examined. Is English the dominant language? Is education valued in the family and/or subculture? Are there gender differences in how males and females are educated in the society?
- If the VIQ is greater than the PIQ, then cognitive deficits must be examined, including mental retardation or organic deficits, including dementia in older persons;
- The Vocabulary subtest is the strongest single indicator for determining the VIQ, while the Block Design is the strongest single indicator for the PIQ.

The mean for the Weschler subtests is 10 while the standard deviation is three.

In this situation, a single deviation below the mean warrants additional review of clinical, social and or familial factors.

A score of less than seven on the Block Design warrants a review of the individual's cognitive capabilities.

The PIQ subscales can help determine the *"*mental age*"* of a subject, especially a child or youth, so as to better plan educational and social programming.

This is done by looking up the scaled score in the Age-Equivalents tables and then comparing the individual's physical age with their scaled score (mental age).

When the VIQ is significantly higher (15 points or more) than the PIQ (especially if the PIQ is below two standard deviations — 70 or less), then a plausible explanation is that the individual has been tutored or trained in the language sufficiently to appear normal, often with a vocabulary beyond their own comprehension.

Clinical Interpretation of Verbal Subtests

Information: (Measures general knowledge; long-term memory).

Poor performance suggests educational deficits, alternative cultural background, or low intelligence. This subtest is used to assess premorbid mental functioning.

Digit Span: (measures immediate memory, attention span, comprehension).

Poor performance suggests brain damage, mental retardation, impaired hearing, fatigue or anxiety. When there is lowest subscale score, rule-out psychosis.

Vocabulary: (Measures mental ability, language acquisition).

Low scores suggest low intelligence, poor education, alternative cultural background, or early brain damage. Those with low scores have the greatest vulnerability to mental deterioration, aging and emotional disturbances. This has the highest correlation with VIQ subtests.

Arithmetic: (measures math skills, problem solving ability, concentration).

Low scores suggest mental retardation, brain damage, impaired concentration or a transient anxiety state.

Comprehension: (Measures practical knowledge, social judgment, organizational skills).

Poor performance is associated with early brain damage, childhood psychosis or poor socialization.

Similarities: (Measures abstract and logical thinking).

Low scores are associated with long-term deterioration, severe brain dysfunction and/or emotional disorders.

Clinical Interpretation of Performance Subtests

Picture Completion: (Measures perceptual discrimination, memory).

Poor performance indicates paranoia, schizophrenia, psychotic depression, poor concentration, alternative cultural background or poor perceptual-concentration integration.

Picture Arrangement: (Measures visual perception, planning ability, "social intelligence").

Poor performance is associated with brain damage (left hemisphere), schizophrenia, anxiety, and/or alternative culture cultural background.

Block Design: (Measures nonverbal and spatial reasoning).

Low scores suggest brain damage (diffuse or parietal lobe damage). This can be used to differentiate between psychosis (schizophrenia) and brain damage. Considered to be a culturally fair or neutral test of intelligence.

Object Assembly: (Measures visual-motor coordination and ability to analyze part-whole relationships).

Low scores are associated with organic disturbances, schizophrenia, and/or depression.

Digit Symbol: (Measures visual memory, visual-motor dexterity, persistence).

Low scores are associated with anxiety, poor concentration, psycho-motor retardation, motor problems in dominant hand, impaired memory, and/or brain damage.

(C) Bender Motor Gestalt Test

Introduced in 1938 by Lauretta Bender, the Bender Gestalt was first used as a culturally fair indicator of maturation levels for grade placement for children and as a tool for ruling out mental retardation.

It has evolved into a clinical scale measuring not only IQ in children but also mental deficiency, aphasias, organic brain damage, major psychosis, and malingering for all ages.

The Gestalt function is the process of integrating a constellation of stimuli into a holistic conceptual framework.

Toward this end, Bender selected nine of Max Wertheimer's (considered the founder of Gestalt Psychology) culture-free geometric figures.

The respondent is provided with a plain unlined piece of paper and provided with a pencil with an eraser and without any mechanical aids (rulers, coins, etc.).

The cards are then presented one at a time and laid on a flat surface for the respondent to observe and copy "as they see them."

The cards remain visible until all nine cards have been revealed and until they have all been copied.

While this stage of the assessment is not timed per se, time should be noted for those who seem to take a long time to complete this part of the task.

This constitutes the "copy" stage.

Next, all the cards and the sheets of paper are collected. Then, immediately, or 10 to 15 minutes later (the approach must be consistent), the respondent is provided with another blank sheet of paper and asked "to reproduce the nine figures in the order or their presentation in the copy stage. This is the "recall" stage.

(D) Rorschach Test

This test was created by Hermann Rorschach (1884-1922), who conceptualized in 1921, before he died from appendicitis and before the test became famous, if not controversial.

Nonetheless, it is second only to the MMPI in its popular use in forensic clinical assessments.

While the Rorschach inkblot test was of European origin, it became popular in the United States during the early 1940s.

The test consists of 10 cards of different symmetrical inkblot patterns; five which are black and white; two of which are primarily black and white with some color; and three of which are in color.

Each card is presented to the respondent and they are asked to describe what they see. Time of response, details, content, color and originality are all noted.

Next, the tester reviews each card and repeats what he/she recorded from the first stage of the assessment, asking the respondent if this is what they said and do they have anything else to add.

Card V has long been known as the *bat* or *butterfly* card while card IV is now commonly known as the *biker* card.

Card X is also commonly known as the *shore* or *beach* card because of the crabs and other sea-looking creatures.

7. Conclusions

This chapter addresses problems common to most post-World War II conflicts, notably those that emerged during the Cold War Era (1947–1991). For the most part, these conflicts were "proxy civil wars," where outside powers played a significant part in either initiating the conflict or sustaining it for political or economic gain. The list includes the UN involvement in the Korean War (1950–1953), the U.S. and other foreign involvement in the Vietnam War (1959–1975), and a host of other conflicts involving once-colonized peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East vying for their independence from European and American powers.

Parallels can be seen between the Third Balkan Wars (1991-2002) and these conflicts, as well as the current situations festering in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Latin America. On the surface, these conflicts often appear to be spontaneous, with unseen outside influences disclosed only later on. Regardless of the origins of the conflicts, those directly involved in these conflicts suffer equally, whether they are combatants or civilians. Physical damage is obvious. However, psychological harm is more difficult to ascertain. Equally significant is the social, economic, and human cost associated with war trauma and its aftermath.

My personal involvement in assessing war trauma and its aftermath stems from my ethnomethodological experience beginning at age 17, when I joined the United States Marine Corps (USMC), serving during the Vietnam era. Once discharged, I continued to work with veterans who had difficulty adjusting to civilian life. Many compensated by self-medicating while others found suicide the only answer to their afflictions. Today, I continue to volunteer with the U.S. Veterans Administration. Thus, my interest and involvement with the Bosnian War is not purely academic. During my clinical training and continuing education, it became apparent that humans suffer similarly, regardless of to which side they belong during a conflict. My clinical work coincided with the recognition of the condition termed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in 1980 and the publication of a new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III). At that point, the understanding of PTSD was used to examine the continuing remnants of trauma specifically among America's Vietnam veterans. However, PTSD diagnoses were soon applied to other conflict and domestic situations (rape, first responders, natural disasters, etc.).

My involvement with the Third Balkan War began in 2004 when, in my role as a police psychologist, I was asked to visit and review the new police college in Banja Luka. Later, I served as a senior Fulbright Scholar at the Faculty of Criminology and Security at the University of Sarajevo (2009–2010). It was at this time that I became

aware of the lack of viable clinical assessment tools needed to optimally diagnosis and treat those directly suffering from the Bosnian War. It also became readily apparent that the families of these untreated victims were afflicted with a phenomenon known as "secondary PTSD." American psychology and psychiatry have played a significant role in developing clinical instruments that meet high standards of reliability and validity. However, few of these instruments were available in the Slavic language. In 2009, my colleague at the University of Sarajevo, Goran Kovacevic and our Serbian counterpart at the International University of Novi Pazar, Lidija Nikolic-Novakovic, embarked on a mission to translate certain clinical instruments so the healing process could proceed. We then conducted training for clinicians throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in Serbia, and later (2017), Kosovo. This effort resulted in the book, *War Trauma and its Aftermath: An International Perspective on the Balkan Wars* published in 2012 by the University Press of America.

In summary, this chapter looks at the complexities surrounding the Bosnian proxy Civil War and the ensuing socio-economic and human problems, providing a roadmap for clinical assessments for all those, regardless of on what side of the conflict they stood, who suffered from the consequences of this unfortunate conflict. The conclusion is that only an objective examination of the conflict employing a restorative justice process will serve to minimize the degree of human suffering and lead to reconciliation.

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CHAPTER III

The Role of Radical Islam

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter addresses the radical Pan-Islamic stream of the Bosnian Muslim political leadership and its radical Islamic political program (Alija Izetbegović's *Islamic Declaration*), goals, strategies, tactics, objectives and modus operandi prior to and during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in today's context of the global *Salafi jihad* movement agenda inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. The global *Salafi jihad* movement as a tool for accomplishing Pan-Islamic goals represents a worldwide religious campaigned aimed at defeating the Western powers, which are perceived as a direct obstacle to *Salafi* plans to re-establish a great Islamic state based on *sharia* law stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, thus abolishing present national boundaries. This movement's ideological platform demands restoration of authentic Islam, and advocates a strategy of both *violent jihad* leading to an explosion of terror and *civilizational jihad* to annihilate what is perceived as a local political heresy and to implement their final goal of creating a global Caliphate through the integration of previously established regional Caliphates. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, and subsequently, his son Bakir Izetbegović and the SDA, employed different types of *jihads*, depending on the current political situation and environment, in their fight for the creation of an Islamic state to serve as the vanguard of regional efforts to create a Balkan Caliphate as an integral part of the global Caliphate. The first, civilizational *jihad* refers to a non-violent form of *jihad* or peaceful conquest of the *Dar al-harb* through a global network of Islamic NGOs, associations, mass media, as well as a high construction rate of mosques, Islamization of knowledge and history, research centers, cultural centers, educational programs, banks, and political parties. The second type of *jihad* involves direct military engagement, either in collaboration with international terrorist organizations

established by Brotherhood members in different regions and countries (*al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya*, Hamas, the Egyptian Islamic *Jihad*, Al-Qa'ida and ISIS), or by aligning with domestic bodies (such as SS Divisions during World War II, and the Bosnian *jihad* in the 1990s), or by training and sending foreign terrorist fighters to participate in the global *jihad* in the ranks of international terrorist organizations in Middle East and elsewhere.

Thus, the Bosnian Muslim political elite, being inspired by the political thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood, saw WWII developments and the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina as opportunities for waging a holy *jihad* against the unbelievers for the establishment of an Islamic state with an Islamic system. All aspects of it would be based on *sharia* law under an Islamic authority which would become a regional driving force for the creation of the Balkan Caliphate that would metastasize into an integral part of the global Caliphate in the future, thereby realizing the ultimate goal of the global Muslim Brotherhood platform.

Accordingly, for the period under examination, we focused on four consecutive waves of imported radical Islam ideology that reinforced radicalization and violent extremism among Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have also led to the creation of the contemporary regional radical Islamic infrastructure as an integral part the global Islamic radical network that represents a serious threat to the national security of the Balkans and Western European countries, and, by implication, to world security in general:

1. Between the two World Wars: We examined the proliferation and spread of Hassan al-Banna's and the Muslim Brotherhood ideology in Bosnia, which promoted the ideas of the Islamic State, Pan-Islam, and active Islam, including violent aspects of *jihad*. In this context, the events taking place at the time in the Islamic world strongly influenced the development of Islamic political thinking in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the three generations of Bosnian students that graduated from Cairo's Al-Azhar University. They then acted as ideological agents for the proliferation of the foreign Pan-Islamic ideas developed by Hassan al-Banna and his Muslim Brotherhood in the region through Bosnia and Herzegovina. The domestically created infrastructure of Islamic organizations, including youth organizations such as the *Young Muslims* and *El-Hidaje*, which were actively promoting radical Islamic ideology in the Muslim community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, played a leading role in spreading radical Islamic ideology. Ideological and close personal links and interrelations were established between Bosnia's Islamic clergy, Muslim intellectual circles and Egypt's religious and academic elite. Consequently, from the outset, the Muslim Brotherhood established a strong foothold in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its first penetration in Europe;

2. During World War II: This war period had a significant ideological impact on the Balkan Muslims, including Bosnian Muslims, in terms of radicalization and the introduction of terrorist practices and violent extremism through the Muslim Brotherhood-Nazi nexus and its radical ideology. This was distributed by the propaganda machine of Nazi regime, with the strong support of Heinrich Himmler and under the guidance of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the Balkans, Bosnian Muslims were systemically indoctrinated and trained to apply extremist and terrorist practices in their fight for the creation of an Islamic state as an integral part of the global radical Pan-Islamic plan and to fight against Communism, British colonialism, Zionism, pro-communist Partisans and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. During the Nazi occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović were referred to as the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland which represented a Serbian nationalist movement and guerrilla force from the legitimate army – the Royal Yugoslav Army – of the occupied state who were also anti-Axis partisans, but pro-monarchist in their long-term goals. Al-Banna's ideology of active Islam was implemented by combining Muslim military units' training with religious indoctrination by local *imams* in SS Division, thus subjecting Bosnian Muslims to radicalization by the systematic militarization of religion. As during the Ottoman empire when they were the spearhead of jihad and main guards of Islamic order in Europe, Bosnian Muslims become again part of the global *jihad* efforts, albeit through regional actions;

3. During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: During this period, Iranian political Islam proliferated, with the active participation of the Iranian secret services. The *Wahhabi-Salafi jihadi* militant ideology was also spread by Al-Qa'ida's radical elements in the region in close collaboration with Alija Izetbegović, SDA members and religious leaders;

4. The present: We continue to witness the proliferation of ISIS ideological propaganda and the spread of a regional terrorist infrastructure as an integral part of the international Islamic terrorist organizations' network.

1. Introduction

Until recently, the Balkans, part of Southeastern Europe, had represented the furthest west Islam had expanded in its bid to conquer the world. However, during the last few decades, the radical Islam movement has come to realize its limited power to conquer by force of arms, and has resigned itself to "peaceful" means of winning the

hearts of people and territories though demographic "inundation" through immigration, legal if possible, illegal if necessary. Indeed, this approach was confirmed by the Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi's declaration that today, conquests need not be forcibly conducted through bloodshed, but can be done peacefully. This pronouncement was made in reference to the second attempt made by Ottoman Islam to subjugate Europe in the 15th century, at about the same time it lost its foothold in the Iberian Peninsula after its expulsion from there during the *Reconquista*.

What is relevant to this report is the widespread ideology in the Islamic world that every population and territory brought under Islamic rule, regardless of the size of the Muslim population, should be governed by Islamic political theory in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. Historically, this ideology has posited the Muslims as the superior elite in the envisioned Muslim-dominated society, with Christians and Jews subjected to them as "scriptuaries," whose right to survive and maintain their faith hinging upon their paying the poll tax (*jizya*), a humiliating sign of submission. During the Ottoman period, in all European Ottoman-occupied territories with a Christian population, Christian children were abducted from their parents under the *devshirme* (child levy) system, and were then converted to Islam and raised in Istanbul in total and blind personal devotion to the Sultan. As adults, they were returned to Bosnia as the most loyal Muslims of the realm, dedicated to supervising their own people and to chastising those Serbs and Croats who remained non-Muslims. This demonstrated to all that being Muslim was a favored status, a notion that did not totally vanish during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There is a fundamental paradox in Islam that has existed since its inception. On the one hand, there is conservatism, repetition, tradition, and imitation of the ways of the prophet. On the other hand, there is an enduring and pervasive myth of renewal. Every century, or every few generations, this myth drives them to seek to renew the achievements of great one of Islam's great historic figures who had tried to introduce some kind of renewal. Herein lies the innate paradox, because seeking renewal is actually forbidden, as it could imply that the individual is greater than Allah. According to Islam, Allah's words and deeds already established the highest ideals and laws for all humanity, for all generations to come. An individual engaging in trying to renew would implicitly be declaring that there are things that God did not take into account, and that that individual is, in essence, claiming to know better than Allah, which is unthinkable, of course. Nonetheless, there have been some giants in Islamic thought in every generation who have tried to infuse some kind of new thinking into Islam. These attempts usually followed one of two patterns. The first involves openly trying to introduce new approaches into Islamic thought. The other involves the argument that a modification is being introduced in order to return to the source. This latter approach is also highly paradoxical, because according to Islamic doctrine,

everything has already been done and nothing new can be introduced. Nonetheless, there is pressure to "renew" in order to keep up with the progress in the world. These two forces in Islam exist side by side, and often result in what is called radical or fundamentalist Islamic movements. The challenge in the present context is to show the relationship between these larger trends in Islam in general and what is going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there were many such radical movements, they always emerged from the background of a much greater Islamic movement. In essence, what has taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not unique to that country, but has always represented the local implementation of something greater that emerged from some other international center, such as Egypt or Turkey. While there are many such periods when radical movements originating elsewhere took root in Bosnia and Herzegovina, only the most essential ones will be discussed herein (Israeli, 2020).

Historically, Bosnia-Herzegovina has represented a focal point where three religions and cultures, Eastern Orthodoxy (Serbian Orthodox), Roman Catholicism (Croatian Roman Catholicism) and Sunni Islam (Bosnian Sunni Muslim) have either clashed or maintained a tenuous co-existence. The Bosnian Muslim community emerged as a separate entity only after the Turkish conquest and occupation of the Balkans in the 15th century. Following that event, those who once were part of Christian civilization, sharing its value systems and cultural identity, were subjected to religious segregation that led to complete cultural alienation within the same culture. This paved the way for the subsequent development of two separate civilizations with completely divergent worldviews. Once converted to Islam, Bosnian Muslims' identities and political views were shaped in the spirit of Islam and influenced by the Islamic educational system, Islamic literature and poetry, the religious and political views in the Islamic world, and particularly by the ideas of the famous Islamic thinkers, ideologues and activists such as Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792), Jamal Ad-Din Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), Haj Amin al-Husseini (1895–1974), Mawlana Abul al-A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979), Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb (1906–1966), Hassan Ahmed Abdel Rahman Muhammed al-Banna (1906–1949), Said Ramadan (1926–1995), Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–present), Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941–1989), Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri (1951–present), and more. All of these figures laid the theoretical groundwork and ideological platform for the radical implementation of Islam through a global *jihadi* movement, now advocated by contemporary Islamic terrorist organizations and other radical Islamic movements. Growing culturally and religiously in this new Islamic sub-culture, the Bosnian Muslim community became increasingly spiritually integrated into the more radical trends of the global Islamic *umma* (one Islamic nation),

supporting its political system, social order, legal system, cultural and religious practices, family code, etc. The Bosnian Muslim community was directly influenced and ideologically and theologically molded by the streams of radical Islamic thought and Islamic activism evolving in the Islamic world, especially since the early 20th century. Radical Islam, *Salafi jihad* and pan-Islamic ideology were thus gradually imported into and implanted in Bosnia, having a direct impact on Bosnian Muslim's perceptions of their non-Muslim neighbors and co-citizens with whom they shared the same history but different experiences and realities. Bosnian Muslims also developed Islamic-influenced views of the secular political system they lived in, and of neighboring European countries and their value systems, viewing their neighbors as colonizers and enemies of Islam due to the long history of conflict between the Western, Christian Europe and the Oriental, Islamic Ottoman Empire.

The global *Salafi jihad* as a tool for accomplishing Pan-Islamic goals represents a worldwide religious movement aiming at defeating the Western powers, which are perceived as a direct obstacle to their plan to re-establish a great Islamic state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, abolishing present national boundaries. The ideological platform of this movement demands restoration of authentic Islam, and advocates a strategy of violent *jihad* leading to an explosion of terror in order to annihilate what is perceived as a local political heresy. Al-Qa'ida, with substructures in Bosnia, was deemed by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (a Palestinian Sunni Islamic scholar and theologian and founding member of Al-Qa'ida, considered the father of global *jihad*) and Osama bin Laden (founder of Al-Qa'ida) considered to be the vanguard of this movement, includes many other terrorist groups that collaborate in their operations and share a large and international base of support (Burke, 2003).

This legacy begins with the words of the Prophet Muhammed in his farewell address in March of 632:

"I was ordered to fight all men until they say 'There is no god but Allah."

His words explain the global vision of Islam as a universal religion supporting a global political order in which all people will live under Muslim rule as either believers or subject communities. To achieve this goal, Islam calls on all male adult Muslims to engage in an uncompromising holy struggle – *jihad*, "in the path of Allah" (Karsh, 2013, p. 66). According to Islam, the world is divided into the *Dar al-Islam* (the House of Islam) and the *Dar al-harb* (the House of War). The *Dar al-Islam* refers to all those lands in which a Muslim government rules and the Holy Law of Islam prevails. Non-Muslims may live there on Muslim sufferance, provided they are *scripturies* (i.e., Christians or Jews). The *Dar al-harb* (the House of War) refers to the outside world, which has not yet been conquered and subjugated (Karsh,

2013, p. 66; Lewis, 1998, pp.121–22). The Muslim community (*umma*) is required to engage in a *jihad* to expand *Dar al-Islam* to those parts of the world that have not yet been conquered by the House of Islam. In other words, *Dar al-harb* will end only with Islam's eventual triumph. Until their ultimate goal of world domination within reach, no peace between these two world systems is possible, but only the temporary suspensions of hostilities for reasons of necessity or expediency.

This global mission of Islam has always been accompanied by tactical pragmatism. Namely, while pursuing the ultimate goal of world domination, the Prophet was not deterred from aligning with non-Muslims whenever the situation called for such alliances (Montgomery Watt, 1961, p. 89). The military triumphs of Islam triggered cultural and civilizational Islamization, with massive conversion processes undertaken after Muslim conquests, converts naturally wishing to be on the victors' side. Thus, the lands Islam occupied and ruled became an integral part of the House of Islam over time, regardless of whether or not most of their inhabitants became Muslims.

In Islam, the concept of *jihad* has multiple meanings. The term *jihad* literally means "striving" and it refers to any form of activity, personal or communal, undertaken by a Muslim in an attempt to follow the path of Allah. It includes adhering to the Five Pillars of Islam. Greater *jihad* concerns the personal or internal struggle of an individual to live a good Muslim life, and the lesser or external *jihad* is the violent struggle for Islam which is divided into two types: offensive and defensive. The offensive *jihad* is a holy obligation of any true Muslim to attack *Dar al-kufr* (land of the infidels) or the *Dar al-harb* (House of War) and force submission to *sharia* law. This implies a collective obligation (*fard kifaya*) which can be and often is discharged by Muslim governments. The defensive *jihad*, being comparable to the international norms of self-defense, calls on all Muslim to wage *jihad* to protect the faith-based community if a foreign force invades Muslim lands and threaten the existence of Islam and its practices there. This implies an individual obligation (*fard'ayn*) for all Muslims to take a part in this defensive *jihad*, through direct fighting, financial contributions, charity or prayers. Military solidarity and mutual protection against foreign aggression represent a religious obligation aimed at preserving the survival of the global Muslim *umma*. For example, when the Soviets entered Afghanistan following the insistent requests of the Afghanistan government in December 1979, or after the Americans entered Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002–2003, numerous Muslim religious leaders issued *fatwas* (religious verdicts) obliging Muslims throughout the world to join the *jihad* to fight off the infidels. The Afghan *jihad* or the Bosnian *jihad* in Europe represented personal obligations (*fard ayn*) for each Muslim, and, as such, an individual did not need to obtain governmental, parental, religious, or spousal permission to join the *jihad*. Sheikh Abdallah Azzam preached this version of defensive *jihad* for the protection of Islam with great success during the Afghan war (Azzam, n.d.; Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 85).

This artificial terminology distinguishing between so-called defensive and offensive *jihad* was actually devised to give legitimacy to *jihad*, and is no longer needed in practice, remaining an issue primarily for theological interpretations. If, as we shall see, the modern leader of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, declared a certain Western policy offensive to his people, this would serve as adequate justification for a *jihad* to be launched. This philosophy could also justify Pakistani hostility to India and Arab hostility to Israel, legitimizing their *jihad*. Muslim political theory also holds that when a Muslim country launches a war of conquest, it should issue a warning to the target country in the form of *Aslim taslam* (surrender and Islamize, or else). Such warnings were considered reasonable, and those who failed to respond positively were crushed mercilessly, killed, enslaved, and destroyed and their culture annihilated. Who would call that a "defensive" *jihad* or battle?

Sayyid Jamal Ad-Din Afghani, the ancestor of an apostolic succession of modernists in the 20th century, had a deep impact on the Islamic world. His ideas, expressed in his lectures, polemics, short essays, and newspaper columns, were based on the idea of finding a *modus vivendi* between traditional Islamic culture and the philosophical and scientific (technological) challenges of the modern West. Most striking was his commitment to Pan-Islamic civilization. Geographically, his activities covered Afghanistan, Iran, India, the Arab world, Turkey, as well as Western Europe and Russia. Afghani's political program of Pan-Islam (*"ittihad-i islam*") was to mobilize Muslim nations to struggle and fight against Western imperialism, and gain military supremacy and power through modern science and technology (Sever, 2010, p. 15). His aim of Pan-Islam was a political rather than religious one, as he believed that the Islamic world could regain its glory through unity instead of division into groups. Afghani's primary goal was to rebuild a strong Islamic state capable of withstanding Western encroachments. His call for the independence of individual Muslim nations was a key factor in the development of Islamic nationalism, and influenced such Muslim figures as Muhammad Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Abu'l Kalam Azad in the Indian subcontinent. The most noteworthy among Afghani's disciples in the Arab world were Muhammad `Abduh, Rashid Rida and Qasim Amin (Malik, 2011, p. 352)

Muhammad Abduh, another outstanding disciple, became Afghani's successor and was the great modernist of the 20th century, contributing immensely to the revival and reform of Islamic intellectual thought and organization. His main efforts can be seen in his struggle to synthesize Islamic and Western ideals, his legal reforms, and his defense of rational and religious liberty and empowerment of women. In Paris, Abduh and Afghani, founded *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'* (The Strongest Link) *Association* and a newspaper of the same name, which was used to condemn colonialism and promote Egyptian nationalism. Abduh supported and promoted the advancement of the

sciences, educational reform, social reform, including Islamic feminism, and European political structures, including parliamentary constitutionalism. In the context of Pan-Islam, he argued that the root cause of the Muslim world's decay was its division into separate states. Many of these ideas would later be adopted by Alija Izetbegović, although he did not always openly acknowledge doing so. Abduh's greatest disciple and successor, Rashid Rida, laid the foundations for Islamic "rebellious modernism" that would deeply inspire Hassan al-Banna and other later radicals, including the *Salafi* movement (Haddad, 1994; Sedgwick, 2010; Terebessy, 2018).

Mawlana Abul Al- A'la Mawdudi, a prominent Indo-Pakistani Muslim revivalist thinker, and founder of the Islamic movement *Jamaat-i Islami*, introduced the concept of "the modern *jahiliyya*" referring to the "period of ignorance" or "period of paganism" preceding the advent of Islam. This line of thinking was emulated by other thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb, executed in 1966 by the Egyptian government for his role in an alleged plot to overthrow the government of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He argued that the deviations from Islam of self-proclaimed Muslims, the imperialist powers' influence, and the application of non-Islamic laws were equivalent to that earlier period of ignorance (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 78). He was a great supporter of the creation of an Islamic state based on the Prophetic model. He believed that the effective mechanism for achieving a social change would originate from the top down, as he considered it difficult to mobilize the masses to overthrow the existing order under the prevailing conditions (Oxford Islamic Studies online, n.d.; Esposito, 2003). Instead, he advocated seizing power from disparate political centers and then introducing wide-scale reforms into society.

In *Under the Shadow of the Qu'ran* published in 1953, Sayyid Qutb introduced his views of the concept "modern *jahiliyya*" which provides the rationale for declaring rulers apostates and consequently waging *jihad* against them. He elaborates that *jahiliyya* is not just a particular period in history, but a state of human affairs and of mind which existed in the past, exists today and may exist in the future. For example, human beings are in a state of *jahiliyya* if they choose to uphold the laws developed by man instead of observing the Law of Allah in its entirety (Sivan, 1990, pp. 23–24, 28). Referring to contemporary times, Qutb considered all Western countries with their legal systems to be in a state of *jahiliyya*, with their rulers perceived as apostates, thus justifying the waging of *jihad* against them. Bringing together the Islamic philosopher Abul al-A'la Maududi' s "modern *jahiliyya*" and Ibn Taymiyya's argument that the unity of God requires that Muslims follow divine law, Qutb developed the synthesis that all those who do not put faith into action through an Islamic legal system and strictly obey the commands of God were part of the modern *jahiliyya* and no longer Muslims, but apostates. According to Qutb, force or *jihad* was a necessary means for the establishment of a universal Islamic state and removal of the chains of

oppression so that Islamic truth could prevail. He disagreed with the interpretation of *jihad* as primarily a struggle against the soul or defensive war to protect the Muslim community (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 79). While trying to implement these ideas in the seam line between Iraq and Syria (2014–2017), ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) provided the most lethal proof that by *jihad* they meant a continuous orgy of killing their opponents: hardly a state of "spiritual striving."

Qutb inspired an assortment of radical groups, including The Islamic Liberation Organization, *Takfir wal Hijra* (Excommunication and Flight), Salvation from Hell, the *Gam'iyya Islamiyya* (Islamic Group), all branches of the Muslim Brothers, notably Hamas, and Islamic *Jihad*. Also, he significantly influenced many Egyptian thinkers who have filled crucial roles in the international *jihadi* movement: Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, an ideologue and head of Islamic *Jihad* in Egypt; Omar Abdul Rahman, the former mufti of Islamic *Jihad*; Gami'yya Islamiyya, who is currently serving a life sentence for conspiracy to commit terrorism in the United States; Ayman Zawahiri, Al-Qa'ida leader since June 2011, succeeding Osama bin Laden, who was slain by the Americans; and others.

In order to understand the new radical Islamic thinking of the Bosnian Muslim elite that proliferated in Bosnia during the interwar period and became ingrained in the consciousness of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the generations that followed, the core ideas of the Islamic political thinking of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, must be examined. In addition, the effects of his and others' ideological itinerary within Bosnia and Herzegovina in those years, after the Islamic seeds had been implanted by the Ottomans almost half a millennium earlier, need to be traced. Their sustenance today is made possible by the neo-Ottoman striving of President Recep Erdogan's al-Banna-based ideology, as followed and further radicalized by Sayyid Qutb, and can be summarized in several main points:

1) *Islam is a perfect and complete way of life.* According to al-Banna, Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life. Therefore, it is impossible for Muslims to separate politics and religion (Al-Banna, 1978, p. 36). As Islam is a complete way of life, encompassing law and politics, all constitutional and positive law must be based on *sharia* law (Ibid., pp. 103–31).

2) *Western societies are decadent and corrupt*. Al-Banna's hostile perception of the West and Western values, especially of Western colonialism and imperialism, has become one of the most powerful bases for the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the development of Islamic radicalism in general. Al-Banna saw the West and Islam as incompatible. Believing that the West had nothing to offer Egypt, he identified Islam as the only solution for remaking the nation (Ibid., pp. 106–107). Sayyed Qutb, who followed him, further

radicalized that view, coupled with a blind and uncompromising hatred and bigotry against the Jews.

3) *The Islamic state or caliphate as the fundamental unit of organization*. According to al-Banna, God has commanded Muslims to conquer and rule the earth. Furthermore, *jihad* is considered a positive instrument, both in violent and non-violent forms, for achieving the goal of establishing this Islamic order. Furthermore, al-Banna declared *jihad* to be a "religious duty" binding on each Muslim individual (*fard ayn)* because it was imposed upon every Muslim by God. He supported the idea of Islamic imperialism, and advocated that polytheists should be forcibly converted to Islam, while Jews and Christians as "People of the Book" should be forced only to pay the *jizya* (tribute tax) as a sign of their humble acceptance of Islamic domination (Ibid., pp. 136, 142), justifying *jihad* against all those who deny Islam as perceived by al-Banna (Ibid., p. 142). Indeed, ISIS precisely follows this model.

Hassan al-Banna wanted to unite all Muslims in one Islamic order (in one *umma*) under strict, religious universal *sharia* law with Islam as the force dominating all aspects of society. In the first stage, this order would be established on a national level by creating a new Islamic kingdom or Islamic state – a caliphate – which in time would encompass the planet by means of Islamic imperialism. According to him, the Islamic state is crucial as it is the only correct form of social and political order for Muslims (Al-Banna, 1978 p. 32; Hansen & Mesøy, 2009, p.19; Mitchell, 1993, pp. 234–35). In this regard, Alija Izetbegović's *Islamic Declaration*, wherein he mentions the creation of an Islamic state in the Balkans, can be seen as a logical extension of al-Banna's Islamic ideology.

Further, in order to achieve the goal of establishing this Islamic order, *jihad* is considered by Al-Banna as a desired instrument, both in violent and non-violent form. He also declared *jihad* to be a "religious duty" binding on each Muslim individual (*fard ayn)* and imposed upon every Muslim by God (Al-Banna, 1978, p. 133). It means that, on the face of it, al-Banna supported both a nonviolent *jihad* (internal struggle) and a military *jihad*, though his mind always veered toward the violent struggle against the West that he abhorred.

The classical Islamic law of warfare that al-Banna adhered to is closely linked to another central teaching of Muhammad and the Qur'an that al-Banna frequently mentioned, that: "Islam is superior and nothing must be made superior to it." Yohanan Friedmann, a scholar of Islamic law, emphasizes that the most conspicuous way in which the superiority of Islam is demonstrated relates to its military victories and the humiliation of the subjugated (Friedman, 1979).

In 1928, al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In his seminal work *The Society of the Muslim Brothers,* the historian Richard P. Mitchell writes that the Muslim Brothers undoubtedly perceived themselves as the practical expression of the theoretical work developed by the Islamic modernists Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935). While al-Afghani was regarded as the "announcer" and Rida the "historian," al-Banna was called "the builder," the director of the project (Mitchell, 1993, p. 321). The essence of the Muslim Brotherhood is its pragmatic execution of the ideas of the modernists, as according to al-Banna, their predecessors had failed in practice, precisely because their work had been carried out only on a theoretical level (Mitchell, 1993, p. 321).

In his book *Fee Qaafilatil-Ikhwaan il-Muslimeen* (*In the Caravan of the Muslim Brothers*), al-Banna exposes his attitudes towards Jews and Israel, calling Jews and Zionists "the enemies of Allah." (Rossomando, 2019; Hasan al-Banna and, n.d.). In the book *The Brotherhood: America's Next Great Enemy*, Erick Stakelbeck presents Al-Banna's statement demonstrating his attitude towards the Jews and the State of Israel: "Israel will exist, and will continue to exist, until Islam abolishes it, as it abolished that which was before it" (Stakelbeck, 2013). Later, this phrase was slightly modified and quoted in the opening passage of the Hamas Covenant: "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it." (Covenant of Hamas terror org, n.d.)

Al-Banna laid the foundations for Islamic thinkers such as Abul al-A'la Maududi (Pakistan), Ruhollah Khomeini (Iran), Sayyid Qutb (Egypt), Alija Izetbegović (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and many young Muslims who would become the core of the Bosnian political party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). The Muslim Brotherhood organization has since spread and extended its reach into Europe and North America, and has become an ideological machine for producing radicals, extremists and terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Al-Qa'ida, the Egyptian *Jihad* and ISIS.

The Palestinian Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, also collaborated extensively with Nazi Germany about the Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe. He had a profound impact on Nazi Germany's Arabic language propaganda to the Arab societies and on the Pan-Islamic and *jihadi* propaganda to all Muslim communities in different regions during World War II. He left a legacy of anti-Semitism and strong militarization of Islam for achieving political goals and promoting Pan-Islam.

Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj (1954–1982), the most influential Qutb disciple, strongly believed that *jihad* would enable Muslims to rule the world and to reestablish the caliphate (Cook, 2005, p. 107). He saw in *jihad* the only option for bringing about a truly Islamic society, and believed that after the establishment of an Islamic

State in Egypt, all Muslim lands should be liberated (Sageman, 2004, pp.17–18.). To summarize Faraj's arguments that later became the essence of the *jihadi* discourse, first, *jihad* is central in Islam, a mandatory requirement for every Muslim, a "neglected duty" that should be re-established as a pillar of Islam. In his book *The Neglected Duty*, Faraj argues that *jihad* has become "the neglected duty" (today's *jihadis* use this phrase extensively), something that must be restored as a central pillar of Islam. Being a member of *Islamic Jihad*, he used the book as a kind of internal discussion paper to explain and defend the ideology of the organization (Jansen, 1986, p. 6; Kepel, 1985, pp. 191–222). Second, rulers who do not apply Islamic law are unbelievers and must be removed from power (Jansen, 2002; Sageman, 2004, pp.15–17). *Jihadists* apply this logic to contemporary states where rulers have implemented Western legal codes rather than Islamic law alone.

Omar Abdel-Rahman (1938–2017), a graduate of Egypt's Al-Azhar University, and the Egyptian Muslim leader known as "the Blind Sheikh" who was convicted of conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and of planning a broader "war of urban terrorism" in the United States, was highly influenced by Qutb's ideas and supported his position on the necessity for God's governance on earth and for using *jihad* to remove apostate rulers. Abd-al-Rahman replaced Abdullah Azzam as the theological leader of the global *jihad* after the latter was assassinated in 1989. He considered the United States and its allies to be the leading enemies of Islam (Zeghal, 1999, p. 395). In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the global *jihad* network, while Abd-al-Rahman served as the head of the main United States office of *Al-Kifah* (The Struggle) in New York, *Al-Kifah*'s English-language newsletter was publishing regular updates on *jihadi* action in Bosnia and aggressively inciting Muslims to join the *jihad* in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan (Scott, 2011).

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, another graduate of Al-Azhar and member of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and known as another "Father of Global *Jihad*," was a Palestinian Sunni Islamic scholar and theologian and founding member of Al-Qa'ida (Syria and Iraq), Hamas (Palestine) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pakistan). Azzam further advanced the idea of *jihad* and, most importantly, put it into practice around the world. He developed the religious ideology for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, recruited Arab *mujahideen* (those foreigners who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan and were later called "Afghanis" after returning home) to implement his vision, and built the international network that his follower, Osama Bin Laden, for whom he was a spiritual mentor, would transform into Al-Qa'ida.

Following the Six Day War (1967), Azzam and his family moved to Jordan from the village of Silat al-Harithiya where he was born in 1941. In 1969, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and in 1984, as a Muslim Brotherhood operative, he established the MAK office *(Maktab Khidamat al-Mujahideen al-'Arab* (the Services

Bureau of Arab *Jihadists*) in Jordan (Farahat, 2017, p. 5; Maliach, 2010, p. 80). His philosophy helped establish and organize the Brotherhood's global *jihad* movement, and his ideology inspired the Egyptian *Islamic Jihad* and *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Group) to engage in exporting terrorism, which greatly inspired Osama bin Laden, whom he taught at the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is in Jeddah where bin Laden, as a student of Muhammad and Sayyed Qutb and Abdallah Azzam, experienced his spiritual transformation from a secular life style to a deeply religious one, becoming a dedicated and pious Muslim. Azzam, bin Laden's spiritual mentor in the years preceding the formation of Al-Qa'ida (Baker, 2009; Karsh, 2013, p. 227; Maliach, 2010, p. 80), professed that Muslims should fight a united, global *jihad* against their enemies as opposed to smaller, separate national fights (Riedel, 2011; Suellentrop, 2002). Bin Laden adhered to Azzam's ideology and continued even further in putting it into action (Jacquard, 2002).

Azzam, in fact, adopted Ibn Taymiyya's logic and argued that if a group of Muslims trying to fulfill their duty to repel aggressors fails to do so alone, it becomes an individual obligation for those nearest to the conflict zone to support the floundering group. For example, in his view, the Afghans could not fulfill their *jihadi* obligation without help from other Muslims. Following the Soviet Union's military entrance in Afghanistan in 1979 based on the official request of the Afghanistan's government and in accordance with the *Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation* from 5 December, 1978, he published a book *The Defense of Muslim Lands*, wherein he called for a religious war to liberate Muslim lands from foreign occupiers as a response to the aggression. The book quickly spread through the Muslim world. In addition, Azzam wrote many articles outlining the requirements of global *jihad* and glorifying the role of the *Islamikaze* (those dubbed erroneously "suicide bombers") (Azzam, 2002; Baker, 2009; Riedel, 2011). He actually elevated *jihad* to the status of the Five Pillars of Islam, i.e., making participation in it necessary to be a Muslim. Relying on Ibn Taymiyya, Azzam emphasized the importance of the "defensive" *jihad* as a religious obligation (Azzam, n.d.).

Azzam stated that everyone not performing *jihad* today is forsaking a religious duty, no different from one who eats during the days of Ramadan without reason, or a wealthy person who withholds the *zakat* (religiously obligated charity). In his book *Join the Caravan*, Azzam declared that: "The obligation of *jihad* today remains *fard ayn* until the liberation of the last piece of land which was in the hands of Muslims but has been occupied by the 'Disbelievers'" (Azzam, n.d.).

By *occupied land* he referred to places such as Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, etc. This argument established the basis for what has been termed "the nomadic *jihad*," or "itinerant *jihadis*," the eternal struggle to "defend" Muslims from the disbelievers

regardless of the time and place, where and when it is necessitated, and for *jihadis* go where there is *jihad*, although they do not seek integration into the country where they fight.

Further developing the concept of the "Islamic vanguard" proffered by Sayyed Qutb in 1964 in his work *Milestones*, Azzam created the conceptual basis of Al-Qa'ida as a spearhead for the implementation of his doctrine of global *jihad*. He argued that an individual who "sold himself to God" would step forard as a leader, and an elect group would gather around this leader and provide a solid base for an Islamic society and confront the surrounding *jahiliyyah* (ignorance) (Azzam, 1988, p. 4; Maliach, 2010, pp. 79–83; Smith, 2014). In order to instill in the vanguard and Islamic society the motivation for *istishhad (*martyrdom or *Islamikaze),* Azzam wrote:

> The *shahids* (martyrs) are those who write the history of nations, because the history of nations is written only in sweat and blood. They are the ones who build the palace of glory, because palaces of glory are built only by skulls and limbs severed from the body. They are the ones who keep the tree of this religion from wilting and drying up, because the tree of this religion is watered only with blood. They are the wise ones, because they found their way to Allah, while the others either mourn them or mock their thinking. They are the ones who love death so that they will earn life (after death). (Azzam, 1990; Maliach, 2010, p. 81)

Azzam was the first to advocate that a global Islamic *jihad* waged to liberate all conquered Islamic territory is an individual obligation incumbent on every Muslim in the world, regardless of nationality or place of residence. Azzam, together with Bin Laden, successfully implemented the notion of engaging in a global Islamic *jihad* by recruiting thousands of Arab and non-Arab Muslim volunteers and generating cohesion among them under one leadership and for one mission. Al-Qa'ida appeared officially for the first time in Peshawar (Afghanistan) in late November 1989 after Azzam's death, after Azzam had inspired bin Laden's understanding of *jihad* and *istishhad*. These concepts continued to guide Azzam's disciple and Al-Qa'ida after his death, as bin Laden continued to adhere to Azzam's idea of global Islamic *jihad* (Maliach, 2010, pp.79–83).

Abdullah Azzam also saw Hamas as the spearhead in the *jihad* against Jews in Palestine, and was closely linked with the organization from its establishment in December 1987. He supported Hamas financially and ideologically and kept in close contact with the movement. Both Hama and Al-Qa'ida were connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and shared a similar ideology.

In 2001, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the post-bin Laden Al-Qa'ida leader, officially merged with the Egyptian *Islamic Jihad*, which he led with bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida network, calling the new entity *Qa'idat al-Jihad* (The Base – physical and spiritual – of *Jihad*). Zawahiri adopted Qutb's unwavering ambition to establish an Islamic state at any cost, using violence if necessary (Bajoria & Teslik, 2011; Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 80). Qutb's influence on Zawahiri led him to a *Salafi* interpretation of Islam which does not recognize any Islamic tradition that has arisen since the time of the Prophet. In his writings, Zawahiri advocates a militant opposition not only to Christians and Jews, but also to Muslims who break with *Salafi* practice and are thus "infidels" (Al-Zayyat, 2004, pp. 20–24; Bajoria & Teslik, 2011).

In the 1960s, during the Nasserite era, many of Qutb's disciples moved to Saudi Arabia, where some of them took positions as teachers of Islam. Among them was Qutb's younger brother Muhammad Qutb, who started teaching at the King Abd al-Aziz University, where his students included bin Laden, Safar al-Hawali and other future radical dissidents (Nishino, 2015, p. 118). Both Qutb brothers had a tremendous ideological influence and played an essential role in building the ideological framework of Al-Qa'ida and its affiliate ISIS. Both of these organizations constructed some of their logistical and infrastructure facilities in the Balkan region, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, as a direct result of the Nasserite policies of the 1960s, many prominent Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members and *jihadi* thinkers went into exile in a number of countries, including: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other shelters in the Arabian Peninsula; Pakistan and Afghanistan in Central and Southwest Asia; and the countries in North Africa and Europe. This Brotherhood Diaspora facilitated not only the spread of the movement's ideology, but also the establishment of its very strong international networks. In addition to missionary networks (*da'wah*), the Muslim Brotherhood also built financial, NGO, educational and university networks (Kepel, 2008). There are four main pillars of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology (Spoerl, 2012):

1) First, Islam is a perfect and complete way of life, something that al-Banna had previously emphasized;

2) Second, Islam must be the basis of all legislation, a provision that was vociferously promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood when Sadat was in power in Egypt (1970–1981);

3) Third, Western societies are decadent and corrupt, a mantra that many Muslim jurists have repeated since the 1950s to convince their followers that the Muslim conquest of the world from Christian domination was imminent; and

4) Fourth, Allah has commanded Muslims to conquer and rule the earth as its most worthy rulers.

Contrary to the Egyptian group, the Saudi *jihadists* relied more on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab as their direct pipeline to the thinking of Ibn Taymiyya. The most relevant work for the radical Muslims of al-Wahhab is *The Things Which Nullify Islam* (*Nawaaqid al Islaam*), which outlines ten phenomena that automatically nullify Islam, which, in effect, means that their existence totally contradicts the Islamic faith and results in apostasy (Rippin, 2005, p. 168). The ten phenomena are as follows:

1) Polytheism (associating other deities with Allah in worship);
2) Using mediators for God (for example, praying to saints, hence the *Wahhabis*' destruction of even the Prophet's tombs in Medina, for fear that it may come to supplement the cult of Allah or even replace it);
3) Doubting that non-Muslims are disbelievers. Because there is always a temptation for Muslims to convert to other faiths, an outright negation of any faith other than Islam was a crucial cautionary measure;
4) Judging by non-Islamic laws and believing these are superior to divine law;
5) Disapproving of anything the Prophet Mohammed practiced. Since Muhammad is regarded by Muslims as the most perfect of men, no one can doubt that all his deeds must be a model for all Muslims, indeed for all mankind;
6) Mocking Islam or the Prophet Mohammed. Muslim sensitivity to this point is what caused the bloody events connected to the Cartoon Affair in 2006 in Denmark;
7) Using or supporting magic;
8) Supporting or helping non-believers against Muslims. This was the basis for the many *fatwa*'s issued against Muslims who served in Western armies during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars;
9) Believing that someone has the right to stop practicing Islam. This is the reason why radical Muslim regimes, like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the brief era of the rule of the Taliban and ISIS (in Afghanistan and Syria) condemned to death any of their heretic nationals; and
10) Turning away from Islam by not studying or practicing it.

Prominent activists within the Muslim Brotherhood global network, such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Abdullah Azzam, and Osama bin Laden created terrorist organizations, turning the Qutbism ideology based on the teachings of Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al Banna into a global action plan (Eikmeier, 2007, p. 86). This plan was to be executed through the Muslim Brotherhood by engaging in different types of *jihad*, varying tactics and strategies in different regions and countries, depending

on the prevailing political situation and environment. The ultimate purpose of this activity was the integration of the global Muslim *umma* through the establishment of regional caliphates (Islamic states or Islamic territorial and cultural space) and their consequent unification and expansion into a global Caliphate (an Islamic super-state) that should further conquer and rule the world, excluding other faiths or non-Muslim systems.

Consequently, the Brotherhood practices an offensive, though supposedly non-violent form of *jihad* or peaceful conquest of the *Dar al-harb* through its global network of Islamic NGOs, associations, research centers and political parties. It also engages in violent *jihad* through its terrorist organizations, such as its own secret militia, *al-Tanzim al-Khass* (the Special Apparatus, also known as the Secret Apparatus), *Gama'at al-Muslimin*, commonly known as *Takfir wa-l-Hijra* (Excommunication and Emigration), *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Group), Hamas, the Egyptian *Islamic Jihad*, Al-Qa'ida and ISIS. All of these organizations have either been founded by current or former Muslim Brotherhood members or have been directly inspired, indoctrinated, and often also recruited by Muslim Brotherhood members, and use its literature.

In the Western countries, where secular systems are established, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and other EU countries, the Brotherhood is performing a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" and "the process of settlement." A document that was entered into evidence as Appendix II during the Holy Land Foundation trial in the United States (USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.) entitled "An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America," thoroughly explains the meaning of the "Civilization-Jihadist Process" and "the process of settlement" that a network of Islamic NGOs and associations should perform in the United States (Baran, 2008, pp. 107–108; USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 2008).

The Memorandum was written and presented by Mohamed Akram (Mohammad Akram Al-Adlouni), at the time the Muslim Brotherhood Director and a senior Hamas leader in the United States, who is now the Secretary General of *al-Quds International* Foundation located in Lebanon (Siegel, 2012, p.178). Youssef Qaradawi, the foremost modern Sunni jurist of our time, was identified as the Chairman of the Board of Al Quds Foundation's Trustee Council (The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, 2010). The document not only describes the Muslim Brotherhood's goals, infrastructure and strategic plan for the United States, but can be used for understanding the *modus operandi* and goals of the Brotherhood in all Western countries. According to the document, a *Civilization-Jihadist Process* or, in other words, civilizational *jihad* process means:

1) Eliminating and destroying the Western systems through a long-term, civilization - killing *jihad* from within by the hands of Westerners and "sabotaging" Western systems by "believers" working on this mission of the Brotherhood platform in those countries;
2) Supporting the universal Islamic movement to establish the global Caliphate;
3) Accomplishing civilizational *jihad* aims using the following general strategic goals:
    - Establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood;
    - Adopting Muslim causes domestically and globally;
    - Expanding the observant Muslim base;
    - Unifying and directing Muslim efforts worldwide;
    - Presenting Islam as a civilizational alternative;
    - Supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it materializes.

The "civilizational *jihad*" includes the "concept of settlement" which consists of the following phases (Akram, Reaboi & Gaffney, 2003, p. 13; USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 2008, p. 278):

1. ***Settlement:*** "That Islam and its Movement become a part of the land it adopted for settlement" (This policy has been adopted by Muslim immigrants to Europe in recent years.);
2. ***Establishment***: "That Islam turns into firmly-rooted organizations on whose basis Islamic civilization, structure and faith are built;"
3. ***Stability:*** That Islam becomes stable in the land in which its people move: namely a permanent feature of the land and no longer a faith of immigrants;
4. ***Enablement:*** "That Islam is enabled within the souls, minds and the lives of the people of the country in which it moves;" i.e., that it is no longer an alien creed imported into the country, but becomes an innate part of it;
5. ***Rooting:*** "That Islam is resident and not a passing episode, or rooted and "entrenched" in the soil where it and not a strange plant to it;"

In addition, the Memorandum provides a list of the Muslim Brotherhood-connected organizations in North America (USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and

Development, 2008, p. 295) responsible for leading this "civilizational *jihad*," such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and its Da'wah (mission*)* section, The Muslim Student Association (MSA), The Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), The Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE), etc. In Europe too, the Muslim Brotherhood infrastructure and pattern of settlement in EU countries, such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, as well as Switzerland, indicate that they are seeking the same goals there. The European Muslim Brotherhood is seeking to integrate its various European proxies operating in different European countries and in Turkey, as they are closely linked into one Pan-Islamic community working diligently for the cause from as early as the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, a wave of Muslim student migrants from the Middle East infiltrated into European countries and the first *gast arbeiter* (guest workers) started to arrive to Germany from Turkey, to France and Belgium from North Africa, and to Great Britan from the Indian sub-continent.

After gaining a foothold in the major European countries, the European Muslim Brotherhood branched out to the rest of the continent, including the Balkans, joining the already existing concentrations of Muslims there. They and their successors now lead Islamic organizations that represent the interests of the local Muslim communities to Europe's political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country. These organizations represent themselves as modern and democratically oriented, while at the same time continuing to adhere to the Brotherhood's radical views and maintaining links to terrorist organizations. Using politically sophisticated mainstream rhetoric, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike, and are being perceived as partners rather than as a threat. Western political elites now turn to these organizations regularly on any matter that concerns Muslim communities, and these organizations now know how to leverage their resource of burgeoning political votes with the Western elites in their respective countries. These organizations are associated with fundamentalism, anti-Semitism, and support for terrorism, particularly Palestinian terrorism.

Said Ramadan, the Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna's personal secretary and son-in-law, has been a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure in Europe and a founding member of several key Muslim Brotherhood groups in Europe. In 1958, Ramadan settled in Geneva and there founded the Islamic Center, which became the headquarters of Muslim Brotherhood members expelled from Egypt. In 1964, he opened Islamic centers in London and Munich, and became the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood abroad. The most important Muslim Brotherhood mosque in Europe is the Islamic Center of Munich (*Islamisches Zentrum München*) that was completed in 1973 after Ramadan took over the Center in 1960 (Steinberg, 2010, p.149). The Mosque

Construction Commission subsequently became the Islamic Community of Germany (*Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland*) that subsequently played a key role in the establishment of the crucial Brotherhood groups in Europe (Johnson, 2008).

Some naive parties in the West have come to believe that negotiations with Muslim radicals could alter their fanatic attitudes and lead to coexistence between Muslims and their rivals. The problem is that dialogue is treated in the West as policy, while it is in fact a non-policy, designed only to fill an awkward vacuum and to make legislators and government officials feel virtuous for "doing something." But while Europeans have regularly entered into such dialogues with Muslims in good faith, fully intending to find common ground with their Muslim interlocutors, Muslims consider "dialogue" as meaning something else entirely. For them, it means the submission of lesser cultures and religions to their own superior one, hoping to inspire conversion to an Islamic worldview. Anything short of that is considered an abject "failure of dialogue."

There is serious drawback to the constant West-Islam dialogue. It lulls the Western populations into believing that their governments are doing something constructive to avert violence or threats of violence in the future. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth, for this non-policy serves to embolden and empower those Muslims whose Western governments have opted to act as intermediaries with the wider Muslim communities. Invariably, Western governments have elected these Muslims because they are prominent activists in the community, while the governments comfort themselves with the injudicious belief that these figures represent moderate Islam. However, these Muslims are familiar enough with the West to have learned to tailor their vocabulary precisely to suit those whom they are facing across the table. They speak the language of peace, reconciliation and goodwill to Westerners and reserve their true beliefs for fellow Muslims or commit them in writing to their ideological platforms, in what can often be characterized as a "double talk" — one for their domestic constituencies and another for their foreign interlocutors, one for their politics at home and another for their interviews with the foreign press.

In essence, Muslim negotiators have specialized in "working the system," and very successfully so. These "moderate" Muslim leaders gradually extract one concession after another from Western policy makers, rendering dialogue a one-way street. They enter each session with the full intention of testing the limits of the concessions they can extract, and it is a rare Western negotiator who would risk disappointing them — or else the headlines of the newspapers the following day would be sure to inflame the Muslim public. Herein lies the value of the worldwide Muslim penchant for overreacting to every perceived slight by demonstrating their outrage loudly and violently, as was dramatically illustrated during the 2005–2006 Cartoon Crisis, involving a Danish cartoonist who was accused of insulting the Prophet. This reaction was quite remarka-

ble, because in the West, the most outrageous desecrations of saints or holy patrimony pass without retribution, because they are considered within the boundaries of freedom of expression, but for Muslims, every perceived insult justifies chastisement, even bloodshed, probably due to their lack of self-confidence in the validity of their creed.

The European Muslim Brotherhood network's main organizations are part of the Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe (FIOE), which is the umbrella group representing the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe and which has strong ties to Hamas and Hamas fund-raising organizations and to Al-Qa'ida. It has 28 members organizations in most of the EU countries, as well as in non-EU countries, such as Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia (Merley, 2008, p. 3), as well as in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, Republic of Serbia. Its most prominent organization is the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), the theological body of the European Muslim Brotherhood. Its members include some of the most prominent members of the global Muslim Brotherhood, including the Bosnian Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić (Merley, 2008, p.6) who is *inter alia* the President of the World Bosniak Congress. In the United Kingdom, The Radical Middle Way organization has a wide range of associated scholars representing the global Muslim Brotherhood, such as Tariq Ramadan, the German Islamic figure Murad Hoffman, Canadian Muslim Brotherhood leader Jamal Badawi, the UK Muslim Brotherhood leader Dr. Kemal Helbawi and his son Abdur Rahman Helbawi, the Bosnian Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić, and many others (*The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch*, 2008; *The Radical Middle Way*, 2011). There are also associated organizations, such as the Union of Good, a global coalition of charities raising funds for Hamas, and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), a fundamentalist Saudi religious organization accused of promoting extremism and supporting terrorism throughout the world, including in Bosnia, Israel, and India (The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, 2007).

Turkey also has a presence in Europe through the Islamic community's *Millî Görüş'* inspired by the Turkish politician and academic Necmettin Erbakan. The German Muslim Brotherhood leader, Ibrahim El-Zayat, who is married to a member of the Erbakan family, and had served as the head of WAMY in Western Europe, runs the *Millî Görüş'* mosques throughout Europe, and is the leader in the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). In its annual report, Germany's domestic intelligence agency, the *Bundesverfassungsschutz*, described the *Milli Görüş'* as a "foreign extremist organization," claiming that this group plays a double game by publicly expressing adherence to the basic principles of Western democracies while at the same time actively working to abolish the secular system in Turkey and establish an Islamic state with an Islamic social system (Vidino, 2005).

The European Trust funds Islamic work in Europe and promotes the stability of Islamic organizations. Some of the sources of the Trust's funding are:

1) *Al-Maktoum* Foundation of the ruling family of Dubai;

2) The *Waqf* Ministry in Kuwait;

3) *The Bayt al-Zakat* in Dubai, possibly related to the *Bayt Al-Zakat* in Kuwait;

4) The company Samara Investments registered in the Jersey Islands, which owns companies related to the Brotherhood in Bahrain. It is linked to Saudi largest companies registered in the British Virgin Islands and an unknown company registered in the British Virgin Islands and to Kuwait's branch of the Brotherhood (Merley, 2008, p. 10);

5) *Al-Islah* (Reform) *European Institute for Human Sciences* (Institut Européen de Sciences Humaines) is politically, intellectually and ideologically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim of fighting against the French cultural influence, seen by them as evil, instead of promoting integration into it (Merley, 2008, p. 12);

6) *The Federation of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations* (FEMYSO), one of the central organizations of FIOE, has developed into a network of 42 national and international organizations bringing together youth from over 26 European countries, headquartered in central Brussels. One of its founders is the FIOE officer Ibrahim El-Zayat, member of the German Muslim Brotherhood. It has developed mutually-beneficial links with the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations. It is the *de facto* voice of the Muslim youth in Europe (*The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch*, 2013; Vidino, 2005);

7) *The Federation of European Arab-Islamic Schools*, the same organization located in Sweden and known as the European Union of Arabic Islamic Schools (EUAIS);

8) *The European Forum for Media Professionals*;

9) *European Forum of Muslim Women*;

10) *European Assembly of Muslim Imams*. The single most important individual in charge of the leadership and coordination of the Global Muslim Brotherhood network is its ideologist Yusuf al-Qaradawi. (Merley, 2008, pp. 17–20)

The essential elements of the offensive non-violent *jihad* or the peaceful conquest of the *Dar al-harb* are the *da'wah* and religious education, which present an

alternative way to conquer a society, from within and without a sword (Quiggin, 2014, pp. 7–11). The official English language website of the Muslim Brotherhood makes this clear: "The Muslim Brotherhood shall never forget religious education and *da'wah*, as they are the essence of its existence" (Al Shafey 2011). Also, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, another graduate of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, who became one of the most prominent Islamic ideologues and popular figure in the extremist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated in a speech in Ohio in 1995: "Conquest through *da'wah*, that is what we hope for…We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not through the sword but through *da'wah*" (Mintz & Farah, 2004).

Another important aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood's "non-violent *jihad*" is the Islamization of knowledge. Two leading scholars, S.M. Naquib al-Attas and the late Dr. Ismail Raji al Faruqi, have been in the forefront of this mission, establishing entities devoted to this effort, such as the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in Herndon, established in Virginia in 1981, and The International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in Kuala Lumpur established in 1987 (Hashim & Rossidy, 2000, pp. 21–22). Working on the cause, the IIIT organized the first international conference in the field dedicated to the issue of Islamic thought and knowledge in Islamabad as early as in 1982. As a result of the conference, a detailed plan was developed to serve as a guideline for Muslim intellectuals and students in the field of Islamization of knowledge entitled *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan* (AbuSulayman, 1989, pp. xiv–xv).

Referring to the Islamization of knowledge, in his book entitled *Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge,* Dr. Raji al Faruqi made clear that, "This is then the great task facing Muslim Intellectuals and leaders: to recast the whole legacy of human knowledge from the standpoint of Islam" (Al Faruqi, 1988, p. 32).

He presented his plan for the Islamization of modern knowledge, with the following five objectives (Hashim & Rossidy, 2000, p. 31):

1) Mastering the modem disciplines;
2) Mastering the Islamic legacy;
3) Establishing the specific relevance of Islam to each area of modem knowledge;
4) Seeking ways to create a creative synthesis between the Islamic legacy and modern knowledge; and
5) Launching Islamic thought on a trajectory which leads to the fulfillment of the divine design of Allah.

In order to achieve the objectives of his plan for the Islamization of modem knowledge, al Faruqi outlines twelve steps for producing university-level textbooks

that would recast twenty disciplines in accordance to the Islamic vision (Ibid., pp. 31–32):

1) Mastering the modem disciplines;
2) Surveying the disciplines;
3) Mastering and creating an anthology of the Islamic legacy;
4) Mastering and analyzing the Islamic legacy;
5) Establishing the specific relevance of Islam to the disciplines;
6) Critically assessing the current levels of the modem disciplines;
7) Critically assessing the current levels of the Islamic legacy;
8) Surveying the *umma*'s major problems;
9) Surveying mankind's problems;
10) Performing creative analyses and syntheses;
11) Recasting the disciplines under the framework of Islam (the university textbook):
12) Disseminating Islamized knowledge.

While presenting itself as a supporter of moderation, the Muslim Brotherhood actually adheres to a more than 80-year-old policy of establishing the Brotherhood's brand of Islam as the global faith, excluding all other religious and secular forms of organization. Even Muslim groups that disagree with the Brotherhood's interpretation of Islam are subjected to abuse (Quiggin, 2014, p. 9). Consequently, it can be concluded that the non-violent "civilizational *jihad*" of the Muslim Brotherhood actually represents a greater existential and systemic threat to Western civilization and societies than the "violent *jihad*" carried out by the Brotherhood's extremist and terrorist organizations, as the former aims to weaken and destroy the open societies of Western countries from within and establish in their place an Islamic political system based on the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology.

In this regard, it is important to mention the lecture of Dr. Lorenzo Vidino, Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, on the topic *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West* that took place on 4 May 2020 at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy's (ISGAP) online platform. For the past 20 years, Dr. Vidino has been researching the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. Explaining the *civilizational jihad* of the Muslim Brotherhood that is its *modus operandi* in non-Muslim majority countries in Europe or North America, he stresses that it is completely different in how does it operates, what it is and how does it

represent itself in comparison to the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in Middle East or other Islamic countries. The first challenge is actually identifying a Brotherhood organization in the West due to a lack of transparency, covert action and its tactics how it presents itself. All Muslim Brotherhood entities, such as the U.K., French, German, and other branches, have organized numerous NGOs with modern names, whereby they appear to present a semblance of representativeness. Thus, they would call themselves, for example, the Islamic society of Germany, the Muslims of France, the American organization of all Muslims, etc. The idea of this facade or public face is to be a presentable, acceptable face of the Brotherhood in the West. These networks represent the majority of Muslim voices and are thus in a position to negotiate their interests when Western political establishments reach out to them for political support before elections (Vidino, 2020).

In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of many contemporary examples would be the misuse of the term Islamophobia as a sophisticated tool of public manipulation and covert actions, together with using modern democratic rhetoric in academic circles and the public space for achieving strictly political goals. However, the logic of the arguments and sometimes the background of the author reveal the true intentions. For example, the SETA *European Report on Islamophobia* 2019 (Karčić, 2019, pp.141–60), wherein the authors describe manifestation of Islamophobia or current and potential tendencies that may lead to Islamophobia, Hikmet Karčić (having written a PhD thesis entitled *Detention Camps as a Tool for Ethno-Religious Cleansing of non-Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995*), the author covering Bosnia and Herzegovina, outlines what he has identified as manifestations of Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim rhetoric:

1) any attempt to analyze and discuss the contemporary security threats (radicalization, terrorist and extremist activities, etc.) to both international and regional security arising from dangerous process taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

2) any attempt to assess the national and regional security threats related to the return of foreign terrorist fighters with their families;

3) any attempt to speak, research and shed light on historical events related to the ethno-religious cleansing of Serbian people, their casualties and victims during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is automatically labeled as *per se* "revisionist activities;"

4) any attempt to give an objective assessment of the structural and institutional crises in Bosnia and Hercegovina and, consequently, any suggested political solution beneficial for all relevant nations; and

5) any attempt by mass media, expert circles and civil society to publicly discuss

6) national security threats coming from radicalization process taking place in mosques built with foreign funds, or any attempt by the Serbian authorities to take preventative action in response to these perceived threats.

The Bosnian model demonstrates how an Islamic entity existing in a European non-Muslim majority country and acting under different political ideologies alien to Islam, changes tactics, policies, and rhetoric, grows in geography, gains political power and coalesces into a powerful regional substructure of the international Pan-Islamic extremist network.

Considering, on the one hand, the *civilizational jihad* approach in Islam as a modern way to conquer Europe from within by establishing cultural and legal dominance over it and convincing non-Muslim Europeans to act in accordance with it, and, on the other hand, the highly dangerous radicalization processes among European Muslims, in particular, in the Western Balkan region, a shift to the front of the battlefield of ideas and knowledge and different interpretations of them can be observed. This shift is highly hybridized and diversified in term of actors, directions and *modus operandi*. In addition, the international dimension of this threat for Europe gradually grows in terms of its geographical reach, intensity and level of openness. A new shape of radicalization is taking place in Muslim dormant-governmental, supra-national structures. The world's second largest organization of states, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), with 57 Muslim member states, adopted a strategic document in 2000, entitled *The Strategy for Islamic Cultural Action Outside the Islamic World* (Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2009), that was drawn up by the cultural department of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). *The Strategy* purely and simply aims at ensuring the domination of Muslim civilization over the rest of the world, and does so overtly.

The Islamic cultural strategy primarily aims to re-root all Western Muslims in their culture and their faith, so that they can serve as active participants in the universal Islamization process. Islamization, now representing an official global Islamic strategy bearing an inter-governmental character, is either to produce an exponential rate of radicalization from the outset, or to pave the way for such a process in the future. Hence, the European political establishments, including in the Balkan region, as well as all global Jewish organizations operating *inter alia* in Europe, especially those fighting contemporary anti-Semitism globally, should monitor closely all these new developments and act accordingly as quickly as possible. In this regard, it is more likely that, in the near future, Europe will be facing rapid waves of complex-approach Islamization that will include the Bosnian *modus operandi* model combined with the opportunities of the high-tech era.

However, as already noted, the Brotherhood also uses its affiliated terrorist and extremist organizations to carry out a violent form of *jihad*, including a series of assassinations and bombings. Currently, Hamas, the Palestinian military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, remains committed to violence and Al-Qa'ida has mounted attacks on non-military and military targets in various countries and is responsible for instigating sectarian violence among Muslims as well. All Al-Qa'ida's founders — Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri — are prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood and graduates of Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Before ascending to the highest position of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (Counter Extremism Project, 2020 pp.1–3; Al-Qarawi confessing, 2014, [Video file]; McCants, 2016). The Muslim Brotherhood itself recently called for *jihad* on the United States and Israel, overtly expressing the same position as Al-Qa'ida (Rubin, 2010).

The global *Salafi* movement has never been homogeneous, having always included different, sometimes competing groups. Similarly, the *Salafi* community in the Balkans has not been homogeneous. There is the *Wahhabi* movement infrastructure facilitated mainly by funds from Saudi Arabia, while the Muslim Brotherhood has financed and promoted their ideology in the Balkans through their global humanitarian and terrorist networks. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the non-violent methods of *jihad* are the following:

1) Investing in the construction of new mosques and employing *imams* with radical views;
2) Strengthening and expanding the already existing and developing new "*paradzemati*;"
3) Establishing Islamic banking and *zakat* (tax or donations, one of the Five Pillars of the Faith) practices (Oluic, 2008, p. 44);
4) Spreading the network of the *Wahhabi* settlements;
5) Investing in local military training camps;
6) Developing an Islamic NGO and association network, cultural centers and
7) Islamic schools and universities which spread radical Islamic ideology, and establishing links between local Muslims and the global *jihadi* movement;
8) Granting scholarships for studies in Muslim countries;
9) Launching mass media, entertainment programs, news agencies, and publication centers;
10) Employing policies encouraging a demographic boom;

11) Actively engaging in politics using modern rhetoric and the active participation of Islamic political parties in state governance. In this way, they conduct civilizational *jihad* and conquer Bosnia culturally and politically from the inside, conduct Islamization and radicalization of the Muslim community, particularly the youth, and provide for political, financial and other support to the global radical Islamic and *jihadi* movement and its terrorist wing.

The method of violent *jihad* (waging a holy war) has been applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina using a dual-pronged approach. The first is domestic violence, which has been used only in particular historical periods, such as during World War II (1939–1945) and the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991–1995), when the global and regional political circumstances favored such action, as well as today, by means of a series of terrorist attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second approach of international violence has occurred in the context of participating in the organization of numerous terrorist attacks in Western countries, and providing logistics, such as military training camps and training and recruiting foreign fighters who are sent to fight alongside their Muslim brothers in different parts of the world for the global Muslim cause.

The Muslim Brotherhood's ideology penetrated into the Bosnian Muslim community in the interwar period through the *El-Hidaje*, a political-religious association and its *Young Muslims* branch. The organization was based on the Egyptian Brotherhood's *modus operandi* and ideology, and its core members were Bosnian graduates from the Al-Azhar University in Cairo who had joined the Brotherhood while they were studying there. Its goal was the creation of an Islamic state in the Balkans. One of the leading members of the Young Muslims was Alija Izetbegović, who wrote in his *Islamic Declaration* (*Islamska Deklaracija*), the program for the Islamization of Muslims: "Our goal: the Islamization of Muslims. Our way: to believe and to struggle" (Izetbegović, 1970, p. 3).

Adopting al-Banna's ideas and political thinking, Izetbegović explicitly stated in his *Declaration* that: "There can be no peace of co-existence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic societies and political Institutions…Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of activity of any strange ideology on its own turf" (Ibid., p. 22). Further reflecting on the idea of the global Muslim Brotherhood of "civilizational *jihad*," Izetbegović wrote that: "…the Islamic movement should and must start taking over power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong to not only overthrow the existing non-Islamic regime, but to build up a new Islamic authority" (Ibid., p. 43).

The Bosnian Muslim political elite, inspired by the political thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood, saw World War II developments and the Civil War in Bosnia

and Herzegovina as opportunities for waging a holy *jihad* against the unbelievers. The goal was the establishment of an Islamic state with an Islamic system in all its aspects, based on *sharia* law under an Islamic authority. This would become a regional driving force to create a Balkan Caliphate that would in the future become an integral part of the global Caliphate, thus realizing the ultimate goal of the global Muslim Brotherhood platform. The Bosnian Muslim elite share the same ultimate goal as the Brotherhood, but the Bosnian Muslims (from 1993 Bosniaks) have gradually changed their tactics over time from political activism to active military engagement. Officially, the Bosnian Muslims (from 1993 Bosniaks) always insist on their commitment to EU and Western values. However, in practice, they have at the same time been Islamizing the Muslim community and broadening ties to international terrorist organizations, Islamic NGOs and political elites of Islamic countries. Today, the Global Muslim Brotherhood maintains strong connections with the Bosnian Muslim political elite led by Alija Izetbegović's son, Bakir Izetbegović and his Islamic political party, The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) founded by Alija Izetbegović and other *Young Muslim* members. Today, as part of the global Muslim Brotherhood platform, the SDA officially espouses modern European rhetoric, but in practice, it fights for the same ideals as the Brotherhood while maintaining close ties with the global Muslim Brotherhood network and international terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qa'ida, Hamas, ISIS and others. Official institutions of Bosnia and Hercegovina headed by the Bosniak political leadership are tied with the Global Muslim Brotherhood and share its ideology.

Muslim activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not unique to that country, but invariably represent the local Bosnian implementation of something greater that has emerged in some other Islamic center of the world. These influential Muslim processes or periods can be observed throughout history, and the following represent the most important ones in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first period is that of *Wahhabism*, founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century. At the time, this was an internal movement, as Abd al-Wahhab did not have any international presumptions or ambitions. Rather, his aim was to return to pure Islam, in the sense that Islam would be rid of all the influences from the outside world that had influenced it. He believed that nationalism, colonialism, westernization, originating in Europe, then the center of world power, had been forced onto Islam. Abd al-Wahhab wanted to purge Islam of all these foreign additions and make it pure again. Today, when you speak about radical Islam in Bosnia, many people identify certain mosques and *imams* in Bosnia and Herzegovina with *Wahhabism*.

The second period is that of Hassan al-Banna in Egypt, and the Muslim Brothers in the early 20th century, an organization which has become the largest and most dan-

gerous threat to peace and inter-religious relations to this day. When al-Banna first appeared, Egypt had been under British rule for quite a few decades. Hassan al-Banna found the British occupation not only colonial or political, but also spiritual. In response, he revalidated existing ideas in Islam and reinvigorated the idea of *jihad*, the latter not only serving as a spiritual individual effort to be a good Muslim, but also enabling one to be strong enough to conquer one's enemies by force. He also reinvigorated the idea of *shahada,* that today means sacrificing for the sake of Allah, resulting in the emergence of the *shahide*, the witness, who should not fear dying in *jihad* for the sake of Allah, but should seek it. During the al-Banna period and beyond, during the interwar years between the two World Wars, two or three generations of young Bosnian Muslims were studying in Egypt and were influenced by the great thinkers at that time, including al Banna himself directly, founding *El-Hidaje* and *Young Muslims* upon their return to Bosnia. *El-Hidaje*, the Muslim Brothers, and the Nazis shared common anti-Jewish and anti-British beliefs, which have gained enormous strength in the Islamic world that continues to this day. Izetbegović was also a part of the youth wings of *El-Hidaje* and *Young Muslims*.

The third important period is that of the Six Day War against Israel in 1967. In November of 1967, just a few months after the Arabs suffered what they considered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Israelis, the high priest of Al-Azhar convened an international conference in Cairo of hundreds of Islamic theologians and notable religious leaders from all over the world. What did they discuss? Abdul Nasser, Egypt's president, tried to explain the reasons for the defeat, and in all their recorded deliberations, resulting in 12 volumes of minutes, all the major leaders of Islam spoke about this defeat as one of the greatest defeats in Islamic history. They concluded that this defeat was the result of having moved away from pure Islam and of having been used and mislead by such Western ideas as democracy, parliamentary, nationalism, all of which are alien to Islam. The conference participants contended that because Muslims had been misled by such Western ideas, Allah had punished them. Therefore, they concluded that the only solution was a return to Islam. Religious leaders returned to Malaysia, Tunisia, Morocco, where there were large Muslim minorities, and called upon their flocks to return to Islam, and to repent for neglecting Islam and Allah in order to regain Allah's favor and to restore the glory of Islam. In the view of these leaders, Islam was so glorious in the Middle Ages because Muslims had a great Caliphate then, where there was the rule of Allah on Earth, and because they had respected and applied Islam. After that period, these leaders believed that Muslims had sold their souls to colonialists and to Western ideas, thus resulting in Islam's great disgrace. This Conference had direct effects in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Analyzing the developments there at this time, one can detect similar radicalization processes and Pan-Islamic tendencies, led by former *Young Muslims* and Islamic religious lead-

ers. One of the most overt manifestations was the *Islamic Declaration*, which was written in exactly the same spirit of repentance that was called for by the great religious leaders at the Conference. A direct link can be observed between developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the greater trends of Islam. Consequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, while ostensibly peripheral, was never cut off from the general trends within the global *umma*.

The next important period for Islam revolved around two major events: the Iranian Revolution which began in 1979 and the Afghan War, which began in 2001. The Iranian revolution was a *Shi'ites'* revolution, but it nonetheless proclaimed itself an Islamic revolution for exportation throughout the world in order to revive Islam. While this Shiite-based revolution had comprehensive ambitions to include the entire Muslim world, it, unfortunately, sparked and revived the great struggle between Shiites and Sunnites in Islam. Shiites represent about 10%–12% of the Islamic world, and many of them are concentrated in Iraq, and Iran, with some in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The rivalry between Shiites and Sunnites was revived because Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini intended to reintroduce Shi'itism as a challenge to Sunnite Islam, although Sunnite Islam had clearly been dominant for so many years. The *Shi'ites* have succeeded dramatically in Iran, not only to sustain the revolution for the past 40 years, but also to create what are called Shiite crescents in the Middle East. Many *mujahideens* encountered in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war were sent, financed, and armed by the Iranians, and during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a daily flight from Teheran to Sarajevo filled with arms supplies.

The Afghani War lasted 10 years from the time the Soviets entered Afghanistan in 2001 on the official invitation of Communist party in Kabu with the interest of eliminating any possibility that revolutionary Islam would penetrate into the Muslim countries of Soviet Central Asia. Of interest here are those called Afghanis, who are not natives Afghanistan. Rather, they are among the approximately 30,000 Muslim volunteers who were financed by Saudi Arabia, trained and armed by the CIA, and sent to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. When the war was over, having had a lot of experience in warfare, these fighters found themselves unemployed, and returned to their home countries. They are referred to as Afghanis and they have become a very strong element in radical Islam. These were people looking for new killing fields, going from country to country fighting for *jihad*. Among the volunteers in the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina were many Afghanis as well as Iranians, who had a significant impact on the fighting.

The last significant period is the more recent ones of the appearance of new radical movements, some of them connected to a specific territory, others not, and all of which consider themselves as the basis, theoretical or practical, for the continuation

of the worldwide violent, not peaceful, *jihad*. The first such movement is Al-Qa'ida, which is connected to Afghanistan. Its leader, Osama Bin Laden was in Afghanistan, where he was tutored, indoctrinated, and guided spiritually. Al-Qa'ida was connected to the word base, meaning not just a spiritual base for the battle of Islam against the powers of the world, but also a physical base, because in order to win the battle, the base must be strong and secure. And that secure base must be situated in remote places of the world where access for any power would be difficult, and must be ready to think fiercely. The Americans crushed Al-Qa'ida theoretically, even killing Bin Laden. However, the ideology and even physical bases of Al-Qa'ida continued to exist, diffused in many places, including part of Yemen, the Philippines, and in some places in Asia. Al-Qa'ida was followed by the radical organization ISIS, founded, by Al Baghdadi. While ISIS was not taken seriously at first, eventually both Russia and the United States, the world's greatest powers, allied to crush it. The difference between Al-Qa'ida and ISIS is that ISIS learned the lessons of Al-Qa'ida. ISIS realized that merely having the idea of *jihad* is insufficient in order to fight; rather, to be effective, a movement must be territorially based, with its own citizens or subjects, its own people, and its own systems of taxation, agriculture and production, in order to sustain an economy. Bosnia and Herzegovina became an operational base for many terrorist organizations such as Al-Qa'ida, ISIS, and others, as well as a source for producing foreign terrorist fighters that were sent together with their families to participate in the *jihad* in the Middle East (Israeli, 2020).

All the Islamic thinkers, radical ideologies, Islamic literature, international terrorist organizations and global radical movements discussed above have gradually and almost always invisibly had a direct impact on the Bosnian Muslim community, seeping into Bosnia and Herzegovina during different historical periods. Four consequent waves of imported radical Islamic ideologies can be identified. This continuously reinforced radicalization among Bosnian Muslims and ultimately led to the creation of the contemporary regional radical Islamic infrastructure as an integral part of the global Islamic radical network that represents a serious threat to the national security of the Balkan and Western European countries, and, by implication, to world security in general.

Hence, during the period between the two World Wars, al-Banna's and the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology promoting the ideas of the Islamic State, radical Islam, Pan-Islam, and militant Islam, including the violent aspects of *jihad*, definitely spread in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed by the period during World War II, when violent Pan-Islamic ideology was disseminated by the propaganda machine of the Nazi regime built by Himmler, under the guidance of the Jerusalem Mufti al-Husseini. This ideology called for regional *jihad* against Communism, British colonialism, Jews, pro-communist Partisans and the Yugoslav Army in the Home-

land. With the help of the Muslim SS Divisions created in Bosnia, Bosnian Muslims were encouraged to fight by violent means for the establishment of an independent Islamic state, separate from the NDH, and as part of the Pan-Islamic territory. Al-Banna's ideas of militant Islam were implemented by combining Muslim military unit training with religious and ideological indoctrination. *Imams* were embedded in the Handschar and other Muslim SS Divisions. It was envisaged that the militarization of religion would engender radicalization. During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina itself (1992–1995), the proliferation of the *Wahhabi-Salafi jihadi* militant ideology was assured by Al-Qa'ida's radical elements in the region. During the fourth wave, from 2014 to today, the Balkans have experienced the creation of a regional Islamic terrorist infrastructure as part of the international Islamic terrorist organizations' network and proliferation of the ISIS ideological propaganda.

In this ideological context emerged Alija Izetbegović's *Islamic Declaration* that reflected, *mutatis mutandis*, the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic ideology, the Bosnian Muslim political leadership, the Bosnian *ulama* (Muslim jurists and scholars), the Bosniaks nation as a separate national identity, and Bosna and Herzegovina as a state. The creation of the Bosniak nation simply meant the formalization of the existing separate Muslim identity and thinking that were already deeply imbedded in the Bosnian Muslims' attitudes, embracing all aspects of their lives. The very religio-centric nature of the Bosniak nation underscores the central role of Islam in their existence and identity and is evidence of the Bosniaks' self-perception as a part of the global Islamic *umma* organism. Therefore, Alija Izetbegović, in the chapter of his *Declaration* entitled "Panislamism and Nationalism" advocates Pan-Islamism, rejecting nationalism in its Western meaning, and arguing that nationalism is non-Islamic in nature, precisely because the crucial notion of global Muslim solidarity and interconnectedness spurs all Muslims to strike for worldwide unity. Izetbegović was also responsible for making *jihad* acceptable in the Bosnian Muslim community by calling on Bosnian Muslims to take action to reflect their feelings of outrage and resentment in reaction to the "sufferings" of their Muslim brothers in Palestine, the Crimea, Kashmir or Ethiopia (Izetbegović, 1970, pp. 47–51).

This means that the Bosniak nation was created with the single purpose of officially obtaining autonomy for the Bosniaks as Muslims from the non-Muslim sector and publicly aligning themselves as an integral part of the global Muslim nation. This move was motivated by a Pan-Islamic ethos, which is religio-centric, with Islam playing not merely a central role in society, but an all-embracing one, with Islam's spiritual elements having priority over national, ethnic or even biological aspects of life. For Islam is a comprehensive and indivisible system: a religion, a nation, an identity, a way of life, a political philosophy, etc. All Muslims are one organism in Islam, and they think differently than do Christians and Western countries. Consequently,

while the Serbs and Croats perceived the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an inter-ethnic war with religious elements, the Muslim leadership and the global *jihadi* movement had no doubt that the war was a holy *jihad*. Like the wars in Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Syria etc., the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was viewed by the Muslim leadership as one for the liberation of Muslim territory in the Balkans. That region would subsequently be integrated into the dreamed-of independent Islamic state stretching from Indonesia to Morocco and Spain, based on *sharia* law under a Muslim leadership. It would then operate as a regional base for the further Islamization of the Balkans and the creation of the Balkan Caliphate – a Caliphate on European soil – as an integral part of the global Caliphate. It was hoped by these Muslim leaders that the war's outcome would serve as the launching pad for the penetration of radical Islam and terrorist elements further into Europe in order to conquer it. As a result, the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina represented a serious and imminent threat not only to regional security, but to Europe's future. For the purpose, it is highly important that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a European country, officially becomes an Islamic state because in that way, Islam will become a legitimate part of the European cultural heritage, as this has been the land of Islam for more than 500 years and Muslims have been living there for hundreds of years.

Referring to the nature of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of global *jihad*, the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not a spontaneous inter-ethnic war with religious elements. Rather, it represented one phase of a holy *jihad* in *Dar al-Islam* (the House of Islam) against the invaders or unbelievers for the liberation of Muslim lands and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic state based on *sharia* law. This new state would further enable them to wage an offensive *jihad* on European soil and on *Dar al-kufr (*the land of the infidels) or the *Dar al-harb* (House of War) and impose *sharia* law there as well. For the supporters of *jihad*, the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a critical phase in the massive proliferation of radical Islam in the region and the subsequent creation of a regional terrorist network. The Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina represented a great defeat for the Christian Balkan nations and Europe, and a great victory for the global *jihad*. It enabled the gradual formation of the contemporary regional Islamic terrorist infrastructure, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including numerous *Wahhabi* settlements, *paradzemati* (outlaw zones), a regional network of international terrorist organizations, international Islamic NGOs and cultural centers, international banks, trans-national companies, networks of regional mosques, terrorist training camps, etc. How ironic that the Western alliance of the United States and the NATO nations, which had joined hands to fight the Nazi sponsors of Islamic radicalism in WWII, during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, helped the Muslim radicals in their war against the Balkan Christians, a war which the Muslims considered their revenge upon the West for the defeat inflicted on them half a century earlier.

Hence, with its center in Sarajevo, the Balkan Caliphate is gradually and successfully progressing toward the creation of a radical Islamic political entity uniting and connecting all territories with Muslim population in the regions, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, especially in the territory of Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, with Turkey and the Arab Middle East. Employing cultural, educational, ideological, economic and political cooperation, the Balkan Caliphate operates as a phase leading to the creation of the global Caliphate, the ultimate goal of the world *jihad* movement. This process of Islamization and radicalization of the Bosnian Muslims and the expansion of the terrorist network in the country and throughout the region has allegedly been strongly supported by state actors such as the United States, some EU countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and other countries, as well as by foreign intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, MI6, and German, Iranian, Pakistani and Turkish secret services. Also lending this process support have been non-state actors, such as private military companies, primarily the Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), the Global Muslim Brotherhood and other international Islamic NGO networks, international banks, international companies and international terrorist and extremist organizations, in addition to international organizations such as the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), NATO, the EU, the OSCE (Organization for Economic Co-operation in Europe) and others. Also significant is the support for this state from numerous Muslim and Albanian political leaders and prominent figures from the Balkan region, such as Alija Izetbegović, his son Bakir Izetbegović, and their political colleagues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sali Berisha and his close collaborators in Albania, the former leadership of the Albanian terrorist organization KLA and the current Albanian political elite in Kosovo and North Macedonia.

Today, in the global structure of international Islamic terrorist organizations' networks, the Western Balkan region, as part of the South-East Europe, is used for: recruiting new fighters; planning and preparing terrorist acts abroad; providing asylum to both local fighters returning from "hot spots" and foreign terrorist fighters non-residents of Balkan countries; and providing logistical, medical, social, ideological and political support to the activities of international terrorist groups. These activities are accompanied by the process of the spread of radical Islam in the region, and from there into Europe. This regional infrastructure of international terrorism and continuous radicalization of regional Muslim communities, represents not only a serious threat to regional and international security, but also constitutes an imminent danger to the national security of each separate country within the EU.

2. First Wave of Muslim Radicalization in Bosnian and Herzegovina: Proliferation of al-Banna's Ideology During the Inter-War Period

2.1. Islamic Political Thinking (Islamic Revivalism vs. Islamic Reformism)

In order to understand the two main courses of Islamic political thinking during the inter-war period between the two world wars and their subsequent autonomous development, the historical discourse of the Bosnian Muslim's education process must be examined. This analysis includes an examination of its ideological bases and the Islamic philosophical thinking that constructed the ideology and shaped the Islamic mindset of both the Muslim intelligentsia and the *ulama* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that ultimately boosted Pan-Islamic identity. During Ottoman rule, Bosnian Muslims frequently went to study in Istanbul. When Austria-Hungary took control over the area, many Bosnian intellectuals continued their education in Vienna. During the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Benjamin Kállay, launched a movement to create a separate Bosniak identity, Bosniakism, (*bošnjaštvo)* referring only to Bosnian Muslims. His vision was to separate Bosnian Muslims from the Ottoman Empire through the creation of autonomous religious institutions, thus facilitating the "Europeanization" of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bougarel, 2008, p. 3; Feldman, 2017; Kraljačić, 1987). In 1906, the Muslim National Organization (MNO: *Muslimanska narodna organizacija*) was created as a result of the first political mobilization of the Bosnian Muslims, and in 1909, the Austro-Hungarian authorities proclaimed a "Status for the Autonomous Administration of Islamic Religious and Educational Affairs" (Djokić, 2003, p.101; Donia, 1981). The MNO, as one of the first modern political parties, was created out of a movement led by traditional Muslim elites who did not promote the emergence of a modern national identity. Rather, these traditional elites led a battle for obtaining and maintaining religious and educational autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian secular regime. Their stance encouraged a strategy of coexistence whereby Muslims living in an autonomous but non-sovereign confessional, power-sharing subsystem could protect their Muslim identity and coexist with other communities within the Austro-Hungarian regime. For the Bosnian Muslims, it was crucial to keep their privileged economic and social status superior to the non-Muslims, and thus maintain the order as they had in the Ottoman state. However, this movement did not succeed in introducing any modernization process on its own. This gap was filled by a new, emerging generation of Muslim intellectuals who had received their education in

Austro-Hungarian secondary schools and were heading the reformist movement in Bosnia.

It is essential to underline two major significant events of the 1920s which actually paved the way for the new winds of change that blew into the Bosnian Islamic community and determined the course of the future Bosnian Muslim's Islamic thought. First, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate and the introduction of a completely new educational system in Turkey by Kemal Ataturk in 1924 severed the intellectual connection between Istanbul and the Bosnian Muslims who had maintained close ties with Turkey even after Austro-Hungarian rule. Ataturk's move disrupted the Bosnia-Istanbul nexus, since all religious schools were closed and banned. Consequently, many Bosnian Muslim intellectuals continued their education in Vienna, while most Bosnian youth studied at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo (Lisica, 2017). The second significant event of the 1920s for Bosnian Muslims was the establishment of the personal authoritarian regime of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1929. He introduced reforms and promoted a highly centralized system with a new administrative division reform of 9 *banovinas* and the abolishment of the multi-party system. The latter move especially affected and caused strong dissatisfaction among the Bosnian Muslims, who found themselves disadvantaged as a minority in each *banovina* and thus deprived of effective political influence through their party.

The intellectuals and Islamic clergy who had obtained their education in pre-Kemalist Istanbul, such as the prominent Bosnian religious reformer, *Imam* and *Reis-su-l-uleme* (Chief Jurist) Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević, were exposed to the ongoing modernization that had been instituted in the empire over the preceding several decades. They were especially influenced and captivated by the thoughts of Muhammad Abduh, the famous Egyptian Islamic jurist, religious scholar and liberal Arabic reformer. These Islamic leaders were dedicated to disseminating these reformist ideas throughout the Bosnian Islamic community. As a result, Bosnian Islamic thinking gradually became more Western-oriented and open-minded in terms of accepting modern interpretations of Islam in order to cope with contemporary challenges.

Those belonging to the generation educated at European universities, such as Mehmet Spaho (the first Bosnian Muslim politician in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization), Halid-beg Hrasnica, Esad Kulović and others, were imbued with Western ideas and supportive of a modern Islam and peaceful coexistence with other ethnicities. They also exhibited loyalty toward the authorities of the secular political systems within which Bosnian Muslims lived at different times (Austria-Hungary, and later in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia) while remaining strongly protective of Islamic religious rights through political activism and engagement (Lisica, 2018). For

example, Spaho supported a closer cooperation between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims and was the first to articulate the all-inclusive Pan-Yugoslav sentiment within the Bosnian Muslim community. On 15 February 1918, he stated in the *Novosti* magazine that the salvation of Bosnian Muslims could be attained only within the "unity of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" (Kamberović, 2009, p. 20). He balanced centralism and federalization, and his party demanded constitutional protection of Islamic religious rights. He also called for the protection of large landowners (Bosnian Muslim *beys*) and the rights that they had acquired during the Ottoman era. His political activities reflected the ambition of the Muslim political elite to adapt their politics to new realities in order to preserve their Islamic identity within a secular and sometimes even politically hostile environment.

Newspapers, such as *Behar* (1900–1911), *Gajret* (1906–1908) and *Biser* (1912–1914) were established in the wake of this support for reformist ideas, abandoning the Turkish language in favor of the Bosnian language written in the Latin alphabet. In these newspapers, reformist writers from Egypt (Muhammad Abduh, Abd al-Aziz Shawish), the Ottoman Empire (Mehmed Akif Ersoy, Sait Halim Paşa) and Russia (Ismail Gasprinski) were instrumental in discrediting the conservative views of the domestic *ulama*. The reformers underlined the need to reform Islamic religious institutions, mostly importantly, the administration of *waqfs* and the curriculum of *madrasas* (Islamic schools). They also sought to lift some bans regarding women's education and the banking system. After the First World War and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, there emerged new divisions within the reformist movement: "secular modernists" (Dževad-beg Sulejmanpašić, Edhem Bulbulović, Šukrija Kurtović, etc.), who gathered in 1928 in the *Association Reforma*; and "religious modernists" (Džemaludin Ĉaušević, Fehim Spaho, Abdulah Ajni Bušatlić, etc.), who established the newspaper *Novi Behar* in 1927. Both groups openly opposed the conservatism of the *ulama* and denounced the ignorance of the local *hodjas* (*imams* or teachers) (Bougarel, 2008, pp.5–6; Ferhadbegović, 2005).

Those who had studied at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo, developing their Islamic political knowledge there, led the Revivalist Movement upon their return to Bosnia. Thus, while the intelligentsia largely conformed to the European way of life and supported the Kemalist reforms in Turkey, with some even espousing Communist ideas, the *ulama* were largely divided into a modernist or reformist camp and a traditional or revivalist one. The modernists mostly congregated around *Reisu-l-Uleme* (the Chief Jurist) Čaušević, following the ideas and direction of Abdu, while the traditionalists associated with the magazines *Hikmet* and *El-Hidaje*, which strongly defended the understanding of Islam in its traditional forms. What both movements strikingly had in common was that after the establishment of the Kemalist regime in Turkey, they started sending their religious cadres to be educated

in Cairo. They both also followed the political, academic and religious developments and tendencies emerging in Egypt (Refleksije vjersko–prosvjetnog, 2013). This shift was a turning point in Bosnian history that gave new shape to the Islamic political thinking in Bosnia for generations.

2.2. Impact of Al-Azhar University: The Impact of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Radical Ideology on The Bosnian Muslim Community

During the period between the two world wars (1918–1941), three generations of Bosnian students completed their studies at the prestigious Al-Azhar University. The first generation included: Alija Aganović, Fadil Čokić, Ahmed Džemal Dervišević, Kasim Dobrača, Muhamed Fočak, Mustafa Gljiva, Akif Handžić, Mehmed Handžić, Šaban Hodžić, Besim Korkut, Derviš Korkut, Bahrija Mulabdić, and Ahmed Smajlović. In the second generation were: Abdullah Dervišević, Husein Đozo, Salih Hadžalić, Husein Merhemić, Osman Merhemić, and Ibrahim Trebinjac. The third generation included: Ćamil Avdić, Mustafa Drljača, Abdurahman Hukić, Sejjid Musić, Mustafa Pašić, Mustafa Sahačić, and Husein Viteškić. In addition to being dedicated to their Islamic studies, these Bosnian students gradually became absorbed by the Islamic thinking and developments emerging and gaining popularity beyond the university and throughout Egypt at the time. Cairo was indeed the center of all popular Islamic developments and activity, not only in the Arab, but also in the overall Islamic world (Đozo, 1980, p. 274; Refleksije djelovanja Muslimanske, 2013). It was during this period that the movement *Ihvanu l-muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) arose in response to increasing efforts to introduce various reforms into religious institutions.

The Bosnian Muslim students in Cairo carefully followed all these developments. Upon returning to Bosnia, they positioned themselves as revivalists and emulated the working methods of the Muslim Brotherhood, establishing the organizations *El-Hidaje* and *Young Muslims*. They also launched the magazines *Hikmet* (Wisdom) and *El-Hidaje* (Guide), which they used to keep the Bosnian Muslim community constantly informed about developments taking place in the Islamic world, in particular, by following the publications in the Egyptian newspaper *Feth* which expressed the views of the Egyptian *Shubbanu'l-muslimina* (Young Muslims) and wherein Hassan al-Banna and Mehmed Handžić also published their articles. These Islamic magazines were publishing articles strongly promoting Pan-Islamic ideology. The publishing activity of *Hikmet* was even officially banned by the Committee for Unity and Progress after publishing very controversial Pan-Islamic texts by Ahmed Hilmi (Karić, 2010, p.158).

Hikmet's content should be examined to help understand the core ideas from the greater Islamic world that it disseminated domestically and as well as how it had an impact on the Bosnian Muslim community, contributing to the creation of a domestic Islamic organizational structure of unofficial social and academic networking similar to those which were instrumental in spreading the ideas of Radical Islam. In its section "From the Islamic World," *Hikmet* provided news about the Egyptian association Young Muslims and its numerous affiliates in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, India, Java and other places. Based on these news items, *Hikmet* organized lectures at its offices by its senior scholar and member Abdul-Vahhab Ennedždžar, noting that *Hikmet* would publish those lectures if the Young Muslims affiliates agreed to cooperate with the Association *El-Feth*[1]. In the "From the Islamic World" section of its second issue, *Hikmet* informed its readers about how the young Arab Muslims in America had decided to set up an association of Young Muslims along the Egyptian model (Ibid., p. 60). *Hikmet's* eighth issue in 1936 published the transcript of a lecture delivered by the president of the Young Muslims association in Bombay (India), Arap Sejjid Jusuf Abdullah Fevzan[2]. This text, entitled "Let's Go Back to the Past," hinted that the last members of this *umma* of Muslims could achieve virtue and happiness only by emulating what had been achieved by the first ones. Here, it is important to underline that this phrase echoed the words of Hassan al-Banna, found in his second message *Da'watuna* (Our Mission), written the same year, 1936 (Refleksije vjersko–prosvjetnog, 2013). Inspired by this and similar texts published in *Hikmet*, some of the activists among the Bosnian *Young Muslims* began promoting a similar motto, reflecting the classic restorative approach of Islam to history and progress that the best had existed at the time of the Prophet and since then, generations have been diminishing in worth and value. This explains the *Salafi* outlook creed, which prescribes the mode of conducts of the ancients (*aslaf*) as the only way to approach the ideal times of the Prophet, when they believe humanity peaked, and since when it has been continually deteriorating. As declared by the *Salafist* Edhem Šehović at the Eighth Regular General Assembly of the Association *El-Hidaje* in 1943: "Our slogan is: Back to Islam!"[3].

It is important to recall that al-Banna was a student at Al-Azhar University during the same time as Mehmed Handžić and the first generation of Bosnian Muslim students. During his studies at Al-Azhar University, al-Banna was frustrated by the passivity of the Al-Azhar *ulama* in the face of the challenge of the atheistic trend in Egyptian society, and decided to found the association *Shubbanul-Muslimin* (Muslim Youth) and began publishing the newspaper *El-Fathul-Islami* (Arnaut, n.d.). During this period, students all had the opportunity to share views, exchange ideas, learn about al-Banna's Pan-Islamic ideology supporting the creation of a new Islamic order, an *umma* for the entire world, and engage in the local religious organizations and developments. The Bosnian Muslim students in Cairo at the time certainly had

the opportunity to be ideologically influenced and involved in these developments, and viscerally experience the tremendous popularity and influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and al-Banna's Islamic thinking.

One of the most striking features of the interwar period was the transformation of the Islamic religious institutions influenced by the new waves of Islamic thinking within the Bosnian Muslim community. There were two streams at the time, one modernist, looking forward and offering a modern interpretation of Islam, and the second revivalist, promoting the idea of returning back to the very roots of Islam. During this period, the Bosnian Muslims, including the clergy and the Islamic *intelligentsia*, were systematically absorbing and digesting the new Islamic ideas emanating from the wider Islamic world. These new streams of Islamic thinking penetrated deeply into the Bosnian Islamic society through organizations such as *El-Hidaje* and *Young Muslims*.

In the late 1920s, Hassan al-Banna had originally founded The Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) in response to what he perceived as the infiltration of atheistic ideology into Egypt society, dramatically turning the country away from Islamic tradition. His new Muslim Brotherhood movement underwent massive growth throughout the 1930s, politicizing Islam with a plan of action backed by a military arm (Arnaut, n.d.; Larsson, 2017, pp. 21–22). This growth was fueled by a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the West's negative impact on Egyptian society, especially following the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, and the subsequent unprecedented separation of religion and state in the newly formed Republic of Turkey, which deeply shocked al-Banna. When the Muslim Brotherhood first emerged, it rejected violence and supported the gradual transformation of society through two types of measures. First, it published periodicals, newspapers and magazines to propagate the Islamic message and make people more conscious about the social issues of the day while offering alternative approaches to them. Second, it financed the creation of a social welfare infrastructure: schools, hospitals, charities, clubs, educational institutions and the like (Zhyntativ, 2008). The organization also began helping in orphan clinics, bringing electricity to smaller villages, and offering society some social benefits, though under their religious banner (Euben & Zaman, 2009 p. 51; Sørensen, Hagtvet & Brandal, 2016, p.118).

However, al-Banna later adopted a more violent approach and created a paramilitary wing based on his vision of "the Spiritual Army of Allah" (Zhyntativ, 2008). The Muslim Brotherhood's violent, or paramilitary, unit, widely called the "Secret Apparatus" (*Nizam al-khass*) was established around 1940. One scholar noted how the formation of this military wing reflected al-Banna's vision:

> The image that [al-Banna] had in his mind since… [the inception of the Muslim Brotherhood]… was of a military group that would encapsulate the idea of jihad in Islam...He [al-Banna]...was very keen to emphasize military activity in order to demonstrate the validity of the idea of jihad. (According to Pargeter [2011] as cited in *History of the Muslim Brotherhood* [2015], p. 56)

The Muslim Brotherhood's Rover Scouts program, in which groups of young men were trained in athletics and an ascetic way of life, played a key role in the recruitment process and military training of youths who joined the Secret Apparatus. Al-Banna had been impressed by the fascist model of youth group formation in Italy and Germany during the 1930s, and attempted to establish an Islamic equivalent with the creation of the Rover Scouts (Lia, 2010, p.167; The History of the Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 56-57). He organized a series of summer training camps for the Scouts in order to provide them with military and physical training. The first Rover instructors were trained in Cairo, and in early 1941, there were already approximately 2,000 Rover instructors. Already in 1945, the Rover Scouts were divided in two sections: Rovers and Military (Sixta Rinehart, 2012, pp. 41–42).

Al-Banna spoke about three stages to the implementation of his vision, the last one of which urges violence in its crudest forms:

1) The Brothers' ideology should be introduced and publicized to the maximum extent; its good points and expected benefits should be mentioned and reach each and every class of the general public;
2) The Brother's mission should have an organization and shape. Sincere men of sacrifice should be chosen. Armies should be prepared and equipped, with organized cadres and ranks;
3) Principles must be formulated and enforced amidst a practical struggle. A team of valiant fighters should be prepared for sacrifice and should be zealous in the fight for the cause of the Mission and to solidify and strengthen the organization. (Ibid., p. 44)

In 1938, the implementation of this third stage was launched, as al-Banna publicly committed the Brotherhood to using violence when the Egyptian government refused to implement the Brotherhood's program.

In their daily activities, the Brothers adhered to the principle "the final goal justifies the means." Thus, they were prepared to sometimes cooperate with even their sworn enemies in order to achieve their highest goal of establishing a universal Islamic state. An example of such cooperation was the secret collaboration of the Brothers with the British and Americans in the 1950s to prevent Communism from

entering Egypt (Melamed, 2016). Similarly, decades later, the Brothers' West Bank branch of the Palestinians was accused of collaborating with the Israeli authorities, when the latter favored them over the nationalist PLO partisans.

Today, this international Islamic movement represents a global ideological platform where many different Islamic organizations, NGOs, extremist and terrorist groups, political parties, religious institutions, prominent Islamic thinkers and religious leaders, and individuals sharing the same views collaborate and support each other. They are very important in the Arab world in general and have a tremendous influence on political developments in many countries. But at the same time, it is a fragmented, decentralized movement which varies in different countries, giving rise to varying Islamic political movements and parties, and missionary, charitable and advocacy organizations, many of which openly trace their roots to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a terrorist organization by the governments of the Russian Federation, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In April 2019, the White House confirmed that it was considering designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, after Egypt's president, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, personally lobbied President Trump in support of such a move (Borger & Michaelson, 2019). However, the few offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood that have become violent, like Hamas and *Liwa al-Thawra*, have already been designated as terrorist organizations by the United States, as well as the infamous Al-Qa'ida and ISIS.

The Bosnian Muslim political elite now maintains close ties and supports good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, shortly after winning his second term of office in 2014, the member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency and the SDA leader, Bakir Izetbegović, hosted a delegation of the Muslim Brotherhood headed by the Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader and Izetbegović's dear friend, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Izetbegović even was photographed with his Arab guests on that occasion, proudly posing with four elevated fingers of his right hand, which is the informal greeting symbol of Muslim Brotherhood members ("Veze Izetbegovića s Muslimanskom", 2018). In fact, in 2017, there were media reports that authorities from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates had sent a joint letter to several Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions asking for Bosnia and Herzegovina's cooperation in the fight against terrorism precisely because of these governments' dissatisfaction about the significant presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid.).

A telling demonstration of the Muslim Brotherhood's deep religious and emotional penetration of the culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred on 19 June

2019, when the government directed that funeral prayers be held in mosques across Bosnia and Herzegovina for Mohamed Mursi (S.H., 2019), Egypt's first democratically-elected president, and a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thousands attended the funeral prayers. In addition to the mosques in Sarajevo, funeral prayers *in absentia* were held in other mosques in the cities of Zenica, Žepče, Zavidovići, Maglaj, Tešanj, Doboj and Teslić. Also, a large number of people attended a funeral held for Mursi in the city of Novi Pazar, the largest city in the *Sandžak* in Serbia (A historical region on the territory Serbia and Montenegro, named after the former Sanjak of Novi Pazar as an administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire 1878–1913. In today's Republic of Serbia, it mainly coincides with the area of the Raska region where one of the most important Serbian States Raska was established in 11th century). Mursi's image was hung in the courtyard of the Hunkar Mosque in Sarajevo. Egyptian expatriates living in the Balkan countries also attended the memorials (Öztürk, 2019). It is worth stressing that the mutual cultural links between Islamic movements in the Balkans and the Middle East had been facilitated by the introduction of the use of the three imported and heretofore unknown Middle Eastern languages: Arabic as the language of Islamic scholarship, Turkish as the language of state administration and Persian as the language of poetry. These linguistic affinities paved the way for further strengthening of cultural ties and ideological influences that had an impact primarily through the growing numbers of Bosnian students studying abroad in Islamic countries and through the translation of books.

2.3. The Role of the First Generation of Bosnian Students from the Al-Azhar University in the Creation of Bosnia's El-Hidaje

The Second World War interrupted the studies of Bosnian students in Egypt, but starting from 1958, when an official delegation from Yugoslavia's Islamic community visited Egypt and reached an agreement with the Egyptian Ministry of *Awqaf* allowing 10 Muslim students from Yugoslavia be admitted to Al-Azhar, a new era in the education of Bosnian Muslims at Al-Azhar began. On 19 October 1962, the first post-war generation of Bosnian Muslims, who had graduated from the *Gazi Husrev-bey Madrasa* in Sarajevo, was sent to Egypt. In total, from 1962 to 1997, 52 Bosniak students graduated from Al-Azhar. Some of them continued their postgraduate studies and three of them, Ahmed Smajlović (1938–1988), Jusuf Ramić (b.1938) and Akif Skenderović (b.1938) obtained PhDs (Karčić, 2016, p. 201). While these later graduates played an important role in the religious, cultural and academic life of Bosnia and Yugoslavia, the very first generation of students returning to Bosnia

and Herzegovina had the greatest impact. The leading figure of that first generation of students was definitely Mehmed ef. Handžić (1906–1944), but also Alija Aganović (1902–1961), Kasim Dobrača (1910–1979), Hussein Đozo (1912–1982), and Ibrahim Trebinjac (1912–1988) (Refleksije djelovanja Muslimanske, 2013).

Mehmed Handžić was the leading figure in the Bosnian Revivalist Movement that converged around the newspapers *El-Hidaje* ("The Right Path," 1936–1945), published in Sarajevo, and *Hikjmet* ("Wisdom," 1929–1936), published in Tuzla (Bougarel, 2008, p. 8). Within one year after starting his studies at Al-Azhar, Handžić had already made such a name for himself that his fellow students and teachers referred to the twenty-year-old as "*al-sheikh.*" There is ample evidence that during during his studies at Al-Azhar, he most likely became acquainted with al-Banna, as they were moving in the same academic circles, attending the same lectures, communicating with the same lecturers, such as Yusuf Didzvija, visiting the same libraries and bookstores, the same mosques, etc.

He became a writer, translator, and educator, serving as a professor at the *Gazi Husrev-bey madrasa* in Sarajevo and, from 1939, at the *Higher Islamic Sharia-Theological School* (*Viša islamska šerijatsko-teološka škola*), a preacher throughout Bosnia and an influential member of almost every single Islamic benevolent society, including *Merhamet (*Mercy), *Narodna Uzdanica* and *Gajret*.

However, Handžić was most influential as a founding member and later chairman of the *El-Hidaje* association in 1936*,* and the editor-in-chief of its periodical of the same name. The aim of *El-Hidaje* was to increase the authority of the Bosnian *ulama* class and to provide new moral and political guidelines to the disoriented Bosnian Muslim population (Karić, 2004, p. 423). Handžić had very little interest in Western ideologies per se, as he believed that most of the Muslims' problems stemmed as a consequence to their straying from the path of righteousness and their attempts to modernize by accepting Western-style reforms in Islam. According to Handžić, the only solution for Bosnian Muslims was repentance and returning to the path of Islam (Klein, 2018, p. 27), much as Izetbegović would teach half a century later. Handžić's ideology closely resembled that of Muhammad Rashid Rida of the *Salafi* movement and the Muslim Brotherhood (Bougarel, 2008, pp. 323, 326). This is not surprising in light of some of the people that Handžić acknowledged having communicated and worked with. First among these was Abdullah Ibn Abdullah al-Yabisi al-Najdi [d. 1969], who taught Handžić *hadith* within the framework of the *Salafi* association *Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya* (Supporters of the Sunnah of Muhammad) and granted him an *ijaza* (permit) to transmit those *hadiths* in his name. Others included Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib [d. 1969], a *Salafi* promoter and publicist, among the most prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood and considered to have close links

to Hassan al-Banna [d. 1949]; and Sheikh Mustafa al-Kayati [d. 1927], among the most notable religious leaders of the Egyptian uprising against the British in 1919, an uncompromising holder of anti-colonial position. In his rhetoric, Handžić used terms such as *Jahiliyya* (ruling by making some human subservient to others) which were widely used and circulated in the *Salafi* discourse of the period, especially with regard to Westernized or secularist statesmen (Klein, 2018, p. 28).

According to Handžić, foreign Western ideologies like nationalism and secularism, and the straying from the path of Islam were the greatest enemies faced by Muslims. He was especially critical of the Muslim intellectuals who thought they could adopt Western ideologies inimical to Islam while continuing to retain their Muslim names and pedigree. Handžić stripped the Muslim reformist leadership, and especially the Yugoslavian Muslim Association (*Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija*) and its chairman Mehmed Spaho, of the right to speak on behalf of Islam and Muslims, believing that this right should be reserved for those who upheld and adhered to Islamic tradition and protected it from any and all attack. Ever since returning from Egypt, Handžić was very active socially, with his social engagement primarily devoted to reaffirming the relevance of the *ulama* class in Bosnia in response to the public campaign launched against it by Yugoslav authorities and Bosnian secularists and reformists. He was most acutely concerned with addressing the *ulama*'s loss of its monopoly over the interpretation of the Qur'an (Karić, 1999, pp. 11–12).

In the context of the creation of *El-Hidaje* in Bosnia, the profound influence on Handžić of Abdul-Aziz bin Halil Dzavis (1876–1929), one of the sheikhs with whom he had studied under at the Al-Azhar University should be noted. Born in Alexandria, Egypt in a Tunisian family, bin Halil Dzavis completed his studies at the Al-Azhar University and later became a professor at Cambridge University. After returning to Egypt, he lectured in Arabic in schools and was the editor of the magazine *El-Liwa*, where he protested against the British occupation of Egypt. After being released from prison (he was imprisoned for his blunt and radical works) he moved to El-Astane, where he founded the newspaper *El-Hilane* and the magazine El-Hidaje and was the co-founder of the organization Esh-Shubbanul muslimin (Young Muslims). Handžić was very influenced by bin Halil Džavis regarding organizational issues, and upon his return to Bosnia, he established the *El-Hidaje* association and magazine and subsequently integrated the organization Young Muslims into *El-Hidaje* (Mehtić, 2016, p. 107). Handžić was later elected president of the Association *el-Hidaje*, and, in that capacity, he participated in several meetings of the main Muslim cultural and religious associations which led up to thecreation of the *Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (*Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne i Hercegovine*) on 30 December 1939 (Begić, 1966, pp. 180–185).

Alija Aganović was another prominent student who was among the people who congregated around Sheikh Didzvija and Hasan al-Banna. Inspired by their ideas and practices, Aganović would also play an active role in organizing religious educational activities and training within *El-Hidaje*. Alongside with al-Banna, Aganović was among the people who founded the Young Muslims association and *El-Hidaje* in Cairo, and then the *El-Hidaje* association in Bosnia, acting as its vice president for a long period. Aganović was later actively involved in organizing the youth by creating a relevant youth structure and establishing its *modus operandi* based on his previous knowledge and experience acquired in Egypt (Ramić, 1997, p. 64; Refleksije djelovanja Muslimanske, 2013).

The article "Social Bulletin" (*Društveni glasnik*) published in the first issue of the Bosnian magazine *El-Hidaje*, provided insight into the formation process of *El-Hidaje* from early October 1935. Aganović had called for a meeting of a wider circle of Sarajevo's *ulama* for the purpose of discussing, among other things, the establishment of an organization involving the active engagement of the entire *ilmija* (class of *ulama*) (Refleksije djelovanja Muslimanske, 2013).

Kasim Dobrača went to Cairo to study at the El-Azhar University in 1928, the same year al-Banna founded the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, and completed his studies in 1935. The period he spent in Cairo was marked by a strong affinity for the Muslim Brothers movement, including their organizational structure and penetration into the broad masses. There is also no doubt that the movement left a strong impact on the intellectual and ideological maturation of Kasim Dobrača, and also inspired his later educational-pedagogical activities in Bosnia, where he became deeply engaged in the Bosnian *El-Hidaje* and its magazine. Indeed, Dobrača and Handžić were the two pillars and leaders of these organizations ("Refleksije djelovanja Muslimanske", 2013; Ramić, 1997, p. 129). Dobrača became the first President of the Young Muslims after it transformed from a movement into an official organization in 1941, separate from *El-Hidaje* (Dautović, 2016).

Husein ef Đozo was born in the village of Bare near Gorazde in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He studied in Foca, Sarajevo, and at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, where he studied Islamic theology and *sharia* law. Upon his return to Sarajevo, he worked as a professor of Arabic language and at the office of the Grand Mufti. Đozo was one of the leading members of the *El-Hidaje* organization in Bosnia before volunteering for the SS Handschar Division in June 1943, becoming an influential *imam* in the infamous 28th Regiment of the 13th SS Handschar Division (Bajramović, 2016), with the rank of captain, responsible for numerous crimes in eastern and northern Bosnia, as well as in Srem (A.P., 2013; Šarac, 2013). During his service in this unit, besides indoctrinating and preaching to the troops, he was also engaged in

training other *imams*. He wrote in classical Nazi propaganda style, using standard phrases such as "giving our life for the great leader Adolf Hitler and New Europe," about the task of the SS, as well as the struggle against capitalism, Communism and Judaism, and the call for the "New Order." Đozo personally wrote to Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler a letter in German:

> These deeds signify the great benevolence for us Muslims and for Bosnia in general. I therefore consider it my duty to extend our thanks to the Reichsfuehrer-SS in the names of the division's *Imams* as well as in the names of the hundreds of thousands of Bosnia's poor in that I pledge that we are prepared to lay down our lives in battle for the great leader Adolf Hitler and the New Europe. (Savich, 2013)

After the War, he was found guilty of collaboration with the Nazis by the Yugoslav Communist government and served five years in prison. He was released in 1950 after receiving an amnesty from the Communist regime. In 1964, he was elected President of the Ulema Association in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia, and became Josip Broz Tito's interpreter when making official visits to Arab nations.

Đozo emerged as one of the leading Islamic thinkers after the Second World War in Bosnia and founded the Islamic newspaper *Preporod* in 1970. He sought to integrate Islam into the daily lives of Bosnian Muslims and to preserve and maintain the Islamic identity of Bosnian Muslims in the face of the increasingly secular, modern, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic Socialist Yugoslavia. In October 1968, at the fourth Islamic Conference in Cairo, Egypt, which was convened by al-Azhar to ponder the Arab-Muslim rout by Israel of the 1967 War, Đozo met with the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (then living in exile in Lebanon) again. On that occasion Đozo, pledged, "on behalf of the Yugoslav Muslims," to contribute volunteers and donations for the victory of *jihad* in the Middle East, and supported the Mufti's call for a *jihad* against Israel. He vowed that the Muslim religious community of Yugoslavia would recruit volunteers and contribute funds for the Palestinian people (Ibid.). He remained an outspoken anti-Semite, focusing his antagonism against the Jews of Israel. In the 1990s, the Bosnian Muslim government renamed an elementary school in his honor in Goražde in eastern Bosnia, *Elementary School "Husein ef. Đozo"* (*Osnovna škola Husein ef. Đozo, 2005-2020*). Đozo's biography speaks for itself, and his story illustrates the disquieting fact that, regardless of being a radical supporting Pan-Islam and maintaining close links with international Islamic terrorist structures, being a bearer and propagandist of extremist, terrorist and anti-Semitic ideology, and a former collaborator of the Nazi regime, he is revered by the Bosnian Muslims as one of their greatest Islamic thinkers of the 20th century, and as a devoted

Muslim. Even today, in Bosnian literature and internet portals, he is referred to as such (Iković, 2020b). Based on these facts, we can conclude the following:

1) The Bosnian Muslim mindset was already deeply receptive to these radical Islamic ideologies, since they accepted both terrorist practices and violence as legitimate tools, and considered Đozo as a great thinker;
2) Đozo, alongside the Nazi regime and the Mufti al-Husseini, succeeded in advancing their mission of radicalizing Bosnian Muslims by reinforcing an already existing Bosnian Muslim receptivity to al-Banna's ideas of active Islam, — namely jihad for the cause — associating religious activism with a strong military component and violence;
3) The Second World War was a historical turning point in terms of Bosnian. Muslims' integration and engagement not only ideologically as before, but militarily, taking part in the international Islamic terrorist organizations fighting for the Pan-Islamic cause.

Hafiz Ibrahim ef. Trebinjca was born in 1912 in Sarajevo, where he started his education. After completing the *mekteba (*Islamic primary school)*,* he enrolled in the *Gazi Husrevbeg's madrasa* (an Islamic high school), from which he graduated in 1933. In 1934, he went to Cairo for further studies, but for family reasons, he had to disrupt his studies and return home, graduating from the *Higher Islamic Sharia-Theological School* (Botić, 2018). What is important in his biography is that he was extremely active in his capacity as the third official president of Bosnia's Young Muslims, following Dobrača and Mustafa Busuladžić. Hafiz Ibrahim ef. Trebinjca was an active member of the Muslim Brothers and prominent among its *ulama*. Numerous members of the Young Muslims described him as their teacher, as he was highly committed to the cause and activities of the organization, including teaching the Arabic language. In 1946, he was arrested by the State Security Service UDBA and sentenced to two years in prison in 1947, accused of being an active member of the Young Muslims (Sjećanje na hafiza Ibrahima, 2018). After his release from prison, he could not find a job in his field, even not in the Islamic community, because of his criminal record. In 1965, he started working as a professor at the *Gazi Husrev-Bey's Madrasa*, and later on, when the Islamic Theological Faculty was opened, he was appointed a professor there, where he remained until his death, teaching Qur'an and *hadith*. He worked as an author, professor and translator. Responding to the request of the *El-Hidaje* Main Committee, he wrote the book *Several Harmful Social Diseases in our Country*, published in 1944, in which he listed eleven dangerous social diseases that were present in the Bosnian Muslim community at that time: alcoholism, gambling, promiscuity and immorality, illiteracy and ignorance, discord and fragmentation, laziness and

inactivity, lack of a hygienic life, poor religious feeling, disrespect in interpersonal conduct, destructive fashion trends and imitation of others, and poor child rearing (Botić, 2018).

These ills that ef. Trebinjca identified reflected the behavior of the majority of Bosnian Muslims in the period during and after the World War II, confirming that the Islamic value system was not genuinely an active part of the lives of Bosnian Muslims. It could be argued that together with, or as a result of the process of radicalization and religious militarization during World War II, these claimed social diseases developed or were reinforced, contrary to the expectation that radicalization produced a more ascetic and modest way of life, barring alcoholism, gambling and other indecent conduct. However, it is also plausible that radicalization took root by channeling and concentrating already existing hatred, fears, rage and vindictiveness through the introduction and implementation of terrorist and extremist ideology and practices, which was brought to its apogee during the Second World War.

The radicalization in Bosnia was also reinforced by the translation into Serbian of Egyptian authors dealing mostly with Islamic reformism, such as Djamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and others who were active in the last decades of the 19th century and continued during the first half of the 20th century (Karčić, 1990, pp. 197–241). Among the translated books was *Al-mar'a al-muslima* (*The Muslim Woman*) by Muhammad Farid Wajdi (1875–1954), an Egyptian encyclopedia writer. Four volumes of the translation of *Tafsir al-Manar*, a major authoritative work of commentary on Islamic classics by Rashid Rida, were also published under titles: *Tefsiru-l-Kur'anil-Kerimi I* (*Commentary on the Noble Qur'an,* Sarajevo: *Islamska dionička štamparija*, 1926), *El-Kur'anu-l-Hakimu* (*The Noble Qur'an*), *Kur'an Mudri* (*prijevod i tumač*) II (Sarajevo: *Islamska dionička štamparija*, 1931), *El-Kur'anu-l-Hakimu, Kur'an Mudri (prijevod i tumač) III* (*Sarajevo: Islamska dionička štamparija*, 1932) and *Tefsiru-l-Kur'ani-Hakim* (*Commentary on the Wise Qur'an*) (*Kur'an tumačem*) IV (*Derventa: Štamparija Josip Lay, 1934*) (Karčić, 2016, p. 203).

Another channel for reinforcing the Bosnian Muslims was the participation of Bosnian Muslim delegations in Islamic conferences throughout the Muslim world, such as: *The Caliphate Congress* in Cairo in 1926, *The Pan-Islamic Congress* in Jerusalem in 1931 and the *Congress of European Muslims* in Geneva in 1935 etc. (Karčić, 2016, pp. 205–206).

3. Second Wave of Radicalization: Militarization of Islam During the Second World War

3.1. Bosnian Muslims and the Ustasha Movement

At the Vienna Conference held in April of 1941, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy decided to make Bosnia and Herzegovina part of the independent State of Croatia, under the Ustasha authorities, who were intent on launching attacks against Serbs, Jews and Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the beginning, the exercise of the pro-Nazi Ustashi authority in the NDH, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, was strongly supported by the Muslim politicians from the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), pro-Ustasha Muslim intellectuals and by majority part of the general Muslim population. In fact, the Ustasha authorities let it be known that their genocidal aim was to eliminate the Serbs: one third by extermination, one third by conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism and one third by expulsion. And they indeed proceeded on that path, while the genocide of Jews and Roma was only a side-product which conformed to the Nazi ideology and plan of action.

One of the main characteristics of the genocide against Serbs in the NDH, including Bosnia and Hercegovina, in World War II is that most of the mass crimes were committed by local Muslims, often close neighbors of the victims. In 1941, Muslims in the NDH, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, joined the pro-Nazi Ustasha movement en masse and organized crimes against the Serbs. The cruelty and brutality these Muslims exhibited in committing their crimes indicate that they were no less brutal than the fellow Croatian thinkers and ideologists. Local Muslims joining the Ustasha movement were committing horrible and barbarous crimes as, for example, in Berkovići, they were reportedly cooking children and forcing their mothers to eat them before killing the mothers, as well as raping girls and women and more (Mastilović, 2014, p. 111). This case depicts the general Muslim attitude and inhumane treatment of Serb population on the whole territory of the NDH.

A particular problem was the fact that the official policy of the leadership of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina had placed themselves openly in the service of the pro-Nazi Ustasha regime and, hence, many, if not the majority of Islamic religious leaders led Muslims in mass crimes against the Serbian people. A prime example was Muharem Glavinić, a *hodja* from the village Ključa near Gacko, who personally led his faithful Muslim believers from the Tower of Fazlagić to massacre Serbs from the village Korita and throw them into the Golubinka pit (Skoko, 2014,

pp. 87–88). Among the most notorious of the Ustasha commissioners designated for Bosnia and Herzegovina were Don Božidar Bralo (for Sarajevo), Dr. Pavle Canki (for Mostar), Dr. Viktor Gutić (for the Banja Luka region), Prof. Hakijci Hadžić (for the Tuzla Basin), Nikola Jurišić (for Travnik), Dr. Dragutin Kamber (for Doboj), and Prof. Alija Suljak from Trebinje, (for eastern Herzegovina) (International Court of Justice, 1995, p. 13).

Ustasha propaganda referred to the Muslims as one of the main constituents in the forming of the independent State of Croatia and proclaimed them the "flower of Croatdom," and Bosnia and Herzegovina as "the heart and soul of Croatia." Muslims in the Independent State of Croatia were officially members of the Croatian political people of the Mohammedan faith and as such had all the political rights along with Catholics and some Protestants. All those who were not members of the Croatian political people did not have the right to exist in the Independent State of Croatia, which is a copy of the Nazi's racial ideology. At the same time, the Serbs were portrayed as the centuries-old enemy that had to be eliminated. All this prompted many Muslims to join the Ustasha movement (International Court of Justice, 1995, p. 14). Ustasha ideologues could rely on the religious hatred of the Bosnian Muslims that was undoubtedly directed mostly toward the Serbs.

An additional strong motive for the Muslims' massive support for the Ustasha movement in the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 was the possibility of sudden enrichment: that is, taking over the property of the killed Serbs. The possibility of financial enrichment was, at least initially, a leading attraction of the Ustasha propaganda in recruiting Muslims for the Ustasha movement. For example, the main Ustasha ideologue in eastern Herzegovina, Alija Šuljak[4], a Muslim, promised that Serbian properties would be appropriated by Muslims if they expelled the Serbs from Herzegovina. During the period of World War II, it should be emphasized that while there were different competing forces on the ground among the Muslims (pro-Communist, pro-Ustasha forces and also those advocating for collaboration with the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland), the Bosnian Muslim political elite was not divided ideologically. Instead, these elites were divided about the different strategies for carrying out the goal. The Bosnian Muslim population as a whole was driven by two objective threats: the fear of assimilation with the Croatian Ustashas on the one hand, and the crimes commited by the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland exclusively in the context of retaliation against pro-Ustasha Muslim villages (with no plan to exterminate Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other. There was a loose network among the Muslim elites from different factions, transcending their alliances with non-Muslims, which kept them informed about new developments and events and attempted to coordinate their actions and policies. This group included: Hamdija Ćemerlić, Hafiz Muhamed ef. Pandža, Filipović, Zaim Sharac, Muhammed Sudžuka, and others. The

Muslim elites initially preferred the newly established Independent State of Croatia (NDH). The main figures of the pro-Ustasha leadership operating in cooperation with Ante Pavelić's government were Hakija Hadžić, Džafer Kulenović, Ademaga Mešić (pro-Croat Muslim), and Alija Šuljak (Mastilović, 2014, p. 112).

In order to execute the NDH's general strategy of the independent State of Croatia for solving the Serbian question, (kill one third, expel one third and convert one third to Catholicism), the government intensified its propaganda throughout the war, especially that promoted by religious actors (Muslim and Catholic) in order to incite crimes against the Serbian population. For example, in Herzegovina, crimes against the Serbs started as early as 1 June 1941 and soon reached their massive scope known as "the three waves of carnage of the Orthodox population." On the holiday of St. Vitus Day (Vidovdan) and on the holiday of St. Elias's day (Ilinden) in June 1941, almost 12,000 men, women and children of Serbian nationality were killed and thrown into pits. In the pit near the village of Korito near Gacko alone, 160 Serbs were massacred and their property appropriated by Bosnian Muslims (International Court of Justice, 1995, p.15).

In numerous actions like these, pro-Ustasha Muslims took the lead in killing the Serbian population and looting their property on the territory of the NDH. For example, only in Eastern Hercegoivina, they took the lead in many of the following campaigns, (Ibid., pp. 15–19):

- In several villages near Ljubinje, the Ustashi killed 143 peasants and threw them in a pit in the village of Kapavica;
- On 23 June 1941, in the fields of Popovo Polje, the Ustashi captured and killed another 168 persons of Serb nationality and threw them in the Rzani do pit;
- On 6 August 1941 the Ustasha threw about 500 women, children and old men, most still alive, into the Golubinkia pit in Surmanci;
- Horrendous massacres and carnage rapidly spread through Herzegovina;
- Out of 1020 Serb inhabitants of the village Prebilovci near Čapljina, 824 were victims of of genocide by the Ustasha;
- The pits Rzani do, Pandurica, Golubinka, Kapavica, Vidovno, Bivolje brdo, Hutovo, Benina ograda, and many others were filled with massacred Serbs;
- In the sheds of the military camp at Nevesinje 137 men, women and children were killed in the carnage on St. Vitus Day and the Ustasha planted potatoes on their graves;
- The Ustasha killed 526 men, women and children in Čapljina and the surrounding villages, with 283 persons executed near Opuzen;

- Four hundred and fifty Serbs from Mostar were slaughtered, battered to death with clubs or thrown into the Neretva river;
- It is estimated that at the end of June 1941, over 20,000 Serbs, among whom were a large number of children, had been killed in the districts of Bihać, Bosanska Krupa and Cazin alone. In Bosanska Krupa, on 31 July 1941, the Ustasha killed several hundred Serbs (men, women and children), and the day after, in the general "cleansing" of that district, another 1,000 Serbs.
- On 1 August 1941, in the area of the commune of Buzin, between 1,000 and 1,300 Serbs were killed and 500 Serbs in the surroundings of Ključ. Another 6,000 people were killed in the area of Sanski Most.
- On 2 August 1941, 800 Serbian hostages were killed in Sanski Most, as well as nearly 3,000 men, women and children of Serb nationality in the entire district. Another 6,000 Serbs were killed in the districts of Prijedor and Bosanski Novi;
- On 22 August 1941, an Ustasha unit composed of 200 Bosnian Muslims attacked the Serb village of Kotorane in the district of Dvor na Uni, setting fire to houses, plundering the village and slaughtering a large number of its inhabitants;
- On 1 September 1941, the village of Srdjevici was raided by a group of Muslims from the nearby villages of Bašići, Kula, Muhovići and Gacko who, led by Musa Bašić and Avdo Zvizdić, set fire to the houses and looted Serb property;
- The Ustasha group that arrived in Jajce, composed of 117 Ustashia who had fled Mostar and Herzegovina before the Italian army, mostly Moslems from Gacko and Mostar, committed grave atrocities in Jajce and the vicinity. On 16 September 1941, 158 Orthodox Serbs were slaughtered in the Orthodox Church in Jajce;
- In February 1942, the Ustasha, led by Catholic Father Vjekoslav Filipović Majstorović, killed 2,300 Serbs with pickaxes, hoes and axes in the villages of Sargovac, Drakulići and Motike near Banja Luka (today part of the city);
- In mid-1942, under the command of Germari general Friedrich Stahl and in cooperation with German units, the Ustashi wiped out 140 villages at the foot of Mt. Kozara. Out of the total 195,000 inhabitants of Kozara, some 70.000 were deported, with 46,642 adults and 23,858 children taken to the Ustasha camp Jasenovac. Most of the inhabitants, 33,398 civilians, including 11,194 children, were killed in the camp.

The extermination of the Serbs as a mechanism for implementing the policy of the ultimate solution to the Serbian question was not much different in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina either. The Serbs were massacred with unprecedented bestiality and were tortured horrendously. The Ustasha killed Serbs everywhere: in the streets, in the fields, on their thresholds, before their parents and children. They gouged out their victims' eyes, cut off their tongues and ears; slit open the bellies of women, extracting unborn infants, and smashed their skulls. As already indicated, this extermination of the Serbs and the ultimate solution to the Serbian question were actively, brutally and systematically carried out. Also, parallel with mass liquidation and terror, the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia systematically moved Serbs out to Serbia or forcibly converted them to Roman Catholicism. Anyone examining the various stages and the reports of the atrocities of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina half a century later can recognize the atrocities of the later war as the direct continuation of what occurred during World War II, often tracing the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina's horrors as stemming from those of World War II.

The main figures supporting collaboration with the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland with Muslim forces were Mustafa Mulalić, Fehim Musakadić, Mustafa Pašić, and Ismet Popovac, who believed that the best solution was to take a stance with the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (Attila Hoare, n.d.). The *de facto* leader of the pro-German and pro-Muslim autonomy, but anti-Ustasha wing of the Muslim elite, was Uzeir-aga Mehmed Hadžihasanović. He was the leader of the Hadžiefendić Legion, the most powerful and successful Muslim militia in the Tuzla region that fought Yugoslav pro-communist Partisans and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. The pro-autonomy Muslim forces from Sarajevo and other cities tried to form their own Muslim militia or to have the Legion extend their field of activity to their territories. *El-Hidaje* became a front organization responsible for supporting the efforts of the Muslim autonomists. The ultimate goal of the autonomous movement was the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the NDH and the creation of an autonomous Islamic state. Among the supporters of this project in Sarajevo were the following: Mehmed Hadžihasanović, Hafiz Muhamed ef. Pandža, director of the charity *Merhamet* and a member of the *Ulema* of the *Islamic Council* (the High Islamic Council), and the city's mayor Mustafa Softic. In Banja Luka, the main supporter was the radical politician Suljaga Salihagić, and in Mostar the former Mufti Omer Džabija, along with others, were supporters of the autonomy movement (Attila Hoare, 2013, p. 46).

Their official condemnation of violence and opposition to the Ustasha was manifested by issuing a series of resolutions in the main Bosnian towns in 1941 addressed to the Nazi regime and NDH authorities. It should be emphasized that, taking into account the favorable political climate for such action, *El-Hidaje* decided to make a shift in its ultimate goal and subsequently in tactics and rhetoric, and, thus, withdraw

its support from the Ustasha NDH regime. As Mile Budak and Ante Pavelić refused to give the Bosnian Muslim community autonomy within the NDH (Savich, 2013), the Bosnian Muslims saw a historic opportunity for gaining a separate Muslim state as a protectorate of the Third Reich. Hence, they begun to officially condemn NDH violence while they were actively exercising it on the ground in the fight against the Serbs for the creation of a separate Muslim state. In this context, for example, on 14 August 1941, *El-Hidaje* expressed its concern about the fatalities caused by recent disturbances and, in the name of all Muslims, condemned and disassociated itself from all Muslims who had participated in acts of violence. This was followed by several similar Muslim resolutions issued by Muslim elite assemblies:

- The *Prjedor Resolution* from 23 September, issued by the District Commission for Vakifs;
- The *Sarajevo Decree* of 12 October signed by the Muslim organizations *El-Hidaje*, *Narodna Uzdanica*, the craft association *Hurije (Freedom)*, the charitable society *Merhamet*, Muslim societies *El Kamer* and *Bratstvo,* and the Association of Former Landlords;
- The *Mostar Resolution* from 21 October claimed to represent the will and feelings of the broadest Muslim population across Bosnia and Heregovina;
- The *Banja Luka Resolution* from 12 November, while it condemned the activities of the Communists, had many signatories who were active or would become active in the Communist movement;
- The *Bjeljina Resolution* from 2 December, issued on the initiative of Murat-beg Pasic, former member of the General Council of the cultural society *Gajret* (pro-Serbian and monarchist), an autonomist;
- The *Tuzla Resolution* from 11 December.

The *El-Hidaje* leadership published the *Sarajevo Decree*, written by Mehmed Handžić and Kasim Dobrača and signed by 108 Muslim dignitaries, which marked the end of the legitimacy accorded to the Ustasha by *El-Hidaje*. The Resolution condemned the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims who had been massacred by the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, denounced the Ustasha atrocities against Jews, Serbs and Roma, denied any Muslim involvement in these events, and called for the restoration of the rule of law and for immediate humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Muslims (Donia, 2006, pp. 186–87). This was simply a tactical move. All of the above-mentioned resolutions condemned or rebuked the Ustasha with different degrees of severity for their attempts to turn Serbs and Muslims against each another and for mistreating the

Muslims (Attila Hoare, 2013, pp. 41–44). Soon the tendency among the Muslims to distance themselves from the NDH began to gather momentum.

Hence, the *El-Hidaje* leadership directed its new policies and further steps towards achieving their long-term goal of attaining an autonomous Islamic state in collaboration with the Nazi regime. In November 1942, the *El-Hidaje* leadership dispatched a memorandum to Hitler, urging the *Führer* to annex Bosnia directly to the Reich, based on the historically dubious claim that the Bosnian Muslims were not Slavs, but rather *Volksdeutsch*, the descendants of the medieval Goths who had settled in the Balkan Peninsula in the third century AD, long before the arrival of the Slavs, and citing their fair hair and blue eyes as evidence (Lebel, 1996, pp. 130–32). The collaboration of *El-Hidaje* members with the Islamic world was financially supported by the Egyptian Red Crescent. Its members were assisted in urging various Arab leaders, such as King Faruq of Egypt, King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, *Imam* Yahya of Yemen, Prime Minister of Egypt, Mustafa al-Nahhas and the Druze prince, philosopher and politician Shakib Arslan, to lobby for this cause (Kisić Kolanović, 2004, p. 919). In addition to these leaders, the greatest Muslim friend of Bosnian Muslim radicals was undoubtedly the Jerusalem Mufti in exile in Berlin during most of the war years, Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini.

It is important to mention that during the Second World War, when Bosnia and Hercegovina became a part of the Ustasha state under the Nazi regime, Alija Izetbegović was a member of the Young Muslims, the *El-Hidaje's* youth section, at a time when the organization was torn between supporting the Nazi-sponsored SS Handschar divisions of Bosnian Muslims or siding with the partisans. This same division was also engaged in propagating Pan-Islamic ideology among the Muslim population, emphasizing militarization, the use of extremist practices and collaboration with the Nazis (Srna, 2014). Notwithstanding the claims of Izetbegović's son Bakir Izetbegović that his father was a partisan all the time, there is strong evidence confirming that before the end of the war, like most Muslims, Izetbegović camouflaged himself and joined the partisan units, as did many in France who had joined the French *Resistance* only at the very end of the war, in an attempt to avoid responsibility and judgment for their deeds (Intervju / Dodik o tužbi Izetbegovića, 2017). In 1946, as mentioned later in the text, after the Second World War, the military court sentenced Alija Izetbegović to three years for his actions during WWII: crimes against Yugoslav people and state, and his adherence to radical Islam ideology and collaboration with the Nazis.

Service in the SS troops was perceived by Bosnian Muslim as a powerful tool of military confrontation with the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and the pro-communist partisans, and the core of both were Serbs. In essence, the motivation of Bosnian Muslims joining the SS troops division was to use the "best weaponry" and

fight in the ranks of the "best soldiers of the world." In addition, service in the SS ranks also gave the Bosnian Muslims the opportunity to avenge the suffering caused by or attributed by propaganda to Communist guerrillas and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. This latter motivation greatly improved the possibility of success of the SS in recruiting Muslims. Those supporting autonomy officially condemned the violence and opposed the NDH regime, but, at the same time, called for the establishment of an independent state under the Nazi Regime, and organized autonomous Muslim militia and military formations to fight pro-communist partisans and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland.

One of the reasons Muslims supported working with the Nazis was that the NDH authorities could not protect them properly. In addition, backers of Muslim autonomy supported the local, armed self-defense units, seeking these units' loyalty to enlist German patronage. Supporters of the creation of a protectorate under the Reich sought assistance from the Germans, calling for the creation of autonomy and their own Bosnian army, which they believed could protect Bosnia. The Third Reich was perceived as a desirable and accessible ally of the Bosnian Muslims in their fight against Orthodox Serbs, the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, Jews and Communists. The Bosnian Muslims separatist ambitions mirrored the approach of the Reichsführer of the SS in terms of organizing the ideological engagement of the Islamic sector to advance the national socialism.

The main opponents of this coalition with the Nazi regime to attain autonomy were Ante Pavelić s government, which saw in such developments a direct threat to the territorial integrity of NDH, and a German SS officer from Sarajevo, Rudolf Trey, who expressed concern that the orientation of Bosnia's Muslims towards neighboring Turkey could also have significant political consequences. He feared that their strong links with Turkey could eventually lead them to change sides and fight alongside the Turks and the Allies if Turkey decided to enter the war on their side. Nonetheless, the existing political situation in the midst of violent inter-ethnic and inter-religious clashes provided the German command with room for maneuver.

The Muslim population, seeing in the Bosnian SS division the possibility of creating their own military units and, hoping to create their own Islamic state in the future, turned out to be very interested in entering the ranks of the SS troops. In August 1942, the campaign across Bosnia and Herzegovina for the establishment of an autonomous Muslim militia was taken over by the so-called Committee for National Salvation, an umbrella organization featuring representatives of various Muslim societies and associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leaders of this organization were Mehmed ef. Handžić, Uzeir-aga Hadžihasanović, and Muhamed ef. Pandža,

with the organization's board consisting of 48 notables, mainly from the ranks of the *Ulema*, as well as some former prominent politicians, such as Shefkije Behmen and Hamdije Karamehmedovic (Jahić, 1995, p. 52). The organization's leaders represented the then unofficial national leadership of the Muslim nation, which was supportive of an independent foreign policy and of financing and arming the Muslim autonomous movement. The group was also active in passing on information to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the kings of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and the president of Turkey, as well as the British, Americans and the Soviets of the suffering of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3.2. Radicalization of Bosnian Muslims: The Role of Nazi Germany, Heinrich Himmler and Amin Al Husseini

As the Second World War involved significant parts of the Islamic world (hundreds of millions of Muslims lived under French and British rule, millions of Muslims were settled in the Russian Empire, Japanese soldiers entered Muslim lands in Southeast Asia, and Hitler's troops marched into Muslim-populated territories in the Balkans, the Crimea, the Caucasus, North Africa, the Middle East, etc.), Nazi Germany's officials began to see the tremendous geopolitical significance and the strategic role of the Islamic world if it could be properly instrumentalized and used against their enemies. Consequently, the Nazis decided to make a noticeable shift in their strategy, and during the war years, significant attempts were made to promote a common front with the global Muslim *umma* against their common enemies: the British Empire, the Soviet Union, the United States and the Jews. Muslims were to play three important roles for the Nazis. They were to be used as a significant pool of manpower for military forces in proxy wars against the enemy in war zones, they were to help pacify the occupied Muslim-populated territories, and were to act as a powerful military and political tool behind enemy lines. Nazi authorities tended to view Islam as a useful propaganda and policy means for addressing ethnically, linguistically and socially heterogeneous populations, while trying to eliminate any potential threat from possible Muslim aspirations for national independence. In terms of racial barriers, the racist Nazis showed a remarkable pragmatism, acceding to the argument that Bosnian Muslims were descendants of the Goths.

In a memorandum written in late 1941, the German diplomat Eberhard von Stohrer, Hitler's former ambassador in Cairo, proposed the systematic instrumentalization of Islam by suggesting that an extensive "Islamic program" should be de-

veloped which would include an official statement about "the general attitude of the Third Reich towards Islam" (Motadel, 2014, pp. 38–39). Seeing that Nazi ideology was aligned with many Islamic principles, Hitler was considered to be in a preeminent position due to his fight against the Jews. Between late 1941 and late 1942, the Reich's Foreign Office developed an Islamic program, which included the establishment of several Muslim institutions. One of these, the Islamic Central Institute in Berlin (*Islamisches Zentralinstitut*), opened in December 1942, became a hub of Germany's propaganda efforts in the Islamic world, employing religious figures from across the Muslim world to support Nazi policies (Ibid., pp. 41–46). This institute in fact had already been founded under the name Islamic Institute (*Islam-Institut*) in 1927, and after years of inaction, members of the Muslim community in Berlin, under the leadership of Kamal al-Din Galal, the al-Azhar-educated Sudanese journalist, who later became the General Secretary of the Institute, made efforts to reopen the Institute in September 1941 with the support of the Foreign Office. Here, again, can be seen the Al-Azhar link and the influence of al-Banna's ideological discourse, that served as an ideological platform for the creation of the global Brotherhood network, on the global Islamic propaganda of the Nazi regime. In order to strengthen the Pan-Islamic spirit of the Institute, the German Foreign Office also employed Syrians, Palestinians, Turks, and Afghans (Ibid., p. 48).

Among the most prominent religious figures working for the Nazi propaganda machine were: the Lithuanian Mufti Jakub Szynkiewicz of Vilnius, who propagated Hitler's New Order in the Muslim territories of Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the Bosnian Islamic dignitary Muhamed Pandža, a leading member of the Sarajevo *ulama* and an ally of the Germans in the Balkans; and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, who called on the faithful between Morocco and the Malay peninsula to wage a "holy war" against the Allies (Ibid., p. 1). In the end, almost all the Nazi institutions, from the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry to the Wehrmacht and the SS, became involved in the efforts to promote Germany as a patron and liberator of Islam. The Nazis used Islam and pan-Islamic ideas as an efficient weapon against their enemies, since Islam was seen as the Achilles' heel of the Allied powers (Ibid., p. 29). With the Allies controlling vast Muslim populations, the Pan-Islamic leaders took advantage of the Nazi regime to transform Islam into an eminent political power in world affairs by promoting their pan-Islamic ideology on a global scale. In fact, these leaders justified and promoted violence in the context of waging a *jihad* against their enemies (the United Kingdom, France, the Communists of the Soviet Union, Jews and, in the context of the Balkans, Tito's pro-communist partisans and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland) and simultaneously posited the global pan-Islamic movement as a "coordinating center" in the Islamic world.

In this regard, it is crucial to mention the connection of the radicalization of the

Muslims in Bosnia, especially in the Nazi SS Divisions, and the Jerusalem Mufti, al-Husseini, and al-Banna. Between 1921 and 1937, Hassan al-Banna coordinated with Hitler to establish a military wing of the Brothers. In 1940, the Brotherhood sent 700 members to train under Hitler (Hitler trained the Muslim, 2015). Al-Banna contacted al-Husseini in 1935 and lent him strong support in his *jihad* against the Jews, and also supplied him with weapons. The Brotherhood even launched a fundraising campaign for *jihadists* in Palestine at that time.

Furthermore, during World War II, Hassan al-Banna established more Brotherhood branches in Transjordan and Palestine. Sharing the common ideological bases of Jew hatred, authoritarianism, addiction to violence and desire to defeat the British, the Muslim Brotherhood became a strong supporter and close collaborator of the Nazi regime and sent al-Husseini to Germany to meet with Adolf Hitler and express their deep conviction that Jews were the common enemy of Islam and the Nazis. During the World War II, al-Husseini served as an intermediary between the al-Banna and the Nazi leadership. Thus, the Brotherhood and the Nazi regime collaborated closely, each promoting its own interest and accomplishing its strategic goals through the partnership. The Brotherhood translated Hitler's *Mein Kampf* into Arabic as *My Jihad* (Eiteneier, 2006; Terrorism: Muslim Brotherhood, n.d.; Sogood, 2009).

Bosnian Muslims became further integrated into the global Islamic *umma*, calling for an overt *jihad* against the enemy under the guidance of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, through their military engagement with and the propaganda machine of the Nazi regime. This process helped reinforce and put into practice for the first time the already rooted radical ideas of al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood ideas in the collective consciousness of the Bosnian Muslims in the Balkan region. The Bosnian Muslims saw a historical opportunity in their collaboration with the Nazi regime that would enable them to free themselves from persecution and oppression and experience for the first time the practical meaning of al-Banna's "active Islam" by participating in a regional war as a part of the global *jihad* aimed at gaining independence on the way to establishing a universal Islamic State.

Notwithstanding the fact that Islam was instrumentalized by the Nazi regime for geopolitical reasons, there were many high-ranking Nazis who overtly expressed their sympathy for the Islamic faith. The most fascinated with Islam among them, who also believed that there was a strong affinity between Nazism and Islam and between Germanic and Islamic culture, was Heinrich Himmler, the commander of the Schutzstaffel and the Gestapo in Nazi Germany. He disdained Christianity, while finding Islam "very admirable," since Christianity promised no reward for soldiers who died in battle, while Islam, in contrast, was "a religion of people's soldiers" (Motadel, 2015). In one of his discussions with al-Husseini, Himmler lamented the fact that the

Islamic invasions of Europe in the past centuries had failed, thus depriving Europe of "the flourishing spiritual light and civilization of Islam" (Ibid.). Himmler's right-hand man in the Waffen-SS, Gottlob Berger, also shared these views (Motadel, 2014, pp. 62–63). Hitler repeatedly compared Islam with Christianity in order to denigrate the latter. According to Hitler, Islam was a strong and practical faith, a religion of the here and now, while he perceived Christianity as a soft, artificial, weak religion of suffering, of a kingdom yet to come. He considered Islam a superior religion, but made a distinction between the superiority of Islam and the inferiority of the Arab race. Furthermore, he believed that Germans had adopted the wrong religion and that they, as *Übermensch* or the superior race, would be more compatible with Islam, the superior religion.

These political affiliations and attitudes of the Nazi leading figures clearly illustrate the pronounced affinity between the value systems of radical Islam and Nazism, which indicates that the radical Islam-Nazi alliance was not only of a strategic nature based on pure interest, but also had a deeply rooted commonality based on the principle of the use of violence and brutality for achieving their ultimate goals. As previously mentioned, in November 1942, the leading Muslim representatives of *El-Hidaje* sent a memorandum to the Führer urging him to annex Bosnia to the Reich, expressing their hope for Muslim autonomy under Hitler's protection, and promising to fight for his cause as part of the "300 million Muslims" allied with the Axis against Judaism, Bolshevism, the English exploiters, the Catholic Church, the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, the leadership of which were the vast majority Orthodox Serbs, and pro-communist partisans. Consequently, the Wehrmacht and the SS saw the Muslims as welcome allies in their attempts to pacify the region and fight the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and pro-communist partisan resistance forces, and promoted Nazi Germany as a protector of Islam in Southeastern Europe (Motadel, 2014, pp. 184–85). In the *El-Hidaje* memorandum, the Bosnian Muslims reiterated their claim to their Gothic origin and claimed that National Socialism was the only true way to establish justice, peace and order in Europe. They stressed the failure of the NDH efforts to deal with the Serbian and Jewish question under their Ustasha regime, and believed that their answer of creating a political-administrative authority over Bosnian-Muslim territory within the NDH under the name *Zupa of Bosnia*, with a seat in Sarajevo, was the desirable solution, specifying that the Chief of this Zupa should be appointed by the *Fürer* himself. They also asked for the Ustashas and Home Guard of the NDH to be withdrawn from that territory, to be replaced by a Bosnian Guard based on already existing Muslim legions under the command of *Hadžiefendić*. They suggested the creation of a Bosnian volunteer division as an autonomous Muslim army under German command, which they thought

would ensure the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the NDH and lead to its transformation into an autonomous Muslim state, integrated within the new German order (Attila Hoare, 2013, pp. 41–52).

Himmler's romantic notions about the Islam and Bosnian Muslims were very influential in building up the Bosnian SS division. He envisioned the creation of a Bosnian SS division constituting solely of Bosnian Muslims, similar to the Bosnian regiments of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On December 6, 1942, Himmler approached Hitler with the proposal to raise a Bosnian Muslim SS division and suggested Artur Phleps, the Seventh SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen commander as the most qualified person for the task. This idea was formally approved on 13 February 1943. The division was to consist of Bosnian Muslims, and they were to be granted all the right and privileges that they had enjoyed in the Austrian army (Lepre, 1997, pp. 18–20). The use of Islam to recruit volunteers had far-reaching military and political implications for the SS leaders. Himmler's closest associate, the chief of the SS Main Office and SS Obergruppenführer, Gottlob Christian Berger wrote:

> Through the Croatian-Bosnian division, it is our desire to reach out to Muslims all over the world, who number around 350 million people and are decisive in the struggle with the British Empire. (Lepre, 1997, p.17)

With the creation of the Bosnian SS division, Himmler planned not only to start a large-scale experiment of attracting Muslims into the ranks of the elite SS troops, but also to promote the integration of Islam and Muslim culture into the Nazi organizations. To this end, the task with the highest priority, according to Himmler, was to support the spiritual dimension of the Bosnian SS Division, as it was designed to represent a bridge in political terms between Europe and the Muslim world (Zaugg, 2016, p. 189). The moral support this engendered among the Muslims played an essential role in raising the fighting spirit and increasing the combat efficiency of the Muslim division.

To help build and strengthen the Bosnian SS Division, Gottlob Berger suggested that the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, could be of help in encouraging Muslims to volunteer for the new division. The Mufti came to play a key role in the formation of the Bosnian Division, the creation of its Pan-Islamic ideological platform and the coordination of the propaganda and indoctrination process within the Division. He also emerged as a key figure in motivating Bosnian Muslims to join the SS Division and the Bosnian Muslim elite and *ulema* to support the Nazi regime. Berlin considered al-Husseini to be an "Islamic pope." (Motadel, 2014, p.188) The Nazi regime promoted the Mufti as Muhammad's direct descendant, an Arab national

hero, and the incarnation of all the ideals and hopes of the Arab nation (Lebel, 2007, p. 243). In order to understand the ideology behind the mass propaganda directed by Haj Amin al-Husseini, we must examine his visions, main ideas, convictions, beliefs and political positions. He was very strongly anti-British and actively promoted the idea of the waging of a holy war by all Islamic countries and Muslims against the "Jewish influence" in the Arab world. Also, from the earliest days of the Nazi regime, al-Husseini sought to gain Hitler's support. The "hybridity" of the political and ideological mindset of two completely different traditions in the face of Nazi-Muslim alliance was based on cultural components of the two civilizations generating similar hatred towards the common enemy (Herf, 2009, pp. 735–36).

The central tenet of al-Husseini's ideology was his strong anti-Jewish sentiment and virulent Jew-hatred, that was overtly demonstrated from the very beginning of his activism and throughout his public carrier. This was reinforced in the aftermath of Second World War and upon the creation of the State of Israel. He orchestrated the murderous anti-Jewish riots of 1920, and two years earlier, he addressed the following words to his Jewish coworker:

> This was and will remain an Arab land . . . the Zionists will be massacred to the last man... Nothing but the sword will decide the future of this country. (Timmerman, 2004, p. 103)

Despite the pogroms that he organized, al-Husseini was granted amnesty by the British, and in May 1921 he was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem by the British High Commissioner, a title he retained for the remainder of his life, as per Ottoman practice. After al-Husseini was expelled from Palestine by the British, following the 1941 brutal anti-Jewish pogrom that he organized in Baghdad and his failure to establish a pro-Nazi Iraqi government, he escaped to Europe. He spent the remainder of the Second World War in Germany and Italy, from where he provided active support for the Nazis by recruiting Bosnian Muslims and Muslim minorities from the Caucasus for SS units (Bostom, 2013, p. 4). He was also a committed supporter of the global *jihad* movement and held strong Caliphate aspirations. Declassified intelligence documents from 1942, 1947, 1952, and 1954, with records of the Mufti's speeches at a wide range of Islamic conferences confirm his Caliphate aspirations and his role not as an Arab nationalist but as a supporter of the global Caliphate (Bostom, 2013, p. 5; Lebel, 2007, pp. 283–310). His position regarding Nazi policy towards Islam was most accurately described in the report of the Germany's ambassador to Croatia, Siegfried Kashe:

> The Muslims' position is clear. In the struggle for freedom they stand on the side of Germany, Japan and their allies. The ultimate goal of the struggle against Britain and the Soviet Union is their total collapse. The victory of the Axis shall be the victory of Islamic peoples. (Redžić, 1987, p. 92)

Hassan al-Banna and his Muslim Brotherhood organization were inspired by al-Husseini's activism, radical ideas and Pan-Islamic ideology. They promoted *Wahhabism*, which justifies violent means to liberate the Muslim world from non-Islamic elements and the establishment of a Pan-Islamic empire based on the Islamic law. Consequently, the Bosnian Muslim elite, especially the autonomists together with the *El-Hidaje*, the main promotor of al-Banna's ideology and a working platform of former Al-Azhar students, welcomed al-Husseini as their role model and fully supported the creation of Bosnian SS Divisions under the Nazi regime. Al-Husseini enjoyed remarkable respect among many of the Balkan Muslims, especially in Bosnia, and was perceived as a spearhead and a protector of oppressed Muslims in many parts of the world. In 1931, the Mufti acquired many supporters and established close links with many Yugoslav Muslims participating in the *Muslim Congress in Jerusalem* (Motadel, 2014, pp. 188–89). Also, in 1942, during his visit at Rome, al-Husseini met a delegation of Islamic dignitaries led by the Mufti of Mostar, Omer *Džabić*, a supporter of an Islamic state in the Balkans, who was sent by Bosnian Muslim religious and political leaders in order to negotiate the establishment of an autonomous Islamic State in Bosnia as a Nazi protectorate (Attila Hoare, 2013, p. 50).

In 1942, soon after Hitler's February approval of Himmler's suggestion to establish a Bosnian Muslim SS Division, the SS sent Haj Amin al-Husseini on a Balkan tour to visit the Muslim-populated territories that lasted from 13 March until 11 April. His tasks were to negotiate with local Muslim political and religious leaders, clergy, and warlords, promote the creation of the SS Division, and to motivate and mobilize the local Muslim male population to join the SS Division. During his tour, he met with Ustasha representatives and German and Italian officials, and had consultations with local *ulama* in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Banja Luka (Frolov, 2017, p. 9; Frolov, 2018, pp. 122–23; Motadel, 2014, pp. 189). In his observations, Jan Wanner highlighted that Haj Amin al-Husseini, during his journey, made an extensive use of religious rhetoric and arguments similar to that used by contemporary Islamic fundamentalists (Wanner, 1986, p. 244, as cited in Bostom, 2013, p.4). At the Gazi Husrev-Bey Mosque, he called on local Muslim to go to war on the side of the Axis powers. All of his speeches and sermons were conducted in Arabic with interpreters translating them.

On 1 March 1943, the 13th SS Volunteer Mountain Division (Croatia) was formed. In 1944 it was renamed Handschar, reflecting the division's symbol, the

Handschar, or scimitar, the sword carried by Turkish policemen. Upon the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, its likeness was emblazoned on the Bosnian coat of arms. The core of the Division was made up of members of the Hadziefendic Legion, and also by Bosnian Muslims and Croatian volunteers that came from the Seventh SS Mountain Division Prinz. The Division reached a maximum of 26,000 men (Mitcham, 2007; Redžić & Donia, 2005, p. 190). The soldiers wore a red fez for the formal uniforms, although in their combat uniforms it was grey, with a tassel and a badge with an eagle, a swastika and the SS skull. On their right collar they had a Handschar (Longerich, 2013, pp. 675–676). The men were trained in France (Mende, Rodez, Espalion, Decazeville, Champ du Larzac, Millau, Aubin, St. Affrique, Villefranche de Rouergue, Le Puy, Marvejols, Langogne, Severac le Chateau, Banassac and Silesia). As the terrain in northeastern Bosnia was mainly mountainous, it was decided that the division would be organized, trained, and equipped as a mountain formation, comprised of two mountain infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, a pioneer battalion, and various combat and service support elements (Lepre, 1997, p. 58).

3.3. Ideological Indoctrination in the SS Divisions

Islamization and radicalization were also part of the military training, carried out by Bosnian *imams* appointed and guided by al-Husseini. All Islamic principles and rules were applied, including prayer practices and the *halal* standard. The *imams* of the division were responsible for the ideological and religious indoctrination of the division members. The radicalization process was executed on two levels. First, all Division members were allowed and assisted to pursue Islamic studies. Second, all appointed *imams* were sent to a specially established Islamic Institutes throughout Germany, where they were trained by al-Husseini in religious ideology and indoctrination methodology. After completing the course, these *imams* became responsible for the religious indoctrination of the Division members (Longerich, 2013, pp. 675–76).

The complex ideological platform for indoctrinating the Division contained two central mutually-supportive ideological conceptions: national socialism as the German national ideology, and Islam as the Arab national ideology, both fighting the common enemies of Jews, the Anglo-Americans, communism, Freemasonry, the Vatican, and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, while sharing common warlike and cultural foundations and a nationalistic education. According to these conceptions, Bosnia belonged racially to the Germanic world, but spiritually to the global Islamic *umma*. The role of the *imams* was to assimilate these two ideological conceptions

through the introduction of the so-called common properties referring to four themes:

- The Idea of Family: the strong family sense possessed by both the Germans and Muslim people;
- The Idea of Order: the idea of the New Order in Europe;
- The Idea of the Führer: the idea that a people should be led by one leader;
- The Idea of Faith: that Islam (for Muslims) and national socialism (for Germans) would serve as educational tools to create order, discipline, and loyalty. (Lepre, 1997, p. 72)

The *imams* for the SS Division were recruited by the *ulema* in Sarajevo and were predominantly school teachers, some of whom had studied religion in Cairo and Alexandria and most of whom had served in the Yugoslavian army. All of them had attended a three-week *imam* training course organized by SS Obergruppenführer Berger, which included: lectures on the use of small arms; lessons on "*The Waffen-SS: Its Organization and Ranks*," and "*The History of Nationalism;*" German language instruction; and cultural excursions to the Berlin Opera, Babelsberg Castle, Nicholaisee and Potsdam. Abdulah Muhasilovicc was appointed as the Division *imam* (Lepre, 1997, p. 71). One *imam* was assigned to each battalion and regimental staff in the division. The *imams*, as ideological teachers accountable to the Division *imam* and the Division's Political Officer, had numerous responsibilities in their units, including: spiritual *c*are, involving responsiblity for organizing and performing the *Jum'ah* (Friday prayer) and the ceremonies for all Islamic holidays; burials*;* welfare, involving looking after the personal well-being of the soldiers and their families and providing what was necessary to enhance their physical and mental welfare; personal example, involving serving as examples to their men; and education, which involved holding weekly lectures for the troops on various subjects that were supplied by the Division's political officer and the Division *Imam* (Lepre, 1997, pp. 75–77). Among these topics were "The Idea and Task of the Division," "Why the Muslims are Serving in the Waffen-SS," "Tito's Bandits, the Scourge of Bosnia," etc. *Imams* submitted monthly progress reports to the Division *imam* and assisted with the preparation of the division newspaper, *Handžar*.

Muhamed Pandža played an active role in recruiting both volunteers and *imams* for the SS. Among these *imams* was Husein Đozo, a graduate in *sharia* law from the Al-Azhar University, close to the *El-Hidaje* and a signatory of the 1941 Muslim Resolution of Sarajevo. When, he took charge for training the young *imams* of the SS Division in 1944, he wrote the following for the Division's newspaper:

> Communism, capitalism and Judaism are side by side against the European

> continent. After the terrible suffering endured in our Croat fatherland, and more particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have learnt what it means when the enemies of Europe govern. This must not come to pass, and this is the why the best sons of Bosnia are serving in the SS. (Bougarel, 2018, p. 63)

In March 1944, the Division was sent back to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it participated in several operations in the whole northeast Bosnia and Hercegovina and carried out a number of major massacres, in collaboration with the local Muslim militia. However, the partisans gained the upper hand, and many Muslims, only after it was obvious that the Nazi regime was to be defeted, made once again a tactical shift and deserted from the SS Division until its transfer to Hungary in late 1944.

On 8 May 1945, the Handschar division surrendered to the British army. Many of its members found themselves in the displaced persons camps in Italy together with NDH soldiers and their families, as they feared to return home after the post-war creation of Marshall Tito's Yugoslavia. Many of them found asylum in countries throughout the Western and Arab worlds.

The transfer of Bosnian Muslims along with a number of NDH soldiers to Syria, Egypt, and Transjordan to fight the newly formed state of Israel was organized by Grand Mufti El Husseini, who met at least twice with representatives of Bosnian refugees in Syria and Lebanon. In 1951, the Mufti lobbied in some Arab countries for the government of the Independent State of Croatia in exile, led by Džafer Kulenović. A new page in the relations between NDH emigration and Arab organizations began with the concordat of the Croatian National Resistance (HNO) and the Muslim Brotherhood. Mahmoud Kamal Muftić, a Bosnian Muslim, religious scholar and Muslim Brotherhood activist, together with his wife (cousin of Said Ramadan, one of the Muslim Brotherhood's main leaders) served as the link between these two organizations. During the Cold War, Muftić's political activity focused on Pan-Islamism and anti-communism. The cooperation between the HNO and the Muslim Brotherhood ended in 1964 due to Muftić's personal quarrels with the both organizations, the NHO and the Muslim Brotherhood (Mišur, 2018, pp. 49–50).

In March 1948, agents of Arab countries recruited men between the ages of twenty-two and thirty-two for military service in refugee camps in Italy. They offered to sponsor the travel costs to Arab countries and financial care for families in exchange for service in the state army for at least one year. At the beginning of March, about three hundred refugees (Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians) were already in Egypt, and Syria, and 90 Croats and Bosniaks were waiting in Naples, which was a transfer point. The agent who recruited them was known as Jamil. He transferred refugees

through the Orient Press, owned by Grand Mufti El-Husseini. Some of the refugees were transferred with the approval of The International Refugee Organization (IRO), while some left Italy with forged passports (Ibid.).

Also, many Islamic states, pursuing their own political and military interests, offered asylum to the former 13th SS Division Handschar fighters and NDH soldiers. Syria had offered asylum to the entire Bosnian SS Division. Many of them, including a significant number of former 13th SS Division Handschar Nazi-trained officers, were recruited in the displaced persons camps and transferred via Germany to Syria to head schools for commando tactics for the Syrian Army and help organize the army of the recently established Syrian state (Baer, 1947; Frantzman, 2008). The International Refugee Organization (IRO) was also involved in the scheme, agreeing to sponsor the travel of Bosnian Muslims from Italy to the Middle East (Frantzman, 2008; Traubner, 1947). Many Bosnian Muslims who settled in the Middle East later came as volunteers to fight in Palestine against the new Israeli state (Frantzman & Ćulibrk, 2009; Lepre, 1997, p.308). Iraq also invited around 2,500 of the Bosnian Muslims located in the displaced persons camps to settle in Iraq (Frantzman & Ćulibrk, 2009, p.193; *Palestine Post*, 1947). Also, many Bosnian Muslims joined the Army of Salvation that had been recruited in Palestine by Haj Amin's cousin, Abdul Khader Husayni (Frantzman & Ćulibrk, 2009, p.196). In January 1948, Arab agents were working to recruit Bosnian Muslims for three causes: joining the local Arab irregular units in Palestine; joining the Syrian regular army; and joining the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) which was formed in Damascus in December 1947 (Rosenthal, 1948).

The majority of the Bosnian Muslims who later settled in the Middle East originally came as volunteers to fight in Palestine against the new Israeli state. Namely, Bosnian fighters participated in the different battles against the State of Israel: the battle for the Kastel (3–8 April 1948); taking over the hotel in Ramallah (16 April 1948); the battle in Jaffa (25 April–5 May 1948); the battle around Nazareth (14–17 July 1948), and more (Frantzman & Ćulibrk, 2009, pp. 197–99).

Notwithstanding the political and military defeat of the SS Division and the Muslim autonomy movement strongly supported by *El-Hidaje*, the Second World War developments had a tremendous long-reaching impact on the Bosnian Muslims in many ways. The combination of religious indoctrination during military training, promotion of violence and extremism in combat, racial and religious demonization, participation in brutal massacres in the field, and the sense of power deriving from the feeling of belonging to a global Islamic community greater than their national iden-

tity, created a significant shift in the perception and interpretation of Islam among Bosnian Muslims in favor of al-Banna's theory of active Islam through violent *jihad*. Furthermore, al-Husseini successfully connected the Bosnian cause with the Arab and Pan-Muslim cause. The Bosnian Muslim volunteers who settled in the Middle East and waged *jihad* against Israel in the ranks of different para-military and terrorist organizations set up the basis of what would later develop into a trans-regional *jihadi* network during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. Yugoslavia Period: The Rise of the Radical Pan-Islamic Stream and Its Political Embodiment Through Alija Izetbegović's Party of Democratic Action

When examining the Yugoslavia period, two ambiguous and contradictory political processes within the Bosnian Muslim community become apparent. On one hand, the majority of Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, as elsewhere in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), were assimilated into the secular Yugoslav society and referred to their Islamic heritage for their traditions and values rather than for religious practices and dogma (Bringa, 2002). These Bosniaks were often regarded as more cosmopolitan, educated and liberal than other ethnic groups in Bosnia (Goodwin, 2005; Hadžiselimović, 2007; Simms, 2001).

On the other hand, this period witnessed a rise in radical pan-Islamic voices and Islamic political activism throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite of the repressive policies that the state was carrying out. At the forefront of this activism were the members of the Young Muslim organization, which, from 1943, officially become the youth section of *El-Hidaje*. When in 1945, *El-Hidaje* was officially dissolved, the Young Muslim organization was banned by the regime, and went underground. The organization continued to influence both young urban intellectuals and much of the young rural population, and to work clandestinely with the aim of creating a Muslim state in the Balkans. At the beginning of Tito's rule, the Young Muslims were tolerated by the new authorities, but after their open confrontation with the Yugoslavian government over its secularization policy, they faced a wave of arrests. In 1946, several members were arrested by the Tito regime and sent to prison. The final crushing of the organization took place during the Sarajevo trial in August 1949, when four leading members were condemned to death and many others were arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Among the targeted activists was

Alija Izetbegović. After being released, some of the Young Muslims immigrated to Western Europe. Although those Young Muslims who remained in Bosnia officially withdrew from political activism, they *de facto* engaged in covert networking and activism to continue struggling for their cause and to make significant contributions to the Islamic revivalism in Bosnia.

This continued activity was made possible by Yugoslavia's liberal policy in the 1970s with respect to religion. Former Young Muslims and the intellectual circles around them that were already indoctrinated with certain radical ideas were actively working on Islamization and radicalization among Bosnian Muslim during the Yugoslavian period in two ways. First, they worked with Muslim intellectuals in establishing educational circles, thus creating a network consisting of former Young Muslims and a number of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals of the younger generation. Second, they worked with the general Muslim population by launching newspapers and magazines on Islamic subjects and by publishing their writings under pseudonyms. Thus, they profoundly influenced and shaped Bosnian Muslims' worldview, perception and way of thinking. Their work gave birth to new Pan-Islamic ideological thinking reflected in contemporary works, such as Alija Izetbegović's *Islamic Declaration* and *Islam between East and West*, which argues that Islam is more than a religion.

By the decision of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 1968, the religious-ethnic community of Muslims became a community of Muslims in the national sense. This was confirmed by constitutional amendments and verified in the 1971 census. On that list, Muslims mostly accepted the new national identity, so around 39.6% of the population in Bosnia and Herrzegovina declared themselves as Muslims. The equal status of the people within the Yugoslav community was granted to Muslims by the Constitution of the SFRY, which was proclaimed at the Assembly of the Council of Peoples of the SFRY on February 21, 1974. Only in September, 1993 a new national name for the Muslims in Bosnia and Hergevovina – Bosniak (Bošnjak) – was adopted by the First Bosnian Convention (*Bošnjački sabor*) in Sarajevo. This national reaffirmation meant much more than just a semantic shift, because the introduction of the Bosniak national name was in fact a reflection of a complete ideological transition from Muslim nationalism to Bosniak nationalism. Until 1993, Muslim nationalism insisted on the sovereignty of Muslims alongside Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while after 1993, Bosniak nationalism emphasized the exclusive statehood of Bosniaks in Bosnia, in spite of the multi-ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the general political liberalization and Yugoslavia's recognition of the Muslim nation as one of the six constituent nations of the Federation in 1974, when it became possible to identify oneself as a *Muslim* by nationality, Young Muslims began

taking advantage of this new political reality by greatly intensifying their efforts to solve the identity crisis vacuum by Islamizing the Bosnian Muslims (Banac, 1988, pp. 287–88). They launched newspapers and magazines on different Islamic subjects. Many of them also published under pseudonyms to avoid persecution by the authorities, either within the Islamic Religious Community (*Islamska Vjerska Zajednica*) or separately as autonomous publications. By organizing discussion platforms and education programs, they managed to develop a new network consisting of older Young Muslims and new younger intellectuals, both secularist and from the Faculty of Islamic Theology. Hasan *Čengić* and Alija Izetbegović played an active role in this process.

In this context, it is significant to note the contributions of the Gazi Husrev-bey *madrassa* students, their activism and their publications in the journal *Zemzem*, as they reveal the social processes that took place in early 1970s among the Islamic youth which led to the rise of political Islam in late 1970s. The students of the Gazi Husrev-bey *madrassa* contributing to the *madrassa's* journal *Zemzem* promoted greater religiosity and observance of Islamic principles, even during earlier periods, when religious observance was strictly banned by the state and many Muslims were influenced by the secular ideology and identified themselves as a part of the Yugoslavian state (Fitcher, 2017. pp. 88–89).

On the one hand, by practicing Islam, the *madrassa* students were gradually withdrawing from socialism and creating a subsystem in which Muslims were encouraged to think about traditions, values, history and relationships that differed from those promoted by the social state. On the other hand, the opportunity to become informed and engaged with the global Islamic trends led the students of the *madrassa* to become involved in the network of the Muslim activists fighting for Islamic revival. It is important to mention that the Islamic activism among the Gazi Husrev-bey *madrassa* students emerged in the context of Yugoslavia's student movements, which, starting from 1965, were actively opposing many state policies in different Yugoslavian cities, such as Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade and others. This activism gained national and religious dimensions by the early 1970s, including the national movement in Zagreb, the leaders of which overtly supported Catholicism[5], or the developments in Subotica, where some people gathered in groups to practice religious mysticism or read the Bible (Fitcher, 2017. p. 89). Especially active was the Croatian student movement which organized massive strikes in October and November 1971 (Ponoš, 2007).

At the time, the *madrassa* students were active in two directions. First, and the activists' major preoccupation, was building connections with the Islamic world. Second, they were engaged in strengthening the sense of community between the Muslims

domestically by reporting on the activities of the Muslims living in the other Yugoslav Republics and publishing articles on different Islamic topics. In their publications, they were expressing support for anticolonial, revolutionary politics, with Islam serving as a major source of inspiration. They covered events related to Islam taking place in different part of the world, and also different religious and life experiences of Bosnian Muslims living abroad[6]. The journal also actively promoted Pan-Islamic ideas. It frequently emphasized that the Sarajevo Muslim community represented an integral part of a group of around 700 million Muslims from all continents, and expressed concern for all Muslims from Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait and Morocco[7]. They considered the Israeli-Arab conflict to be a crucial issue on which it was their duty to inform and raise awareness[8].

In order to underline the common ideological platform that spread radical influence among the Bosnian youth, it is important to mention that the Young Muslims established close links with the Gazi Husrev-bey *madrassa* students through discussions and debates led by a young *imam*, Hasan Čengić, and this significantly empowered the radical Pan-Islamic movement by gaining them supporters among the younger generations. There was constant growth in the enrollment at the Gazi Husrev-bey *madrassa* during the socialist period, reaching its peak between 1950 and 1975 (Fitcher, 2017, p. 88). The growing interest of Bosnian Muslims in both religious studies and in student political activism that took place in the period was due to two main factors. On the international level, the rise of Pan-Islam (Irwin, 1984, p. 437) had a strong impact on the community. On the domestic level, decisions made by the Yugoslavia leadership in favor of a more decentralized state structure in the 1960s empowered the republic-level Communist elite to promote national identity policies. This decentralization also encouraged individuals to identify themselves with particular national groups rather than perceiving themselves as part of the supranational Yugoslavianism (Devic, 2000, pp. 30, 45, 315).

The rise of nationally-based politics and the official recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation generated a need for self-determination and self-identification among the Bosnian Muslims. The combination of these two factors created a fertile ground for defining the Bosnian Muslim identity as an integral part of the global Islamic *umma* and the transnational *jihadi* network. This led to the subsequent development of political Islam in Bosnia based on radical Islam ideology. At the same time, the first generation of Yugoslav Muslims returned from their studies in Islamic countries, bringing with them radical Pan-Islamic ideas, which gave an added impetus to the spread and strengthening of the revivalist movement's interpretation of Islam among the Bosnian Muslims headed by the Young Muslims. Furthermore, Muslims who were working in European countries were now sending home remittances that

were used for financing the construction of new mosques in the country (Karčić, 1997, p. 568). The Islamic Religious Community (*Islamska Verska Zajednica*) began to distribute literature addressing general Islamic concerns and manuscripts in Arabic referring to contemporary developments in the Arab Muslim world. According to a 1983 article in the *Jerusalem Post*, up to 3,000 Yugoslav Muslims made *hajj* pilgrimages yearly. According to Yugoslav sources, the most active in this activity were the Bosnian Muslims. There were also significant improvements in the social and economic position of Bosnian Muslim during this period (Friedman, 2018, 189–191).

In the 1970s, Islamic revivalism gained popularity in Bosnia, with a specific local character. It was expressed in increased personal religiosity, construction and reconstruction of mosques, the development of Islamic education and publishing, increased use of Islamic social symbols, increased political culture and organization, and attempts to build a regional network of Muslim solidarity institutions (Karčić, 1997, p. 570). This revivalist upsurge followed the period of intensive translation and publications of essential religious textbooks in the early part of the second half the 20th century. The established publishing center *El-kalem* was publishing translations of classical and modern works on Islam and Islamic heritage and textbooks, including some originating from Egypt. Several graduates of Al-Azhar played a crucial role in these developments, including: Prof. Dr Ahmed Smajlović, Mesud Hafizović and Dr. Jusuf Ramić, who helped reestablish religious and cultural connections between Bosnia and Egypt and translated numerous books written by Arab authors into Bosnian language. These books included: Abdulaziz Kamil's *Islam and Discrimination*; Muhammad Bahiyy's *Belief in God*; Mustafa Mahmud's *Allah*; Khaled Muhammad Khaled's *Humanity of the Muhammad*; Mustafa Mahmud's *Al-Qur'an: muhawala li fahm 'asri* (an *Attempt to a Contemporary Understanding of the Qur'am*), and more (Karčić, 2016, pp. 201–203)

Prof. Ahmed Smajlović played a key role in publishing the influential journal *Islamic Thought* (*Islamska misao*), published in Sarajevo by the Islamic authorities, which disseminated Islamic works of Arab authors from 1979–1993 and dealt with Islamic studies, theology and religious information (Lavić, 2001, pp. 71–207). This trend of translating and disseminating Islamic authors continued in the 1990s. Among Arab authors whose works have been translated are: Muhammad Abduh, Abu A'la Afifi, Abdul Jawdat Al-Sahhar, Muhammad Arkun, Abdul Halim Mahmud, former rector of Al-Azhar, Anwar Abdul Malik, Mustafa Abdul Razaq, Abdul Mahmud Shahata, and the like. Among the translators from Arabic into Bosnian language are: Ibrahim Ahmetagić, Ismail Ahmetagić, Munir Ahmetspahić, Senahid Bristrić, Besim Čanić, Nermin Čanić, Abdulah Čelebić, Mustafa Cerić, Salih Čolaković, Ibrahim Džananović, Hasan Džilo, Mehmedalija Hadžić, Mesud Hafizović, Habiba Hafizović, Rešid Hafizović, Ahmed Halilović, Bilal Hasanović, Zuhdija Hasanović, Abdurah-

man Hukić, Ibrahim Husić, Omerdić Ibrahim, Salih Ibrišević, Ibrahim Jakubović, Nevad Kahteran, Mahmud Karalić, Fikret Karčić, Ismet Kasumović, Fatima Kunto, Šefik Kurdić, Sabaheta Kutješ, Džemaludin Latić, Enes Ljevaković, Mustafa Prljača, Hasan Makić, Vehbija Makić, Naida Mehmedagić-Sušić, Halil Mehtić, Muhamed Mrahorović, Teufik Muftić, Šerif Mujkanović, Hilmo Neimarlija, Jarkoč Selim, Jelovac Selim, Fikret Pašanović, Jusuf Ramić, Šukrija Ramić, Fuad Sedić, Subhija Skenderović, Seid Smajkić, Ahmed Smajlović, Nijaz Šukrić and Ibrahim Trebinjac (Karčić, 2016, pp. 204–205).

The official recognition of the religio-centric Muslim nation was only one of Tito's policies promoting his personal patronage and encouragement of the Muslim population in Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia. The federal government under Tito implemented a series of policies towards both the domestic and the international Muslim communities, which ultimately boosted the dissemination of Pan-Islamic ideas, increased radicalization among Bosnian Muslims and facilitated the Islamization efforts of Alija Izetbegović and the Young Muslims by enabling them to establish international links with Islamic countries through different types of state programs.

The first factor behind these policies was that the federal authorities naively thought that they would gain more influence by granting more religious and political freedom to Bosnian Muslims. The League of Communists from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the federal government began financing the rebuilding and refurbishment of Islamic religious sites and educational facilities with federal budget funds. The League also financed the preparation and dissemination of manuscripts of interest to the Islamic community in Arabic, Persian and Turkish. The federal government made significant contributions to the budget of the Islamic Religious Community (Hadžijahić, Traljić & Šukrić, 1977, p. 163), and under Tito's patronage, hundreds of new or renovated mosques and masjids were opened. New Islamic cadres who had been educated in the Islamic countries of the Middle East, North Africa and Asia, began to work in these mosques upon their return to Bosnia, acting as local ideological transmitters of the Pan-Islamic ideology. Many institutions of Islamic education were established (Hadžijahić, Traljić & Šukrić, 1977, pp.158–61; Karčić, 1999, pp. 545–46), such as the Faculty of Islamic Studies and the girls' division of the Gazi Husrev-bey *madrassa* in 1977, both in Sarajevo. By the end of the 1970s, Yugoslavia was the only European country that had an Islamic theological school, three thousand mosques, several Islamic middle schools and a number of Muslim periodicals (Ivanković, 1984, p.14).

The second factor was that Yugoslavia had become an attractive destination for many students coming from other non-aligned countries, mainly Muslim-majority states, as a result of Yugoslavia's international student exchange programs run in ac-

cordance with the policies of the Non-Aligned Movement (Tanasković, 2000). Also, many Yugoslavian Muslims, predominantly from Bosnia, went to study abroad in different Islamic countries during the period when Pan-Islamism was gaining momentum in the Islamic world.

The international student exchange programs tripled with the growing availability of international Islamic literature and the annual *hajj* pilgrimage. As a result, Bosnian Muslims had the opportunity to learn about the experiences and developments in the Muslim world, which at the time was witnessing the rise of the international Pan-Islamic network. One of the two major events that influenced the push to *jihad* in Islam took place in the 1960s: the colossal defeat the entire Islamic world experienced in the 1967 war against Israel. After the war, leading Muslim thinkers wondered how this could have happened, even holding a conference on this issue in 1968. Islamic scholars came to the conclusion that Islam was glorious and expansive, with Muslims originally very loyal to the roots of Islam. According to these scholars, with the passage of time in Western-occupied Muslim countries, Muslims became "westoxicated" due to the introduction of negative Western values into their societies, which corrupted their Muslim youth. The result was the defeat in 1967. This logic caused a tremendous return to the roots of Islam in the whole Islamic world (Herland Report, 2019).

The rise of Pan-Islamism among Muslims in many non-aligned Islamic countries, due to the desire to overthrow the Communist and socialist anti-Islam regimes, immediately found its reflection in socialist Yugoslavia through the Revivalist Movement. For example, the opening of the Theological University in Sarajevo coincided with the rise of radical Pan-Islamic networks around the world under the patronage of Saudi Arabia. By the 1980s, the radical Pan-Islamic movement had consolidated its political power in a number of countries and had developed a Pan-Islamic network comprising many organizations. The radicals in the Pan-Islamic groups mainly used students to advance their political vision and ideology, and their prime targets were the non-aligned socialist countries that had not adopted neoliberal regimes.

Due to a shortage of Islamic educational facilities prior to 1977, Muslim students who finished their studies at the *madrassa* were forced to continue their education abroad at Islamic universities in the Middle East and Asia (Ceranić, 1971). Also, many Muslims went to study at the universities in the Islamic Middle East and Asia, and most of them were subsidized by the Islamic government. For example, in 1978 alone, approximately 150 Yugoslav Muslims received scholarships from host governments to study in Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Friedman, 2018, 189–91; Smajlović, 1978, p. 562). As a consequence, many of them seemed to have embraced radical Islamic ideas and, upon their returns to Bosnia, be-

gan expressing anti-Communist attitudes and engaging in anti-Communist activities (Stanković, (1983, pp. 2–3).

Dr. Ivan Cvitković, the Executive Secretary of the Presidium of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Central Committee, claimed that Pan-Islamism posed a danger to Yugoslavia and that the 300 or so Yugoslav students who had studied in Cairo, Bagdad or at other Islamic universities were now preaching neo-Islamic ideas in Yugoslavia. He also said that pan-Islamic ideas had been spread by pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, to which some thousand Yugoslav citizens traveled every year for the *hajj*. According to Cvitković, who believed that Yugoslav Muslims aspired to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into Europe's first Muslim state:

Pan-Islamism is not only being propagated throughout Bosnia, but also in Zagreb, Belgrade and elsewhere where former students who have come under the influence of Islamic fundamentalist live and work. Groups of hostile militant believers have also taken part in international conferences in which the Islamization of world was discussed rather than faith. (Yugoslavia: Trouble with Moslems, 1983, p.20)

In essence, Tito's policies, that endangered the future of Yugoslavia, also significantly contributed to the radicalization of the Bosnian Muslim community, with long-reaching consequences not only for Bosnia, but for the region as a whole. Furthermore, such policies facilitated the creation of the links between Bosnian Muslims and representatives of the Pan-Islamic movement in different Islamic countries, which would later on evolve into an international platform for suppling Bosnian Muslim forces with funds, ammunition, arms and foreign terrorists in order to assist them in the *jihad* in Bosnia from 1992–1995. In the local context, this Pan-Islamic radical ideology was reflected in the political program of Alija Izetbegović as expressed in the *Islamic Declaration*.

Another crucial event that significantly affected the course of the Islamic political movement in Bosnia was the Iranian Revolution in 1979. This Islamic Revolution served as a source of inspiration for Alija and his Young Muslims, who, admiring the newly established Islamic system in Iran, invested all their efforts in the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Bosnia (Shay, 2017). After the triumph of the Revolution, Izetbegović visited Iran and gave a series of interviews to Iranian state mediums such as the *Kayhan* international edition (Eftov, 2016a, 00:53:34). Also, in 1982, several Young Muslims secretly visited Iran for the Revolution's anniversary (Pugliese, n.d.). Ever since then, Alija Izetbegović and the Young Muslims, that later on became the core of his political party, maintained close links with the Iranian leadership.

After Tito's death, several hundred people were purged as a result of an investigation conducted by the Bosnian leadership as a result of a report entitled, "Political

Islam in International Movements" and submitted on 23 September 1983. The report was distributed by the intelligence unit of the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Commission for International Affairs and Cooperation with Labour and Progressive Movements in the World, 1983). The report indicated that the Yugoslavian Muslims were targeted by external forces interested in and capable of influencing domestic Muslims. The report discovered that at a conference held in August 1982 in Niger, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) adopted a resolution committing its members to examine the position of Muslim communities in non-OIC countries, with special reference to the Muslims in Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak and Kosovo and Metohija). Concurrently, OIC deliberations that took place in Cairo on political Islam, with a focus on Bosnian Muslims, concluded that the spread of Islam in Yugoslavia would contribute to closer links with the Muslim communities in the Balkans and Western Europe.

This *Political Islam in International Movements* report, as well as the activities of Alija Izetbegović and the Muslim Youth organization led to the initiation of the so-called Sarajevo Process (in Bosnian, *Sarajevski Proces*).

4.1. The Sarajevo Process

On the 23 March 1983, thirteen members of the Young Muslims organization were accused by the members of the National Security Service of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of spreading Islamic fundamentalism and attempting to create "a religiously and nationally 'pure' republic, an exclusively Moslem state" (Stanković, 1983, p. 2). Among the arrested were Omer Behmen, Djula Bičakčić, Edhem Bičakčić, Salih Behmen, Hasan Čengić, Derviš Đurđević, Alija Izetbegović, Ismet Kasumagić, Džemal Latić, Rushid Prguda, Melika Salihbegović, Mustafa Spahić, and Husein Živalj (Izetbegović, 2001, pp. 39–50).

As during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its aftermath, the leadership was accused of covertly working to establish a Muslim state. It is important to note that in addition to the future president of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, among the accused were also Omer Behmen, the future first Bosnian ambassador to Iran (appointed in 1992 by Izetbegović), and Hasan Čengić, Izetbegović's future Minister for Refugee Resettlement and the person responsible for the covert supply of money and arm shipments, especially from Iran, during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina through his membership on the board of the Sudan-based "humanitarian" organization the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). Behmen also had close links to Elfatih Hassanein, the director of TWRA, to Osama

bin Laden and the Al-Qa'ida terrorist network, and to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and other extremists. Hasan's father Halid Čengić was the manager of the ARBiH's (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) main logistic center in Visoko (Bougarel, 2018, p. 153).

Support for these accusations was voiced on April 8, 1983, when the presidency of the Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina held its 32nd meeting. Taking part were the most prominent members of the Bosnian leadership, comprising Muslims, Serbs and Croats[9]. Hamdija Pozderac, a Bosnian Muslim politician who devoted himself to gaining recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nation, chaired the meeting. It is important to mention Pozderac's accusations against Izetbegović and the Young Muslims, accusing this group of demanding "an ethnically clean Bosnia and Herzegovina and attempts to organize an Islamic state as a way of expressing a moral concept of the religion"[10], an accusation which became reality during and after the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pozderac also claimed that the long-term goal of this group was to ethnically cleanse Bosnia and Herzegovina and to take control of the Islamic Religious Community in order to form an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the trial against the Young Muslims held by the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, additional evidence included the report of the Minister for Police, Duško Zgonjanin, revealing that the Young Muslims organization was linked to the international operative centers in Riyadh, Istanbul and Vienna and that it had collaborated with the anti-Communist emigration networks in exile in the Western countries. Zgonjanin's report concluded that this group was engaged in activities directed towards the "politicization of religious life, seizing the control of the Islamic Religious Community with the aim to establish an Islamic state on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina"[11]. Raif Dizdarević, another Bosnian Muslim who had served as the Chairman of the Assembly in Yugoslavia between 1982–1983, a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia between 1984–1988, and Chairman of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia between 1988–1989, stated that the Young Muslims organization had outstanding organization, a clear political platform and political aims, as well as support and connections with foreign operative centers[12]. Dizdarević further pointed out that the available information indicated organized activity by the Muslim Brothers directed at undermining the fundamental pillars of the Yugoslav system, "pointing to an orchestrated political subversion"[13]. These statements are highly significant, as they demonstrate that the Young Muslims had been generously supported by the transnational Pan-Islamic network in their efforts to create a favorable political climate for the dissolution of the Federation and

the waging of a *jihad* to establish an independent Muslim State.

The trial initiated by the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina began on 18 July 1983. The Young Muslims' leadership was accused of having organized a group aimed at conducting contra-revolutionary actions in Yugoslavia and establishing an Islamic state (Omerika, 2002, p.11; Prguda, 1990, pp. 37–51). It was claimed that their aims were contained in the *Islamic Declaration*, which appeared in a pamphlet entitled *A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples* (Izetbegović, 1970). In many aspects, this program resembled the platforms of radicals supporting Pan-Islam elsewhere, as it was written in 1970, when the neo-Islamic movement was beginning its rise, especially in socialist and Communist countries with Muslim populations. Also, this was the time when Izetbegović was frequently travelling between Belgrade and Sarajevo to visit his friend, Elfatih Hassanein, whom he had met while attending medical school in Belgrade (Pomfet, 1990). Furthermore, an investigative journalist, Senad Avdić claimed that the *Islamic Declaration* was written by foreign radicals and signed by Izetbegović (Avdić, 2009, p. 7).

The Young Muslims were sentenced to a total of eighty-nine years in prison. Among them were Alija Izetbegović, Omer Behmen, Salih Behmen, Ešref Čampara and Ismet Kasumagić, as well as the younger intelectualls Edhem Bićakčić, Hasan Čengić, Džemaludin Latić, Mustafa Spahić and Husein Živalj (Prguda, 1990, pp. 37–51). Izetbegović was sentenced to fourteen years in prison, later reduced to six. The other Young Muslims also had their sentences reduced (Danilović, 2006, pp. 225–31). Ironically, it was a part of the Serbian intellectual establishment that facilitated the early release of the members of this group and enabled them to continue with the realization of their radical Islamic platform. Specifically, in 1986, the Serbian Assembly for Freedom of Thought and Expression, led by Dobrica Ćosić, launched a petition for the release of Young Muslims, and 23 Serbian intellectuals condemned the imprisoned of the neo-Islamic leaders in a letter to the Yugoslav Presidium describing the trial as a monstrous hoax staged to incriminate those in favor of freedom of speech (Danilović, 2006, p. 228). The members of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) organized a banquet for the family members of the imprisoned Young Muslims. According to the account of Halid Čengić, the father of Hasan Čengić, the dinner was organized at the house of one of the SANU members (Halilović, 1998, p. 80).

4.2. The Pan-Islamic Stream in the Creation of the SDA

After serving five years of his 14-year sentence, Alija Izetbegović was released in 1988. This trial and their imprisonment transformed the leadership of the radical Pan-Islamic movement into martyrs domestically in the eyes of Bosnian Muslims and internationally within the pan-Islamic movement. As a result, these leaders were able to overcome their prior marginality. On 26 May 1990, together with a number of other Muslim intellectuals and activists, Alija Izetbegović founded the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the core of which become the two streams of the Young Muslims and its network: the veteran Young Muslims and the members from the younger generation. Thus, a political party was created for the implementation of the radical Islamic political program laid down in the *Islamic Declaration.*

At the beginning, the SDA declared itself as a party of all Bosnian Muslims, adhering to parliamentary democracy and concentrating its activities in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its platform also included religious goals, such as introducing major feasts as state holidays, the return of religious estates (*waqfs*) to the Islamic religious institutions, the freedom to build new mosques, the introduction of *halal* products in hospitals, prisons and the army, and more. The SDA had a growing grassroots influence among the Bosnian Muslims, but very limited success among Albanians and Turks.

In 1990, the radical Pan-Islamic stream in Bosnia had very limited resources and capacities. It had not more than a few hundred members, it was poorly represented in the executive bodies of the Islamic Community (*Islamska Zajednica*), and it had no influence on the Muslim secular intelligentsia. At this point, given this situation, the radicals supporting Pan-Islam in SDA were very careful and discrete about expressing their interpretation of Islam. Instead, they were able only to instrumentalize Islam for the purpose of attracting more members by using Islamic symbols (religious greetings, green flag, etc.) during elections. They also involved religious leaders (*ulemas*) in order to ensure the support of the intelligentsia for themselves and to make sure that the national mobilization and identity-building process of the Bosnian Muslims would be controlled by them and would adhere to their radical Islamic political ideology. Any attempt to make the national or secular dimension prevail over the religious in the Bosnian Muslim national identity was immediately squelched, and the "perpetrator" neutralized by the radical pan-Islamic block within the SDA. For example, when, in September 1990, Adil *Zulfikarpašić*, the main representative of the Muslim political emigration, together with some Bosnian Muslim intellectuals, suggested changing the name of the nation from Muslim to Bosniak (*Bosnjak*), the

radicals demonstrated great hostility and used the *ulemas* and some prominent intellectuals from the 1970s National Affirmation Movement to neutralize this threat by expelling Zulfikarpašić and other supports of a new *bosnjastvo* from the SDA (Bougarel, 1999, pp. 2–4). In September 1990, Zulfikarpašić and Muhamed Filipović left the SDA, claiming that the Islamic element in the SDA political program was too dominant. They subsequently formed the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO). At this time, the SDA also faced the problem of having limited control and power over the state apparatus, because not only did the SDA have to share power with two more nationalist parties, the Serbian SDS and the Croat HDZ, and, but the leadership and the staffs of the largest state companies and the administration were Communists.

In the first multiparty general elections for Presidency in 1990, Fikret Abdić won the most popular votes (with 9% more of the vote than Izetbegovic) and was supposed to be the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina. However, for unknown reason, as both were candidates from the same party – SDA – the party decided to declare Izetbegovic as President of the Presidency. Abdić steped aside and accepted this decision. Also, in the early 1990s, during the Civil War in Bosnia and Hercegovina, he declared his opposition to the official Bosnian government, and established the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia composed of the town of Velika Kladuša and nearby villages. The province existed between 1993 and 1995 and was allied with the Army of Republika Srpska. This would be another proof that Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina had no intention of exterminating Muslims, as is sometimes claimed.

The SDA faced both the lack of readiness of the broader Muslim population and significant parts of the Muslim intelligentsia to embrace a radical Islamic political platform, as well as their highly limited political power in the government apparatus and state companies due to the fact that, on one hand, SDA had to share power with two more nationalist parties — the Croatian HDZ and the Serbian SDS (the last to be founded due to new political realities and inter alia out of fear of a new genocide by those who reaffirmed old goals through the mentioned parties) — and, on the other, the leadership and the staff of the largest state companies and the administration were communists. Consequently, the SDA leadership concluded that a war for independence was the only solution that would lead to the dramatic all-embracing changes sought by the radicals of SDA, and that would enable them to seize power and implement their radical Islamic political program. Edhem Bićakčić, a former *Young Muslim* who was sentenced alongside Alija Izetbegović in 1983, defined very clearly the top priority goal of SDA: that is, the creation of "a Muslim state that will enable our survival and not a shared life which have no interest in" (Schindler, 2007, p.70). Therefore, the SDA began making active preparations for war, mobilizing all their resources domestically and internationally. For this purpose, they developed a

strategy for raising funds and organizing arm shipments from the Islamic countries, and also strengthened the capacity on the ground of their parallel Islamic structures and networks: the humanitarian organization *Merhamet*, the cultural organization *Preporod* (Rebirth) and most important, the Patriotic League (Patriotska Liga), the SDA's private militia, an underground paramilitary organization.

At the beginning of May 1991, Izetbegović made his first visit to Tehran after the multi-party elections in Bosnia. (U.S. Role in Iranian Arms, 1996 [Video, 00:50:21]; Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives, 1996, p.607) At that time, the Iranian government, overtly supporting Bosnian Muslim political leadership, publicly promised that Iran would plan the state budget in the future as if it had two million more people in its population than it had stated previously in order to help the Bosnian Muslims. Concurrent with Izetbegović's visit to Teheran, a session of the Tudjman's National Defense Council was held in Zagreb on 6 and 7 May 1991, and attended by Stjepan Kljuić (member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a founding member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party in 1990), and the General Secretary of the SDA Hasan Čengić. At the meeting, they discussed the military patronage of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina Croation Democratic Union (HDZ). Essentially, the discussion centered around the perspectives and the format of the anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav coalition.

In March 1991, the SDA formed its military wing, the Patriotic League, a Muslim paramilitary organization. By February 1992, it was organized into formations from departments to brigades. Its members also included Muslim officers and members of the Yugoslav People's Army (Hodžić, 1998, p. 18). It was formed many months before the outset of the war and even before Slovenia and Croatia officially declared independence. As confirmed by the Patriotic League Commander Sefer Halilović, the Patriotic League had about 150,000 members, 70,000 of whom were armed. These figures were confirmed by the Patriotic League Commander Sefer Halilović himself (Halilović, 1998, p. 148). In June 1991, Izetbegović and the SDA formed the National Defense Council, whose members included: Irfan Ajanovic, Hasan Čengić, Alija Izetbegović, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Salim Šabic, Sulejman Ugljanin, and four others[14] (ICTY, 2011, p.20541; Bougarel, 2018, p.142). The leadership of the Patriotic League headquarters included: Zaim Backović, Rifat Bilajac-Cica, Hasan Čengić, Mustafa Hajrulahovi, Mustafa Hajrulahović-Talijan, Sefer Halilović-Halil, Dervo Harbanja-Omer, Fai-Heco, Meho Karicik-Kemo, Alija Lončarević, Kerim Lučarević-Doktor, Salko Polimac-Sale, Zajo Rašidagić, Arif Šaronjić-Emir, Hajrudin Šuman, Sulejman Vranje, and others. The Patriotic League was led by Hasan Čengić, who was later known as the "flying *imam*" due to his frequent visits to Islamic countries. At the end of the 1991, Čengić was arranging covert arm shipments for the needs of the Patriotic League. He was also sent to Islamic countries to raise funds, where he conveyed that

funds were needed for the *jihad* in Bosnia to secure the creation of an all-Muslim state in the Balkans (Schindler, 2007, pp. 69–70). And while Čengić and others were preparing for war, the role of Izetbegović was to provide them with political cover by playing a double game and participating in negotiations for power-sharing with the Serbs to avoid a war.

At the session of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on 27 February 1991, Izetbegović expressed his true determination and his party's position, declaring: "I am prepared to sacrifice peace for Bosnia and Herzegovinas sovereignty, but I would never sacrifice the sovereignty for peace!" (Izetbegović, 1991; General Meeting of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992; ICTY, 2005b).

The SDA intention for creating a Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina was also confirmed in the political program of Adnan Jahić, the president of the SDA in Tuzla, which declared that: "The Muslim state will be the national state of Bosniaks, that is, Muslims, while other ethnic groups will have all the civil rights that belong to them as national minorities" (Nišić, 2004, p. 57). Jahic stressed that the state would have a Muslim ideology based on Islam, which would be embedded in all political and educational institutions (Ibid.).

The program document of Adnan Jahic, the president of the SDA in Tuzla, testifies to the intention of creating a Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina that would have a Muslim ideology based on Islam, which would be embedded in all political and educational institutions.

On 14 and 15 October 1991, at the session of both Chambers of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was proposed to adopt the *Memorandum on the Sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina* as a special item on the agenda. The *Memorandum* was not adopted, primarily due to strong Serbian opposition. However, on 15 October, without the presence of Serbian MPs, the Croatian and Muslim MPs adopted the *Memorandum of Sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. An independence referendum was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 29 February and 11 March 1992, which actually served as a *casus belli* for the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. The Third Wave of Radicalization: Proliferation of the Wahhabi-Salafi Jihadi Militant Ideology and the Emergence of the Contemporary Terrorist Network in the Region during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–1995

The first organized groups of foreign fighters in Bosnia arrived at the request of Alija Izetbegović (Ali Izat) addressed directly to Osama Bin Laden. The mediator among them were two Sudanese: Elfatih Hassanein (on behalf of Izetbegović) and Hasan Turabi (conveying messages from Izetbegović to Bin Laden and vice versa). It was agreed that in the name of world Islam, the Bosnian Muslims would be led by the Algerian Abu Maali as a military commander and Anwar El Shaaban (Abdel Rahman) as an *emir*, a religious leader (Galijašević, 2007, p. 99).

The arrival of the *mujahideen* (those engaged in the *jihad*) in Bosnia was not a spontaneous development. On one hand, Izetbegović and his SDA party, having long been enthusiastic about waging *jihad*, took advantage of the difficult political situation at the time and the mood of the radical part of the Muslim population, and arranged for the arrival of foreign *mujahideen* from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Sudan and other Islamic countries (Analiza na razuznavačot, 2012), who, in addition to participating in hostilities, acted in Bosnia and Herzegovina as military instructors and, more importantly, as preachers of radical Islam, strengthening the idea of performing *jihad* through the use of terrorist methods and methods of warfare in the minds of Bosnian Muslims. According to Bosnian military intelligence internal correspondence dated from 11 December 1993 under register number 03/29-341-1 signed by Jusuf Jasarevic, the Chief of the Security, the military leadership was aware of the presence of members of "the extreme organization Muslim Brotherhood" in Central Bosnia fighting *inter alia* within the El Mudzahedin Detachment (Appendix 38 to chapter III)[15].

On the other, the *mujahideen's* arrival in Bosnia was a part of an action plan of a long-term strategy already adhered to by leading radicals, such as Osama Ben Laden, who wanted to spread *jihad* to the West on European soil. This strategy was supported by many Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan etc., as well as by forces within some Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, etc.

In the framework of the international Pan-Islamic action plan for consolidation and coordination, joint efforts of the Islamic world to establish a trans-regional Islamic network and logistics to assist the Bosnian *jihad* and for further cooperation, two crucial conferences were held in Zagreb. The first international conference, held

in June 1992 was initiated by Elfatih Hassanein and coordinated by Hassanein, Hasan Čengić and Salim Sabić. Among those attending was the representative of the Hezbollah terrorist organization. According to intelligence sources, with the support of the British MI6 and Croatian SIS, British and French generals located at UN spots in Bosnia and Croatia were to facilitate the transfer of *mujahideen* to Bosnia. Therefore, at the conference, it was agreed that the UN base in Split would be responsible for receiving and delivering *mujahideen* to the battlefield in Bosnia. The organizers of the conference agreed to install Husein Zivalj in the Bosnian diplomatic service to the United States to coordinate activities with TWRA, and to send Namik Kosaric from Canada to Bahrain as an entrepreneur to open a "private business." This would serve as a cover for his real activities of coordinating long-term collaboration between the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the activities of TWRA (Galijašević, 2007, p. 90).

The Report on the activities of the International Conference on the Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 19 October 1992, submitted to Alija Izetbegović, the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and signed by Dr. Al-Fatih Husanain and Dr. Mustafa Cerić (Appendix 41 to chapter III)[16], confirms that the second conference, the *International Conference on the Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina* held 18–19 October 1992, was initiated by the invitation of the main *imam* of the Zagreb Mosque, Mustafa Cerić. The conference was attended by approximately one hundred representatives from more than 30 Islamic and Arab countries, led by reputable figures of the Islamic world. The aim of the conference was to acquaint the Islamic world with the sufferings of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly those of the Muslim population, and urgently make efforts to send help to Bosnia and Herzegovina. An Executive Committee of the Conference was formed with the tasks of: initiating and supervising the implementation of the Conference's decisions; coordinating political and humanitarian aid intended for the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina; monitoring developments in Bosnia; and developing a propaganda campaign for informing the Islamic world about the developments in Bosnia, emphasizing the crimes against the Muslims. The Committee organized several visits of Bosnian delegation to the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Islamic countries. The first meeting of the Executive Committee that was held on 20 October 1992 in Zagreb was attended by: Ahmed al-Assal (Egypt), Ali al-Dzuraism (Saudi Arabia), Muhamed al-Ghaazali (Egypt), Muhamed al-Manuti (Malaysia), Jusuf al-Qardawi (Qatar), Kamil al-Sharif (Jordan), Umer al-Zubair (Saudi Arabia), al-Fatih Ali Hasanain (Sudan), Mustafa Cerić (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Ahmed Khursid (Pakistan), Salih al-Suhajbani (Saudi Arabia), Mustafa Plicanic (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Salim Shabic, (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and al-Sajid Wasiti (Pakistan). Dr Mustafa Cerić was elected Chairman

of the Executive Committee and Dr Elfatih Hassanein was elected Secretary.

They decided to hold the next meeting on 11 October 1992 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in order to arrange several meetings between the Bosnian Muslims delegation and leading representatives of Saudi political and business circles. This move was highly important for the Bosnian Muslim political leadership in the context of establishing close links with influential parties in the Islamic world ready to invest funds for the Bosnian cause and for world Islam in terms of establishing a regional network for ideological and political proliferation in the region. At the meeting, the following decision were made:

- Sheikh al-Suhajbani was to contact the Saudi Arabia's Protocol service to arrange for an audience of the delegation representing the conference with the King Fahd bin Abdulaziz;
- Arranging a visit to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait to make preparations;
- Sheikh Muhammed al-Ghazali was to speak on behalf of the delegation about the importance of Bosnia for the Islamic world during the audience;
- Mustafa Cerić was to speak about the genocide against the Muslims of Bosnia;
- Salim Shabić was to speak about the need for political and economic assistance to Bosnia in its righteous fight;
- Initiating the establishment of a Fund for Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, amounting to $100,000;
- Letters signed by all delegation members (joined by Dr Omar Nasseef, Secretary-General of Muslim World League) were to be sent to all rulers of the Persian Gulf states;
- Contacts were to be made with as many organizations and figures in Saudi Arabia as possible with the aim of obtaining humanitarian aid for the Bosnian Muslims.

The meeting was chaired by Mustafa Cerić, and attended by: Ali al-Dzurais, Umar al-Zubair, Sejkh Muhamed Ghazali, Elfatih Hassanein Fehmi Heweidi, Husejn Omerspahić, Kamel Serif, Salim Shabić, and Sheikh Salih Suhajbani. In the next few days, the Bosnian Muslim delegation already had obtained the following audiences:

- 12 October 1992: with Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia Defence Minister;

- 13 October 1992: with Prince Majid, Governor of the Mecca Region, Jeddah, and Ta'if;
- 14 October 1992: with King Fahd Bin Abdulaziz;
- 15 October 1992: with the ruler of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates), Sheikh Sultan Al-Qasimi, a great friend of Bosnia who donated $2 million USDto the Fund;
- 16 October 1992: with the Minister of Awqaf of the United Arab Emirates in the Sheraton Hotel in Abu Dhabi;
- 17 October 1992: with Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates; and
- 17 October 1992: with the Minister of Awqaf of Qatar.

According to the Report, the subsequent meetings were hold in Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Istanbul, etc. Many trips and visits to Islamic countries were organized for the Bosnian Muslim representatives, thus allowing for the systematic development of a network between Bosnia and the Islamic states. This network later was used for financing and organizing the transfer of men power, arms, funds, and humanitarian aid to Bosnian Muslims.

In the summer 1992, before the conflict in Central Bosnia broke out, the first *jihadi* group of 25 *mujahideen* (from Afghanistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt and Algeria) arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Saudi Arabia, veterans of the war in Afghanistan. Entering Bosnia and Herzegovina through Croatian territory and assisted by Croatian authorities (ICTY, 2006a; Valetskiy, 2013), the *mujahideen* were met by Bakir Alispahić and Šemsudin Mehmedović, and Fikret Muslimović, and were organized in the *El Mudžahid* Detachment (Galijašević, 2007, p. 90). The vanguard of the international *jihadi* movement came to Bosnia for the purposes of *da'wah*, preaching and spreading radical Islam, fighting a *jihad* to liberate Muslim lands, creating an Islamic state in the Balkans, and creating a *jihadi* base of military operations in Bosnia that could subsequently be expanded further throughout the region. Some of the *jihadists*, such as Abu Abdel Aziz Barbaros, had links with Al-Qa'ida.

According to operative information from the State Security Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of those who came from Europe and the United Kingdom were recruited and transferred to Bosnia through London, Milan, Frankfurt and Munich[17] (Kohlmann, n.d., pp. 2–3 (pdf reader)).

The first wave of arriving *mujahideen* was completed by the beginning of 1994.

The second wave began right before the end of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the end of 1995, new groups of foreign fighters with criminal backgrounds coming from France, Tunis, and Italy began arriving in Bosnia. These new groups had two things in common. First, their leader was the Egyptian Abu Hamza al Misri or al Masri, one of the activists of Takfir ve Hidzra. Second, all of them had criminal records in the countries from which they had come; that is, Interpol had issued arrest warrants for their arrests due to their involvement in criminal and terrorist activities. For example, among the criminals that arrived from France were Lionel Dumonti-Abu Hamza (leader of the French fighters of Takfir ve Hidzra), Zaferini Binijam-Abdulah, and Moulud Boughelan-Sulejman. Among those with criminal backgrounds who arrived from Italy were Halil Jaraj-Amr and Saleh Nedal-Hasim, and Abu Hamza Tunisi, who was originally from Tunis. All of them came to Bosnia via Slovenia and Croatia with forged documents provided by the Milan network led by Shaaban. Before his arrival in Bosnia, Abu Hamza al Misri issued a *fatwa* allowing Croatian and Serbian blood to be spilled and their property taken, and applied this to Bosnian Muslims as well, as he claimed that Bosnian Muslims were not true Muslims (Galijašević, 2007, pp. 90–92).

In terms of motives, the foreign terrorist fighters could be divided in several groups. The first of those truly came to defend their Muslim brothers against the "Serbian aggressors and conduct *da'wah* or proselytize Islam. The second group included those who were expelled from their countries for different reasons, such as the commission of criminal offences. In the third group were those with links to different intelligence services. The last group consisted of prominent terrorists from different international terrorists organizations, including fanatical converts from Western countries, seeking to spread their radical interpretations of Islam, and build a regional *jihadi* operational base for the further creation of regional transnational terrorist infrastructure which could later be expanded and connected with *jihadi* operational bases in Europe (primarily Al-Qa'ida, *Al-Gama'a al*-Islamiyya, and the GIA, the Group Islamic of Algeria) (Kohlmann, n.d., pp. 3–4 (pdf reader)).

It is important to emphasize that many terrorist leaders and veteran fighters, having gained extensive experience in urban warfare and having committed brutal wartime crimes, benefited greatly from NATO's policy to expel the foreign *mujahideen* from Bosnia, as they were granted political asylum in many EU countries, Australia and Canada, which help them to infiltrate and spread *jihad* in the new countries. One of the European counterterrorism experts who has written on the topic is Jean-Louis Bruguière, who concluded that after the end of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many veterans from the *El Mudžahid Detachment* (*mujahideen*) became perpetrators of terrorist acts[18].

Also, many of the foreign *mujahideen* joined the army even before the creation of the *El Mudžahid Detachment*. They obtained false papers and even ran their own camps in the zones of responsibility of ARBiH (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**)** brigades. For example, according to the witness Hajrudin Hubo, who at the time held the position of a Head of Personnel within the Third Corps Staff, an order from the Third Corps Security Service was received to compile a list with the names of the members of the *El Mudžahid* Detachment. He mentions that the list composed on 7 May 1995 contains names of 252 members (many of the names were pseudonyms) and their entry and registration data in the army, indicating that some of them had joined the army even before the creation of the *El Mudžahid* Detachment (ICTY, 2006a). Thus, foreign *mujahideen* units were fighting on many occasions under the responsibility of different brigades and battalions of the ARBiH during the war. For example, foreign *mujahideen* were involved in the fight of the ARBiH's Seventh Brigade, First Battalion, the 17th Brigade, Third Battalion and the 312th Brigade against the Serbian forces and the HVO (Croation Defense Council) in Bijelo Bucje in 1993. A unit of at least 30 Arab soldiers was under the responsibility of the 312th Motorized Brigade, and foreign *mujahideen* took part in the fight of the 307th Brigade, 308th Brigade, 17th Brigade, and Seventh Brigade, First Battalion of the ARBiH against the HVO and the Serbian forces. The 333rd Brigade was reinforced with a unit of foreign *mujahideen* from the Seventh Brigade, Third Battalion, Third Company in order to conduct combat operations at Kaćuni, southeast of Busovača, and at other locations. In some battles, ammunition and other combat equipment, including financing, were provided by the Iranian embassy in Zenica and the IGASA (International Islamic Relief Organization) humanitarian organization.

Many *mujahideen* camps were established operating in zones under the responsibility of different ARBIH brigades. The Poljanice Camp was located next to the village of Mehurići in the nq2orthern part of the Bila River Valley, in the Travnik municipality and was part of the 306th Brigade's zone of responsibility. The foreign *mujahideen* started arriving in Mehurići in the second half of 1992. Around a dozen of them were allowed to occupy the second and third floors of the local elementary school as representatives of humanitarian organizations. They were later relocated to the Savici houses in Poljanice and their camp there seemed to consist of a few houses and stables, using the large meadow for praying and military training for volunteers that agreed to stay at the camp. The Orašac Camp, located in the Croatian village Orašac, which was a part of the municipality of Travnik and consisted of 35 houses, was in the zone of responsibility of the ARBiH Third Corps in 1993. After the murders in Miletići on April 24, 1993, the villagers left Osashac, not returning until 8 June 1993, which cleared the way for the *mujahideen* to move into the villagers' houses during the second half of 1993 and to build a four-story building made of

breeze blocks. The Orašac camp included a building for meetings, prayers, and a detention center. This camp was maintained until at least 1996. Foreign *mujahideen* were also seen spotted in the town of Travnik during the second half of 1992, in the offices of different humanitarian organizations (created by them) nearby mosques, as well as at the Zenica music school in the town of Zenica as well. Above the door of what was supposed to be a dormitory at the music school, the word Hezbollah was written in Latin script. Intelligence has confirmed that the *mujahideen* were armed and in uniforms, originated from North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria and were situated in Zenica from late 1992 until 1993. After the fighting near Zenica on April 18, 1993, the *mujahideen* relocated to the Vatrostalna building in Podbrežje, nearby Zenica, at the former headquarters of the Jure Frančetić Brigade Command, which later became the *El Mujahideen* Detachment base. In Arnauti, 20 km. from Zenica, the Turkish *mujahideen* were running a training camp from October 1992. According to available data, *mujahideen* from this camp participated in the fighting south of Zenica on April 18, 1993. The *mujahideen* situated in Bijelo Bučje throughout 1993 seemed to be part of a *mujahideen* group stationed in Poljnice and Zenica. *Mujahideen* were present in Ravno Rostovo as well, although it is not known to which group, precisely, they belonged (ICTY, 2006a).

5.1. Formation of the El Mudžahid Detachment as a Third Corps Unit of the ARBiH

According to the testimony of Divjak Jovan, a former deputy commander of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Army Main Staff at the Rasim Delić trial, in 1993, having in the field *mujahideen* training camps in Bosnia and *mujahideen* units fighting alongside the regular army, Rasim Delić decided to discuss with Izetbegović the possibility of the *mujahideen* units officially becoming part of the ARBiH. Consequently, this came into effect ("Jovan Divjak: I Am", 2007). The *El Mudžahid* Detachment was formed by Rasim Delić's order dated 13 August 1993 and was under the official jurisdiction of the Bosnian Army, directly subordinate to the Third Corps of the Army, although it operated autonomously and was comprised of foreign, fighters *mujahideen* from various Islamic countries. All foreign fighters were radicals and religious fanatics, and many of them were the members of or had close links with terroristic organizations, such as Al-Qa'ida, Hezbollah, Hamas, *Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya* and others (Gibas-Krzak, 2013; Schindler, 2007, p. 119).

To dispel any possible amiguities concerning the official status of the Detachment, it is important to mention the Letter of Commendation (dated from 1 December 1995 under Register number 8/2-4856-9, signed by the army general, Commander Rasim Delić) issued on the occasion of the third anniversary of the formation of the Third Corps Unit of the ARBiH (Appendix 37 to chapter III)[19], wherein he expresses his appreciation as a military commander and pays special tribute to the exceptional results achieved in the execution of military and other tasks within the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina *inter alia* by the El Mudžahid Detachment, and Abu El Maali.

El Mudžahid was based in Zenica, having its training camp in Mehurici. The unit was placed under the command of Operative Group (OG) Bosanska Krajina. The first leader of the foreign *mujahideen* in Central Bosnia in 1992, before the Detachment was formed, was Abu Abdel Aziz from the Arabian Peninsula. Once Aziz left in search of funds to support their activities, he entrusted the command of the *mujahideen* to the Egyptian Wahiudeen. In the summer of 1992, Abu Haris became the leader of the *El Mudžahid* with Wahiudeen as his military commander. In early October 1993, Wahiudeen was killed near Novi Travnik in an HVO ambush. After the death of Abu Haris in 1995 in Zepce, Abu Mali became the new commander (ICTY, 2006a). In 1996, the *El Mudžahid* Detachment became one of the most important Al-Qa'ida military groups and consisted of 1,774 fighters, including preachers (Galijašević, 2016). The Detachment was visited and reviewed by Alija Izetbegović himself as their Commander (ICTY, 2002).

Testifying as a prosecution witness at the trial of Rasim Delić, Syrian-born Aiman Awad, a former unit translator and coordinator of relations between the unit members and the ARBiH in the *El Mudžahid* Detachment, explained the decision-making process in the *El Mudžahid* Detachment. The decision-making body of the Detachment was the Shura Council. The Shura was composed of Arabs and Bosniaks, but sometimes the Arabs would meet alone. The Sura discussed combat strategy plan and decided on offensive military operations, regardless of whether they were carried out, and decided on all the major issues concerning the life and work of the Detachment. Also, any unit member had to receive the permission of the *emir* in order to do anything on a personal level. The internal organization of the *El Mudžahid* Detachment followed its own code which had nothing to do with the ARBiH code, and had certain rules by which its members had to abide (ICTY, 2008).

Also, the *El Mudžahid* Detachment took part in many combat operations under the command of different brigades. For example, under the command of the 27th, 306th and 325th Brigades, it took part in combat operations in Zabilje, Ograde, Pokrajcici and Grbavica in the period between 5–7 September 1993. On 18 September 1993, the *El Mudžahid* received orders from the commander of OG Bosanska Krajina, Alagic,

to fight alongside the 17th Brigade in the Krushica sector, and more.

The judgment of the case *Prosecutor vs. Enver Hadžihasanović* and Amir Kubura before the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 dated 15 March 2006 (ICTY, 2006a) reveals unique details on the origin, manner of dressing, *mujahideen* camps, leadership, *modus operandi*, ideology, organizational structure and warfare tactics of the *mujahideen* in the ARBiH Army during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to analyze all of these aspects in order to understand the ideology and *modus operandi* behind this new wave of radicalization that was imported into Bosnia with the arrival of the *jihadi* elements and Islamic NGOs in the country.

The *mujahideen* differed in their manner of dressing, which consisted of traditional garb of long white robes and scarves around their head and neck; some even wore camouflage uniforms or parts of camouflage uniforms. They were also distinguished by their dark complexions and long beards and they spoke only Arabic. They would carry with them automatic rifles, sabers or long knives, and rocket launchers and were recognizable by the insignias on their shoulders. They arrived under the guise of members of humanitarian organizations, and in the beginning, they provided the local Muslim population with food and organized classes in religious instruction. However, they later started supplying the local Muslims with weapons, uniforms and military training. Since the *mujahideen* gained trust and support from the locals, a lot of young men started joining them, but also many ARBiH soldiers joined their ranks, pursuing material benefits. To blend in, the foreign *mujahideen* started marrying young women from the region, ordering them to cover their heads. They condemned the consumption of alcohol and insisted on local Muslims practicing their view of fundamental Islam. They would voice their strong opposition to situations that contravened their "moral values," such as serving alcohol in restaurants or cafes or a young girl or woman inappropriately dressed.

The *mujahideen* recruitment campaign targeted young man and minors for combat training, promising money, weapons, uniforms and other goods for staying with the units after completing training. As a result, some Bosnian Muslims joined the foreign *mujahideen* and, in the process, became local *mujahideen*. They imitated the foreigners in both behavior and dress code, to such an extent that it was sometimes, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) documentation in subsequent war crimes trials, "difficult to distinguish between the two groups." These were the very first local fruits that were cultivated under the *Wahhabi* ideology during the war. Also, during the fighting, the *mujahideen* were particularly cruel. Many of them subsequently married Bosnian women, received Bosnia and Herzegovina citizenship, and remained to live and carry out actions in

the Bosnia and Herzegovina territory (Appendix 23 to chapter III) [20] (RTRS, 2016).

One of the main corridors for the transfer of *mujahideen* from Afghanistan to Bosnia operated along the Vienna-Zagreb line (Gibas-Krzak, 2013). In the year preceding the arrival of the *mujahideen*, around twenty Islamic organization established their branches in Zagreb, among them the so-called Service Bureau (*Makhtab al-Khidamat*-MAK), to facilitate the spread of *jihad* in the region by organizing a transport of men and munitions to Bosnia through Croatia (Schindler, 2007, p. 120). The *modus operandi* of the Islamic NGOs and local religious organizations facilitating the transfer of foreign mujahideen to Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with the local authorities and providing them with a humanitarian cover is clearly depicted in a Letter of Confirmation dated from 7 August 1993 under Register number 147/93, signed by the President of the Crises Management Committee of the Croatian Muslims for Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the War (*Krizni štab muslimana Hrvatske za pomoć Bosni i Hercegovini u ratu*). In the document, the leader of the Committee confirms that Mr. Saed S.M. Al Garaf from Saudi Arabia traveled to Bosnia for humanitarian purposes (Appendix 39 to chapter III)[21]. This is only one example of hundreds of similar cases.

The Seventh Muslim Brigade, consisting of three Muslim battalions, was formed around a core of Bosnian radicals in Zenica on 17 November 1992, upon the Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, Register number 02/1010-435. Amir Kubura was appointed as the Chief of Staff and Asim Korcica as a Brigade Commandant. Prof. Mahmut ef. Karalić was the first *emir* of the Brigade. He had completed his *hadith* (*hadith* refers to what Muslims consider a record of the prophet Mohammed's words, actions and approval) studies in Medina and was a prewar professor of Koranic studies at the Sarajevo *madrassa*. The Muslim Brigade differed from the others as it required from its members to adhere to Islamic principles, the "codex of the Brigade" which defined the Islamic character of its internal organization of work and life, as well as combat tactics and practices. "Moral purity" according to Islamic understanding was required for membership. This confirms the radical Islamic character of the Muslim Brigade acting according to the same ideological logic and pursuing the same political goals as the SDA. The Brigade embodied the militant virtues of radical Islam that the Young Muslims had envisioned a half century before the Brigade was considered as a prototype of the Islamic force to which Izetbegović's army aspired (Terović, 2006, pp. 62–69). According to some sources, the Muslim Brigade was funded by the TWRA. The Brigade solders were subjected to a program providing for intensive religious indoctrination by SDA-approved *imams*, with the aim of creating an army of fanatical and fearless solders ready to wage *jihad* and die as *shahids* and that would serve as an example to rest of the solidary. Some of them were trained in the *mujahideen* camps. The person in charge was the *emir* of the Brigade, Mahmut ef.

Karalić. As was the case with *El Mudžahid* Detachment, the Muslim Brigade quickly acquired a bad reputation for their mercilessness in combat and for committing war crimes against the Christian Serbs (Schindler, 2007, pp. 168–69).

Also, in many other divisions of the ABiH, there were units consisting of local *mujahideen*, which were called *mujahedin* units. One of them was operating in Srebrenica as part of the 28th Division of 103rd Brigade of the ABiH.

It is important to mention that during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a Handschar Division led by Ekrem Mandal and operating in Labinu (Croatia). Many Muslims who ended up in Croatia volunteered in the division to obtain the necessary military training for their subsequent return to Bosnia to join the Bosnian Army and fight against the enemy for the Muslim cause. For example, one of them was Hasan Becirović, former SDA President in Srebrenica. The division consisted of just over thirty people, and it is better known for the crimes that its members perpetrated against the Serbian population than for any serious contribution to the defense of that part of Croatia (Jelinić, 2011). The ARBiH Army collaborated and coordinated its activities with this division.

The cases of Rasim Delić, Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura reveal many details concerning the atrocities conducted by them among the Serbian population. The *mujahideen* were known for their brutality. They were far more aggressive than the regular Bosnian army soldiers. Torture and collective killings were common, including beheadings; in fact, they became their signature. For instance, Aiman Dean, a Saudi foreign fighter who later joined Al-Qa'ida but began by working for U.K. intelligence, arrived in Bosnia in 1994 as part of the contingent of foreign *jihadi* volunteers recruited from North Africa and the Middle East. He testified that he had witnessed summary executions of Serbian prisoners. He stressed that Bosnia was only just one episode in a long series of *jihad* conflicts in different regions, all directed to the single purpose of establishing the Caliphate (Swicord, 2015). Notwithstanding the fact that the *El Mudžahid* Detachment was an official structure operating within the regular Army of ARBiH, it was not officially charged with torture, sexual violence or murder or of violating Geneva convention in many aspects. For example, during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Kamenica Camp, located in the Gostovic valley and run by the *El Mudžahid* Detachment, macabre tortures and horrific cold-blooded murders were committed using inhumane killing methods (ICTY, 2005a). The description of the atrocities perpetrated by the *El Mudžahid* Detachment against captured enemy combatants and civilians indicated in the charges against Rasim Delić released to the public on the ICTY official site reveals the resemblance of the terrorist *modus operandi*, combat tactics and methods of committing atrocities against enemy soldiers and civilians perpetrated during the Civil War in

Bosnia and Herzegovina by the *mujahideen* and their radicalized alumni among the Bosnian Muslims, with those used by terrorists in different conflict zones, such as in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, etc.

According to the information presented in the Sarajevo Richochet documentary (Illogic2tube, n.d.), there were approximately 2,000 extremists in Bosnia in 1995. Also, an increasing number of civilians and members of the UN were kidnapped and murdered. The radicals made horrifying propaganda movies in which they documented their murders of prisoners of war. It was horrible for all people in Bosnia, even for their Muslim comrades. Serbian prisoners of war were abused in public places and then murdered, later to be buried in mass graves. This cult of death was well-documented by the Islamic extremists themselves. They taped each other murdering war prisoners for propaganda purposes. There were ceremonial beheadings at several locations.

Furthermore, it is highly important to empasize that in 1993, the ARBiH purchased chemical weapons from Islamic countries and payed for instructors to train Bosnian Muslims to use chemical weapons using funds donated by Islamic countries. By purchasing smaller quantities of chemical weapons from Arab countries, Bosnian Muslims were able to produce some types of chemical weapons and repeatedly used them on the battlefield. In the early summer of 1993, Bosnian Muslims acquired some thirty aircraft bombs filled with an unknown nerve warfare poison from Arab countries, through the Islamic network. The bombs arrived from Syria and were transported by a Red Cross truck to Tuzla, to a warehouse in Dubrava near the airport of Tuzla. Five chemical warfare experts arrived together with the weapons shipment in order to train Muslims on how to use the weapons. The Joint Chemical-Alkaline Combine (*Udruženi hemijsko-alkalni kombinat*), with large chemical storage facilities (chlorine), is located in Tuzla, and there are also facilities of "Energoinvest" where mortars of all calibers and spare parts are manufactured, including pipes for cannons and howitzers of various calibers (Appendix 15 to chapter III) [22].

Nerve warfare poison was first used by Muslims on 2 August 1993, in an attack on the wider area of Vornik in an effort to get to the Drina River and consolidate their positions there. UNPROFOR (The United Nations Protection Force) took soil samples and stated in its report that in at least three separate cases Muslims had used chemical weapons in the fighting around the village of Boskovici, north of Zvornik. This conduct is thoroughly explained in a classified document titled "BiH: The BiH Army owns and uses chemical weapons" dated from 10 October 1993 (Appendix 31 to chapter III) [23]. The presence of chemical weapon in Tuzla was also confirmed by many Bosnian high officials. For example, on 9 June 1993, Salih Brkic stated on Radio Sarajevo that the district Council of Tuzla decided as a last resort against the

Serbs "to use chlorine and other chemical agents for defensive purposes" (Leitner & Leitner, 2007, p. 213). Another official who issued a similar statement was Andjelko Makar, Chief of Staff of the Second Corps of the ARBiH based in Tuzla, admitting that: "the Bosnian-Herzegovina Army will also use unconventional weapons, such as chlorine and other chemical weapons" (Leitner & Leitner, 2007, p. 213). Rasim Delić also indirectly referred to the possible use of chemical weapons, stating that "if we had to cause a disaster to prevent the Serbs from invading Tuzla…we would do so" (Leitner & Leitner, 2007, p. 213).

In the outline of the diary of Anwar Shaaban, the *emir* of the Detachment, that was produced in English (Appendix 31 to chapter III) [24], Shaaban describes his vision and efforts related to the Bosnian *jihad*. Under his leadership, the *mujahideen* exhibited a strong desire for martyrdom in Bosnia. He encouraged the use of guerilla attacks as an alternative and the assassination of leaders as a means of promoting *jihad*. According to his long-term strategy, the *mujahideen* in Bosnia should be established as a distinct military and social entity occupying a private district to be called "the *mujahideen* village" equipped with weapons, which would serve as terrorist operational bases in the region. His strategy involved creating the following:

- a military infrastructure, including an ammunition warehouse, care for the wounded, a military school and more;
- a social, educational and welfare infrastructure, including care for orphans, hospitals and clinics, schools, facilities for athletic activities, educational centers, welfare organizations, societies for the handicapped, buildings for the ceremonial washing of the dead, etc.;
- a religious infrastructure involving teaching religious lessons, conducting missionary work, providing training sessions, etc.; and
- an economic infrastructure.

The *mujahideen* leadership organized propaganda campaigns and interaction with the news media. The press was invited to celebrations honoring *mujahideen*, and press interviews were arranged with the leaders of the *mujahideen* (with Shaaban, Abdel Aziz, etc.). Clarifications and video tapes were produced and presented by the *mujahideen* to the news media, and booklets were published to familiarize the public with the work of the *mujahideen* [25]. Today, we can witness the implementation of his strategy with the creation of the *paradzemati* and *Wahhabi* settlements in Bosnia and the region as a whole.

Mujahideen recorded many training activities, battles with Serb forces, including photos of martyrs, both alive and after their deaths. The images are very similar to

those of Al-Qa'ida's training camps[26]. The Bosnian political and military leadership was aware of all the atrocities and inhuman crimes perpetuated against the Serbian people. This was repeatedly confirmed in official letters from the High Public Prosecutor of FRBiH Ivica Stanić addressed to: Commandant Sefer Halilović dated from 17 June 1992 and 22 July 1992; to the Minister for National Defense Jerko Doko dated from 17 June 1992 and 22 July 1992; and a letter dated 30 July 1992 to the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia And Herzegovina[27]. In these letters, Stanić personally points to the occurrence of criminal conduct of persons wearing Military Police insignias, with special reference to unlawful conduct in connection with the apprehension and detention of citizens, mainly Serbs.

With regard to the strategy of producing and presenting video materials on *mujahideen*, it is important to be mention the first video in English made by the *mujahideen* about their activities (Mujahideen Regiment of Bosnia Herzegovina, 2000). This video was translated from original material produced by the *El Mudžahid* Detachment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The publisher was Azzam Publications (2000). The video, showing speeches of radical *imams*, glorifies *jihad* and martyrdom and invites Muslim brothers from all around the world to take part in the Bosnian *jihad*. The first part, titled "The Martyrs of Bosnia," is dedicated to experiences told by foreign *mujahideen* fighters. The second part opens with the slogan "*Odred El Mudzahedin*: *nas put je dzihad"* ("*El Mudžahid* Detachment: *our way is jihad*"). In the third part, the author reports on the experiences of the foreign *mujahideen* in the Bosnian *jihad*. In the fourth part of the video, the *mujahideen* present personal stories of several foreign *jihadi* fighters who died as *shahid* during the Bosnian *jihad*. Excerpts from some of the radical *imams*' recorded speeches can be seen below:

Part of the speech of Anwar Shaaban, called the *imam* and leader of the *mujahideen* in Bosnia, (Mujahideen Regiment of Bosnia Herzegovina, 2000, 21:50:00):

> Allah said in the Surah al Nisa; "wherever you are death will find you." So, the Mujahid the one with sound belief knows that his death can come at any moment when Allah wills, so he is not afraid of death.

Voice of Shaykh Hassan Ayub (Mujahideen Regiment of Bosnia Herzegovina, 2000, 24:41:00):

> So, who is Martyr (*Shahid*) and what is the purpose of martyrdom? What is the position of the Martyr and when does he reach this level? According to Scholars the Martyr is one killed in battle in the path of Allah. The word martyr in Arabic is the plural of the word witness because the Martyr is the one who has borne the greatest testimony for Allah and with it he reaches the pinnacle

> of Islam to a testimony he has nurtured in his blood, soul and his wealth for the Pleasure of Allah and for the victory of this Religion and destruction of Falsehood. The Mujahid martyr is he who fights and is killed on the path of Allah to make Allah word supreme.

Voice of Shaykh Salman Al-Awdath *(*Mujahideen Regiment of Bosnia Herzegovina, 2000, 32:45:00):

> Statistically, more than 35.000 women were raped under the supervision of Serbian authorities. A German writes that the UN peace-keeping forces also took part with the Serbs in the raping of Muslim women, in Bosnian villages… The masses of the Muslims in Bosnia cry out to every Muslim in the world in whose heart is present: "There is no god but Allah and Muhammed is his Messenger" and says to them: Where are you O Muslims? My enemy has overwhelmed me whilst you are all asleep? Where are the billions among you?... Do you not see the seas of blood flowing through my streets? Do you not see the Cross being raised scorching the faces of Muslims who call for Islam? Save me…

5.2. Key Persons from the Bosnian Political Elite Having Close Links with the Transnational Terrorist Network

Al-Qa'ida was highly interested in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of the country being a strategically important location for the creation of a powerful base in the Southeast Europe, the Balkans, that would allow terrorists to bring jihad to Europe. Although the Bosnian authorities currently deny this, there is irrefutable evidence that Osama bin Laden came to Bosnia and Herzegovina several times and personally met with Izetbegović. For example, at the trial of Slobodan Milosević, Ms. Eve-Ann Prentice, a British journalist who had covered the Balkans for both the Guardian and the London Times newspapers since the 1980s, testified at the Tribunal that in November 1994, while she and her journalist colleague from Der Speigel, Renate Flotel, were waiting in Izetbegović's foyer for an audience with him, they saw Osama bin Laden being escorted into Izetbegović's office at the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidential premises (ICTY, 2006b). Another leader of Al-Qa'ida who had been traveling frequently to Bosnia to facilitate the jihadi cause and contribute to the creation of the local operational Al-Qa'ida base, was Ayman Al-Zawahiri. According to Dzevad *Galijašević*, in 1992, Al-Zawahiri appeared in the Malagaj area to

visit mujahideen camps. Al-Zawahiri's brother Muhammad, an expert in establishing logistics, was sent to the Balkans to act as the Al-Qa'ida representative during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He worked in many countries as an IIRO official, including Bosnia, Albania and Croatia (Schindler, 2007, p. 123).

The closest collaborators and associates of Alija Izetbegović, representing the core of the SDA party and today holding high positions in Bosnia's military, defense, diplomatic and executive branches, have, even to this day, been undertaking common efforts to Islamize Bosnian Muslims and support *jihad* in Bosnia for the establishment of independent Islamic state. According to Western sources, the most powerful among them are associated with the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) and committed to maintaining close relations with Islamic states and individuals with links to terrorists (Pomfret, 1996a). Key persons engaged in coordinating delivery, arming, intelligence cover and legal protection for the *mujahideen* were: Bakir Alispahic, chief of the Izetbegović's secret services; Hasan Čengić, SDA high official, war-time logistic manager of the ARBiH; Muris Hadžiselimović, Chief Prosecutor of the Zenica-Doboj canton; Zahid Kovac, member of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council; Semsudin Mehmedović, former chief of the Ze-Do canton police, member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament; Fikret Muslimovic, chief of the military intelligence service of the ARBiH; and Haris Silajdžić, member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency (Galijašević, 2007, pp. 98–99).

In order to understand the level of involvement of the Bosnian Muslim political leadership in the transnational Pan-Islamic network, it is important to analyze the biographies of particular Bosnian Muslim political figures who were highly influential in the country, especially their posts and activities during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this context, the key figure among the above-listed Izetbegović's associates is Hassan Čengić. He was a member of the Young Muslims, a highly powerful man in Bosnia, an Islamic cleric, a member of a powerful clan headed by his father Halid Čengić, former Deputy Minister of Defense, and former Minister for Refugee Resettlement (he served as such immediately after the conflict). The Čengić family was based in Visoko and completely controlled this region through its own militias. Before the war, the Čengić family already had connections in Europe and the Middle East, and owned numerous companies located in Croatia and Turkey. From 1992, Čengić worked for the ARBiH, being responsible for arms procurement, and for contacts with the Islamic fundamentalist organizations and Iran that were making generous contributions supplying the Bosnian government with funds, arms and fighters (Wiebes, 2002). He visited Teheran on frequent occasions from 1983. During the War, Čengić negotiated with Islamic governments, including Iran, to provide the Bosnian Army with weapons, equipment, and soldiers. He was the key person responsible for arranging arms shipments from Islamic countries, primarily from Iran. He

was a member of the supervisory board of TWRA, a Sudan-based, bogus Islamic humanitarian NGO connected to Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qa'ida terrorist network. TWRA financed illegal arms shipment and transfers of *mujahideen* to Bosnia during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Čengić's involvement was confirmed by the TWRA's director, Elfatih Hassanein, with whom he closely cooperated. He was identified by Slovenian officials as the man who arranged a multimillion-dollar deal for arms shipments from Sudan to Bosnia via Slovenia in 1992. During the course of the war, Čengić lived in Istanbul and Teheran, organizing clandestine arms shipments for Bosnia. His political beliefs leaned close to those of the fundamentalists in Iran. In his public statements, he always expressed opposition to mixed marriages with non-Muslims. His vision of Bosnia having a strong Muslim army directly contradicted the plan of the United States to form a joint force of Croats and Muslims. He was against cooperation with the Military Professional Resources Incorporation. Therefore, he was identified as the main obstacle to implementing the equipment and training program of the United States.

On many occasions in 1996, U.S. officials asked Izetbegović to remove Čengić from his post because of his ties to Iran, even offering different types of privileges and bribes to Izetbegović. For example, the United States State Department asked the Bosnian government to fire Čengić, and they were ready to provide Bosnia with $100 million worth of military equipment to do so (Kay Rozen, 1996). However, Čengić's strong influence in Bosnia was due not only to his high post in the government, but also his powerful family background. His father, Halid Čengić, was leading the main logistics center of the ARBiH during the war. One of his family members leads the cantonal government of the southeastern city of Gorazde, and another is the c*hargé d'affaires* of Army headquarters administration. Three of his cousins hold key positions in the Bosnian government (Kay Rozen, 1996). Furthermore, Čengić served six years in prison together with Izetbegović for being a member of Young Muslims, an organization persecuted by Yugoslavia's government. Thus, Čengić was connected to the Bosnian government through both family relations and a deep personal link with Izetbegović. In essence, what Haris Silajdžić (Foreign Minister from 1990 to 1993, Prime Minister from October 1993 to January 1996) was to the West, Čengić was to the Orient. While Silajdžić, a schoolmate of Čengić at Sarajevo's Islamic school, was convincing U.S. official that the arms embargo was unjust, Čengić persuaded Islamic countries to supply arms illegally to Bosnia. The Čengić family was involved in many logistics operations. For example, the arms shipments from Iran ran mainly via the Cengic family's logistics network. The ARBiH also obtained arms via the military intelligence service, the VOS (*Vojna Obavjestajna Sluzba*) from Austria, Germany, Turkey, Argentina and Czechoslovakia (Bulatovic, 2002, p. 192).

In addition to Čengić, the following are key SDA high officials enjoying diplomatic status and having close links with terrorist organizations (The Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, n.d.):

1) Husein Zivalj, Bosnia ambassador to Austria between 1992 and 1995, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bosnian Ambassador to the UN and a member of TWRA's executive board. He arrived in the United States shortly before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack and left his UN post shortly thereafter. There is evidence that during his mandate at the embassy in Vienna he issued a significant number of visas and passports to Islamic radicals who were not originaly from Bosnia. Also, upon his return to Bosnia, in the capacity of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, he ensured that the Vienna Embassy became a key location for ongoing support of Islamic radicals, and a wide range of visas and passports of Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted to them even after his own term there as Ambassador (Trifunovic, 2004a);

2) Ivica Mišić, a former UN Deputy Permanent Representative of Bosnia to the UN (1992–1996), former c*harge d'affairs* of Bosnia to the UN, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the National Coordinator of Bosnia's Anti-Terrorism team. There is evidence that he supported the appointment of Safet Ćatović, an Al-Qa'ida operative, at the Bosnian mission to UN with the rank of Minister Counsellor, and Ćatović apparently received a salary and insurance from the UN until December 2001, according to Mišić. Using his diplomatic cover, Ćatović managed to organize a "Summer *Jihad* Camp" in Pennsylvania. According to the FBI, Ćatović was involved in the Global Relief Foundation in Bridgeview and the Benevolence International, all Islamic humanitarian organizations that propagated terrorism (Đogić, 2003);

3) Muhamed Sacirbegovic, a former Bosnian ambassador to the UN (1992–1994; 1995–2000), and former Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Internal Affairs requested that Interpol issue an international arrest warrant for Sacirbegovic, charging that in 2000 he embezzled $610,000 which was supposed to be given to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mission at the UN. It is thought that he has misused more than $2.5 million during his mandate. He was at the Mission during the same period as Catovic;

4) Mirza Kusljugić, a former Bosnian ambassador to the UN. As a member of Military Presidency of the city of Tuzla during the War, he had authority over the Second Corps of the ARBiH, which had regular units that included Islamic fundamentalist *jihad* warriors from Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. He is responsible for crimes committed by those units (The Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, n.d.).

5) Irfan Ljevakovic, one of the SDA founders. There is evidence that he was involved in the delivery of Islamic fighters to Bosnia and Herzegovina under the patronage of TWRA.

In this context, it is important to recall the Al-Qa'ida operative Safet Ćatović who managed to receive employment at the Bosnia and Herzegovina mission at the UN with the assistance of Bosnia and Herzegovina officials. He is considered to be a coordinator of all terrorist operations conducted from the Balkan regional network of international terrorist organizations. According to Darko Trifunović, professor at the Belgrade Faculty of Security, Ćatović, together with *imam* Sirai Fahai, a suspect in the first attack on New York Trade Center in 1993, organized the summer *Jihad* Camp in Pennsylvania at the spot where one of the planes involved in the 11 September terrorist attacks was downed. Furthermore, the expert on terrorism and political Islam Dzevad Galijasevic claims that Ćatović is hiding behind a false identity that he took from a Bosnian Muslim who died in 1992, with the Bosnian Muslim leadership issuing him false documents for cover, most likely from a member of the GIA from Algeria. Galijasević thinks that there is a great possibility that the real name of Catović is Abdel Kadeer Moktari Abu Mali, former commander of the Bosnian *El Mudžahid* Detachment and that he is of African-Asian origin. According to Galijasević, Ćatović is a very important link in the chain as an an operative who connects the troops on the ground with the leadership and financial circles. There is information that he is the person who connected Husein Zivalj and Hasan Čengić with the TWRA (*DeConstruct E-Zine*, 2008).

Also, it is important to mention Bisera Turković, one of the founders of SDA party in Bosnia, and who served as an Ambassador to many countries and international organizations. During her time as an Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Zagreb, in violation of the U.S. embargo, the SDA organized a massive flow of weapons from Iran through Croatia (State Department Recommends, 2005).

5.3. The Crucial Role of the External Factors

As the process of dissolution in Yugoslavia begun in 1991, many delegations from Islamic countries, predominantly from Iran and Saudi Arabia, came to the Balkans to offer regional Muslim community large amounts of money for the restoration and construction of mosques and religious schools. James Woolsey, director of the CIA at the time, reported:

> We looked with great concern at the very great amount of money coming in, especially from Iran, for the promotion of a very particular type of Islam in the Balkans. (Bergman, 2008, p. 227)

Iran has a long history of sponsoring terrorist violence through its vanguard of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah. However, Iran has also worked closely with Hamas in the Middle East and in Sudan, and with Al-Qa'ida, al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, the Abu Nidal Organization, and others operating in Af Bosnia, Pakistan, and elsewhere (Ibid., p. 213).

Cooperation between the Bosnian Muslim leadership and Iranian authorities began in 1979 after the victory of Khomeini. Their relations reached a new level in 1992, when agreements on military, political and temporary cooperation with Iran were signed. Consequently, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sent more than five thousand tons of weapons to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also provided hundreds of military instructors, consultants and intelligence officers for the Bosnian military and intelligence services (O'Hern, 2012, p. 82). Iran also provided the dispossessed Bosnian Muslims with necessary aid (Sciolino, 1995). Thus, VEVAK (the Iranian Intelligence Service) intelligence operatives entered Bosnia in large numbers, and the Bosnian Intelligence Agency employed dozens of Iranian specialists (Bennett, 2012, p. 54; Shai, 2006, p. 94). Iran-backed Hezbollah also sent its supporters to the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, an article in *the Independent* reports that Hezbollah in Lebanon initially sent 150 volunteers to fight in Bosnia (Fisk, 2014). Furthermore, British intelligence reports reveal that some two hundred advisers from the Iranian Republican Guard were in Bosnia during the war period, and from 1,000 to 3,000 volunteers, including some from Hezbollah, came to help fight in Bosnia (Bergman, 2008, p. 228). It is significant that by the end of the war, opinion polls showed that about 86% of Bosnian Muslims expressed a positive attitude towards Iran (Bardos, 2013, pp. 62–63). In the context of Hezbollah, it is important to mention the conclusions on page 201 in the report of the United States House of Representatives Select Subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia established with Resolution No. 416 dated from 29 April 1996 (United States Congress Committee on International Relations, 1996):

> The Iranian presence and influence [in Bosnia] jumped radically in the months following the green light. Iranian elements infiltrated the Bosnian government and established close ties with the current leadership in Bosnia and the next generation of leaders. Iranian Revolutionary Guards accompanied Iranian weapons into Bosnia and soon were integrated in the Bosnian military structure

> from top to bottom as well as operating in independent units throughout Bosnia. The Iranian intelligence service [VEVAK] ran wild through the area developing intelligence networks, setting up terrorist support systems, recruiting terrorist "sleeper" agents and agents of influence, and insinuating itself with the Bosnian political leadership to a remarkable degree. The Iranians effectively annexed large portions of the Bosnian security apparatus [known as the Agency for Information and Documentation (AID)] to act as their intelligence and terrorist surrogates. This extended to the point of jointly planning terrorist activities. The Iranian embassy became the largest in Bosnia and its officers were given unparalleled privileges and access at every level of the Bosnian government. (United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, 1997; United States Congress International Relations Committee, 1997, p. 201)

Both the House Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives, 1997) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued reports in 1997 and 1998, respectively (United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1998). Both reports confirmed the involvement of the United States in the above described processes during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the Mossad, Iranian embassies in Sarajevo and Vienna served as channels for the transfer of funds and it was there where arms deals were arranged. The airfield at Visoko, northwest of Sarajevo, served as a secret landing place for arms shipments from Iran. At first, *mujahideens* fought as disorganized militias; but, as discussed above, a special unit was soon established for the volunteers: the *El Mudžahid* Detachment, part of the Seventh Division of the Bosnian army's Third Corps. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards took it upon themselves to train the recruits. During the Bosnian *jihad*, Iran's relationship with Al-Qa'ida expanded (Bergman, 2008, p. 228).

The infrastructure and networks established by Iran through the Revolutionary Guards in the Balkans, especially in Albania and Bosnia, are constantly involved in terrorist operations and provide political refuge to suspected international terrorists and their families. For example, the Iranians provided a political refuge for the wife and son of Sabri al-Banna, better known as Abu Nidal (killed in Baghdad in 2003), former leader of the terrorist organization the Fatah Revolutionary Command, the most dangerous terrorist organization during the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1998, when Abu Nidal's wife, Hiyam al-Bitar, moved to Bosnia, $15 million had been deposited on her bank account. Suspecting that these funds were to be used for terrorist operations, a secret investigation was launched. Just when the Swiss were about to

issue an international warrant for the woman's arrest, they were informed that she had been granted Bosnian citizenship. According to Bosnian law, citizens of Bosnia cannot be subjected to extradition to other countries (Ibid., p.229).

Saeed Kasemi, a retired general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in his latest interview with the state-approved internet channel Aparat from April 17, 2019 reveals details of the Guards' relationship with Al-Qa'ida and their engagement in the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He stated that in the 1990s, he traveled to Bosnia to train Muslim fighters against the Serbs while wearing the Iranian Red Crescent uniform (Face to face 21-Saeed, n.d.). In his interview, he reveals that he was visited by Hossein Allahkaram (Ansar e-Hezbollah leader), who had proposed that he go to Bosnia under diplomatic cover. In his interview, Kasemi relate that:

> We were there as members of the Red Crescent, but we were really there to train Bosnian Muslims. In Bosnia, in the heart of Europe, so many things were happening. Mujahideen from all over the world came to fight alongside us. We were fighting side-by-side with Al-Qaeda. Sepah gave Al-Qaeda headbands, uniforms, flags that were made to look like they were Sepah, and they all wore badges. What's happening in Yemen now, we did it first in Bosnia. It was CNN's spy, Christiane Amanpour, our fellow compatriot that all of our leaders like to give interviews to, that blew our cover and some of us had to leave. It was all her fault. Somehow, she caught wind of what we were up to and that was it…Anyways, it was the Iranian government's responsibility to give all of the fighter's money and weapons and training. (Keshavarz, 2019)

He also added that:

> In Bosnia, in the heart of Europe, there were many developments. We were side by side with al-Qaida. The members of al-Qaida learned from us. From all over the world, mujahedeen poured into Bosnia, and there was a new development. Muslim jihadi units were established. (Keshavarz, 2019; Bivši iranski general, 2019)

Iranian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina operated through three brigades. The first and the most important was the *Noah Nabi* Brigade led by Mohammad-Reza Naqdi. Naqdi served as the leader of all three brigades. The second was the Muslim Brigade led by Saeed Kasemi, and the third was the *Malik Ashtar* Brigade led by Hossein Allah-Karam. It is assumed that the Iranians, led by Muhammad Reza Nakdi, arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as late 1991 and early 1992. According to some sources, Commander Mohammad-Reza Naqdi and Hossein Allah- Karam

directed the Islamic Republic's activities in Bosnia within the framework of the Quds Force of the IRGC (Alfoneh, 2013, pp. 230–31; Gol & Montazeri, 2019; Home »The commander of the, 2019).

At the very beginning of the war, Al-Qa'ida members fought within these brigades under the command, uniforms and command of Iranians. Due to their lack of knowledge of Bosnian geography and to the ideological differences between Sunnis and Shiites, these brigades could not effectively combat the VRS (the Bosnian Serb Army) and the HVO. Shortly thereafter, due to some losses during fighting and due to the ideological conflict between Al-Qa'ida Chechen Muslims with Hussein Allah-Karam and the Iranians inside his brigade, an order was issued from Tehran for Allah-Karam and Kasemi to be withdrawn from Bosnia and replaced by other officers, who would continue to work under Nakdi's command. Allah-Karam obeyed the order and returned to Tehran, while Kasemi stayed in Bosnia with the Iranian director Nader Talibzadeh, where they made a 90-minute film about the role and activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Bosnia (Javid, 2017). In early 1993, 60 additional trainer-members of Iran-controlled terrorist organizations arrived in Bosnia to provide training for the local Muslims, with the aim of deploying a 2,000 member brigade of its Al-Quds forces (Leitner & Leitner, 2007, p. 210). Later on, the IRGC was providing Bosnian Muslim with military training within the organizational framework of the *mujahideen*. At the end of the war, Iranians were more engaged in intelligence, propaganda and arm shipments, and the Sunni *jihadi* fighters were fighting on ground within the *El Mudžahid* Detachment of the Bosnian Army. However, Al-Qa'ida and the IRGC found a common ground for cooperation in Bosnian *jihad*. During the Ahmadinejad presidency, Allah-Karam was sent to Bosnia as a military attaché (Alfoneh, 2013, p. 231). In May 2019, at the suggestion of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Commander-in-Chief of Iran's Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Naqdi was appointed as the Deputy Coordinator of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) due to his qualifications and valuable experience ("Ayatollah Khamenei appointed", 2019).

In honor of Resul Hajdari or Majid Muntesari, who was the first Iranian *shahid* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, dying in an ambush set by HVO forces at the Thermal Power Plant Kakanj, a detachment within the Seventh Muslim Brigade was named *Shehid Resul* immediately after his death. Also, in Visoko in contemporary Bosnia, there is street called The Alley of the *Shahid* Resul. In June 2016, Amri Babić was visited by a delegation including *Shahid* Resul's wife Masoumeh Barzegar and his son Mahdi Haydari, as well as Ferida *Čabaravdić*, who was the secretary of the Iranian humanitarian organization which provided cover for the Resul Hajdari during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Iranska delegacija u posjeti, 2016). This indicates that Iran and Bosnia succeeded in maintaining and even advancing all the

contacts they established during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his *shahid* will, Resul states that Iran and Iranian *mujahideen* will help Bosnian people in their fight against the infidels, and argues that if Bosnian Muslim are incapable of confronting the enemy, they should step aside and give the lead to the Young Muslims, Iranian *mujahideen* and Islamic countries (Appendix 35 to chapter III)[28]. In his speech, the then Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, expressed Iranian commitment to the principle of global Muslim solidarity extending beyond state boundaries and nationalities, and the readiness of Iran to help their Bosnian brothers in any aspect and by all means (Appendix 36 to chapter III)[29].

Iran was the first government to send covert arms supplies to Bosnia. The first shipment arrived in Zagreb in September 1992 with a Boeing 747 carrying ammunition, small arms, anti-tank rockets and communications equipment (Curtis, 2010, p. 178 (pdf reader)). On many occasions, after the end of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many war veterans, such as Prof. Mahmut ef Karalić, a veteran of the Seventh Muslim Brigade, gave speeches expressing their deepest gratitude and appreciations towards Iran due to their policy of shipping arms, supplying the *mujahideen* and supporting the Bosnian Muslim government with fighters, funds, arms and other shipments (Prof. Mahmut ef. Karalić, 2016, 45:04:00). He further related that Bosnian Muslim were engaged in true *jihad* when they were defending Islam from 1992–1995, referring to the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Prof. Mahmut ef. Karalić, 2016, 19:09:00).

In 1993, the Clinton's administration decided to facilitate covert arms shipments from Iran to Bosnia via Zagreb, despite the United Nations arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia that the United States had pledged to uphold, and despite the U.S. administration's policy of isolating Iran internationally. Officially, towards Croatia, the United States decided to apply the "no instructions" policy, as testified to by the then U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith on 30 May1996 before the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He stressed that he was instructed by Washington to tell the Croatian Government that he had "no instructions" on the matter if they were to ask him what position the United States would take if Croatia allowed Iranian arms to be transported across its territory on route to Bosnia (United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1998, p. 3). Unofficially, Clinton's administration and the Pentagon arranged secret arm shipments and the transport of *mujahideen* to Bosnia, flagrantly violating the UN security council arms embargo against all combatants in the former Yugoslavia. The key persons from United States in the arms shipment scheme were Clinton's National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Peter Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to Zagreb.

One of the many volumes of the Report published by the Dutch Parliamentary

Commission of Inquiry into the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 in January 2002 is devoted to clandestine activities during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Cees Wiebes of Amsterdam University, who had five years of unrestricted access to Dutch intelligence files, had the opportunity to study and research the covert operations of various secret services in Bosnia during the war in the 1990s for the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, after the Institute had been instructed by the Dutch government to carry out a study of all the events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica. The results of his research were published in his study *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992–1995: The Role of the Intelligence and Security Services* as Appendix II (Wiebes, 2002) of the Institute's Report on Srebrenica, entitled *Srebrenica: a 'Safe' Area*. His study comprehensively exposed the involvement of the United States in arming the *mujahideen* in Bosnia. His findings prove that terrorist groups fighting at the time in Afghanistan and Middle East, many backed by Saudi Arabia and Iran, were highly interested in traveling to Bosnia and waging *jihad* alongside the Bosnian Muslims in 1993. These groups were supported in their efforts by the Clinton administration and the Pentagon in terms of providing political and logistical cover for illegal arm shipments from Iran and Turkey through Croatia to Bosnia to equip the *mujahideen* and the Bosnian army (Wiebes, 2002, pp. 138–92).

Pakistan also was involved in arming the Bosnian Muslim forces, providing sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles. Saudi Arabia financed the arms purchases from Iran and Turkey, including through different Islamic humanitarian NGOs. These operations were arranged by the United States, Iran and Turkey in cooperation with the Afghan *mujahideen* and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah and numerous other terrorist groups. According to Professor Wiebes's findings, the U.K. intelligence service was fully aware of these ongoing channels from their outset, having evidence confirming direct deliveries from Iran. At the beginning, the arms were shipped on Iran Air aircraft, but once the shipments grew, a black C-130 Hercules aircraft was used. There is also evidence proving the close United States involvement through the Pentagon in the air deliveries, which also included transfer of *mujahideen* fighters to Bosnia (Aldrich, 2002; Wiebes, 2002, p.156). In fact, for this purpose, the U.S. military personnel tried to help the Bosnian Muslim Main Staff to construct an airport at the Visoko, but the efforts failed. At that time, a British soldier surveying the surrounding area of the town Gornji Vakuf saw members of U.S. Special Forces present. They stated that they were looking for landing places for their helicopters. One day later, a U.S. Hercules jet dropped equipment, ammunition and weapons, which were apparently transferred by helicopters to the Bosnian Muslim Army (Elzeser, 2006, p. 81).

Professor Wiebes's report reveals that Croatia kept between 20% and 50% of the arms for itself as a "transit tax." To cover the deliveries, the United States, as one of the nation's contributing troops for UNPROFOR for intelligence, used its AWACS

aircraft to cover crucial areas and were able to turn a blind eye to the frequent night-time comings and goings at Tuzla. The report also reveals that weapons delivered to Bosnia in the spring of 1995 ended up in the demilitarized and under siege enclave at Srebrenica after only four days (Aldrich, 2002). When these deliveries were noticed, the United State asked UNPROFOR to exclude this information from reports and used threats to silence Norwegian officials who protested against the flights. Also, UNPROFOR was covered by Cengic's network. Turkish and Malaysian UNPROFOR troops, in collaboration with TWRA (The Third World Relief Agency) were involved in smuggling light arms worth $15 million (Pomfret, 1996b).

The Iranian arms deliveries continued for around one year before being significantly reduced in late 1993 as the conflict between the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces intensified. In order to resume shipments, on 13 March 1994, a Muslim-Croatian federation was established under the auspices of the United States, thus ending the hostility between the two parties. On April 16, 1994 Peter Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to Zagreb, spoke with *Imam* Sefko *Omerbašić*, the religious leader of Zagreb's Muslim community, and forced him to buy arms for Bosnia. Namely, the very same day, Omerbašić told the Iranian ambassador to Croatia that two U.S. officials had encouraged him to acquire arms for the Bosnian Muslims by any available means (Risen, 1996). After President Tudjman was given a green light from the Clinton Administration to facilitate Iranian arm supplies to Bosnia, Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentić and Bosnian Muslim Deputy Prime Minister Ejup Ganić visited Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani in Tehran and drew up a tripartite agreement for arms supplies and humanitarian aid for Bosnian Muslims. On 4 May 1994, an Iranian aircraft landed at Zagreb Airport with 60 tons of explosives and equipment. In order to not attract any attention, shipments were not only delivered to Zagreb, but also to Albanian airports and to the Adriatic islands of Krk and Brac, from where the cargo was transported by helicopters to its final destination (Elzeser, 2006, p. 84). According to the U.S. government, the amount of equipment shipped from Iran varied from 5,000 to 14,000 tons from May 1994 to January 1996 (Curtis, 2010, p. 178 (pdf reader)).

In late 1994, the United States secretly hired the private company Military Professional Resources Incorporated, staffed with retired American generals and intelligence officers, to provide regular military training for Bosnian Muslims and Croatians. In the winter of 1993, fourteen Americans claiming to have served in the special forces trained Arab and Bosnian fighters near the town of Tuzla. The foreign mercenary team was led by Abu Abdullah, a former colonel in the United States military (Kohlmann, 2004, pp.74–75; Perle, 2007).

The United States also conducted covert direct arms deliveries to Bosnian forces,

making nighttime air drops at Tuzla air base in eastern Bosnia with C-130 transport aircraft. These became known as the "black flights". These operations were executed in coordination with Turkey and the Bosnian intelligence service. Supplies included anti-tank guided weapons to counter Bosnian Serb armor, stinger surface-to-air missiles to ward off helicopters, night vision goggles and Motorola radio sets to enable the ARBiH to operate more efficiently in large-scale offensive operations ("Allies and lies", 2001). Turkey proved to be the second most important arms supplier after Iran, playing a role in the Croatian pipeline from 1992. Specially modified C-130s flying from American bases in Germany and the United Kingdom picked up their cargo on remote runways, which consisted of arms and ammunition and were delivered there by Iranian and Turkish aircraft. In 1993, a Turkish pipeline actively operated, smuggling arms shipment from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei and Pakistan (Pomfret & Ottaway, 1996; Wiebes, 2002, p.172).

Another document that confirms both the United States-Iran-Turkey arm and foreign *mujahideen* shipments via Croatia to Bosnian Muslims and the presence of Iran in Bosnia is the declassified CIA Memorandum from a Principals' Committee Meeting, dated from 4 December 1995 written by the Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force for the Director of Central Intelligence (Appendix 2 to chapter III)[30]. The document also outlines the decision of the United States to eliminate the presence of Iran, its "temporary smuggling partner" in Bosnia, whose continued presence in Bosnia might had led to the creation of an Islamic State on the Balkans having strong links with Iran. In order to prevent such a scenario from occurring, the United States insisted on establishing an EU-oriented quasi-multi-ethnic federation that has mutated over time and has proven to be completely dysfunctional in all ways. In response to one of the questions that needed resolution, of how to eliminate the *mujahideen* and Iranian threat, it was suggested to "have the Bosnians eliminate all military contacts with the Iranians that goes beyond the Dayton agreement," and, as the Iranian arms pipeline to Bosnia was vulnerable to interdiction at several points, to establish checkpoints "on the border near Croatian airfields. Croatia could be pressed to stop its tolerance of Iranian arms ships. Frontline states could deny overflight clearance requests. Also, Turkey could be pressed to withdraw its support for Iranian flights, such as by allowing them to refuel in Ankara"[31].

Another important document stressing the United States concerns over the presence of Iran and Iranian- backed terrorist groups in postwar Bosnia is the CIA declassified Memorandum from Anthony Lake containing conclusions of the 5 December 1995 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia dated 7 December 1995 (Appendix 3 to chapter III)[32]. The conclusions on "Eliminating Mujahideen and Iranian Threats" were as follows:

> Principals agreed we must press the Bosnians more firmly on the need not only to remove foreign military and paramilitary forces as required by the Dayton agreement but also to break their military links and operational intelligence cooperation with Iran. Dick Holbrooke will travel to Sarajevo on Friday to deliver a strong message along these lines, stressing the risks that Tehran-backed terrorist groups pose to our troops and to our larger interests. John Deutch has agreed that we can present some of our intelligence about Iranian activities inside Bosnia so that Izetbegović will have no doubt about the depth of our concern. Dick will make clear that our readiness to help the Bosnians – both militarily and economically – will be jeopardized if the Bosnians do not break the Iranian connection.

The documentary film entitled *Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War* produced by the American film producer and journalist, George Bogdanic, confirms that U.S. intelligence was aware that since the mid-1980s, Iran had been training 250 Bosnian Muslims annually. According to Bogdanic, Iran has a number of strategic objectives in Bosnia, including firmly establishing an Islamic state in Western Europe. The Sarajevo regime, led by Aliya Izetbegović, is a radical Islamic regime that is closely tied to Iranian and other radical Islamic elements. That is why Osama Bin Laden and his international Islamic radical movement are very supportive of the Izetbegović regime (Clark's History Reels, 2016, 57:17:00). It was not until 1996 that NATO leaders worried about their own troops' safety and raided terrorist training camps in Bosnia run jointly by the Iranians and Bosnian government (Ibid., 58:13:00)

In his interview to Jurgen Elsasser, the German journalist and the author of the book *How the Jihad Came to Europe*, also confirmed that United States had supported global jihadi movement efforts during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referring to Al Zawahiri, Elsasser related:

> In the beginning of the 1990s, he traveled all through the United States with an agent of the US Special Command to collect money for the *Jihad*; this man knew that he participated in this collection of money as an activity that was supported by the United States. (Cattori, 2006)

And referring to the role of U.K. and U.S. secret services in the formation of the Balkan terrorist infrastructure, Elsasser stressed the following:

> The terrorist network that the American and British secret services formed during the civil war in Bosnia and later in Kosovo provided a reservoir of militants that we find implicated later in the attacks in New York, Madrid, London. Once the war was finished in Afghanistan, Osama Ben Laden recruited these

> jihadist militants. It was his work. It was he that trained them, partially with the support of the CIA, and put them in place in Bosnia. The Americans tolerated the connection between the President Izetbegović and Ben Laden. Two years later, in 1994, the Americans began to send weapons, in a common clandestine operation with Iran. After the treaty of Dayton, in November 1995, the CIA and the Pentagon recruited best of the j*ihadists* that had fought in Bosnia. I analyzed testimonies given by some *jihadists* interrogated by the German judges. They said that after the treaty of Dayton, which stipulated that all foreign ex-fighters had to leave the country, they didn't have any more money and had nowhere to go. As for those that could remain in Bosnia, because they had been provided with Bosnian passports, they were without work and without money. The day when the recruiters came and rang at their doors and proposed to pay them 3000 dollars a month to serve in the Bosnian army, they didn't know that they were recruited and paid by emissaries of the CIA to serve the United States. (Cattori, 2006)

The United Kingdom was also covertly supplying arms to both the Muslims and Croats in the early 1990s. For example, Operation Clover, planned and sponsored by U.S. intelligence with a $5 million budget, involved at least one British covert operative, Tom Carew. Also, in early 1992, with the help of Monzer al-Kassar, a British agent and arms dealer with close links to terrorists, the United Kingdom supplied Croatia, and eventually continued to apply the same scheme of arms shipments to Bosnian Muslims, with Polish arms and ammunition having false end-destination certificates indicating Yemen as a delivery point (Curtis, 2010, p.180 (pdf reader).

According to Bosnian Muslim military intelligence sources, the United Kingdom served as one of the main channels for foreign *jihadists* to enter Bosnia, while many sponsors and recruiters were located in and operating from London (Kohlmann, n.d., pp.4-10 (pdf reader)). In the context of the role of the United Kingdom in the global *jihad* movement, it is important to emphasize that the British Sunni fundamentalist movement, the establishment of which was inspired by the Iranian Revolution and the Afghanistan *jihad*, found in the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina an instrument for a wide practical implementation of their ideas. The BBC television broadcasts of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina depicting war crimes against Bosnian Muslims had a tremendous effect on the British Muslim community. Many British Muslims who were shocked and furious because Western countries did not intervene while such horrific events were taking place in Bosnia, became an easy target of the violent radicals calling on Muslims to take personal responsibility and do something about it themselves. British Muslim college students protested against the

persecution of fellow Muslims in Bosnia (Kohlmann, n.d., p.5 (pdf reader)). Many Muslims, mostly of Pakistani origin, living in the United Kingdom went to Pakistan, trained in the camps of the Pakistani terrorist group Harkat ul-Ansar (HUA) and joined the HUA's contingent in Bosnia. British and American intelligence agencies were completely aware of and actively facilitated these efforts (Curtis, 2010, p. 181 (pdf reader)).

In the summer of 1997, Azzam Recordings released a second audio tape on *jihad* experiences, produced in English under the title *Under the Shades of Swords*. It outlined some of the stories of *mujahideen* from all around the world, many of whom actively participated in the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It revealed the experience of Abu Mujahid, who, after graduating from university in 1993, came to Bosnia in the capacity of a charity employee. From 1993–1995, he was traveling back and forth between the United Kingdom and Bosnia, suppling Bosnian Muslims and *mujahideen* with valuable supplies under the cover of transporting medicine and food in central Bosnia. He was also engaged in fundraising throughout the United Kingdom for the Bosnian *jihad* cause. When he arrived back in Bosnia in 1995, he joined a *jihad* training camp run by Al-Qa'ida elite Egyptian trainers transferred to the Balkan region directly from Al-Qa'ida camps along the Afghan-Pakistani border (Azzam Publications, 1997; Kohlmann, n.d., p. 7 (pdf reader)). Also heard on the released tape is Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, at the time student at the London School of Economics (LSE), who joined the HUA during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1993, he was involved in a humanitarian mission financed by a humanitarian Islamic organization called Convoy of Mercy, which delivered both relief supplies to Bosnian Muslim civilians and covertly provided support to the Muslim fighters (Hannaford, 2005). In fact, in his autobiography, *In the Line of Fire*, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf writes that it is believed that while Omar Saeed Sheikh was studying at the London School of Economics, the U.K. intelligence agency MI6 contacted him and persuaded him to become actively engaged in demonstrations against Serbian aggression in Bosnia and, later on, even sent him to take part in the uprising in Kosovo and Metohija. Moreover, it is believed that while Sheikh was recruited by the U.K. intelligence agency MI6, at some point, he probably became a rogue or double agent (Musharraf, 2006, p. 225).

Another volunteer for the Bosnian *jihad* who obtained U.K. citizenship was the Egyptian Abu Hamza, who later became the notorious *imam* at the Finsbury Park Mosque in north London. He was known for indoctrinating vulnerable young Muslims, supporting Taliban leaders, having direct contact with Al-Qa'ida and recommending recruits for terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Under his leadership, the London mosque became a place where young boys were taught hand-to-hand combat, the use of knives, how to dismantle and reassemble firearms and surveillance

techniques. Amongst his alumni were Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker from the attacks of 9/11, and Mohammed Sidique Khan, the ringleader of the 7 July London bombings (McGrory & O'Neill, 2006; Leiken, 2007). In 1987, while participating in a *hajj* to Mecca, Hamza met Abdullah Azzam, and in 1990, he already was actively supporting the *mujahideen*, arranging for some of them that had been wounded to be provided with medical care in London that was paid for by wealthy Saudis. From 1991, Hamza had lived in Afghanistan with his family, and in 1994, he established his own organization in the United Kingdom called the Supporters of *Sharia*, with a goal of supporting global *jihad* and imposing *sharia* on all of the world ("About Supporters of Shariah", n.d.). It is known that he had visited Bosnia three times using a false name and under the cover of a relief worker. In fact, in Bosnia he stayed with the *mujahideen,* mostly with the Algerian factions, and acted as their advisor. He was one of the many *jihadists* with U.K. citizenship who were not submitted to any questioning after their return to the United Kingdom (McGrory & O'Neill, 2006, pp. 30–32; O'Neill, 2006).

United Kingdom's policy towards the *mujahideen* and regional *jihadi* efforts during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be described as "creating balance of power by supporting both and neither sides" (Curtis, 2010, p. 183-84 (pdf reader)) for serving U.K. interests in the region, and the Islamic extremists were perceived as a proxy tool for the cause. There is evidence that MI6 was highly active in recruiting agents during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and ran operatives at various levels, including in Izetbegović's cabinet (Curtis, 2010, p. 184 (pdf reader)). Hence, by facilitating the Bosnian *jihad*, the United Kingdom supported the development of global terrorism.

Italy, even before the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, hosted a transnational terrorist infrastructure providing for activities of numerous Islamic terrorist and extremist North African groups, including the GIA, *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya*, the Egyptian Islamic *Jihad*, and the Tunisian An-Nahdah movement. An enormous influence on Bosnian *mujahideen* was the former top *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* commander in southeast Europe located in Italy, Shaykh Anwar Shaaban, also known as Abu Abdel Rahman al-Masri, who became the *emir* of the *El Mudžahid* Detachment in Bosnia. Born in El Gharbia, Egypt, in 1982, he established contacts with relatives of extremists imprisoned for the murder of President Sadat. In 1987, he was actively engaged in recruiting fighters for the Afghan *jihad*. He entered Italy in 1989 from Kuwait after he left Egypt, as the Egyptian authorities accused him of being involved in terrorism. Anwar Shaaban had a close working relationship with Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, and also stayed in regular contact with Al-Qa'ida's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. Shaaban was in charge of a training camp thirty miles outside of Milan where foreign *jihadi* fighters heading to Bosnia participated in training for

using weapons and explosives (Schindler, 2007, pp. 163–164).

In his interview to Bosnian *Liljan* published on 15 November 1995 (Appendix 29 to chapter III)[33], Shaaban presented himself as an active missioner (*da'wah*) dedicated to the mission of spreading the true Islam globally. He said that he was living in Bosnia with his family. During his six years working as a Director of the Islamic Cultural Center in Milan, his *da'wah* was directed both towards Muslims living in the Islamic world and Italians who demonstrated interest in Islam. In 1992, Shaaban and his associates were actively engaged in activities related to the 200,000 Bosnian refugees who arrived in Italy. He spoke about their missioner called Jusuf Islam (known as Cat Stevens), claiming he had been sent to Albania in 1993 to operate there. He accused Western countries of aggressive policies and interference in the internal affairs of Islamic countries under the pretext of saving democracy. He was absolutely convinced that one day a true Islamic state would be established based on the *rashidini-Caliphs'* model of an Islamic state. Scrutinizing different sources about his life and the activities in which he was passionately engaged in, it is clear that he was a strong supporter and promoter of *dawa*, *jihad* and martyrdom, fighting by all means for the global *jihad* cause of establishing a true Islamic state. Consequently, he actively supported and participated in the Bosnian *jihad*.

According to the report of the Antiterrorist Section of the General Investigations and Special Operations Department of the Milan Police Station produced as a result of an investigation of the operations of the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Shaaban entered Italy on 8 September 1989, and in the very same year became the director and *imam* of the Institute. In 1995, he was accused by the Egyptian authorities, *inter alia*, of "helping Egyptian terrorists residing in Italy to go to the Republic of Bosnia in order to be trained to use weapons and be used under the guise of *jihad*, to serve the purpose of the Islamic group and be sent to Egypt with the task of committing terrorist acts causing damage to innocent people." The report reveals that during his time at the Institute, the Institute represented the most important center in Europe for the activities of both the Egyptian terrorist organization *Jamaa Al Islamiya* and *Al Jihad*. Shabban was supported in his efforts by Mahmoud Abdel Al Mohamed, also called Mohammad Shawki, the *emir* of the Islamic Union, the leader of the Sahabah Mosque in Vienna, and an important member of the *Islamiya* and *Al Jihad*, considered to be the most prominent figure of Sunnite radicalism in Europe, as well as by Abu Talal, the spokesman for the Al Thawba mosque in Copenhagen. Within the framework of the investigation carried out in connection with Shaaban, telephone interceptions were made in 1993, 1994 and 1995 that revealed Shaaban's close and ongoing relationships with many respected members of the terrorist organizations *Jammaa Al Islamiya* and *Al Jihad*, including Aiman Al Zhawahiri, Moustafa Hamza, Mohammad Shawki Islambouli, Moustafa Nawawa, Taha Rifai, Amu Talal, Talaat

Hammam Yassin, and many others considered guilty in their home countries of planning and committing crimes of terrorism. As a result, many of these figures found refuge in other countries, including Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Austria. Also, numerous telephone conversations were made to and from Yugoslavia by Shaaban. Among the persons with whom he was constantly in touch were Abu Abdel Aziz, Abu Hareth, Abu El Maa'li, and others.

Investigations of Shaaban and the Institute, conducted by the Italian counterterrorism police, led to numerous documents confirming Shaaban's strong support of *jihad* in Bosnia, including engaging the Islamic Cultural Institute in organizing paramilitary training activities for those interested in fighting in Yugoslavia. The Islamic Institute in Milan was also assigned the task of conducting propaganda activities on behalf of the Bosnian *El-Mudžahidin* Unit. A search of his office at the Islamic Cultural Institute resulted in confiscation of documentary material which confirmed the findings of the technical investigation. Among the confiscated documents related to Bosnia (Antiterrorist Section of the General Investigations and Special Operations Department of the Milan Police Station, n.d., pp.17–19):

- A letter dated 6 December 1994, signed by Abu Abdel Aziz, addressed to Abu El Maali, commander of the *El Mudžahid* Detachment in Bosnia. The letter mentions enormous sums of money intended for the Bosnian conflict, refers to a sum of about 400,000 DM already designated for the "laudable sheik Abdel Rahman (Anwar Shaaban) during his stay in Zagreb to be spent as he wishes." Among the other mentioned names are Mohammad Saddiq of Qatar (probably Ramzi Youssef, the main suspect in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York), and Tarek Issa of the Association for Revival of the Islamic Heritage;
- Two missives, one of which was sent by fax and addressed to Abu El Maali in Bosnia, referring to a pilgrimage to Mecca by "Bosnian brothers" and the other concerning the collection of funds for the *El Mudžahid* Detachment by Abu Abdel Aziz;
- A missive that the *imam* addressed to "Abu Mossaab" informing him about the war events in Visoko, Bosnia;
- A missive addressed to Haitham in which the *imam* informs the addressee that he met in Sarajevo Anwar Shaaban, an Islamic person who said that he was prepared to receive "trained Muslim youth, capable of training others" to use Russian and oriental weapons.

During the investigation, another letter was found written by Abu Al-Maali of

the Bosnia-Herzegovina office of the Islamic Cultural Institute and addressed to the Minister for AWQAF (the ministry in Islamic countries that is concerned with religious affairs) dated from 23 March 1995 (Appendix 30 to chapter III)[34]. According to the content of the letter, Abu Abdel Aziz came to Bosnia in 1992 and was a leader of a group of Arab *mujahideen* until December 1992, when he left Bosnia and handed over the command to Wahi Al-Din. Abu Al-Maali and Abu Abdel Aziz had a brotherly relationship. Abu Abdel Aziz came to visit Abu Al-Maali and the *mujahideen* in March 1994 and stayed with them for five days. Huge amounts of funds from Qatar were collected on the behalf of the *mujahideen*.

Another official document, no. 03/1-174-84-1, dated from 17 May 1995, issued by the Security Services Department of the Third Corps of the ARBiH (Appendix 32 to chapter III)[35], reveals some of the Abu Maali's efforts for the Bosnian *jihad* and some of his contacts. According to the information in the document, Abu Maali had contacts with Ahmed ef. Halilolvic from Travnik, E. Hasan and E. Muada from El Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The contacts were established at the end of April 1995. Abu Maali was supplied with 20 tons of weapons by E. Hasan, and also received organized supplies from the humanitarian organization *Al Haramain*. This reveals from inside the organizaiton the *modus operandi* of the transnational supply schemes and networks.

Some *mujahideen* representatives credit Sheik Anwar Shaaban with teaching, encouraging, and inspiring the fighters, and laying the same foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that Shaykh Abdullah Azzam had laid in Afghanistan (*Mujahideen Regiment of Bosnia Herzegovina*, 2000). Shaaban sought to take advantage of the Bosnian conflict in order to create a strong base for North African Islamic militants in Europe. Thus, in his letter sent by fax in September 1994 to a wealthy *jihad* supporter in Qatar, Shaaban asked for additional funds "to finance the purchase of camp equipment for the Bosnian *mujahideen* in view of another winter spent in war in former Yugoslavia" (Kohlmann, n.d., p.12 (pdf reader)). In his letter, he explains that:

> I'm convinced that based on today's facts, the Islamic projects in the European countries are a priority over all general Islamic projects, especially when based on what we have seen with regard to the possibility of establishing bases in these places in order to aid Muslims all over the world. (Ibid.)

It is also important to mention Mohamed Ben Brahim Saidani, an Italian fundamentalist influenced by Shaaban, and an *imam* of a mosque on Massarenti Street in Bologna, Italy. Saidani had participated in a guerilla training course held in Afghanistan in 1993 and, as a foreign fighter in the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

managed to recruit 30 locals for the *El Mudžahid* Detachment in Bosnia. He also established the Piccola Societa Cooperativa Eurocoop company in Italy that provided legal working permits for *jihadi* fighters and veterans, enabling them to travel to different parts of the world, including to Bosnia [36]. Jamal al-Fadl, an Al-Qa'ida lieutenant was instructed to meet Saidani in Zagreb in order to get intelligence information about the developments in Bosnia and report on this directly to Bin Laden (United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 2001, p. 997).

The official document obtained from the Eighth Criminal Department of the Civil and Penal Court in Milan containing a transcript of two phone conversations of Anwar Shaaban with Khaled and Abu Abdel El Aziz (Appendix 24 to chapter III)[37], confirms their direct involvement and collaboration in transferring *jihadi* fighters to Bosnian battlefields during the war and reveals the schemes they employed to carry out this mission. The phone conversations under No. 2347, on page 34, between Abu Avdel El Aziz and Shaaban are as follows:

Abu Abdel El Aziz: Tell me, do you have guys coming to Bosnia?

Anwar Shaaban: I am arranging for their arrival and it is successfully done. Also, I am engaged in something else. If it succeeds, we would be able to send you a lot of people.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: Let's hope for the best. Abu El Hareth called me from Bosnia and told me that he needs commanders for several battlefields.

Anwar Shaaban: I send to him two guys from here, they will be with Abu El Hareth in the next couple of days. They will be of great help to him, they are great.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: Another two brothers arrived from Bahrein, brother Abu Khallad and brother Mohamed El Fateh.

Anwar Shaaban: They did not transit from here. Have they already entered Bosnia?

Abu Abdel El Aziz: They told me that they came through Italy. There are another two guys that are trying to come to Bosnia.

Anwar Shaaban: I repeat, I am trying to apply a new channel...it would be very useful. The scheme is as follows: a new housing project is being set up as a cover in a particular area with the assistance of the UN.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: And then what?

Anwar Shaaban: If the project is approved, we would be able to infiltrate people as workers for the job, do you understand how? We can infiltrate them with documents and business badges.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: Ok. There is another scheme providing for them to be infiltrated as journalists.

Anwar Shaaban: That scheme was discovered. We will try to use this scheme as long as we can, but they got aware of it.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: Is it difficult?

Anwar Shaaban: Through this scheme we are trying to infiltrate the best men, only those who are to make a substantial contribution in Bosnia.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: Yes, of course, one or two. If we manage to transfer those guys to you, could you take them?

Anwar Shaaban: Of course, of course.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: Are they leaving you from Milan?

Anwar Shaaban: No, they are leaving from Milan once they are provided with journalist ID cards. They leave from Ankone which is located at 400 km from Milan.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: OK.

Anwar Shaaban: All among you who will come here will be well attended dear my sheik Abu Abdel El Aziz, no problems.

Abu Abdel El Aziz: The current account, is it open on the name of I.C.I?

Another official document from the Eighth Criminal Section of the Civil and Penal Court in Milan (Appendix 25 to chapter III)[38] reveals some of the activities of Shaaban's Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan supporting Bosnian *jihad* and promoting global *jihad*. According to the documents:

- The Institute held videotapes, books and video recording of television programs. Some cassettes contained speeches of Sheik Omar, the spiritual leader of the global *jihad* and the man behind the assassination of Sadat. Other cassettes showed speeches of a man called El Ouali;
- False blank documents were produced at the Institute and were then filled in. These documents were used when traveling abroad to Switzerland or Egypt because the Egyptian government applied capital punishment to *jihadi* members;
- Shaaban arranged for the mosque to control whether local butcheries run by Muslims were acting in accordance with *halal* standards and set fixed prices for meat, even if the owners opposed this. Trucks leaving for Shabaan's mosque were loaded and unloaded at a closed private property: a farmstead (Cascina Schezzita) in Via Cava Rossa of Cologno Monzese;

- A truck filled with supplies from Bosnia left from the farmstead carrying clothes and weapons;
- Another truck arrived from Germany in May or June 1993 with five people on board (Algerians and Moroccans). Three days later, the truck left with the same people on board and arrived in Bosnia with a help of a Croat who had been given $20,000 by Mohamed Shaaban for crossing the state border;
- There was an apartment situated 30 km from Milan that was used for storing weapons. It was used by an Egyptian who had been involved in Sadat's assassination;
- There was a man called Taha (Abu Eletha) who was in charge of sending weapons from Switzerland to Italy. Abu Mohamed, who worked as a librarian spoke to him about possible attempted assassinations against a minister or a writer;
- Ibrahim Shahat, a mosque leader in Austria was connected with Shabaan Mohamed and members of the Islamic Cultural Institute;
- Each group and each person had their own task and nobody knew the identity of the others. Group leaders issued orders received from Anwar Shaaban. The person above him was the other Shaaban, known as the Great;
- The Islamic Cultural Institute had information about upcoming assassination by members of international terrorist organizations.

On pages 19, 20 and 21 in the same document (Appendix 26 to chapter III)[39], a witness called Ramadan Kandil mentions key persons all called Shaaban: Shaaban Salah Din, having international contacts and financing the Islamic Cultural Institute, and most probably the Shaaban that was mentioned as the Great in the previous document; Anwar Shaaban, *imam* at Viale Janner and the head of ICI; and Shaaban Abdel Aziz Mohamed, the secretary of the mosque, the person in charge of everything that happened inside the Institute, and the main associate of *Imam* Anwar Shabaan. These pages reveal, among other things, that during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several cargoes of weapons had been dispatched from Italy. Volunteers had been trained in military camps located at about 50km from Milan for about ten days and then had left for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The organization's structure was hierarchical and the different groups did not know each other for security reasons.

Pages 16 and 17 in the same document (Appendix 27 to chapter III)[40] reveal that the Center in Viale Jenner agreed to send help for the Islamic cause in Bosnia. Trucks were sent to Bosnia with volunteers and weapons to support the Bosnian *jihad*. The Institute had its own print shop where texts in Arabic were reproduced and permits of stay were prepared. A paramilitary camp was organized near Triste,

from which soldiers were sent to Bosnia. Anwar Shaaban signed *jihad* manifestos and received funds from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which were deposited in a Swiss bank account in Lugano and in the account of "a Vatican bank" in Milan. The Institute was operating with a serious amount of funds and goods, including various real estate holdings and vans for transporting goods and people. The Institute maintained connections with similar institutes in Turin, Florence, Reggio E. (Emilia) and Rome. Anwar Shaaban was the contact person with Arabia and had visited some training camps in Afghanistan;

The document also contains the testimony of the witness Perida, a DIGOS (the General Investigations and Special Operations Division) inspector (Appendix 28 to chapter III)[41]. According to Perida's statement:

- The investigation into Nabil Ismail Feki and other persons frequenting the Islamic Cultural Institute in Viale Jenner begun in July 1993, since on 27 February 1993, the first attack on the Twin Towers in New York had taken place, and the name of El Feki was detected during the investigation into Sheik Omar Rahman, considered to be one of the perpetrators behind this terrorist attack. DIGOS' central service had reported the telephone number 02.40091946, registered to El Feki, the *muezzin* at the Institute founded in 1988;
- Rahman led *Jamah Islamiha*, and Al Zawairi led *Al Jihad*;
- The director of the Institute, Anwar Shaaban, wanted in Egypt as a political extremist, had emigrated from Egypt to Jordan and Saudi Arabia and had entered Italy in 1989 from Kuwait. He died during the war in Bosnia;
- The interception of phone numbers registered to the Institute, conducted according to permission obtained on 21 July 1993, included the phone number 02.4009246, registered to el Feki, thus confirming the link between the heads of the mosque and *Jamah Islamiha*;
- Shaaban was constantly informed via fax by the *imam* from Denmark and the *imam* from Vienna about the outcome of the attack carried out in Egypt against government officials;
- Abu Talaal, Jamah's spokesman, operated in Denmark. He attended the summer camp organized in Modena by the Institute. In 1995, he was killed in battle near Zagreb.

On 26 June 1995, during the search of the Islamic Cultural Institute (Appendix 38 to chapter III)[42], numerous documents were seized, among them those related to the Bosnian *jihad*, including a forged ID with the photograph replaced. The photo-

graph was that of Moktar, the leader of a Muslim battalion in Bosnia. Also found was another forged Italian passport with the photograph of the Egyptian terrorist Tahat, and a Danish passport registered to Kaled. However, the real person in question was Ahmani Ressam, who entered Italy on an authentic Bosnian passport on 14 May 1995 and was permitted to stay there on humanitarian grounds. Later, he left to Canada to join an Algerian group and was sentenced to 130 years imprisonment in the United States for carrying explosives. Also found in the search were twenty forged blank cards from UN for refugees and counterfeit UN stamps.

In the course of the above-mentioned investigation, the investigators established that the leaders of the Islamic Cultural Institute were heavily involved in supporting the Bosnian *jihad* between 1993 and 1995. During that period, the group was in contact with humanitarian NGOs in Bosnia and Croatia. There were transfers of weapons, funds and men to Bosnia.

On 26 June 1995, in a mission code-named "Operation Sphinx," Italian police arrested 11 suspected members of *Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya* (including ten Egyptians and one Palestinian) and carried out formal searches of 72 addresses across northern Italy, including Milan, with a special focus on Shaaban's Islamic Cultural Institute. The detained terrorists were charged accordingly. The Italian counterterrorism unit did not manage to find Shaykh Anwar Shaaban, who escaped to central Bosnia and Herzegovina to be gunned down in 1995 in a clash with Croatian HVO forces. However, the influential network in Italy and Bosnia established by Shaaban continued to prosper long after his death, thanks to Algerian *mujahideen* commander Abu El Maali, also known as Abdelkader Mokhtari, and his reputed lieutenant Fateh Kamel, also known as Mustapha the Terrorist. Kamel was born in Algeria and trained in Afghanistan in 1991, subsequently joining the *jihad* in Bosnia. He and his associates had multiple links with numerous international terrorist organizations around the world, particularly in Bosnia, Pakistan, Germany, and London.[43]

According to French intelligence, by 1995 the three most important persons heading the *El Mudžahid* Detachment in Bosnia were: Anwar Shaaban, who headed the Detachment politically; Abu El Maali headed the Detachment militarily; and Fateh Kamel, in charge of the Detachment's logistical matters, mostly coordinating the transfer of weapons, new recruits, and false documents to and from the Arab headquarters in Zenica.[44] Many members of Fateh Kamel's fighters continue to enter and leave the Balkan region even today.

The recruitment and organization on the ground among Bosnian Muslim was conducted by the Hodja Izudin ef. Kruško. It was decided that the Islamic fighters were to be housed in the premises of the school Jablanica in the municipality of Tesanj. These four individuals — Abu El Maali, Abu Hamza (Imad al Husin), Semsudin

Mehmedović (former chief of the Ze-Do canton police and member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament) and Hodja Izudin ef. Kruško — were to be the main operatives working on the creation of the terrorist network in Bosnia during the following 15 years (Galijašević, 2007, p. 100).

An official document prepared by the Agency for Investigation and Documentation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Agencija za istraživanje i dokumentaciju* - AID) registered under no. K-02/ 2-7-49 dated from 6 December 2001 (Appendix 33 to chapter III) [45], reveals operative information gathered on Abu Maali. Abu Maali arrived in Bosnia in 1992 via Italy. He used many identities for his cover in Bosnia, including: Adbel Khadir Makhari from Algeria, Halid Ibn Abdullah from Kuwait born in 1967, Halid Catic born in 1967 in Kuwait. Before Anwar Shaaban, the religious leader of the *El Mudžahid*, was killed in 1995, Abu Maali had been charged for security matters within the *El Mudžahid*. After this event, Abu Maali took over the leadership in the Unit. After the end of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Abu Maali participated in the formation and leadership of the *mujahideen* community in Bocinj, completing its formation in 1990 before he left Bosnia. In his absence, Imad Al Husein – Abu Hamza from Syria – was the leader of this Bosnian community. Also involved in the leadership of the community were: Awad Abdul Rahman Ayman, known as Abu Ayman from Syria; Saeid Shibi Seror, known as Abu Mi'nah from Egypt (he recently changed his name to Saeid Colic); and Durmo (Fargala) Eslam, known as Imad Al Misri from Egypt, who was later arrested on Ilizda and deported from Bosnia. Abu Maali was in constant contact with these individuals, who reported to him on the developments in the community when he was not in Bosnia. Abu Maali enjoyed unquestioned authority, not only in the above-mentioned community in Bosnia but among others belonging to the same group, regardless of their country of origin. He had a close relationship with Karim Said Atmani, who was arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina and extradited to France, and with the Algerian-Canadian, Fateh Kamel, who was considered to be the leader of the Algerian group in Montreal and was wanted on an Interpol warrant issued by France and arrested in Jordan in April of 1999. After Abu Maali left Bosnia in 1999, according to available information, he visited Bosnia three or four times using a false name Halid Ćatić, son of Taliba and Amine, born in Kuwait on 24 July 1967.

Abu Abdel Aziz Barbaros or Barbarossa, also known as Abdul Rahman al-Dosari, senior Al-Qa'ida recruiter, actively participated in the Bosnian *jihad* and made significant contributions to the creation of the Balkan terrorist infrastructure. After fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, where he took part in the holy *jihad* in the 1980s in response to the call of Abdullah Azzam for the need for *jihadi* fighters, he went to Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue the *jihad* and establish operations there. It is known that he established headquarters in the Mehirici camp in Travnik in central

Bosnia (Tam, 2018) and that several foreign contingents were trained by his battalions, among whom were many U.K. citizens, such as Baber Ahmed and Abu Hamza al-Masri, as Aziz was active in promoting the Bosnian jihad *inter alia* among U.K. Muslims. Barbaros also sought out and gained the blessings and endorsements of the *jihad* in Bosnia from notable religious leaders, such as the Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Baz, or Sheikh Al-Albani, a leading *Salafist* (Byman, 2019, p.43). The educational and ideological impact of the foreign *mujahedeen* on Bosnian society was greater than their military effect.

In his interview to Tawfiq Tabib from August 1994, who also was found by the FBI to have close links with Islamic radicals, Aziz overtly speaks about the nature of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina which he considered undoubtedly a *jihad* from the point of view of the global *jihad* movement. Azis described the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina as only an episode within a greater *jihad* effort, global in its geography and endless by its nature, stating:

> The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "The highest peak of Islam is *Jihad*." We were looking for *Jihad* (after Afghanistan). We found it in the Philippines, and in Kashmir. Only fifteen days lapsed (after the conquest of Kabul) and the crisis of Bosnia begun. This confirmed the saying of the Prophet (of Islam), peace and blessings be upon him, who said, "Indeed *Jihad* will continue till the day of Judgment." A new *Jihad* started in Bosnia, (we moved there), and we are with it, if Allah wills. (Tam, 2018)

Furthermore, in this interview, Aziz explains that he acted in the capacity of a field commander under the General Unified Armed Command in Bosnia and that commanders had full jurisdiction in the region for which they were responsible, which was mostly central Bosnia in his case. Aziz stated that he had a personal meeting with Alija Izetbegović, which confirms once again the links between Alija Izetbegović and the leadership of the global *jihad* movement that were established during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political support of the SDA for the international terrorists and radicals continues even to today, as it has basically remained the same structure since its outset. Moreover, according to Aziz, the best possible scenario that the foreign *mujahideen* hoped and fought for was the establishment of an Islamic state that could operate under any type of rule, religious or secular, during its first stage. In contrast, the worst scenario for them would be the one that has become reality since the Dayton Peace Accords, which is the creation of a mixed state with a mixed parliament or a government shared between the Muslims and the Christians. This should be born in mind when examining the discrepancies between the political statements of the Muslim political elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its practical

steps and lack of political will with regard to the fight against terrorism, extremism and radicalization. It is important to understand that today's cantons in the Bosnia and Herzegovina under Muslim control are ethnically the purest and most homogeneous in all of Europe. Today, in Sarajevo, Serbs, who were 30% of the population before the war, now number approximately 2.5% of the population. Croats also left Sarajevo en masse after the war. This tendency on the ground is a good indicator of the real intentions and goals of the Muslim political establishment in Bosnia.

As a consequence of the tolerant policies to which the Scandinavian countries adhere, they have been granting political asylum even to militant leaders escaping from prosecutions in their own countries. Hence, the region has gradually been transformed into an operational base for international terrorist groups, in particular for the *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* group. The Bosnian link to Copenhagen is Shaykh Abu Talal al-Qasimi, the head of the *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* group, a close friend of Anwar Shaaban and among the first Muslim clerics involved in supporting the Bosnian *jihad*. In Denmark, al-Qasimi found political asylum and continued to spread his radical message at the foreign office of *Al-Murabeton* in Copenhagen (Sheikh Abu Ithar, 1997–1998). At the time, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was engaged as an editor in Copenhagen (Kohlmann, 2006, p. 99). Al-Qasimi took an active position in supporting the Bosnian *jihad*. On 24 April 1993, Abu Talal al-Qasimi convened the first meeting of the Shura Council of the European Union in Copenhagen. Among the participants were Shaykh Anwar Shaaban from Milan and *Imam* Shawki Mohammed from Vienna. Al-Qasimi proposed to his colleagues to develop the Shura Council in Europe as an autonomous command apparatus to make decisions, coordinate efforts and mobilize shared resources in Europe to support nearby ongoing *jihad* operations without consulting *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* or *Al-Jihad* leaders located in Egypt or Afghanistan (Kohlman, n.d., p. 21).

Groups of young Algerian radicals from Sweden were also traveling to Bosnia to join the local *jihad*. Among them was Abu Musab al-Swedani, son of a Swedish mother and an Algerian father. Earlier he had traveled to Peshawar to participate in combat training and to join the Afghan *jihad*. He arrived in the region and joined the extremists based in the camp on Mt. Igman, under the leadership of "General" Abu Ayman al-Masri. Later, al-Swedani was killed in Bosnia by a sniper (*Mujahideen Regiment of Bosnia Herzegovina*, 2000).

Bosnian *jihadist* activities were financed principally from Gulf businessmen and Saudi "charities" that were sending aid and weapons. The overall public and private aid from Saudi Arabia to Bosnia during the entire war amounted to around $150 million (Kepel, 2002, p. 248). Al-Qa'ida also funded the *mujahideen* in Bosnia through a variety of channels, including through the Advisory and Reformation Committee

based in London (Kurop, 2001). As previously mentioned, Osama Bin Laden visited Bosnia several times between 1994 and 1998, obtaining a Bosnian passport that he obtained from the embassy in Vienna in 1993. He sent men and arms to Bosnia from Afghanistan, and also assigned Ayman al-Zawahiri the task of coordinating Al-Qa'ida's operations in Bosnia at the time (Curtis, 2010, p.178 (pdf reader); Kurop, 2001).

Yossef Bodansky, Director of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the U.S. House of Representatives, in his book under the title *Offensive in the Balkans*, wrote the following on the Bosnian *jihad* (Bodansky, 1995):

Indeed, the build-up of new Islamist units was completed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Spring of 1995. These forces are closely associated with the Armed Islamic Movement (AIM) and Islamist international terrorism, and include the first organized deployment of martyrdom forces (that is, suicide terrorists); both veteran Arabs and newly trained Bosnian Muslims. These recent activities were conducted under the guidance of the new Islamist headquarters in Tehran and Karachi, decided upon during the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC) convened in Khartoum in the first days of April 1995. The Conference decided to establish "new Islamist representative offices. for the international Islamist movement. The new regional center in Tehran will be responsible for Islamist activities (training, equipping, operational support, etc.) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (as well as other politically-sensitive hot spots), while the comparably new center in Karachi would be responsible for Islamist activities in Albania (including Kosovo). Furthermore, this overall Islamist effort and build-up is not just to cope with the situation in the Balkans, but also to be used as a sound base for the Islamists' ability to expand operations into western Europe – mainly France, the UK and Germany – in revenge for any military or diplomatic setback for the Sarajevo administration.

The AIM senior officials in Sarajevo included in their May 1995 report to the supreme leadership of AIM a strategic analysis of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the general context of the importance of the Mujahedin forces. They wrote that "[the] Mujahedin are preparing for major battles, expected to escalate this Summer. Military readiness is at maximum and the Bosnian army is planning to take back its Muslim land from the occupiers." In order to facilitate this escalation, total mobilization was declared in Sarajevo.

According to Bodansky, already in mid-May of 1995, senior AIM officials in Sarajevo had sent reports of a new camp, called the "Martyrs' Detachment" to absorb the high numbers of new mujadiheen who were arriving. Many of these, including at least a dozen Bosnian Muslims, had received intensive training in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1995 and were actually suicide terrorists. All these recruits had been sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina for operations in the Balkans as well as in Western

Europe, if the opportunity arose, particularly in France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Belgium. Bodansky relates that it was learned from high-level Middle Eastern sources that these suicide terrorists arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina were meant to serve as a core or center for operations throughout Europe. Indeed, by the summer of 1995, the Islamist infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina served as a new training center for European Muslims.

Regarding the relations between the *El Mudžahid* Detachment and UNPROFOR troops, there have been claims that the *mujahideen* units, consisting of foreign fighters who were citizens of different Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Libya and others, were based mostly in the areas of deployment of UNPROFOR units from the Islamic countries, particularly from Turkey, Malaysia and Pakistan. For example, according to some estimates, within the Turkish UNPROFOR battalion that was stationed in Zenica, there were approximately 150 bogus UNPROFOR troopers who were actually Bosnian Muslims and Muslims from the Raška region in the Repbublic of Serbia who had gone to Turkey in 1992 for training and schooling. Another *mujahideen* unit – *the Muderiz* (the Teacher of Islam) – based in Konjic, closely cooperated with the UNPROFOR Malaysian battalion located there. During a *mujahideen* attack on the Serb positions, the UNPROFOR Malaysian battalion assisted the *mujahideen* by taking out artillery pieces and leaving them east of Konjic for the fighters. Other examples include the cooperation of Muslim forces in the Kupres, Zenica and Banja Luka areas with the UNPROFOR Bangladesh battalion, which resulted in a significant degree of military success for the *mujahideen*. These cases demonstrate how UNPROFOR supported the *jihad* in Bosnia on a strategic and tactical level, which has led to the spread of global terrorism (Can, n.d, pp. 7–9).

5.4. *International Islamic Humanitarian NGOs Financing the Bosnian Muslim Political Leadership and Bosnian Jihad Efforts Prior to and During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

A CIA report from 1996 outlined 50 International Islamic humanitarian NGOs operating in the Balkans, one third of which had close links with Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al-Qa'ida, the Egyptian *Jamaah al Islamiyah*, Algerian terrorist organizations, Hezbollah and Hamas. This network performed the major functions of transferring funds to terrorist organizations engaged in global *jihad*, serving as a logistical infrastructure, and covering for terrorist activities by issuing fake documents and flight tickets and providing working places to cloak their true activities.

These organizations coordinated all their activities through coordination councils located in Zagreb and Sarajevo, applying the same *modus operandi* as the ones in Peshawar, Pakistan. They coordinated deliveries of arms and military equipment, organized training camps and provided medicine, medical equipment and humanitarian aid. According to CIA reports, the following organizations were most widely involved: The Egyptian Humanitarian Relief Agency, the Kuwaiti Rebirth of Islam Mission, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IGASA or IIRO), the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), and the Saudi High Commission (Shai, 2006, pp. 49–50). International terrorist organizations continue using these Islamic charities as a mechanism for financing the global terror infrastructure by investing funds in the establishment and further expansion of regional terrorist infrastructures, like the one that was created in Bosnia and extended throughout the Western Balkan region with an aim to extend further in Europe, integrate with European operational bases, and, thus, develop a unified platform for action on European soil.

According to the NATO report on Islamic NGOs operating in Bosnia from 1996 (Appendix 34 to chapter III) [46], the following international Islamic NGOs were actively operating and supporting the foreign terrorist fighters and Bosnian Muslim government during and after the war:

1. Third World Relief Organization (TWRA);
2. Red Crescent Iran;
3. International Humanitarian Hifsorganization (IHH);
4. The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief or Humanitarian Relief Foundation - Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), Turkey;
5. International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO, or known as IGASA in Bosnia);
6. Menschen Helfen Menschen (MHM);
7. Headquarters for Aid and Support of Iranian people (HASIP);
8. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation in Bosnia (Saudi Arabia);
9. Al Kifah;
10. La Pace per Tutti (Peace for All);
11. Qatar Charitable Society (QCS);
12. Muwafaku Foundation;
13. Dar al Ber Society;
14. Humanitarian Relief Agency of Egypt (HRAE);

15. Human Appeal International (HAI), UAE;
16. Human Relief International (HRI);
17. Balkan Islamic Center Zenica;
18. Islamic Relief Agency (IRA);
19. Islamic Relief Worldwide;
20. Islamic World Committee – Kuwait;
21. Kuwait Joint Relief Committee;
22. Merhamet.

Other Islamic NGOs operating with the same purpose in Bosnia not listed above include: *Da'wah*, Benevolence International Organization — BIF (Saudi Arabia); The Maktab Al Kidmat Charity (Peshawar, Pakistan); the CIRKIL organization (Al-Qa'ida); The Qatar Charitable Committee; Human Concern International; The Om al Qura Foundation; and the Saudi Joint Relief Committee (SJRC), The Saudi High Committee for Fundraising to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Shai, 2006, pp. 50–64).

The following briefly describes some of the organizations listed in the NATO report:

Red Crescent Iran. Registered at UN, the organization is financed by the Iranian government. The organization in Bosnia was engaged in providing humanitarian aid and serving as a cover for arms supplies to Iranian volunteers active in the Bosnian Muslim Army and for Iranian intelligence operations. The organization had branches in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Ljubljana. The Red Crescent was suspected of having ties with Egyptian *Jamaah al Islamiyah*, Hamas and Algerian terror organizations (Shai, 2006, p. 62).

International Humanitarian Hifsorganization (IHH). This organization was established by the Refah Party (Turkey), with headquarters in Germany and offices in Sarajevo and Zagreb. The organization had links with Algerian terror organizations and Iran. It is used as a mechanism for the Islamization of society and politics by applying the dialectical approach of a top-down process through the exercise of state power and a bottom-up influence via social associations (Shai, 2006, p.62; Yavuz, 1997, p. 63).

The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief or Humanitarian Relief Foundation - Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH). This is one of Turkey's most influential NGOs, operating in 135 countries, and which was formed

in 1992 and formally registered as a charity in Istanbul in 1995. Substantial evidence indicates that it also operates as a hidden arm of Turkey in different conflict zones of the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Yayla, 2019). In 1996, in a declassified report of CIA titled, "International Islamic NGOs and Links to Terrorism." IHH was identified as maintaining links to Islamist groups in both Iran and Algeria and of being one of fifteen NGOs sponsoring terrorist activities in Bosnia (Weiss, 2010). Esad Hecimović, a Bosnian investigative journalist, asserts that the IHH was linked to *jihadist* activity and arms trafficking during the Bosnia conflict (Hecimovic, 2010). Also, many IHH employees served as volunteer fighters with the Bosnian army in the town of Zenica (Hecimovic, 2010). A CIA report from the mid-1990s, claims a director of IHH in Sarajevo was linked to Iranian government operatives, but does not name the person in question (Berger, 2010). Since 2008, it has been designated as a terrorist organization by Israel because of its support for Hamas (Hamas is Exploiting Turkish, 2017) and has been investigated by European prosecutors as a key logistical supporter of Al Qaeda. In January 2014, Serbian news agencies reported that IHH was under investigation in Bosnia-Herzegovina for exporting weapons to Turkish companies that were suppling the *jihadis* in Syria. The Report suggested that the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) may have been working with several local charities and businesses, and even the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Defense (Manuga, 2014).

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO, also called IGASA in Bosnia). This organization was established in 1978, with its headquarters located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In 1993, IGASA's operations in the Balkans were run by Abd al Azziz Zaher, known as Abu Ans (leader of IGASA's regional office in Vienna), Jamal al Jibouri, known as Abu Mahmmoud al Iraqi (head of IGASA's office in Skopje), and Djamel Lermani, known as Abu Musab Djaziri (head of IGASA's regional office in Zagreb). Abu Musab would later serve in Kosov as one of the instructors of the *mujahideen* unit *Abu Bakr as-Sadiq*. In the 1990s, these three were arrested in Belgrade as members of the Islamic Salvation Front. It is important to mention that this organization, as well as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood's Sudanese wing, were working together on recruiting students from Sudan, Algeria, Palestine and Egypt into religious Islamic organizations such as IGASA and the Association of Islamic Students of Palestine. Also, there is some evidence that the IGASA branch in Peshawar, Pakistan was headed by Talaat Fuad Qassem, an Egyptian terrorist from *Jamaah al Islamiyah*. He came to the Balkans, and was arrested in Croatia and extradited to Egypt, where he was put on trial for terrorism. In the Balkans, the organization had offices in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zagreb, Split and Ljubljana. It mostly provided logistics, arms and ammunition supplies for the Islamist fighters in the region. It had three warehouses in Tuzla and delivered its supply trucks mostly from Italy via Split to Bosnia, but also sent supplies through Germany (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[47]. The

organization does provide humanitarian aid, but it also aids terrorist organizations such as Al-Qa'ida, Hamas, Algerian terrorist organizations, and the Egyptian *Jamaah al Islamiyah* (Shai, 2006, p. 62; Starr & Trifunovic, 2002, p. 42).

Menschen Helfen Menschen (MHM). This organization should be considered as part of the IGASA. Lacking valid ID UN cards, it operated illegally in Bosnian territory, providing assistance to the *mujahideen*. It had offices in Germany, Visoko and Zenica (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[48].

Headquarters for Aid and Support of Iranian people (HASIP). This organization provided aid for the Bosnian people, refugees, the elderly, and *shahids'* families. The organization had its offices in Split and Sarajevo. Taking into account its locations, it may have been involved in organized deliveries of arms and munitions supplies to the Iranian staff and volunteers in Bosnia (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[49].

Muwafaku Foundation. This organization was active between 1992 and 1996. Its headquarters was in London, with a regional office in Zagreb. It was headed by Safik Iyadi, a woman known for laundering schemes involving Kuwaiti money. A private Saudi entity, it also had offices in Germany, the United States, France, Netherlands and several Arab countries. The organization's main task in the region was to provide assistance to TWRA and deliver terrorists from Croatia to Bosnia (Starr & Trifunovic, 2002, p. 43). In Bosnia, it had offices in Zagreb (Director: Abdullah Ismailic and General Director: the Bosnian Chafik Ayadi), Jablanica (Director: Amir Nazak), Konjic (Director: Sallah Ismail), Mostar (Director: Abdullah Ismailic), Sarajevo (Director: Makhlauf Nabil Ben Mohamed Saleh from Tunis), Split (Director: Abdullah Ismailić), Zenica (Director: Bashir Mekni), and two offices in Tuzla. In Tuzla, among its other socially oriented activities, the organization offered intensive Arabic and English courses, and offered scholarships for students from Tuzla University, especially those studying medicine (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[50].

Dar al Ber Society. This organization is not registered at the UN. It actually represents a conglomerate of Islamic organizations from the Gulf states. It specialized in charity for children without parents, but it also provided for the local Muslims medicine and medical equipment to hospitals, educational programs for computer skills and Arabic and English language courses. It had offices in Zagreb (Director: Othman Al Hayder), Travnik (Director: Allaucu Malik), and Tuzla (Director: Jamal Z. Edin) (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[51].

Humanitarian Relief Agency of Egypt (HRAE). This organization had offices in Zagreb (Contact persons: Sutni Al Said and Amir Osman), Kairo, Sarajevo (contact person: Mohamed Skirbi), Split, Tuzla (head of office: Shebab El Din from Egypt), and Zenica (Director: Lofry Elsayed). They were providing clothing, food, medicine and medical equipment, medical attention, educational programs, scholarships, sport activities, etc. (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[52].

Human Appeal International (HAI). This organization is based in the United Arabic Emirates, with offices in the United Kingdom and various other countries. It is believed that the organization funds Hamas and is known to have been one of the members of the worldwide coalition of charities, Union of Good, headed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi (The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, n.d.) During the war in Bosnia, the organization had its offices in Zagreb (head of office: Hayed Osman Ahmed), Sarajevo (head of office: Mousa Al-Razi), Tuzla (head of office: Wassera Abu Husein), Ajman (contact persons: Basam Nasir and Ahmed Jarusuf), and Zenica (head of office: Bilal Memisevic; Director: Mausa Al Raci from Jordan. The office staff in Zenica came from Bosnia, Jordan and Sudan. The organization was providing food, clothing, transportation, evacuation of the wounded, medical assistance, medicine and medical equipment, social care programs, educational programs, and funds to schools (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[53].

Human Relief International (HRI). This organization was funded by the Muslim Brotherhood and it had links with the Egyptian medical associations and many terrorist organizations, particularly with Egyptian *Jamaah al Islamiyah*. For example, the HRI offices in Albania were run by members of *Jamaah al Islamiyah*, including Anwar Shaaban. Subsequently, the HRI offices in Albania were closed due to the pressure from the United States (Shai, 2006, p. 63). During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had offices in Zagreb (head of office: Farid Al Zayat), Sarajevo (head of office: Farid Al Zayat), Split, Tuzla (Directors: Saureh Yassin and Basel Sulejman from Egypt), Zenica (Director:Ayman Hassan from Egypt, with the remaining staff from Palestine, Egypt and Canada), and in London (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[54].

The Al-Kifah (*Struggle*). This is a refugee center in New York, established in the mid-1980s by Egyptian Mustafa Rahman as a joint venture with Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, spiritual leader of *Gamaat al-Islamiya*. It engaged in recruiting and raising funds, first for *mujahideen* headed for Afghanistan, then for *mujahideen* going to Bosnia (Walker, n.d.). It was also involved in arranging transportation for *mujahideen* to Bosnia. During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had its offices in Zagreb and Sarajevo (head of office: Abdemadjid Benaissa (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[55].

La Pace per Tutti (Peace for All). This organization's headquarters were located in Milan and it had offices in Sarajevo (contact person: Aimad Maid), Zenica and Zagreb (contact person: Saadeldin Bahr) It was directly involved in the arms shipments to Bosnia. Some of its employees of Algerian origin were later arrested due to charges that they were involved in planning the terrorist bomb attack in Parise. Most of its staffs were from North Africa (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[56].

Qatar Charitable Society (QCS). During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this organization had offices in Zagreb (head of office: Sayed Raafat from Egypt), Tuzla (Director: Besham Mahdy from Egypt, and most of the staff from Egypt, with only one Jordanian), and Zenica (Director: Muhamed El Haga) (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[57].

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation in Bosnia (Saudi Arabia). The Foundation acts as a private, charitable and educational NGO that actively provides support throughout the world for the Al-Qa'ida network. All its branches, including the Bosnian, have received and/or provided financial, material and/or technological support to or from the Al-Qa'ida network, including *Jemaah Islamiyah*, *Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya*, the *Egyptian Islamic Jihad* and *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba*. The Bosnian branch was linked to the Egyptian terrorist group *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* that was a signatory to bin Laden's statement from 23 February 1998 establishing the "World Islamic Front for *Jihad* against the Jews and the Crusaders" (United Nation Security Council, 2009). During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had offices in Zagreb, Rjeka, Albania, North Macedonia and Bosnia, Sarajevo, Tranvnik and Visoko (Appendix 34 to chapter III)[58]. The Bosnian branch was headed by Ibrahim Sati and it had a direct contact with the Internet website of Azzam Publications, Al-Qa'ida's propaganda site. Since 2002, *Al Haramain* has been designated as a terrorist organization. As a result of a NATO raid on its offices in Bosnia, documents were seized that confirmed its connection to Al-Qa'ida. In May 2003, the organization started to operate in Bosnia under a new name of Wazir, but remained at its old premises. Its activities were banned and its offices in the Balkans were shut down due to pressure from the United States (Shai, 2006, p. 57).

Da'wah was one of the domestic Islamic organizations in Bosnia working on the radicalization or "purification" of Islam among Bosnian Muslim, paving the way and preparing the ground for the upcoming Bosnian *jihad* before the war. According to an official report dated 10 April 1995 on the performance of the Bosnian Islamic organizations, *Da'wah* was established by religious individuals two years before the outset of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the purpose of Islamizing, or, as indicated in the report, "purifying" the Bosnian Muslims and spreading *jihadi* ideology through: education of Muslim individuals and families; education of Muslim society; and fighting for Islam to become a world religion. The organization consists of 15 groups (*dzemata*) and has a representative body, *Sura*. Numerous courses based on the Koran and *Sunnah* about purity, prayers, monotheism or *tevhid*, Islamic creed or *aqidah*, are organized thanks to generous contributions from Saudi Arabian sheikhs. Sheiks Ebu Abdullah Mazin and Ibrahim are mentioned as the main contributors to the efforts of raising pure Muslim individuals and pure Muslim families (Appendix 1 to chapter III)[59].

Benevolence International Foundation – BIF (Saudi organization). This organization opened its offices in Sarajevo, Zanitsa and Zagreb. The trial of Enaam Arnaout, the BIF Director in the United States sheds light on BIF activities in the Balkans. According to one of the documents confiscated during the Bosnian police raid conducted in March 2002 of the Bosnian offices of the BIF, the BIF office in Croatia was established to provide humanitarian aid and finance the Bosnian *jihad* with the goal of helping its comrades there to block the Jewish-Crusader attack on Islamic soil (Shai, 2006, p. 53). During the raid, the police found weapons, military manuals, a fake passport, photographs of Bin Laden, and other items (Woehrel, 2005, p. 4).

Active Islamic Youth (AIO). This organization was supported in the past by Mr. Haris Silajdžić. It advocated that Bosnia should adopt *sharia* law and had plans to form a radical Muslim party with radical positions towards the United States and Israel. Several observers and intelligence operatives in the area contend that the group enjoys support from many in the AID (Agency for Research and Documentation – Federation Intelligence Agency). According to available intelligence information, AIO is still funded by Islamic humanitarian NGOs and other terrorist organizations and militant groups. In October 2001, the U.S. Embassy asked the federal government to close the following organizations: Active Islamic Youth, *El Harmein*, *El Furkan*, the Saudi High Committee, and International Islamic Relief (Lugert, Munro & Stephens, 2002, p. 88, 96). According to some media records, the AIO is actually a front for the Saudi High Commission for Relief and the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (De Quetteville, 2004).

The Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). The first organization on the NATO list is the most significant. The TWRA was founded in Vienna in 1987 by the Sudanese Elfatih Hassanein and his brother Sukarno Hassanein. It is governed by a committee composed of Elfatih Hassanein, Hasan Čengić, Irfan Ljevaković, Husein Zivalj and Derviš Đurđević. All of them are highly positioned in the SDA, and all of then, with the exception of Irfan Ljevaković, were persecuted together with Izetbegović in 1983. All five members must approve any spending above $500,000, and the approval of three members is sufficient for smaller transactions (Schindler, 2007, pp. 148–152).

During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia's Muslim-led government ignored the United Nations arms embargo and purchased black market weapons worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Illegal arms shipments (machine guns, missiles and other weapons) were being delivered to Bosnia for the needs of the Bosnian army and the *mujahideen* in containers marked as humanitarian aid (Burr & Collins, 2006, pp. 140–41). According to Austrian investigators, $350 million flowed to Bosnia from Muslim countries and radical Islamic movements through bank accounts of the Third World Relief Agency. Western intelligence sources estimate that at least half of

the funds was spent on illegal arms deals and their subsequent covert deliveries to the Bosnian government army. Contributors to the TWRA for the needs of Bosnian *jihad* were: Iran and Sudan (big contributors), Saudi Arabia (largest contributor), Pakistan, Turkey, Brunei and Malaysia, and Osama bin Laden.

The TWRA had ties to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian cleric who was convicted of planning several terrorist bombings in New York and is linked to the group that carried out the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 (Pomfret, 1996b). The TWRA will open offices in Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Mostar, Ogeysn, Drvepik, Knin, Visoko, Sarajevo and Istanbul (Galijašević, 2007, p. 90).

Elfatih Hassanein, a TWRA leader, is a member of Sudan's government party and a follower of top Sudanese leader Hassan al-Turabi. He has worked with bin Laden and the "Blind Sheikh," Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman. He became the main agent in Europe for marketing and selling video and audio tapes of Abdul-Rahman's sermons. In March 1992, the Sudanese government granted him a diplomatic passport and he used it to illegally transport large amounts of cash from Austria into Bosnia without being searched.

The fact that Islamic countries were financing activities of the SDA leadership through TWRA and Elfatih Hassanein, including using Hawala (an alternative remittance system *inter alia* extensively used for financing international terrorism) (Sandhu, 2004) can be confirmed with the following documents collected by the Secretariat of this Commission from different intelligence sources and archives:

- Letter of authorization by Haris Silajdžić, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 10 February 1992, wherein, on behalf of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he authorizes Elfatih Hassanein to receive donations and purchase aid for the needs of Bosnian refugees located in Bosnia, Slovenia and Croatia, and to deliver food, clothes, medicines, medical equipment and money to their centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia (Appendix 4 to chapter III)[60];
- Handwritten letter by Izetbegović to Fatih Hassanein dated 6 May 1994, wherein he addresses him with the words "Dear brother Fatih" and asks him to give to Edhem *Bičakčić*, the deputy president of SDA, 500,000 DM for the needs of the party. Edhem Bičakčić is one of the founders of the SDA party and the former Prime Minister of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) entity (Appendix 5 to chapter III)[61];
- Handwritten letter signed by Alija Izetbegović dated 22 August 1993 (Vienna) confirming that he took 60,000 DM from Elfatih Hassanein. Taking into account the fact that the text was written on blank paper of a Hilton hotel

(Vienna), it can be concluded that all the meetings where money was given as cash by Hassanein to Bosnian officials were conducted at the Hilton Hotel in Vienna (Appendix 6 to chapter III)[62];

- Document containing a short biography of Hassanein and a brief overview of his efforts for the radical Islam cause. The documents confirm that he was a close friend of Alija Izetbegović and one of the main promoters of radical Islam in Eastern Europe. From the moment he came to Yugoslavia and completed his studies at the Faculty of Medicine in Belgrade, Hassanein was highly engaged in Islamic activities, founding several organizations in Yugoslavia, such as the Society of Islamic Students in Eastern Europe (*Udruženje islamskih studenata u Istočnoj Evropi*) in 1967, the Muslim Society of Yugoslavia (*Jugoslovensko muslimansko udruženje*) in 1996, out of which the SDA was later created under the leadership of Alija Izetbegović. Hassanein participated in translating into Serbian and publishing the first Islamic books in 1973, such as *Islam the Religion of the Future* by Sayyid Qutb. He paid the expenses of those involved during the Sarajevo process trial and was the head of the TWRA located in Vienna. During the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he provided help for wounded Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was authorized by Alija Izetbegović to act as his representative to collect funds and donations in the Islamic countries. In 1991, Hassanein was appointed as an Executive Director of the Islamic Council for Eastern Europe. At the time, there were plans to convert this Council into a leading Islamic organization for Muslim affairs in Eastern Europe (Appendix 7 to chapter III)[63]. The document shows that from the moment Hassanein arrived in Yugoslavia, he dedicated his life to building a regional radical Islamic network as part of a transnational Islamist platform by establishing close links between the Bosnian political elite and Islamic countries and radical groups and individuals;
- Handwritten letter signed by Hasan Čengić dated 22 June 1993 confirming that he took $200,000, 500,000 DM and another $250,000 from Fatih Hassanein in Vienna. This too was written on Hilton Hotel paper in Vienna, further confirming that all money given as cash by Hassanein to Bosnian officials was conducted at meetings in Hilton Hotel in Vienna (Appendix 8 to chapter III)[64];
- A debit advice dated 3 March 1993 sent from Erste Bank (Filiale Garben) to the TWRA to inform them of an international payment resulting in a $600,000 deduction from their account. The reason indicated for the payment is the purchase of 20 satellite telephones for Hasan Čengić from Multicom

Information Systems LTD (Appendix 9 to chapter III)[65];

- Invoice from the Hilton Hotel in Vienna addressed to Hasan Čengić, Sudan Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia for a one-night stay (4 September 1992–5 September 1992), room service, use of the business center and phone calls (Appendix 10 to chapter III)[66]. The invoice shows that the business visit of Čengić in Vienna was paid for by the Sudan Embassy in Zagreb;
- Handwritten letter signed by Hasan Čengić dated 25 June 1993 (Vienna) confirming that he took 500,000 DM from Fatih Hassanein for the needs of the "International community" in Zagreb. The text was again written on Hilton Hotel blank paper (Vienna), indicating that the money was handed over at the Hilton Hotel in Vienna (Appendix 11 to chapter III)[67];
- Handwritten letter signed by Alija Izetbegović dated 22 August 1993 (Vienna) confirming that he took 300,000 DM from Fatih Hassanein. The text was again written on Hilton Hotel blank paper (Vienna), indicating that the money was handed over at the Hilton Hotel in Vienna (Appendix 12 to chapter III)[68];
- Specification by the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb dated 8 August 1993, wherein the Embassy specifies on what they spent the funds received from Hasan Čengić on 29 July 1993, amounting to 20,000 DEM (Appendix 13 to chapter III)[69]. Obviously, part of the funds provided by Islamic countries and handed over personally to Hasan Čengić in Vienna, most probably at the Hilton Hotel, was also used for financing the work of the Bosnia nd Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb, as it was the key embassy in the context of arms shipments for the Bosnian Muslims that went through Zagreb. A Purchase Agreement signed on 08 January 1993 between Hasan Čengić on behalf of TWRA (as a buyer) and Hudoletnjak Ivan as the representative of the company Memerson (as a supplier) from Croatia for purchasing two helicopters MI-8T, demonstrated once again the crucial role of Zagreb and TWRA in international arm deals and supplies for Bosnian Muslim political establishment and its army (Appendix 14 to chapter III)[70];
- Contract for the purchase of two MI-8T helicopters dated 8 January 1993. The buyer, TWRA, is represented by Hasan Čengić and the supplier is Memerson from Croatia, represented by Hudoletnjak Ivan. The deal amounted to $1,020,000 (Appendix 14 to chapter III)[71];
- Invoice number 1812-1D-015 per issuer 34C dated December 4, 1993 amounting to 619,450 DEM issued by Multicom Information System Ltd. for the Fourth Corps of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Army for supplied equipment and relevant services. In the left corner at the bottom of the invoice it is noted

that the order was made upon approval of Hasan Čengić and the merchandise was received by Sejo Sejmen (Appendix 16 to chapter III)[72];

- Intelligence document revealing that on 14 September 1993 at the Hotel President in Geneva, a meeting was held which was attended by Alija Izetbegović, President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ejup Ganić, Vice President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdžić, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Elfatih Hassaneein, Director of TWRA. The following conclusions were reached: 1) To add two new members to the TWRA Board of Directors, Irfan Ljevaković and Đurđević Derviš; 2) To establish a new bank with the following stakeholders: the SDA, the International Community for Helping Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Međunarodna zajednica za pomoć muslimanima Bosne i Hercegovine*), the TWRA, *Merhamet*, the Gazi Husrev-beg medrasa, the Muslim Cultural Society *Preporod*, the Organization for Helping Families of Martyrs (*Organizacija za pomoć porodicama Sehita*); and several stakeholders from Islamic countries; 3) To extend the supervisory board with a new member, Teufik Velegic from Vienna; 4) To develop a report on received and spent funds for providing aid to Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and 5) Ejup Ganić and Elfatih Hassanein to continue with their trips to Malesia, Brunei and Indonesia (Appendix 17 to chapter III)[73];
- Official letter dated 1 January 1994 signed by Alija Izetbegović and addressed to Dr. Elfatih Hassanein in Istanbul. According to the letter, a board of five members would manage the funds of the Relief Fund for aid to Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovia deposited in the bank account number 51364476 at the Die Erste OCS Bank in Vienna: Dr. Elfatih Hassanein, Hasan Čengić, Irfan Ljevaković, Husein Živalj and Derviš Đurđević. The Director of the Board was Dr. Elfatih Hassanein. To withdraw an amount up to $1,000, only the Director's approval was needed. For amounts of less than $500,000, approval from at least three members of the board was needed. For any amount exceeding $500,000, Alija Izetbegović and the entire board had to give consent (Appendix 18 to chapter III)[74];
- Handwritten letter signed by Hasan Čengić dated 10 December 1993 (Vienna) confirming that he took 1,000,000 DM from Fatih Hassanein for the needs of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Appendix 19 to chapter III)[75];
- Handwritten letter signed by Senad Šahinpašić-Šaja addressed to Fatih Hassanein wherein he asks him to pay for invoice amounting to 929,000 DM issued by the Midest Edelmann GMBH (Appendix 20 to chapter III)[76]. Senad was an SDA official, Izetbegović's favorite tycoon, a close friend of

Bakir, a business partner and long-time friend of Alija Delimustafic, a former parliamentarian, one of the richest Bosniaks, who operated in Germany and Austria during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was involved in fund-raising and funds-smuggling operations for the Bosnian *jihad*. It is believed that he took substantial parts of these funds for himself (Schindler, 2007, p. 152);

- Handwritten letter dated 20 April 1993 confirming that Šuajb Šeta received $500,000 from Fatih Hassanein through Sukarna I., which he was obliged to subsequently hand over to Hasan Čengić (Appendix 21 to chapter III)[77]. There is evidence that through the Logistics Center in Zagreb (Samobor Group), managed by Hasan Čengić and Šuajb Šeta, nearly two million German marks and over half a million dollars were spent just in the first two years of the war (Mijatović, 2015).

The Minutes of the hearing of the accused Cviko Amer at the Bavarian State Criminal Police Office from 9 February 1995(Appendix 22 to chapter III)[78] depicts in details one of the TWRA's financing schemes in collaboration with Alija Izetbegović and his closest associates for the needs of the Bosnian *jihad*. It was suspected that Cviko Amer and Senad Šahinpašić-Šaja, in collaboration with others, organized and coordinated deliveries of weapons, ammunition and other items from Germany to the war zone of the former Yugoslavia without the necessary approvals. Invoices for all services and purchases of humanitarian aid and other supplies conducted by Senad Šahinpašić on behalf of Izetbegović for the needs of the government and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were sent to Fatih Hassanein and paid by TWRA in Vienna[79]. Senad Šahinpašić received donations from many Islamic countries for the cause in Bosnia. Hasan Čengić, working at *Merhamet* in Visoko, was responsible for distributing the goods that Amer delivered, and Senad Šahinpašić was responsible for procuring goods. Amer was instructed by the Bosnian government to go to Germany together with Senad Šahinpašić and work for *Merhamet* there. Thus, Cviko Amer and Senad Šahinpašić were responsible for placing orders (for batteries, antennas, radios, etc.) for the main logistical center in Visoko and for the Bosnian authorities through the Bosnia and Herzegovina Embassy in Bonn. The ordered goods were purchased and supplied by Edelmann, and later invoiced to TWRA. All goods were first delivered to *Merhamet*'s warehouse in Zagreb and then distributed to Bosnia. After some incident with Croatian authorities, the center was relocated to Split. Shipments were conducted through IGASA (Zagreb, Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo). At the instruction of Izetbegović's government, Cviko worked at the Bosnia and Herzegovina embassy in Bonn and at the Consulate General in Stuttgart, acquiring diplomatic status from 12 September 1992.

According to available information, there is evidence that Senad Šahinpašić-Šaja, together with Fatih Al Hassanein and Hasan Čengić, was one of the most influential members of the radical Islamic organization *CIRKL*, founded by Osama Bin Laden and Shah Omar Abdal Rakhman in order to establish complete control of the Bosniak political and military elite by investing hundreds of millions of dollars and to provide funds to the *mujahideen* and other terror organizations, thus establishing a terrorist infrastructure throughout the Balkans. Besides being responsible for arranging arms shipments, Senad Šahinpašić-Šaja was engaged in criminal activities in Germany and Austria. There he organized a terrorist group which conducted numerous murders, robberies and extortion schemes. The stolen merchandise was delivered to Bosnia and Herzegovina territory controlled by Muslims during the war (Patriot's Team, 2004).

It is important to note the findings revealed in the Dutch documentary film *Sarajevo Ricochet,* which shows how Al-Qa'ida financed Bosnian *jihad* and the Bosnian government in order to establish training camps and an operational base in Bosnia, which were later extended into Albanian territory. It is informative to quote some parts of the interviews from in the film. Tom Corrigan, a New York City Police Department Detective, spoke about the Al-Qa'ida group:

> When I got assigned to the Al-Qa'ida squad I kind of kept an ear on to the "Third World Relief Agency," but a lot of that stuff that was going through it was not blankets, and, you know, children diapers and all. It was all military hardware that was going through, super sophisticated stuff… A phenomenal amount of money that was going through there…. (illogic2tube, 2011, 00:01:20)

The Third World Relief Agency actually distributed money and weapons for *Jihad*. The filmmakers investigated the TWRA with the help of the Bosnian Police and American juridical and investigative documents. Those documents prove that the TWRA paid a large amount of money to the Multicom Information Systems Company. As it turned out, the owner of the company was Muradif Pajt, a retired intelligence officer who specialized in communications and who was helping the Bosnian government during the war. The filmmakers acquired information which points to a clear connection between Al-Qa'ida, the TWRA and Cengić. Their documents reveal that Hasan Čengić transferred money to Vael Julaiden, the founder and financier of Al-Qa'ida, who is from Saudi Arabia, just like Osama bin Laden. According to John R. Schindler, a chief analyst at the U.S. National Security Agency, this network of Islamic NGOs and its *modus operandi* begun to spread in other conflicts as well.

According to Schindler, Izetbegović's government not only sacrificed some of its own civilians for the greater cause, but actually eliminated many political oppo-

nents using a secret service unit called Sheve, which was linked to Al-Qa'ida and trained by the Iranians. The Iranians were involved in what is considered wet work, very ugly assassination type operations in Bosnia on behalf of the SDA government. They were training their comrades, and showing them how to do it.

In 1994, Elfatih Hassanein traveled to Istanbul. He was under investigation for money laundering and smuggling of weapons. Elfatih and the TWRA were awarded the Bosnia and Herzegovina Order of Merit by Izetbegović.

The Clinton administration knew about the existence and activities of TWRA, but did not intervene, as Clinton played a role in the arms shipment scheme via Croatia to Bosnia. Austrian and German authorities also did not take any action to shut down the TWRA or to stop its fund collecting and arms purchases. The case of TWRA actually demonstrates how the arm embargo, coupled with the Western countries' policy of turning a blind eye to these dangerous processes, contributed to the creation of the Bosnian foundations of what would later on develop into a Balkan regional terrorist infrastructure by having paved the way in 1990 for the Bosnian Muslim government to establish close links with the world's most radical states, as well as terrorist movements.

The Bosnian *jihad* created a new generation of *jihadists* that received military training and combat experience and brought it back to their home countries. After Bosnia, many *mujahideen* reached high leadership positions in *jihadist* groups in the United States, Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Chechnya, and Kashmir. The deployment of Islamic terrorists in Bosnia occurred when the Al-Qa'ida movement was just at an early stage of its development, and the experience it gained in Bosnia had long-lasting, strengthening effects on the group. Furthermore, the Bosnian *jihad* enabled militant terrorist cells from around the world to establish close collaborations and links, and integrate within a single transnational network. As a consequence of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, numerous terrorist facilities have been established in Bosnia: schools, NGOs, mosques, operational bases, cultural centers, banks, business entities, etc., that enjoy the political support of the Bosnian Muslim government. By the summer 1995, the Islamic terrorist infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted the core of a new training center in the Balkans for European Muslims. By the end of the war, the United States was pressing the Bosnian government to expel the *mujahideen* prior to the arrival of NATO peacekeeping troops, as required by the Dayton Accords. To evade this, the Izetbegović government simply issued thousands of Bosnian passports and other paperwork to members of the foreign battalions (De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2014, p. 5). Up to 400 of their members are believed to have settled in Bosnia, many of them marrying local women. With valid documentation, lingering groups of *mujahideen* were able to operate without

significant interference from the UN, the United States or NATO. Many of the most dangerous elements were also protected by religious and political hardliners at senior levels in the Bosnian government (Curtis, 2010, p. 185 (pdf reader)).

6. Fourth Wave of Radicalization: The Contemporary Regional Islamic Terrorist Infrastructure as the Foundation of the Balkan Caliphate

The Balkan-ISIS connection is not random and it derives from the Bosnia-ISIS connection. Indeed, the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the 1990s was a crucial period in the history of modern *jihadism*. In many respects, Bosnia is where contemporary *jihadism* took shape, culminating in the rise of ISIS. The *El Mudžahid* Unit recruited local fighters to join their brigade, and, in doing so, introduced a global brand of hardline Islamism into the Bosnian population. Islamic extremism in Bosnia today is a direct descendent of that period of cultural exchange between Bosniaks and foreign *jihadists*. In Bosnia, the modern *jihadism* that originated in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviet Union in the 1980s gained a new dimension: a narrative of apocalyptic war between Islam and the West. The *mujahideen* unit as an official structure of the ARBiH found itself fighting *jihad* against Westerners on behalf of Islam, for perhaps the first time. Bilal Bosnić, a Bosnian who fought with the *El Mudžahid* Detachment, is today known as the nation's top extremist cleric, and is currently serving seven years in prison for recruiting ISIS fighters. Bosnić and other clerics like him are responsible for turning northern mountain towns into miniature caliphates. Bosnia is the cradle of modern *jihad*.

Starting in the winter of 1995, a few hundred veterans from the Bosnian *jihad*, known as "Balkans," were transported to Turkey by the Turkish intelligence service, MIT, and the country's main radical Islamic party, the Refah Party (Welfare Party). The Bosnian *jihad* veterans were then taken for advanced training at a base in Northern Cyprus and subsequently transferred to eastern Turkey for action against the Kurds, as well as to Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan to wage *jihad* (Curtis, 2010, p. 186 (pdf reader)).

The Bosnian *jihad* produced a huge number of highly trained Bosnian *jihadi* veterans with military experience and combat skills and having strong connections to international terrorist organizations who became widely-known recruiters, suicide bombers, masterminds of major terrorist attacks, promotors and financiers of radical Islam and terrorism. They dispersed and continued their *jihad* throughout the world. As a result, a large international terrorist infrastructure and network of *jihadist* oper-

atives was formed, operating in different parts of the world but having strong links with Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, ISIS and other terrorist organizations.

The long list (A Supplemental Schematic Diagram, n.d.) of those involved in this network includes: **Wael Julaidan** (Al-Qa'ida cofounder, who exchanged several million dollars with Hasan Čengić); **Abdelkader Mokhtari, aka Abu El-Ma'ali** (links with Alija Izetbegović, Bosnian *jihad* veteran, leader of the El Midzahid Batalion); **Osama Bin Laden** (Bosnian passport holder, met Alija Izetbegović in 1993 in Bosnia); **Ayman Al-Zawahiri** (Director of Al-Qa'ida's Bosnian operations); **Omar Abdel Rahman, aka "The Blind Sheikh"** (affiliated with the GIA, TWRA, convicted of seditious conspiracy for involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center attacks, sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States); **Clemey Rodney Hampton-el** (received TWRA funds for training individuals involved in the 1993 World Trade Center attacks); **Enaam Arnaout** (close links with Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qa'ida founding father, Bosnian *jihad* financier, Director of the Benevolence International Foundation, Chicago); **El Fatih Hassanein** (friend and collaborator of Alija and Bakir Izetbegović, TWRA founder, funding Izetbegović's government and facilitating activities of terrorist groups operating in Bosnia, including employing their members); **Sulaiman abu Ghaith** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Al-Qa'ida spokesman, Osama Bin Laden's son in law); **Abu Zubair al Madani** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, affiliated with Al-Qa'ida, Osama Bin Laden's cousin, killed in 1992 in Bosnia); **Mohammed Al-Zawahiri** (Bosnian passport holder, Ayman Al-Zawahiri's brother, Al-Qa'ida logistic expert); **Khalid al-Harbi, aka Abu Sulayman al-Makki** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran 1992–1997, close links with Osama Bin Laden, rumored son-in-law of Ayman Al-Zawahiri); **Ali Amin al-Rashid, aka Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri** (Al-Qa'ida coufounder and operation chief, trained Bosnian *jihadi* volunteers in Afghanistan, died in Africa in 1996); **Adis Medunjanin** (Bosnian Muslim, participated in the New York City subway system plot, apprehended crashing on the Whitestone Bridge, linked to Adnan Shukrijumah, Al-Qa'idaglobal operations chief, and to Abid Nasser); **Anes Subasic** (Bosnian Muslim, 2009 Raleigh group, conspirator planning attack on a United States Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virgina); **Ramiz Hodžić** (Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian *jihad*, *El Mudzahid* veteran, indicted in 2015 for participation in alleged Bosnian-American ISIS support group); **Abdullah Ramo Pazara** (Bosnian-American ISIS volunteer, Deputy of the Islamic State Emirate Omar al Shishani, died in 2014 in Syria); **Abdu Ali Sharqawi** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, affiliated with Al-Qa'ida, Osama Bin Laden's bodyguard, recruiter), **Nasser Ahmed Al-Bahri, aka "Abu Jandal" – "the Father of Death"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, affiliated with Al-Qa'ida, Osama Bin Laden's bodyguard); **Mohamed Abu Ghanim** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, affiliated with Al-Qa'ida, Osama Bin Laden's bodyguard, known associates include Abdu Ali Sharqawi, and Bashir Al Shadadi); **Khalid al Hajj, aka "Abu HAzim al Sha'ir"** (Bosnian *jihad*

veteran, Osama Bin Laden's bodyguard, Al-Qa'idaleader in Saudi Arabia, killed by Saudi security forces in 2004); **Khalid al Juhani** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, affiliated with Al-Qa'ida, Osama Bin Laden's bodyguard, reportedly bought the boat used in the USS Cole attack, died in Riyadh in a suicide bombing attack in May 2003); **Ahmed Ressam** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, the Los Angeles LAX bombing conspirator, known associate of Fateh Kamel); **Karim Said Atmani** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Bosnian passport holder, document forger for the Los Angeles LAX bombing plot, known associate of Ahmed Ressam); **Raouf Hannachi** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Al-Qa'idare-cruiter, Al -aeda Montreal cell); **Zoheir Choulah** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Bosnian citizen, associate of Karim Atmani, was in custody in France); **Mehrez Amdouni** (Bosnian *jihad*/ *El Mudzahid* veteran, Bosnian citizenship/passport, Osama Bin Laden's lieutenant, arrested in Turkey in 1999); **Tarik Mahmoud Ahmad** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Bosnian citizenship, located in Bosnia 1992–1999, Al-Qa'ida weapon expert, developed IEDs and shoe bombs, was in U.S. custody); **Abu Abdel Aziz, aka "Barbaros"** (links to Al-Qa'ida, first *emir* of the *El Mudzahid* Unit); **Omar Al Faruq** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, killed in Iraq in September 2006); **Salim Umar Bin Salim al-Qaiti, aka "Hamza Al-Qaiti"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, operated Al-Qa'ida guesthouse in Kabul, killed in Yemen in August 2008); **Abu Zubair al-Haili, aka "Fawzi Saad al-Ob-yadu"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, known associate of Osama Bin Laden, Abu Zubaydah, Zaccarias Mousawi, Richard Reid, believed to have been in U.S. custody); **Basheer al-Shadadi** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Al-Qa'ida *jihadi* travel facilitator, known associate of Mohamed Abu Ghanim); and **Abdel Aziz Al Muqrin** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, former leader of Al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia, involved in May/ June 2004 Al Khobar massacres and beheading of U.S. citizen Paul Johnson, killed in Saudi Arabia in June 2004).

Bosnian *jihadi* veterans actively participated in almost all major terrorist attacks against the Western countries and interests over the past two decades, including the 9/11 attacks, the August 1998 U.S. African embassy bombings, the December 1999 Millenium Bomb Plot targeting the Los Angeles LAX Airport, the October 2000 at-tack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, the November 2003 Istanbul bombings, the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 7 July London Underground bombing, the May 2007 Fort Dix bomb plot, the July 2009 Raleigh Group conspiracy, and the January 2010 conspiracy to attack the New York subway system.

Among those involved in the 9/11 conspiracy: **Amer Azizi** (trained in Bosnia in 1995, links to Al-Qa'ida, suspected ringleader, Madrid train bombing, indicated accomplice of 9/11 conspirators, suspected of involvement in the July 2001 Tarragon meeting of Mohammed Atta and Ramzi bin al Shihb, killed in North Waziristan in 2006); **Mohammed Haydar ZAmmar** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida,

surrogate father to 9/11 hijackers, known associate of Mohammed Atta Said Bahaji, was in Syria); **Ramzi bin al Shihb** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, coordinator of 9/11 attacks, known associate of Mohammed Atta, was in U.S. custody); **Khalid Al Mindhar** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, 9/11 hijacker of AA Flight 77); **Nawaf al Hazmi** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, 9/11 hijacker of AA Flight 77); and **Khalid Sheikh Mohammed** (Bosnian citizen, links to Al-Qa'ida, mastermind of 9/11 attacks, implicated in the beheading of Daniel Pearl, was in U.S. custody).

Those involved in the USS Cole attack in Aden Harbor in October 2000 include: **Jamal Al Badawi** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, convicted for involvement in USS Cole, escaped from Yemen prison in 2006, on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist List); **Bashir Ali Nasir al-Shadadi, aka "Abu Zabayr"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Al-Qa'ida facilitator, implicated in USS Cole attack, known associate: Abu Ghanim); **Hassan Al-Khamiri** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, suicide bomber in USS Cole attack, known associate: Abu Ghanim); **Ibrahim al-Thawar** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, suicide bomber in USS Cole attack); **Absul Rahim al-Hashiri** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, operational commander of USS Cole attack, was in U.S. custody); and **Mohammed Hamdi al Ahdal, aka "Abu Asim al-Makki"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, links to USS Cole attack).

Those involved in the Roubaix group metro bombing in Paris in 1995 include: **Lionel Dumont** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, French Roubaix group member, was in custody in France); **Rachid Ramda** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Roubaix group financier, conspirator in the Metro bombing in Paris); **Christopher Caze** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, French Roubaix group member, killed in Belgium in March 1996); and **Fateh Kamel** (Bosnian *jihad*/*El Mudzahid* Unit veteran, French Roubaix group member, released from French prison, living in Canada).

The terrorist attack in Casablanca on May 2003 was organized and executed by: **Salaheddin Benyaich, aka "Abu Mugen"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to GIA, was in custody in Morocco); and **Abdelaziz Benyaich** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, participated in operations in the Casablanca bombing, was in custody in Morocco). Another terrorist attack targeting the McDonalds restaurant in Casablanca was carried out in September 1993 by **Hamel Marzouk**, a Bosnian *jihad* veteran.

Those involved in the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 include: **Nasser bin Ali Ansi** (took credit for the attacks, Bosnian *jihad*/ *El Mudzahedin* Unit veteran, leader of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, suspected to have Bosnian citizenship); Charlie Hebdo attacker **Cherif Kouachi** (killed in January 2015); and **Amedy Coulibali** (killed in January 2015), who carried out the attack on the kosher supermarket in Paris, were recruited by **Djamel Beghal** (a longtime Al-Qa'ida operative, who was in custody in France, known associates: Abu Zubaydah, Abu Hamza Al-Misri); **Abu**

Zubaydah (top Bin Laden lieutenant with Bosnian citizenship/passport, was in U.S. custody, known associates: Djamel Beghal, Khalil Deek); and **Khalil Deek** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, involved in the December 1999 Jordanian terror bombing).

Abdelhamid Abaaoud, ringleader of the later November 2015 Paris atrocities, coordinated the preparation efforts for the attacks from Athens. **Salah Abdeslam** and two of the suicide bombers used the migrants' Balkan route to get to France. It is important to note that the weapons and ammunition used in both Paris attacks were supplied from the former Yugoslavia (Bajekal & Walt, n.d.).

Bosnian *jihad* links to the Strasbourg Christmas market bombs plot in December 2000: **Slimane Khalfaoui** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, conspirator in the plot, was in custody in France); and **Fouhad Sabour** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, conspirator in the plot, was in custody in Germany).

Those involved in the attack in Istanbul in November 2003 include: **Habib Aktas** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, conspirator in the bombings, killed in Iraq in April 2005); **Azad Ekinci** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, leader of an Al-Qa'ida Turkish cell, conspirator in the bombings, killed in a suicide attack in Iraq in December 2004); **Louai Sakka** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, financier of the bombings, alleged trainer of 9/11 attackers, was in custody in Turkey). Another Bosnian veteran, **Zuri-ur-Rehman Lakhv**i who has links to Lashkar-e-Taiba in South Asia, acted as a mastermind of the bombings in Mumbai in 2006. He was in custody in Pakistan.

Also, interestingly, **Mamdouh Mahmud Salim**, an Al-Qa'ida co-founder and the mastermind of the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in August 1998, made a "business trip" to Bosnia three months prior to the bombings. He was in U.S custody.

Other Bosnian *jihadi* veterans include ***Ahmed Zeid Salem Zohair*** (had links to Al-Qa'ida, distributed 500 blank Bosnian passports to global *jihadi* members, allegedly involved in the murder of U.S. citizen William Jefferson in Bosnia and in the September 1997 Mostar car bombing); ***Younis al-Hayari*** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Bosnian passport holder, married to a Bosnian women, leader of Al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia, was number one on the Arabia most wanted list, known associate of Abdel Karim Mejjati, killed in July 2005); ***Hamid Aich*** (Bosnian citizenship, implicated in 1997 Luxor massacre, known associate of Ahmed Ressam); ***Imad al Husin aka "Abu Hamza"*** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, religious instructor for *El Mudžahid* Unit, was in custody in Bosnia); and **Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, involved in kidnapping/beheading of *Wall Street Journal* Reporter Daniel Pearl, possible 9/11 funder, was in custody in Pakistan).

The Spanish Al-Qa'ida cell includes the following Bosnian *jihadi* veterans: **Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, aka "Abu Dahdah"** (alleged leader of Al-Qa'ida in Spain,

Bosnian *jihad* recruiter; in July 2001 he organized the meeting of Mohammed Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh, was arrested in possession of maps of Bosnia, released from prison in 2013); **Jasem Mahboule, aka "Abu Mohammed"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links with Spanish Al-Qa'ida cell, was in custody in Spain); **Mohamed Needl Acaid, aka "Nidal"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links with Spanish Al-Qa'ida cell, was in custody in Spain); **Mohamed Zaher Asade, aka "Zaher"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links with Spanish Al-Qa'ida cell, was in custody in Spain); **Omar A Deghayes** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, LIFG, known associates: Abd Al Aziz Benyaich, Salahaddin Benyaich (aka Abu Mugen), released from Guantanamo in 2007); **Osama Darra, aka "Abu Thabet"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links with Spanish Al-Qa'ida cell, was in custody in Spain); and **Said Chedadi** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links with Spanish Al-Qa'ida cell, known associates: Amer Azizi, Abu Dahdah).

The Italian cell has strong links to the Bosnian *jihad*. The key persons in this radical Islamic network are as follows: **Anwaar Shaaban** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, founder of the Islamic Center in Milan, political leader of *El Mudzahedin* Unit, killed in Bosnia in December 1995); **Karray Kamel bin Ali, aka "Abu Hamza"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Bosnian citizen, suspected in involvement in 1997 assassination plot against Pope John Paul II, was in custody in Tunisia); **Mohammed bin Riyadh Nasri** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links with Al-Qa'ida

Bologna cell, was in Bosnia 1995–1997, was in U.S. custody); **Kahlil Jarraja** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Bosnian citizenship, U.S. government-designated global terrorist, implicated in the 1997 Bologna assassination plot against Pope John Paul II, links to the Al-Qa'ida Bologna cell, the GIA, arrested in 2008 in Italy for recruiting suicide bombers*);* and **Lassad Sassi, aka "Abu Hashem"** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to GSPC, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Magrebh, led terrorist cell in Milan, implicated in planning and financing suicide attacks in Italy, killed in Tunisia).

The Bosnian-Scandinavian extremist network includes the following: **Mirsad Bektašević** (Bosnian-Swedish would-be suicide bomber, recruiter for Iraqi insurgency leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi, known associates: Abdulkadir Cesur, Bajro Ikanović, was in custody in Bosnia); **Abdulkadir Cesur** (contact with Bosnian-Danish extremists Adnan Avdić, known associate: Mirsad Bektašević, was in custody in Bosnia); **Abu Anas al Shami** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, links to Al-Qa'ida, Abu Musab al Zarqawi's deputy, killed in September 2004 in Iraq); and **Abu Musab al Zarqawi** (Al-Qa'ida leader, killed in June 2006 in Iraq).

Many of the Bosnian *jihad* veterans became masterminds and main organizers of many terrorist attacks including the London 7/7 bombing: **Abu Hamza al Misri** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, London Finsbury mosque *imam*, spiritual father of London 7/7 bombing, was in U.S. custody); **Abu Ubaydah al-Masri** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran

Al-Qa'ida external operation chief, mastermind of London 7/7 attacks); and **Karim el-Majjati** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, linked to March 2004 Madrid train bombing and to July 2006 London bombings, killed in Saudi Arabia in April 2005).

Radical operatives in Germany with links to the Bosnian *jihad* include: **Allem Nasir** (Bosnian *jihad* veteran, Al-Qa'ida recruiter in Germany, links to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, known associate: Nihad Ćosić, was in custody in Germany); and **Irfan Peci** (Bosnian from Sandžak, Al-Qa'ida operative, former head of Global Islamic Media Center in Germany).

Another important *jihadi* nexus would be the Buzim-Gornja Maoca cell, Sandžak, which includes: **Nusret Imamović** (Bosnian *Wahhabi* leader, specially designated global terrorist (SDGT), links to *al Nusra* front, active in Syria); **Bilal Bosnić** (Bosnian *Wahhabi* leader, ISIS headhunter in Europe, was on trial in Bosnia); **Abid Podbicanin, aka "Ebu Safija"** (leader of *Al Furqan* Center in Novi Pazar, Sandžak, links to ISIS, killed in Syria in 2015); **Mevlid Jašarević** (attacked the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo in October 2011, sentenced to 15 years in prison in Bosnia); **Kenan Bjedić** (Bosnian extremist, links to *al Nusra* front, military instructor for Bosnian *jihadi* volunteers in Syria); **Bajro Ikanović** (links to Bosnian *Wahhabis* – Handžići, on the U.S. Banned Person's list in 2015, fighting in the ranks of the al Nusra front in Syria); and **Emrah Fojnica** (Bosnian suicide bomber, killed more than 20 people in Baghdad in August 2014).

Reda Seyam, a Sarajevo rental car agent, was an Osama Bin Laden financier in Europe. He is linked to the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing and to ISIS. He was killed in Iraq in December 2014. **Thamir Saleh Abdullah, aka "*emir* Ibn al-Khattab"** was a Bosnian, Afghanistan and Chechnya *jihad* veteran, who was killed in March 2002 in Chechnya.

The Australian links to Bosnian *jihad* include: **Harun Mehicević** (radical Bosnia-Australian cleric, leader of Al-Furqan Islamic Center in Melbourne, Australia's greatest security threat; **Sevdet Ramadan Besim** (ANZAC terror plotter, was in custody in Australia); and **Human Haider** (killed in September 2014 stabbing two police officers, had close links with Harun Mekicevic and the Al-Furqan Islamic Center in Melbourne).

The Vienna network operatives include: **Adnan Buzar** (son-in-law of Sabri al-Banna, aka "Abu Nidal," suspected Bosnian *Wahhabi* financier); **Adem Demirović** (originally from Sandžak, preached at the Tehvid Mesdzid in Vienna, known associates: Nusret Imamovic and the Furqan Mesdzid in Novi Pazar, was arrested in October 2014 in Vienna during Austrian police operation code-named Palmira); **Nedžad Balkan, aka "Ebu Muhhamed"** (studied in Saudi Arabia, leader of the Sahaba mosque in Vienna, suspected Bosnian *Wahhabi* financier); **Misrad Omerović, aka "Ebu Tejma"** (Altun-Alem mosque in Vienna, studied in Saudi Arabia, alleged to have recruited 160 ISIS volunteers

from Europe, was in custody in Austria); and **Muhammed Fadil Porca** (*imam* at Tehvid mosque in Vienna, studied in Saudi Arabia, suspected Bosnian *Wahhabi* financier).

6.1. External Actors Facilitating the Development of the Regional Islamic Terrorist Infrastructure

After being heavily pressured by the Americans, in February 1996 Alija Izetbegović formally abandoned Iranian military and intelligence assistance. However, the Iranian presence in Bosnia continued under cover, masked by the establishment of numerous cultural, scientific and educational organizations, institutions, associations, etc.

In 1994, the Iranian Cultural Center in Sarajevo was opened by the then Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati. In line with Iran's long-term goals, the presence of Iran's intelligence services in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been camouflaged through the establishment of numerous humanitarian programs and various courses, educational programs and enrichment courses for Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens in Iran. Over the past 25 years, around twenty such institutions have been opened under the auspices of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in average, one per year): The Scientific & Research Institute IBN SINA, the Iranian Cultural Center in Sarajevo, RTV IRIB (Iranian Radio and TV Service), the Iranian news agency IRNA (later relocated to SiCG), the Iranian-Bosnian Friendship Society, the Persian-Bosnian College, the Iran Center for Reconstruction and Development (IRCA), the Association of Citizens *NUR* ("Light"), the Association of Citizens Fatih, the Association of Citizens *Kevser*, the humanitarian organization *Obnova* (Renewal), the humanitarian organization *Hasib*, the humanitarian organization Birds-Estehlal Institute in Tehran, the humanitarian organizations the Iranian Red Crescent, *Kosar*, and *Most prijateljstva* (The Bridge of Friendship), as well as the companies Ltd. Rainbow (d.o.o. Duga), Ltd. Heyva and others, the foundation *Mula Sadra*, TV Sahar, TV Behar and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. From Bosnia, Iran's influence extends to other countries in the region (Galijašević, 2017a).

In the first week of March 2017, the Bosnia and Herzegovina National Security Agency (OSA) published a special report on the activities of the Iranian intelligence community over the past 15 years in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the document, the Bosnia and Herzegovina NSA has a list of 650 names of representatives of the Iranian intelligence services, as well as several other intelligence services of Islamic countries operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time the report was published, 330 representatives of foreign special services and about 1,000 secret in-

telligence officers from Iran, Pakistan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia worked with different security structures of the country (Galijašević, 2017b, p. 341) This information is alarming and represents a serious challenge in the fight against terrorism and radical Islam in the Balkans and Europe.

Bosnian-Iranian relations are being actively nurtured also in the 21st century. During a visit by the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bakir Izetbegović to Tehran in October 2016 and a meeting with Iranian President H. Rouhani, a memorandum of understanding was signed, and an agreement was made to increase bilateral investment in small and medium-sized businesses (Rose, 2016). The presence of Iranian officials and diplomats in Bosnia and Herzegovina has increased. The SDA political leadership and Bakir Izetbegović maintain close contacts with the Iranian Minister of Culture Sejid Muhammad Husseini, who was hosted by Bakir Izetbegović many times, and with the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Seyed Hosein Rajabi, and others (Galijašević, 2017a).

Iran is not the only Bosnian ally in building the regional segment of the international terrorist network, the foundation of which was established in Bosnia during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslim political elite of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been also working closely with Saudi Arabia (especially after 1995, when the United States introduced sanctions against Iran), which has actively pursued and continues to pursue a foreign policy of spreading *Wahhabism* in Bosnia and the Balkans in general. The main sponsors of radical structures in the Balkans among individuals from Saudi Arabia are bankers and businessmen: Khalid Bin Mahfouz, Salih Abdullah Kamel, Abdullah Suleiman al Raihi, Abel Abdul Jalili Baterye, Mohamed Hussein al Amudi, Wa'el Hamza Julaidan, and Yasin Al Kadi (Brisard, 2002, p. 8; Brisard, 2003, p.3). The Saudi government allowed its citizens to go into Bosnia and Herzegovina without interference and engaged in airlifting wounded Bosnian children out of the war zone for medical care. The royal family established a high-profile *High Committee for Fundraising to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, headed by Prince (and later King) Salman, which raised almost $400 million for the Bosnian cause. The Kingdom spent approximately around $300 million in a covert campaign to arm the Bosnian army. In addition, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia reportedly invested $8 million of his own money in the Bosnian *jihad*, and the Saudi government was making efforts to diplomatically pressure the UN and the United States to help the Bosnian Muslims (Byman, 2019, p. 44).

In October 2002, it was Yasin Al Kadi who was labeled by the U.S. Treasury as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) and his accounts and assets in the United States and Europe were frozen. Among his ventures, he was financing Bait ul-Mal Incorporated (BMI), an Islamic investment firm that fundraised mostly on behalf

of the U.S. terrorist-designated Hamas. He owned the Deposit Bank (Depozitna Banka D.D.), which subsequently merged with the Wakuf Bank in Sarajevo (Vakufska Banka D.D. established in 1992 by Yasin Al Kadi, an Al-Qa'ida front), which in turn, was closed on charges of financing the Al-Qa'ida network in the Balkans. According to a 2002 report by the Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID), the activities of the extremist Islamic NGO Al Haramain Islamic Foundation were funded through the Deposit Bank. The bank has provided financial support to several organizations acting as fronts for Al-Qa'ida, including the Muwafaq Foundation, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Saudi High Commission for Relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some of which have already been designated as SDGTs by the United States government. Yasin al Kadi is one of the six directors of the Muwafaq Humanitarian Organization that provided assistance to the Al-Qa'ida network. These banks were also funded by another SDGT, Chafiq Ayadi, along with a Saudi-controlled offshore company based in the Isle of Man, whose main shareholder is a member of the Saudi royal family, nephew of King Fahd and son of the Saudi Deputy Minister of Interior. While Chafiq Ayadi was the co-owner of Depozitna Banka in 1995, he transferred DM 2.5 million through the bank to the account of the Muwafaq Foundation. He and his business partner Yasin al Kadi also became co-owners of a company Euroinvest D.O.O. in Sarajevo, which shared the same address as Depozitna Banka (Trifunovic, 2004b). This scheme explicitly demonstrates the close link between the Bosnian Muslim political elite and international terrorist networks, their close collaboration in financing international terrorism, and the political cover and assistance in logistics the Bosnian government provides for international terrorist organizations and extremists.

Also, it has been revealed that numerous intellectuals have become close collaborators of Iranian intelligence services, especially the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). These include Nevad Kahtaran, professor of the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, and Muhammad Reza Golzardi, director of Radio TV of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Sarajevo. Another example would be Fuad Kasumovic, the Zenica City mayor. According to intelligence information, in July 2012, during his five-day stay in Iran, Kasumovic met with Abolghas Parhizkar (one of the highest-ranking officers of VEVAK, that is, MOIS). To make matters worse, upon his return from Iran, Kasumovic, who was then Deputy Minister of Finance and Treasury of Bosnia and Herzegovina, organized a festive *iftar* dinner for the Iranian ambassador and his associates at the Sarajevo Hotel Zagreb. According to Western intelligence sources, Abolghasem Parhizkar visited Bosnia and Herzegovina twice during 2014 with a diplomatic passport, and on both occasions, he secretly met Fuad Kasumović.

Thus, analyzing the Iranian presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their contributions to the radicalization of Bosnia Muslims for the last couple of years, several

conclusions can be drawn. First, the Iranians have a wide network of collaborators, which is constantly being extended. Second, the presence of Iranian officials and diplomats in Bosnia and Herzegovina has increased significantly, as the Iranians have established a highly effective infrastructure including Islamic NGOs, associations, cultural and education centers, mass media entities, private companies, etc. Third, the Iranians are highly active within the Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim community, establishing and strengthening contacts with the non-governmental sector and persons associated with radical Islamism and terrorism, especially contacts with radicals from Gornja Maoca, Fourth, the Iranian services use the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an area from which they can very easily enter Serbia and, through Croatia, into the European Union, which clearly indicates the presence of Iranian associates in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Border Police. Finally, the Iranians have close links with Bosnian intelligence services, the SDA and Bakir Izetbegović.

Another important player in the region is Turkey. As early as in 1993, in one of his political speeches, Erdogan criticized the U.S. global policy, calling it anti-Muslim and advocating for global Muslim solidarity. According to Erdogan, Turkish soldiers should be sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina instead of to Somalia, where they would fight alongside their brother Muslims and become either *shahids* or *gazi* (*gazi* refers to an honorary title in the Ottoman Empire, and today it is used in the sense of a hero or war hero) (Republika Turska, 2017, [Viedo file]). Turkey is known as a "defender of Islam" and, with the support of the United States, is again trying to expand its influence, especially in countries and entities with a significant Muslim population (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, and North Macedonia). Turkey's interests also extend to Serbia and Montenegro. Expansion of the Turkish presence in the region is conducted through investment in economic ventures, opening of cultural and educational centers, establishing media networks, creating networks of NGOs, etc. Turkish politics in the Middle East aims at strengthening the role of its leadership through active support of extremist and terrorist organizations, primarily of ISIS, and poses a direct threat to the security in the Balkan region. A number of experts confirm that the emerging threat from the "Islamic State" and potential terrorist attacks in the Balkans comes, in part, from the Turkish intelligence radical Islamic network in the Balkans, predominantly located in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to some expert sources, Turkish activities directed towards the creation of a terrorist network in the Balkans, in fact, marks the realization of the neo-Ottoman ideal of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoglu. Many regional experts warn that Turkey is investing enormous efforts in turning the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija into a narco-terrorist emirate in the Balkans, converting part of Macedonian territory populated with predominantly Albanian Muslims into another small narco-terrorist emirate, supporting

separation processes in Bulgaria in territories having predominantly Turkish population, connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina and those territories with Turkey and the Middle East (Eftov, 2016a, [Video file]; Eftov, 2016b, [Video file]). It is indicative that the percentage of Turkish soldiers in NATO missions in the Balkans is extremely high, which confirms that Turkey is using NATO as a mechanism for promoting its policies in the region.

In cooperation with Bosnian and Herzegovina authorities, Turkey has arranged arms and military equipment shipments to ISIS fighters and other terrorist formations in Syria and Iraq through Turkish companies established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This again raises the issue of the responsibility of the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities, which from 2013 to 2017 supplied extremists with weapons, explosives, etc. through Turkish companies, such as: the most influential state company Makina ve Kymya endustrisi Kurumu Genel Mudurlugu; large private companies, such as Feride Kirlioglu Patlayici Madde Ticareti and two companies controlled by Erdogan's son Bilal — Turc Dis Tic Ltd Sti and Orica Nitro Ankara Dis Ticareti; and some offshore institutes. These entities have been used for conducting purchases of tens of millions of explosive components for filling electric and non-electric detonators, a huge amount of 7.62 mm and 9 mm caliber cartridges, projectiles, etc. (Galijašević, 2017b, pp.328–29).

Analyzing Turkey's activities in the field of establishing NGOs and banking networks for financing terrorism and radical Islam in the region through Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to mention that through the initiative of Turkish company IHH (Insan Hak vel Hurijet or Insani Jardim Vakfi) the mechanisms were created for the purpose of establishing a network for providing financial support for terrorists through the Turkish Ziraet Banke, and a network of non-governmental organizations to recruit and finance *Wahhabi* settlements, Islamic groups and organizations. The most famous among these groups are: Solidarity in Bihac, the Heart of Tsazin; the Association of Culture, Education and Sports (AKOS) in Zenica; The Way of Knowledge in Zenica; OAZA in Tuzla; the International Forum Solidarity EMAUS in Doboj East; Dawn in Sarajevo; *Selsebil* in Zivinice; *Dirham* in Sanski Most; the Association Life in Bihac; the Women's Educational Organization Iskra in Bihac; the Association *Vatan-domovina* in Bosanska Krupa; the Association *Aktiv* in Buzim, H.O.; *Sadaka* in Buzim, OKC; *Atis* in Sanski Most; and many others. The main sponsor of the organizations led and funded by Turkey's IHH Humanitarian Relief Fund is the spouse of the President of Turkey, Emine Erdogan (Ibid., p. 329).

In addition, it should be noted that a Turkish intelligence and military center operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is located in the Turkish cultural center *Yunus Emre*. This intelligence center was opened in Sarajevo (on St. Mula Mustafe

Baseskije) during a visit by Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu in July 2015. With the support of Turkey, the Anatolia Agency is actively working in the region, as well as several portals and print newspapers. The *Factor* magazine is clearly of a radical orientation and known also as the *Mujahideen* magazine (Ibid.).

Another external factor contributing to the growth of the threat of extremism and terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkan region are Vienna and Milan. According to the former director of the Counterintelligence Department of Macedonia, Z. Mitevski, these cities are centers for coordinating the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism into the Balkans. The mosques, Islamic institutes, and charitable foundations located there accumulate significant funds from Middle East countries and use them to purchase literature and finance paramilitary camps and regional Islamic media (Ponomareva & Dimitrovska, 2018, p. 41). According to experts and representatives of regional intelligence services, several structures actively working in Vienna provide significant financial and organizational support to radical organizations and movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These include: the Union of Jamaat of *Salafi Dawa*, led by Mohamed Porcha, born in Sarajevo, who is under special surveillance of the Austrian security services; the *Salafi-Wahhabi* Jamaat, led by Abu Muhamed Nedzad Balkan, originally from Sanjak; and IZBA (Regular Islamic Bosnian Community in Austria). All these organizations are raising funds for radical Bosnian Islamists, who in turn are closely linked, including by blood ties, with international terrorists. For example, the famous Bosnian radical Adnan Buzar is married to the daughter of the most dangerous terrorist Abu Nidal (1937–2002) (Obradović & Adžić, 2015).

At this stage, the countries of the Western Balkans represent an important recruitment zone for recruiting terrorist fighters who are sent to fight in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine. In addition, the Balkans have become a "recovery base" for local terrorists and foreign fighters who have returned from war zones. In the camps established in the region, they undergo rehabilitation and "advanced training" courses. ISIS and *al-Nusra* use on-the-ground recruiters in the Balkans. ISIS is widely represented on social networks. As a result, Albanian and Bosnian Muslims in the region easily learn about extremist groups and their ideology. The aforementioned terrorist groupы provide their supporters with financial and logistical support, including travel to conflict zones. Social support is provided both personally, through local recruiters, and through social networks (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2018, pp. 79–109).

Amidst the high unemployment rate and the difficult socio-economic situation and public demonstrations of "European values" (gay parades, active sex life individualism, etc.), which are in sharp contradiction with Islamic traditions, ISIS offers not only good pay, but concrete goals, meaning to life, and an opportunity to rise to

leadership positions and lead a conservative Islamic lifestyle (Speckhard & Yayla, 2016). All of this combined greatly facilitates the recruitment of terrorist organizations in the countries of the Western Balkans.

Mosques in the Balkans have several functions that address a number of issues simultaneously. First, the subconscious and spiritual perception of Balkan Muslims is being transformed, as a mosque is becoming a mandatory and central attribute of being. Second, the cultural landscape of the Balkan lands is changing and radical Islam is spreading among Muslims. Third, mosques are main recruiting centers for radicals. Thus, we witness the implementation of a strategy aimed at expanding the zone of the Muslim population and creating a new Islamic cultural and political space of radical discourse in the region, which from its outset is being created as an integral part of an international Islamic terrorist organization network. In recent years, there has been active construction of mosques in the region. In North Macedonia, 88 new mosques were built just on the road from Skopje to Gostivar. In almost every place in North Macedonia today, there is a mosque, even where Muslims do not live. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is even more serious. In Sarajevo alone, 140 mosques have already been built, including the King Fahd mega-mosque. The King Fahd mosque was built after the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Saudi funds at a cost of $30 million (Poggioli, 2010). After 1999, 240 mosques were built in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, including The Hasan Beg Saudi-financed mosque in the city of Pristina, Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, which is brand new. In total, there are 800 mosques in the region. Funding for the construction of places of worship is provided mainly by Saudi Arabia (Gall, 2016). For the period from 2003 to 2013, the Saudis spent about one billion euros on the spread of Islam in the Balkans (V Makedonii rastyot chislo, 2013).

A whole network of Islamic NGOs is also engaged in the dissemination of the propaganda of radical Islam, indoctrination, transformation of youth's consciousness and financing the spread of Islamic *Wahhabi* ideology. The most odious among them in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija only are: the Saudi Joint Relief Committee; the Al Haramain Humanitarian Foundation; *Al Wakt l Islami*; the World Association of Muslim Youth; the Islamic International Relief Organization; the Global Relief Foundation; the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society; and *Kalliri Il Millerise* (Drecun, 2013) Through this network's channels, extremists act by cooperating with Albanian terrorist and criminal structures, and by creating strong ties between the Albanians and the rest of the Muslim population.

The Albanian population is facing the same challenges (Ponomareva & Dimitrovska, 2018, p. 42). There are a number of structures involved in the propaganda of radical Islam, and they are attracting not only the citizens of Albania, but adherents

of Islamic fundamentalism from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and North Macedonia. For example, the Hafizi Center in the city of Sauk is funded by the Drita Foundation, which receives funds from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Hafizi centers in the cities of Gotz and Kavajë are financed by the Islamic foundation *Munazmat al-Dawa al-Islamiya*, which, according to some reports, is related to Al-Qa'ida. The Abu Hanifa Institute in Bulqizë is funded by the Taibah Foundation, which receives money from Algeria, Syria and Kuwait. However, the most famous among these structures is the Al-Hagri Institute in the city of Elbasan. It is financed by the Kuwaiti Committee of Kindness. All centers and institutes have their own private schools, where the Koran is required to be studied in Arabic. Students of these institutes are selected by different criteria and are later sent to Islamic schools in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt. Upon their return to Albania after four years of training, these young people form their own groups or cells that are tightly integrated into the network of transnational Islamist structures (Joksic, 2013).

The *Wahhabi* movement has also been growing in the Republic of North Macedonia since the mid-1990s (Analiza na razuznavačot, 2012). The most influential *Wahhabi* communities are located along the border with the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Republic of Serbia) and Albania, in Kumanovo, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, as well as in the Skopje region (Zafirovski, 2005). The ethnic composition of the movement is mainly Albanians and Muslim Macedonians (Torbesi); there are a small number of Bosniaks and Turks. The leaders of the *Wahhabi* movement in North Macedonia are Albanians from the Skopje region, who have strong ties with corresponding structures in Kosovo (Ponomareva & Dimitrovska, 2018, p. 43). Since 2002, two Islamist units have been operating in the northwestern part of the republic, consisting of *mujahideen* militants from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya (Dettmer, 2002). One of the main goals of these organizations is to create a strong foundation for the Islamic society in the country, including through the spread of radical Islam among young people (Zafirovski, 2015). In the republic of North Macedonia, as well as in the other countries of the region, Islamic NGOs operate which are associated with the international Islamic network promoting *jihad* and violent Islam.

Thus, the political, military-strategic, civilizational, ideological and organizational-logistical foundations of the Balkan Caliphate have been forming in the region for more than a decade from the outset of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A vast regional, multilevel network of cross-border non-state actors (transnational banks, the mass media, NGOs, international terrorist organizations) has already been created, contributing to the spread of radical Islam and extremism in the region, which is constantly being strengthened and expanded. This complex infrastructure facilitates the growth of the terrorist threat in the region and globally.

6.2. Modus Operandi of the International Terrorist Organizations for the Creation of the "Balkan Caliphate" with its Epicenter in Bosnia and Herzegovina

As already noted, a fertile environment for the creation of the political space of radical Islam in the Balkans, as part of the Souteast Europe, or the so-called "Balkan Caliphate" has been gradually developing since the 1990s. The danger lies in the fact that it is with the direct consent of the political Muslim elites and with their collaboration that the cultural-humanitarian and military structures of the international radical Islamic network are formed in the region.

The organizational and military base of the Balkan Caliphate consists of numerous villages existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina for over a decade: the so-called "*paradžemati.*" They are illegal *Salafi* structures (illegal independent mosques with illegal *imams* who are usually acting also as military instructors) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, located mainly in remote rural regions that do not recognize the authority of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina and function as autonomous religious communities. In fact, they have a paramilitary dimension, as indoctrination, combat training and other actions are carried out in these areas in order to produce militants. There are remote villages in the mountains of northern Bosnia where the ISIS flag flies, and residents live under *sharia* law. There is a steady growth in the number of *Wahhabi* settlements, military terrorist camps, international Islamic NGOs and Islamic financial institutions. The center of all Islamic operations in the Balkans is located in Sarajevo, where the main contact person of ISIS for liaison with Europe, the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Imam* Al Misri, is located (Obradović & Adžić, 2015).

The Bosnian model of spreading radical Islam through the creation of the *paradzemati* described in the preceding paragraph and outside the official Islamic institutions, and thus undermining the unity of the Islamic community, was also applied in many other European countries. For example, in September 2016, as part of the "Cultural Year Austria – Bosnia and Herzegovina" organized by the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, the Austrian Ministry for European Integration, the Austrian Embassy and the Austrian Cultural Association, together with the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held a conference in Sarajevo entitled "State and Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Austria: A Legal Framework for Islam in a European Context." Conference participants focused on the challenges facing the official Islamic institutions in both countries with respect to "illegal" mosques and *imams*. They agreed that this was a challenge not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Austria, but also for Europe as a whole (Rexhepi, 2019).

Another highly dangerous trend is the growth from year to year in the number of Balkan foreign terrorist fighters who are sent to fight in "hot spots" (Afghanistan, Libya, Syria) in the ranks of Al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State. It is known that a separate combat brigade, *Yaish Muhhamed Katiba*, was created from the Balkan *Wahhabis* (Više od 300 islamista, 2014). According to information provided by the then President of the Republic of North Macedonia, Gjorge Ivanov, on 22 June 2016, 110 fighters from North Macedonia fought in Syria, 25 were registered as dead, and another 86 returned to the Republic (Ivanov, 2016). In April 2015, *The Economist* cited other figures: 232 foreign terrorist fighters only from the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and 70 from the rest of Serbia, 330 from Bosnia, 90 from Albania, and 12 from North Macedonia actively participated in the war in the Middle East (Balkan warriors abroad, 2015). Shpend Kursani, who studied the growth of extremism in 22 European countries, concluded that Kosovo ranks first in terms of the number of foreign *jihadists* per capita, Bosnia and Herzegovina is second, and Albania is fourth on the list of number of foreign *jihadists* per capita (Ibid.). According to available data, in 2016, 314 Albanians from the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija joined ISIS (i.e., the number of combatants more than doubled in two years), including two suicide bombers (Gall, 2016). It is important to note such Balkan specifics as the departure of Balkan foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq with women and children. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija contributed the region's largest number of men (256) (Shtuni, 2019, p. 18; European Commission, 2019, p. 38), whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed the highest number of women (61) and children (81) (European Commission, 2018, p. 25).

A direct threat to the security of both the Western Balkans as part of Southeast Europe and to Europe as a whole presents the opposite trend of the return of foreign terrorist fighters to their region together with their families, including Arabs, who, after acquiring citizenship (usually through illegal or corrupt means), are given the opportunity to integrate into society as part of state programs for the re-socialization and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters. Numerous regional security services and terrorism experts confirm that many of them are members of "sleeping cells" waiting for instructions for further actions. Over 1,200 adult male foreign terrorist fighters, woman and children from the Western Balkans, were fighting in Syria and Iraq, and, currently, around 500 from the region are still there: one-third of them are male combatants, and two-thirds of them women and children, taking into account those born in war zones. (There were 155 children born to Albanians from the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and Bosnian Muslims as of early 2019.) After seven years of active participation in the war theater, more then 260 died in combat. The last active combat unit is composed of ethnic Albanian fighters operating with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in and around the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib, and

may have up to two dozen active fighters in its ranks. Those remaining in Iraq and Syria, mostly children, are located in Kurdish-controlled IDP camps, and around 460 have returned to the Western Balkans. These trends, with a special emphasis on "the children of the Caliphate" will represent a long-term security challenge with national, regional and international security implications, especially for Europe, making the Western Balkans the region with the highest concentration of returning foreign terrorist fighters on the European continent and a hub of international terrorism (Shtuni, 2019, pp. 18–19).

Another challenge is the rapid development of the so-called "mosque route," a new Balkan route through which migrants from Asia, including hidden "sleeping" members of terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qa'ida, try to get into western European countries. The "mosque route" passes through Albania, Montenegro or Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This "migrant route" is called the "mosque route" because the extensive network of mosques along the route provide all kinds of support for the Muslim refugees from the Middle East in their movement: material, logistical, informational, etc. (Nastaje "džamijska ruta", 2018).

In February 2018, the Stratpol analytical center prepared a report entitled "Balkan Foreign Fighters Are Coming Back: What Should Be Done?" which notes a new trend related to the changing role of women in the radical Islam project. Previously, the role of women was to raise children as future soldiers and to marry terrorists, but now they are active participants in the building of the "caliphate," involving recruiting and indoctrinating not only women and children, but also men. As for the children, everyone who is over 15 years old takes part in hostilities, and training begins at the age of nine. In addition, children under the age of 15 are used to transport weapons, protect strategically important areas, arrest civilians, and to serve as suicide bombers (Metodieva, 2018, pp.11–12). Both groups, women and children, constitute a permanent threat to national, regional and global security, since it is difficult to assess the degree of their commitment to extremist views and terrorist groups, as well as their motivation to become active or passive participants.

If the core of the organizational-militarized base of the Balkan Caliphate consists of "*paradžemati,*" its political framework is formed on the basis of existing political parties that have become heirs to the so-called "Liberation armies," such as Izetbegović's SDA, that were able to penetrate the representative bodies and state structures in the republic, becoming members of political parties, non-governmental organizations, or gaining a foothold in the intelligence and security services, in the judicial system of the country, and more.

At the moment, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, *jihadist* camps are actively working to train fighters, who then go to war in conflict zones. Political protection

for these camps is provided by members of the SDA party through their cadres in the security structures and the judicial system, preventing the prosecution of Al-Qa'ida and ISIS fighters in the country. As a result, modern Bosnia and Herzegovina is not only an ideal refuge for foreign terrorist fighters, but is also a productive recruiting zone. Officials report that by June 2016, approximately 50 people from Bosnia and Herzegovina were killed during the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, another 50 returned to Bosnia, and 90 Bosnian men, 50 women and 80 children remain there (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). At the end of 2017, another 53 people returned from Syria and Iraq to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including three women and four children (Regional Cooperation Council, 2017, p. 30). According to the Stratpol report, Bosnian women held the highest share in foreign communities in Syria and Iraq under the rule of ISIS (Metodieva, 2018, p. 11).

The majority of the foreign terrorist fighters in Bosnia is recruited in the "*paradžemati*." According to the Minister of the Interior of the Republika Srpska, Dragan Lukac, if until 2017 there were 64 "*paradžemati*" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the beginning of 2018, there were more than 100 of them. According to intelligence agencies, militants who returned from Syria live in the new "*paradžemati.*" These structures have close links with Al-Qa'ida and ISIS (Galijašević Dž.: BiH je, 2016).

Another major threat is the expansion of *Wahhabi* settlements. In the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, this community has more than 6,200 radicals, which is one of the largest cells of this radical Islamic movement in Europe, with more than 100,000 members. Currently, 96 international arrest warrants ("red" circulars) of Interpol are circulating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 of which are intended for people associated with terrorism. At the same time, six terrorists from Guantanamo, to whom adequate control measures are not applied, returned to Bosni and Herzegovina. Among them are five Algerians and the most advanced specialist in explosives, Tarik Mahmoud Ahmed Al Sawah (Obavještajne agencije BiH, 2018).

After analyzing numerous sources, several conclusions can be drawn. First, since the 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a regional center from where the spread of radical Islam and violent extremism in the region is coordinated, financed and organized. On the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are several parallel networks of international Islamic NGOs sponsored by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries, as well as international terrorist organizations. Second, terrorist and extremist groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina are highly effective and successful in the "production" of new radical elements, which are subsequently sent to fight in the ranks of international terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Africa. Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a regional recruiting and training center deeply integrated into the structures of international terrorist organizations, primarily of Al-Qa'ida and

ISIS. Third, the political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides political support and asylum to well-known terrorists, as well as to returning foreign terrorist fighters of Bosnian and of other nationalities. Many of the latter receive Bosnian passports and begin to live in *Wahhabi* settlements, and work as preachers and instructors. Fourth, a large number of representatives of foreign intelligence services, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries, are infiltrated and actively involved in the security structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These trends and processes not only pose a direct threat to the territorial integrity and national security of the Balkan states, but also represent a serious challenge to the international security system as a whole. The activities of international terrorist and extremist organizations in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina play a crucial role in the promotion and realization of the Islamist project the so-called "Balkan Caliphate," which should become an integral part of the global Islamist Caliphate. The established Bosnian-international Islamists ties and network begin to expand regionally.

The Bosnian model of radical Islam proliferation has been applied in Albania as well. As a consequence, similar processes are unfolding in Albania. The active spread of radical Islam in the country began in 1995 after the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the beginning of the open persecution of extremist organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Stabiizaiton Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Interior Ministry when foreign legionnaires began to arrive in Albania in large numbers in search of asylum. As a result, most of them received Albanian citizenship. They were mainly deployed in the paramilitary camps in Kurtz, Tropoia, Korcha, Valona and Vlore, where they began to conduct active military training of the Albanian paramilitary terrorist structures from the region.

In Albania, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a well-organized network of camps for military training of terrorist fighters, closely connected with recruitment centers in the region, primarily in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, as well as with the Albanian drug mafia, international terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence agencies and Albanian political circles. The spread of radical Islam among Albanian Muslims is carried out through the network of international Islamic NGOs and international banking institutions established since the 1990s. Albania became the main platform for establishing contacts and relations of representatives of *mujahideen* and other international radical Islamic organizations with Albanian terrorist organizations, which subsequently enabled the radical structures to penetrate the Albanian cultural space in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and southern Serbia, North Macedonia and Montenegro. Since 2013, the number of

paramilitary camps, Islamic NGOs and educational institutions has been growing in Albania, from where the ideology of *Wahhabism* is transmitted not only to the countryside, but also to large cities.

The Bosnian-international radical Islamic network expended to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija through Albania. In 1998, in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, Saudi Arabia financed the formation of an Al-Qa'ida military wing called *Abu Bekir Sidik* headed by Ekrem Avdia. In the late 1990s, Al-Qa'ida members Ekrem Avdia, Shpend Kopriva and Hedjmadin Laush, who operated in the Bosnian city of Mahala, were convicted on terrorism charges (Talović & Lopušina, 2011). After his release, Avdia continued to lead the "Kosovo Islamic Bureau" (founded in 1998 with the support of Saudi Arabia), which to this day has been promoting *Wahhabism* and recruiting Muslims for *jihad*. Its branches are located throughout the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, and its agents are located in all Western European countries. Ekrem Avdia, a graduate of the Faculty of Theology in Medina, was trained at the Khost terrorist camps in Afghanistan and *Abu Bekir Sidik* in Jablanica near Tešanj in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he met Abdullah Duhayman from Saudi Arabia, with whose help he created the *Abu Bekir Sidik* Detachment (Ibid.). Abdullah Duhayman is the founder of the Islamic Balkan Center in Zenica and the World Islamic Call Bureau. Both organizations are funded by Saudi Arabia and urge Muslims to participate in *jihad*. Since 1997, Duhayman, through the Islamic Center in Kosovska Mitrovica, has carried out financial transactions to purchase weapons for the *mujahideen* detachment *Abu Bekir Sidik*. He is now in prison in Algeria (Drecun, 2013).

In one of the first NATO Mission in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (KFOR) research papers entitled "Kosovo at the Center of Interest of Islamic Extremists," the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is defined as a transit zone for extremists coming from the Islamic Gulf countries to Europe. It is also noted in the paper that the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is potentially fruitful grounds for recruiting extremists. A large number of young Muslims living in total poverty represent ideal targets for terrorist recruiters. The city of Prizren is identified as the main center of activity of Islamic extremists in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. The Jeni Mahalla Mosque operates there, which is not part of the local Islamic community, and its *imam* Mazlam Mazillumi is recognized as the most radical preacher in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. The local extremist group, the Army of Allah, is led by Samedin Dzhezairi, who has contacts with Al-Qa'ida. He opened a kindergarten, supports Islamic education, and operates in North Macedonia. A diverse terrorist network includes radio-TV Besa, the party Truth, the *Kaliri Il Meliris* NGO, the Jeni Mahalla mosque and the local extremist group, Army of Allah. This paper also identified a network of Islamic NGOs

operating in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and engaged in the creation of a terrorist infrastructure (Drecun, n.d). Currently, according to intelligence agencies, five ISIS training bases are operating in the areas of Đakovica, Uroševac, Dečani, Prizren and Peć (Sputnik, 2016).

Carlotta Gall notes that, using a network of humanitarian organizations with the help of radical *imams*, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic Gulf countries have spread *Wahhabism* in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija through the construction of new mosques, methods of creating irrational fear and intimidation, and recruiting fighters, including women and children, who are sent to fight in conflict zones in the Middle East. More than 800 mosques are currently operating in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, 240 of which were built after 1999 and which are accused of aiding the spread of *Wahhabism* as part of the Saudi Arabia's long-term strategy to transform traditional Islam into *Wahhabism*. Also, many receive a scholarship to study Islam in Saudi Arabia (Gall, 2016). In addition, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is also known as an important transit point for radicals coming from the Islamic Gulf countries to Europe. The use of this transit corridor is facilitated by both the low level of border control in Kosovo and the existence of "out-of-law zones" in the province (Ponomareva & Rudov, 2013, p. 75).

The *Salafi-Wahhabi* movement in North Macedonia as an organized structure first appeared in 1997, when people educated in Saudi Arabia and Yemen began to return to the Republic in great numbers. Radicals, mainly *Wahhabis*, who settled in North Macedonia, maintain contacts with Islamic organizations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. Some of them took a direct part in the Bosnian *jihad*, and some took part in the conflict in North Macedonia in 2001 in units of the Albanian National Liberation Army (Analiza na razuznavačot, 2012). In 2002, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Macedonia prepared a report on the situation in the country in connection with the presence of Al-Qa'ida structures, containing detailed information on the links between local radicals and this international terrorist network (Dettmer, 2002). The main tasks of the radicals in North Macedonia are creating a strong basis for the formation of a radical Islamist community, spreading radical ideology, constructing mosques and creating new *madrassas*, and spreading radical Islam among young people who will play a key role in the future (Zafirovski, 2015). As in other Western Balkan countries, there are Islamic NGOs in North Macedonia that are associated with networks of radical structures in the region that receive money from Saudi Arabia and Islamic states (Bougarel, 2005).

The *Wahhabi* movement is mainly concentrated in the Skopje region and in rural areas of northwestern Macedonia, where people are poor and illiterate. Significant

Wahhabi communities are located along the border with the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Republic of Serbia) and Albania: in Kumanovo, Tetovo, Gostivar and Struga (Zafirovski, 2005). The main activity of the radical structures is directed towards the promotion of radical Islam in order to recruit new *jihad* warriors. The target audience, youth aged 16–20 years-old (Deliso, 2006). *Wahhabis*' main efforts aimed at spreading radical Islam include, first of all, supporting the construction boom of new mosques, which began in the mid-1990s. Mosques are being built and paid for by private companies and non-governmental organizations from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Libya, and Turkey. The largest contributions come from the government of Saudi Arabia, mainly for the opening of schools and the spread of Islam, including the organization of travel arrangements for pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina (Koj gi gradi džamiite, 2013) *Wahhabis* also seek to gain control of the official Islamic religious community of North Macedonia by sending young Muslims to obtain an education in Islamic countries and by taking control of mosques using violent methods (Schwartz, 2007).

According to information provided in November 2017 by the country's president Gjorge Ivanov, 154 Macedonian citizens left for Syria and Iraq. Up to 10% of them were women. In the conflict zone, 33 citizens of North Macedonia were killed, and 41 people, including four women, remained there (Ivanov, 2017; Regional Cooperation Council, 2017, p. 35). Also, according to available information, by the end of 2017, about 80 militants returned to the republic, 16 of whom were charged with crimes related to participation in wars on territories of foreign states, and received sentences of two to seven years in prison (Sitel TV, 2016). It is important to note that all foreign terrorist fighters from North Macedonia profess Islam, and their significant share is represented by Albanians, among whom there are former government officials, who, until 2002, were members of the Albanian terrorist organizations operating both in North Macedonia and in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija during the war (Vojuval vo ONA, 2014).

The Bosnian-international network which has extended in almost all regional countries, has established and developed its structures in Serbia as well. *Wahhabism* in Serbia was also imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1990s. According to the 2016 report of the International Crisis Group, about 300 followers of *Wahhabism* live in Sanjak, a region on the border of Serbia and Montenegro. *Wahhabis* work through unofficial mosques, usually gathering to pray in private buildings: *mesdzid* (Kljajić, 2016). Mainly, *Wahhabis* live in the areas of Novi Pazar, Senica and Priboj. Serbian authorities report that 49 adult Serbian citizens, 37 men and 12 women, went to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq. To date, 10 foreign fighters with Serbian citizenship have returned from ISIS to Europe, with only four to Serbia., and they were immediately charged with crimes related to terrorism (Na ratištu u Siriji,

2017).

In Montenegro, the number of Muslims of both Serbian and Albanian origin is increasing every year in the communities of Belo Polje and Rozaje (Sandžak). In Montenegro, the *Wahhabi* movement is funded, *inter alia*, from the money received from drug trafficking. Throughout the territory of the republic, there is a well-developed network of drug dealers from the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Novosti: Centrala vehabija, 2013). In July 2010, the U.S. National Security Agency counted 100 Islamic extremists in the Republic. Journalists with whom U.S. embassy officials spoke said that about 300 *Wahhabis* live in Plava, 200 in Rozaje, and 50 in Belo Polje. In several municipalities, including Berane and Ulcinj, as well as in the capital of the Republic, there are small *Wahhabi* groups (Radulović, 2011). According to some unofficial sources, only 23 adult citizens of Montenegro, 18 men and 5 women, went to Syria and Iraq together with three children; and eight men, one woman and one child returned to Montenegro (Srna, 2017). The growth of the Muslim population, the ongoing radicalization and expansion of the *Wahhabi* movement, financed by funds received from the Albanian drug trade, speaks of dangerous trends in the country that, if not neutralized by competent state authorities in time, can lead to an increase in the terrorist threat in the region.

7. Conclusion

The analysis of a variety of sources, such as official documents, mass media, analytical papers, books, videos, interviews, etc., conducted during the research process preceding the production of the chapter allow us to draw a number of conclusions.

First, for the period under research, we identify four consecutive waves of imported radical Islam ideology that were reinforcing radicalization and violent extremism among Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and facilitated the gradual creation of the regional Islamic terrorist infrastructure. The first of these four waves occurred during the interwar period, with the proliferation and spread of Hassan al-Banna's and the Muslim Brotherhood ideology in Bosnia promoting the ideas of the Islamic state, political Islam, Pan-Islamism, and active Islam, including the violent aspect of *jihad*. In this context, the events taking place at the time in the Islamic world strongly influenced the development of Islamic political thinking in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the three generations of Bosnian students that graduated from Cairo's Al-Azhar University, and, subsequently, acted as an ideological instrument for the proliferation of the foreign Pan-Islamic ideas developed by al-Banna and his Muslim

Brotherhood in the region through Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, the main role was played by the domestically created infrastructure of Islamic organizations, including youth organizations such as the *Young Muslims* and *El-Hidaje*, which were actively promoting radical Islam ideology in the Muslim community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An ideological interconnectedness and close personal links were established between the between Bosnia's Islamic clergy and Muslim intellectual circles and Egypt's religious and academic elite. Hence, the Muslim Brotherhood, from its outset, had established a strong foothold in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second wave occurred during World War II. This had an enormous ideological impact on the Balkan Muslims, including Bosnian Muslims, in terms of radicalization and introduction of terrorist practices and violent extremism, achieved through the Muslim Brotherhood-Nazi nexus and its radical ideology distributed by the propaganda machine of Nazi regime with the strong support of Henry Himmler and under the guidance of the Muslim Brotherhood member, the Grand *Mufti* of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini. In the Balkans, they systematically indoctrinated Bosnian Muslims and trained them to apply extremist and terrorist practices in their fight for the creation of an Islamic state as an integral part of the global radical pan-Islamic space and to fight against Communism, British colonialism, Zionism, pro-communist Partisans and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. Al-Banna's ideas of active Islam were implemented by combining Muslim military units' training with religious indoctrination (local *imams* in SS Divisions). They were subjected to radicalization by systematic militarization of religion. For the first time, Bosnian Muslims were part of the global *jihad* efforts but through regional actions.

The third wave occurred during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the proliferation of Iranian political Islam through the presence of the Iranian secret services in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the proliferation of the *Wahhabi-Salafi jihadi* militant ideology with the arrival of Al-Qa'ida's radical elements in the region. The fourth wave is a contemporary one, marked by the proliferation of ISIS ideological propaganda and the spread of the regional terrorist infrastructure as an integral part of the international Islamic terrorist organizations' network.

The second major conclusion is that, due to radicalization processes, a number of developments over the past two decades threaten to change the historically more moderate nature of Islam in the Balkans.

Third, the domestic driving force behind the radicalization processes of Bosnian Muslims that in turn led to the creation of the contemporary Islamic terrorist infrastructure in Bosnian and the region was *El-Hidaje*'s youth section, the Young Muslims. This group was formed in the late 1930s early 1940s by Alija Izetbegović and a group of like-minded Islamic extremists. Their ultimate goal was the creation

of an Islamic State based on *sharia* law by means of civilizational and violent *jihad* depending on the actual political environment. Later on, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, the Iranian revolution and the creation of the Islamic Pakistani state, Izetbegović elaborated this vision in his Pan-Islamic political program called the Islamic Declaration, which subsequently became the political program of his political party SDA, the core of which was consisted of the former Young Muslims members. His son, Bakir Izetbegović, the SDA, and the Bosnian Islamic Religious Community headed by Mustafa Cerić continued to implement his vision. In this ideological context emerged Alija Izetbegović, the Bosnian Muslim political leadership, the Bosnian *ulama* (Muslim jurists and scholars), the Bosnian Muslim nation (Bosniaks) as a separate national identity and Bosna and Herzegovina as a state.

Fourth, adhering to the ideology of Qutbism (Islamic teachings of Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al Banna) and of becoming integrated within the global Muslim Brotherhood network Alija Izetbegović, and subsequently his son Bakir Izetbegović and the SDA, applied different types of *jihad* depending on the current political situation and environment in their fight for the creation of an Islamic state to serve as the vanguard of the regional efforts for the creation of a Balkan Caliphate as an integral part of the global Caliphate. The first, civilizational *jihad* refers to an offensive but non-violent form of *jihad* or peaceful conquest of the *Dar al-harb* through a global network of Islamic NGOs, associations, mass media, a high construction rate of mosques, research centers, cultural centers, educational programs, banks, and political parties. The second method is violent *jihad* through direct military engagement in collaboration with international terrorist organizations established by the Brotherhood's members in different regions and countries (*al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya*, Hamas, the Egyptian Islamic *Jihad*, Al-Qa'ida and ISIS), either domestically (SS Divisions during World War II, the Bosnian *jihad*) or internationally (producing and sending foreign terrorist fighters to participate in global *jihad* in the ranks of international terrorist organizations in Middle East and elsewhere).

Fifth, the creation of the Muslim nation ("Bosniaks") as a separate national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina meant only the formalization of the existing separate Muslim identity and thinking that were already deeply installed in the Bosnian Muslims' consciousness at the time, embracing all aspects of the Muslims' lives. The very nature of the Bosniak nation, that is religio-centric, emphasizes the central role of the Islam in their existence and identity, thus demonstrating the Bosniaks' self-perception as a part of the global Islamic *umma* organism rejecting nationalism in its Western meaning and supporting global Muslim solidarity and interconnectedness.

Sixth, the formation of the *El Mudžahid* Detachment as an official unit of the Seventh Muslim Brigade of the Third Corps of the Bosnian Army consisting of for-

eign terrorist fighters from all around the world, mainly veteran *mujahideen* of the Afghan *jihad*, as well as their *modus operandi*, methods of propaganda dissemination, and links to international terrorist organizations reveal the nature of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the point of view of the Bosnian Muslim political elite. Undoubtedly, for Alija Izetbegović, the SDA, the Bosnian *ulama* and for the global *jihadi* movement, the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by its nature and character, was a *jihad* for liberating Muslim lands from infidels and establishing an Islamic State based on *sharia* law in the Balkans.

Seventh, the Bosnian *jihad* contributed tremendously to the expansion and strengthening of the global *jihadi* movement and Muslim Brotherhood infrastructure for a variety of reasons. First, close links were established between the Bosnian Muslim political leadership and Bosnia *ulama* and the leadership of many international terrorist organizations, Islamic countries (Iran, Saudi Rabia, Turkey etc.), foreign intelligence agencies, and global Islamic NGO networks funding terrorism. Second, the so-called Bosnian model of financing and facilitating terrorism, through Islamic NGO networks, Bosnian diplomatic corps, banks, private companies, funds, cultural centers, the production of fake documents, false identities and official working IDs, etc., was developed, which was later applied in other European countries. Third, members of terrorist organizations and foreign intelligence services, especially the Iranians penetrated deep into the Bosnian state structure and thus gained strong positions in the region. Fourth, *Wahhabi* settlements, "*paradžemati*" and terrorist training camps were established in Bosnia. Fifth, many Bosnian *jihad* veterans with links to terrorist organizations built their own cells throughout the United States, Europe, and Australia and became masterminds of almost all major terrorist attacks against the Western countries that have taken place over the past two decades. Sixth, Bosnia became a safe haven for international terrorist fighters and radicals from all around the world obtaining Bosnian citizenship.

Eighth, the failure to establish an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina was facilitated mainly by the United States, as such an outcome did not conform to American regional and global geopolitical interests. Instead, the United States insisted on establishing an EU-oriented, quasi-multi-ethnic federation that has mutated with time and proven to be completely dysfunctional in all ways. Facing such an outcome, the radicals slightly modified their tactics and began to gradually develop and expand a regional terrorist infrastructure which they plan to have serve as a cornerstone of the future Balkan Caliphate that should be created through the following efforts: expansion of the "*paradžemati*" network and *Wahhabi* settlements and military terrorist camps; the construction of new mosques and Islamic schools; further development of the regional network of international Islamic NGOs and international Islamic financial institutions; and funding Muslim political parties. Thus, gradually the goals

of global *jihad* are being implemented as the Balkan Caliphate will be only another stage on the path to building a European Chaliphate that is to be integrated in a worldwide Islamic Caliphate.

Ninth, today, in the global Islamic terrorist organizations' networks, the Western Balkan region is being used for recruiting new fighters, planning and preparing terrorist acts abroad, providing asylum to both local fighters returning from "hot spots" and foreign terrorist fighters non-residents of Balkan countries, and providing logistical, medical, social, ideological and political support for the activities of international terrorist groups. These activities are accompanied by the spread of radical Islam in the region, and from there into Europe.

Tenth, today, in the context of civilizational *jihad*, the spread of radical Islam in the region is financed through banking schemes, private and state companies, international humanitarian Islamic NGOs, and sometimes directly from the budget of some Islamic countries. The main centers through which such funding is being conducted are Vienna and Milan.

Eleventh, the post-modern nature of the Islamic fundamentalism (*Wahhabism*), on the basis of which the Balkan Caliphate is intended to be built, is a direct threat to regional security and territorial integrity, especially of such countries as Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Republika Srpska, since it implies the elimination of national borders with a view to the integration of the Islamic community into a single political space.

Twelfth, these dangerous developments are being highly facilitated by a variety of out-of-region state and non-state actors: Islamic states (primarily Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar), some Western countries (the United States, the United Kingdom and some EU countries), specific entities within international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE etc., private military companies (especially Military Professional Resources Incorporated), global Islamic NGOs, trans-national banks and companies, intelligence services, international terrorist organization and radical Islamic groups, etc.

Finally, this regional terrorist infrastructure, including the Islamic NGO network engaged in funding the spread of radical Islam in the Balkans, was created as an integral part of the global Islamic terrorist network, with a center in Sarajevo having close links to the Bosnian government (more precisely, to SDA and its satellite Muslim parties) and, as such, represents a direct security threat not only for the Balkans countries as part of the southeast Europe and Europe as a whole, but to many countries and regions, such as Russia, the United States, Israel, the Middle East, Central Asia, and more. Bosnia and Hezegovina is the cradle of modern jihad on European soil.

Endnotes

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[13] City of Sarajevo Archives. (1983e) Report Number: 21:3. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[14] The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) official letter under register number 1360/91 confirming the creation of the SDA Council for National Defense on 11 June 1991, signed by Hasan Čengić, dated from 13 June 1991. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[15] Document of the Security Directorate of the OS Supreme Command Headquarters of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated from 11 December 1993 under register number 03/29-341-1 signed by Jusuf Jašarević, the Head of the Security Directorate. [Appendix 38 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[16] The Report on the activities of the International Conference on the Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 19 October 1992, submitted to Alija Izetbegović, the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and signed by Dr. Al-Fatih Husanain and Dr. Mustafa Cerić [Appendix 41 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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[20] Interview with Awad, the president of UG Ansari, a company offering legal assistance to stateless people, one of the ex-members of *El Mudžahid,* by Ekrem Tinjak. Interview from 7 August 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina. [Appendix 23 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[21] Letter of Confirmation dated from 7 August 1993 under Register number 147/93, signed by the President of the Crises Management Committee of the Croatian Muslims for Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the War (Krizni štab muslimana hrvatske za pomoć Bosni i Hercegovini u ratu). [Appendix 39 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Outline of the diary of Anwar Shaaban, the *emir* of the El Mudžahid Detachment, in English. [Appendix 31 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[25] Ibid.

[26] These materials to be available for all interested parties in the electronic database of the International Commission.

[27] Appendix 40 to chapter III [Four documents]: (1) Higher Public Prosecutor's Office Sarajevo. (1992, July 30). Letter to the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Signed by Ivica Stanić, the Higher Public Prosecutor, Sarajevo. (2) Higher Public Prosecutor's Office Sarajevo. (1992, June 17). Letter to the Ministry for National Defence of BiH to the Commandant of the BiH TO, personally - No.A. 83/92. Signed by Ivica Stanić, the Higher Public Prosecutor, Sarajevo. (3) Higher Public Prosecutor's Office Sarajevo. (1992, July 22). Letter to the Minister for National Defense Jerko Doko. Signed by Ivica Stanić, the Higher Public Prosecutor, Sarajevo. (4) Higher Public Prosecutor's Office Sarajevo. (1992, July 22). Letter to the Commandant Sefer Halilović. Signed by Ivica Stanić, the Higher Public Prosecutor, Sarajevo. [Documents available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[28] *Oporuka Shehida* [Testament of the Martyrs] written by Majid Muntesari (or Resul Hajdari) dated from 5 August 1993. [Appendix 35 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[29] Speech of the then Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. [Appendix 36 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[30] Declassified CIA Memorandum from a Principals' Committee Meeting, dated from 4 December 1995, written by the Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force for the Director of Central Intelligence. [Appendix 2 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[31] Ibid.

[32] Declassified CIA Memorandum for the President of US from Anthony Lake dated 7 December 1995. Subject: Conclusions of 5 December 1995 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. [Appendix 3 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[33] Anwar Shaaban's Interview to Bosnian *Liljan* published on 15 November 1995. [Appendix 29 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[34] Letter written by Abu Al-Maali of the Bosnia-Herzegovina office of the Islamic Cultural Institute and addressed to the Minister for AWQAF (the ministry in Islamic countries that is concerned with religious affairs) dated from 23 March 1995. Found during an Investigations of Anwar Shaaban and the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, conducted by the Italian counterterrorism police. [Appendix 30 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[35] Official document, no. 03/1-174-84-1, dated from 17 May 1995, issued by the Security Services Department of the Third Corps of the ARBiH. [Appendix 32 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[36] Bruguiere J.L. & Ricard, J.F. (n.d.) Réquisitoire Définitif Aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel De maintien sous Contrôle Judiciaire De maintien en Détention [Prosecutor's closing speech/argument for case dismissal. Partial case dismissal. Requalification. To make a referral to the Magistrates' Court to keep under court supervision to keep the detention/incarceration]. Cour D'Appel de Paris: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. No. Parquet [Prosecution number]: P96 253 3901.2. P.97. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[37] Official document obtained from the Eighth Criminal Department of the Civil and Penal Court in Milan containing a transcript of two phone conversations of Anwar Shaaban with Khaled and Abu Abdel El Aziz. [Appendix 24 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[38] Official document from the Eighth Criminal Section of the Civil and Penal Court in Milan. [Appendix 25 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[39] Official document from the Eighth Criminal Section of the Civil and Penal Court in Milan (pages 19, 20 and 21). A witness called Ramadan Kandil mentions key persons all called Shaaban. [Appendix 26 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[40] Official document from the Eighth Criminal Section of the Civil and Penal Court in Milan (pages 16 and 17). It indicates that the Center in Viale Jenner agreed to send help for the Islamic cause in Bosnia. [Appendix 27 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[41] Testimony of the witness Perida, a DIGOS (the General Investigations and Special Operations Division) inspector. Included in the official document from the Eighth Criminal Section of the Civil and Penal Court in Milan. [Appendix 28 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[42] Ibid.

[43] Bruguiere J.L. & Ricard, J.F. (n.d.) Réquisitoire Définitif Aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel De maintien sous Contrôle Judiciaire De maintien en Détention [Prosecutor's closing speech/argument for case dismissal. Partial case dismissal. Requalification. To make a referral to the Magistrates' Court to keep under court supervision to keep the detention/incarceration]. Cour D'Appel de Paris: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. No. Parquet [Prosecution number]: P96 253 3901.2. P.126. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[44] Bruguiere J.L. & Ricard, J.F. (n.d.) Réquisitoire Définitif Aux Fins de Non-Lieu. De Non-Lieu partiel. De Requalification. De Renvoi devant le Tribunal Correctionnel De maintien sous Contrôle Judiciaire De maintien en Détention [Prosecutor's closing speech/argument for case dismissal. Partial case dismissal. Requalification. To make a referral to the Magistrates' Court to keep under court supervision to keep the detention/incarceration]. Cour D'Appel de Paris: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. No. Parquet [Prosecution number]: P96 253 3901.2. P.99. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[45] Official document prepared by the Agency for Investigation and Documentation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Agencija za istraživanje i dokumentaciju - AID) registered under no. K-02/ 2-7-49 dated from 6 December 2001. [Appendix 33 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[46] NATO report on Islamic NGOs operating in Bosnia dated from 8 May 1996. Pp.4-5. [Appendix 34 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[47] Ibid., pp.7-8.

[48] Ibid., p.9.

[49] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[50] Ibid., pp.13-15.

[51] Ibid., p.15.

[52] Ibid., pp.15-16.

[53] Ibid., Pp.16-18.

[54] Ibid., pp.18-19.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., pp.11-12.

[57] Ibid., p.13.

[58] Ibid., pp.10-11.

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[60] Letter of authorization by Haris Silajdžić, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 10 February 1992. [Appendix 4 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[61] Handwritten letter by Izetbegović to Fatih Hassanein dated 6 May 1994. [Appendix 5 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[62] Handwritten letter signed by Alija Izetbegović dated 22 August 1993 (Vienna) confirming that he took 60,000 DM from Elfatih Hassanein. [Appendix 6 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[63] Document containing a short biography of Hassanein and a brief overview of his efforts for the radical Islam cause. [Appendix 7 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[64] Handwritten letter signed by Hasan Čengić dated 22 June 1993, confirming that he took $200,000, 500,000 DM and another $250,000 from Fatih Hassanein in Vienna. [Appendix 8 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[65] Debit advice dated 3 March 1993 sent from Erste Bank (Filiale Garben) to the TWRA for the purchase of 20 satellite telephones for Hasan Čengić from Multicom Information Systems LTD amounting to $600,000. [Appendix 9 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[66] Invoice from the Hilton Hotel in Vienna addressed to Hasan Čengić, Sudan Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia for a one-night stay (4 September 1992–5 September 1992). [Appendix 10 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

67 Handwritten letter signed by Alija Izetbegović dated 22 August 1993, Vienna. Confirms that he took 300,000 DM from Fatih Hassanein. [Appendix 11 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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69 Specification by the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb dated 8 August 1993, wherein the Embassy specifies on what they spent the funds received from Hasan Čengić on 29 July 1993, amounting to 20,000 DEM. [Appendix 13 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

70 Purchase Agreement signed on 08 January 1993 between Hasan Čengić on behalf of TWRA (as a buyer) and Hudoletnjak Ivan as the representative of the company Memerson (as a supplier) from Croatia for purchasing two helicopters MI-8T. The deal amounted to $1,020,000. [Appendix 14 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

71 Ibid.

72 Invoice number 1812-1D-015 per issuer 34C dated December 4, 1993 amounting to 619,450 DEM issued by Multicom Information System Ltd. for the Fourth Corps of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Army for supplied equipment and relevant services. In the left corner at the bottom of the invoice it is noted that the order was made upon approval of Hasan Čengić and the merchandise was received by Sejo Sejmen. [Appendix 16 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

73 Intelligence document revealing that on 14 September 1993 at the Hotel President in Geneva, a meeting was held which was attended by Alija Izetbegović, President of the Republic of Boshnia and Herzegovina, Ejep Ganić, Vice President of the Republic of Boshnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdžić, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Elfatih Hassaneein, Director of TWRA. All reached conclusions at the meeting are indicated in the document. [Appendix 17 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

74 Official letter dated 1 January 1994 signed by Alija Izetbegović and addressed to Dr. Elfatih Hassanein in Istanbul. [Appendix 18 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

75 Handwritten letter signed by Hasan Čengić dated 10 December 1993 (Vienna) confirming that he took 1,000,000 DM from Fatih Hassanein for the needs of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. [Appendix 19 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[76] Handwritten letter signed by Senad Šahinpašić-Šaja addressed to Fatih Hassanein wherein he asks him to pay for invoice amounting to 929,000 DM issued by the Midest Edelmann GMBH. [Appendix 20 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[77] Handwritten letter dated 20 April 1993 confirming that Šuajb Šeta received $500,000 from Fatih Hassanein through Sukarna I., which he was obliged to subsequently hand over to Hasan Čengić. [Appendix 21 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[78] The Minutes of the hearing of the accused Cviko Amer at the Bavarian State Criminal Police Office dated from 9 February 1995. [Appendix 22 to chapter III]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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(2) Higher Public Prosecutor's Office Sarajevo. (1992, June 17). Letter to the Ministry for National Defence of BiH to the Commandant of the BiH TO, personally - No.A. 83/92. Signed by Ivica Stanić, the Higher Public Prosecutor, Sarajevo.

(3) Higher Public Prosecutor's Office Sarajevo. (1992, July 22). Letter to the Minister for National Defense Jerko Doko. Signed by Ivica Stanić, the Higher Public Prosecutor, Sarajevo.

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CHAPTER IV

The Role of the Media

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Each profession has a set of rules that govern it. In journalism, the most important of these rules – the first commandment - is objectivity, listening to the other side. A journalist should follow this rule in every circumstance. And a journalist must, above all, stay out of a story. The public expects facts, not assumptions nor hearsay. When reading media reports of war in former socialist Yugoslavia, the most common impression for us was that this war was one of the most misrepresented wars in recent media history. One must ask: why? So this is what we asked. That was the reason why we started this search for answers to so many questions.

The second chapter offers some of the historical and political background necessary to establish the context in which the media catered to the public interest. In this chapter we present first-hand testimony about those events and people necessary to understand what really happened. To avoid any mistake in thinking, here we must stress that all of this "media evidence" came from journalists, editors, publicists, soldiers, and staffers from powerful state administrations who had no sympathy for Serbs. But not all of them could withstand the burden of the truth and those stubborn facts that always find their way out. In spite of this, however, some might say that is not enough to come to any conclusions or to get closer to the truth. That is why, after all going through the huge amount of material that passed through our hands, we set out to test the "facts".

We then present the core of our report: chapter III. We invited scholars to carry out media content analysis by accepted scientific methods. In the first part of this chapter, we present the media performance in the six pre-war months when the parameters for reporting the war were being set. The findings of this analysis are ex-

traordinary. During the six months, before any hostilities broke out in former Yugoslavia, the media had set a black and white frame, simplified a very complex problem within Yugoslavia, and defined the good and the bad actors of war. This also had the potential to influence diplomatic efforts to prevent a bloody Balkan war.

The second part of the media content analysis deals with the period 1991 to 1995, analyzing the events that led to war and the war itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to be more precise, in Sarajevo. Researchers have started from one assumption: if the suffering of one ethnic group at the expense of another was emphasized and/or if one side was consistently portrayed as an attacker, criminal, and aggressor (Stojadinović & Jevtić, 2020) the media reports were biased. Their findings bear exclusively on the more than 10,000 pages from two primary sources, The *New York Times* and the *Guardian*, whose content between 1991 and 1995 was analyzed.

Both parts, after each analysis, offer conclusions.

Finally, as we have kept ourselves out of the story, and we followed the leads in the search for the facts, this report will leave you, the readers, to come to your own conclsions, or at least to find answers to some questions. Our main question was: were the media reports of the war in Sarajevo objective? What we found we present here as objectively as possible. We have no illusions that we will have answered all questions, but we are certain that this report will serve, now and in the future, as a solid ground for others to dig deeper and deeper. We are confident that, after decades of bloody wars in the Balkans, this report mirrors the behavior of the media of that time and its influence in cementing the horrifying image of a people and the unprecedented consequences this has had, and will have for future generations.

1. Introduction

> Violence was, indeed, all I knew of the Balkans: all I know of the South Slavs. . . . But I must have been wholly mistaken in my acceptance of the popular legend regarding the Balkans, for if the South Slavs had been truly violent they would not have been hated first by the Austrians, who worshipped violence in an imperialist form, and later by the Fascist in a totalitarian form… (as cited in Brock, 2006, p. 316)
>
> Rebecca West

Studying the materials related to the role of the media during the events that caused the war, and the war itself in Bosnia, more precisely in Sarajevo (1991-1995), we have noticed two main directions in observing media functioning. One speaks of the media influencing decision-makers. The other implies that, on the contrary, the decision-makers use media as a tool through which they communicate with the public. Is the media a completely autonomous and independent entity that regulates its own life? Or is the media completely influenced by an external force coming from the elites, whether they are political, corporate, or some other?

The questions are quite legitimate, but they were not the main focus of interest to us here. We have tried to present both, but only in terms of the context of the work of the media. Neither were we interested in who the "actors" who determined the narratives and news distribution were so much as we were interested in presenting media reporting in the context of the wars on the territory of former socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sarajevo.

In chapter II, we offer background as it was necessary to make the role of the media clearer and to look at the events from the end of the 1990s as closely as possible, in order to place the work of the media in the historical and political context. Without any ambition of performing a scientific study of the internal and external actors of the Yugoslav crisis, we focused on the primary sources, that is, the writing of the most influential Western media, as well as other primary sources as books, magazines, articles, testimonies, and video presentations, signed by the journalists and others who were witnesses to the war.

That is why, wherever possible, we spoke with witnesses and researched war biographies as well as the memories and opinions of war reporters who in many ways portrayed the situation on the ground, which is very important for understanding the circumstances, ethics, and professional norms. Equally important to us were the experiences of journalists who were in their home countries in their newsrooms and witnessed the climate and circumstances that determined the front pages of prestigious media; and secondary sources that were worth mentioning. For example, Melanie Phillips of the *Guardian* once told a surprising story of a "broader truth", which means that there was a defined frame: Serbs were portrayed as the bad guys, Muslims as the good guys: this was the mindset of the 1990s. And there are many other similar stories told or written by former journalists or editors.

Where possible, we were also interested in what the atmosphere was in the ranks of officials and the staff of the great powers and prestigious international organizations which were in one way or another involved in the processes better known today as the bloody civil wars in the Balkans. For example, Professor Samuel Moyne who had, as a young intern in the White House, "sowed stories" for the influential Amer-

ican war media, which was his unofficial job. To this end, we investigated as many circumstances and events as the duration of the project and the number of resources allowed. Some will be presented here, while others will be in an archive available to all interested parties on request and with the permission of the Government of Republika Srpska.

In this chapter we explore a short overview of the broader context of media performance during the different periods of history and political circumstances, but not in the way the reader might expect to see. Much of this chapter will rely on declassified documents, now provided by different intelligence agencies and other institutions. This will certainly add new and surprising dimensions in understanding the circumstances and events of the period preceding the war in Bosnia and Sarajevo. Also, some key milestones will be presented regarding politics and decisions made during and after the Cold War era.

In chapter III, we will present media content analysis as the core of our report. We have invited scholars to carry out studies. Two scientific studies were made by Dr. Aleksandar Mitić, who once worked for *Agence France-Presse*. Today, he works in the scientific field and runs the Center for the Strategic Alternatives. In 1997, he wrote his MA thesis: *Impact of the Media on Preventive Diplomacy: Three Case Studies from the Yugoslav Conflict* (Ottawa, Carleton University). Here, for this report, he went further in his research. Dr. Mitić updated his thesis with events of interest to our work, titled *Manufacturing of the "Good and Evil" Archetype in Western Media before the Beginning of Armed Hostilities in Former Yugoslavia*. In his study, he analyzed the six months before the war from the perspective of the preventive diplomacy efforts of the European community and the role of the United States and the media during this period.

He first analyzed the European media: *The Economist*, *The Times,* and *Le Monde* and their role in the period between December 25, 1990, and June 25, 1991. He found:

> The media could have had an influence on the following elements of preventive diplomacy: the weakening of the EC's support to Yugoslav unity; the softening of the stance towards the unilateral secessions of Slovenia and Croatia; strengthening of the EC's criticism towards Serbia; and the EC's refusal to acknowledge the demands and fears of Serbs in Croatia. (2020, p. 14)

The United States media that were analyzed included the dailies *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Los Angeles Times*, as well as weeklies such as *Time*, *Newsweek,* and the *New Republic*. Those media sources were analyzed in the period between January 15, 1992 (the EC's recognition of

Slovenia and Croatia) and April 6, 1992 (the EC/U.S. recognition of Bosnia and the beginning of the war):

> The U.S. preventive diplomacy was not clearly defined. It was ambiguous, unclear, and in flux. Also, the U.S. considered the Yugoslav conflict to be at the periphery of its interests since Yugoslavia had lost the important geopolitical role it played during the Cold War. Thus, there was a possibility for the media to have an influence on U.S. preventive diplomacy.
>
> The most important element which could have been subject to media influence is the anti-Serb bias. The U.S. ignored the "Serb question". It is thus important to analyze the media coverage and portraying of Serbs in the Yugoslav crisis. (2020, p. 34)

Those were the elements on which the media could have had an influence, according to Dr. Mitić.

The second study, performed by the Institute of Political Studies[1] led by Professor Misa Stojadinovic, and junior research assistant Milos Jevtic, MA,[2] analyzed more than 10,000 pages of the two influential media sources in the English language: *The New York Times* and the *Guardian* as the most awarded newspapers for journalism (at that time). The time frame of the analysis spans the entire period of the events that led to war and war itself in Sarajevo (1991-1995) which this study commissioned to be presented in an exclusive, new study. To our knowledge, no study of this kind has ever been performed before: "Researchers have started from one clear assumption - reporting on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is biased if the suffering of one ethnic group is emphasized at the expense of another and/or if one side is consistently portrayed as an attacker, criminal, and aggressor".[3] Content analysis, methodology, and conclusions will be explained in detail in chapter III. This is the core of our report.

What was important for us was to collect facts rather than observations, since the general perception of the war in former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Sarajevo) today is that this was the most unrepresented war in recent history from the media perspective. Numerous works were written on this. That is one reason. The second was to prevent any sort of attempt to file this report under: "unbalanced", "false", "biased", "pro-Serb", and similar categories. This is also the reason, why we have chosen to analyze the content of the most prominent Western media, instead of local media which propagated its view of the events and the people involved. Since propaganda is understandable in wartime, we have chosen influential Western sources as they are considered supposed to be immune from propaganda. Or, in other words, they are

supposed to be neutral, objective, and professional.

For all these reasons we have decided not to draw any conclusions but simply to offer this exclusive right to the readers of this report. Why? As once written by American journalist Peter Brock, "journalists are poor political scientists and worse foreign policy analysts. Diplomacy is not their game; selling newspapers is. Their job is to factually report what they see and hear and to ask questions - lots of them. Above all, they are supposed to personally stay out of the story, and not get involved." (Brock, 2005, p.VI) We won't pretend to be scientists (that is why we invited them to help us) or analysts, so we will prepare the report as easily readable, but it will nonetheless be difficult to comprehend, as new data offers new and surprising insights into the saga of war reporting and the role of media during the war in former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Sarajevo, which turn it into a tragic episode in the long history of media performance. It is tragic in the sense that journalists, by choice or otherwise, whether they were aware of it or not, took a side in the war and helped prolong the war, which led to unprecedented consequences that are still felt to this day. Sadly, it seems that many, though not all, forget that the first commandment of professional journalism is objectivity – and listening to the other side.

It would be a huge mistake to even think that this report aims to protect someone or to offer a one-sided view. On the contrary! It was a war. A bloody war. Each side committed crimes that need to be remembered. Each side had its victims who suffered due to the horrors of a civil war. We are aware that there will be those who will label this as a pro-Serb report. For all of them, a small reminder: once upon a time, one of the members of this Commission wrote, as a first-hand witness of war trying to answer the complex question: who are the Serbs, anyway?

> A mystified world asks itself about the real nature of these Serbs, able to survive six wars in the past hundred years, at times capable of horrendous violence, more often able to amaze with great acts of generosity, openness, and heroism. Yes, they are Serbs (...) Anarchists in peace, united in war, the Serbs at the end of this Millenium have once again challenged the world, and have again shut themselves up within the shell of resistance that is stubborn, silent, and monolithic. As confusing as their behavior may seem, their concept of national identity retains a force that the West has forgotten." [4]

So, it's up to readers to decide the objectivity of an author, as it is objectivity that he has looked for in this report.

Giuseppe Zaccaria

2. Background: Key Historical and Political Facts

In order to understand the role of media during the events that led to the war and during the war itself (1991-1995), it is important to present some historical and political context. The history of the Balkans from the perspective of historians won't be the same as from our perspective; especially since prominent members of the Sarajevo Commission will present the history of the region of Bosnia and Sarajevo and within as they see it. Our focus in this chapter is to provide an account of what the media was doing during the period preceding the 1990s, and to describe the political context and key political facts needed to understand the behavior of the media.

In the course of studying the hundreds of thousands of pages of different material, archived documents and all sorts of noteworthy publications, we have realized how important the material is to understanding what had happened in Sarajevo leading up to and during the war, and perhaps it will help explain the huge discrepancies between the actual events and the news reports and make them much easier to understand. We have no intention of offering any kind of implication or judgment, taking a side, or offering any sort of conclusion.

We will present facts in logical and chronological order based on solid evidence in the form of now declassified documents that used to be classified as confidential or top secret. In this chapter, we intend to offer an overview of primary and secondary sources primarily for the purpose of presenting a broad context with respect to the complexity that the time period that defined the last bloody Balkan episode and Sarajevo's role in it is known for, so that the behavior of the media and the communication strategy of all parties involved in the process could be easier to comprehend. We will start by going over some key facts from the Cold War era and move on to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the failure of preventive diplomacy, but the core of this chapter will be the first-hand witness accounts of the war, mainly from journalists, reporters, opinion-makers, writers, and publicists. So far, a lot had been said and written that can shed a different light on the behavior and influence of the media leading up to and during the war in Sarajevo.

2.1. Cold War: Short Overview

During World War II, sometime before its conclusion but after it had already become certain that Nazi Germany would lose the war, skilled high-ranking strategists of the German army knew that the world would be divided between two major world powers after the war:

the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It was also clear that the conflict between the concepts of capitalism and liberalism translated into the political system of Western democracy, and that the rise of another authoritarian Communist system would be inevitable. All it took was to approach at the right moment and offer "services and resources". That is how erstwhile wartime opponents started cooperating behind closed doors after the war. For the sake of intellectual honesty, all parties on either side of the Iron Curtain did the same. For the purposes of our report, and in light of what has already been written, we are interested in the cooperation between America and the Nazis, which was to lead to extraordinary developments in the political and every other field.

In February 2005, the National Security Archive of the United States of America released the secret documented history of the cooperation between the U.S. government and General Reinhard Gehlen, the German army's intelligence chief for the Eastern Front during World War II. At the end of the war, Gehlen established a close relationship with the U.S. and successfully maintained his intelligence network (it ultimately became the West German BND) even though he employed numerous former Nazis and known war criminals.

As Tamara Feinstein wrote following the release of the National Security Archive original documents (Feinstein, 2005), it was a shock. Although many articles, columns, books, and studies were published throughout the Cold War years about the secret alliance, their authors were labeled as conspiracy theorists and subsequently discredited. The proof of this well-hidden history of wartime cooperation between the Allied superpower, as well as between the United States and the Nazi war criminals, was released in 2005 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act:

> The declassified *SECRET ReIGER* two-volume history was compiled by CIA historian Kevin Ruffner and presented in 1999 by CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jack Downing to the German intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) in remembrance of "the new and close ties" formed in post-war Germany to mark the fiftieth year of CIA-West German cooperation. This history was declassified in 2002 as a result of the work of the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) and contains 97 key documents from various agencies, wrote Tamara Feinstein (2005). The IWG, which was established on January 11, 1999, [has] overseen the declassification of about eight million pages of documents from multiple government agencies. . . .
>
> The documentation unearthed by the IWG reveals extensive relationships between former Nazi war criminals and American intelligence organizations, including the CIA. For example, current records show that at least five associates of the notorious Nazi Adolf Eichmann worked for the CIA, 23 other Nazis

were approached by the CIA for recruitment, and at least 100 officers within the Gehlen organization were former SD or Gestapo officers. . . . The IWG enlisted the help of key academic scholars to consult during the declassification process, and these historians released their own interpretation of the declassified material last May (2004) in a publication called *US Intelligence and the Nazis* (Feinstein, 2005).

Thus, immediately after World War II, and we will see this in more detail later in the chapter, a Nazi network was created. It was well organized and extraordinarily well funded. It worked under the radar of the general public as a completely parallel system created to wage war against the Soviets. This parallel Nazi network, as we shall see, was involved in the work of many institutions (one of which was the German intelligence agency the BND.) It financially supported many important international events and was very important in creating events that changed the course of the Cold War and brought 'victory' over the Soviets.

Feinstein further wrote:

Timothy Naftali, a University of Virginia professor and consulting historian to the IWG, who focused heavily on the declassified CIA material, highlighted the problems posed by our relationship with Gehlen: "Reinhard Gehlen was able to use U.S. funds to create a large intelligence bureaucracy that not only undermined the Western critique of the Soviet Union by protecting and promoting war criminals but also was arguably the least effective and secure in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As many in U.S. intelligence in the late 1940s had feared would happen, the Gehlen Organization proved to be the back door by which the Soviets penetrated the Western alliance". (Feinstein, 2005)

The original title of the document the *Secret ReIGER* was *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, edited by Kevin C. Ruffner, approved for release by the CIA in 2002, in coordination with the US Army and prepared by the CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, European Division, Directorate of Operations, 1999. The over 400 page long original document, divided into Foreword, Preface, Notes on Sources, Persons Mentioned, Chronology, Photographs, Firsthand Accounts (Part I), Stunde Null (Part II), the Vanderberg Report (Part III) and the Bossard Report (Part IV), provides fascinating insights.

Here are some excerpts from the original documents. It is important to note that what Downing presented was merely the introduction. The other parts of the document were prepared by CIA historians.

Since 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has maintained close ties to the Gehlen Organization which became West Germany's BND, or Federal Intelligence Service, in 1956. Through the long decades of the Cold War, the CIA and the BND worked closely together to expand freedom in Europe [redacted] during which time both countries faced new threats in the form of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and unrest in Europe and other regions of the world. Forging this intelligence partnership between the United States and Germany was not an easy task. In 1945, the United States and its allies had just been at war with Nazi Germany. Germany itself lay in ruins, its towns and cities destroyed, while American, British, French, and Soviet troops divided the country into occupation zones.

Democratic government was reestablished in the Western zones while a totalitarian system was forced on the Eastern zones by the Soviet Union. . . . In order for Western Europe to recover from the war and to survive the threat of Communism, Germany had to be rebuilt and its government restored. The United States promoted these efforts through the Marshall Fund, the formation of the Bundesrepublik, the rearmament of West Germany, and its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations. The Gehlen Organization operated in the vacuum of the Cold War. After the war, General Reinhard Gehlen, a senior German army intelligence officer and expert on the Soviet Union, directed his officers to preserve their records and surrender to American forces.

In the summer of 1945, a handful of US Army officers recognized that Gehlen's position as the head of Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) could be useful in obtaining information about the Soviet Army … After sending Gehlen and several of his officers to the United States for debriefings in the summer of 1945, the Army also began to use former German intelligence officers as operatives in the American occupation zone in Germany. Between 1945 and 1949, the US Army handled the Gehlen Organization and funded its intelligence collection. During this period, the US Army wanted the CIA and its predecessor organizations to assume responsibility for the Gehlen Organization. The CIA, still getting itself established in Washington as the nation's first peacetime, centralized intelligence organization, had reservations about the Army's efforts for it to take over the Gehlen Organization. (Downing, 1999)

Indeed, Army Intelligence and the CIA had many disagreements over the issue for years regarding operational matters such as costs and security. More than anything, the trust posed in their erstwhile enemies was at the core of their mutual clashes.

We have studied all the documents that were released and spent many hours perusing the CIA digital library. Here we will present just a few key documents that shaped the Western world after the war, such as this excerpt from a CIA document entitled *Biographic Sketch of General Reinhard Gehlen,* declassified in 2001:

> From 1949 until 1956 General Gehlen devoted his full energies to legalizing his organization like the West German Federal Intelligence Service. He achieved this goal in March 1956 and thereby became its first president. He became directly responsible to the Chancellor's office. After legalization, he strove to develop his organization into a worldwide intelligence service having collection capabilities and liaison on a world-wide basis. He has gone a long way toward accomplishing this goal. . . . General Gehlen was succeeded on 1 May 1968 by General Gerhard Wessel, his adjutant in Fremde Heere Ost, who was instrumental in assisting in the formation of the Gehlen organization. Wessel has served with the BND, the West German Ministry of Defense, and the NATO Military Committee in Washington and Brussels (CIA, 2001, 2005).

General Gehlen foresaw that the New World Order following the collapse of the Third Reich will consist of two world powers, the USA and the USSR. He was also convinced that the two would sooner or later divide the zone of interest and eventually clash with one another. He anticipated the Cold War and had strong arguments to support his claim; he had access to reams of documents at his post of duty on the Eastern Front, and built a strong network of installations that he was hoping to convince the USA to use against the USSR.

General Gehlen's dream of a new Europe with German leadership under American control eventually came true. This can be seen in a piece of his correspondence dated October 12, 1949, which was declassified and published by the CIA in 2005 under the title *Dr. Schneider's Reply to Recent Policy Guidance Letters*:

> Dr. Schneider'[5] Reply to Recent Policy Guidance Letters. Subject: Basic Considerations in Reviewing the Concept and Mission of this Project. . . . General Elements of our work, Political Fundaments: following the German point of view, the political fundaments of our work general to the following two points: a) The firm belief that future German policy has to be based, for the coming period of history, on very close cooperation with the United States, even in the frame of a Western European unity. . . . As far as I have been able to ascertain up to now, this conception seems to correspond in all points to the views of the new Federal Chancellor. In this connection, it is to be said that a future German foreign policy will aim to secure the German people's partici-

> pation in equal rights with equal duties in the family of all nations of Western ideas under the leadership of the United States.
>
> I suppose that in the long run, the interests of the United States will be lying on the same lines. It will be of importance for the development of the organization what contribution in the field of politics is or can be expected from them by our organization in the future with respect to American-German cooperation. Here I must stress the point that it will never be up to this organization to execute an active political influence in domestic or foreign politics, as this would stand in complete contradiction to the non-partisan character of a German intelligence organization working against the East. However, a role which the leaders of our organization could be expected to play and could actually play is the role of a loyal intermediary also in the field of foreign politics and in conformity with our mutual ideas. (CIA, 2005)

It is important to note that General Gehlen's group revived its network created just before and during World War II in Europe and the Middle East, and not only there, but also in all areas of interest. The area of interest for this report will be the network in Europe and the Middle East, particularly the declassified documents relating to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.

The Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini and Ali el-Gailani, two Arab leaders, had a strong connection with Nazis, who financed their activities. The outcome of the war was already obvious in April 1945, and had been even before then, but what they wanted to do was to continue their activities. Al-Husseini believed in a pan-Islamic state. They had enough resources to execute the plans forged before and during World War II. For example, Breitman and Goda wrote:

> A German field marshal received a base salary of 26,500 marks per year. . . . From spring 1943 to spring 1944, Husseini personally received 50,000 marks monthly and Gailani 65,000 for operational expenses. . . . Husseini and Gailani received substantial foreign currency to support adherents living in countries outside Germany. (Breitman & Goda, 2010, p. 19)

Husseini maintained regular contact with high-ranking SS officers such as Wilhelm Beisner, Hermann Hoth, and Waffen-SS General Gottlob Berger who was in charge of recruiting non-German forces into the Waffen-SS. Husseini also maintained a very close personal relationship with Heinrich Himmler himself.

The Grand Mufti was aware of the significance of propaganda and media for his mission and he maintained a strong relationship with persons who worked for the German Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry:

> An Egyptian named Galal in Berlin edited an Arabic-language periodical designed to stir up the Arabs to support Germany, and El-Naggar assisted him in 1940. By 1941 El-Naggar had his own Arabic publication for Middle Eastern audiences, and in 1942 he took on the additional job of director of Nazi short-wave broadcasts to the Near East. After Husseini came to Berlin, he wanted to collaborate with El-Naggar on Middle Eastern broadcasts, and for a time they worked together successfully. Then El-Naggar established an Islamic Central Institute in Berlin. Husseini had wanted to head this institute, and after El-Naggar refused him, Husseini used his influence with the SS to get El-Naggar removed from the broadcasting job. (Breitman & Goda, 2010, p. 20)

In his pursuit of a pan-Islamic state, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, in coordination with the Nazis, recruited Muslims from all over their zones of interest:

> Fall of 1943: "Husseini went to the Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi ally, to recruit Muslims for the Waffen-SS. During that trip, he told the troops of the newly formed Bosnian-Muslim 13th Mountain Waffen-SS division that the entire Muslim world ought to follow their example". (Breitman & Goda, 2010, p. 20)

As the war ended with the obvious outcome, Husseini arranged with the Nazis to continue cooperation on a political-ideological basis. According to the declassified files, the Nazis made arrangements with Husseini to continue this mission after April 1945. What we know today, based on the CIA's Secret Information on Amin el-Husseini, which was declassified in 2008, is that the CIA and the Army secret services were well aware of the Grand Mufti's routes, missions, contacts, and power (CIA, 1951). What is important for this part of the report is that the Grand Mufti maintained the close ties forged during World War II and continued working on the mission defined during that time:

> [T]he formation of more than two dozen Muslim Waffen SS and Wehrmacht units in Bosnia, Kosovo, Western Macedonia, North Africa, and German-occupied Soviet Union. After the war, wanted for war crimes by the Yugoslav government, al-Husseini fled to Egypt, where he worked with the Odessa Network to bring thousands of Nazis to the Middle East and into the Egyptian and Syrian military**.** In 1945, he was named the Muslim Brotherhood leader in Jerusalem.

Bruce Tefft pointed the above out in his article The Muslim Brotherhood Threat to the Middle East, Israel and the World (Tefft, 2013). Tefft's article also mentions events from 1946, one year after the Nazis had, in April 1945, signed a new agreement for the post-war era with the Grand Mufti:

> In 1946 al-Husseini met his Egyptian-born grandnephew, Yasser Arafat, who at 17 began to work for al-Husseini as an arms smuggler for al-Husseini's militia forces in Jerusalem. Arafat became an official member of the Brotherhood in 1948 and attempted to fight the Jews in the 1948 War… but was stopped by Egyptian forces on his way from Cairo. In 1957, while at university in Kuwait, Arafat founded the Palestinian terror organization Fatah, which later joined, and then took control in 1969 of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). (Tefft, 2013)

Meanwhile, the same process was taking place in the former Yugoslavia. In 1948, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the lifetime leadership of Marshal Josip Broz Tito split from the Soviet Union. The *Cryptologic Quarterly*, the National Security Agency's classified in-house journal, carried out a top-secret analysis of how close the world as we know it had come to a direct clash in the 1950s. In 2010, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the National Security Agency of the United States (NSA) published a top-secret document entitled *Dodging Armageddon: The War That Almost Was, 1950*, an article that originally appeared in the February 1998 edition of the NSA's *Cryptologic Quarterly*, on the topic of World War III nearly breaking out in the 1950s (NSA, 1998).

This caused a seismic shift within the Eastern Bloc and everything changed in a very short period of time. A year later, in 1949, the leading German news magazine *Der Spiegel* delivered another shocking blow, publishing the article about the secret connection between Marshal Tito, a World War II hero, and Frantz Neuhausen, the notorious Nazi governor of southeastern Europe.

On November 17, 1949, the reputable German newspaper published an article about Frantz Neuhausen and his postwar fate. He served two and a half years in prison, even though he had been sentenced to 20 years of heavy imprisonment. But, as it happened, Göring's protegee was far more useful as an industrial planner for Marshal Tito's new postwar plans. "In 1947 [Neuhausen's] life was worth at best five pfennigs," wrote *Der Spiegel* (*Der Spiegel*, 1949). A few years later, he was spending his time drinking beer in popular restaurants in downtown Belgrade (like the Three Hats on Skadarlija, or at the Majestic). With all of his ups and downs in his prewar business undertakings, "Fat Franz", as he was nicknamed, knew that he needed the right connections and opportunities to leverage his understanding of the trade. He

soon became a wealthy industrialist and supported Göring by showering him with all his favorite things. It was Göring who had saved his neck on many occasions during the war.

Neuhausen was a figure with all the best connections suited for the post-war elite. In his war days, he liked to say, "I determine who is [a] communist," appointing some to suitable high-ranking positions. "Those communists were now acting for him," wrote *Der Spiegel* (*Der Spiegel*, 1949). The mines in Yugoslavia were in need of an efficient manager, as well as money. Neuhausen and his connections provided 20 million in bonds from the World Bank for the Bor and Trepča mines. "Neuhausen provided the documents for the international bond business. Americans found his calculations 'very useful'," wrote *Der Spiegel* (*Der Spiegel*, 1949). For Marshal Tito, it was a practical postwar decision, since he needed to rule over a country plagued with many problems and which had many opponents, primed for a new round of war both inside and outside its borders. Neuhausen was officially released in 1953, and died in 1966 in Berlin, Germany.

In these early days of the Cold War era and its various top-secret alliances, it was necessary to organize a system of propaganda that would maintain and nurture the processes which would shape the mindset of so many generations to come, born and raised in an atmosphere of constant threat from the other side of the Iron Curtain.

2.2. Public diplomacy, communication strategy, and information management

Public diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy goes through different stages of restructuring for various political and other reasons. The so-called "soft power" was seen as a condition of the tendency of superpowers to spread, occupy, work with, and above all to control, all in the name of higher moral values, one of which is freedom. "Public diplomacy – which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves – has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies," Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, stated in 2002 (as cited in Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 310). Back in 2002, Chairman Hyde (R-Illinois) was fighting to obtain a grant in the amount of $255 million for the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, as reported by *The New York Times*. "If we are to be successful in our broader foreign policy goals, America's effort to engage the peoples of the world must assume a more prominent place in the planning and execution of our foreign policy" (Shanker & Schmitt, 2002).

In 2005, Professors Liam Kennedy[6] and Scot Lucas[7], published an essay entitled *Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy*, offering a lucid insight into the history of "reorganization and retooling, as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the 'hearts and minds' of a foreign public" (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 310). Since this role is not a new one, in the sense of conveying ideas and activities, historical "prefiguration", as authors labeled it, during the decades-long history of the so-called "soft power", took many shapes, schemes, stakeholders, within the well-organized state-private conglomerate:

> The term "public diplomacy" was coined by scholars at Tufts University in the mid-1960s to "describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda" under the control of the U.S. government. As the term came into vogue, it effectively glossed (through the implication of both public and diplomatic intent) the political valence of both its invention and object of study through an emphasis on its role as "an applied translational science of human behavior." The origin of the term is a valuable reminder that academic knowledge production has itself been caught up in the historical foundation and contemporary conduct of U.S. public diplomacy, with the American university a long-cultural knowledge in service of the state. (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 310)

In a wider context, the very origin of the term and the phenomenon goes all the way back to the origin of the United States. The structure of public diplomacy as government-led information engineering or psychological warfare, or propaganda of the Cold War could be found in agencies developed during and immediately after World War II:

- The Office of War Information (OWI), and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS): "Circumstances that occurred by the end of the war and in the first years after it triggered concerns which directly influenced the idea of the formation of a 'national security state'". (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 311)
- In 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) was formed. In December of the same year, the NSC issued a directive, NSC 4, for the "Coordination of Foreign Information Measures." The instruction both confirmed the State Department's management of existing outlets and initiatives such as the Voice of America radio system, the United States Information Service, and the Fulbright educational and cultural exchanges, and pointed toward the development of new activities. (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 312)

In 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) reported on foreign information measures. In an internal memorandum from the Executive Secretary Souers to the members of the NSC, later declassified and published by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the problem was defined as needing "to determine what steps are required to strengthen and coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S. Government in furtherance of the attainment of US national objectives" (NSC, 1947, published by the FAS). In the memo, the focus was on the propaganda from the Eastern side of the Curtain:

> The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the US and is employing coordinated psychological, political, and economic measures designed to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the US and the effectiveness of its national policy but to weaken and divide world opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by political, economic or military means. In conducting this campaign, the USSR is utilizing all measures available to it through satellite regimes, Communist parties, and organizations susceptible to Communist influence. (NSC, 1947)

In order to counter the "Communist propaganda", what was important for the United States was extending economic aid to certain foreign countries, particularly in Europe, [which] is one of the principal means by which the US has undertaken to defend its vital interests. The nature and intent of this aid and other US contributions to world peace are unknown to or misunderstood by large segments of the world's population. Inadequate employment of information measures is impairing the effectiveness of these undertakings (NSC, 1947).

Circumstances in the early days of the Cold War were such that both sides dedicated full-scale resources to information measures, as seen in the NSC (1947) memorandum:

> World situation requires the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign information measures of the US Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of its objectives and to counteract the effects of anti-US propaganda. (NSC, 1947)

According to the memorandum, this required the close cooperation and coordination of "policies, more effective integration of existing facilities, and intensification of foreign information measures" (NSC, 1947).

In terms of power structure, this meant that the Secretary of State was to be charged with formulating and coordinating the implementation of all information measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of US objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda. It is assumed that these functions will be exercised by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, who should consult with an informal group composed of representatives of other appropriate departments and agencies (NSC, 1947).

The above-specified document details all necessary means, facilities, budget, agencies which would have to cooperate "for the implementation of approved foreign information policies" (NSC, 1947). A new, wide, revolutionary network was about to be born.

Professors Kennedy and Lucas coined the term "state-private network" to describe: "extensive, unprecedented collaboration between 'official' U.S. agencies and 'private' groups and individuals in the development and implementation of political, economic, and cultural programs in support of U.S. foreign policy from the early Cold War period to today" (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 312). In 1948, the US Information and Educational Exchange Act came into force and gave the legal basis for "the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the U.S., its people, and its policies, through the press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad. . . . to provide a better understanding of the U.S. in other countries and to increase mutual understanding" (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 312). This gave force to the Truman Doctrine that relates to freedom and the protection thereof.

> U.S. projects, by early 1951, covered ninety-three countries, broadcasting in forty-five languages and disseminating millions of booklets, leaflets, magazines, and posters. . . . In 1953 the organization of public diplomacy moved beyond the State Department with the formation of the autonomous United States Information Agency (USIA) "to tell America's story to the world". (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 312)

In April 1948, the Marshall Plan was passed. According to it, five percent of the budget was attributed to NSC 4-A, which meant hundreds of millions of dollars dedicated to propaganda and covert action. In May 1948, George Kennan, the head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, drafted a proposal entitled *The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare* against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The National Security Council would support "liberation committees" and "underground activities behind the Iron Curtain" as well as "indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World".

> The NSC endorsed Kennan's plan in November 1948, and within months the Policy Planning Staff, CIA, and Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a new agency created to carry out covert operations, converted the proposal for "a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees" into the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE). The NCFE's guidelines came from the State Department and 75 percent of its funding from the CIA; its chief executive officers were psychological warfare veterans from the army and the CIA's forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Its best-known operation, Radio Free Europe, was on air in 1951, but even before that, the NCFE was already promoting the idea of liberation from communism through pamphlets, magazines, books, and a Free European University in Strasbourg, France. (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, pp. 313-314)

Over the decades, corporations filled the gap and introduced new players into the old game with the singular task of shadowing power-elite interests. According to Kennedy & Lucas, the conglomerate consisting of the media industry, the public relations sector and the advertising industry became an inevitable factor in this campaign:

> In 1983 the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created, ostensibly based upon "the idea that American assistance on behalf of democracy efforts abroad would be good both for the U.S. and for those struggling around the world for freedom and self-government." As an autonomous, nominally "independent" program, the NED could acknowledge a link with the government while maintaining the illusion of detachment from the state. (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005, p. 316)

From the 1990s onward, "the corporate-based diplomacy" and the measures that followed only technological development justified the existence of the state-private network. Those whom we recognize as members of the elite are only those who were in this orbit, regardless of their geographical location. This label extends to all societal strata: from workers to artists, intellectuals, politicians. This kind of social architecture, of course, was developing almost along the same script on the Eastern side. In the years to come, anyone who acted outside this so-called framework would be subject to a witch hunt.

2.3. Cold War Witch Hunt

Just after World War II, "hundreds of Hollywood's filmmakers were dragged before Unites States Congressional Committees and questioned about their political beliefs. Actors and actresses, writers and directors who refused to cooperate. . . . lost their jobs in Hollywood. None of the studios would hire them. Over 250 top professionals were blacklisted." Hollywood actor Alec Baldwin presented, in Christopher Koch's 1996 documentary *Blacklist: Hollywood on Trial*, a well-documented story about one of the biggest scandals in the history of the entertainment industry. "Are you the member of the Communist Party, or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" Hollywood icons at the time were asked that question on their trials (Koch, 1996). It was sad to witness how the so-called democracy fighters of the free world actually hijacked personal freedoms in front of a global audience. It was sad, shocking, and frightening for all who thought that their world was based on freedom, compared to the totalitarian Soviet regime in the Eastern hemisphere. The lives of so many people employed in the industry hinged upon their answer to that question. Say nothing of personally having left-leaning beliefs, even only being friends with people who supported the leftist ideology was enough to be condemned and blacklisted, deprived of a job and, on occasion, even imprisoned. The trend was not limited to entertainers.

In February 1950, Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy started a series of hearings and investigations aimed at expelling communists from public office:

> McCarthy claimed that he had a list (whose number varied) of State Department employees who were loyal only to the Soviet Union. McCarthy offered no evidence to support his charges and revealed only a single name, that of Owen Lattimore, who was not in the State Department and would never be convicted of a single offense. Nevertheless, McCarthy enjoyed a highly successful career, and won a large personal following, by making charges of disloyalty that, though mostly undocumented, badly hurt the Democrats. Many others promoted the scare in various ways, leading to few convictions but much loss of employment by government employees, teachers, scholars, and people in the mass media. (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)

Many people lost their jobs to the McCarthy-era public inquiries, often only to clever manipulation without any solid evidence. However, as it happened, the general public that made McCarthy so popular for a time was the very same that eventually led him to rock bottom (Achter, n.d.).

Today, the centerpiece of the Wisconsin senator's legacy is the shameful term "McCarthyism" that is still used in the political narrative to refer to similarly minded phenomena.

2.4 Cultural Cold War

In the summer of 1950, just a few months after McCarthy set off on his witch hunt, a group of around 100 intellectuals met in West Berlin to discuss, shape, and define the fate of the so-called free world. From their point of view, the Soviets were winning the hearts and minds of the people, the elites were attracted to their Communist ideology:

> The West Berlin conference was a direct response to these cultural assaults. Its supporters included the cream of the anti-Stalinist left – Arthur Koestler, Bertrand Russell, Benedetto Croce, Sidney Hook, John Dewey, Raymond Aron, and Ignazio Silone. Some of them were former Marxists or ex-Communists; many had spent time in the prisons of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, or Falangist Spain. Their goal was to seize the cultural offensive by creating an international organization of intellectuals devoted to democratic governance and the exposure of Stalinist lies. After days of heated debate, the participants produced a Freedom Manifesto, which rejected political neutralism and expressed solidarity with the victims of all totalitarian regimes. They called the organization they formed the Congress for Cultural Freedom. (Oshinsky, 1989)

This cultural Cold War entered scientific discourse decades later as an important part of historiography. Since then, numerous scholars have published and continue to publish works on the essential part of winning the hearts and minds of people around the world. Looking more closely at the references listed in the bibliographies of various studies, a select few pop up consistently and almost inevitably. One of them is Peter Coleman's *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*, which details the structure, finance, and organization of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). He described personal interactions and relationships as well as political conflicts within the institution. In his 1989 book *The Encounter Group*, Peter Coleman brought up the bravery of the intellectuals from the West that stood up against Stalinism:

> These courageous figures included the novelists Arthur Koestler and Ignazio Silone, the poets W.H. Auden and Stephen Spender, the philosophers

> Sidney Hook and James Burnham (and even, for a time, Bertrand Russell), the editors Melvin J. Lasky and Irving Kristol, the composer Nicolas Nabokov (a cousin of the famous novelist), the physical chemist turned social scientist Michael Polanyi and the sociologist Edward Shils. (*The Washington Post*, 1989)

The detailed structure of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and an overview of their work was published in *Congress for Cultural Freedom, June 1950-December 1955*:

> The Founding Congress at Berlin: June 1950 – The Congress for Cultural Freedom came into being in June 1950, when 118 distinguished writers, artists, philosophers, and scientists from 21 countries assembled in Berlin. The participants in this Congress launched a public discussion on the present state of freedom and the crisis of our age. In four sessions, before a large audience of Berliners, international guests, and students who had come - not without danger - from the Soviet zone, these men and women set forth their ideas, and at the close of their discussion pledged themselves to unite in defense of creative and critical thought. (*Congress for Cultural Freedom, June 1950 - December 1955*, n.d., p. 7)

National organizations that were members of the CCF worked through their committees: The French *Friends of Freedom*, The Italian Committee, The Indian Committee, The Australian Committee, The American Committee, The Congress in Latin America, The Congress in the Scandinavian Countries, The Exiles of Central and Eastern Europe, which held several international meetings and conducted a range of activities. The somewhat recent trend of analyzing the Cold War as a rivalry between two hegemonic powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with a focus on diplomacy, economics, international affairs, and military build-up presents a traditional, some would say obsolete way of studying an era. Once upon a time, history saw culture, propaganda, and ideology only as additional to events that were analyzed and incorporated into historiography. Only recently did scholars start to focus on studying on this level this complex part of the history of civilization, which the Cold War certainly was. One of the many scholars who work in the field certainly is Prof. Dr. Michael Hochgeschwender.[8] In his 2003 study entitled *The Cultural Front of the Cold War: The Congress for Cultural Freedom as An Experiment in Transnational Warfare*, Professor Hochgeschwender offered a different interpretation of the structure of the Cold War:

> Questions of culture and ideology provided intellectual frameworks for the whole understanding of the diplomatic, economic, social, and military impetus of this conflict without reducing it into an idealistic narrative. A far more coherent interpretation of the Cold War as a clash of cultures shaped by ideologies and interests became possible. . . . Propaganda and the quest for the inner stabilization of the developing hegemonic systems of the Cold War era became a central focus of historical research. This led to further questions of how and why the formation of these hegemonic systems was accepted by the peoples and societies involved in the conflict. (Hochgeschwender, 2003, pp. 5-6)

Hochgeschwender regarded the Congress for Cultural Freedom as the cultural front of the Cold War and looked at "its impact on the American hegemonic system after 1950" (Hochgeschwender, 2003, p. 7). Reflecting on the internal ideological relations of erstwhile Communists, the protagonists of the Comintern's agitprop in Paris that jumped ship and became anti-Communists, Professor Hochgeschwender presented the background of the ideological battle that shaped the Cold War's platform of winning the hearts and minds of people through a heavy propaganda apparatus set to spread on a global level:

> The most important lobbyists for a strict anti-communist course from the left were the Union of Democratic Americans (UDA), the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the remnants of the long-gone Committee for Cultural Freedom, an intellectual anti-totalitarian organization of the 1930s led by John Dewey and Sidney Hook, and the New York Jewish Intellectuals, a group of authors, critics, and artists loosely connected by high-brow magazines, such as for example the *New Leader* or the *Commentary*. Integrated with European émigré circles, they began during World War II to criticize the alliance with the Soviet Union and Stalin. After 1945, predominantly in 1947, they were actively engaged in excluding left-wing New Dealers' power in the Democratic Party. Moreover, despite all their domestic troubles, they tried from the beginning to combine their own agenda with that of comparable European organizations. It was the specific advantage of the New York Jewish intellectuals to base on already existing transatlantic networks. They and the ADA actively searched for further allies in a struggle against Communism perceived as being apocalyptical in the very sense of the word - and they found them. (Hochgeschwender, 2003, p. 8)

It is important to note that a new form of an old set of ideas was propagated by NGOs and their network of philosophers, authors, artists, and a ring of journalists

whose cooperation was necessary for spreading the heavy propaganda pushing the implementation of an ideology yet to come. As World War II came to a close and it had become obvious that the world would be divided between two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Russia, each fundamentally hegemonic in nature, this created a perfect momentum for new international ideologies to unite: "[T]he New York intellectuals, with the help of their widely read magazines (*New Leader*, *Commentary*, *Partisan Review*, and *Politics*), were willing and able to cross the Atlantic. They, in cooperation with the ADA, established a ring of journalists and correspondents all over Western Europe, especially David E. Williams in London and Melvin J. Lasky in Berlin" (Hochgeschwender, 2003, p. 9). All parties involved were well aware that it would be difficult to direct the Communists in the direction they desired while Stalin was alive. Communist parties had a very strong foothold in several large European countries, and were loyal to the Soviet Center. Keeping in mind all the different factions in the Western left, it was necessary to invent a third option of sorts to consolidate the liberal left ideology, which can be attributed to Lasky, relying on a set of propaganda tools.

One particular observation presented by Professor Hochgeschwender is especially important for this report:

> Culture, ideology, and propaganda were the main purposes of the CCF on both the transnational as well as the national level. The major means of transporting the intrinsic ideas of the organization were the magazines. While edited on the national level, they were controlled and harmonized by the Paris bureau. Besides Melvin Lasky's *Der Monat* that only in 1958 became an official monthly of the CCF, the most influential magazines were the London-based Anglo-Saxon *Encounter*, edited by Irving Kristol, Stephen Spender, and – after 1958 – Melvin J. Lasky, and *Preuves*, edited by Francois Bondy in Paris. The Spanish anti-Franquist magazine *Cuadernos*, *Tempo Presente* in Italy, *Forum* in Austria, or *Quadrant* in Australia completed the picture. With the help of its monthly or quarterly magazines, the CCF was able to reach regularly hundreds of thousands of intellectually interested persons all over the world, even inside the East. Their style was comparable, but not uniform. Normally, the CCF magazines were intended to present a broad variety of articles on highbrow culture and actual discussions within the intellectual circles of the anti-Communist liberal intelligentsia. (Hochgeschwender, 2003, pp. 16-17)

On both sides of the Iron Curtain, propaganda machines were central to the process of hegemonic rule and the implementation of the new political map of the world. They were specifically engineered to win the hearts and minds of the public, shape

the public opinion and prepare postwar generations for the era of the unipolar world. In one of his early papers on this topic entitled *The Intellectual as Propagandist: Der Monat, the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Process of Westernization in Germany* (1999), Professor Hochgeschwender introduced the term "intellectual as propagandist", referring not only to anti-Communist Cold Warriors as fellow-travelers of hegemonic interests of the United States, but also subtly and delicately pushing the liberal ideology as an alternative to:

> Communism, conservatism, nationalism, monetarism, or Thomism. Certainly, and without any question, this liberal ideology, which may be described as consensus liberalism, served the hegemonical interests of the United States in Western Europe after World War II. But, on the other hand, it did as well allow the left wing-liberals and their right-wing social-democratic partners to form an anti-Communist alliance on the basis of reformist notions and concepts. Consensus liberalism, a key element in the editorial praxis of *Der Monat* and the other CCF magazines, changed not only the perceptive framework of European, especially German, intellectuals and politicians but also-by using Hamiltonian means for Jeffersonian ends - that of the Americans. insofar it was a decisive tool within the permanent process of westernization after World War II. (Hochgeschwender, 1999, pp. 2-3)

It is important to emphasize that anti-Communism was not the end goal of this post-war ideological, cultural, and propaganda project. It was a dominant stream just after World War II, but it was not sufficient to dominate the world. For that, it would be necessary to impose a singular mainstream narrative, and not only in the Western hemisphere, a united framework to overpower all alternatives and firmly push them out to the margins of global society:

> [But] this hegemony was not at all as simple as critics have construed it. Its aims were broader and more sophisticated than one would suspect. Within this development, at least on the German level, but with some respect to the ideological preconditions of American foreign policy also worldwide, Cold War anti-Communism was a catalyst, not a monolithic cause, said Hochgeschwender in conclusion of the presentation he gave at a 1999 conference at the German Historical Institute in Washington". (Hochgeschwender, 1999, p. 31)

Many researchers and scholars who study this subject share a similar point of view. As Professor Amy C. Beal[9] said in 2006, in her 360 page book titled *New Music, New Allies: American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification*:

> Even before the end of the war, American composers had helped plan for the dissemination of American culture in postwar Europe. . . . a number of media were deployed to disseminate information about American values in the context of reeducation programs and the threatening Cold War. Publishing licenses for newspapers and books, radio broadcasting stations, U.S. Music and Theater Offices, America Houses, and the State Department's exchange programs were all part of the plan to set German culture back on its feet and to guide its progress as deemed appropriate by the victors. While the occupation of Germany altered the political structure of the country, U.S. State Department control of culture became the rule in the American zone. (Beal, 2006, pp. 10, 18)

A similar perspective can also be found in Thomas Doherty's 2003 book Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture, or in Walter Hixson's 1998 historical analysis Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 1945-1961. When historiography, thanks to dedicated researchers, acknowledged the value of culture, media, information, and propaganda as important topics in analysis, many scholars contributed to a better understanding of an era that came and shaped post-war generations. And when it comes to psychological warfare, as propaganda was once called, understanding the evolution of information tools is key to understanding the apparatus that has shaped the perception of the bloody wars in the Balkans in the 1990s.

2.5. Media in Changed Historical Circumstances

Information strategy changed hand in hand with the historical circumstances as the Eastern Bloc underwent a wave of anti-Communist revolutions. New generations had come, born and raised under intense Cold War propaganda. Stalin died in 1953; Gorbachev, as the leader of the Soviet Union, proclaimed *Glasnost* as a campaign of openness and started a process of *perestroika* or restructuring in 1983, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Poland and Hungary gained independence the same year. The Berlin Wall was torn down in November of the same year. By the end of 1989, Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania had toppled. Boris Yeltsin became the President of Russia and Germany was reunified the following year, 1990. The Cold War officially ended in August 1991, and the Soviet Union was dissolved in December of the same year, according to the timeline of the Cold War published by the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (Truman Library, n.d.). The newly arisen circumstances required a new ideological and propaganda

scheme. What that meant is that the media, as a key tool of the machine, went through a restructuring process.

In 1994, the RAND Corporation, an American nonprofit think tank, published a research book by John E. Tedstrom to answer the question of future US communication strategy to the rest of the world in the sense of its national interests and foreign policy goals. The old information distribution tools such as VOA, RFL, RFE, etc., had completed their mission. In a post-Cold War world, new means of spreading ideas and taking control of the public narrative required having a set of new information tools at hand, ready to be used in the most efficient ways. The main question of the study was: "How can the United States best use the fruits of the information revolution to further its interests through public diplomacy and international broadcasting?" (Tedstrom, 1994, p. iii).

Tedstrom's book further attempted to outline the platform of the United States acting in a post Cold War world through promoting US interests and values, international broadcasting, and institutional reforms of the broadcasting system:

> The driving issue in the international broadcasting debate in 1992 and 1993, of course, was money. Together, the operating budgets of VOA and RFE/RL total approximately $500 million, split roughly between them. . . . Every day, U.S. international broadcasters speak to tens of millions of people worldwide. . . . The explosion of telecommunications technologies and their relative affordability have already led to an impressive shrinking of the globe. Whether by electronic mail, telephone, facsimile transmission, or television and radio, even long-isolated parts of the world are now more intimately linked to the larger global community. This suggests that international broadcasting and public diplomacy more generally can have an even larger impact on foreign affairs than they did during the Cold War. (Tedstrom, 1994, pp. 8-9)

Tools of soft power such as the media proved to be massively important in shaping public opinion. The Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whose works were broadcast frequently on both VOA and RL, wrote of "the mighty non-military force which resides in the airwaves and whose kindling power amid Communist darkness cannot even be grasped by the Western imagination." The President of Estonia Lennart Meri testified to the dramatic impact of the first VOA broadcast in Estonian and later nominated the RFE/RL for the Nobel Peace Prize. And Russian President Boris Yeltsin said: "[D]uring 3 - 4 days of the (failed 1991) coup, Radio Liberty was one of the very few channels through which it was possible to send information to the whole world and, most importantly, to the people of Russia, because now every family in Russia listens to Radio Liberty" (Tedstrom, 1994, pp. 4-5).

The other issue that must be addressed is the economy of mass media, or, the issue of media mergers that have created a global media monopoly. Floyd Norris from *The New York Times* wrote on this topic in 1989, when Time Inc. merged with Warner Communications Inc.:

> Time is a leading book and magazine publisher with extensive cable television holdings, and Warner is a major producer of movies and records and has a large cable-television operation. The merger would create a new company, Time Warner Inc., with a stock market value of $15.2 billion and revenue of $10 billion a year. . . . The merger would ensure Time Warner a place in the 1990s as one of a handful of global media giants able to produce and distribute information in virtually any medium. The companies said the deal would help the United States compete against major European and Asian companies. 'Only strong American companies will survive after the formation of a unified European market in 1992,' said Steven J. Ross, chairman of Warner. (Norris, 1989)

What this and other relatively recent mergers in the media industry mean is that the ownership of the media is concentrated in only a few pairs of hands, which further means that a select few people have unprecedented control over the distribution of news, magazines, and other media content that is framed according to their interest: John Reidy, an analyst at Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc, described the deal as mind-boggling:

> What you've got is a company that will be the largest magazine publisher in the country, the world's most profitable record company, a cable television entity with more than 5.5 million cable subscribers, one of the world's largest book-publishing operations and the country's largest supplier of pay-cable programming. (Norris, 1989)

> Time's properties include *Time*, *People*, *Money*, and *Sports Illustrated*, as well as Home Box Office, the pay-television operator; Time-Life Books, and the Book-of-the-Month Club. Warner owns Warner Bros., a major film producer, and a large record company, a major paperback book publisher and cable-television systems. Time Board Members Applaud (Norris, 1989),

wrote Norris in his article. And, as expected, these mergers in the media industry were the main concern of numerous media institutions striving to protect the media market from monopoly. Still, the consolidation of media ownership continues to this day.

Just to name a few names: firstly, Rupert Murdoch, Australian born American newspaper publisher, and media mogul:

[B]y the time that Murdoch acquired his first British newspaper in 1969 – the *News of the World* of London – he had put together a proven formula for boosting circulation, which entailed an emphasis on crime, sex, scandal, and human-interest stories with boldface headlines, prolific sports reporting, and outspokenly conservative editorializing. This formula was successful with both the *News of the World* and *The Sun*, a London daily that he acquired the following year. In 1973 Murdoch entered the American newspaper business by purchasing two San Antonio, Texas, dailies, one of which – the *San Antonio News* (later the *Express-News*) – he transformed into a sex-and-scandal sheet that soon dominated the city's afternoon market. In 1974 he introduced a national weekly sensationalist tabloid, the *Star*, and in 1976 he purchased the afternoon tabloid the *New York Post*, but in the late 1980s he sold both, profitably; he repurchased the *Post* in 1993.

He also purchased the *Boston Herald American* from the Hearst Corporation in 1982 and changed the name to the *Boston Herald* (sold 1994). He bought *TV Guide* in 1988 (sold 2008). Overall in the 1980s and 90s, he bought and later sold several American publications – such as the *Chicago Sun-Times*, the *New York City Village Voice*, and the *New York Magazine*. Among Murdoch's diverse publications were some more conventional and respected newspapers, such as *The Times* of London and the *Sunday Times* (both acquired in 1981) and the *Australian* (a national daily that he established in 1964). Murdoch took up residence in the United States in 1974 and became a naturalized US citizen in 1985, based in New York City. In the 1980s and 90s, Murdoch amassed major holdings in other communications ventures, including radio and television stations and video, film, and record companies, as well as book publishing.

In 1985 he acquired the Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation (later called 20th Century Fox) and bought several independent American television stations from Metromedia, Inc., and then consolidated both these ventures into a new company, Fox, Inc., which has since become a major broadcast television network in the United States, rivaling ABC, CBS, and NBC. He bought the Australian newsgroup the *Herald and Weekly Times Ltd*. in 1987. He thereafter purchased some book-publishing companies including, in the United States, the prestigious Harper & Row Publishers (1987), the religious publisher Zondervan (1988), and the giant textbook and trade publisher Scott, Foresman & Company (1989), and, in the United Kingdom, the venerable William Collins plc (1989). These companies and some operations in Australia and New Zealand were merged in 1990 as HarperCollins Publishers. In Britain in 1989 Murdoch inaugurated Sky Television, a four-channel satellite service, which merged with the rival British Satellite Broadcasting in 1990 to become British

Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB). In 2014 the company was renamed Sky after it acquired various sister companies in Europe. (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)

Another example of a media mogul was Ted Turner:

In 1970 Turner bought the UHF TV station Atlanta, and within three years he made it one of the few truly profitable independent stations in the United States. In 1975 Turner's company was one of the first to use a new communications satellite to broadcast his station (later renamed WTBS, or TBS, the Turner Broadcasting System) to a nationwide cable television audience, thereby greatly increasing revenues. To reflect the business's shift from billboards, Turner renamed it Turner Communications Company, and in 1979 the venture became known as Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. Turner went on to create two other highly successful and innovative cable television networks: CNN (Cable News Network; 1980), the first 24 hour news channel, and TNT. (Turner Network Television; 1988)

Through the Turner Broadcasting System, he also purchased the Atlanta Braves major league baseball team in 1976 and the Atlanta Hawks professional basketball team in 1977. In 1986 he bought the MGM/UA Entertainment Company, which included Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's library of more than 4,000 films. Turner set off a storm of protest when he authorized the "colorizing" of some of the library's black-and-white motion pictures. The large debt burden sustained from these purchases compelled Turner almost immediately to sell off not only MGM/UA but also a share of the Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., though he retained control of it. He also kept ownership of the MGM movie library, which included many Hollywood classics. Turner resumed the expansion of his media empire in the 1990s with the creation of the Cartoon Network (1992) and Turner Movie Classics (1994). He also oversaw the purchase (1993) of two motion-picture production companies, New Line Cinema and Castle Rock Entertainment. In 1996 the media giant Time Warner Inc. acquired the Turner Broadcasting System for $7.5 billion. As part of the agreement, Turner became a vice-chairman of Time Warner and headed all of the merged company's cable television networks. When Time Warner merged with Internet company AOL in 2001, Turner became vice-chairman and senior adviser of AOL Time Warner Inc. In 2003 he resigned as vice-chairman of that company, and three years later Turner announced that he would not seek reelection to its board of directors. (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)

Now, CNN is "established as the premier global television news channel" in the words of Robert McChesney in his article:

> CNN International, a subsidiary of CNN. . . . beamed via ten satellites to over 200 nations and 90 million subscribers by 1994, a 27 percent increase over 1993. The long-term goal for CNN International is to operate (or participate in joint ventures to establish) CNN channels in French, Japanese, Hindi, Arabic, and perhaps one or two other regional languages. CNN launched a Spanish-language service for Latin America in 1997, based in Atlanta. CNN International will also draw on the Time Warner journalism resources as it faces new challenges from news channels launched by News Corporation and NBC-Microsoft. (McChesney, 1997)

Nationally- and state-owned news distribution channels gave way to a few corporations who created media conglomerates through a series of mergers and acquisitions, effectively removing competition and contributing to a new definition of democracy, since this behavior is so far removed from actual democratic government:

> Until the 1980s, media systems were generally national in scope. While there have been imports of books, films, music, and TV shows for decades, the basic broadcasting systems and newspaper industries were domestically owned and regulated. Beginning in the 1980s, pressure from the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. government to deregulate and privatize media and communication systems coincided with new satellite and digital technologies, resulting in the rise of transnational media giants. . . . The two largest media firms in the world, Time Warner and Disney, generated around 15 percent of their income outside of the United States in 1990. By 1997, that figure was in the 30 percent - 35 percent range.
>
> Both firms expect to do a majority of their business abroad at some point in the next decade. The global media system is now dominated by the first tier of nine giant firms. The five largest are Time Warner (1997 sales: $24 billion), Disney ($22 billion), Bertelsmann ($15 billion), Viacom ($13 billion), and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation ($11 billion). (McChesney, 1997)

Attempting to simplify this view on media centralization through concentration of ownership leads to the same conclusion McChesney reached in his article in *The Nation*:

> In short order, the global media market has come to be dominated by the same eight transnational corporations, or TNCs, that rule US media: General

> Electric, AT&T/Liberty Media, Disney, Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom and Seagram, plus Bertelsmann, the Germany-based conglomerate. At the same time, many new firms and different political and social factors enter the picture as one turns to the global system, and the struggle for domination continues among the nine giants and their closest competitors.
>
> But as in the United States, at a global level this is a highly concentrated industry; the largest media corporation in the world in terms of annual revenues, Time Warner (1998 revenues: $27 billion), is some fifty times larger in terms of annual sales than the world's fiftieth-largest media firm. A few global corporations are horizontally integrated; that is, they control a significant slice of specific media sectors, like book publishing, which has undergone extensive consolidation in the late nineties. (McChesney, 1999)

Music, movies, cartoons and everything that falls under the umbrella of art, culture, and industry of entertainment can be added to this list. The stage was set to begin the global process of winning the hearts and minds of the people. The only requirement left in order to exercise a truly global power and reach was an opportunity, which arose in the form of the crisis in the Balkans: "A win in the Balkans would establish US leadership in the post-Cold War world in a way that Operation Desert Storm never could," according to George Kenney and Michael J. Dugan in *The New York Times* in 1992 (Kenney & Dugan, 1992). This leads us to the Operation Balkan Storm and the bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

2.6. Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

In November 1992, George Kenney and Michael Dugan published an article in *The New York Times* titled *Operation Balkan Storm: Here's a Way*. Likely based on insider information, the two authors had published the plan that eventually won the bloody civil war in the Balkans. Here are some key points:

The first step was to build a coalition:

> The U.S. should not act unilaterally - that was the mistake we made in Vietnam. . . . A coalition is possible only through ad-hoc arrangements. Three allies, Great Britain, France, and Italy, must be included; they provide staging bases and a limited number of air, naval, and ground forces that support a U.S. dominated air power operation. The coalition arms and trains Bosnian forces,

who conduct unconventional operations on the ground to recover their country. (Kenney & Dugan, 1992).

The next, to persuade Russia to participate:

> President Clinton persuaded several allies to agree to this plan. Here, Russia is a key player. Were Russia to disapprove at the start, the coalition would still keep it fully informed while leaving the door open for cooperation. There is reason to believe Russia could be talked into participating: it has a natural interest in being seen as a player on the world stage in this peace-making effort. (Kenney & Dugan, 1992)

Then, ensuring that the UN humanitarian personnel become Serbian targets, which would result in suspending U.N. operations and deliveries of humanitarian relief. . . . The U.N. operations are thus subordinated to larger war aims. But with coalition support, the armed Bosnian Muslims are as able as the U.N. to deliver aid. In addition, the United States drops food packages on refugee areas from planes flying above ground fire. Bosnian forces create "safe haven" areas, which help prevent the depopulation of Bosnia and save tens of thousands of lives. The havens also keep hundreds of thousands of refugees out of Western Europe (Kenney & Dugan, 1992).

The next step would come in two phases:

> [F]irst, destroying Serbian forces in Bosnia and, second, using concentrated force against Serbia itself. In phase one, the U.S. uses AWACS aircraft and F-15 fighters to establish visible allied air supremacy over all the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Next, Serbian heavy artillery and armored units in Bosnia are prime targets for airstrikes. British and French infiltration teams deploy anti-battery radar to locate Serbian artillery positions near areas under siege. (Kenney & Dugan, 1992)

The rest of the plan explains the use of technology to destroy Serbs by all means.

> Technology using carbon-fiber strands allows us to render useless Serbia's electricity grid, without destroying it, so that once hostilities cease power may be restored. Another technology allows us to turn petroleum products in refineries and storage tanks into useless jelly, without destroying the facilities. We destroy Serbian communication installations. At the same time, we take over Serbian airwaves to make our intentions to end the war clear to the Serbian people. That is a war the Serbians cannot win (Kenney & Dugan, 1992).

> The operational costs for the planning side would be relatively low: "There are indications that, if asked, Saudi Arabia would be willing to consider paying a substantial share of these costs. Other states would also likely contribute," George Kenney and Michael J. Dugan pointed out. (Kenney & Dugan, 1992)

This plan was created by President Bill Clinton's advisers as a third alternative to the options faced by Clinton's predecessor, George H. W. Bush, which were "either doing nothing or sending in hundreds of thousands of ground troops," they further said (Kenney & Dugan, 1992). Also, this plan showed that the beginning of the Clinton era was the official start of the involvement of the United States in the civil war in the Balkans.

Without going too far into the past, it should be pointed out that the intelligence community was very well aware of the internal processes, main actors, events, and prospects that led to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. For example, in an analysis by the CIA Office of National Estimates dating all the way back to 1971, almost a full decade before the death of Josip Broz Tito, titled *Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal* (CIA, 1971), the CIA tried to answer a basic question: Can Yugoslavia survive as a single state without Tito? According to that analysis (CIA, 1971, p. ii), the economy was at the core of antagonism between the former Yugoslav republics that had started to express and fight for their national identities:

> Inflation, foreign trade deficits, unemployment, and economic disagreements between individual republics are all on the rise. And in the face of these problems, the principal national power centers, the top command of the Communist Party and the federal government in Belgrade, sometimes appear to be indecisive. The future of Yugoslavia without Tito thus appears, at the least, to be uncertain.

For most intelligence analysts involved in preparing the 1971 CIA analysis, the core dilemma was "will, in fact, Yugoslavia outlive Tito?" (CIA, 1971, p. 2). Yugoslavia was, in effect, a hybrid state, an experiment that was a perfect choice in Europe during the Cold War.

The decentralized, federal and socialist country was a role model for other Soviet satellite states, in the sense that a third option, other than the two blocs of the Cold War, was indeed possible. However, the early 70s brought about new developments that worried the West. According to one declassified document dated September 27, 1972, the CIA had a Memorandum entitled *Yugoslavia – The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem*. Sixteen pages long, well-documented, the paper detailed the first serious political crisis that threatened to trigger a disintegration of the federal

state due to the rising nationalist movements:

> The hijacking of the SAS plane in Sweden and the bombing of two Yugoslav tourist offices in Australia by Croatia émigré terrorists (Ustashi) (sic) are the most recent episodes in a series of dramatic and violent acts intended, among other things, to demonstrate to the world the undying hatred born by Croatian patriots for Tito and the unified Yugoslav state. Belgrade has for some time been concerned about Ustashi's actions abroad and alleged Ustashi complicity in Croatian separatist stirrings at home. It is apprehensive that the problem may be growing, partly as a consequence of Ustashi activities within large colonies of Yugoslav workers in the West. . . . Like Al Fatah and the IRA, the Ustashi represent only the militant peak of a large movement whose beliefs and resentments and aspiration are rooted in a troublesome past and are nourished by the prospect of a turbulent future. (CIA, 1972)

This 1972 CIA analysis further stated that the Yugoslav officials had tried to obtain support from Western governments, seeking cooperation in dealing with the migrant groups operating with the aim of destabilizing the country:

> Austria, Australia, West Germany, France, Sweden, Canada, and the United States are known to have been the targets of these diplomatic efforts. The lengthy aide-mémoire submitted to Washington last month is devoted almost entirely to Croatian émigré groups. Serbian émigré groups are given very little space, apparently because Belgrade does not consider them a major threat at this time. Presumably, the Croatian element dominated the aide-mémoire addressed to the other Western capitals as well. (CIA, 1972)

Almost a decade later, on May 29, 1980, the CIA filed another memorandum on *Yugoslav Émigré Extremists*.[10] In the summary of that memorandum, the CIA concluded:

> Since the end of World War II, Croatian and Serbian émigré groups have been particularly active in terrorist attacks against Yugoslav installations abroad. Most of their activity has been conducted in Australia, West Europe, the United States, and Canada. . . . The main émigré groups are made up of Croatian separatists who want to establish an independent Croatian state and Serbian nationals who want to overthrow the Communist system and restore Serbian dominance over Yugoslavia. These conflicting goals underscore the bitter ethnic rivalry between the two groups and their many subgroups, who often disagree on tactics.

> The one feature they all share has been an intense animosity for Tito and the Communist Yugoslavia he built. Croatian separatists are the most numerous and the best organized, but the lack of unity among the various exile organizations has reduced their effectiveness. This memorandum consolidates available information on the leading individuals and groups that make up the Yugoslav émigré movement. It also reviews their past activities to provide a better understanding of the extremes to which they may be prepared to go in the future. The paper does not address émigré groups or individuals in the United States. (CIA, 1980, pp. 1-3)

The memorandum named all organizations, individuals, methods, weapons, and a list of terrorist attacks all over Europe. The Yugoslav secret service carried out many assassinations abroad in order to prevent the émigré groups from gaining solid ground in Yugoslavia. Mutual assassinations were also carried out. A notable feature, however, was the link between émigré individuals and organizations, semi-émigré groups and some sort of distance from Western governments in helping Yugoslavia to solve this serious émigré issue, as noted in the 1980 CIA assessment:

> The outright assassination attempts have resulted in numerous deaths over the years. The extremists seem interested in harming only Yugoslavs, although some of their bombings have killed or injured innocent bystanders. In a situation where they hold non-Yugoslav hostages the extremists are likely to give in to firm pressure rather than harm those people who have nothing to do with their "war" against Yugoslavia. They do, however, take the opportunity to gain maximum notoriety for their cause (CIA, 1980, pp. 1-3).

In November 1970, the CIA published a 72-page study entitled *Yugoslavia: The Outworn Structure* that included a detailed analysis of the politics, economy, Communist cadre and other factors that called attention and caused worry about the post-Tito state experiment:

> This study calls attention to particularist forces which have decentralized political authority and control within Yugoslavia to an extent unequaled in any Communist society. Whether these forces will undermine centralism is now at issue in the Yugoslav debate, and the outlook for post-Tito stability will not become clear for some time. . . . Yugoslavia's character is in the process of change, and the consequences of the eventual outcome federalist-centralist, tyrant-collegium are of a growing moment for the Yugoslavs, the Russians, and the West (Ford, 1970).

After the event known in history as the Croatian Spring, Malcolm W. Browne covered the aftermath for *The New York Times* in 1976:

> The unrest, such as it was, was put down as swiftly and effectively as was the brief surge of liberalism in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Since then, dozens of Croatian groups abroad, representing a wide range of political tendencies, have continued their criticism of the Belgrade Government. In some cases, criticism has been mixed with terrorism. Various Yugoslav representatives abroad have been assassinated, bombs have been planted in Yugoslav offices outside the country, and earlier this month, an American airliner was hijacked by Croatian émigrés who wanted to publicize their cause. (Browne, 1976)

In the article, Browne gave a short history of the activities of Croatian nationalists, focusing on what the then Yugoslav leader Tito did to silence those voices:

> He (Tito) stunned the nation by announcing that Croatia was in the grip of "rotten liberalism," and that the whole country was endangered by a "Croatian counter-revolution." The President initiated a purge of the Croatian Communist Party, installed a new republic government, replaced various Croatian army and police officers, dismissed a number of judges, applied new restraints on the university, and closed many publications. An 11-day student strike in Zagreb was suppressed, and hundreds of people were arrested. Those found guilty in subsequent trials of having written articles for periodicals in support of a more liberal government in Croatia received particularly long sentences. (Browne, 1976)

Ideological leaders, as Browne wrote, were sent to the Stara Gradiska prison.

Dozens of terrorist attacks, dating all the way back to 1962, had been committed by the Croatian émigré groups, sending a clear message: Independent Croatia. Several CIA reports listed all of the major terrorist attacks. Those voices were silenced for a while, but, as we are about to analyze, the sentiment remained until the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Among this serious trend, other factors paved the way for what is known as the bloody civil wars. In September 1979, the CIA Directorate issued an intelligence estimation entitled *Prospects For Post-Tito Yugoslavia*.[11] In its introduction, the early 80s were described as:

> [P]robably. . . . a time of troubles in Yugoslavia. The precipitant will be the incapacitation or death of President Josip Broz Tito, whose role in the creation and preservation of contemporary Yugoslavia has been so large that one cannot be confident it will prove dispensable. . . . During the past several years, and especially since the June 1978 Yugoslav Party Congress, a number

> of developments that had seemed conducive to a relatively smooth and orderly post-Tito succession have lost momentum. Simultaneously, a number of countervailing developments have ensued. . . . We remain fairly confident that Tito's passing, in and of itself, will not during the first six months or so pose a threat to the integrity or independence of the Yugoslav state. It will, however, reduce the regime's ability to manage domestic and foreign challenges, which are likely to be more severe in the post-Tito period than they have been in the 1970s. Moreover, the high degree of internal political solidarity that will probably characterize the immediate post-Tito succession is unlikely to persist. In consequence, the country will enter a period, probably prolonged, of great uncertainty and potential instability. (CIA, 1979, p. 1)

As estimated, political unrest was anticipated to follow Tito's death. Although he had left some guidelines in place for the period following the end of his leadership, such as a collective Presidency, the CIA intelligence estimation made it more than clear that his successors would be responsible for keeping the federal state together:

> Weakened central leadership will make it more difficult for the post-Tito regime to manage what are in any case likely to be increased economic problems. At a minimum, their lack of charismatic authority will deprive Tito's successors of an asset that has helped to prevent economic crisis during the 1970s, when the effects of high inflation (averaging 17 percent per annum), large deficits in the balance of payments, growing regional economic disparities, and fluctuations in the growth of consumption, associated with wide swings in overall growth rates, have threatened to get out of hand. . . . while a military intervention might temporarily stabilize a crisis situation, the longer-term prospect would remain one of potential instability and unrest, with an appreciable chance of ultimate civil war. (CIA, 1979, p. 2-4)

The lifetime authoritarian ruler of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, died in 1980. According to information used in the August 30, 1983 CIA Intelligence Estimate titled *Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,* the key points were:

> The intensity of ethnic rivalry has been increasing since the death of Josip Broz (Tito) in 1980 because the cumbersome decentralized system Tito bequeathed is beset by economic crisis, reflected in a widening gap between the prosperous north and the poorer south and a growing perception among Yugoslav peoples that their collective leadership is inadequate. . . . Yugoslavia's long-term stability is likely to depend on the relationship between its endemic ethnic disputes, fragile economic prospects, and cumbersome, decentralized political structures. (CIA, 1983)

An analysis of all possible factors that may destabilize the country for some time, included in a declassified CIA intelligence estimate titled *Yugoslavia Transformed* (1990) acknowledged that Yugoslavia, as a federal state, would cease to exist within one year,

> and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup.
>
> . . . Serbia will block Slovene and Croat attempts to form an all-Yugoslav confederation.
>
> . . . There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to the advocacy of democracy and self-determination. (CIA, 1990)

All of these well-documented facts led to the inevitable at exactly the wrong moment in the history of this Balkan state – the end of the so-called Yugoslav Experiment. According to journalist Celestine Bohlen in the May 16, 1991 issue of *The New York Times*, Serbia was the one to blame for triggering the constitutional crisis by blocking the installation of a Croat as federal President:

> The leadership of Serbia plunged this volatile country into a constitutional crisis today by blocking the installation of a Croat as federal President, a position that in the decade since the death of Tito has automatically rotated each year among the six republics. The maneuver by Serbia, the largest of the country's six republics, was seen as a last-minute attempt to maintain dominance over the fragile federation. (Bohlen, 1991a)

Instead of showing some possible resolutions to the blocked federal Presidency, the dispute between Serbs and Croats was certain to lead to further deterioration, as Bohlen pointed out in the same article:

> Although many experts on Yugoslav politics suggested that Serbia was bluffing in the hope of getting political concessions, they warned the consequences of the move were still dangerous. **"**Fingers are on the trigger all over the place," said one Western diplomat. "This has taken us to the top of the political crisis with unforeseen political consequences for all of us", said Vasil Tupurkovski, Macedonia's representative on the presidency, after learning an hour before the meeting of Serbia's intentions. "I am struck by the irresponsibility of the decision.
>
> Both Yugoslav and foreign observers interpreted Serbia's move as a bold

> attempt to keep control over the national political dialogue as the country lurches from crisis to crisis. Privately, Serbian leaders have said they can not accept a Croatian president at a time when other top positions in the federal government are held by Croats, among them Prime Minister Ante Marković. (Bohlen, 1991a)

Bohlen also pointed out that Mr. Slobodan Milošević arose as a new Serbian leader who rebranded the Communist Party as socialist, and who was re-elected as the leader of the Socialist Party in December 1990. Elaborating on the background of the recent event, *The New York Times* explained the fears that had set in on both sides:

> Fears that an attempt to block Mr. Mesić's succession grew two weeks ago after 12 Croatian policemen and 3 Serbian civilians were killed in a shootout in a village in eastern Croatia. In Croatia, the incident was widely seen as a provocation by Serbia designed to precipitate a state of national emergency which would lead to a suspension of the presidency, and effectively block Mr. Mesić's succession. But such speculation subsided last week after the killing of a soldier by Croatian demonstrators in Split, on the Adriatic coast. That incident forced a political compromise on the disarming of illegal militias on both sides. Western diplomats were also reassured after Mr. Milošević said as late as last Friday that Mr. Jović would step down today and that the normal rotation would take place, meaning that Mr. Mesić, who has served as vice president in the last year, would ascend to the top post under the established formula.
>
> Several Western governments, which had been watching the growing crisis in Yugoslavia with alarm, sent strong messages to Belgrade saying they regarded the orderly succession of Mr. Mesić as a test of Serbia's commitment to a democratic and non-violent solution for Yugoslavia. Croatia, too, had made clear that it would regard any denial of its right to assume the country's highest office as an attack on its sovereignty. "In that case, Croatia would act in the only way possible – it would secede from Yugoslavia," Mr. Mesić said at a news conference yesterday. Slovenia, the northernmost republic, has already set June 26 as its deadline for declaring independence. (Bohlen, 1991a)

The article in *The New York Times* saw the debate over what type of a future federal state the republics would seek as a constitutional debate over the centralized state that Serbia sought, (according to Bohlen in *The New York Times*) or more autonomy for the republics that Croatia and Slovenia sought:

> While Croatia and Slovenia have been pressing for greater autonomy within a loosely confederated Yugoslavia, Serbia, under Mr. Milošević's leadership, has insisted on a more centralized state. One of Serbia's chief concerns is the fate of Serbs living outside the republic's boundaries, in particular the 600,000 Serbs who for centuries have inhabited the eastern region of Croatia. The constitutional debate, which has virtually paralyzed the federal Government and pushed the Yugoslav economy to the brink of collapse, has been overshadowed by an outburst of nationalist fervor. The danger, many experts say, is that the leaders of both Serbia and Croatia are now being held captive by the nationalism that they themselves unleashed. (Bohlen, 1991a)

Nevertheless, the hope for a solution, or at least for a method of easing tensions, was seen in Mr. Mesić's "negotiating skills", Bohlen wrote, ending the article.

Two days later, on May 18, 1991, Celestine Bohlen again reported for *The New York Times* that Yugoslavia had failed to elect a Presidency and that the Prime Minister Mr. Ante Marković had named a special coordinating team including the Minister of Defense, General Veljko Kadijević, who would be in charge of keeping the peace:

> For the second time in two days, Serbia and its allies on the eight-member presidency, as Yugoslavia's governing federal council is called, blocked the election of Stipe Mesić, the Croatian representative, as federal President. Mr. Mesić, the outgoing Vice President, is entitled to the job under the rules of rotation in Yugoslavia's Constitution. Mr. Mesić, joined by representatives of the republics of Slovenia and Macedonia, walked out of the session held here in the federal capital and declared that in spite of the deadlock, he considers himself Yugoslavia's President.
>
> "No one else can perform this function," said Mr. Mesić, a 57-year-old lawyer, who returned to the Croatian capital, Zagreb, as other members of the presidency continued to meet in Belgrade. As chairman of the presidency, the President is head of state and commander of the armed forces. "In the shortest possible time, they should call me after they complete the voting, or Croatia will not be able to stand this insult," said Mr. Mesić. "For Croatia, it will mean that the presidency is no longer legitimate and Croatia will no longer be obligated to honor any of its decisions." Many here had feared that the failure to pass the President's job to Croatia would propel the republic's nationalist government toward a unilateral move on independence, following the lead of Slovenia, a republic that has already said it will declare independence on June 26. Early signals from Zagreb indicate that Croatia will not rise to what many see as Serbia's bait. (Bohlen, 1991b)

"It is very good for Croatia to wait now, to show people Serbian robbery and Serbian politics against the Constitution," said Zvonko Lerotić, a deputy to the Croatian President, Franjo Tuđman," *The New York Times* reported (Bohlen, 1991b). In the same article, a Serbian representative, Mr. Borisav Jović, explained that "he could not support a president who has spoken in favor of the dissolution of Yugoslavia." By the beginning of December, the same year, on December 6, 1991, Mr. Mesić resigned, which was reported by Danica Kirika and Carol J. Williams in *The Los Angeles Times*:

> Declaring his job irrelevant because Yugoslavia no longer exists, Croatia's Stipe Mesić resigned Thursday as president of the disintegrating Balkan federation. The gesture was mostly symbolic since Mesić exercised little influence in the collective presidency, which has been paralyzed by the same political, ethnic, and religious strains that have broken up Yugoslavia and plunged its people into a deadly war.
>
> "I think I've accomplished my duty – and Yugoslavia does not exist anymore," Mesić said in a statement to the Croatian Parliament. (Kirika & Williams, 1991)

Kirika and Williams further reiterate that Mr. Mesić's inauguration had been blocked for almost six weeks, fraught with controversy:

> … [W]ith the four presidency members loyal to Serbia blocking his inauguration for six weeks, then vetoing all attempts to rein in the renegade federal army. In an interview in the Croatian capital of Zagreb after his resignation, Mesić said he decided it was absurd to continue in the post because his orders as commander in chief of the armed forces were being ignored. "I feel as if a stone has fallen from my heart," Mesić said, professing relief at his departure from a lame-duck position.
>
> Yet he argued that both taking the job in early July, and now leaving it, helped Croatia in moving toward independence. "I had to say in the name of Yugoslavia that there is no Yugoslavia," Mesić said. He blamed Yugoslav Defense Minister Veljko Kadijević and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević for the bloody fratricide racking Yugoslavia, saying the pair plotted to bring the war to Croatia. "Now it's Yugoslavia's problem. Tomorrow it's Europe's problem," Mesić said, warning that the war would spread if left unchecked by foreign mediators. "Then it will be the world's problem." (Kirika & Williams, 1991)

Not too long after, it had indeed become Europe's and the world's problem. From today's perspective, it is rather simple to follow leads towards a better understanding

of the carnage that swept the federal and socialist European state that many had regarded as a Cold War experiment. Nowadays, we have so many sources, access to so many declassified materials that tell quite a different story from a couple of decades ago. As has been said before in a few declassified CIA analyses it is rather obvious that political economy had been at the core of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, and yet, this simple explanation is typically omitted from many analyses performed to date.

2.6.1. Political Economy and the Political Context of Ending the 'Yugoslav Experiment'

At first, many scholars rationalized the violent dissolution of Socialism and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as an inevitable outcome of deeply seated ethnic hatred. In their perspective, the disintegration was the logical next step following the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, since the authoritarian rule that kept the Yugoslav republics together had died with him, and the battle for Tito's legacy had started. Nevertheless, others regarded this as an oversimplified explanation. For example, in 2009, Susan Woodward wrote about the "alternative explanation of the Yugoslav collapse" (Woodward, 2009, p. 74). In 1995, Woodward published an extensive study of economic parameters that had a strong impact on the disintegration process, along with ethno-nationalistic movements that were born out of the economic crisis imposed by international actors. This well-known and oft-cited 556-page study, titled *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and the Dissolution after the Cold War*, presents data that offers completely new insights into the carnage that swept former Yugoslavia. As has already been said, some of the key data referenced in Woodward's 1995 study coincides with the later declassified CIA analyses:

> As early as 1955, Yugoslavia's borders were open to the movements of its citizens, foreigners, and trade. Since 1949 it had regularly negotiated loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented marketizing and decentralizing economic reforms to satisfy IMF conditions and, between 1958 and 1965, the condition of membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The consequence was a socialist country with extensive economic liberalization and political decentralization, earning association agreements with the European Community (EC) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) long before the nations of central Europe made their requests. Even after a decade of economic hardship and political uncertainty in 1979-89, the relative prosperity, freedom to travel and work abroad, and landscape of

> multicultural pluralism and contrasts that Yugoslavs enjoyed were the envy of eastern Europeans (Woodward, 1995, p. 1-2).

For most average citizens in Europe and the rest of the world, it was rather shocking to see this country, with its so-called third way of living between the two Blocs that had been bitter Cold War enemies, simply disintegrating in a bloody and brutal manner. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the start of the war in Bosnia (1992), a policy of austerity and hard economic reforms applauded by some Western advisers, creditors, and counsels; coupled with the loss of the centralized political rule of the Communist Party and the ensuing secessionist movements, as well as the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia had vanished in the most surprising, brutal and high-speed manner.

Today, many regard Woodward's book as the manual to understanding the Yugoslav crisis from an alternative perspective, far from the mainstream. The less known background of this crisis that originated decades before Yugoslavia exploded includes austerity measures and tough economic reforms and liberalization due to international policy of conditioning. Those interventions brought upheaval from the outside to many countries in Europe in the 80s, especially as economic reforms set the stage for political and social turmoil all over the Old Continent. In order to be able to appreciate the nature, causes and the background of the crisis, it is necessary to first understand all parties that influence the way of life in a country: "to explain the Yugoslav crisis as a result of ethnic hatred is to turn the story upside down and begin at its end," wrote Woodward (1995, p. 15). She was right; and although the perspective that she took was a path that few scholars had followed since the media outrage that accompanied the wars in Yugoslavia had effectively threatened to have all scientists dedicated to objective reasoning without bias or desire to take a side of the conflict labeled as conspiracy theorists, she was not alone. There were, for example, Michael Chossudovsky, professor emeritus of Economics at the University of Ottawa (2003, p. 259-260), Philp Baum (2016, p. 1), and others.

2.7. Global Political Context of the 90s

The circumstances that ended the Cold War era led to the fact that in the 90s the major and, essentially, the only global super-power was the United States of America. Regarding key decision-makers, this was the time of George H.W. Bush's Presidency. Mr. Bush (senior) was elected President of the United States on January 20, 1989. His mandate lasted until January 20, 1993. Apart from the fact that Mr. Bush strongly

advocated the reunification of Germany, he was also a leader of the international coalition during the First Gulf War that forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. His presidential campaign was that of a "strong leadership". Mr. James Baker was the Secretary of State from 1989 to 1992, Lawrence Eagleburger from 1992 to 1993, and General Colin Powell was the foreign policy adviser and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. Dick Cheney ran the Department of Defense.[12]

Much later, in an episode of the show *Democracy Now!*, a long-time CIA analyst, Ray McGovern, spoke with his host, Amy Goodman, about Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and George Bush's attitude towards these people:

> Well, you know it's really interesting. When we saw these people coming back in town, all of us said who were around in those days said, oh my god, "the crazies" are back – "the crazies" – that's how we referred to these people. . . . When Wolfowitz prepared that defense posture statement in 1991, where he elucidated the strategic vision that has now been implemented, Jim Baker, Secretary of State, Brent Scowcroft, security advisor to George Bush, and George Bush said hey, that thing goes right into the circular file. Suppress that thing, get rid of it. Somebody had the presence of mind to leak it and so that was suppressed. But now to see that arise out of the ashes and be implemented while we start a war against Iraq, I wonder what Bush the first is really thinking. Because these were the same guys that all of us referred to as "the crazies". . . . He was promoting the idea that has now been implemented that we are the single superpower in the world and that we should act like it. We've got a lot of weight to throw around, we should throw it around. We should assert ourselves in critical areas, like the Middle East, and over the next few years, the Project for New American Century documents very much elucidate this kind of strategic vision and strategic plan. It's very much like *Mein Kampf*. . . . We mean to be the sole superpower, a dominant superpower in the world… . (Goodman, 2003)

Ray McGovern was a long-term CIA analyst who spoke with journalist Amy Goodman in 2003, accusing "President Bush of waging the Iraq war based on a series of lies" (Goodman, 2003). In the excerpt shown above, Mr. McGovern spoke of the so-called Wolfowitz's doctrine that had somehow got leaked to the press and was then shoved into the bottom drawer. Some would say that this Policy Guidance was the actual policy on the ground. Paul Wolfowitz was deputy secretary of defense for policy together with others known as "hardliners" or, as the media preferred, the "hawks":

> Wolfowitz basically authored a doctrine of American hegemony," says historian and foreign policy expert John Lewis Gaddis, "a doctrine in which the

United States would seek to maintain the position that it came out of the Cold War with, at which there were no obvious or plausible challengers to the United States. That was considered quite shocking in 1992. So shocking, in fact, that the Bush administration, at that time, disavowed it.

As the first President Bush left office, Wolfowitz's draft plan went into the bottom drawer, but it would not be forgotten. (PBS, 2003)

The New York Times published the inside story, together with excerpts from the *Wolfowitz Doctrine*:

Though the document is internal to the Pentagon and is not provided to Congress, its policy statements are developed in conjunction with the National Security Council and in consultation with the President or his senior national security advisers. Its drafting has been supervised by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's Under Secretary for Policy. Mr. Wolfowitz often represents the Pentagon on the Deputies Committee, which formulates policy in an interagency process dominated by the State and Defense departments. (Excerpts from Pentagon's plan, 1992)

The document was provided to The New York Times by an official who believes this post-cold-war strategy debate should be carried out in the public domain. It seems likely to provoke further debate in Congress and among America's allies about Washington's willingness to tolerate greater aspirations for regional leadership from a united Europe or from a more assertive Japan.

Together with its attachments on force levels required to ensure America's predominant role, the policy draft is a detailed justification for the Bush Administration's "base force" proposal to support a 1.6million-member military over the next five years, at a cost of about $1.2 trillion. Many Democrats in Congress have criticized the proposal as unnecessarily expensive.

Implicitly, the document foresees building a world security arrangement that pre-empts Germany and Japan from pursuing a course of substantial rearmament, especially nuclear armament, in the future.

In its opening paragraph, the policy document heralds the "less visible" victory at the end of the cold war, which it defines as "the integration of Germany and Japan into a U.S. led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace."

The continuation of this strategic goal explains the strong emphasis elsewhere in the document and in other Pentagon planning on using military force, if necessary, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons

> of mass destruction in such countries as North Korea, Iraq, some of the successor republics to the Soviet Union and in Europe. (Tyler, 1992)

In the new post-Cold War structure of the world, it was expected the United States, as the only superpower that it was, would use this significant leverage it had. Europe was struggling with its new identity crisis and all of these external factors and actors, placed in the most unfortunate way for former Yugoslavia, sealed its tragic destiny – a bloody and brutal dissolution into pieces. The United States Army College led the Strategy Research Projects, and one of the reports issued as part of these projects was *Yugoslavia: Implications of an Unjust War* by Robert Saylor. In his analysis, he documented several key milestones:

> According to Michael Parenti, the Reagan administration issued US National Security Decision Directive 133, "United States Policy toward Yugoslavia" which was updated to advocate a "quiet revolution" in Yugoslavia. In the early 1990s Germany, Hungary, Italy, and the Vatican openly encouraged the breakup of Yugoslavia. Their rationale was based on the historical ties of religion, ideology, and WWII. These interests certainly coincided with some economic interests and the agendas of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank. The notion of powerful forces undermining the sovereignty of a country through the influence of world economic organizations is carefully examined in John Perkins' The Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. His experiences and revelations cast light on the possible contributions of U.S. corporations, the World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on Yugoslavia's economic plight and ultimate dissolution. (Saylor, 2008, p.2)

He further explained that it was the Bush Administration, which we have already mentioned, that cut off the funding for Yugoslavia and authorized appropriations to its separate republics. He emphasized that the U.S. had cooperated with Yugoslavia for five decades and with good reason. That meant that the US had a huge amount of investment there. And then all of a sudden, all of that stopped:

> [It] caused economic disarray and precipitated communal violence in the country. According to a 28 Nov 1990 *New York Times* article, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) predicted that this new law would lead to a bloody civil war. The article also stated that the Yugoslav experiment had failed and that the country would break up, probably triggering ethnic violence and unrest. . . . In 1991 a European conference favored the dissolution of Yugoslavia into sovereign and independent republics. Later, oil and drug interests supported dissolving and advocating Muslim independence in both Bosnia and Kosovo.

> There is strong evidence to support this advocacy in Jane's Intelligence Review, which warns of Muslim narco-terrorism related to Kosovo. Clearly, prior to the onset of hostilities, various groups had aligned to undermine Yugoslavia's sovereignty. (Saylor, 2008, pp. 2-5)

He continued, mentioning the already known process of fueling the acts of independence by Slovenia and Croatia:

> In 1991. . . the central government in Belgrade quickly arrived at agreements between Slovenia and Macedonia; meanwhile Croatia and Bosnia clashed over their borders. . . While the stated U.S. policy was to support a peaceful resolution, the actual U.S. policy did not. An example of questionable U.S. policy was its decision to deem the state borders as inviolate, but not the federal borders. This only confounded international law: When can people claim the right of self-determination? (Saylor, 2008, pp. 2-5)

The aftermath of so much military and other intervention ambushed many American analysts, scholars, and journalists years later. This excerpt from the Strategy Research Project of the U.S. Army College is just a small part of what we plan to cite here. This also shows that there were many wise persons in the U.S. who foresaw, predicted, and struggled for the other opinion in opposition to those coming from the mighty war industry. At first.

On the other hand, others saw Mr. Bush's "ambivalent policy" as responsible for "a full-blown civil conflict in Yugoslavia that undermined America's confidence in its European allies":

> President Bush was content to leave the problem to the Europeans. "I've told our top people, 'We don't want to put a dog in this fight,'" he wrote in his diary on July 1. "It's not one that we have to mastermind… This concept that we have to work out every problem, everywhere in the world, is crazy."
>
> The United States agreed to coordinate transatlantic consultations on Yugoslavia through channels with the European Community. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council defined the conflict in Yugoslavia as "out of area", and thus outside NATO's scope. (Chougule, 2018)

The excerpt above is from an article written by Pratik Chougule[13], who reminded his readers about what, in one article published in Foreign Affairs, Mr. David Gompert, the president's National Security Council director for Europe, stated had been concluded regarding Yugoslavia:

> George Bush and his lieutenants studied the facts and concluded that leadership in this crisis would have had major drawbacks for the United States. Following the Gulf War, a leading role in Yugoslavia would have implied that the United States could and would act as an international policeman, even in an area of more immediate importance to America's rich European partners. The consequences of an absent American policeman - the worst atrocities on the European continent since World War II - ultimately proved too much for the country's conscience to bear. The United States led a NATO intervention in Bosnia four years later and in Kosovo another four years later. The lesson learned: when it came to strategic and humanitarian interests, the New World could not rely on "old Europe". (Chougule, 2018)

At the Woodrow Wilson International Central for Scholars, on March 1, 2000, David Binder, once a member of the Washington Bureau of the New York Times, presented his comments at a discussion regarding the Balkans. He tried to answer the question "Why the Balkans?" in the 90s, trying to give an adequate answer regarding the United States and its European allies' errors in their approach towards the Yugoslavia crisis:

> I think that it lies in their belief that they could succeed where others failed and then, to choose sides narrowly in what inevitably became a series of civil wars: here uniformly innocent victims, there uniformly genocidal aggressors; here ethnic cleansers, there the ethnically cleansed.
>
> Did it not register with the strategists in Washington, London or Bonn that in World War II, Croats "cleansed" far more Serbs than Serbs "cleansed" Croats; if one can call the extermination of tens of thousands in the Jasenovac death camp "cleansing"? (Binder, 2000)

As a distinguished journalist of *The New York Times*, Mr. Binder tried to present the mainstream press and foreign policy decision-making process towards the Balkans at the end of XX and the beginning of XXI century:

> Oddly, the American approach to the Central Balkans in the last decade has been Wilsonian self-determination gone wild, with some help from Ambassador Holbrooke. Aided and abetted by some European countries, the United States has had a decisive hand in creating not arguably fragile multiethnic states such as the Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia of Wilson's day but mono-ethnic ministates – Croatia, Slovenia and, even more grotesque, a Bosnia-Herzegovina that is ethnically divided three ways. Like it or not the Clinton Administra-

> tion is now presiding over the evolution of yet another mono-ethnic state – an Albanian Kosovo.
>
> To put it another way, the US and NATO, though it was the opposite of their declared intentions, have far outstripped everyone else in ethnic cleansings in the Balkans. (Binder, 2000)

As an ally of the United States, Europe insisted, at the beginning of the former Yugoslavia crisis, that this was a European problem, meaning the Europeans need to be the problem solver. This is another external actor responsible for not preventing the bloody dissolution of the so-called "Yugoslav experiment" that we need to present. Christina Balis, in her *The Lost Hour of Europe: An Autopsy of the Failed Yugoslav Experiment*, mentioned many important factors not taken into account by many analysts, not to mention other people. She cited many of them from the ITV *News at Ten*:

> A commonly held view is that the Yugoslav crisis was "the wrong crisis (one of disintegration in an integrating Europe) at the wrong time (when it had to cope in Europe with the aftermath of Germany's unification and dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and the Middle East with Iraq) and in the wrong place (the Balkans, which had ceased to be a region of high strategic importance):" This may have been a defensible position for the United States to hold, reluctant as it was to become embroiled in another European conflict, but it was certainly not the European impression of the situation. For European leaders, it was the right crisis (one that reflected the new realities of the post-Cold war period) at the right time (just after the first serious discussion of the new concept of a political union) and in the right place (precisely in Europe's backyard).
>
> One commentator remarked in December 1991 that "Yugoslavia has become a test for Europe which Europe cannot pass, with consequences yet unknown." In 1999, one can say with confidence that Europe has failed this test – with dramatic implications. It was a mishandled experiment, but one that has the potential to provide answers for the future. Yugoslavia cannot be reborn or restored; an autopsy is the only process available to establish whether misguided policies or fatal omissions on Europe's part were to blame. The Balkans are not going to disappear from Europe's agenda in the near future, and the current conflict over Kosovo offers little optimism for any immediate peaceful resolution in the region. (ITV, 1991, as cited in Balis, 1999)

For this, the Balkans' bloody history of the 90s aftermath, Ms. Balis listed a few

reasons she considers causes of Europe's failure to solve the problem, such as a sad and critical coincidence of events:

> When the Yugoslav crisis erupted, Europe was in search of its identity and was attempting to define a new common foreign policy. The then EC was just emerging from discussions at the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in Maastricht at which a commitment had been made to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Such events were taking place amid a general economic slowdown and new geopolitical realities. The Community had to cope with an enlarged Germany after the dramatic events of 1989-90 and increasing German monetary dominance. (ITV, 1991, as cited in Balis, 1999)

Then there was the complexity of the problem that rarely had the will to understand aspects such as the Balkans' specific portrait. This was followed by:

> Europe's over-ambitious and naive attitude. . . "termed the "Sinatra doctrine", "we'll do it our way." This was Europe's clear message to its Atlantic partner. But in the absence of a clear plan and with no realistic balance between aims and ambitions, the EC was itself venturing into uncharted waters. It had neither a solution to offer nor the necessary means to impose one. Its hope of acquiring both was, at best, precarious and wishful thinking. (ITV, 1991, as cited in Balis, 1999)

This misuse of history was accompanied by simplistic explanations of the nature of the war:

> For most European countries, this view was too complex. For the British, it was a civil war rooted in bitter history, whereas for the Germans it was clearly a war of aggression. The first approach seemed to offer a justification for Serbian brutality, whereas the second view was flawed by its lack of impartiality, and in its arrogant assertion that Europe could act as the legitimate arbiter in a conflict whose origins were as subjective as its interpretation of history. (ITV, 1991, as cited in Balis, 1999)

Fatal for Europe (and thus for the Balkans) in preventing the war efforts were the lack of leadership, confusion of principles, and institutional shortcomings – all of which made Europe incapable of acting and sent the Balkans directly into the hell of wartime.

Certainly, this open space was used by some to act. Years later, in 2016, when the *Reuters* news agency wrote the obituary column for Mr. Genscher, his role in the Balkans was mentioned, and not without a good reason:

> A passionate supporter of the European Union. . . . more controversially, he was instrumental in Germany's quick recognition of an independent Croatia in 1991, a decision considered by many to have been a trigger for the uncontrolled breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the region's subsequent slide into war. (Ex-Foreign Minister Genscher, 2016)

In connection with this, in 1992, during the time of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, Stephen Kinzer from *The New York Times* reported:

> In a triumph for German foreign policy, all 12 members of the European Community, as well as Austria and Switzerland, recognized the independence of the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia today. . . . The action by the European Community marked an important diplomatic victory for Germany, which has vigorously supported Slovenian and Croatian independence. German officials announced last month that they would recognize the two republics regardless of the wishes of other European countries, and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher lobbied intensely for the breakup of Yugoslavia.
>
> Mr. Genscher said in a radio interview today that he was "very happy" with his success. He asserted that Croatia "has achieved the highest imaginable standard of respect for minority rights. (Kinzer, 1992)

Then again, this act of recognition was jeopardized by French Justice Minister Robert Badinter's report that in essence stressed that

> Croatia should provide constitutional guarantees that human rights and minority rights would be observed. There are 600,000 Serbs among the 4.5 million residents of Croatia, and many of them rose up in rebellion after Croatia declared its independence last year. Croatian fascists slaughtered thousands of Serbs during World War II, and Serbs said they feared they would be victimized again if Croatia became independent. (Kinzer, 1992)

The acts of the strongest European countries mirrored the disagreement between the partners from the Old Continent:

> France and Britain, two of the countries that today announced recognition of the breakaway republics, said they would not send ambassadors to Croatia until human rights issues were resolved. . . . Although most European governments favored the eventual recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, some had sought to postpone today's announcement so recognition could be part of an overall peace settlement in the Balkans. (Kinzer, 1992)

Though for Germany, that had waited for the perfect moment to reinforce itself as the most powerful country, that moment finally came. Thus, it insisted on the process of recognition:

> German officials insisted that recognition was the only way to force the Serbs to accept a settlement.
>
> Germany's decision to press for quick recognition of the two republics, disregarding appeals from the United States and the United Nations, marked a new assertiveness that some Europeans find disconcerting.
>
> "Germany is acting in a highly sensitive psychological environment," said a commentary this week in Bonn's principal newspaper, the *General-Anzeiger*. "The fear of German dominance and unilateralism has grown. (Kinzer, 1992)

Decades later, many argue that this early recognition of two former Yugoslav republics was what directly led to war. Just as then, some believe today that if only the European countries had acted more strongly, combined with the ambivalent attitude of the United States, preventive diplomacy would have succeeded in preventing the war.

2.8. Failure of Preventive Diplomacy and the Role of the Media Before and During the War

As mentioned before, Dr. Aleksandar Mitić carried out a well-documented scientific study for the purpose of this report that refers to media reporting during the six pre-war months. This period is important since it was then that efforts were being made to prevent the war through diplomatic means. Unfortunately, Europe and America as dominant external actors in the Yugoslav crisis, failed. Here, in this part of the report, the core of diplomatic failure will be analyzed.

2.8.1. European Community

In order to understand the political landscape of external actors in the Yugoslav crisis, it is necessary to know that the two dominant ones were the United States of America and the European Community (EC). The latter had a long history of conflict prevention and by its definition it strove towards integrative processes rather than the opposite. At the time of the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the EC had 12 member-states. The most important and thus most powerful ones were Germany, Great Britain, and France. The aim of increased EC activities before the war was to prevent conflict, as all signs indicated that war was inevitable – particularly after the Slovenian referendum on independence (December 1990). Slovenia and Croatia opted for independence while the rest of former Yugoslav republics opted for federal unity. These divergent approaches clashed in a way which indicated that, in the case that independence was granted, a violent "solution" would be inevitable:

> The EC opted for an unclear and contradictory policy towards the Yugoslav crisis. In fact, both the federal government and the governments of Croatia and Slovenia were actively seeking support from European institutions for their separate programs. Officially, the European Community supported the continuation of federal Yugoslavia, but in practice, it was meeting on a constant basis with the representatives of the aspiring break-away republics, thus fueling their hopes for independence. (Mitić, 2020, p. 11)

The actions of the EC which was burdened with problems at home (such as the unification of Germany) were unclear, though the EC always opted for peaceful resolutions of disputes and thus the EC, as an integrative European force, opted for the preservation of the former Yugoslavia:

> First of all, while the EC officials expressed support for the unity of Yugoslavia, they always emphasized their opposition to using force to solve the crisis. The underlying assumptions of these messages were understood differently in Belgrade (where it really meant support for Yugoslav unity) and in Ljubljana and Zagreb (where it meant opposition to the use of force). (Mitić, 2020, p. 11)

Visits to the region that was about to explode, from different EC officials who met with presidents of the republics in dispute, were seen as approval of the secession. On March 12, 1991, the EC dealt a blow to Yugoslav unity when the European Parliament passed a resolution declaring "that the constituent republics and their au-

tonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right to determine their own future in a peaceful and democratic manner and on the basis of recognized international and internal borders" (Woodward, 1995, as cited in Mitić, 2020, p. 12). Woodward went even further by calling this "'covert support and encouragement of Slovene and Croatian independence' by EC members Germany and Denmark" (Woodward, 1995, as cited in Mitić, 2020, p. 12). Meetings between EC member countries' representatives with officials in Zagreb and Ljubljana reinforced this process:

> Yet another member of the EC joined the ranks of Slovenian/Croatian supporters – by early June, Italy's cautious position had shifted. Thus, the Slovenian and Croatian presidents, as well as the Slovenian prime minister, were received by the Italian president and prime minister, while the Italian president Francesco Cossiga "made public Italy's sympathy for Slovene and Croatian independence". (Mitić, 2020, p. 12)

In short but well-analyzed EC efforts in crisis prevention, Mitić concluded that there were several reasons for the failure of EC preventive diplomacy. Some of them have already been mentioned. In Dr. Mitić's opinion, the media did play a strong role:

> First of all, the EC shifted from its full support to Yugoslav unity toward conditional support. The EC began sending ambiguous, mixed messages to the Yugoslav republics. Each of the republics saw in these messages support for their cause, which strengthened their intransigence. (Mitić, 2020, p. 14)

> [T]he coverage by three very influential print outlets (originating in countries which traditionally have been supportive to the federal Yugoslavia and Serbia) indicates an anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav bias. The negative coverage could have contributed to the gradual change (weakening) in the EC support to federal Yugoslavia, to the incoherence of EC preventive diplomacy and to the EC indecision on how to formulate an adequate crisis – thus, to the failure of the EC to prevent the violent resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. (Mitić, 2020, p. 30)

In the following chapter, we will see what the media reports were, what narrative they used, and what roles they attributed to the warring parties in just the six pre-war months. This is also important since the role of the media referring to the Yugoslav crisis that evolved into a war had not changed – quite the contrary. This part of the analysis is important in order to understand that the parameters of war reporting were set precisely during this period.

2.8.2. The United States of America

As was well noted in Dr. Mitić's study, although the administration of (George) Bush and (Bill) Clinton supported the concept of "preventive diplomacy", the impression then was that there was no clear idea how to exercise this in the outset of the post-Cold War era: "[T]he U.S. had two important problems. The first was the definition of U.S. interests – ethnic conflicts like the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina being at the time at the bottom of U.S. interests. The second was the incoherence of U.S. preventive diplomacy efforts," wrote Mitić (2020, p. 31). First, for about 50 years, during the Cold War, and after the Tito-Stalin split, as explained earlier, the USA supported and invested in socialist Yugoslavia. After the Fall of the Berlin War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the unification of Germany, a once important European country, Yugoslavia lost its significance.

Yet, in May 1991, the Bush administration opposed the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. It seemed that the United States would favor Yugoslav unity. Secretary of State James Baker's visit in June strengthened this stance. Mr. Baker warned Yugoslav separatist republics that their acts present a danger leading to the "disintegration of this country" (Hoffman, 1991). He went even further, saying that "[t]he United States would not recognize their act of independence if they left the Yugoslav federation" (Hoffman, 1991). The United States Secretary of State, after a day of talks, expressed his serious concerns "that Yugoslavia is heading for a violent breakup that could have" very tragic consequences "for the country and for Europe" (Hoffman, 1991).

Unfortunately, this visit had no effect on the separatist movement in Yugoslavia:

> [T]he northwestern republics of Slovenia and Croatia are expected to issue formal declarations of independence next week. Although neither republic will leave the Yugoslav federation immediately, the declarations will start a process of disengagement and ultimate secession if a compromise with the other four republics is not reached. (Hoffman, 1991)

> Since Europeans argued that this crisis was a European problem, the United States passed the possible solution on to Europe, for it to solve the problem. As the problem evolved together with media reporting pressuring the administration to act, "the U.S. administration endorsed EC sanctions against Serbia. In December, the U.S. approved a UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the deployment of peacekeeping troops in buffer zones between Serbs and Croats in Croatia". (Mitić, 2020, p. 32)

Due to the rapid deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia, and after two secessionist republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared independence in January 1992, the United States and the European Community started a cooperation in terms of making "preventive diplomacy efforts":

> Despite the opposition of the Bosnian Serbs, in January 1992 the Badinter Commission proposed a referendum, which was held in late February and early March. The boycott of the Bosnian Serbs and the murder of Bosnian Serb Nikola Gardović on March 1st marked the referendum, after which the first barricades were set up. On March 10, James Baker traveled to Brussels to send a clear message to the Europeans - the United States would recognize Slovenia and Croatia only if the European Community recognized Bosnia and Macedonia. For the first time, the United States said that it would recognize the secessionist states because it believed that would contribute to their stability. (Mitić, 2020, p. 32)

Without any concrete agreement between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who constituted Bosnia, the United States decided to support a unified, independent Bosnia:

> Frightened by the prospect of recognizing Bosnia without a prior agreement with the Serbs, the European Community pushed for an accord. As a result, on March 18, Portuguese diplomat José Cutileiro presented in Lisbon the EC framework for the future of Bosnia. The agreement provided for keeping Bosnia as a single state. (Mitić, 2020, p. 33)

Europeans realized that there was no turning back, and thus tried to negotiate some kind of an agreement between the constitutive nations' representatives: Radovan Karadžić (representing Serbs living on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Mate Boban (representing Croats living on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Alija Izetbegović (representing Muslims living on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Even though it seemed that an agreement would be reached, all of a sudden Alija Izetbegović left the meeting after a consultation with the U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman. This was the end of the EC attempt to bring about a peaceful solution and the beginning of a brutal war. This was also a failure of US preventive diplomacy:

> First of all, the U.S. strategy was inconsistent and ambiguous. For nine months, the United States was opposed to the recognition of the secessionist republics. Washington changed its policy suddenly, and from the toughest opponent of recognition became the biggest proponent. Second, the U.S. pushed

> for recognition without a prior agreement with the Serbs, who made up a third of Bosnia's population and a majority in more than 60 percent of Bosnia's territory. Despite the fact that it was clear that an agreement had to be found for their opposition, Washington opted for confrontation. Finally, the U.S. encouraged Izetbegović to reject Cutileiro's plan, an EC agreement which the three constituent nations had supported at first. (Mitić, 2020, pp. 33-34)

The most important element which could have been subject to media influence is the anti-Serb bias. The U.S. ignored the "Serb question. It is thus important to analyze the media coverage and the portrayal of Serbs in the Yugoslav crisis" (Mitić, 2020, p. 34).

Before we move on to the media content analysis of what was written six months before the war and during the entire period of the war in Sarajevo, it is important to introduce a short overview of primary sources that witnessed the events that led to the war and the period of the war in Sarajevo.

2.9. Selling the War

So far, the war reporting during the Yugoslavia wars has been studied in numerous research papers. The simplified general impression is that the media manipulated the public opinion through false reporting for several purposes. One was sensationalism and selling the paper, another was the fact that the media served particular interests and thus it was to sell the war to the public, and the third group claims that media were "indisputably [a] weapon of war" (Woodward, 1993). It is not our perspective here to determine each of these views. Since we have decided to perform the media content analysis just to obtain facts rather than estimations, we were also interested in the first-hand experiences, that are worth reading.

Over the years, many of them went public. Whether they worked within the power state administration, or for a certain public relations agency, whether they were journalists, editors, or opinion-makers, it is always a bit shocking to read such experiences. Maybe a good start of this section would be this year's interview with professor Samuel Moyn[14] from the Belgrade-based daily *Politika*. Among many things that professor Moyn said, what is important for us here is his inside story. He worked for the National Security Council, as the White House intern, during the bombing of Yugoslavia and his job was to "sow" stories in *The Washington Post* about the NATO bombing campaign:

> My story is representative of my generation, which in the 1990s believed that it was necessary to extend human rights to those who had been deprived of them. Especially because of the danger of an ethnic cleansing. . . . I "sowed" stories published in *The Washington Post*. It was all about selling the war and explaining its virtues. My moment of truth came a little later. I wanted internationalism to coincide with the awakening of progressive policies, but it wasn't until after the Iraq War that I realized I was engaged in something in my twenties that had dire consequences. My writing on human rights is also a way of self-reflection on all these events. (Vojinović, 2020)

When journalist asked Moyne to explain the term "sowed", the professor answered:

> During the war, especially in modern times, there are few journalists who gain much access. The government controls the information, and I was tasked with what was called public diplomacy, and I was able to provide some facts about the war to the press. Of course, I did not publish all the facts, but only those that were favorable to our presentation of the war. The problem is, there was a little independent journalistic search for the facts. In Vietnam, journalists were much more in search of their own truths, which is not the case with the American wars now. (Vojinović, 2020)

Two years earlier, in 2018, one of *Guardian's* former journalists, Melanie Philips[15], who worked there for about 25 years, spoke at the Speakers Action Group[16] about the inner life of *The Guardian*, describing one event:

> [T]he war was going on in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, all that sort of thing I forgot quite in which stage was that I want to tell you about but there was a period when war was going on and there was a particular journalist of the *Guardian* who wrote like a dream. She was a marvelous crafter of words. She won award after award it was always on a front-page she was a war reporter she was in central Europe during this period. She was in Bosnia and I remember in particular one piece she wrote which was on the front page particular affecting. There been some terrible, tragic event a lot of people dead and she described an affective scene in a village in a heart of all this trouble she described this pathetic convoy. Trucks coming in and on the back of the one of the truck she described in detail how the back of the truck was filed of refugees and she described how they looked and the women were like this, and they wearing the headscarves, and they were bowed, and the children were subdued and

> there were no men because they have been killed and, you know, it was very affecting and it was completely untrue.

The attendees of the Group were shocked. Mrs. Philips, who is usually under heavy criticism due to her public expressions, continued:

> She hadn't been there. She hadn't seen it! She had made it up! And at the *Guardian*, where, you will be amazed to know, some people had some vestiges of conscience, people said, "Can this be right that we've printed something which is, you know, not actually true?" And other people said, "No! It's fine. It's absolutely fine that we've printed this because it is the broader truth." What was the broader truth? The broader truth was what everybody knew: it was unarguable that the Serbs were the bad guys, the Muslims were the victims. That was the broader truth and anything that illustrated that broader truth was fine, because it was illustrating the broader truth. So the fact that it was a lie, wasn't a lie at all. It was actually true. This was the mindset. (Speakers Action Group, 2018)

And this mindset, the concept of the "broader truth" was a stage of the Cold War propaganda evolution. This time, it was enriched with new players such as powerful public relations companies. Peter Brock, Dianna Johnston, Mira Beham, Sara Flounders, Heather Cottin, and Alvin Dorfman, Raphael Israeli, Albert Benabou, and others wrote about war public relations. What is the common ground for the authors above is that all of them, among well-detailed relations between Croatian and Muslim Governments and PR companies relationships, referred to a time in 1993 when the French *TV2* associate director Jacques Merlino interviewed James Harff, Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs CEO. Harff was proud of their success of "win[ning]" over three "big Jewish organizations the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress" (Cottin & Dorfman, 1998, p. 212) on their side: "To have managed to put Jewish opinion on our side. . . . was a sensitive matter, as the dossier was dangerous looked at from this angle. . . . At the beginning of July 1992, *New York Newsday* came out with the article on Serb camps. We jumped at the opportunity immediately" (Merlino, 1993, as cited in Founders, p. 55).

And this mentioned opportunity was the opportunity to twist the strong anti-Semitic attitudes of both Franjo Tuđman (President of Croatia) and Alija Izetbegović (leader of Muslims), the horrors of the World War II past, and the concentration camps such as Jasenovac ran by the Ustashi, in which Jews, Serbs, and Roma people were executed in the most severe and unimaginable ways. Also, this was an opportunity to portray Serbs as "Nazis". Harff did that with a story published in the *Newsday*. Merlino raised a question to Harff: "But between 2 and 5 August 1992, when you did

this, you had no proof that what you said was true. All you had were two *Newsday* articles" (Merlino, 1993, as cited in Founders, p. 55). For Harff, what had been done was quite legitimate since it was not up to PR companies to verify the truth:

> Our work is not to verify information. . . . we are not equipped for that. Our work is to accelerate the circulation of information favorable to us, to aim at judiciously chosen targets. We did not confirm the existence of death camps in Bosnia, we just made it widely known that *Newsday* affirmed it. We are professionals. We had a job to do and we did it. We are not paid to moralize. (Merlino, 1993, as cited in Founders, p. 56)

And, they did it. They suggested to Jewish organizations to call for a demonstration, by advertising it in the *New York Times*, in front of the UN headquarters:

> That was tremendous coup. When the Jewish organizations entered the game on the side of the (Muslim) Bosnians, we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind. Nobody understood what was happening in Yugoslavia. The great majority of Americans were probably asking themselves in which African country Bosnia was situated. (Merlino, 1993, as cited in Founders, p. 55)

The aim of the Rudder Finn was to make a move that would be the game-changer:

> By a single move we were able to present a simple story of good guys and bad guys which would hereafter play itself. We won by targeting the Jewish audience. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the press, with use of words with a clear change of language in the press, with use of words with high emotional content such as ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, etc., which evoke images of Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz. No one could go against it without being accused of revisionism. (Merlino, 1993, as cited in Founders, p. 55)

Knowing business, Harff and his team, as skillful communication strategists, were aware that in a work like this, speed and contacts were crucial: "Merlino described how Harff uses a file of several hundred journalists, politicians, representatives of humanitarian associations and academics to create public opinion. Harff explained: 'Speed is vital it is the first assertion that really counts. All denials are entirely ineffective.'" (Merlino, 1993, as cited in Founders, p. 54).

Dianna Johnston, like others who dealt with PR agencies engaged in the Balkan wars by Croats and Muslims, explained in detail the core of the contracts:

> On 23 June 1992, Izetbegović's government in Sarajevo. . . . signed a contract with Ruder Finn in order to promote a stronger leadership role for the United States in Balkans. To this end, the agency undertook an impressive array of actions, notably setting up a "Bosnia Crisis Communication Center" in contact with American, British, and French media: media appearance coaching for Bosnian foreign minister Haris Silajdžić; sending press releases to U.S. Congressmen and "Fax Updates" on developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina to over 300 addresses, including the most important world media and parliamentarians; writing 17 letters to be signed by Izetbegović and Silajdžić and addressed to top world officials; setting up press conferences and interviews with Bosnian representatives at international conferences; organizing personal contacts between Silajdžić and Al Gore, Margaret Thatcher, and other influential personalities, including 17 U.S. senators; placing articles on the editorial pages of *the New York Times*, *the Washington Post*, *USA Today*, *the Wall Street Journal*, and so on. (Johnstone, 2002, p. 69)

This wasn't covert or illegal activity – quite the contrary. Public Relations companies in the United States that are engaged in international public relations, more specifically, that cooperate with foreign governments, are obliged by United States Law to refer to the Ministry of Justice every six months via reports. These reports are in the form of a questionnaire, and one of its sections refers to political propaganda. In this Act in those years, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, political propaganda was defined as a set of communications that aims to indoctrinate, manipulate, or to influence in any other way regarding specific political ends, including the foreign policy of the USA. Under this section of the questionnaire, Ruder Finn responded that they ran "political propaganda" for the "Republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo", as Mira Beham (1997, pp. 146-147), a former journalist from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, wrote in her book. Authors who wrote extensively about this PR campaign have never denied atrocities or crimes committed by any of the parties, they simply acknowledged unbalanced reporting and campaigns in connection with the events that happened. For example, Gary Wilson, a journalist and researcher, wrote in *The Dayton Accords Reshape Europe*:

> Most media reports on events in the Balkans are sensationalized and filed with quotes from the State Department, CIA, or Pentagon sources. When this happens in other countries they call it propaganda. When it happens here, they pretend it's just "objective journalism". If you were to ask a half-dozen U.S.

> citizens, picked randomly, who are the most aggressive people in the world, at least one would answer "the Serbs". (1998, p. 143)

Often, such attitudes would be discredited as pro-Serb, or the author would be simply placed in the register of "conspiracy theorists". But Wilson was far from that. His perspective was clear – it was a war, and there were crimes and all sides committed all sorts of atrocities. Somehow, in the mainstream news, other sides were missing. Serbs were the "usual suspects", the side to blame by default:

> The U.S. media and politicians often portray the Serbian army in Bosnia as being like the Nazi army. This is propaganda. There is no basis in fact. That's why sometimes the reports are just absurd. Consider remarks made by National Public Radio commentator Daniel Schorr.
>
> President Clinton had said in a speech that the Serb army in Bosnia was like the Nazi army of the 1930s and 1940s. Schorr, in talking about Clinton's speech, added that in fact, the Serbs were worse than the Nazis. "At least the Nazis never raped Jewish women," he said. Schorr was later forced to issue a correction to this incredible lie. (Wilson, 1998, p. 143)

Here, in his article, there is not a single line that implicates denial or justification of crimes committed by any of the sides. Furthermore, he was explicit:

> There have been terrible, bloody events in the Yugoslav civil war. No one can deny that. And the media reports have been about some of these events. But what has been emphasized has been very selective. For example. . . . An open letter written at that time from the Serbian Jewish Friendship Society based in Belgrade to the American Jewish Committee said that "anti-Serbian propaganda" is "a twin sister of anti-Semitism". The letter stated that Croatia had instituted a policy of eliminating the Serbs. This policy was so thorough that "in Croatia, there are (now) no more Serbs than there are Jews in Germany or Poland." The letter was signed by the chief rabbi of Yugoslavia as well as by many other prominent Jews of Yugoslavia. (Wilson, 1998, pp. 154-155)

2.9.1. Crisis Communication and Public Relations

As previously noted, many authors researched crisis communication and public relations activities prior to and during the war in Yugoslavia. One of them, as mentioned earlier, is Mira Beham[17], who worked for ten years as a journalist for

Süddeutsche Zeitung, a German newspaper, and later she began teaching at reputable journalism school in Munich. In her book entitled *War Drums: Media, War, and Politics*, she elaborated the activities of PR companies that had been engaged by two governments (Croatian and Muslim government) to work on creating the public images of the mentioned countries and to lobby for their cause. She cited Carl Jacobsen, a Canadian professor, who led the "Independent committee for the war crimes in the Balkans", who had determined that the Croats' expenses of the propaganda campaign on American and Canadian television channels alone outspent the marketing expenses of Pepsi and Coca Cola together (Beham, 1997, p. 141).

The campaign that aimed at portraying Serbs as Nazis, when publicly presented, was impossible to refute, as was any part of it:

> Especially not since they were supported by Jewish organizations. Indeed, in this way James Harff managed a brilliant maneuver in creating an image: from the common victims of fascism in World War II, and, in that way, almost natural allies, Jews and Serbs, he managed to make opponents. No one listened to those Jews who reacted to that with indignation. (Beham, 1997, p. 151)

And there were prominent Jews who reacted:

> In April 1994, Johanan Ramati, director of the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defense, commented on the propaganda campaign regarding the war in the Balkans in the magazine "Midstream" (published by the Theodor Herchl Endowment): "The civil war in Yugoslavia continues with immense suffering on all sides. The media report on the suffering of Muslims down to the most horrific details. The suffering inflicted by Muslims on Croats is receiving little attention. The suffering of Serbs is being ignored. . . . Such organized Muslim and anti-Serb propaganda should cause serious concern to all who believe in democracy and freedom of speech. . . . American Jewish organizations and their leaders, outwitted by 'Ruder Finn', can pat each other on the shoulder. . . . A well-constructed demonization of Serbs is a warning to all Jews who want Israel to survive. Israel could become a goal." The atmosphere created by the PR campaign made it difficult for Jews to avoid public pressure. (Beham, 1997, p. 152)

But, no one listened. At least, no one of influence did. And the pressure was significant. All Jews who questioned the aggressive American-Bosnian PR campaign were faced with defamation. To say something outside the "Serbs are Nazis" frame initiated a brutal response:

> The association "Students against Genocide – Project Bosnia" from Stanford University started a campaign against "Serb apologists and revisionists" in 1994. Among the accused were many prominent professors from around the world, journalists, Serbian and Greek organizations in the United States, but also the Buchenwald Concentration Camp Survivors, and some personalities such as Alfred Lipson, one of the leading Holocaust researchers. Both Buchenwald survivors and Alfred Lipson repeatedly pointed to the fate of Serbs under the fascist Ustasha regime in Croatia during World War II and warned of current Croatian national fanaticism and Bosnian Islamism.
>
> As early as July 1995, the same Jewish names and organizations were placed near war criminals in an article entitled "whose ears are filled with Chetnik propaganda" – published in the national Bosniak weekly *Ljiljan* by media spokesman Alija Izetbegović. The sources were *Student against Genocide-Project Bosnia*. (Beham, 1997, p. 152)

The scale of the campaign was such that it was impossible to hear the voice of reason. Fear spread among the Jewish people as well as among intellectuals who were well aware of the long-term consequences: "Nora Beloff, an author, and connoisseur of the Balkans warned in December 1993 in the *Swiss Chronicle* of the massive impact of public campaigns: 'There is a clear need for all observers of the Balkan conflict to insist on solid evidence before accusing Serbs'" (Beham, 1997, p. 152).

None of those who reacted to such a one-sided and brutal information campaign, aware that "someone" had done a good job of cementing the image of a certain nation (Serbs), ever denied the crimes committed by Serbs – quite the contrary. The voice of all these rare but persistent journalists and intellectuals demanded respect for the basic values in reporting, and thus in what followed as the effect of these campaigns and related to political decisions:

> There is no doubt that the Serbian soldiers committed terrible crimes in the war in the Balkans, crimes that cannot be justified by anything. However, the dilemmas posed by the propaganda actions of the two war governments around the world, Zagreb and Sarajevo, relate not only to the veracity of the image imposed to the Western public about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia but also to the political and military goals that are being pursued. They hide behind these manipulative efforts. (Beham, 1997, p. 153)

Many who felt that was necessary to react, to send words of critique, felt the same as the proficient German journalist. They were also very harsh in their criticism of the

Serbs, but the manipulations, false and biased narrative, the effects of such information strategy were much worse. One such figure was a veteran of the Gulf War, head of the UNPROFOR information Center in Sarajevo (1994), American Colonel John E. Sray.[18] He cataloged personal, political, and military observations of the war in Bosnia:

> [I]mmediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs suffered a loss from which they could no longer recover – they were defeated in the propaganda war waged against them by the government of Alija Izetbegović. Sray believes that the combination of three factors contributed to the "fertility of the propaganda machinery" of Bosnian Muslims. The work of PR agencies, the cooperation of important public opinion creators and "elements of the American State Department" who sympathized with Bosnian Muslims, created a climate in which it was not possible to rationally consider the conflict. The "Bosnian lobby" tried to convince politicians that they would commit "moral and political suicide" if they did not support the goals of Muslims – for example, lifting the embargo on arms deliveries. At the same time, the same lobby "maliciously attacked" all critics of such a policy "as pro-Serbian" or even "Nazi-sympathizers." Comparisons with the Holocaust evoked strong images and feelings, but in this case, they existed only in the wild imagination (...) of seduced moralists and unprofessional elements in the media". (Beham, 1997, pp. 153-154)

Beham illustrates by citing Sray the climate, all wrongdoings by all actors involved in the Bosnia war.

There are many examples, and each had the same fate, nothing outside the created images of three nations could pass the heavy iron door of mighty censorship. We are certain that many journalists decided to write, speak, and act according to their professional standards just because it was impossible to sell the other side of a story to any of mainstream and influential media. Many freelancers that we spoke to said that it was impossible to sell the story of suffering the Serbs, to offer a balanced report, to tell the other side of a story. Even today, they prefer silence to publicly telling the truth. But some had no dilemma, though they chose a different path, the path of a "lone ranger", by exposing the catalog of colleagues, events, and narratives that filled the dark pages of the history of journalism.

2.9.2 "Serbs Did It"

As we were interested in reaching as many primary sources as possible, we created a questionnaire and sent it to various people via email. Here we will present some answers, but the complete questionnaire and answers to its contents will be archived, and any interested party may have access to it upon requesting the formal approval of the Government of Republika Srpska, as noted before. First, we were interested in hearing, from this time perspective, in which way journalists, publicists, or other persons who had a media experience during the wars in Yugoslavia could describe the events and circumstances. We are referring here to the beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While working for the *CNN World Report* as a contributor, Oleg Dmitriev[19] said that in the early stage of the Yugoslav war, public opinion was pretty much confused:

> Only two Russian State TV channels by that time had correspondents in the Balkans. As for other stations that sprang up all over the former USSR the objective coverage of such events was a sort of a luxury. That's why many news outlets relied on the footage that was provided by international news agencies. At that time the copyright law in Russia did not exist – so many stations simply copied the stuff they saw on CNN International.
>
> For this reason, some editors took this information for granted. That's why it was next to impossible to understand who is battling whom during the first stages of the conflict. Only after this Russian TV started to pay more attention to the actions of the Yugoslav government as well as to cations of Bosnian Serbs. (Questionnaire, 2020)

Hannes Hofbauer,[20] who wrote several books, *Balkan war*, *Experiment Kosovo*, and *Ordered Truths – Bought Justice*, in response to our questionnaire, said:

> The Western media coverage, especially in the German speaking world, was totally one-sided and concentrated on the Muslim narrative. This corresponded with most of the political forces in Germany and Austria. They accelerated existing inner-Bosnian conflicts from outside by supporting anti-Yugoslav secessionist movements. I remember a statement from a top-ranking Austrian conservative politician, Andreas Khol, who postulated the theory that supporting the so-called national self-determination of Croats and Muslims will avoid war. In reality it did the contrary, it led to war. (Questionnaire, 2020)

Guy Mettan[21] is a Swiss journalist who has visited Sarajevo three times, in 1978, in 1993, and in 1996, and he shared his views of the media coverage during the war. Mr. Mettan was a part of an international delegation of journalists during the Siege of Sarajevo. He was interested to experiment during the visit of *Oslobođenje* newspaper "how the visit was biased in order to support the Bosnian side against the Serbian one, even if the Serb forces were effectively surrounding the city" (Questionnaire, 2020). What we wanted to know, from this time distance, was how Mr. Mettan sees the media coverage of the war events in Bosnia. This is how he described it:



As biased. Since the beginning of the former Yugoslavia tensions, the mainstream British, German and French media have adopted an anti-Serbian bias, saying that the federal army was manipulated by Serbia and pouring sympathy with Slovenia and Croatia claims for independence.

During summer 1992, the photo of Fikret Alić at Trnopolje has been an emblematic case of media distortion of facts and picture hijacking. As it has been established now, a journalist team of ITN TV Channel and The Guardian had been invited by Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic to visit the so-called "prisoners camps" where Bosnian people were supposed to be detained by Serbian militias. The British crew took a photograph of a Bosnian young man, his emaciated condition highlighted by his gaunt face and protruding ribs and his

prisoner status emphasized by a prominent strand of barbed wire. Alić's image became iconic of the suffering of poor civilian prisoners outraged by Serbs all around Europe. Former PM Margaret Thatcher criticized his successor John Major, saying that she had "never thought she'd see another holocaust in her life".

The British press published the image with the comment "Bergen-Belsen 92".

As a German investigative journalist has established the fact later at his own expense, the picture showed, in fact, a man suffering from disease and artificially centered on barbed wire in order to hide the innocent sheep wire-mesh which was supporting it from below. By manipulating the photo, it was possible to present this camp as a Nazi extermination camp and to designate the Serbs as new Angels of Death. And so did the European media after that event. At the very beginning of the conflict, nobody knew who were the good guys and who were the bad guys. But due to their irrepressible need to divide the world between good and bad guys and thanks to subtle manipulations as show[n] by [the] Alić case, the western media were able very fast to establish it forever… or almost ever! (Questionnaire, 2020)

That "German investigative journalist [who] has established the fact later" whom Mr. Mettan mentioned was Thomas Deichmann[22]. Deichman published his story in the German magazine *Novo* in 1997, in its January/February issue, and the

British magazine *LM* published the story later in February 1997, in its issue no.97. A year later, International Action Center, published Deichmann's story in New York in 1998 within the publication *Nato in the Balkans: Voices of the Opposition*. The ITN sued the British magazine *LM* in order to "prevent LM from publishing the story, demanding that its editor withdraw the issue and pulp every copy. LM. . . . faces a costly legal battle for insisting on its right to publish the truth" (Deichmann, 1998, p.165). Deichmann deconstructed the event that surrounded the picture that was taken from the video clip made by a team of ITN, Penny Marshall and her cameraman Jeremy Irvin, Ian Williams from Channel 4, and reporter Ed Vulliamy from the *Guardian* newspaper. He detected several facts:

> Trnopolje was a collection center for refugees seeking safety and they could leave it again if they wished. "The barbed wire in the picture is not around the Bosnian Muslims; it is around the cameraman and the journalist" (Deichmann, 1998, p. 166).
>
> For the sake of truth, without going into the intention of the British team, Penny Marshall, Ian Williams, and Ed Vulliamy have never called Trnopolje a concentration camp. They have criticized the way that others tried to use their reports and pictures as "proof" of a Nazi-style Holocaust in Bosnia. Yet over the past four and a half years, none of them has told the full story about that barbed-wire fence which made such an impact on world opinion (Deichmann, 1998, p. 166).

And, indeed, the picture was taken from the video clip:

> Against a background of mounting hysteria, as the first reports claiming that the Bosnian Serbs were running brutal internment camps. . . . On July 19, 1992, the American journalist Roy Gutman wrote in Newsday about the camp in Manjača, and Andre Kaiser's picture of prisoners with shaven heads at Manjača was shown around the world. On July 29, in the Guardian, Maggie O'Kane quoted eyewitnesses who claimed that Muslims had been crammed into cattle cars and shipped off from the Trnopolje station.
>
> On August 2, Roy Gutman published another article in which he called the Bosnian Serb camp at Omarska a "death camp". Gutman's and O'Kane's articles drew heavily on hearsay and unconfirmed claims. Nevertheless, they caused an international sensation. (Deichmann, 1998, pp. 167-168)



The impact of the picture was significant: in France, in 1993, Médecins du Monde, a French humanitarian organization, used the picture in their campaign "Stop ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia". They went even further, comparing ex-Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milošević to Adolf Hitler:

> Three hundred thousand posters measuring 3x4 meters, were posted on walls in major French cities. Half of them showed Milošević and Hitler side by side, with the caption, "Speeches about ethnic cleansing, does that remind you of anything?" The general public had no way of knowing that far from giving "speeches about ethnic cleansing", Milošević continued to advocate harmony between Yugoslavia's peoples.



> A second poster showed the thin man, Fikret Alić, behind barbed wire with the caption, "A camp where they purify ethnic groups, does that remind you of anything?" The text read: "Ethnic cleansing means camps, rapes, murders, executions and mass deportation of the non-Serb populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo. The Serb nationalists will go all the way with their murderous ideology… (Johnstone, 2002, p. 74)

The international campaign, triggered by the photo of Fikret Alić, was well-founded, organized, and had full impact on decision-makers:

> On 12 August, the United States proposed to the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Geneva that the United Nations should consider setting up an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes in Yugoslavia and Iraq. On 19 August, German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel raised the rhetorical level by declaring: "The attempt of the Serbian aggressors to carry out an ethnic cleansing action aimed at other population groups in order to achieve their national goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina is genocide". At the London conference the following week, Kinkel made clear his intention to press for the establishment of an international court to prosecute leading Serbs for crimes against humanity and genocide, and also for strengthening the UN embargo against Serbia. (Johnstone, 2002, p.73)

Michele Piccoli from the MSF video clip.

The well-planned public relations campaign that flooded the international news spectrum, from tabloids to mainstream influential papers, engaged stars from the entertainment industry only in France:

> Médecins du Monde also sponsored three weeks of TV spots denouncing "Serb crimes against humanity", featuring film stars Jane Birkin and Michel Piccoli. The whole campaign cost over FF 11 million (some $2 million). This advertising campaign was full of factual lies. But the most fundamental lie was to present the Serb campaign to secure a swath of defendable territory as a matter of "ideology" and "genocide". It was the emphasis on a supposed "ideology" that excited intellectuals into taking sides in a brutal little war between Bosnians, on the mistaken impression that they were heroically opposing the

> equivalent of Hitler's project to conquer Europe in the name of German racial superiority. (Johnstone, 2002, p. 74)

On the other hand, the Serbs' blind spot was public relations. They either did not understand the role and the importance of communication, or they were simply struck by the power of the communication hurricane that approached them with unimaginable speed and intensity. Or, it was something else. The fact is that from the point of crisis communication and its strategy, seemingly, the Serb side did almost nothing. Mira Beham, a German journalist, did an insightful analysis of the propaganda activities of Serbs. From her point of view, what lacked in the Serbian perspective was something that originated from their geography. Serbs lived in almost every Republic of the former Yugoslavia. That means they differed from each other. And, as Beham pointed out, it is a fact that they were not a monolith and thus were not united around the same goal such is how to survive the carnage that history brought upon them.

It was the same with Serbs who were émigrés. They were disorganized and uncoordinated. This was enough for the others (Muslims and Croats) to engage those best at their job to build their image and reach their aims. There were other factors when Serbs had lost the moment in the begging while the West was a bit confused about the clashes in the Yugoslavia, that decided the horrifying outcome for the Serbs:

> Due to the total embargo imposed in May 1992, the Serbs themselves in the former Yugoslavia were deprived of any opportunity to present themselves abroad, including those in all international political institutions. Even the capacities of telecommunication connections, such as telephone lines, were reduced to such an extent that mediation abroad was hardly possible. With the severance of all political, economic and cultural relations of the international community with Serbia, communications from the other direction from the world to Serbia were cut off. . . . it was so comprehensive that the London public relations agency Saatchi and Saatchi had to withdraw its promise to represent the Serbian government., as this would be contrary to the provisions of the embargo (Beham, 1997, p. 166).

One of the important reasons for the nonexistent communication strategy towards the western public was the structure of the Serb propaganda, Beham explained. While Zagreb and Sarajevo propagated their cause inside and outside their republics, Belgrade focused its propaganda on internal issues, so as to unite Serbs from all sides of the region into one voice. Even in this, Belgrade failed, as Beham illustrates in her book (Beham, 1997, p. 166). Since then we have spoken to many western journalists

and other persons with personal experience in war reporting from ex-Yugoslavia, then from Bosnia and Sarajevo, all could agree with what Mira Beham wrote. Serbs looked disoriented, well outside the way of reality. They lost precious starting points and some key moments to intervene and take advantage of the media at any level. For example, regarding our questionnaire, Slobodan Despot[23], a Swiss/Serbian writer and a publisher well-known by the French public, who was willing to answer some of our questions, when asked what he would have changed if he could go back for a moment, he answered:

> I would have tried to persuade the Serbian leaders to try and learn how the Western world was being ruled and informed and to draw a strategic lesson from it. They tragically underestimated the role of PR and communication in the conflict, boasting with their military strength and braveness, not even noticing that the coalition of the Mighty was battling them with the weapon of the weak: fake news, historical distortion, libel and defamation, and mass media brainwashing. Just like the West did not want to know what was really going on in the Balkans, the Balkans were not willing to understand what was going on in the Western heads. (Questionnaire, 2020)

This was also a common experience for (almost) all who were there in the Balkans during the bloody civil war. And Despot's experience with war-torn Yugoslavia started in Pakrac in Slavonia, Croatia, in the spring of 1991. He accompanied Antoine Bosshard, a Swiss reporter who worked for the *Journal de Genève,* a renowned Swiss newspaper. Bosshard talked with Serbs about their fears of a revamping Ustasha ideology, and he saw many graves from World War II, graves of Serbs, victims of the Ustasha regime. Despot said that when Bosshard's story was published and was quite objective and balanced,

> [He was] never allowed to write about that topic again. His story was contradicting the Western mainstream narrative, which basically consisted of overturning history and showing the victims as tormentors and vice versa.
>
> This was an eye-opening experience. I reused it years later in my post-war novel *Honey*[24]. (*Le Miel*, Gallimard, 2014)

This book portrays all shades of life in ex-Yugoslavia, people of flesh and blood, as well as their lives. Though one of the best sellers in France in 2014, it probably would have been prohibited in the 1990s. But in 2014, *Le Figaro's* author, Sébastien Lapaque, wrote about *Honey* as the *Iliad – lessons to be learned* (Lapaque, 2014). During his work as a translator, Despot came across many similar examples:

> A year later, I edited and co-translated the French version of a capital testimony by Serbo-Croat journalist Vjekoslav Radović, *Les spectres de la guerre* (*The Ghosts of War*, orig. *Aveti rata*). Radović had been reporting from the Vukovar front for *Reuters*. He resigned from this famous Western agency when he understood that whatever he wrote about the sufferings of local Serbs was tucked under the rug or censored. His book is a trove of examples of manipulation and dishonest, one-sided reporting. (Questionnaire, 2020)

In 1992, it was November when Slobodan Despot, as a member of Elie Wiesel mission, was about to inspect "death camps" allegedly established in the Serb parts of Bosnia:

> In particular, I witnessed gross manipulations with the inmates at Manjača, the monopolistic and rude behavior of ABC News crew led by David Marash, the strong information control imposed by the Muslim side in Sarajevo as opposed to the relative indolence of the Serbs, the disinformation job accomplished by the head of UPI agency in Belgrade… And above all the fact that the results of this investigation - that there were *no death camps* on the Serbian side - were completely suppressed in Western media. The contradiction between the reality on the ground and the mainstream media tales was so harsh that one of the reporters participating decided to lead an independent inquiry about this war. (Questionnaire, 2020)

We have already written about Merlino's epic interview with James Harff. Merlino wrote a book that translates into English as *Yugoslav Truths are not all Suitable to be Told* (orig. *Les vérités yougoslaves ne sont pas toutes bonnes à dire*), but Slobodan Despot continues, reminding us of Jacques Merlino's fate after that: "This exemplary investigative job cost Jacques Merlino his career. He ended up being exiled to Beijing as an ordinary correspondent. His book, despite having been sold out in a matter of weeks, has never been reprinted. It is now a collector's item" (Questionnaire, 2020). With so many tragic examples, Despot decided to create a journal in French *Raison Garder*, inviting a team of professionals to:

> Unmask the gross pro-Croat propaganda operation that stood behind the famed book *Vie et Mort de la Yougoslavie* (*Life and Death of Yugoslavia*) written by a totally incompetent and even surprisingly sloppy and stupid French university professor, Paul Garde. Despite our groundwork, with more than 300 material errors listed, Garde's fake book remained an "invaluable reference" and history manual for French journalists, diplomats, and scholars. (Questionnaire, 2020).

With so many ups and downs, fighting with a few against many, Slobodan Despot, like Peter Brock, David Binder, and all those others, were the real seekers of not only the truth but the rebirth of professional standards, like those journalists had once had. And, like that of a few then and of many today, Despot's general opinion regarding that period is:

> The general insight I drew from this experience – apart from that it resulted in a temporary academic and social suicide for myself still as a student – was that the West was not willing to know the truth about Yugoslavia, or even to acquire a reliable picture of it. They set up a narrative based upon centuries of cultural commonplaces and stereotypes about Serbs, the Orthodox world, the Balkan "barbarians", and they mainly stuck to it until today, despite the quantity of corrections and rebuttals that came out since the war ended. (Questionnaire, 2020)

Hannes Hofbauer is of the similar opinion:

> My conviction is that Western politicians and media dynamised inner conflicts into civil wars. Both the internal and the external factors are important. If there had not been a deep economic crisis within Yugoslavia and strong national forces striving to overcome this crisis by secessionist demands, external factors would not have been able to intervene. And if there had not been in the interests of German and US political and global players to profit from the Yugoslav weakness, the war would not have developed in this cruel way. Whereas Western narrative only reports on the internal situation to legitimate the Western interventions, there are Serbian voices only speaking about foreign forces that destroyed Yugoslavia. We have to put the whole story together. (Questionnaire, 2020)

A person cannot detach him- or herself from the experience of war and the sufferings that follow. These kinds of life experiences most certainly change a person for life. Injustices, as well as braveries, last forever, until the very end, in one's memory with unchanged intensity, with the same impressions as if one is witnessing the same all over again. The mixture of bad and good, beauty and ugliness is what defines our memories. But, in the end, the strongest feeling that still keeps us tied to some events is the feeling that everything had a purpose. This is also the common ground of all those people that we spoke to or read about. Slobodan Despot is not an exception. He brought home something good to remember:

> In 1992 we received at our home in Switzerland a little blind girl, Suzana, whom the Swiss humanitarians exfiltrated from a war zone in Krajina to try to save her eyes at an eye clinic in Lausanne. She, unfortunately, could not recover her sight but we remained friends for life. She is a bright person and a ray of light.
>
> Such exceptional circumstances also led me to meet exceptional people and to work with them. Let me mention legendary French general Pierre-Marie Gallois, the immense Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić, who became head of the Yugoslav state in 1992 when we were working together, the Swiss ecologist Franz Weber, whom I helped to set up an international conference on the protection of cultural treasures of
>
> Serbia during the 1999 NATO war, Alexander Zinoviev, one of the smartest minds of the century, the world-famous writer Peter Handke, colonel Jacques Hoggard who protected the Serbs in Kosovo and brave military doctor Patrick (Stefan) Barriot, fearless women like Jean Toschi Marazzani Visconti or Diana Johnstone, and more recently Jeremy Scahill from *The Intercept*, probably the best new inquiry journalism outlet in today's world.
>
> To resist the pressure of commonplace anti-Serb thinking, they all had to be people of strong character and independent mind. Going through that turmoil for about ten years along with such people was the most valuable life school. (Questionnaire, 2020)

And, all of those alike who search for answers, witnessed horrible atrocities, sufferings, and brutality of all sides, paid a price for not following the "line". They were censored, some lost jobs, while some were discredited, to set the example for others. One of them was the famous *New York Times* journalist David Binder. When Markale (Sarajevo) happened, the reports on it were odd. Binder followed his experience, logic, and asked questions that led him to answers which he wrote in his article *Anatomy of Massacre*, which was censored by the *New York Times*. David Binder published the story eventually in the winter issue (1994/1995) of the *Foreign Policy*. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was a time of severe conflict with no end in sight. Precisely, the war that U.S. policymakers did regret in 1992 after opposing the partition (Binder, 1993), and it was the same one that Binder wrote about in the New York Times. After so many events, one stands out: the explosion of a mortar shell in the crowded Markale marketplace:

> The bloody results of that incident, a little afternoon on a Saturday, were filmed within minutes and televised around the world. The images provoked the first engagement of NATO in European hostilities since it was founded four

> decades earlier and the first involvement of U.S. forces in combat in Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. (Binder, winter 1994/1995, p. 70)

It was a massacre with conflicting and opposing investigation results, with the highest number of casualties (around 68 dead and 197 wounded), one that had the strongest impact during the Bosnia war up until 1994. For Binder, it was hard to imagine the reasons why the reporters were acting in such a way, missing the opportunity to follow so many leads, since it was more than obvious that something strange was happening behind the scene:

> Despite the magnitude of the incident, reporters on the scene expended little effort in investigating or trying to reconstruct events surrounding the massacre. Nor did local or international authorities in Sarajevo provide much in the way of insights. Still, there was something to be learned, especially from the United Nations peacekeepers assigned to investigate the Markale mortar shelling. Now, through interviews with key U.N. officials charged with probing the massacre, who were sworn to neutrality, and through the confidential final United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) report assessing the investigations they conducted, it is possible for the first time to shed light on why have been such different interpretations of what took place that fateful day. (Binder, winter 1994/1995, pp. 70-71)

First, the Muslim police banned the UNPROFOR officers that arrived soon at the scene from entering it. They cleared the marketplace of dead and wounded at an astonishing speed that surprised the present UNPROFOR personnel. Secondly, in a few hours, the Western media, Americans, blamed the Serbs. Some European media blamed the Muslims for the attack. And these divergent reports brought chaos in the aftermath of the event pointing at the clashes behind the scene of Western coalitions:

> As secrecy cloaked the investigations of the incident by United Nations officials, reports about alleged Muslim perpetrators appeared, mainly in the European press. One sensational and widely reprinted report was based on a document, skillfully forged in Greece, attributing to Lord David Owen, the European Union peace negotiator, a statement blaming the Muslims. In fact, the salient quote was drawn verbatim from a dispatch by *Tanjug*, the Belgrade press agency. With quotation marks removed, it looked as if Lord Owen had written it, rather than *Tanjug*. The suspicion of Muslim perpetrators was underscored in some minds by previous UNPROFOR reports, which I have seen, of incidents in which Muslim forces fired deliberately at Muslim civilians with the aim of creating incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs.

> Yet other UNPROFOR reports in 1992 and 1993, which I have also seen, list incidents in which Muslim forces sought to provoke Serb reactions (which usually became overreactions) by firing directly at Serb positions during putative ceasefires. (Binder, winter 1994/1995, p. 73)

It was more than evident that there were gaps in the field and media reports that reflected divergent attitudes between the partners. Not to mention Russians that acted almost independently in comparison to others. Some would say it was impossible to understand what was happening in the Sarajevo battlefield that already filled so many hours of TV shows, pages of opinion, and other articles and news, as well as TV screens, with scenes of horrors with just one side to blame: officially, the Serbs. In the case of the Markale in 1994, one statement changed the perspective of those willing to think outside the political fault line:

> An indicator of the thinking in some U.N. quarters was the final message of the departing head of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, on January 9, 1994: "In Sarajevo, the (Muslim-led) BiH army provoke the BSA (Serbs) on a daily basis. This is very easy for us to notice as the BiH mortars are generally located near UNPROFOR units.

Muslim officials bitterly assailed U.N. officials for alleging that their forces may have been culpable on February 5. As an international official noted:

> [they were] claiming several times that U.N. or UNPROFOR members often stated Bosnian responsibility in the market shelling." What follows are details of the marketplace massacre investigation drawn from interviews with UNPROFOR, U.N., and U.S. officials as well as from hitherto unavailable documents. (Binder, winter 1994/1995, p. 73)

Further on, he explained the "official" UNPROFOR report on a blast that killed many, from the scene where international peacekeepers were banned from entering the market, where real forensic reports of the victims were missing, as were the eyewitnesses, and where to date none know for certain what had happened that winter day in the crowded marketplace. But, the impressions that the "Serbs did it" stayed. The existence of such a defined "broader truth" as Melanie Philipps, a long-term journalist for the *Guardian*, explained, and we wrote about earlier, was also acknowledged by Benjamin Kerstein (2010).

In fact, this concerned the Bosnia war *CNN* star, a former CNN war correspondent and television host, Christiane Amanpour. For some, she was a great war-story

seller, a truly gifted war correspondent. Others cataloged her in a register of "advocacy journalism":

> *The Times* profile quotes an anonymous "insider" who "has doubts about Amanpour's commitment to objective journalism." I have winced at some of what she's done, at what used to be called advocacy journalism," he said. "She was sitting in Belgrade when that marketplace massacre happened, and she went on the air to say that the Serbs had probably done it. There was no way she could have known that. She was assuming an omniscience which no journalist has." Indeed, Amanpour herself openly admitted to her biases. In 1996, she told the British newspaper *The Guardian*, "It drives me crazy when this neutrality thing comes up." (Kerstein, 2010)

Amanpour was certainly the *CNN* icon of the 1990s, and the Bosnia war made her a star. Some would say that while being in the middle of a brutal war, she attached herself to a side closer to her. Though, she thought that objectivity was her trademark.

This sort of a debate is usually led among journalists during and after the war events, and many reasons can be named as quite solid arguments for all sides of the debate. But, Sarajevo still exists in many minds as a carnage that was signed by the Serbs and with only Muslim victims. Many wrote about the marketplace massacres, and there were three almost frighteningly similar explosions at the Sarajevo marketplace: the first happened on May 27, 1992, the second on February 5, 1994, and the third on August 28, 1995. Each incident provoked some major international political decisions: the first one, commonly known as the "bread line massacre" triggered the UN Security Council Resolution 757 that imposed, as *The New York Times* wrote, "the most sweeping sanctions in history" (Johnstone, 2002, p. 66); the second provoked demands to initiate "airstrikes on Bosnian Serb forces and withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons" (Johnstone, 2002, p. 66); and the third one triggered massive NATO airstrikes on Serb positions in less than 48 hours. All incidents served Muslims perfectly. Furthermore, all of them, without exception, brutally punished the Serbs.

Chapters, pages, hours of testimonies were dedicated to Sarajevo. Authors clashed over the tone of the reports, politics vs. journalists. One interesting testimony was the one of the British journalist Eve-Ann Prentice during the ICTY trial of Slobodan Milošević. Eve-Ann Prentice was covering the Balkans from the 1980s for the British influential papers: *The Guardian* and later *The Times* in London. She was present in the region, all in all, about 50 times. What motivated her to cover the war of the 1990s was that "broader truth" that Serbs were the villains and Muslims the victims. Her point of view was this: "[W]hereas it was very plain to me that everybody fought as hard as they were physically able to gain ground for their - for their own people, and everybody had their innocent victims, including the Serbs. And I felt increasingly strongly that this was not - that the conflicts were not being covered in a truly fair and

objective way" (*Prosecutor v. Milošević*, n.d.). When asked to describe if there were discrepancies between the reality and the news reports, Prentice answered by giving an example:

> There were many big differences between what Western leaders were portraying as to be the situation and the reality. The Western politicians were giving the impression that every - every time civilians were killed, it was definitely Serbs' fault, and every time it was clear that another side, for instance the Croats in Mostar, when they bombed the Stari Most, the old bridge there, this is just one example, there was very little attempt to make it clear that, you know, this was – this was a Croatian bombing, and to this day people – the ordinary public in Britain, for instance, are of the opinion that Serbs bombed that bridge. This is just one example. There were many, many examples. (*Prosecutor v. Milošević*, n.d.)

To establish that these were examples of pure propaganda, upon being asked who the protagonist of the "anti-Serb" propaganda was, Eve-Ann answered:

> The instigators were the Western politicians and generals, but I would say that too many journalists helped this by at best not questioning deeply enough the causes and the - and the claims that were made by the Western politicians, and indeed some journalists I believe actually colluded with the attempt to portray particularly the Bosnian conflict and then Kosovo as this black and white guilt – guilty and innocent as if one side was almost unarmed and totally the victim and the other side; i.e., the Serbs, were the armed ones and the perpetrators of all killing and destruction. (*Prosecutor v. Milošević*, n.d.)

This was also the common ground of all confessions, memoirs, and remembrances we read, as well as opinions of professionals that we talked to. All of them relied on just one, but also the first commandment of journalism, which is objectivity, or "let's hear the other side". None of them could digest such brutal propaganda that turned some into "stars" but also had terrible consequences in the field, with so many lives lost, the destruction, and the never-ending war in the Balkans.

Prentice remembered one event well – she, along with her colleague journalist from the German *Der Spiegel*, Renate Flotel, saw Osama bin Laden entering Alija Izetbegović's office. The other was the Markale blast in 1994. It happened during the time when this British journalist was in Sarajevo. Prentice was interested in investigating Markale since it was so dominant in the western press with such aggressive claims that Serbs did it and with so many gaps in the stories. She interviewed Paul

Beaver (*Jane Defense Weekly*), spoke to some western diplomats, the Portuguese ambassador to Bosnia, and all of them had concerns about the incident. The ambassador told her that explosive devices had been taped underneath a market stall. There was no explosion. And he showed her evidence of that:

> And I also spoke to UN people who had been in – on-site at Markale within minutes of it happening who told me off the record – these were French peacekeepers who were very quickly on the scene – who told me that the injuries had been almost exclusively from the feet up and were not consistent with any sort of aerial – any explosive landing from the air (...)When I asked (...) Lord Owen about this, his – he would neither confirm nor deny that he had evidence or proof that the bombing had been perpetrated indeed by the Bosnian Muslim government in the taping of a bomb underneath the – under a market stall. And the very fact that he would not deny it lent weight to my suspicions. (*Prosecutor v. Milošević*, n.d.)

And, Eve-Ann Prentice was full of insights during her testimony. For her, Sarajevo in 1994 was a divided city, not a peaceful one but not one under siege – divided is the word. What is important is that all who were engaged to report objectively could move around and collect the facts, ask questions, and get bring the image much closer to the truth. As she did. She saw, at her surprise, while reading so many news reports that "there were large numbers of non-Serb ethnic minorities who were being given shelter in Pale. These were people who had - whose homes had been destroyed in Sarajevo or who had fled just from the general chaos and violence" (*Prosecutor v. Milošević*, n.d.).

There was another event that was quite shocking and thus memorable for Prentice. It was the day when she met Robin Cook, British shadow foreign Secretary, who was on a "fact-finding" mission in Sarajevo:

> He gave a press conference, and I did ask him if he was going to go to visit Pale as well, and I was quite shocked when he said that even if that were possible, which it wasn't physically, he wouldn't do that because, you know, the Serbs were - he actually used words "Why would I want to go and see those monsters?" That was his phrase. I was quite shocked by that. I explained to him that it was indeed physically possible to go to Pale, that I myself was going back later that day, and if he was on a fact-finding tour, I suggested he might like to come and see for himself what it was like there and the fact that there were people, non-Serbs, being given shelter there. He declined to do so. (*Prosecutor v. Milošević*, n.d.)

Two weeks after giving her testimony before the ICTY, Eve-Ann Prentice passed away as she was terminally ill. She was preparing material for her new book, but death came first. She was one of the rare journalists who testified outside the political fault line before the ICTY – telling the other side of war stories. There are many various examples. More so, during the recent years, one follows another. Also, many first-hand witnesses of biased reporting and distortion of the facts are telling their stories about certain events or people. However, there is one journalist who cataloged it all. He was considered to be a "lone ranger" as he was coming from Texas and wrote about the whole war in the Balkans, Bosnia, and Sarajevo before others came to light. His name, as we mentioned him several times before, is Peter Brock.

In 1993, he wrote an article entitled *Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press* (Brock, winter 1993/1994, pp. 152-172) where he cataloged "facts and people" who distorted the reality of the war in the ex-Yugoslavia. From the mid-1991, the focus of the international news was the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The frame was set; the villain was known (Serbs), as were the victims (Muslims). Those parameters were defined almost at the start of the war, and were then carefully managed to date. Brock recollects many news "events", some of which are important for our report:

> [T]he 1992 BBC filming of an ailing, elderly "Bosnian Muslim prisoner-of-war in a Serb concentration camp" resulted in his later identification by relatives as retired Yugoslav army officer Branko Velez, a Bosnian Serb held in a Muslim detention camp.
>
> - among wounded "Muslim toddlers and infants" aboard a Sarajevo bus hit by sniper fire in August 1992 was a number of Serb children - a fact revealed much later. One of the children who died in the incident was identified at the funeral as Muslim by television reporters. But the unmistakable Serbian Orthodox funeral ritual told a different story.
>
> - in its January 4, 1993, issue, "Newsweek" published a photo of several bodies with accompanying a story that began: "Is there any way to stop Serbian atrocities in Bosnia?" The photo was actually of Serb victims, including one clearly recognizable man wearing a red coat. The photo, with the same man in his red coat, is identical to a scene in television footage from Vukovar a year earlier.
>
> - CNN aired reports in March and May 1993 from the scenes of massacres of 14 Muslims and then 10 Muslims who were supposedly killed by Serbs. The victims later turned out to be Serbs. There was no correction.
>
> - in early August 1993, a photo caption in "The New York Times" described a Croat woman from Posušje grieving for a son killed in recent Serb attacks.

> In fact, the Croat village of Posušje, in Bosnia near the Dalmatian coast, had been the scene of bloody fighting between Muslims and Croats that had caused 34 Bosnian Croat deaths, including the son of the woman in the photo. (Brock, 1933, pp. 153-154)

With the precise hand of a surgeon he described narratives, actors, and relationships that started to tell a different story. He pointed at all actors and their doings; he criticized all under the full scale of objectivity that was missing from the reports. Serbs were disoriented and confused, so far from the reasoning of the world of the western journalists. And this was their biggest failure. On the other side, Croat and Muslims have stepped into the war with the arsenal of media and high skilled professionals in the field of communications, and they won. Images and narratives that were created outlived the war to date. Brock recalls one statement of the United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, from May 1993 when he referred to the CNN's fourth world report:

> Today, the media do not simply report the news. Television has become a part of the events it covers. It has changed the way the world reacts to a crisis." Boutros-Ghali accurately described the routine and consequence of coverage of the Yugoslav civil war: "Public emotion becomes so intense that United Nations work is undermined. On television, the problem may become simplified, and exaggerated. (Brock, 1993, p. 155)

And there was another truth, revealed by Brock, known by all correspondents that covered the war:

> Reporters tended to foxhole in Sarajevo, Zagreb, or Belgrade and depend on their networks of "stringers" and outlying contacts. Most arriving correspondents spoke no Serbo-Croatian, and interpreters were often domestic journalists or "stringers" with established allegiances as well as keen intuitions about what post-communist censors in the "new democracies" in Zagreb and Sarajevo preferred. Reporters began to rely on aggressive government spokespeople – the government Information Ministry in Zagreb soon acquired scores of English-fluent publicists, and the Bosnian government also mobilized scores of handlers for the Western media". (Brock, 1993, p.157)

And, indeed, all sorts of factors far from the will to do any harm must be included in understanding of the war reporting from Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Sarajevo. Or, from any other hot spot later. But, among laziness, low level of skills and knowledge,

there were those "award-winning" journalist who knew well that the awards they received were awards for presenting a distorted reality. Brock named them all. Sarajevo became the image of the Bosnia war - the siege, and Markale "shelling", and all sorts of incidents that, by a "chance" provoked aggressive answers by the western built-up coalition. Brock painted the general image of Sarajevo together with the Robert Fox (London based, the *Daily Telegraph*): "The mauling of Sarajevo, the worst single crime against a community in Europe since Auschwitz, cannot be watched impassively night after night on television news bulletins" (Brock, 1993, p. 169). In the field, far from the correspondent's will to report, other stories happened. Only every now and then, some papers published these stories. Brock named a few:

> As early as July 1992, senior Western diplomats had stated publicly that Bosnian Muslim forces in Sarajevo were repeatedly provoking Serb shelling of the city to trigger western military intervention.
>
> But few wire stories other UNPROFOR reports in 1992 and 1993, which I have also seen, list incidents in which Muslim forces sought to provoke Serb from Muslims who had fired on Serb targets and neighborhoods first. (Brock, 1993, p. 169)

The Siege of Sarajevo was a highlight motive for TV shows, books, studies, art performances, movies. When googling the term, looking for the list of movies and books telling war stories from Sarajevo, Bosnia, and the war-torn Balkans, for example, the list that comes up is impressive.[25] And each tells a war story from another angle. However, rarely can we read or see the true image of, again, for example, the Koševo hospital. In his article, Brock introduced that story:

> Koševo hospital in Sarajevo was a favorite backdrop for television journalists who, when the hospital's water supply was interrupted because of the shelling, eagerly awaited the first birth without water in the maternity ward.
>
> Once they got their pictures, the Western film crews dismantled their cameras and returned to the nearby Holiday Inn, where hot water was abundant. Unreported was the fact that on their exit from the hospital they had to avoid tripping over a shielded Bosnian army mortar emplacement that was never identified as the probable reason why Serbs sporadically fired at the hospital. (Brock, 1993, p. 169)

This was just one of many similar stories. Brock reminds us of the rare exception coming from the Guardian dated July 22, 1992, who reported on General Lewis Mackenzie's reaction to civilian targets attacks in Sarajevo:

> Mortars are set up beside hospitals, artillery beside schools, mortars, and other weapons are carried in ambulances. I've never seen the Red Cross abused like that, on both sides." Such reports seldom appeared in the American media, which may explain some dramatic differences in the public perspectives about intervention between Europe and the United States. (Brock, 1993, p. 170)

As for Serbs, as was already explained, it was almost impossible to tell their side of story by mid-1993. However, some high-ranking military officers opened their hearts, one of them being French general Phillipe Morillon, after he left his UNPROFOR commander post. The French general blamed Muslims for keeping Sarajevo under siege as their key propaganda milestone: "In an interview with Prague daily 'Lidove Noviny', Morillon said the Bosnian regime wanted to keep Sarajevo a focal point for world sympathy and repeatedly refused to allow UNPROFOR to achieve a ceasefire" (Brock, 1993, p. 170). We could list all the examples, names, circumstances, but Peter Brock already made a catalog of them all in his, later, famous book *Media cleansing Dirty Reporting Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia* (2005). In the 327 pages, a rare name or event was missing as a reminder of all wrongdoings in the media and communication industry during the reporting from the Balkan in the 1990s.

As David Binder, who wrote the foreword for Brock's book, wrote:

> In the category of fabrication he has dissected several articles that led to the award of the parallel 1993 Pulitzer prizes for international reporting: first, the "confession" of thirty-five murders and sixteen rapes in Sarajevo by Borislav Herak, a Bosnian Serb, in a 3,500-word story by John F. Burns for the New York Times and, second the stories by Roy Gutman of Newsday alleging the creation by Serbs of Nazi-style "concentration camps" for thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners, some of whom were slaughtered. . . . Brock painstakingly establishes that Herak's "confession" had been tortured out of him by his Bosnian Muslim captors. Separately, he determines that Gutman's stories, far from representing on-the-scene reporting, were based on scantly identified sources who never surfaced as real people. (Brock, 2005, pp. 3-4)

Though there were many more examples, here, we have no ambition to type or cite them all, but few are enough to tell the story.

What was missed, but kept in memory after so many years was a tragedy that happened in June 1992, when 11 babies lost their lives in Banja Luka, according to *UPI* (1992). It was but a short news report that appeared in the news agencies' ar-

chive. What happened was that 12 Serbian babies died in May and June of 1992 in the Intensive Care Unit of the maternity ward in Banja Luka due to the lack of necessary oxygen. This happened as a result of the blockade of Serbian territory by Croatian and Muslim military forces in the area of Semberija in the northeast of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This tragedy triggered Operation "Corridor 92" when the BSA (Army of Republika Srpska) and the military forces of Krajina confronted the regular forces of the Croatian Army and their paramilitary forces in Bosnia, (so-called Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane), as well as the Muslim Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fighting lasted for two weeks and resulted in the breaching of the blockade allowing a better supply of Western Serbian territories.[26]

Examples, as already mentioned, are many. There is not enough space here to list them all, and those that were selected, we hope, at the least offer another side of a story missed, distorted, manipulated, or fake that was created during the reporting from the war-torn region of Balkan, as Bosnia and Sarajevo were back in the 1990s. To present precise data that explained discrepancies in reporting and equal treatment of all warring sides, together with a narrative that defined the outcome of the war, we have decided to measure. This means that we provided the quantitative and (were possible) qualitative media content analysis of two most influential newspapers, *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, as primary sources during the whole period of the events that led to the war, and the war itself. In the next chapter, which is a vital part of our report, all that has been written will be presented in an objective scientific way which will, we hope, fill the gaps and will make the image of the media role during the events that led to the war and war itself in Sarajevo whole.

3. Media Content Analysis

3.1. Part I: Six Months Before Hostilities Started in the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

As noted before, among hundreds of thousands of pages of material that deals with the narrative, context, and media reporting on the most recent Balkan wars at the end of the previous century, scholarship is divided according to two main perspectives: one group claiming that the media influence the decision-making processes by pressing and shaping public opinion, and the other one seeing this process as the opposite of that. Decision-makers control the news flow through specific filters, and only acceptable truths can flow to the public. During the six months before hostilities

started in the Balkans, preventive diplomacy from some influential countries tried to prevent bloody confrontations. As certain researchers and academics believed, the media impacted that process. One of them is a former *Agence France-Presse* correspondent, today President of the Center for Strategic Alternatives, Dr. Aleksandar Mitić. In 1997, he wrote his MA thesis entitled *Impact of the Media on Preventive Diplomacy: Three Cases from the Yugoslav Conflict* (Ottawa, Carleton University). Here, in this report, he went even further in his research:

> Discourses and narratives, however, are constructed. How were they formed at the outset of the Yugoslav crisis? How were the Serbs, their interests, and values differentiated and put against the interest and values of other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia – primarily against the Slovenians, Croats, and Muslims in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina? How was this image constructed? How were the discourse and narrative formed?
>
> In this analysis, we will not find the final answer to these questions. We will attempt, however, to use the content analysis of Western media in the period before the beginning of armed hostilities to draw the contours of the archetype which certainly had a very important role in decision making, and thus impacted the course and outcome of the Yugoslav crisis. (Mitić, 2020, p. 3)

As a first-hand witness of the news agencies' work, Dr. Mitić considers that the construction of a media narrative can be seen either as produced autonomously, independently from political control and pressure, or under the strong influence of strategic communication actors. He considers that the answer is within the "nuances of grey".

> Full domination of strategic communication is hardly achievable, except in tightly-controlled media conditions. On the other side, except in absolutely free media conditions, the freedom of journalists to report without external interference is impossible. . . . However, is it even possible to accept such a viewpoint from the point of view of communication science? Let us look at some of the modern communication concepts, particularly those which, since the analysis period of 30 years ago, have gained substantial prominence in academic and professional fields. These concepts are providing tools that could at least partially explain the events of the early 1990s. A key concept among them is "strategic communication" (Mitić, 2020, p. 4). This concept of "organized persuasion" represents a "system of coordinated communication activities implemented by organizations in order to advance their missions, by allowing for the understanding of target groups, finding channels and methods of communication with the public, developing and

> implementing ideas and attitudes which, through these channels and methods, promote a certain type of behavior or opinion. (Mitić, 2016, as cited in Mitić, 2020, p. 9)

States and organizations of various kinds are using strategic communication in order to achieve legitimacy, given that legitimacy is based on perception and interpretation – not on actions but on perceptions of these actions. To achieve legitimacy through strategic communication, organizations need trust, social capital, and networks to project their discourse, narrative, and power (Mitić & Atlagić, 2017, as cited in Mitić, 2020, p. 4). They do so through "framing", which is the way political discourse on certain themes is formulated. Public relations practitioners, from the start of their campaigns, function as "frame strategists", that is, they seek to influence the way a certain situation, attribute, choice, action, question, and responsibility is represented in order to achieve objectives (Hallahan, 1999, as cited in Mitić, 2020, p. 5).

Those "frames" have a specific goal, to provoke reactions from the public. With appropriate techniques of those engaged in the process of communication, the specific goal is to achieve the final aim:

> Yet frames cannot be fully understood without narratives, just as narratives cannot function without frames. In the process of strategic communication, organizations thus use frames and discourse to shape strategic narratives. . . . Strategic narratives, however, also face limitations: from the formation of the strategic narrative to its projection and reception. This is particularly true in international environments, in which great powers must face not only a complex international environment but also a complex media ecology as well as frequent or even permanent contestation by other actors. However, the objective of each interest group is to have its narrative dominant and widely accepted as "correct". It must thus incorporate [this narrative into] the existing historical, cultural, and socio-political context: "If we hope to influence people, then we have to enable them to see that what we are saying fits with their story; or, at least, that it is not so far removed from their story that they think that what we are saying is ridiculous or that we are lying". (MacNulty, 2007, as cited in Mitić, 2020, p. 5)

For this report, it is extremely important to determine whether a certain frame or an archetype of *good* versus *evil* existed before the outbreak of the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This means that it is important to determine whether

the Western media with dominant influence on the public opinion used the *good and evil* archetype even before the beginning of the conflict in Slovenia and Croatia. This was an important period when preventive diplomacy could have saved the Balkans from the bloody civil wars. As noted earlier, what happened before and during the Slovenia and Croatia wars set the parameters for the later wars, particularly the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This analysis did not aim to address whether it was the media themselves or specific external factors that influenced the formation of the normative. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the narrative was constructed before the outbreak of the war.

3.1.1. Slovenia and Croatia (1991): Reporting of EC Media During the Preventive Diplomacy Effort[27]

During the period we are analyzing, the EC had 12 member states, among which the most influential were France, Germany, and Great Britain. The British press was divided into quality newspapers (*The Times*, *Financial Times*, *Guardian*, *Independent*), which were considered to influence British foreign policy, and tabloid newspapers (*Daily Express*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*), which had a higher circulation but a much lower influence on the government's decision-making processes. Britain was also home to *The Economist*, one of the most influential newsmagazines in the world. The newspapers were largely owned by conservatives like Rupert Murdoch, Robert Maxwell, and Conrad Black, and at times reflected their owners' bias. The press was also free of governmental control, more so than in many other European countries. The relationship between the press and the government policy-makers was summarized in the subtitle of a book by James Margach, a veteran *Sunday Times* reporter, worded as follows: *The War between Fleet Street and Downing Street*. Indeed, much as in the United States, the British "quality" press was considered independent, influential, and part of the government's foreign policy-making process.

In contrast, the press in Germany was under the direct influence of recent German history. The post-World War II Western German press decidedly broke away from the past of Nazi Germany and communist Eastern Germany and took a liberal democratic stance. After the German reunification in 1990/1991, there was a brief period of idealism, experimentation, and journalistic empowerment in the German press (Humphreys, 1994, pp. 3-4). The celebration of national self-determination was common, as was the desire to "educate" the East Germans about the values of liberal democracy. The press in Germany was free from government control. The most influential print media were *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Die Welt*, and *Der Spiegel*.

The French press was considered to be an important factor in French policy-making process. Until the 1970s, the French press was still under at least indirect control of the state but has since rejoined the ranks of Western democracies in terms of press freedom. Quality French dailies such as *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, and *Libération* exercised a strong influence among key economic and political decision-makers (Kuhn, 1995, p. 32). Among these newspapers, *Le Monde* had established a reputation for independence and non-partisanship. It was also the paper with the most in-depth coverage of international politics with detailed background articles that were highly analytical (Kuhn, 1995, p. 72).

3.1.1.1. Content Analysis

The content analysis will be performed on three print media outlets: *The Economist*, *The Times*, and *Le Monde*. *The Economist*, a Britain-based newsweekly, is one of the most influential media outlets in the world, with in-depth and highly analytic coverage of international affairs. It influences not only British foreign policy-making but also impacts the foreign policy-making of other countries, as well as EC's supranational bodies. *The Times* is perhaps the most influential British newspaper. *Le Monde* is the most independent and most influential newspaper in France. All articles in these three media outlets relating to the crisis in Yugoslavia in the period between December 25, 1990, and June 25, 1991, will be analyzed. This time frame was chosen because it represents a period during which the preventive effort took place. It begins with December 25, 1990 – the aftermath of the Slovenian referendum on independence, which resulted in the decision to proclaim independence within six months if no other satisfactory arrangement was made. It also followed the proclamation of the Croatian constitution, which was rejected by the Croatian Serbs as "discriminatory". The period ends with June 25, 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, and a violent conflict began.

The analysis will focus on four terms: "Serb/Serbia", "Serbia" "Milošević", and "Federal army". The term "Serb/Serbian" is applied to both Serbs in Serbia and Croatia/Bosnia. "Serbia" represents the Republic of Serbia. "Milošević" applies to Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. "Federal army" applies to the Yugoslav People's Army. These terms represent the main supporters of federal Yugoslavia: Serbs (in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia), Serbia, Milošević (as president of Serbia), and the federal army. The terms could indicate the slant of the coverage regarding both the supporters of the Yugoslav option and the Serbs (the opposition of Serbs in Croatia being the main obstacle to Croatia's independence, and Serbs in general backing their demands).

All terms will be divided into three categories, based on the concept of *affect*: *negative* affect indicates that the term was used in a negative connotation in the context of the time (1990-1991) and the readership (policy-makers) (i.e. the actor represented by the term is uncooperative, threatening, manipulating, etc.). *Neutral* affect indicates that the term was used in a neutral connotation (i.e. "said", "live", "leader of", etc.). *Positive* affect means that the term was used in a positive connotation (i.e. explanation of reasons behind the action of the actor represented by the term, a depiction of the actor's fears, suffering, cooperation). The content analysis will focus on the connotation in which each of the four terms were used in all of the articles published by the media outlet in the period between December 25, 1990 and June 25, 1991. Each time one of the four terms appears in an article, it will be attached a value of *positive*, *negative*, or *neutral* – depending on the term's connotation. The total number of times each of the four terms is used in each of the three connotations will be calculated. This total will allow for an assessment of the kind of slant the analyzed terms were given in the media outlet's coverage.

3.1.1.1.1. The Economist

The Economist published 16 articles on the Yugoslav crisis between December 25, 1990 and June 25, 1991. All the texts from *The Economist* were analyzed and commented on. There was a wide range of texts: from Serbian elections and demonstrations to Croatian and Slovenian independence moves and talks on the future of the federation and potential consequences for tourism and economy.

Table: Number of references in "The Economist"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Number of references to "Serb/Serbian"	46	39	5
Number of references to "Milošević"	40	10	0
Number of references to "Federal army"	20	9	0
Number of references to "Serbia"	35	28	3
Total	**141 (60%)**	**86 (36.6%)**	**8 (3.4%)**

Graph: Number of references in "The Economist"



Table: Examples of references in "The Economist"

	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Examples of references to "Serb/Serbian"	"Serboslavia", "behavior turning them against their neighbors", "complained about by Muslims and Croats in Bosnia"	"talks between", "live in Croatia"	"have been provoked", "slaughter of a third of Serbs living in Croatia"
Examples of references to "Milošević"	"turbulent", "gambler", "communist"	"leader of the country's biggest republic"	

Examples of references to "Federal army"	"made a fake video", "only communist institution of the old Yugoslavia"	"announced it would refrain from political interference but preserve the right to preserve Yugoslavia's current borders"	
Examples of references to "Serbia"	"Serbia's communism survives on nationalism", "pays the heavy cost of occupying Kosovo", "frontiers of a Greater Serbia"	"Serbia's leader", "Serbia's ally"	"Serbia not as much of a police state as claimed"

A total for the four terms combined (235 references) indicates that the forces opposed to the secession of Croatia and Slovenia were placed in a negative context 141 times (60% of the total number), in a neutral context 86 times (36.6%), and in a positive context eight times (3.4%).

From the outset *The Economist* labeled Milošević as "impulsive". Serbia was said to be pressing for a "centralized federation dominated by Serbia". Serbia was also "paying a high cost of occupying Kosovo". As a result, *The Economist* expected trouble in Kosovo as well as from Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. On the other hand, Croat and Slovene leaders "restated willingness to sit down and talk" about making Yugoslavia into a body "not unlike the European Community". The Croatian/Slovene moves towards independence were "welcomed by a Macedonian party".

In its February 2 issue, *The Economist* wrote about the "Serb campaign to blacken Croatia with the charge of sedition" – referring to a video made by the federal army intelligence service using a secret camera and showing Croatian Minister of Defense Martin Špegelj in the process of planning arms smuggling operation on behalf of Croatia through the Hungarian border and plotting massacres against the Yugoslav army. Špegelj dismissed the video as a fabrication at the time, but years later he admitted it was real. Nevertheless, *The Economist* argued that the video "looks fake, but fact matters less in such quarrels than belief". It also reiterated the existence of the Slovene and Croat fear of "Serboslavia" – the name Slovenes and Croats used to describe a "Yugoslavia under Serbia's thumb". According to *The Economist*, there were three reasons for this fear: Serbia's "taking of Kosovo in 1989", the "landslide of

Milošević, a turbulent communist Serbia-firster", and "Serbia's communism" which had "nationalism as an ideology". On the other hand, *The Economist* labeled Croatian president Franjo Tuđman as an "anti-communist and Croat patriot", and channeled the Slovene/Croat argument that "we are westerners, they are easterners."

On March 3, *The Economist* asked "at what point should an independent Slovenia get official recognition" and "how much help should it be offered to make itself viable". For *The Economist*, federal Yugoslavia suited Serbs who wanted a "centralist state", "centralist economy", "large army", and "Serbia as a dominant republic". It also mentioned that the Macedonians and Bosnians were unhappy with the Serbs and that the Croats' confidence that they could work with Serbia was low. On a positive note for Yugoslavia, *The Economist* wrote that the "idea of Yugoslavia has merit".

Following a series of demonstrations in Serbia and a confrontation between riot police and demonstrators in Belgrade on March 9, on March 16 *The Economist* wrote that Milošević's first reaction to the protesters seemed to confirm the "worst fears of people in Croatia and Slovenia". Even Serbian democrats were "strongly tinged with nationalism", and the opposition leader, Vuk Drašković, was a "Serbia-firster."

In an editorial on May 15, *The Economist* suggested how the West should respond to the Yugoslav crisis and argued that "imposing unity on Yugoslavia is no lasting solution". With "some softening of the Serbian line, it may still be possible to negotiate a looser but still intact Yugoslavia; if so, fine, but if parts of the place conclude that they can preserve their newfound freedom and build a better future only by breaking away, then so be it". *The Economist* suggested that "the West should not oppose the secession of Slovenia and Croatia" the same way it did not oppose the independence of Lithuania and Estonia.

In the same May 15 issue, riots by Croats in Split, which had led to the death of a Yugoslav army conscript, were said to have been provoked by Serb attacks on Croats in eastern Croatia and the Serb siege of an isolated Croat village north of Split. The Serbs were a "minority" in Croatia, the federal army was a "communist institution", and Croatia had "a democratically-elected government".

On May 25, *The Economist* argued that "Serbia can be blamed for much of the recent trouble", that "Serb propaganda fuels fear and mad rumors" among Serbs in Croatia, and that "Serb behavior is turning them against their neighbors".

3.1.1.1.2. The Times

A total of 84 articles from *The Times* was analyzed.

The total number of features, analyses, and comments was around a quarter of the total number (23 out of 84). There was a wide range of texts. Most of the texts were focused on the situation in Croatia and Serbia, but many also concentrated on the talks, the federal army, and Slovenia.

Table: Number of references in "The Times"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Number of references to "Serb/Serbian"	161	89	20
Number of references to "Milošević"	108	22	0
Number of references to "Federal army"	98	40	1
Number of references to "Serbia"	104	100	4
TOTAL	**471 (63%)**	**251 (33.6%)**	**25 (3.4%)**

Graph: Number of references in "The Times"



Table: Examples of references in "The Times"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Examples of references to "Serb/ Serbian"	"Serbian communist rule", "Serbs are putting more pressure on Albanians", "Serb terrorists"	"agreement between Serbs and Croats", "prevent fighting between Serbs and Croats"	"lost his job because he was Serbian", "two reporters of the Serbian newspaper *Večernje Novosti* beaten up"
Examples of references to "Milošević"	"virulent nationalist", "Milošević's oppressive form of communism cloaked in Serbian nationalism", "mad Bolshevism of Milošević"	"Serbian leader", "declared"	

Examples of references to"Federal army"	"led by communist generals who advocate strong central role", "waging a vicious campaign against the democratically-elected government of Croatia", "intervened in Pakrac having exaggerated the threat there"	"army withdrawal", "representatives met with the army"	"has acted within the constitution", "issued a statement calming fears of immediate intervention"
Examples of references to "Serbia"	"impose a Greater Serbia on Croatia", "accused of stirring political upheaval in Albania", "Serbia is increasingly being seen as the culprit"	"future relations with Serbia", "Serbia's border"	"smartly attired firebrands of Serbia"

A total for the four terms combined (747 references) indicates that the forces opposed to the secession of Croatia and Slovenia were placed in a negative context 471 times (63% of the total), in a neutral context 251 times (33.6%), and in a positive context 25 times (3.4%).

A closer look at *The Times* coverage complements the numbers. At the beginning of this period, *The Times* wrote that Croats and Slovenes had adopted Central European values, while the Serbs were "undeniably Balkan". The victory of "Serbia's communists" (referring to the Socialist Party of Serbia) in the Serbian elections was said to be leading to likely tensions with other republics. In January, Croatian president Franjo Tuđman warned that the "army could strike during the world's preoccupation with the Gulf War", following the previous week's "Soviet crackdown in the Baltics", in order to "restore communist order and centralist Yugoslavia" (January 18). On the other hand, Slovenia and Croatia "ousted the communists after a democratic election and have pursued independence ever since" (January 22). On January 23, *The Times* wrote that the "Croatian leadership appealed to calm and negotiated settlement" while "there are indications that the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army, mimicking Soviet attempts to take action against the Baltic republics, is ready to move on the Croats and Slovenes". Croatia and Slovenia, "the two republics closest geographically, economically and psychologically to the West want Yugoslavia based

on the model of European Community", while Slobodan Milošević, "the virulently nationalist and still communist leader of Serbia sees the maintenance of the federal arrangement as the only way of keeping and expanding Serbian power". Milošević's wife was "a dogmatic communist whom critics compare to the late Elena Ceauşescu".

The "propaganda effect" of the Yugoslav army's video of Croat arms trafficking and plotting massacres of the army and Serb opponents was described "as total in Serbia," while General Špegelj said "the report was false" (January 28), "a total fabrication," and recalled "the use of faked evidence in the Stalinist era" (February 1). The army "commits to the defense of 'communism' and arrests the defense minister of the democratically-elected Croatian government" (February 1). On the other hand, Špegelj, a long-time general, who said "he has always been something of a liberal", warned that Yugoslav army general Blagoje Adžić was "an extremely dangerous and unscrupulous militarist", and that the Yugoslav army was "a cruel, KGB Stalinist organization" (February 4). Serbs, "who are viewed as 'Turkish', are seen with particular loathing (in Croatia)" (January 30), while "Slovenes and Croats discover their credentials as Central Europeans denied to them by four decades of communist propaganda linking them to Belgrade" (February 8). The Yugoslav president Borislav Jović was "the tool of those who wish to impose a Greater Serbia on Croatia" and "as a Serb, (he) is hostile to Croatians" (February 5).

Slovenes were seeking a "peaceful divorce" (February 6). Slovenia, "like Croatia, [is] a relatively prosperous, devout Catholic and Central European republic", while "Serbs throughout Croatia are being whipped up by propaganda from communist Serbia" (February 11). On March 4, in a report from Tirana, Serbia was "accused of stirring political upheaval in Albania". Following demonstrations in Serbia, *The Times* wrote in an editorial that "Milošević's oppressive form of communism cloaked in Serbian nationalism is reaching the end of the road" (March 12). "Communist demonstrators" who were in favor of Milošević "kicked opposition spies" and "manhandled a British TV crew and CNN" (March 12). Serbs in Knin "declared independence from Croatia and provided a *casus belli* for Milošević if it provokes the Croats" while Serbia was "putting pressure on Albanians", "spreading propaganda", and "beating up the opposition". Milošević "has decided to make the sickness of communism into the death of Yugoslavia" (March 18). Following the clashes between the local Serb police in the Krajina region and the Croatian police, "Croats have been fleeing the Serbian-dominated town of Knin, the center of Serbian unrest, after a series of bomb explosions damaged Croatian shops and property" (April 4).

On April 9, Croat protesters denounced the Yugoslav military authorities as "Serbian gypsies" and the "red gang", and as a response to the Serbian Orthodox Easter, they were throwing eggs at the military building, thus "sending the Serbs Easter

eggs". Blagoje Adžić, a general who temporarily replaced the Yugoslav minister of Defense Veljko Kadijević, was "considered as a hardliner known for his hostility to the democratically-elected nationalist government in Croatia" (April 23). On April 30, *The Times* argued that "conflict is seen as being provoked by the army to give it an excuse to demonstrate its strength". In the May 8 issue, Franjo Tuđman, during a visit to London, argued that the conflict in Yugoslavia was a "battle between communism attempting to make its last stand and Western civilization". In the same issue, a *Times* editorial argued that Tuđman had drawn an "over-simplified picture" but that "fear of Serbia has bred separatism" and that "the more Serbia insists on maintaining a tight federal structure which it intends to dominate, the fiercer become the Croat and Slovene pressures for independence". Also, "Western finance, indispensable to Yugoslavia's economic reform, has to be firmly conditioned on republican cooperation with Marković's reform" (May 8). In a column on May 9, Peter Millar quoted from an 1837 German travel guide to describe Belgrade as "Turkish" and ugly, while Ljubljana and Zagreb were noted for their opera houses, churches and universities.

For Millar, "Yugoslavia was a bad idea," and for the Serbs "the Kingdom of the South Slavs was to be the Greater Serbia they had dreamed of since they attained autonomy from the Ottomans and saw the possibility of expansion at the expense of the crushing empires on either side". Millar argued that "we shall immediately be required to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia and acknowledge a state of armed hostility, if not outright war with rump Yugoslavia, which may as well again be named Greater Serbia". On May 10, in an article on the arms trade to Yugoslavia, *The Times* portrayed a typical "member of the new Croat force: camouflage uniforms from Germany, reinforced plastic helmets from France, American or Russian automatic weapons and British boots". Two months earlier, *The Times* had dismissed the Yugoslav army video showing Croat arms smuggling.

On May 21, following the suspension of U.S. aid to Yugoslavia, Slovenian foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel said that he understood this "as a protest against the chauvinistic policies of the Serbs". *The Times* concluded that, to Slovenian and Croatian satisfaction, Serbia was increasingly being seen as a culprit in the failure to create a new form of Yugoslavia in the wake of a collapse of the old federation" (May 21).

3.1.1.1.3. Le Monde

A total of 79 articles from *Le Monde* were analyzed.

More than 25 percent of articles were analyses, comments, and features (21 out of 79). There was a wide range of articles: Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Federal Army, Kosovo, history, economics, EC policy.

Table: Number of references in "Le Monde"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Number of references to "Serb/Serbian"	154	126	18
Number of references to "Milošević"	77	38	2
Number of references to "Federal army"	115	93	4
Number of references to "Serbia"	108	73	6
TOTAL	**454 (55.8%)**	**330 (40.5%)**	**30 (3.7%)**

Graph: Number of references in "Le Monde"



Table: Number of references in "Le Monde"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Examples of references to "Serb/Serbian"	"Great Serb c hauvinism", "hegemonic totalitarianism of Serbian power", "Orthodox, oriental and autocratic"	"tensions between Serbs and Croats", "Serb enclave in Croatia"	"three Serbs killed", "history has given Serbs reason to be fearful"
Examples of references to "Milošević"	"neo-Marxist populist wanting personal power", "by provoking trouble wants to continue Serb hegemony in Yugoslavia", "wants to worsen tensions in other republics"	"president of Serbia", "will meet"	"declared he was ready to accept the platform"

Examples of references to "Federal army"	"dogmatic, communist hegemonic force," "the only authentic Bolshevik army," "preoccupied with the defense of socialism"	"army units sent", "studied measures"	"contributed to calm"
Examples of references to "Serbia"	"last bastion of populist, demagogic and centralized neo-communism", "terrorists imported from Serbia", "repression by Serbia against the Albanian minority in Kosovo"	"part of Serbia", "representatives of Serbia"	"Serbia does not want Bolshevism or perestroika but Europe"

A total for the four terms combined indicates that forces opposed to the secessions of Croatia and Slovenia were placed in a negative context 454 times (55.8% of the total amount of times the terms were mentioned), in a neutral context 330 times (40.5%), and in a positive context 30 times (3.7%).

On December 25, 1991, *Le Monde* wrote that "communists will keep power in Serbia". In January, the authenticity of the army's documentary was questioned (January 28). *Le Monde* wrote that the Croat authorities believed the film would serve "as an instrument of army repression because Croatia (non-communist) wants independence from Belgrade" (February 1). In February, the new Serbian government was elected but its policies "are immediately qualified as incoherent and conservative" (February 13), and on February 22, *Le Monde* reported that the Serbian authorities were being accused by an international human rights organization of "practicing an act of forced integration of the Kosovo economy". On March 6, *Le Monde* reported on points made by the Croat authorities that "the psychosis among Serbs in Croatia has been imported by provocations from Serbia". A March 11 article about Kosovo reported on "Serb repression in Kosovo", and quoted Albanian leader Adem Demaci, "the Nelson Mandela of Kosovo", as saying that "Kosovo is the biggest prison of humanity".

In several articles, *Le Monde* reported about the March demonstrations in Belgrade. Milošević was "blamed for the violence" (March 13), but *Le Monde* concluded that the opposition leader Vuk Drašković "incarnates in Serbia a democratic nationalism which opposes the neo-communist nationalism of Slobodan Milošević – because, in fact, on the national question there is no difference" (March 15). A March 19 editorial argued that events in Serbia, "the last bastion of populist, demagogic, centralist neo-communism", have destabilized the country. Milošević "provokes the revolt of Albanians" and "wants to worsen tensions in other republics" (March 19). In a historical background to the Yugoslav crisis, *Le Monde* wrote that World War II Croatian Ustashi (Croatian Nazis) had attempted to take revenge for inter-war "Serb chauvinism" by killing "dozens of thousands of Serbs who would refuse their option" (March 20). *Le Monde* reported on March 20 that "according to a majority of observers, the Serbian president firmly decided to oppose a democratic resolution of the Yugoslav crisis". In fact, Milošević "does not see another solution for maintaining the unity of the federation but to submit it to under a hegemony – Serb and communist at the same time" (March 22). After a period of calm and talks at the end of March, *Le Monde* wrote that in Zagreb "it is said that the idea that Serbs had renounced their project of Greater Serbia which would make a Serboslavia out of the country should not be trusted" (March 30).

An article on clashes between Serbs and Croats in Plitvice national park reported about the fears of Serbs in Croatia but quoted a Croatian official as saying that "Serbs had always profited from communism," and that Milošević and his "typically oriental despotism" should be blamed for destabilization (April 3). On April 11, an opinion piece by a Paris professor of Croat origin was a direct reply to the March 15 interview with Vuk Drašković in which the author criticized the leader of the Serbian opposition for "joining the propaganda of Milošević's communist government" by discussing the fears of Serbs in Croatia. Following the clashes in Borovo Selo in early May, *Le Monde* quoted Tuđman as saying that the killing of members of the Croat police "is the work of a bunch of extremists in the service of Belgrade's power" (May 8) and quoted Tuđman's counselor Darko Belić as arguing that Serbs had engaged members of the former Romanian Securitate (Nicolae Ceaușescu's secret police) to fight on their side (May 9). The same day, a *Le Monde* editorial argued that "it is practically clear that the murder of 12 Croatian policemen has been an operation carefully planned by Serb nationalist chetniks coming from Belgrade, armed with modern guns and maybe even helped by mercenaries from the former Securitate".

The editorial also argued that Milošević defended a thesis of a "strong, centralized federation under Serb domination". A May 10 article quoted a Croatian MP as saying that the conflict between Serbs and Croats was "a conflict between civilizations" – "a Catholic, Western and democratic world – that of Slovenia and Croatia

– and an Orthodox, oriental and autocratic world – that of the Serbs". On May 11, *Le Monde* published an interview with Croatian president Tuđman who argued that "the action of Great Serb elements and chetnik terrorists in Croatia has the only objective of aggravating the situation". A May 15 interview with the Croatian representative in the federal presidency, Stipe Mesić, described him as "optimistic", "humorous", and wanting "dialogue" and "negotiations". On May 28, an opinion piece by a Serb journalist argued that in order to ease the tensions between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, there was a need for the Croat regime to apologize to the Serbs for the World War II massacres committed against them by the Croatian Ustashi, the same way Helmut Kohl apologized to the Jews.

In the reply to this piece, which was a letter written by a couple of Croat Catholic priests, it was argued that the Croats would not do so until the Serbs apologized for their "genocides" against Croats, Muslims, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Germans and Hungarians (June 18). On June 21, *Le Monde* published polls revealing that 50 percent of Croats supported the secession (and not 94 percent as argued by the Croatian government) and that 44 percent of Slovenes supported the secession (and not 88 percent as argued by the Slovenian government). After that, opposition of the EC and the U.S. to the secessions was reported (June 24), but on June 25, Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence.

3.1.1.1.4. Conclusion

The numbers revealed by the content analysis are relatively constant: the pro-Yugoslav forces have been placed predominantly in a negative context (60%, 63%, 55.8%). They have been placed in a positive context very rarely (3.4%, 3.4%, 3.7%). Thus, the coverage of *The Economist*, *The Times*, and *Le Monde* can be said to have been biased against Serbs and a federal Yugoslavia. While not every term placed in a negative context indicates bias (a killing is a killing), when observed as combined, the coverage indicates anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav bias. This applies to all terms.

While the bias has been constant throughout the period, the bias against each particular term reached a peak at a different time. For the "army," it was in January/February when the Croats and Slovenes warned against "army intervention". For "Milošević," it was in March, following the demonstrations in Belgrade. For "Serb" and "Serbia", it was in April, following the clashes between Serbs and Croats in Krajina. The culmination was in May and June, dominated by bias against all of the supporters of federal Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that even those who had

received positive coverage at the time (such as the Serb opposition) received it at the expense of another pro-Yugoslav term (when it opposed the Serbian government) and, soon after, they lost it as well (when it expressed its own opinions on the Yugoslav crisis).

Recognized sources have been, to a large extent, Croat or Slovene politicians and officials (Tuđman, Mesić, Kučan). Very often their comments were taken for granted and a few days after they would be repeated as *facts* in the nut paragraphs (background paragraphs). Comments from Serbian or army officials were used when they were "warning" someone or of something – such as comments from Serbs in Croatia when they were using a militaristic tone, and from the Serbian opposition when it was attacking Milošević. The causes of the Yugoslav crisis, according to the coverage of the press, could be summarized as the difference between Serbs as supporters of a federal Yugoslavia and Croats/Slovenes as supporters of confederation or secession.

Table: Serbs and Croats/Slovenes, according to the press

	Serbs	**Croats / Slovenes**
Political differences	Hegemonic / centralist / irredentist	Want independence and freedom from the hegemony
Economic differences	Want centrally-planned economy	Want a market economy
Ideological differences	Communist	Anti-communist
Cultural differences	Militarist / uncooperative / hardline / oriental / backward	Open to negotiation / Western / democratic / developed
Historical reasons	Serb hegemony during the inter-war and the communist era	Victims of Serb hegemony during the inter-war and communist-era / crimes committed seen as the result of revenge for Serb hegemony

The main problem of the Yugoslav crisis in 1991 was the question of the opposition of Serbs to living in an independent Croatia. According to the analysis, the press reported that Serbs in Croatia did not have anything to fear, that their fear was a result of propaganda coming from Belgrade, and that Serbs wanted to create a Greater Serbia at the expense of Croats.

Very little or nothing was mentioned of the new Croatian constitution transforming Croatia from a state of all citizens living in Croatia to a state of the Croat people, thus transforming the Serbs from a constituent nation to a minority. The Croat use of the same national anthem and currency that they had used during the Nazi Ustashi regime, the use of a very similar flag to that of the World War II Croatia, and of the rhetoric that was constantly using the term "independent Croatia" (reminiscent of the Nazi-led Independent State of Croatia) was never mentioned. The Croat rhetoric aimed at internal consumption (much more hard-line and threatening) was forgotten. Very little was said about the historical reasons for Serb fears (the Ustashi massacres, when mentioned, were either downplayed or refuted). Nothing was said of Tuđman's anti-Semitism and anti-Serb writings, of the rehabilitation of Nazi Croat criminals, of the Serbs who were being harassed, losing their jobs and homes, and of the thousands of Serb refugees fleeing Croatia in 1990/1991.

Thus, to a policymaker reading the EC press, the demands of the Serbs were unjustified and were a result of expansionistic objectives, rather than of fears. The Croat/Slovene demand for a "confederation or secession" was accepted as a done deal – it was never questioned. Although through their demands, Slovenia and Croatia presented Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia with an ultimatum, the EC press argued that it was up to the Serbs to make concessions or face the consequences. The "federal" option was buried from the beginning. The survival of a federation would mean a victory for the "communist", "totalitarian", "hegemonic" Serbia, "extremist" Serbs, "Bolshevik" federal army, and "neo-communist populist" Milošević, at the expense of the "Western" "democratic" Slovenia and Croatia.

Yet, it is that "federation" that the EC had firmly supported up until the beginning of the preventive diplomacy effort. While the USSR and the U.S. continued to support the federation throughout the period, the EC gradually weakened its support. Thus, the EC was indecisive in supporting the economic reforms in Yugoslavia – aid was conditional, the federal army and Serbia criticized, while Croat and Slovene demands started to be acknowledged and even split the EC on the issue (covert support of Germany, Denmark, and Italy). The EC policy showed indecisiveness and incoherence as a result – the EC itself was not sure what kind of an option it was supporting. It did not pressure Slovenia and Croatia into more flexibility about a confederal option, nor did it address the question of possible confidence-building measures for the Serb population in Croatia.

Thus, the press could have exercised an influence on the EC policy. In fact, the policy was neither firm nor clearly defined: the EC was sending ambiguous, mixed messages to disputants, which strengthened their intransigence – the preventive diplomacy actors were not coherent, there was inadequate and untimely use of the EC economic incentives, and there was very little pressure to instil confidence-building measures. The EC effort was also aimed at preventing a conflict which was at the periphery of its geostrategic interest at the time. In 1991, the EC was preoccupied with the Gulf War, German reunification, the process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Maastricht negotiations, and the transition in Eastern Europe. Thus, the media could have had an impact on the EC preventive diplomacy effort.

Given that the EC lacked adequate intelligence data at the time, it can be said that the media were an important source of information for EC policymakers (Pohrt, 1991). But the coverage of three very influential print outlets (originating in countries which traditionally have been supportive to federal Yugoslavia and Serbia) indicates an anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav bias. The negative coverage could have contributed to the gradual change (weakening) in the EC support for federal Yugoslavia, to the incoherence of the EC preventive diplomacy, and to the EC indecision on how to formulate an adequate strategy – thus leading to the failure of the EC to prevent the violent resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

In an interview with the author, the German ambassador to the EU Dietrich von Kyaw confirmed that the impact of the media on EC policy towards Yugoslavia in 1991 was “extremely big” and that “a lot of decisions at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis had been made under media pressure.” Von Kyaw said that he was personally opposed to the breakup of Yugoslavia, and that “(German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich) Genscher agreed with me, and then had to do the opposite under heavy media pressure”.

3.1.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992): Reporting of U.S. Media During the Preventive Diplomacy Effort U.S. Media

The media in the United States are considered to be among the freest and most developed in the world, with guarantees by the First Amendment. Thus, the power of the media in the U.S. is very strong. In the period which we analyzed, among the most powerful print media were the dailies *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Los Angeles Times*, as well as weeklies such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *New Republic*. The editorial policies of these papers had the capacity to influence decision-makers in Washington, D.C.

3.1.2.1. Content Analysis

Content analysis was performed on The New York Times and a combination of several newsweeklies and magazines (Time, Newsweek, New Republic, National Review). All articles in these media outlets related to the crisis in Yugoslavia in the period January 15, 1992 (EC recognition of Slovenia and Croatia) – April 6, 1992 (EC/U.S. recognition of Bosnia and the beginning of the war) will be analyzed. This period is analyzed because the U.S. policy was playing a minor role in the crisis prior to its involvement in the Bosnian case and because the Bosnian problem received little coverage until after the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.

The analysis will focus on four terms: "Serb/Serbian", "Serbia", "Milošević", and "Federal army". The term "Serb/Serbian" is applied to both Serbs in Serbia and Croatia/Bosnia. "Serbia" represents the Republic of Serbia. "Milošević" applies to Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. "Federal army" applies to the Yugoslav People's Army. The terms could indicate the slant of the coverage regarding both the supporters of the Yugoslav option and the Serbs.

All terms will be divided into three categories, based on the concept of *affect*: *negative* affect indicates that the term was used in a negative connotation in the context of the time (1992) and the readership (policy-makers); for example, the actor represented by the term was uncooperative, threatening, manipulating, and so forth. *Neutral* affect indicates that the term was used in a neutral connotation, for example, "said", "live", "leader of", and so forth. *Positive* affect means that the term was used in a positive connotation; for example, explanation of reasons behind action of the actor represented by the term, depiction of the actor's fears, suffering, cooperation. The content analysis will focus on the connotation in which each of the four terms were used in all of the articles published by the media outlet in the period between December 25, 1990 and June 25, 1991. Each time one of the four terms appears in an article, it will be attached a value of *positive*, *negative*, or *neutral* – depending on the term's connotation. The total number of times each of the four terms is used in each of the three connotations will be calculated. This total will allow for an assessment of the kind of slant the analyzed terms were given in the media outlet's coverage.

3.1.2.1.1. New York Times

The New York Times published 64 articles on the Yugoslav crisis in the period January 15, 1992 –April 6, 1992.

Table: Number of references in "The New York Times"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Number of references to "Serb/Serbian"	169	125	17
Number of references to "Milošević"	29	6	1
Number of references to "Federal army"	37	28	4
Number of references to "Serbia"	29	29	1
TOTAL	**264 (55.6%)**	**188 (39.6%)**	**23 (4.8%)**

Graph: Number of references in "The New York Times"



Table: Examples of references in "The New York Times"

	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Examples of references to "Serb/Serbian"	"Serb-occupied territory", "Serbian irregular forces killed", "targets of Serbian nationalism"	"live in Croatia", "largest Serbian area", "talks with Serbian leaders"	"said they feared They would be victims again"
Examples of references to "Milošević"	"hardline communist", "fascist killer", "tempted to seek renewed popular support by war"	"decided not to back", "insisted that"	"supports UN troops"

Examples of references to "Federal army"	"takeover by Serb-led troops", "accused of shelling Osijek", "backed Serbian irregulars", "ousted non-Serb generals"	"signed by the federal army", "said", "to withdraw", army's firepower"	"agreed", "full cooperation"
Examples of references to "Serbia"	"resorted to force to resolve an ethnic and political conflict", "forcefully ended Kosovo's autonomy in 1989"	"plan signed by Serbia", "Serbian president", "says", "leaving only Serbia and Montenegro", "into Serbia"	"Serbia's bête noire is Croatian fascism"

A total for the four terms combined (475 references) indicates that forces opposed to the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been placed in a negative context 264 times (55.6% of the total number), in a neutral context 188 times (39.5%) and in a positive context 23 times (4.8%).

A closer look at *The New York Times* complements these numbers. On January 16, the day following recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the European Community, *The New York Times* published a commentary by Hungarian Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky, who argued that recognition should have occurred even earlier, and that recognition of all the secessionist republics (by the EC but also the U.S.) should proceed without delay because recognition would lead to stability in the region.

The editorial comment of *The New York Times* on February 16 argued that isolation of Serbia and recognition of Croatia would "encourage peace". The paper intensified its coverage of the Bosnian crisis on the day of the referendum, on March 1st. An explanation of the Bosnian situation outlined that Muslims and Croats feared a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, while Serbs wanted to remain in the same state as Serbia. Izetbegović was portrayed as the only Yugoslav leader never to be a communist. In the March 3 article, Serbs were putting up barricades throughout Sarajevo because of the result of the Bosnian referendum on independence, which they boycotted. On March 4, *The New York Times* published an article "February 27", depicting the ruins of Vukovar in Croatia, where a fierce battle had taken place five months earlier.

The article suggested that most of the destruction had been done by the "Serb-led Yugoslav army". On March 7, Serbs in Bosnia became a "minority" and were said to "threaten civil war". On March 8, an analysis of the Yugoslav crisis repeated the claim that the Serb "minority" threatened war, but also stated that Serbia itself threatened Macedonia (another state not recognized by the U.S.) and that the Serb government ruined its country in order to support the war effort. The same article was accompanied by two photos. One of them showed three armed men whom the paper's cutline described as "armed Serbs control[ing] a road near Sarajevo" without identifying the mourners. But the cross in the photo clearly shows the Cyrillic inscription on it – it was the funeral of Nikola Gardović, a Serb whose killing in Sarajevo had caused an uproar among Serbs. In the March 9 issue, the author wrote that Serbia was threatening to intervene in Bosnia and Macedonia, that Serbian President Milošević was a communist who became the major proponent of fighting Croatian independence, and that he was tempted to renew the war against Croatia.

Following this intense *New York Times* coverage in the first ten days of March, on March 10, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker hinted for the first time that the U.S. might recognize the secessionist republics, Bosnia included. That same day, a report from Belgrade depicted Milošević as a communist and the Serbian opposition as nationalist. For his part, Baker, on March 11, acknowledged he would work towards the recognition of secessionist republics with the EC.

A few days later, there was a breakthrough in negotiations among the three Bosnian ethnic groups. All three leaders signed the so-called Cutileiro plan, which was aimed at preserving Bosnia as a whole while dividing the country into ethnic cantons. For *The New York Times*, that was the first and last time the Cutileiro plan was mentioned. Its fate, including the U.S. influence on Izetbegović's decision to revoke his signature subsequently and kill the plan, never became known to readers of *The New York Times*. However, on March 27, the paper published another article in which the Serb government was criticized. A long-time communist dissident, Milovan Đilas, criticized the Serb leadership. Thus, the stage was set: according to the *New York Times* coverage, Milošević was a communist, a nationalist, and a fascist who attacked Croatia, armed the Serbs on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, threatened Bosnia and Macedonia, collapsed the Serbian economy, stole from federal reserves, and was criticized at home by communists, nationalists, and liberals alike. In any case, on March 28, the U.S. administration announced it was planning to recognize the secessionist republics as soon as the EC did.

Starting in early April, Serb "militia" and "gang" attacks filled *The New York Times* articles. They were launched in order to prevent the recognition, the paper said. But they were in vain since on April 6, the EC recognized Bosnia as an independent state, as did the U.S. the very next day.

3.1.2.1.2 Time, Newsweek, New Republic, National Review

The four magazines published a total of 11 articles on the Yugoslav crisis in the period between January 15, 1992 and April 6, 1992.

Table: Number of references in "Time," "Newsweek," "New Republic," and "National Review"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Number of references to "Serb/Serbian"	28	13	2
Number of references to "Milošević"	10	4	0
Number of references to "Federal army"	11	2	0
Number of references to "Serbia"	13	2	0
TOTAL	**62 (72.9%)**	**21 (24.7%)**	**2 (2.4%)**

Graph: Number of references in "Time", 'Newsweek", "New Republic" and "National Review"



Table: Examples of references in "Time", 'Newsweek", "New Republic" and "National Review"

	Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Examples of references to "Serb/Serbian"	"fascist Serbian demagogue", "Serbian soldiers cheered as their shells slammed into the roofs of Dubrovnik", "end to Serbian aggression against Croatia"	"Serbian organizations called" "differences between Serbs and Croats"	"fear among the Serbs"

Examples of references to "Milosevic"	"deliberately stirred and manipulated fears", "hard-line communist", "Milosevic and his neo-communists"	"said", "thrown political support behind"	
Examples of references to "Federal army'	"few believed in the army version", "war the Yugoslav army was about to start"	"called", "withdrawal of army units"	
Examples of references to "Serbia"	"in Serbia, (nationalism) has remained married to hard-line Leninism", "perpetrated extreme abuses in the dominantly Albanian province of Kosovo"	"between Serbia and Croatia", "colleagues from Serbia"	

The total for the four terms combined (85 references) indicates that the forces opposing the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina were placed in a negative context 60 times (72.9% of the total number), in a neutral context 21 times (24.7%), and in a positive context two times (2.4%).

While most analyzed articles to a large extent reflect the coverage of *The New York Times* (in terms of topic and presentation), two articles stand out. On February 24, the *New*

Republic published an analysis of the U.S. policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis. In the article, author Patrick Glynn argued that the U.S. policy was flawed from the start and that it continued to be so because the U.S. was refusing to recognize the secessionist republics. His argument was that Serbia was undemocratic, communist, nationalist, and abusive of Albanians in Kosovo and other nations elsewhere in for-

mer Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Croatia was democratic and open to compromise and negotiations.

Glynn dismissed some of the U.S. fears about a possible expansion of the war into Bosnia after recognition and argued that Germany's push for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia brought stability to the region. He argued that the policy brought "an absolute loss of international power for the United States" and suggested that such a policy might be due to personal financial interests of some American policymakers, such as Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who according to Glynn's expose – had stakes in two large Yugoslav firms and was thus perhaps "more inclined to give a more sympathetic hearing to Serbs."

Yet another article criticizing the U.S. policy on Yugoslavia appeared a week later, on March 2, in the *National Review*. An article by former U.S. President Richard Nixon criticized the U.S. for supporting the central "communist" government and argued that support should be given to the "democratic" independent republics.

3.1.2.1.3. Conclusion

The numbers stemming from the content analysis show that the terms referring to actors opposed to the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina were placed in a predominantly negative context (55.5 percent, 72.9 percent), and were placed in a positive context very rarely (4.8 percent and 2.4 percent). It can be said that the coverage by the analyzed media was anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav. Again, the negative connotations went beyond objective *negative* actions (such as killings) and, to a large extent, dealt with subjective interpretations. After all, despite the sporadic violence, the period analyzed was marked by an absence of open warfare (it occurred during the ceasefire in Croatia and before mass violence erupted in Bosnia).

The coverage followed a pattern that occurred the previous year during the EC preventive effort. Again, each pro-Yugoslav and pro-Serbian actor was dismissed one after the other. For example, the Krajina Serbs were criticized in January and February, while the Serbs, Milošević, and the army were criticized in March and April. Milošević and the Serbian government were given a voice only when they criticized the Krajina Serb leadership, while the Serbian opposition was only given a voice when it criticized Milošević.

Similarly to the case in Croatia, the solution to avoiding the war in Bosnia was finding a way to satisfy the demands of the Serbs, which was opposed to living in an independent Bosnia. Yet, the demands of the Serbs were never explained. A State

Department policymaker reading the analyzed media outlets during the U.S. preventive diplomacy effort was informed that Serbs were "irregulars", "rebels", "militias", "gangs", "guerrillas", and thus not "troops" or "soldiers", which were the terms reserved for the Muslims and the Croats. Serbs were considered a "minority" both in Croatia and Bosnia, which – the Serbs argued – was not true since they were a "constituent nation" in these republics, and were, in fact, fighting against being treated and defined as "minorities." Serbia itself was "an aggressor", "threatening Bosnia", "threatening Macedonia", "resorting to violence in Kosovo", "stealing federal reserves", and thus, it was "good to isolate it". Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was a "communist", but also a "nationalist" and a "fascist".

On the other hand, Serbs were mentioned as victims very rarely. Chairman of Bosnia's Presidency Alija Izetbegović was introduced to the public as the only leader in the former Yugoslavia "never to be a communist". Muslims and Croats "fear to stay in a Serb-led Yugoslavia", while nothing was mentioned of the Serb fear of living in a Muslim-Croat-led Bosnia – Serbs do not fear, they only want to live in the "same state as Serbs". There was no discussion on the viewpoint of the Serbs living on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which presented the following dilemma: "If Muslims and Croats would not live with the Serbs in a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, why would the Serbs live with Muslims and Croats in a multi-ethnic Bosnia?" Thus, there was very little mention of the rationale for the Serb opposition to life in an independent Bosnia. Emphasis was placed on disregarding Serb claims as illegitimate and considering Serb leaders aggressive and threatening to the entire region.

An interesting period in the media coverage was the period immediately preceding the shift in the U.S. position on recognition of the secessionist republics (end of February-early March). This period started with harsh criticism of the U.S. policy on Yugoslavia in the *New Republic*, in which a shift of the stance on recognition was urged. It was followed by a period of intensive anti-Serb coverage in *The New York Times*, starting with the referendum in Bosnia and ending with the announcement of the shift in the U.S. policy. From the main opponent of recognition, the U.S. suddenly became its main proponent.

The evidence does not intend to prove that the U.S. policy changed as a result of the media coverage. Yet, the impact of the press on the U.S. policy could have been exercised. In fact, the U.S. preventive diplomacy was incoherent and not clearly defined: its policy on recognition changed and suddenly shifted, its position towards the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina became confrontational, it had a role to play in the "killing" of Cutileiro's compromise plan. The U.S. effort was also aimed at preventing a conflict which was at the periphery of its interest at the time. In fact, Yugoslavia had lost its geostrategic interest for the United States at the end of the Gulf

War. Thus, instability in Yugoslavia did not directly threaten the interests of the U.S.

Given that the U.S. policy changed and harmonized with the media perception of the crisis, it is possible that the media reporting had a certain influence on the overall U.S. strategy – including the weakening of opposition to recognition of secessionist states, the dismissal of the importance and legitimacy of Serb claims, and the overall confusion surrounding the policy. Thus, the media could have contributed to the U.S. failure to prevent the violent solution to the Bosnian problem (Mitić, 2020).

3.2. Part II: Media Content Analysis: the Events that Led to the War and the War itself In Sarajevo (1991-1995)

Belgrade-based independent Institute for Political studies[28] performed the novel media content analysis of the events that led to the war and the war itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995). The exclusivity of this study lies in the fact that 10,000 pages of the primary sources were analyzed during the entire period preceding the beginning of the war and the war itself in Sarajevo. To our knowledge, so far, there is no relevant analysis that studied the entire time frame that includes the period before the beginning of the war and the war in Sarajevo.

The following research is an integral part of a study.

3.2.1. Methodology of research

Our research aims to provide an understanding of the image of the Serbs in the BiH war formed by two Western media: *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*. At the same time, we will analyze the image of other nations in BiH as well. This choice was made for several reasons.

- First, these dailies are part of the most influential Western media.
- The second reason is the leading position that these newspapers have in terms of circulation and readership in their countries (*The New York Times* in the U.S. and *The Guardian* in the UK).
- Third, the selection of these media covered the Anglo-Saxon speaking area of countries that (in)directly participated in the war in BiH.

- Fourth, these daily newspapers were also suitable for research because they allowed us to access the electronic archive for the entire time-frame relevant to this research, which was not the case with some other media that we tried to use in the analysis (e.g., *The Washington Post*).
- Finally, dailies have a relatively easy-to-process content – they consist of written text from where researchers can gather material and analyze it without large human, material, or time resources (unlike video media like *CNN* or the *BBC*).

It should be emphasized that this research did not cover the media reports from some other countries, the results of which would mean a great deal for our deeper understanding of how media reported on Serbs and the events that led to the war and the war itself in BiH internationally, meaning in countries such as, for example, Germany, France, Russia, and so forth. The main reason for this is the lack of funding that could provide for setting up a network of researchers to cover other language areas and the time constraints of the project. It should also be noted that information on how local and regional media covered the war was missing for the same reasons. However, it remains a recommendation to conduct this type of research in the future as a supplement to this study.

To obtain more accurate results on what was the image of the Serbs prior to and during the war in BiH painted by *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, a specific database that imported the entire volume of articles covering the defined theme was a basic requirement. The time frame of the study covers the pre-war period and the period until the end of the conflict. Thus, the main database includes articles published from January 1, 1991, to December 31, 1995. The authors of this research have no previous knowledge that a study of the same volume was conducted any time before. This fact alone contributes to the exclusivity and importance of the research carried out, but at the same time, the researchers faced certain challenges that needed to be overcome. Specifically, two databases were formed (one for each daily newspaper individually), making a total of nearly 10,000 pages that were analyzed. Researchers estimate that over 95% of articles that covered the period before and during the war in the BiH published in these dailies were analyzed.

After the database was created, the researchers applied the methods of content analysis to analyze imported articles. Having in mind the volume of the study sample, the computerized quantitative content analysis was applied. Currently, the most applied software for automatic text analysis based on analysis of certain words is LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count), which has been used as a tool in this analysis as well. Like other computer programs, LIWC has software that processes text, com-

paring it with the dictionary that had been previously defined. The program does regular text analysis, using a single word as a unit of analysis. It is designed in a way to compare morpheme composition of every single unit of analysis in imported text with a dictionary morpheme composition already incorporated into the database. The dictionary is composed of morpheme compositions, classified within categories in a way that one composition can correlate to one or more categories. When the program finds a morpheme in the dictionary that correlates to the morpheme composition of imported text, it registers categories and the morpheme that belongs to it.

Finally, after processing the entire text in this manner, the program calculates the percentage of how often each of the predefined text categories is represented. In other words, the outcome of the analysis is a result of quantitatively measuring how often each of the categories was represented within a defined text sample. Without going further into the method of category extraction, it is necessary to note that LIWC validity, as a text analysis instrument, has been proven more than once so far. This program has shown its usefulness in linguistic production analysis in psychological researches, ranging from clinical to social psychology. In fact, based on general text descriptors and linguistic categories, the total number of words in the whole text, average number of words in a sentence, frequency of different words usage, and so forth, we collect information about how persons communicate by speech or text, or, in other words, about aspects that are not correlated with the content of the text itself. On the other hand, based on categories such as negative and positive emotions (fear, grief, fury), we collect information about the emotional tone. Also, based on categories that reflect cognitive mechanisms (insights, causation, discrepancy, rethinking), we gain insight into the representation of different thought processes that are reflected in the language used.

LIWC also contains categories that reflect other psychologically important processes such as social, perceptive, biological, and correlative processes. Finally, through application of this program, it is possible to gain insight into themes that are most represented in the linguistic production of a person, that is, job, pastime, house, money, religion, and so forth. In that sense, LIWC is a program that produces a wide spectrum of verbal production characteristics. The first step in the quantitative analysis was defining the dictionary/keywords of interest (it is a basic step of ongoing computerized content analysis). The process of keyword selection will be further explained in detail within the subchapter that deals with the research results. Qualitative content analysis was used only as a complementary method where possible, as an addition to the results of the quantitative analysis.

The division of databases for each of the dailies individually allowed us to analyze the “general image” of the Serbs and other nations prior to and during the war

in BiH (for each paper, keywords were searched throughout the database, i.e., for the period between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 1995). It is important to note that this provided us with robust results when it comes to the moment of occurrence and frequency of the use of the terms, such as "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing", as well as the moment of occurrence and frequency of the mention of Serbs as an ethnic group that was carrying out such actions against other ethnic groups in BiH, and in comparison mentions of Croats and Muslims. Also, another robust piece of information is related to the front-page war articles of BiH.

At the same time as analyzing the most generalities, the researchers divided the bases of the aforementioned newspapers into several sections to reach more specific conclusions. The first large database relates to articles which have words the "Sarajevo" or "BiH capital" in their headlines, to offer insights into the manner of journalistic reporting during the Siege of Sarajevo. The time frame for this part of the analysis was the period between April 1, 1992, and December 31, 1995. At the same time, while analyzing the general image of Sarajevo at the time, special attention was paid to the following events: Dobrovoljačka Street (May 3, 1992), the Massacre at Vase Miskina Street (May 27, 1992), Markale 1 (February 5, 1994), and Markale 2 (August 28, 1995). These events were singled out because they represent some of the best known historical episodes of the war in BiH, which had far-reaching consequences for further events, as well as for the image that was formed about Serbs in the Western media.

The next large database includes all significant photographs and other visual content published between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 1995. It should be noted that this database will not be analyzed due to lack of time, and the need to hire appropriate experts, but will become available. Therefore, some of the most significant photographs will be presented in our analysis, in order to illustrate our conclusions.

However, before the results are presented, the basic criterion for selecting articles should be elaborated. Bearing in mind the aim of the research, the selected articles explicitly talk about Serbs and their relation to other ethnic groups, especially to the Muslims and Croats who were on the territory of BiH. Therefore, all articles that did not explicitly talk about the relations between these three groups, but referred to relations between foreign actors (e.g. Western countries' division over BiH) or referred to other countries of the former SFRY (e.g. the unstable situation in Macedonia or the fuel shortage in Serbia due to sanctions) were not analyzed. Articles reporting about actions involving foreign factors and Serbs (e. g. the NATO bombing of the Republika Srpska army positions) were also included in the research sample. Since the relations between Croats and Muslims/Bosniaks are not the subject of this

research, articles about the ongoing conflict between Croatia and BiH have not been included in the research sample.

3.2.2. Research Results

3.2.2.1. Data Analysis Procedure

The analysis of the enormous amount of collected data showed that necessary adjustments needed to be made, aiming at their systematization and achieving the best possible results. This concerns, first and foremost, the approach discussed in the methodological section concerning the Sarajevo and Srebrenica databases. The reason for this is the fact that a huge number of articles are filled with diverse information, that is, that newspaper articles covering only one theme are quite rare.

As noted before, the primary analysis was quantitative, while the qualitative approach was applied only in certain cases where possible, and primarily as an addendum to the quantitative method. For this purpose, a database of keywords/phrases was formed, which would be the basis for quantitative content analysis. It consists of several thematic clusters:

- Serbs as subjects / perpetrators of war actions: (Bosnian) Serb (forces) torture / kill / rape / pound / reject / attack / raid / assault / slay / retreat / ignore / lay siege / blew up / withstand / occupy / shell, and so forth.
- Serbs as a side against which war actions were carried out (this is the reverse order of the words from the previous item – for example, Serbs attacked by / attack on Serbs)
- Characterization of Serbs: Serbian nationalist forces / nationalist Serbs, fearful Serbs, Serbian irregulars/guerrillas, Serbian civilians, Serbian forces/soldiers/military, Serb violations, Serb-held, Serb onslaught, Serb victims, etc.
- Muslims/Bosniaks as subjects / perpetrators of war actions: Bosniaks / Muslims (forces) torture / kill / rape / pound / reject / attack / raid / assault / slay / retreat / ignore / lay siege / blew up / withstand / occupy / shell, and so forth.
- Muslims/Bosniaks as a party against which war actions were carried out (this is the reverse order of the words from the previous paragraph – for example, Muslims attacked by / attack on Bosniaks)

- Characterization of Muslims/Bosniaks: Muslim nationalist forces / nationalist Muslims, fearful Muslims, Muslim irregulars/guerrillas, Muslim civilians, Muslim forces/soldiers/military, Muslim violations, Muslim-held, Muslim onslaught, Muslim victims, and so forth.
- (Bosnian) Croats as subjects / perpetrators of war actions: (Bosnian) Croat (forces) torture / kill / rape / pound / reject / attack / raid / assault / slay / retreat / ignore / lay siege / blew up / withstand / occupy / shell, and so forth.
- (Bosnian) Croats as a side against which war actions were carried out (this is the reverse order of words from the previous item – for example, Croats attacked by / attack on Croats) etc.
- Characterization of (Bosnian) Croats: Croat nationalist forces / nationalist Croats, fearful Croats, Croat irregulars/guerrillas, Croat civilians, Croat forces/soldiers/military, Croat violations, Croat-held, Croat onslaught, Croat soldiers, and so forth.
- Conflict characterization: ethnic strife, horror, massacre, genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes (trial/tribunal), and so forth.
- Toponyms and figures: Bratunac, Kravica, Goražde, Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Mostar, Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić, Alija Izetbegović, Naser Orić, and so forth.

The expressions and phrases listed above represent the thematic clusters of the dictionary itself and illustrate the basic *axes* of the analysis (given that LIWC searches for the root of the word, a list of morphemes in English would only confuse the reader). It should be noted that the researchers defined the *passage* of the text as a word of analysis and the *theme* as a content unit of analysis. An inductive approach was employed – the researchers did not have predefined themes but instead they allowed them to "emerge" from each newspaper article. The described rule applies to any qualitative analysis of texts on specific events. In addition to the findings, the researchers will cite sections of the text that most accurately illustrate the given themes.

3.2.2.2. Quantitative Analysis of Complete BiH Database of Articles Published between January 1, 1991 And December 31, 1995.

The largest database that includes all articles important for the so-called general image of the Serbs created prior to and during the war in BiH (for the period from

January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1995) was analyzed exclusively by a quantitative method. In other words, the researchers applied computerized processing of content analysis at the level of a single word (see the section on methodology).

Media reporting prior to and during the war in BiH was analyzed through the general structure of the narrative – the researchers having first defined the main actors and the actions they took. More precisely, the core of the analysis refers to the attacker-attack dimension. At the same time, actions were defined, that is, behaviors that are characteristic of war conflicts. Finally, negative descriptions and epithets are an indispensable aspect of any war reporting, and they were also taken into consideration. Given the above, the quantitative analysis consists of several dimensions:

- detecting the frequency of mentioning each ethnic group as attackers,
- detecting the frequency of mentioning each ethnic group as victims,
- descriptions of the conflict, that is, various actions taken during the war,
- detecting the frequency of mentioning each ethnic group as the initiator of the described actions,
- detecting the frequency of mentioning each of the ethnic groups in a negative context.

Having in mind the variety of words that describe the events that led to the war and the war itself in BiH, the researchers focused their attention on frequent, that is, repetitive descriptions – the term had to be repeated at least 100 times at the level of the entire base of articles for both papers. Therefore, although the analyzed terms do not represent an exhaustive list of all possible words of interest, the described list provides a robust insight into the manner of reporting on the conflict. At the same time, individual thematic clusters listed in the introductory part, which are not included in the computerized content analysis, are the subject of later qualitative analysis.

It should be emphasized that this type of processing is not without its deficiencies. For example, individual keywords are strongly contextualized. For example, this is visible in sentences such as: “Small cells of Serbian gunmen moved around the town yesterday to ensure it had been ‘cleansed’ and the army units secured the bridges and dam on the Drina River.” It must be read in its entirety in order to understand the use of the term of interest – (ethnic) cleansing. Therefore, the researchers combined computerized data processing with a visual search of individual terms, to reach more precise conclusions. However, the number of individual terms and the lack of material and human resources limited visual search in advance - some keywords simply could not be manually researched (e.g., the term *attack*, in various lexical forms, appears over 2,500 times in *The New York Times* alone). However, the researchers

singled out a few extreme terms, guided by the stance that, if there are regularities in the case of the most negative terms, a similar regularity can be assumed in the case of less extreme words. As an additional argument for this approach, if a clear asymmetry between ethnic groups is observed on the *attacker-attacked* dimension, it can be (albeit roughly) assumed that the party that is predominantly described as the attacker is also the initiator of various actions.

3.2.2.3. The General Image of the Serbs Prior to and During the War in BiH

The New York Times

Regarding the *attacker-attacked* dimension, the data indicate that Serbs are almost exclusively portrayed as the attacking party, while the remaining ethnic groups (especially Bosniaks/Muslims) are portrayed as the attacked.

Keyword frequencies are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Characterization of different ethnic groups' roles in the conflict

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
Attacker			
force(s)	1502	265	257
militia(men)	153	13	140
irregular(s)	59	0	1
Army	135	776	78
Military	204	45	2
gunmen/gunner(s)	144	1	2
fighter(s)	120	44	29
Total	**2317**	**1144**	**509**
Victim			
defender(s)	2	60	5
civilian(s)	63	120	11
family(ies) (also includes the terms such as women and children)	35	75	4
refugees	60	127	12
Total	**160**	**382**	**32**

On the other hand, the keywords relating to the description of the conflict ranged from the typical ones, that is, stereotypical for any modern war (e.g., *kill, wound*), to the expressions specific to the war in BiH (e.g. *cleanse*).

Keyword frequencies are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Description of war activities in BiH

Terms	
wound(ed/ing)	796
kill(ed/ing/s)	1671
attack(ed/ing)	2846
(be)siege(d)	1109
shell(ed/ing)	1607
pound (ed/ing)	158
assault(ed/ing)	291
rape(ed/ing)	227
torture(d)	57
(ethnic) cleanse(ed/ing)	577
raid(ed)	219
genocide(al)	103
Onslaught	43
massacre(d)	119

By selecting a few terms for visual search, the researchers pointed out the strong regularity of the descriptions – the Serbian side is, almost exclusively, the initiator of war activities (even the most serious one).



It should be noted that when it comes to the term of *genocide*, it was used in almost all cases as a condemnation of the Serbian people. Only four times the term has been mentioned in the context of the Serbian diplomats' appeals to the international community to help prevent genocide against Serbs.

The use of the term genocide began in 1991 when Serbian officials accused Croats: "At Friday's rally, the women echoed allegations and demands made by Mr. Milošević, who has charged that Croatia's government is riddled with neo-fascists who are plotting genocide against Serbs in the republic" (Sudetic, 1991). On the other hand, articles directly related to the war in BiH mention the term genocide for the first time in reports on the suffering caused by Serbs during the siege of Sarajevo:

> A resident with one of the few telephones still functioning in the central district dialed the home of an American diplomat in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, at 5:30 a.m., demanding help.
>
> "This is a citizen of Sarajevo," he said. "Do you know what is happening in Sarajevo? This is genocide, this is holocaust. What will you do? Please will you do something?" His voice breaking, the man was drowned out several times as shells slammed into a neighboring building, throwing clouds of masonry dust into the air. He went on: "Two months we spend in the basement! This night is fire night! Every building is hit with hard artillery. Please, Mister, it is early, my kids and wife, we want to sleep". (Burns, 1992d)

Finally, an additional argument for characterizing the reporting on the war in BiH as the representation of antagonistic parties is the frequency of negative descriptions of each ethnic group.

Table 3: Portrayal of ethnic groups in a negative context

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
nationalist/nationalism	764	22	70
hardline(r)	54	20	2
war criminal/s	74	1	2
militant/s	8	1	2

3.2.2.4. The General Image of the Serbs Prior to and During the War in BiH

The Guardian

As for the dimension *attacker-attacked*, the data confirm *The New York Times* analysis. The Serbs were presented as *attackers*. For the other two (especially for the Muslims/Bosniaks), the opposite regularity stands. They were presented as *attacked*.

Table 4: Characterization of different ethnic groups' roles in the conflict

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
The ethnic group as the attacker			
force(s)	571	305	152
militia(men)	90	27	33
irregular(s)	74	4	1
Army	140	339	90
military	145	31	33
gunmen/gunner(s)	50	7	3
fighter(s)	55	35	13
Total	**1125**	**748**	**325**
The ethnic group as the victim/attacked			
defender(s)	2	23	3
civilian(s)	29	69	10
family(ies) (includes the terms such as women and children)	34	73	5
refugees	45	110	14
Total	**110**	**275**	**32**

On the other hand, keywords that relate to conflicts have shown a strong presence of "general" terms, but have also shown the presence of descriptions of specifics that relate to the war in the BiH.

Table 5: Description of war activities in BiH

Terms	
wound(ed/ing)	500
kill(ed/ing/s)	1175
attack(ed/ing)	1305
(be)siege(d)	873
shell(ed/ing)	1003
pound (ed/ing)	104
assault(ed/ing)	177
rape(ed/ing)	197
Torture	80
(ethnic) cleanse(ed/ing)	570
Raid	204
genocide(al)	134
Onslaught	93
massacre(d)	167

By visual search of certain terms, the researchers confirmed the above-mentioned regularity – the Serbian side is, almost exclusively, the initiator of war actions.



It should be noted that when it comes to the term genocide, its usage begins in 1991, as a characterization of Croats by the Serbian media (it is a matter of mutual accusation): "The controlled media in both republics produces a diet of blood-cur-

dling rhetoric. The Croats are described in Belgrade as 'genocidal', and in turn, they appear unable to mention the elective Serbian without adding terrorist or criminal" (Traynor, 1991). On the other hand, articles directly related to the war in BiH (the beginning of reporting on clashes after the referendum on independence) contain this term for the first time in the context of reporting on the difficulties of the Serbian side to justify secessionist aspirations:

> Whereas Serbian moves in Bosnia – boycotts of parliament and referendums, declarations of secession and calling forth of an "autonomous republic", arming of militias – are identical to the pre-war actions of the Serbian minority in Croatia, Bosnian Serbs lack the justification invoked in Croatia, that a "fascist" government was bent on "genocide". (Traynor, 1992a)

In general, the use of the term *genocide* is different here compared to *The New York Times*. Most often, it is a question of the very general use of the term (it is not possible to directly conclude who is the perpetrator and who is the victim) and (equally general) creating a parallel with World War II. Also, the term was used as many as six times by Russian leaders as a characterization of the NATO attack on Serb positions in 1995 and twice as an accusation by Serbian leaders against a foreign media campaign and sanctions against Serbia.

In other words, in over 60% of cases when the term *genocide* was used it was not possible to determine which ethnic group was committing this crime and against whom during the war in BiH. However, the most valuable information concerns the *source* that spoke of genocide. Any allegations regarding the genocidal actions of the Muslim/Bosniak and Croat sides originated exclusively from the statements of Serb leaders. On the other hand, allegations that Serbs committed genocide came from both the Muslim/Bosniak side and *The Guardian* readers and correspondents, as well as Western and international leaders.

Finally, the finding that the Serbian side was portrayed negatively, in different ways, was reaffirmed:

Table 6: Portrayal of ethnic groups in a negative context

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
nationalist/nationalism	87	13	19
hardline(r)	35	3	3
war criminal/s	64	2	0
militant/s	81	7	2

3.2.2.5. The General Image of the Serbs Prior to and During the War in BiH

Conclusion

Although not exhaustive, a quantitative analysis of the general image of the Serbs lead to the formation of several extremely robust conclusions:

- *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* presented a high level of mutual similarities;
- The Serbian side was the one that was consistently presented as the attacker;
- Other ethnic groups, especially Muslims/Bosniaks, were presented as the victims, that is, the attacked side;
- Descriptions of war activities were detailed and possessed a strong presence of different expressions, from the typical one for every modern conflict to specific ones related to the war in the BiH;
- The Serbian side was the exclusive initiator of war activities and perpetrator of the most serious crimes;
- The Serbian side was consistently described in a negative context.

Also, a very important fact refers to the discrepancy in the term *army*. Namely, Muslim forces were consistently characterized in this way, and far more often than Serbian forces were. Researchers believe that the reason lies in the fact that the Bosniak side, with its political and military institutions, was defined as the only legitimate one (hence the frequent use of the term *legitimate* or *government* as the epithet by which they are described). In contrast, the Serbian side was not defined as legitimate – its political institutions were usually *self-styled* and/or written in quotation marks (e.g., *Nikola Koljević, deputy of Bosnian Serbs' "parliament"*, etc.), and military institutions were defined using general terms.

The described conclusions can be summarized in a clear and simple message. Reporting on the war in BiH painted a picture in which the conflicting parties were distinguished. On the one hand, there was the Serbian side, as the "bad" attacker. In contrast, Bosnian Croats living on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially the Bosniaks, were portrayed as a party against whom various acts of war were being committed. Thus, these two ethnic groups became the *de facto* "good" side, bearing in mind the consistently negative characterization of Serbs.

This undoubtedly simplified picture was reaffirmed and repeated through practically every newspaper article. Given that *The Guardian* alone dedicated almost 2,000 headlines to the war in BiH (the actual number is higher, but, given the poor resolution of some scanned articles they did not become part of the database), it becomes clear to the reader how strong this simplified interpretation is, incessant, and long-lasting.

3.2.2.6. Quantitative analysis of the general database of articles related to Sarajevo

When forming this database, the researchers focused, as already mentioned, only on the articles that mention *Sarajevo* or the *capital/capital of BiH* in their title. A large number of articles were intentionally left out, in which the siege of Sarajevo is also mentioned, but they also deal with many other themes in their content, so that their analysis would obscure the real picture. Articles related to the siege of Sarajevo for the period between April 1, 1992, and December 31, 1995, were analyzed in a manner identical to the analysis of the general image of Serbs prior to and during the war in BiH. Therefore, it is possible to immediately focus on the results. *The Guardian* database of articles with the term of *Sarajevo* in the title consists of 147 articles, while *The New York Times* database of articles consists of 235 articles.

Considering the *attacker-attacked* dimension, the researchers reaffirmed the assumption that the Serbian side was the one that was predominantly portrayed using military terms, that is, as an attacker, while the Bosniak/Muslim side was portrayed as the victim. However, the difference in the frequency of certain terms was not as expressed as in the case of the general image of Serbs and was more present within the database, which consists of all the articles of *The New York Times*. At the same time, it turns out that certain expressions that proved to be effective characterizations of the role of the victim/attacked are simply not sufficiently represented. Therefore, researchers will pay more attention to this problem at the end of the quantitative analysis.

Table 7: Characterization of different ethnic groups' roles in the conflict in "The New York Times"

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
<u>The ethnic group as the attacker</u>			
force(s)	344	98	37

militia(men)	25	1	30
irregular(s)	7	0	0
Army	13	198	4
military	36	8	1
gunmen/gunner(s)	38	1	0
fighter(s)	18	6	5
Total	**488**	**312**	**77**
The ethnic group as the victim/attacked			
defender(s)	0	21	8
civilian(s)	3	12	0
family(ies) (includes the terms such as women and children)	18	120	4
refugees	3	13	0
Total	**24**	**166**	**12**

"The Guardian"

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
The ethnic group as the attacker			
force(s)	78	32	11
militia(men)	8	2	2
irregular(s)	9	0	0
Army	4	31	5
military	5	3	2
gunmen/gunner(s)	11	0	0
fighter(s)	6	4	1
Total	121	72	21
The ethnic group as the victim/attacked			
defender(s)	0	6	0
civilian(s)	1	3	0
family(ies) (includes the terms such are women and children)	3	3	0
refugees	0	7	1
Total	4	21	1

On the other hand, keywords related to the descriptions of the conflict retained their diversity. Also, the newly formed dominance of certain terms characterizing the Sarajevo scene (the terms *siege* and *shell* in their lexical forms) was noticeable:

Table 5: Description of war activities in BiH in "The New York Times"

Terms	
wound(ed/ing)	241
kill(ed/ing/s)	332
attack(ed/ing)	534
(be)siege(d)	429
shell(ed/ing)	594
pound (ed/ing)	36
assault(ed/ing)	37
rape(ed/ing)	12
torture	5
(ethnic) cleanse(ed/ing)	9
Raid	19
genocide(al)	13
onslaught	9
massacre(d)	11

"The Guardian"

Terms	
wound(ed/ing)	70
kill(ed/ing/s)	118
attack(ed/ing)	111
(be)siege(d)	145
shell(ed/ing)	152
pound (ed/ing)	17
assault(ed/ing)	12
rape(ed/ing)	7
torture	3
(ethnic) cleanse(ed/ing)	19
Raid	7
genocide(ial)	4
onslaught	9
massacre(d)	14

The change in the frequency of use of certain expressions has enabled the researchers to conduct a visual search on other terms. It turns out that in this case, too, the Serbian side was described as the main perpetrator of war actions and the perpetrator of crimes

The New York Times



The Guardian



At this point, it is necessary to further clarify the use of the term *massacre* in the base consisting of the articles from the *The Guardian*. Namely, the only time it described the action of the Croatian forces, and referred to it as a massacre, was the massacre of the Muslims/Bosniaks in the village of Stupni Do. On the other hand,

the massacre of Serbs by Muslim/Bosniak forces was mentioned in only one text (the term was also in the title of the article). In contrast, the allegations of massacres committed by Serb forces were not concentrated in one or two articles. Finally, the term massacre was used five times together with toponyms such as the shop/market, Dobrinja, Tuzla, and the like. In the qualitative analysis, it turns out that Sarajevo's toponyms were used as synonyms for crimes committed by Serbian forces.

Finally, although epithets of interest are rarely mentioned, the finding that the Serbian side was portrayed negatively, in different ways, was reaffirmed:

Table 6: Portrayal of ethnic groups in a negative context in The New York Times

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
nationalist/nationalism	174	6	12
hardline(r)	0	1	1
war criminal/s	5	0	0
militant/s	0	2	0

The Guardian

	Serbs	**Muslims/Bosniaks**	**Croats**
nationalist/nationalism	11	2	2
hard-line(r)	3	1	2
war criminal/s	3	0	0
militant/s	7	0	0

At this point, it is necessary to clarify in more detail why the frequencies related to the *attacker-attacked* dimension are relatively low. In the case of the Guardian, it arises that the way of reporting on the siege of Sarajevo had a subtle regularity. The war was not presented as an interethnic conflict but was dominated by the image of the struggle between the city and its invaders. This is supported by the clear grouping of 147 headlines into three general wholes (only 14 headlines referred to extremely specific themes):

- Siege of Sarajevo by Serb forces: 40 titles (about 27%)
- The suffering of the Sarajevo residents and the humanitarian catastrophe in the capital of BiH: 51 headlines (about 35%)
- Negotiations, humanitarian actions, and concrete attempts by foreign actors to end the siege: 42 headlines (about 29%)

Of the 147 headlines, only two mention the suffering of the Serbs, with one headline referring to the suffering that happened not far from Sarajevo.

When it comes to The New York Times, it is possible to notice similar regularities. From 235 headlines, the following themes can be singled out:

- Siege of Sarajevo by Serb forces: 52 (22%),
- The suffering of Sarajevo residents and humanitarian catastrophe in the capital of BiH: 137 (58%) - two of them are about Serbs as victims during the siege of Sarajevo,
- Negotiations, humanitarian actions, and concrete attempts by foreign actors to end the siege: 46 (20%).

In general, it turns out that, while the Serbian side was clearly and consistently characterized as an attacker, the reports about the city being defended were based on the testimonies of its residents. In most cases, the residents interviewed were Muslims/Bosniaks. Thus, the researchers assumed that Muslim/Bosniak (and to a lesser extent, Croat) victims were portrayed indirectly, through testimonies. The relationship between the attacker and the victim was, therefore, as strongly demarcated as in the case of a quantitative analysis of the general image of the Serbs prior to and during the war in BiH.

3.2.2.7. The Siege of Sarajevo

Conclusion

As in the case of a comprehensive quantitative analysis, reporting on the siege of Sarajevo allowed for several clear conclusions to be drawn:

- The Serbian side is the one that was dominantly described as the attacker,
- Other ethnic groups, especially Muslims/Bosniaks, were portrayed as the victims, or the side that was attacked, through the reporting on the suffering during the war in the BiH capital,
- Again, the Serbian side was practically portrayed as the only initiator of war activities and perpetrator of severe crimes.

Of course, it should be borne in mind that these conclusions do not carry the same "weight" as in the case of the analysis of the general image of the Serbs in the war in BiH. However, the main reason for this is the smaller number of articles in the Sarajevo database, due to which certain keywords did not have sufficient discrimination. However, the mentioned deficiency is adequately compensated through three qualitative analyses, which will now be discussed in more detail.

3.2.3. The Attack on the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Column (The Case of the Dobrovoljačka Street Massacre)

The New York Times

As previously mentioned, qualitative media content analysis was performed in situations when the extensive volume of materials allowed it and when it was recommended for the sake of more detailed insights. Selected events from the Siege of Sarajevo event fulfill both criteria.

The attack on the JNA column in Sarajevo, otherwise known as the "Dobrovoljačka Street Massacre" in 1992, happened on May 3rd when BiH military forces attacked the JNA column in retreat. According to the reports of Republika Srpska's Ministry of the Interior (MUP RS) and the Republika Srpska Centre for the Research of War Crimes, this event was named the Dobrovoljačka Street Case. This case file includes not only the attack but also the events from the May 2nd. With this in mind, a database was formed that includes articles reporting on events related to both dates.

Within the whole database, there are only three articles that mention historical events, but with a variety of other themes. Some of them are:

- War field description:

A pall of smoke from burning automobiles, tram cars, and buildings hung over the city this evening as artillery shells, and heavy machine-gun fire continued to rain into apartment blocks, the republic's presidency and parliament buildings and downtown streets, witnesses said.

Bodies lay on sidewalks and in doorways after Serb-led Yugoslav Army forces and Serbian irregulars, claiming that they were provoked, fought street battles for hours in the center of Sarajevo against forces loyal to the new Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the casualty toll was undoubtedly considerable, no comprehensive figures were available because heavy gunfire prevented ambulances from bringing out the wounded and dead. (Sudetic, 1992a)

- Statements of foreign officials and/or international organizations:

The chief negotiator, Jose Cutileiro of Portugal, blamed the collapse on the Serbian leaders' failure to honor important commitments that they gave under a cease-fire agreement reached in Sarajevo on April 23, including pledges to dismantle barricades around Sarajevo and to withdraw artillery trained on the city. Sarajevo's Worst Nightmare. (Burns, 1992b)

- Croatian and Muslim civilian casualties and the catastrophic living conditions they were

in (without mentioning the Serbs):

Hundreds of people strolling the downtown area were caught in the sun-drenched streets when the attack began. They ran for shelter in barns, basements, and entrance halls. . . . "It is terrible," said a Croat woman cowering in an apartment hallway tonight with her neighbors. "I put my children into the basement with some food. I'm afraid this won't end for a long, long time". (Sudetic, 1992a)

- Muslim/Bosniak appeals for foreign help:

'We need help, military help,'" said a young Muslim-Slav man. 'We don't need blankets and food. Send in the Sixth Fleet and some guns, and we'll take care of this together'. (Sudetic, 1992a)

The only text that explicitly mentions the attack on the JNA column was published on

May 5th, and only one paragraph was dedicated to this event:

This afternoon, President Izetbegović said he had agreed to the release of about 180 Yugoslav Army soldiers taken prisoner by Government militiamen as the soldiers were trying to evacuate the army's regional headquarters on Sunday night.

Several soldiers were killed in the attack, which came despite guarantees for the soldiers' safety by Mr. Izetbegović and an escort by personnel attached to the United Nations peacekeeping headquarters in Sarajevo.

"Chances for negotiations for achieving an orderly movement of the Yugoslav Army out of Sarajevo were severely affected by the unjustifiable attack on the retreating army column on Sunday," the diplomat said.

The Yugoslav Army condemned the attack and blamed Mr. Izetbegović. Government officials in Sarajevo, however, said the attack happened because local commanders did not know about the guarantee of safe passage. (Sudetic, 1992b)

Once again, this paragraph was but a small story in an article that dealt with many events, like offensives of the "Serbian guerillas" with JNA's support, the total number of victims and displaced person, and similar matters:

> Heavy Serbian attacks throughout Bosnia signaled a stepped-up effort to overrun Muslim-Slav towns inside corridors linking up Muslim-dominated regions.
>
> Early this morning, Serbian guerrillas fired mortar shells on the Muslim-Slav town of Goražde, Sarajevo radio reported. The last major Government-controlled town on the Drina River, Goražde has been swollen with about 20,000 refugees. Yugoslav Army units have surrounded the town for weeks and have pledged to protect it from local Serbian militias as well as from guerrilla groups from Serbia itself.
>
> Serbian guerrillas backed by Yugoslav Army units also attacked the towns of Doboj and Modriča, creating new waves of refugees, local news reports said. Fighting was also reported in Bosanska Krupa, which controls access to an almost entirely Muslim-Slav populated county where the Yugoslav Army has a major airbase. Truce Efforts Are Set Back. The sharp increase in fighting has also short-circuited all European Community efforts to halt the violence, which has killed hundreds of people, wounded thousands, and forced about 500,000 from their homes. (Sudetic, 1992b)

The photo published in that same article highlights the Serb protests against the war and the withdrawal of the army from BiH. In other words, there is no visual attachment to the text – no photographs or other visual illustrations.

Associated Press

In Belgrade, Yugoslavia, about 200 Serb parents protested at the Federal Defense Ministry building and about 30 of them shoved their way inside, demanding that their children in the military be pulled out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One mother told an officer she had three sons in the army.

Above is a photograph from a *New York Times* article (Sudetic, 1992b).

3.2.4. The Attack on the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Column (the Case of Dobrovoljačka Street Massacre)

The Guardian

In *The Guardian* database, there are five articles in total that mentioned the case of the Dobrovoljačka Street. However, only one article explicitly dealt with the theme. The article was published a day after the event, and was published on the cover of the daily (O'Kane, Traynor & Palmer, 1992).

The first part of the article offers a detailed description and the background of the event. The foreign leaders' tone of condemnation of Muslim/Bosniak acts is evident:

> Bosnian militiamen last night ambushed and killed federal Yugoslav troops who had been offered safe conduct out of their beleaguered barracks in Sarajevo, raising the prospect of a fierce escalation of the last few days' fighting. President Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia-Herzegovina had just been freed by the Yugoslav army after being held hostage for 24 hours, in a deal under which up to 500 Yugoslav army troops, trapped in barracks here with their commander, General Milutin Kukanjac, would be allowed out of the Bosnian capital in return. The deal had been arranged by Lord Carrington's special representative, Colm Doyle. The president, who had been held by the army since arriving back in Sarajevo from peace talks in Lisbon on Saturday, was allowed to return to government headquarters. Appearing on Bosnian television late last night, Gen Kukanjac demanded the return of his men – "the dead, the wounded and the living." It appears the tall end of the convoy was hit by Bosnian territorial soldiers. The column had been escorted by UN armored personnel carriers painted white. Sporadic shooting was heard after the attack, apparently in retaliation. Mr. Doyle spoke at an army barracks alongside Gen Kukanjac, who shook with emotion as he recounted that nine trucks in the convoy were seized. "More than half the vehicles were cut off, surrounded," Gen Kukanjac said. "People were killed, stripped naked, it was horrible." An army statement released early this morning in Belgrade said two army colonels were among those killed. It said there were "several" killed and wounded, but did not give a total figure. Mr. Doyle declared himself "very annoyed" at the attack, which he said was a breach of the understandings reached. (O'Kane, Traynor & Palmer, 1992)

However, the rest of the article was dedicated to other themes:

- Intensifying clashes in Sarajevo:

The seizure of Mr. Izetbegović, a Muslim, and the battles that raged on Saturday marked a serious worsening of the conflict in Bosnia, which pits Serbs and the army against Slav Muslims and Croats. For the first time in several weeks of clashes in the city, the army used tanks, mortars, and heavy artillery against Muslim militiamen fighting with rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns. Government buildings were set on fire, and corpses were left lying on the streets of the city of more than 500.000. The death toll last night was 20 and expected to rise. (O'Kane, Traynor & Palmer, 1992)

- Condemnation of the JNA for the death of the EC observer, failure of negotiations, as well as for the BiH President Alija Izetbegović's detention after his return from Lisbon:

The EC suffered its first casualty of the Bosnian conflict when a Belgian monitor was killed near the south-western town of Mostar on Saturday. EC officials yesterday blamed the federal army for the death of the monitor and suspended monitoring operations in Bosnia. EC officials in Portugal also singled out the Serbian side for causing the breakdown of the Lisbon negotiations by failing to honor pledges it made at the negotiating session. The temporary kidnapping of Mr. Izetbegović attracted howls of outrage inside Bosnia and round condemnation abroad. (O'Kane, Traynor & Palmer, 1992)

- Description of Serbian and JNA troops' actions, as well as their reaction to condemnation:

Serbs and army leaders were unapologetic at their detention of Mr. Izetbegović. After a month in which the Serbs and the army have taken military control of at least half the republic, driven hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, effectively partitioned Sarajevo and hijacked international relief lorries at gunpoint, they yesterday blamed Mr. Izetbegović for Saturday's battles. The Yugoslav defense ministry in Belgrade said Mr. Izetbegović was to blame for a Muslim militia assault on army facilities in Sarajevo on Saturday, which the military alleged triggered for day's battle. (O'Kane, Traynor & Palmer, 1992)

On the other hand, the rest of the articles only mentioned that the event had occurred, sometimes in just one sentence:

- The fighting followed the ambush by Muslim gunmen of a Yugoslav army convoy late on Sunday, in which four federal soldiers died, including two colonels. Two of the dead were shot in the back, said the Yugoslav army commander in Bosnia, General Milutin Kukanjac. . . . Yesterday, United Nations

officials in Sarajevo secured the release of 156 Yugoslav soldiers captured by Bosnian defense forces, including 90 federal soldiers captured in Sunday night's ambush. (O'Kane & Traynor, 1992)

- "But the assault of Moslem guards upon the army after an agreement had been reached was reckless and inflammatory" (Berets for Bosnia, 1992).

They included two Yugoslav army colonels shot by Muslim gunmen in the ambush of a military convoy on Sunday evening. The charred remains of another nine federal soldiers killed in the ambush filled orange plastic sacks. "The soldiers burned to death in the trucks," said Dr. Faris Gavrankapetanović, a surgeon at the hospital. (Traynor, 1992b)

"Dragan Kovačević, a handsome conscript in the Yugoslav army, was on his last day of one year of military service when he was shot after the Bosnian territorials attacked his convoy". (O'Kane, 1992)

At the same time, articles already mentioned paid much more attention to other content. Some of the more common themes were:

- Foreign military intervention appeals:

As the confrontation between Bosnia's Muslim leadership and the Yugoslav army deepened, Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegović, appealed for foreign military aid to halt the aggression. "We need military help," Mr. Izetbegović told reporters in Sarajevo. Bosnia's presidency said it would ask the 52 nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to intervene militarily. (O'Kane & Traynor, 1992)

- The worsening situation in Sarajevo and BiH:

As Mr. Izetbegović spoke, Yugoslav jets, some dropping flares to divert heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles, flew intimidatingly over the city. Bosnian officials claimed federal jets attacked the city outskirts. Sarajevo radio said planes attacked a relay station and that two local television stations went off the air. Federal troops also moved to attack other towns and villages in the newly independent republic. In the Muslim village of Hranča, just inside the Bosnian border from Serbia, 40 houses were burned to the ground, and witnesses saw four corpses on the street, including that of a girl aged seven. Muslim villagers said the village had been burned down by Serbian irregulars on Sunday. Army troops were reported to have fought battles in Brcko, in north-east Bosnia, and to have ringed the northern town of Doboj with tanks. A few miles north of Sarajevo, mountain cottages were razed as Serb and Muslim gunmen engaged in a worsening village war, causing hundreds of Muslims to flee. . .

- Foreign and international organization leaders' difficulties in achieving a ceasefire:

However, the UN and the European Community's chief official in Sarajevo failed to bring the two sides together for ceasefire talks. According to the chief EC official in Sarajevo, Colm Doyle, no further talks have been arranged between the army and Mr. Izetbegović. As an indication of the growing chaos in the city, nine dead bodies of federal soldiers have been lying in the street for three days beside a burned-out tram. The blackened bodies – one without legs – cannot be retrieved by the army, and the last semblance of order in the city is decomposing with them. (O'Kane & Traynor, 1992)

Yesterday afternoon even the patient voice of Colm Doyle, the determined head of the EC monitoring mission in Sarajevo, sounded despairing. The spiral of violence has already led to the suspension of EC monitoring, and the next ceasefire seems more likely to arise out of exhaustion than negotiation. (Berets for Bosnia, 1992)

- Funerals:

The coffins are of simple unpolished wood, draped in a white sheet. The graves are still being dug by teams of young Muslims with handkerchiefs tied around their brow to mop up the sweat. The mounds of ochre-colored earth are marked by piles of lilac and simple wooden stakes engraved with the Muslim crescent and star. There are 55 fresh graves excavated in a little patch of the park opposite the Kovaci cemetery across the road from the mosque in the Muslim heart of old Sarajevo, the target of attacks by Serbian forces for the past month. Another seven coffins queued for a resting place yesterday as the old quarter received a fresh pounding from Serbian irregulars in the surrounding hills. "These three days have been the worst in Sarajevo's History," said Eco Ramez, aged 32, burying his brother, Nuro, a 36-year-old Muslim fighter, killed in the battles that raged on Sunday. "The worst thing is that they won't even stop shooting to let us bury the dead." Another sniper's bullet ricocheted down the road. A mortar thudded. Oblivious to her surroundings, a middle-aged Muslim woman lay down on the grass alongside the coffin bearing the remains of her son. She stroked the wood and sobbed quietly. Old men in black berets looked on from the shade of the trees lining the impromptu burial ground. The graves are reserved for Muslim fighters, explained Mr. Ramez. "Those who have fallen in the defense of Sarajevo." The white, pillared headstones in the cemetery across the road mark the graves of an earlier generation of Muslim fighters who died during the last war. (Traynor, 1992b).

- Morgues:

As the Muslims of old Sarajevo buried their dead yesterday, more than 80 putrefying corpses lay in the morgue at the Koševo hospital, filthy, stinking and seemingly abandoned. They included two Yugoslav army colonels shot by Muslim gunmen in the ambush of a military convoy on Sunday evening. The charred remains of another nine federal soldiers killed in the ambush filled orange plastic sacks. "The soldiers burned to death in the trucks," said Dr. Faris Gavrankapetanović, a surgeon at the hospital. The rest were civilians or Bosnian fighters, many of them with bullet wounds to the head, the corpses grimy, blood-stained and twisted. Dr. Gavrankapetanović said there were another 45 corpses at another Muslim morgue in the city. In addition, of the 309 wounded admitted to the hospital in the past three days, 17 were dead on arrival, and seven people died in the hospital. (Traynor, 1992b)

- Abuse of prisoners:

Amid such suffering and bitterness, the cruel and the brutal are becoming routine, the seizure of hostages and the beating of prisoners appears to be increasing. The Serbian and Muslim militias yesterday successfully swapped busloads of prisoners, all of them male, many of them elderly. The 18 Serbs, seized on Tuesday when Muslim gunmen entered their homes and dragged them away, bore the evidence of the sound beatings they had received overnight in a Muslim police station – swollen faces, broken noses, black eyes, cut throats, and backs and abdomens bruised and bloody. Mile, a 50-year-old Serbian factory worker, said he was seized on Tuesday afternoon when three Muslim militiamen entered his flat. "Eighteen of us were taken to the police station and kept there overnight. They took us in groups of two and three, and beat us, kicked us, hit us with batons. I was sat down and kicked in the face." Another Serb, his face swollen and cut, swore that never again would he be able to live with the Muslims (Traynor, 1992b).

- Ethnic differences vanishing in hospitals:

They lie side by side now, all in the same uniforms, beige hospital pyjamas. Men wounded trying to kill each other a few days ago now pass each other cigarettes. . . . Dragan Kovačević, a handsome conscript in the Yugoslav army, was on his last day of one year of military service when he was shot after the Bosnian territorials attacked his convoy. Sitting in a wheelchair at one end of the same ward is Karudin Vrazalica, aged 43, a fighter with those mainly Muslim Bosnian forces. Across the barricades, they are killing each other. "Here," says Karudin, "nobody is an enemy" (O'Kane, 1992).

- "Blaze" of humanity:

Not far away, in the civilian hospital, 18-year-old Pejić, another army conscript, is recovering from a grenade attack. Badly wounded in last Saturday's battle in Sarajevo, he was pulled off the street by the 34-year-old barman who threw the grenade. Under fire, the barman dashed out from the territorial lines, dragged the young soldier away, and drove him to the hospital. It turned out the wounded conscript had one of the less common blood groups. The barman had the same. He gave blood to the man he had been trying to kill. (O'Kane, 1992)

Also, the only visual content that illustrated the articles (the case of the Dobrovoljačka Street) did not relate directly to the event, but instead it illustrated Sarajevo as a scene.

Running for cover . . . A civilian flees past burnt out vehicles in the centre of Sarajevo yesterday as the Yugoslavian army continued to pound Bosnia's capital PHOTOGRAPH: DANILO KRSTANOVIC

Above is a photograph from an article in *The Guardian* (O'Kane & Traynor, 1992).

3.2.5. The Attack on the JNA Column in Sarajevo (the Case Of Dobrovoljačka Street Massacre)

Conclusion

Generally speaking, the content analysis of the event known as the Case of Dobrovoljačka Street in *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* indicated several regularities.

First, the description of the event itself is clear and homogeneous – both news companies report that the JNA members have been attacked, and there is a condemnatory tone towards the attackers.

Second, the event was not of special interest. In total, *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* have eight articles that cover this event. However, only two articles (one for each newspaper) pay more attention to it.

Third, not a single newspaper article dealt exclusively with this theme – all of the articles contained themes not related to the attacks on the JNA members. Moreover, a greater representation of themes that have nothing to do with the case of Dobrovoljačka Street is regularity.

Fourth, The New York Times and The Guardian are similar in emphasizing unrelated themes. Namely, by far, the largest proportion of the content of the articles relates to the deterioration of the situation in BiH. It is dominated by themes such as the JNA and Serb forces' offensive, descriptions of the scene, and the most recent scenes of violence, as well as the difficulties faced by civilians. The second thematic unit predominantly covers the foreign and international officials' concern and their often condemnatory tone towards the Serb side, with appeals from Muslims, that is, Bosniak officials for foreign intervention against the Serbs and the JNA. The rest of the articles consist of themes that are poorly represented and not related to each other or to the two thematic clusters already mentioned.

Fifth, except for the concise descriptions of the case of Dobrovoljačka Street, rare episodes of humanity and hospital descriptions, practically the entire rest of the articles, describe Serbs in a negative context and as attackers, while the Muslim/Bosniak and Croat sides are almost exclusively portrayed as victims or as being forced to defend themselves. Only one text explicitly lists Serb civilians as victims, that is, as abused by Muslim/Bosniak forces.

3.2.6. The Vase Miskina Street Massacre

The New York Times

The event that took place in Sarajevo on May 27th, 1992, known as Vase Miskina Street Massacre, or Sarajevo Bread Line Massacre, is characterized as one of the most horrifying events during the Siege of Sarajevo. The New York Times has published four articles in total that relate to the event. Three of them are on the cover of the daily. It should be emphasized that the major article that described the event was published the day after the event, unlike the other two articles that were published during June. Other articles that deal with the event dealt with other actual events in the form of May 27th as a reminder that destroyed all hopes for peace and normal life in Sarajevo. Qualitative content analysis abstracts several themes that dominate:

- The number of injured and killed:

Mortar Attack on Civilians Leaves 16 Dead in Bosnia [this is the article headline; the article was on *The New York Times* cover, published a day after the event]. Col. Jovan Divjak, the Serbian officer who is deputy commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina's defense force, said that 16 people were killed and 70 wounded. Sarajevo Radio said local hospitals put the number of wounded at 160 (Burns, 1992a).

The tour of the city took Mr. Mitterrand to hospital wards filled with weeping civilian wounded, to the city center where artillery and rocket fire has devastated high-rise office buildings, to Parliament and the American cultural center, and to the Vase Miskina pedestrian mall, where 22 civilians waiting to buy bread were killed, and more than 100 were wounded by Serbian mortars on May 27. The French leader laid a red rose on a memorial there (Burns, 1992f).

- Serb forces as the main cause of suffering of all ethnic groups (even the Serbs themselves):

Although all sides in the Sarajevo fighting have attacked civilians, it appeared that today's incident, in which three mortar shells fell near a group of Serbs, Croats and Muslim Slavs waiting in line at a market to buy bread, was launched by Serbian units in hills south of Sarajevo. (Burns, 1992a)

Although ethnic armies of Serbs on one side and Muslim Slavs and Croats on the other are fighting the war for Sarajevo, and for wide areas of the newly in-

dependent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian guns on the hillsides have made victims of Serbs, Muslim Slavs, and Croats alike (Burns, 1992c).

- Description of the scene:

The television showed severely wounded people, some with severed limbs, waiting for assistance that was delayed when ambulance crews attempting to reach the scene came under sniper fire.

Within hours of today's mortar attack, officials of the Serbian Government, and of the rump Yugoslav Federal Government they dominate issued a spate of alarmed statements in Belgrade, suggesting that they saw the incident as removing the last chance for avoiding international sanctions (Burns, 1992a).

- Condemnation coming from the very Serbs who live in Sarajevo:

'Tell the world I'm ashamed, absolutely ashamed, of what the Serbs are doing,' a middle aged Serbian woman told a visitor to the three storage rooms at the rear of shopping arcade off Vase Miskina Street (Burns, 1992c).

- Insisting on defining this event as a massacre:

Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian President, issued no immediate comment, but other officials called the mortar attack a "massacre" and a "crime" and demanded that those responsible be prosecuted (Burns, 1992a).

- Bringing the event into the context of earlier events, emphasizing that Serbs were the ones blocking humanitarian aid deliveries and attacking hospitals:

About 12 hours before today's mortar attack, artillery shells, also apparently fired from the southern hills where Serbian gunners have set up batteries, hit the main maternity hospital near Sarajevo's center. The hospital was set ablaze, and 200 mothers, medical personnel, and infants were forced to take refuge in the hospital's basement.

Last week, Serbian gunners in the same hills, which were the site of the skiing and sledding events in the 1984 Winter Olympics, launched rockets at a convoy of vehicles belonging to the International Committee of the Red Cross. That attack killed the Swiss-based organization's chief representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a local Serb employee. Also last week, Serbian units hijacked 11 food trucks chartered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Subsequently, both the Red Cross and the United Nations relief agency announced that they were suspending operations in the republic. (Burns, 1992a)

Another commonly shared view is that the Serbs have no intention of allowing the Sarajevo airport, 4.5 miles from the city center, to be opened for relief

flights of food and medicine. Earlier this month, the United Nations Security Council settled on the opening of the airport and the establishment of "safe routes" into the city as the first steps toward what it hoped would be an end to the war. (Burns, 1992e)

- Bringing the event into the context of World War I and II:

Television pictures tonight showed bodies lying near the covered market on Vase Miskina Street, a block from the city's Catholic cathedral and a few blocks from the site where Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in 1914, setting off World War I. (Burns, 1992a)

For the handful of Western reporters who entered the heart of the city from the Serbian-held Western suburbs on Friday, the desperation of the people trapped by the siege, said by city officials to number as many as 300,000 to 400,000, appeared to exceed anything experienced in Europe since the devastation of World War II.

Almost every major building in the city has been severely damaged, some by more than 100 hits by high-explosive shells. . . . Along Marshal Tito Street in the Eternal Flame District of the city center, named for the flame lighted for the victims of the city's Nazi occupiers in World War II, neo-baroque buildings dating from the 40-year period of Austrian occupation before World War I are a gallery of shell holes. The upper floors are almost all private apartments, and few of those facing the hills have escaped without at least severe shrapnel blasts (Burns, 1992c).

- Emphasizing the need for US and international organizations to interfere militarily with developments in BiH:

Another view that was practically universal was that the outside world -- and in most conversations, that quickly turned out to mean the United States -- should intervene immediately with military power (Burns, 1992c).

"Tell Bush, come quickly!" said Džemila Merdan, a 72-year-old woman who spent the day sheltering from the mortars and artillery shells in a dank tunnel where Austrian forces used to store armaments in World War I. Wrapped in three blankets and a headscarf and wearing her grandson's high-top sneakers, she added: "Tell Bush I spend every day and every night here! Me, an old grandmother! Tell him to come and defend us, please!"

After the attacks today, the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegović, made a formal appeal to the United Nations Security Council to approve bombing attacks on the Serbian gun positions and on the airfields used by the jet fighter-bombers that support the Serbian gunners (Burns, 1992e).

- Characterization of General Ratko Mladić as a criminal and a murderer by leaders of international organizations:

Until now, one United Nations official said, the organization's statements have taken an even-handed tone to avoid alienating the Serbian leaders, including the military commander, Gen. Ratko Mladić. "They've wanted me to talk to Mladić, and how can I talk to Mladić if I call him a murderer?" one United Nations official said (Burns, 1992e).

Below are the images that were part of the article published on the cover of the daily the day after the event, with the intention of enhancing the visual experience of this event for readers worldwide

Mortar Attack Kills 16 in Bosnia

At least 16 people were killed and 100 wounded, including this man reaching out for help, in a mortar attack on a bread line in Sarajevo. Serb irregulars were blamed, and Muslim Slav forces sought revenge. Page A8.

Rescue workers attended a victim of yesterday's mortar attack in Sarajevo. Leaving basement shelters during an early morning cease-fire, Serbs, Croats and Muslim Slavs had lined up for bread when the attack came. Sniper fire at the scene delayed ambulances trying to reach the wounded.

Above are photographs from one *New York Times* article (Burns, 1992a).

3.2.7. The Vase Miskina Street Massacre

The Guardian

A total of nine articles was devoted to this theme by The Guardian. Of these, only one article that was published the day after the event detailed the crime (the article was on the cover). The remaining eight articles only briefly address this event. The most important themes related to Vase Miskina Street are:

- Description and condemnation of the event:

Scores of hungry people queuing for bread in Sarajevo were killed or wounded yesterday when mortars fired from Serb-held positions overlooking the city slammed into a crowded marketplace. Local media reports put the dead at 20 and the injured as high as 160, the vast majority of them civilians and many of them children or elderly people. The mortars exploded in Vase Miskina street, the main shopping thoroughfare in the Muslim-held center of the city, which has been blockaded by Serb forces for eight weeks. . . . It showed dozens of dismembered bodies, dead or wounded, lying in pools of blood on the street. The mortar attack came a day after Serb forces shelled a Sarajevo maternity clinic, setting ablaze the building housing 173 babies and 70 pregnant women (Chazan & Traynor, 1992).

"And then even the bread queue became a target for artillery attack – that has never happened in this part of the world. Not even during the second world war [sic]" (Pajić & Pick, 1992).

- The event as endangering of the peace negotiation:

Meanwhile, the International Committee of the Red Cross said yesterday it was suspending its operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina because conditions there were too dangerous for its staff to continue their work. The scenes of utter carnage in Sarajevo – which last night prompted Bosnian Muslims to walk out of the latest round of EC peace talks in Lisbon – were broadcast by local television. . . . The mortar attack shattered the relative calm of mid-morning and the latest Bosnian truce brokered by the Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, on a brief visit to Sarajevo on Tuesday night. The truce deadline passed four hours before the attack (Chazan & Traynor, 1992).

- Blaming the Serbs for civilian sufferings:

The deputy commander of the Bosnian territorial defense force, Colonel Jovan Divjak, said three mortar shells were fired from Serbian positions on nearby hills. He said the bread queue had been deliberately targeted (Chazan & Traynor, 1992).

There are plenty of other Belgrade- and locally-based freelance operators having the times of their lives in the mountains of Bosnia and no longer in any mood to return to the dull, pre-war stupefaction of factory jobs or unemployment. The nightmare now stalking Bosnia, graphically illustrated by the hellish scenes in the blood-spattered Sarajevo bread queue on Wednesday, is that these guerrilla outfits in alliance with demoralized, demobbed Yugoslav troops in the republic are being let loose of all political controls to plunder and pillage to their hearts' content. The bread queue massacre could not have come at a more uncomfortable time for Belgrade and bears all the hallmarks of a freelance operation (Traynor, 1992c).

The shelling of the bank queue and other targets in the city center came after hungry and desperate victims of the Serbian siege emerged from their bunkers into a relatively peaceful morning under bright sunshine to forage for food or simply to get a breath of fresh air. The shelling recalled a Serbian mortar attack on a bread queue in the city center last month in which 16 people were killed (Traynor, 1992d).

- Serbian military and political leaders' reactions:

A Serbian leader, Momčilo Krajišnik, said the incident was "an appalling crime" and denied that the Serbs were responsible. Milan Gvero, deputy commander of Serb troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said television pictures of yesterday's attack were "mere anti-Serbian propaganda." He said his soldiers were not responsible (Chazan & Traynor, 1992).

In the aftermath of the Sarajevo attack, Belgrade and the army high command promptly denounced the 'heinous crime,' demanding punishment for the guilty. . . . Gen Mladić failed to comment on Wednesday's atrocity, but his number two, another extremely hardline colonel, Milan Gvero, alleged the incident was a Muslim provocation (Traynor, 1992c).

- Foreign and international leaders' condemnation of the attack:

The United Nations Security Council, under immense US pressure, was poised to order comprehensive sanctions against Serbia last night as Serbian forces besieging Sarajevo launched what was described as one of their fiercest bombardments of the city in two months (Traynor & Pick, 1992).

- Condemnation of the attack, but also of the wider political scene by the Serbian institutions:

> The pressure on President Milošević, was compounded by a ringing denunciation of all his policies from the influential Serbian Orthodox Church which effectively called for his replacement by a new government of national unity. The unprecedented statement from the assembly of bishops accused Mr. Milošević of failing to look after the Serbs' vital interests, criticized the Serbian siege of Sarajevo, and condemned attacks in Bosnia on the International Red Cross and relief organizations. It challenged the legitimacy of the new rump Yugoslav state Mr. Milošević established last month, said it had no confidence in this Sunday's parliamentary elections, demanded a new government that would enjoy public trust, and urged that the international community, in penalizing Belgrade, should distinguish between the regime and the people (Traynor & Pick, 1992).

Some of the themes are not directly connected to the event, although they have an important role in these selected articles:

- Increase of sanctions imposed on Serbia:

> The attack came shortly before European Community ambassadors, meeting in Brussels, agreed on a package of wide-ranging trade sanctions against Serbia – though not an oil embargo. Oil would be included only if the United Nations imposed similar measures. Serbia's international isolation may be heightened further today when European and international football organizers meet to decide whether Belgrade should be expelled from next month's European Championship games in Sweden (Chazan & Traynor, 1992).

> In New York, the US made it clear that it was looking for a package of UN sanctions similar to that ordered against Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. The US-led diplomatic blitz is expected to produce the adoption of a mandatory sanctions resolution tomorrow, imposing an all-embracing trade and oil embargo and turning Serbia into an international pariah (Traynor & Pick, 1992).

- Description of the actions of Arkan and his "Tigers":

> Arkan is dead, the Bosnian police were eager to reveal a few days ago, breaking the news, not for the first time, that the Belgrade legend who divides his time between selling ice cream, watching football, and leading Serbian commando assaults had fallen on the Bosnian battlefield. The next night Belgrade television got a call from Arkan, who told viewers that reports of his death were distinctly premature. His self-styled "Tigers", the Serbian Volunteer Army, a bunch of black-balaclavaed commandoes carrying rocket-launching tubes

and AK-47s, are still in business, the stormtroopers of the Serbian campaigns in Croatia and Bosnia. Arkan's army is the most feared in what used to be Yugoslavia. The exploits of the leader, a renowned Belgrade underworld figure who runs cafes and restaurants and who is head of the Red Star football team supporters' club, are legendary. His men spearheaded the campaign to conquer tracts of eastern Croatia last year and were at the forefront of the early assaults in Bosnia in April. His team is the most prominent and formidable of the plethora of paramilitary units thrown up by the wars for the spoils of Yugoslavia (Traynor, 1992c).

- Morale and discipline among the JNA's remnants stationed in the deteriorating BiH:

Milošević has left the army behind in Bosnia. It is losing all discipline, the troops are just becoming dogs of war. There could be mass destruction, mass killings," says a Western diplomat. Faced with the huge domestic problem of the Yugoslav army, Mr. Milošević sacked 40 generals and admirals at the beginning of the month and disowned four-fifths of the army in Bosnia, concentrating on tightening control of the army in Serbia. The troops abandoned as a heavily-armed orphan in Bosnia, estimated to be 60,000-strong, were put under the control of a hardline Serbian general, Ratko Mladić, who is already coming under attack in Belgrade. "Everything depends on whether Mladić can get control of his troops. At the moment, it does not look very promising," says Miloš Vasić, a Belgrade military analyst (Traynor, 1992c).

- Solidarity among all people of different ethnicities in Sarajevo:

People of different ethnic backgrounds sense a common danger and help each other. Last night when we were sitting in our basement, there were people of all nations sitting there trembling, frightened, some of them crying, trying to protect the children. There were Serbs – and I stress that – and Croats, Muslims, Jews and a Gypsy. So my apartment house, eight floors high with about 35 flats, was a microcosm of Sarajevo: a place where people have lived together comfortably for centuries, centuries without conflict. Even now, the services in the city – ambulance, fire, doctors, and such like – are run by the different nationalities all mixed up (Pajić & Pick, 1992).

- Condemnation of the Serbs for the deterioration of the situation in Sarajevo and BiH:

Under the deal negotiated by Mr. Kozyrev, the airport, held by the Serbs in an area of bitter fighting over the past few weeks, was to have been reopened to allow international charities to fly in relief foods and medicines.

There was no sign yesterday that the airport had been reopened despite pledges from Belgrade and the Serb leader in Bosnia, Radovan Karadžić. Repeated attempts to supply Sarajevo by road have been frustrated by Serbian paramilitaries who control checkpoints on the outskirts of the city and who have several times hijacked the relief vehicles (Chazan & Traynor, 1992).

Sarajevo radio, quoting a Serb officer formerly with the Yugoslav federal army, said surface-to-surface missiles, artillery shells and rockets were showered on the center of the city from Serbian positions in the surrounding hills. Witnesses in the city said Serbian missiles hit the presidential palace in the center of the city, injuring three people inside. Fires were said to be raging across the city amid street-to-street fighting (Traynor & Pick, 1992).

At the weekend, the general, apparently against Belgrade's wishes, opposed the deal negotiated with the Muslims to hand over some of the army's hardware in return for being allowed to evacuate troops from surrounded barracks in Sarajevo. The result yesterday was further violence as Muslim forces attacked army convoys coming out of the barracks (Traynor, 1992c).

It started immediately after 10 o'clock at night and did not stop until 2.30 in the morning. They rained Katyusha rockets down on us. It was the first time they had used them. After eight weeks of siege, of heavy mortar and artillery attacks, after the bombing of the maternity hospital and the massacre of the bread queue, we imagined things could not get any worse. But this was worse. The city was shelled and systematically destroyed. They targeted the center in particular. You can't really believe you can have such systematic destruction of civilian targets in central Europe today. But the city is being shelled and destroyed. People in residential areas are being reduced to starvation. It gives me the right to say that Sarajevo is the shame of Europe. The scenes we saw this morning were just too much. The main office buildings are on fire, and many, many apartment blocks.

I live some five or six kilometers away from the center of town, and in the house next to mine, a grenade destroyed one of the walls and killed a man in his apartment. It's a strange situation. Looking from my window now, you would say, "well, there is no war around," – but all of a sudden, a grenade or mortar will hit, and someone will be killed. My parents live near the city center, and their windows were shattered. Imagine. Two elderly people, 80 years old, without a single window in their apartment. It's amazing. We are not witnessing a battle. We are witnessing a one-sided attack on a city. There is no weaponry, and there is no army to return the attack. The (Bosnian) Territorial Defense Force was only created after the war began, and I don't think

they have any heavy weaponry. . . . The conflict here has been imported from Serbia, and to some extent, from Croatia. The violence, the atrocities have been committed to a great extent by Serbian extremists and the Yugoslav army. But Croatian extremist forces have also fixed their sights on certain parts of western Bosnia-Herzegovina. . . . After the bread queue deaths, we thought that now we had seen the worst. But again, we were wrong. Let me tell you about Dobrinja, a part of the city where I have friends. It was a new residential area, built like an Olympic village for the Games in 1984. Afterward, it was converted to a huge residential area and houses between 35,000 and 40,000 people. The area has been totally isolated. Let me be very precise. Since May 2, when the heavier attacks began, Dobrinja has been besieged. People are unable to leave their homes because of sniper fire and heavy artillery. The people in Dobrinja are virtually in a situation as if they were in wartime concentration camps. They can't leave their homes, they can't buy bread. In some parts they have been without electricity for 12 days, freezer stocks have run out, and they are threatened by epidemics because they cannot dispose of refuse (Pajić & Pick, 1992).

- Foreign Military appeals for help (more often the appeals were related to the USA):

I must consider myself a Bosnian, and Bosnia is part of Europe. If the European Community wants to preserve its dignity, it must scrap its plan for the cantonization of Bosnia and preserve its borders and multinational character. If the world wants to preserve a kind of international and political order, then this slaughter must come to an end. My answer is twofold. We welcome UN sanctions because they will make clear that Serbia's designs do not have any support or backing from any country. But what is in the air here, what people have been hoping for a couple of weeks now is military intervention. So much misery has been heaped upon Sarajevo. Let me put it this way: people think they are entitled to direct intervention. I would argue for the American Sixth Fleet. They have the weaponry (Pajić & Pick, 1992).

- Description of everyday life of Sarajevo residents:

Every day, Vedran Smajlović puts on evening dress, does up his white bow tie, and walks unhurriedly with his cello on his shoulder to the bakery in Vase Miskina Street. There, in front of a pile of fading flowers that mark the spot where on May 27, a mortar bomb caused a massacre in a bread queue, he sits down on a white chair and with his eyes closed, plays Albinoni's Adagio. "I play for the dead and the wounded of Sarajevo," he says in a low voice. . . . Normally, at that time, Gordana Knežević is to be found on the ground floor

of a 19th-century building next to the Bosnian presidency putting together the next day's edition of the newspaper Oslobođenje. Gordana, aged 42, is a Serb with three children. Until four months ago, she was a correspondent in Cairo. She usually gets to the crowded room, which serves as the newsroom, at around 9.30 in the morning, and at about 4.30, when the bombardment starts, she sets off home like a bat out of hell. Her flat is close to Hum hill, where the city's Serbian attackers and the Bosnian defenders have been fighting to and fro over every inch of terrain. To get down to the center, Gordana waits crouching in her doorway for a colleague to appear, driving one of the vehicles with which the journalists distribute their own paper. As soon as a bundle of copies hits the doorstep, she climbs in. Gordana says her neighbors sleep in the basement, but that she prefers to stay out in the corridor listening to the radio. There is no water and no electricity. To heat food or brew tea, everyone in the building has to make for Flat 4C, whose owner has a camping stove. She says that all she has left in her pantry are four pounds of rice and some packets of macaroni (Rojo, 1992).

- French President's Sarajevo visit:

Mitterrand, you are our only hope," "Thank you for your courage," shouted Sarajevo's Bosnians as they scattered flowers in the path of the French president yesterday amid the rubble and glass of the devastated city. Hundreds wept and tried to touch the French president as he walked unhurriedly through the destruction, surrounded by French members of the United Nations peacekeeping force. But apprehension was mixed with the tears of gratitude for the president's bold solo project to bring relief to the city. Mr. Mitterrand – accompanied by the Muslim president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović – toured some of the most dangerous and devastated areas of the center of Sarajevo, unperturbed by the explosions and the gunfire (Fuentes & Traynor, 1992).

It should be noted that only two news articles cast doubts on claims that only one, the Serb, side was to be blamed for the BiH carnage (one of them is a reader's letter, as a matter of fact):

It is clear this is a dirty little war. What is not clear from your reports is that there is more than one set of bad guys. I learned at school about the "Balkan Problem". The underlying ethnic viciousness has not lost intensity since. Why do we not get even-handed reporting? The Bosnian Serbs are armed by Belgrade. But it seems equally clear that the Bosnian Croats are armed by Zagreb. It is said that Croatia is sending men as well as materials. What of

the Muslims? (Note that these are Serbo-Croats, speaking Serbo-Croat, who changed their religion generations ago during the Turkish occupation.) It is believed in Belgrade that a Muslim faction blew up the bread queue to stall the talks in Lisbon. They want the airport to get arms from Libya. Who is hindering the UN column from Belgrade to Sarajevo? Surely not Serbs? All sides should be punished for their parts in the atrocities. Serbs have no monopoly on wickedness (Jeynes, 1992).

It is now more important than ever to bring the fighting to an end. This cannot be done by outside military intervention. It is only through the effective use of pressure that Bosnia-Herzegovina can move towards normality. Pressure has already been applied to the Bosnian-Serbs and Serbia, the time is now right to put real pressure on Mr. Izetbegović who constantly refuses to negotiate, who repeatedly fails to turn up to international conferences and who has abandoned an earlier agreement to explore a system of cantonized, and by definition less centralized, power. If sanctions are to be an effective tool, then they must be flexible, they should reflect progress and be lifted by degree against Serbia and applied by degree against those that refuse to join in the process of negotiation. It is futile for the Muslims to be simply stage-managing "blame the Serb atrocities" such as the bread queue and funeral shelling in an attempt to avoid the reality of negotiations (Letters to the Editor, 1992).

Finally, only the first cover article that wrote about the event in Vase Miskina Street was followed by a photograph of the crime scene as visual content.

Death on the street . . . Bosnian gunmen survey the scene after mortar shells landed amid a crowd of people waiting to buy bread in central Sarajevo yesterday PHOTOGRAPH: HIDAJET DELIC

Above is a photograph from one article in *The Guardian* (Chazan & Traynor, 1992).

3.2.8. The Vase Miskina Street Massacre

Conclusion

As in the Dobrovoljačka Street case, *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* show clear similarities in describing the massacre on Vase Miskina Street. Moreover, the structure of the narratives that these two dailies present is relatively clear, and every single whole harmoniously builds on top of the previous one, forming a continuous flow. Researchers (de)constructed it as follows:

- the event description is clear and picturesque,
- civilian casualties are the subject of the most severe condemnation and parallel with World War II serves as an additional argument for such an assessment,
- the view that the grenade was fired from Serb positions was reported from the very beginning and is virtually out of the question,
- foreign and international leaders were united in condemning the crime,
- the shelling is condemned by the Serb side as well; however, the condemnation is directed at the Serbian armed forces, while statements by Serb leaders that the shells did not come from Serb positions are not presented in such a systematic way as it is done when it comes to blaming the Serb units,
- Vase Miskina Street was described as an example of increasing deterioration of the situation not only in Sarajevo but in the whole BiH, the description of the various war episodes being the most represented theme of the articles; The JNA in BiH and other Serb units are predominantly responsible for escalating the war,
- description of the lives of people in Sarajevo that personalize the victims and make it easier for readers to live their troubles,
- at the same time, the description of the paramilitary units and remnants of the JNA in BiH serves to show the reader what the party responsible for the deterioration of the situation in BiH looks like,
- the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro can easily be interpreted as a logical step, in the context of the depiction of the crime that took place on May 27,
- foreign military intervention appeals carry much more "weight" when they follow the description of the Vase Miskina Street event.

3.2.9. Markale 1 and 2

The New York Times

Markale 1 (February 5, 1994) and Markale 2 (August 28, 1995) are events known as Markale Massacres and relate to sufferings in the Sarajevo downtown. The New York Times has published seven articles in total dedicated to these events. Four of them were on the cover of the daily. Six, out of seven, articles, are dedicated to Markale 1, and one to Markale 2. In both cases, articles were published a day after the events. The word "civilians" has been used seven times in these articles, and each time as in Serb forces attacks context.

Several themes have been selected through qualitative analysis:

- The number of injured and killed:

A mortar shell exploded in the jammed central market here today, killing at least 66 people and wounding about 200 others in the worst massacre in the 22-month siege of Sarajevo" [Markale 1] (Kifner, 1994).

Two shells slammed into the central Sarajevo market area today, killing at least 37 people and wounding 80 in the most devastating single attack on the Bosnian capital since a similar one 18 months ago led NATO to vow that the city would be protected" [Markale 2] (Cohen, 1995b).

- The scene of the event descriptions:

The ramshackle market of rows of steel tables were packed with weekend shoppers when the single 120-millimeter shell hit at half past noon, sending shrapnel ripping through people bartering for second-hand clothes and used electrical appliances.

Blood, arms, legs, and pieces of flesh were strewn about the market. People screamed hysterically, rushing about to try to give help or escape. A woman lay by an overturned table, her legs severed. Men threw the badly wounded onto makeshift stretchers fashioned out of scraps of corrugated tin that had shaded the stalls and raced to ambulances and private cars. Eight bodies were so mangled they could not be identified as men or women. Ambulances and Carnage. . . . A severed head lay among what had been a display of used shoes. Torn bodies were tossed about, making relief workers ill as they tried to help the wounded [Markale 1] (Kifner, 1994).

Limbs and flesh were splattered on storefronts, and bodies fell to pieces as they were lifted into cars. After 40 months of Serbian siege and bombardment, the

scene was familiar, but the horrified frenzy among an exhausted population was still intense [Markale 2] (Cohen, 1995b).

- International organizations officials blaming Serbs for the attack:

Diplomats said that a committee of the National Security Council would meet on Sunday in Washington to consider what response the United States should make. France was reportedly pressing for an immediate NATO meeting in Brussels, apparently with a view to authorizing NATO airstrikes against the Serbian gun positions around Sarajevo [Markale 1] (Kifner, 1994).

The United States blamed the Bosnian Serbs for the attack, and United Nations officials in Sarajevo suggested that the 120-millimeter mortar that had caused most of the damage had been fired from Serbian positions south of the capital" [Markale 2] (Cohen, 1995b).

- The judgmental tone regarding the lack of direct military assistance to the Muslim population and highlighting the inefficiency of international organizations' diplomacy:

Bitter frustration with the failure of the United Nations and Western diplomacy and mediation to have any effect on halting the nearly two years of indiscriminate shelling of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces spilled out today as survivors screamed at foreign journalists at the scene. "It Was the World."

"This was not the Chetniks that did this, it was the world," shouted Munevera Bavtić, referring to the historic name of Serbian fighters that the Bosnian Serbs have adopted. "This is the world's responsibility."

"Thank you, Boutros-Ghali! Thank you, Clinton!" yelled another man who did not give his name, referring to both the American President and the United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. "All the world killed these people." (Kifner, 1994).

- The insistence by some Western and international officials on NATO intervention (air strikes on Serb positions):

Washington's new Defense Secretary, William Perry, said: "It is time for responsible leaders among the warring factions to step forward and be counted. It is time for the international community to stand together and bring the maximum pressure to bear."

His comments were reminiscent of British and French calls in recent weeks, which initially seemed to fall on deaf ears in Washington.

Willy Claes, the Belgian Foreign Minister, also called for rapid airstrikes by NATO, and Defense Minister Fabbio Fabbri of Italy said his nation's air

> bases were ready to provide support if and when NATO decides to intervene in Bosnia. (Cohen, 1994)
>
> Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked NATO today for authorization to order punitive airstrikes against Serbian gun positions around Sarajevo.
>
> He already has the authority to unilaterally request NATO airpower to defend peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, but he cannot order punitive attacks. In a letter today, he sought NATO approval to order punitive air strikes if he deems them necessary. So far, he has not requested punitive strikes.
>
> In the letter to NATO's Secretary-General, Manfred Worner, Mr. Boutros-Ghali asked him to seek authorization as quickly as possible from the NATO Council in Brussels to empower its Southern Command to attack Serbian guns encircling the Bosnian capital (Lewis, 1994).

Finally, it should be noted that (out of seven) two articles had visual content related directly to Markale 1 and Markale 2 on the cover of the daily:

Above is a photograph from a *New York Times* article (Kifner, 1994).

People unharmed by the shelling in Sarajevo yesterday helped remove the dead and wounded from the street.

Agence France-Presse

Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs

PATAKI ANNOUNCES ALIENS' EXPULSION

Above is a photograph from a *New York Times* article (Cohen, 1995b).

3.2.10. Markale 1 and 2

The Guardian

The Markale 1 and Markale 2 database has 42 articles in total. Nine articles deal explicitly with the event, and they were published the day after the event occurred. One article related to Markale 2 was on the cover page.

Several themes have been selected through qualitative analysis of nine articles:

- Descriptions of the event and its consequences:

  Into this bustling midst, the mortar fell at 12.30pm Saturday. It hit a table in the middle of the market. The shrapnel was augmented by shards from the tables and the railings holding the canvas. People were torn apart.

  It was the greatest single act of carnage in Sarajevo in the 22-month long siege. It was, said the mayor, Muhamed Kreševljaković, the worst day of death in the city for 500 years. Heads were blown off. One lay on a table, alongside a pile of clothes. Arms and legs littered the scene. Blood flowed into the gutter. Police rushing to the scene vomited.

Along with medical workers, the officers desperately tried to separate the dead from the living. But there was a worse task in store: attempting to match to each mutilated corpse the right head or limb (Mullin, 1994).

Several children were reported among those slaughtered in the most savage assault on Sarajevo since the massacre in the same market area in February 1994. The death toll is expected to rise. A series of shells – presumed to have come from Bosnian Serb positions – crashed into the entrance of the Tržnica covered market, the neighboring open market, and around the national theatre. Bloodied remains of the dead and the wounded were strewn across the streets. Goods littered the pavements along with pieces of human beings and streams of blood. One shell, in particular, a 120mm heavy mortar, killed about 20 people (Vulliamy, 1995a).

One minute it was business as usual at the main market of Sarajevo. Then the shell landed. Mayhem. Carnage. Despair. . . . Shopping bags lay amid the dead and wounded outside the busy main entrance of the once-elegant building. A man's body was hurled by force on to a railing that separated the pavement from the road. It hung there, jack-knifed over the iron bars. Old women crawled along the road, spewing blood as they gasped for air. Limbs and flecks of human flesh were splattered along shopfronts. Bodies were literally blown to bits. The air was thick with the screams of the wounded and dying, and the wails of relatives and friends. Journalists joined taxi-drivers and market vendors in heaping bodies into the back of vehicles to rush them to hospital. Some fell apart as they were lifted by the survivors. . . . "I heard the explosion and felt something cutting into my legs," said Nihada Hadžiahmić, aged 50, who was near the market when the shell hit. "There was a moment of silence, and then people started screaming". . . . At the market, policemen collected legs and arms into plastic bags (Latal, 1995).

- The crime as direct peace negotiation sabotage:

  The United States-backed peace plan for Bosnia was delivered a crushing blow yesterday by the massacre of 37 civilians, with 88 wounded, in the crowded center of Sarajevo. The carnage threatened to propel the Bosnian war into a new crisis, placing the strongest pressure on NATO and United Nations commanders to honor their pledges to defend Bosnia's "safe areas" with robust military action if they came under attack. The Bosnian prime minister, Haris Silajdžić, said his government was ready to suspend participation in the peace process until NATO had pledged to protect Sarajevo. . . . The attack was a manifest attempt to sabotage the peace initiative and came just hours before Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegović, was due to meet Mr.

Holbrooke in Paris. . . . Effectively calling off further talks in Paris, Mr. Silajdžić said: "When the negotiations start seriously, they do this. If there is to be a peace process, it should not be at gunpoint" (Vulliamy, 1995a).

"Yesterday's market bomb has stiffened American and European determination to increase pressure on the Bosnian Serb government, which Mr. Holbrooke described as the 'major obstacle' to peace plans" (Webster, 1995).

Even before yesterday's murderous shell slammed into a Sarajevo market place, it was obvious that the reconstituted US negotiating team, resuming its shuttle diplomacy, only had a tenuous prospect of a political breakthrough towards a Balkan settlement. The deaths of 37 men, women, and children, with many more badly wounded and maimed, can only reduce those prospects further (Murder in the Marketplace, 1995).

- The appeals for the NATO retaliation in order to protect the UN safe areas:

  At one point a nurse, covered in blood, raced outside to scream at a low-flying NATO warplane.

  It was flying over Sarajevo, as they had done on Friday when ten people died in a playground, and a bloody pool of flour and sugar after the Serbs shelled a humanitarian food queue in Dobrinja, the one-time Olympic village.

  The warplane's task was to ensure the UN no-fly zone remained un-infringed. But the nurse screamed: "What are you doing here? Where were you when this happened? Go away. They can continue killing us without you monitoring that." (Mullin, 1994)

  He added that if the source was confirmed as being the Bosnian Serbs, then "there is no reason to think why the pledge for airstrikes will not be followed through". . . . ["]The peace process should be suspended until NATO says clearly that it will prevent these massacres and punish those who do them." He linked his demands to the arms embargo on his government. "The NATO governments are responsible. We have no arms to defend ourselves. They must defend us, or let us protect ourselves," he said. The Bosnian government spokesman, Mirza Hajrić, challenged NATO to respond with airpower after the promise at the London conference last month to retaliate against attacks which threatened "safe areas" and new guidelines hammered out two weeks ago which said such strikes need not be proportionate to the attack itself, nor geographically limited to its source. "We expect and strongly ask for NATO airstrikes because that is what the UN promised should be done. There are more than 30 dead, and if this is not an attack on a safe area, then I don't know what is." (Vulliamy, 1995a)

- Foreign and international leaders' strong reactions:

  Baroness Lynda Chalker, head of the UK Government's overseas aid agency, alled the attack "senseless and depraved." She said Britain was ready to respond to requests for humanitarian help but insisted, "there can be no military solution to this conflict." But Robin Cook, the Labour foreign spokesman, demanded an immediate military strike against the forces responsible. Elsewhere among the five Contact Group countries – Britain, the US, Germany, France, and Russia – the attack brought equally resolute condemnation but no consensus on the best strategy for a decisive response. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, said he had instructed UN commanders "to investigate this attack immediately and to take appropriate action without delay." Yasushi Akashi, the UN envoy, warned that "strong action will be taken" (Vulliamy, 1995a).

  Together with justified condemnation of yesterday's Sarajevo shelling, there is a case for arguing that the negotiators will only be able to exercise any authority over the warring factions if they also order airstrikes against the perpetrators. Robin Cook, the shadow foreign secretary, is among those who have made a strong case for retaliation (Murder in the Marketplace, 1995).

- Referring to the Serbian side as a source of shelling:

  A series of shells – presumed to have come from Bosnian Serb positions – crashed into the entrance of the Tržnica covered market, the neighboring open market, and around the national theatre. . . . One UN source said yesterday the crater traces in the latest massacre "carried indications that the shell was fired by a weapon that only the Bosnian Serbs have" (Vulliamy, 1995a).

- Insisting on the claims that the Muslim side is not responsible for the crime:

  The United Nations in Sarajevo says it is unable to pinpoint precisely the provenance of last Saturday's I20mm mortar shell, and it never identified those guilty of the bread queue attack in central Sarajevo on May 27,1992.

  But suspicions that the Muslims murdered their own in May 1992 have been revived after the Saturday atrocity.

  UN and diplomatic sources in Zagreb, Geneva, and New York, however, all intimately connected with the operations in former Yugoslavia, unanimously maintain that they know of no instance where the Muslims have committed atrocities against their own side.

  "I am not aware that the UN has ever officially found that the Muslims attacked their own people," says a well-placed UN official. "It's such a serious charge that it should not be bandied around callously."

One of the most senior UN officials in former Yugoslavia, who has been there since the UN operation began in spring 1992, says he has combed the files for reports on who was responsible for the bread queue mortar and found nothing.

"There is no conclusive evidence at all. Reports of classified documents are hogwash." In August 1992, a British newspaper reported that senior UN officials in New York believed the Muslims were staging atrocities against Muslims to gain international sympathy, including the bread queue massacre in the city center. The report was said to be based on confidential documents and classified briefings, none of which were cited. . . . Two UN sources then in former Yugoslavia say the story that the Muslims perpetrated the May 1992 atrocity originated with General Lewis MacKenzie of Canada, the first UN commander in Bosnia. He was in Belgrade on the day of the Sarajevo attack.

In his book, Peacekeeper, about his stint in Bosnia, General MacKenzie says he told President François Mitterrand of France in Sarajevo a month after the bread queue carnage that there were strong suspicions that the Muslims had carried out the attack. "There is strong but circumstantial evidence that some really horrifying acts of cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the Muslims against their own people for the benefit of an international audience," he cites himself as telling the French leader.

"To my knowledge," a UN official working in Bosnia since mid-1992 said yesterday, "there has not been a single incident like that." Such charges "are completely fabricated and trumped-up". (Traynor, 1994a)

Confronted with repeated Serb allegations that the Muslims were murdering their own kin and framing the Serbs as the culprits, a senior UN official said he knew of no evidence to support such charges.

"I've seen them [the Muslims] firing out of Sarajevo to provoke the Serbs and producing a brutal, excessive reaction from them," he said.

"But I don't know of any instance where the Bosnian army has attacked its own people" (Traynor, 1994b).

United Nations officers who examined the crater left by the mortar could not determine which side fired it but said there was no evidence that government troops had shelled their own people to curry world sympathy, as Serb forces charged (Victims of Market Carnage, 1994).

- Thorough UN analysis of the crime scene:

  UN soldiers were last night analysing the shell craters in the Bosnian capital

to determine their exact origin. Lieutenant Colonel Chris Vernon, the chief UNPROFOR spokesman, said: "Because of the severity of this incident and the severity of the consequences that might follow, we must be sure of our finding". . . . But last night the UN authorities were still engaged in the formalities of not presuming the attack to have come from either the Bosnian Serbs besieging Sarajevo or the government troops defending it. . . . The chief UN spokesman, Alex Ivanko, said the UNPROFOR commander, General Rupert Smith, was being kept informed of "all the factors." He added: "What we have seen today is the shelling of a downtown area where there are no military installations, and that is why I am saying we cannot rule out any option" (Vulliamy, 1995a).

- Drawing a parallel between Markale 1 and Markale 2:

  "Yesterday's slaughter was the worst assault on Sarajevo since the massacre in the open market, in which 68 were killed and 200 wounded, 100 yards away from today's attack" (Vulliamy, 1995a).

  The 120mm mortar shell that struck yesterday near the battered turn-of-the-century building that serves as the city's largest indoor market left at least 37 people dead and 85 wounded – the worst massacre of civilians since February 5, 1994. Then, a shell exploding less than 100 yards from where yesterday's landed killed 68 people and wounded 200. The scene was sickeningly reminiscent of the carnage 18 months ago (Latal, 1995).

- Descriptions of the Koševo hospital:

  Bodies were scooped up into trucks, most bound for the brown-tiled mortuary at the main hospital, Koševo. Its three rooms were crammed to overflowing.

  They were unable to identify the dead because they were so mutilated, said the director, Alija Hodžić. They were unable even to count them because they were in so many pieces (Mullin, 1994).

  At Koševo hospital, normally hardened nurses wept and waved their arms in the air in despair as they struggled to cope with more than 100 bodies – some dead, others dying. . . . Like others whose wounds were not life-threatening, Ms. Hadžiahmić hit in both legs by shrapnel, was forced to wait outside to be treated. Blood seeped through the cloth wrapped around her legs. Doctors and nurses, their white robes splattered red, rushed casualties into different operating rooms. Dr. Fahrudin Konjhodžić, the hospital director, said all units were overcrowded with wounded, and all nine operating theatres were working nonstop. Many of the wounded were critical, and some would not survive (Latal, 1995).

On the other hand, themes that relate to the Markale 1 and Markale 2 events are relatively rare and mainly dedicated to the:

- The relations between Western leaders:

  But it appears that a new policy of punitive air strikes may first have to go through the Security Council. That is certainly the Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind's opinion.

  While he remains reluctant to see such Western military intervention, Gen Rose has taken another step towards being more assertive in getting aid to Bosnia's civilians.

  Staff said he has decided that the UN must either "get tough or get out". (Fairhall & Stephan, 1994)

  The French leader has been particularly disappointed by the relative impotence of the rapid reaction force, set up with Britain, which he believed would play a key role in bringing an end to the war. Mr de Charette said he wanted to return Paris to the front line of peace efforts. Officials had complained privately of feeling left out of the peace process after Washington launched its initiative. Mr de Charette denied that France was out of step with other members of the five-country Contact Group, which also meets here today, but confirmed the tension with the US. "For months we have been faced with an American attitude which, at the least, was reserved and often hostile and skeptical over what we were trying to do," he said, referring to French insistence on maintaining Bosnian territorial integrity and defending Goražde. "Today, in its essential elements, the American position is closer to the French position." France still supported territorial integrity, but this would need "special forms of institutional arrangements," suggesting that France would be forced to accept the US solution because it has been unable to find allies in the contact group. (Webster, 1995)

- A need to intensify peace negotiations:

  Far from allowing this new tragedy to halt or even delay the search for peace, the effort must be maintained and redoubled. There is no other way of ending such senseless suffering. To interrupt the peace effort would be to give in to terrorism. . . . Bosnia's military commander General Delić has condemned the US plan as lacking both head and tail; he insists that the only road for a worthy Bosnia is to continue the fighting. President Izetbegović must be persuaded to heed saner, less bloodthirsty voices. (Murder in the Marketplace, 1995)

- Geopolitical relations in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:

  In the convoluted terms of the Balkan conflict, this latest outrage might prove just enough to persuade the Serb leader into finally abandoning the Bosnian Serbs and into supporting the peace proposals now on offer from the Americans. It must be obvious to Belgrade that yesterday's violence will only stiffen the Bosnian government's resistance to the concessions, which the present US formula also demands from Sarajevo, and that peace and the end to economic sanctions will become still more elusive. The peace on offer from the United States is a far cry from what the Bosnian Muslims had expected from their powerful ally. True, it has a face-saving device for preserving Bosnia's sovereignty, which would have to be recognized by Serbia. The goal of Greater Serbia would have to be abandoned, at least for now. Sarajevo would not only lose control over almost half its territory but is also being pressed to give up Goražde as an untenable pocket within a future Bosnian Serb administered area. A weakened Bosnian government, anchored in the Bosnian-Croat federation, would have to depend on the goodwill of big brother in Zagreb – not the most trustworthy of prospects. (Murder in the Marketplace, 1995)

  On the other hand, 31 articles mention Markale 1 and Markale 2 almost exclusively as a massacre reminder, with frequent emphasis that shells came from the Serbian side, and that NATO airstrikes were an act of retaliation for the crime:

  The Bosnian government imposed a ban on outdoor gatherings in Sarajevo yesterday, for fear of a repeat of the massacre in February 1994, when a single mortar round killed 68 people in a central Sarajevo market. (Borger, 1995a)

  The casual shelling on Thursday night of Tuzla was a totally gratuitous piece of indiscriminate sadism on a par with the infamous market shelling in Sarajevo — and this time, there can be no excuse that the slaughter might have been self-inflicted by the Bosnian government (Murderous Muddle, 1995).

  Tearful families buried 59 victims of Sarajevo's weekend mortar attack yesterday — many of them having waited until dark to avoid Serb snipers.

  Dozens of funerals laid to rest Muslims and members of Sarajevo's minority Serb community whose ethnic kin have besieged the Bosnian capital since April 1992.

  Some 68 people were killed and about 200 wounded in the bloodiest atrocity of Bosnia's civil war when a mortar bomb devastated a street market in Sa-

rajevo, provoking worldwide revulsion (Victims of Market Carnage, 1994).

President Clinton declared yesterday that the US would support a proposal for limited airstrikes against Serb artillery around Sarajevo, but only if "the UN determines who is responsible" for the shelling, which killed 68 people in Sarajevo on Saturday (Palmer, Bates & Walker, 1994).

The United Nations Secretary-General last night put pressure on the reluctant Western powers to intervene militarily following the massacre of 68 civilians in a Sarajevo marketplace at the weekend.

A senior UN spokesman said Boutros Boutros-Ghali had sent a letter to NATO's Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, asking him to take action to obtain, as soon as possible, authorization for the NATO council to launch airstrikes "against artillery positions in or around Sarajevo, which are responsible for attacks on civilians."

European Union foreign ministers are to meet in Brussels today, and an emergency meeting of NATO officials could follow tomorrow as pressure mounts for punitive action against Serbian forces who have been besieging Sarajevo for almost two years (Traynor, Walker, Palmer & Fairhall, 1994).

NATO planes launched attacks early today on Serb-held positions to the south and east of Sarajevo in retaliation for Monday's mortar bomb outrage in the Bosnian capital. . . . The air strike came after a day of intensifying demands for retaliation against the Bosnian Serbs, who were blamed for the deaths of 37 people killed when a mortar hit the city's market place. . . . British officials said military action was imminent and wholly justified after the UN officially confirmed that Bosnian Serb fire had killed 37 civilians and wounded 85 in the city. . . . In Sarajevo, the UN issued a statement saying its investigators had concluded "beyond all reasonable doubt" that Bosnian Serbs were responsible for Monday's attack. . . . "We want a reprisal since it is clear from the analysts that the origin is Serb," France's foreign minister, Hervé de Charette, told reporters after meeting Mr. Izetbegović (Vulliamy, Black & Webster, 1995).

'Although we can't pinpoint the exact firing position,' said a UN spokesman in the Bosnian capital, 'we can tell the general area, and the whole of that area is Serb-controlled' (Fairhall, 1995).

"Openly angered by Monday's mortar-bomb massacre of 37 people by the Bosnian Serbs in a Sarajevo market, he said the actions 'would not end until [the UN-designated safe areas] are beyond the range of heavy artillery'" (Vulliamy, Black & Palmer, 1995).

"The first victim to be buried yesterday from Monday's Serb mortar attack that killed 37 in a Sarajevo market – the action that prompted yesterday's raids – was a Serb, Ilija Keranović, an elderly army reservist" (Savic, 1995).

"The timing of the shelling resembled that of the marketplace massacre in the Bosnian capital ten days ago, mounted by Bosnian Serbs just as the peace talks were opening in Paris" (Vulliamy, 1995b).

"It was these types of mortars that were responsible for the market and bread-queue massacres in the city which triggered the NATO airstrikes" (Traynor, 1995).

"At Živinice, four children and two women were killed – the worst single attack on civilians a mortar bomb killed 37 in a Sarajevo street on August 28, triggering a wave of NATO airstrikes" (Borger, 1995b).

"Nowhere is the regression in the city more apparent than at the market place, where a mortar attack that killed more than 60 people in February of last year prompted a NATO ultimatum that fleetingly brought new hope" (Cohen, 1995a).

"Any sympathy for the columns of Serbian refugees soon evaporated when a Serb shell killed 37 men, women, and children in the Sarajevo marketplace. At last, NATO retaliated, bombing Serbian military positions around Bosnia" (Bennett, 1995).

Simultaneously, themes that are more represented in these articles are:

- NATO ultimatum to the Serbian side:

  NATO was moving behind a demand last night to give Serb forces besieging Sarajevo up to 10 days to withdraw their heavy artillery or face air strikes from allied governments convinced their credibility is on the line after Saturday's market massacre (Palmer, Black & Bates, 1994).

  "Unless Serbs withdraw their heavy weapons from around the Bosnian capital or place them under UN control by midnight on Sunday, NATO may order its first-ever offensive action — airstrikes against the encircling positions" (Fairhall, Black, & Pick, 1994).

- Deterioration of the situation because of the Serbian attacks:

  The international aid effort in Serb-held Bosnia ground to a halt yesterday after Bosnian Serb military leaders threatened to seal their borders and hold foreigners hostage in the event of NATO airstrikes.

Several international relief officials were blocked from leaving Bosnian Serb-held territory, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees began to evacuate its stair and canceled aid convoys. (Traynor & Wintour, 1994)

Serbian forces are defying a NATO ultimatum by positioning tanks, heavy artillery, and mortars within the Sarajevo exclusion zone. They have laid mines around gun positions to prevent United Nations access to the arms, UN officials said.

Despite the discovery of the worst breach of the demilitarization of Sarajevo, the UN said it had no intention of taking charge of the army by force or authorizing NATO air raids if they are not moved.

Canadian UN troops north of the city located four tanks, one armored vehicle, four 105-millimeter howitzer guns, three anti-aircraft guns, and 18 mortars just inside the 12-mile exclusion zone around Sarajevo decreed by NATO last month (Traynor, 1994c).

- Peace talks:

  The deadlocked Bosnian peace talks in Geneva lurched forward last night after the three warring parties accepted a United Nations inquiry into the Sarajevo market massacre.

  The negotiations started badly as the mainly Muslim Bosnian government angrily rejected a Bosnian Serb demand for an international investigation into the incident, but by last night resistance had been broken.

  Diplomats said the agreement meant there was now no excuse for the Serbs not to negotiate seriously against a background of the urgency created by NATO's 10-day deadline.

  Talks are to resume this morning, with hopes for a new tone when the parties are briefed by a senior United States envoy as part of President Clinton's belated decision to engage more actively in Bosnian diplomacy (Black, 1994).

- Relations between the foreign and/or international officials:

  But in spite of the unprecedentedly tough language of the warning issued by EU foreign ministers in Brussels, some NATO governments are still holding back from a final decision to send warplanes to bomb Serb military targets.

  The EU foreign ministers' declarations expressed their "revulsion at the recent brutal shelling of civilians in Sarajevo and recalled earlier NATO and UN decisions threatening airstrikes. It went on to call for a very early meeting of the NATO council and said, "… the aim should be to bring about the immediate lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, using all the means

necessary including the use of airpower". . . . NATO has meanwhile asked United Nations military commanders in Bosnia for an up to date assessment of the consequences of actions against a range of different targets. This will allow NATO governments to decide which targets would least risk civilian casualties or put UN forces in unacceptable danger.

In a striking hardening of its own attitude, the British government last night hinted that it now favored military action if the consequences could be contained. The Foreign Secretary, Douglas Kurd, said that as a direct consequence of the weekend massacre, there had been "a fundamental shift in the balance of arguments for and against the use of air strikes."

He said that although he had opposed NATO's use of force in Bosnia in the past, airstrikes might now be necessary to persuade the Bosnian Serbs that they could not achieve their goals by military means. "There is an overwhelming feeling that this must be attempted," he said.

In London, the Prime Minister will meet Mr. Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind, the Defence Secretary, at Downing Street this morning to discuss the options in advance of tomorrow's NATO meeting (Palmer, Bates & Walker, 1994).

- Sarajevo residents' experiences:

  The old woman woke with a start. It was 3 a.m. She reached for the light switch, but there was no power. Something had woken her, but she couldn't think what it was. Then she realized: it was the sound of silence.

  Silence has broken out in Sarajevo after nearly two years of bombardment, and she is having trouble getting used to it. So is everyone else. Two weeks after the original ceasefire agreement silenced the Serb guns on the hills above the city, most are unwilling to believe the bombardment is really over.

  "I don't want to be relaxed," says Amra Basic, a radio reporter. "I don't want to feel that beautiful feeling again and after that to be shelled." (Stephen, 1994).

- NATO strike descriptions:

  Wave upon wave of air squadrons swept from the Aviano base in Italy and the United States aircraft carrier Roosevelt. The first wave alone involved more than 60 planes. The heavy artillery of the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force deployed on Mount Igman also fired more than 600 rounds against about 15 targets around Sarajevo. While they focused on Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft defenses, artillery, munitions factories, and communications systems around Sarajevo, the overall scope of the raids spanned the entire country (Vulliamy, Black & Palmer, 1995).

"Bombs hit the army barracks in Pale, sending up a huge plume of black smoke as the sound of anti-aircraft guns intensified" (Savic, 1995).

"NATO says its aircraft have flown 2.200 missions over Bosnia from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic and Italian buses since Operation Deliberate Force began on August 30" (Vulliamy, 1995b).

- NATO commanders, and western leaders' statements of the nature of the attack:

  Mr. Claes said bluntly: "The attacks will not end until the Serbs change." The UN's supreme commander in former Yugoslavia, Lieutenant-general Bernard Janvier of France said the strikes were "a turning point in the war" which aimed "to lift the threat of heavy weapon attacks on the civilian population," first in Sarajevo and then in "the other UN safe areas... and to put a final end to such [Serb] attacks." (Vulliamy, Black & Palmer, 1995).

  The commander of NATO's southern forces said that after nine days of the bombing, he could get tougher if the Serbs refused to leave the area around Sarajevo. NATO officials said Admiral Leighton Smith's threat stood despite the agreement in Geneva between Bosnian, Serb, and Croat officials. Adm Smith told a NATO conference in Belgium: "We have not yet tapped the full capability of the air or ground forces. They (the Bosnian Serb army) ought to understand that they are losing some pretty valuable stuff." (Vulliamy, 1995b).

- Richard Holbrooke's initiative to continue with the negotiations despite the attacks:

  Richard Holbrooke, the US official leading the initiative, is expected to go to the Serbian capital, Belgrade, today and report back to Contact Group colleagues next week (Vulliamy, Black & Webster, 1995).

  It was Richard Holbrooke, America's peace envoy for Bosnia, who let the cat out of the bag. "There are many negotiations in history in which fighting continues while negotiations continue," he announced shortly after NATO started its bombing raids against the Bosnian Serbs (Steele, 1995).

  "After talks in the town of Mostar on Thursday with Richard Holbrooke, the United States mediator, the Bosnian government is less than happy with the scheme the US and President Slobodan Milošević of Serbia have devised" (Traynor, 1995).

- The controversy around some attacks:

  The United Nations military in Sarajevo was conducting an urgent investiga-

tion last night into Serbian claims that artillery from the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force hit a Serbian hospital and killed two people. . . . The Serbian claim that the hospital had been attacked caused consternation among UN officials, one source saying, "if true, this could be enough to call off the airstrikes." The Serbs allege 20 people were injured, eight of them seriously. UN sources say that a definitive version of events will emerge today (Vulliamy, 1995b).

- Serbian side reactions to attack:

  The Bosnian Serbs were outraged. Their "Foreign Minister", Alesha Buha, said, "NATO has surpassed the limit of its participation in the conflict" with a "crazed act". The Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, vowed: "We will hold our front lines... and win in the end." (Vulliamy, Black & Palmer, 1995).

  "'Those bastards. Hope they rot in hell,' said a Serb soldier, Mirko Vasić, pointing at a NATO plane streaking over Pale, the Bosnian Serb stronghold less than 10 miles from Sarajevo. 'They'll never crush us. Never!'" (Savic, 1995).

- Muslim/Bosniak leaders' and civilian reactions to the attack:

  In Sarajevo, there was delight at NATO's pounding of Serb positions that have rained death on the city for 40 months. "It was beautiful," said Kemal Korić, aged 54. "I was wrapped in a blanket on my balcony, watching for hours." As NATO planes screamed overhead, a man dashed to the middle of the city's notorious sniper alley and defied Serb gunners. "Why don't you come out now, you Chetnik bastards," he shouted, waving at Serb positions. "Why don't you shoot at me now?". . . . A jubilant Bosnian government praised the attacks, with the prime minister, Haris Silajdžić, saying as he arrived in Zagreb: "The air raids restore the credibility of the international community." Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegović, said in Paris: "The path toward peace is open". . . . "I feel good, oh yes!" he said. "I feel good, probably for the first time in this war. It looks like they are skinning them alive!" (Vulliamy, Black & Palmer, 1995).

- Shooting down of French bomber, and EU monitors' deaths:

  In the latest raid over the outskirts of Pale, a French bomber was shot down. Its two-man crew was believed to have been captured by Serbs. In Paris, the defense minister, Charles Milton, said: "We will do all we can to get back the pilots. We have all the means for this type of operation." He did not give details. There were five confirmed allied casualties: a group of European Union monitors, killed either by the bombing or by Serbs, EU officials said (Vulliamy, Black & Palmer, 1995).

- The United States from the geopolitical side of the attack:

  In the American case, it fits a modern practice, developed in Vietnam and expanded in the Gulf War, of over-kill and "under-suffer" – how to maximize destruction while keeping one's own casualties virtually to zero. For commanders in a war with clear sides, this makes military sense. But the UN is a political referee. It needs to take tough action against foulers, but not become a player on the field. The second worry centers on the reasons for the new American activism. That Clinton wants Bosnia off the 1996 electoral agenda by brokering a quick peace deal is obvious. The question is how. Any settlement with the slightest chance of sticking will require the long-term presence of UN ground troops to prevent violations. Few of the war's million refugees will go back without an international force to protect them. This was recognized in the Vance-Owen plan and the Contact Group's proposals. Is it in the latest American plan, or is the new bomb-and-talk strategy going to be used to argue that airpower will be a sufficient guarantee? Will it be the excuse for Clinton to drop his commitment to provide 25,000 American troops to cover the withdrawal of the present British and French contingents if no peace settlement is reached?. . . . Warren Zimmermann, the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992, is one of these hardliners. In the latest New York Review of Books, he goes further than Robert Dole, Clinton's leading challenger, who favors lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and a UN pull-out. The policy is known as "lift and leave." "Without the promise of NATO airpower," Zimmermann argues, "the policy could quickly become 'lift and drift.'" He complains that "UN foot-dragging and European caution" have undermined Washington's "flexibility to hit hard." Ominously, he then brings in the Vietnam analogy (Steele, 1995).

- Russian leaders' condemnation of the attack:

  Thumping the table and shaking his fist, President Boris Yeltsin threatened yesterday to make things "hotter" for NATO if it continued its bombardment of the Bosnian Serbs, and said its plans to expand to Eastern Europe would lead quickly to a re-division into opposing military blocs. . . . "Russia insists that the United Nations look again at the situation in Bosnia in the light of new evidence on the blasts in the Muslim region of Sarajevo. Until then, NATO military action in Bosnia should be stopped," Sergei Medvedev, the president's press secretary, said (Hearst, 1995).

- Description of fights in the north and the west of BiH:

  NATO aircraft tried to carry out air strikes against Bosnian Serb guns near Tuzla, but were prevented by poor weather. Nine mortars had been fired at a UN

airbase near the city, a few miles north of Živinice. A Pakistani peacekeepers' base nearby was targeted by a volley of mortars. "NATO was on the spot and had permission to attack the Serb gun positions," said a Western diplomat of NATO's response to the request from UN Bosnia commander, Rupert Smith. "I am told the UN and NATO were quite keen to do the business against the Serbs, but they were prevented by weather and technical problems from getting the visual confirmation of the target they require under their rules of engagement." Serbian aircraft also dropped cluster bombs on villages in the Croat-held Usora valley of northern Bosnia yesterday afternoon, killing and wounding dozens of civilians, the Croatian state news agency Hina said. Serbian artillery then bombarded the valley. Croatian artillery, which had been massing on the north-western border in recent days, went into action yesterday in support of a Bosnian army offensive around the town of Otok. Rebel forces are thought to have been pushed back from the town. To the south-east, the rebels continued their attempt to retake Ključ, a formerly Serb-held town that fell to government forces last month. "Heavy fighting is going on along the whole front line between Otoka and Ključ. We shall see the results in the evening and tomorrow," Mirsad Selmanović, a Bosnian army officer, said. The struggle for territory in northern and western Bosnia has been under way for three weeks, but the attacks in the north came as a shock (Borger, 1995b).

It is worth mentioning that, out of the 42 articles in total, only seven expressed explicit doubts about the dominant version of events. These "alternative perspectives" were arranged thematically into four clusters:

- Serbian officials' statements that Muslim forces were responsible for the massacre:

  "The Muslims and most EU governments blamed the Serbs, but Serb forces asserted that the mainly Muslim Bosnian government was enacting atrocities against its own people to provoke international intervention" (Traynor, Walker, Palmer & Fairhall, 1994).

  "Mr. Karadžić claimed yesterday that the Sarajevo market attack was a "stage-managed fraud," alleging corpses of people who had died earlier and plastic body parts were used to boost casualty figures" (Palmer, Black & Bates, 1994).

- Doubts related to the accuracy of the UN method of determining the position from which the mortar was fired:

The five-man investigative team, appointed by the UN special representative in Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, said that it had unearthed no concrete evidence to determine which side was to blame.

“There is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other fired the mortar bomb,” said Colonel Michael Gauthier, a Canadian military engineer heading the UN military team of inquiry, in Zagreb yesterday.

“The mortar bomb could have been fired by either side,” he confirmed.

Col Gauthier said the mortar bomb detonated on contact with the thin layer of asphalt laid over the soft ground in the market, and not on a market trestle table as initially thought.

During the past week, the military team attempted to calculate the possible trajectory of the 120 mm mortar shell, analyzed the make of the rocket, and interviewed survivors but were unable to draw more than tentative conclusions.

The team estimated that the rocket, a conventional factory-made 120 mm mortar bomb of a type which both military forces possess, had been fired from a range of between 300 and 5,850 yards.

But the evidence pointing to the trajectory of the mortar attack showed that the rocket could have been fired from any standpoint within a square mile arc, an area where Muslim and Serbian military positions overlap.

Unfortunately, Mr. Gauthier said yesterday, any clues originally left in the place where the mortar had been launched had probably long since been eradicated. (Luce, 1994)

UN investigations continue, but officials doubt whether they will be able to elicit much more detail. They say there are currently five “serious” versions circulating explaining the attack.

UN explosives experts engaged in “crater analysis” have determined that the mortar was fired from north-east Sarajevo and from a distance of between 2,000 and 3.500 yards.

“Could it have come from another direction? The answer is, categorically, no,” said a well-placed official. The Sarajevo front line runs between those two points. (Traynor, 1994b)

“Crater analysis” is the name for the new but inexact science used by United Nations commanders in trying to establish who fired the mortar bomb, which killed nearly 70 people in a Sarajevo market on Saturday.

One of the first things experts look for are fragments which sometimes sur-

vive the explosion — a mortar tail fin or the fuse of an artillery shell — that will indicate what fired the round. In this case, it was soon identified as a heavy 120mm mortar, which also means the attack must have been launched close to the city.

In some conditions, it is also possible to deduce a lot more from the shape and size of the crater. In soft ground, particularly, there may be an obvious "splash," indicating the round's trajectory and, therefore, leading back to the position from which it was fired.

When eight people were killed three days ago by another mortar in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja, the UN was able to declare unequivocally that Serb gunners were responsible.

Saturday's devastating attack left less incriminating evidence. The ground was hard. But more important, according to the UN Bosnian commander General Sir Michael Rose, the bomb's trajectory was crucially altered by striking a market stall table as it fell. As a result, he said, it was impossible to be sure who fired it.

Other sources speculated that the bomb came from a north-easterly direction. It could have been deliberately targeted on the crowded Saturday market place, but this seems unlikely, given the limited accuracy of the weapon, and the fact that Sarajevo has so often been under similar bombardment. (Fairhall & Stephan, 1994)

The United Nations based its conclusion that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible "beyond any reasonable doubt" for the Sarajevo mortar attacks on an inexact military science known as crater analysis. . . . In most other conflicts, it could be assumed that an attack on one side must have come from the other. But in this war, the Serbs have often accused Bosnia's Muslims of firing on their own people, and earlier this year, French marines claimed to have substantiated reports that Muslim snipers were shooting at their own community. On Monday, the Serbs repeated their accusation that the Muslims were prepared to slaughter their own to prompt punitive action by NATO. The technique of crater analysis was used unsuccessfully in February last year when a mortar attack on the same Sarajevo market led to the establishment of a heavy weapons exclusion zone around the Bosnian capital (Fairhall, 1995).

- The Russian version of Markale 2:

  Afterwards he issued a statement giving official credence to reports circulat-

ing in the Russian media that a "third party" had been responsible for firing the heavy mortar in the Sarajevo market, the act which triggered air strikes. . . . Reports have circulated in Moscow that a Russian military official has evidence that the attack on the market was not carried out by the Serbs. General Boris Gromov, the military adviser to the foreign ministry, claimed that one of the powers engaged in the airstrikes had organized the mortar bombing "as a provocation". (Hearst, 1995).

- Problematization of the airstrikes against the Serb positions:

  Some media headlines suggested bombing persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to accept the American peace plan as a basis for talks and to agree to a joint negotiating team with Belgrade. Others implied the vicious mortar attack on Sarajevo's market, which killed 37 civilians, led to the bombing. Neither point is correct. Momčilo Krajišnik, the speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament, met European mediators on August 16 to discuss the US-drafted peace plan and said afterwards "the Serb side could be very satisfied with the new offers." Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader, made similar noises the same day. Eleven days later in Belgrade, both men agreed with the Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević, to enter peace talks and let him lead the team. In Washington that day, Holbrooke used a television interview to threaten airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs as part of the negotiating process. The mortar attack on Sarajevo the next day was a coincidence. It was used to trigger the bombing, but airstrikes had already been agreed, and were only waiting for the right moment to come into play (Steele, 1995).

Finally, as for the illustration, the analyzed database of the articles has two visual contents with direct connotation with Markale 2:



A nurse comforts a weeping woman after yesterday's market-place carnage in the Bosnian capital

Above is a photograph from one article published in *The Guardian* (Latal, 1995).

Above is a photograph published in *The Guardian* (UN Soldier, 1995).

3.2.11. Markale 1 and Markale 2

Conclusion

As in the case of the Dobrovoljačka Street, the newspaper articles show a high degree of similarity. In other words, all newspaper articles can be classified under one common narrative. In the following, its structure will be discussed in more detail.

In fact, the first articles about this historical event were filled with detailed and very explicit content. The researchers assume that, in this way, a strong affective deviation towards the content of the title articles was created among the readers.

At the same time, information was beginning to emerge about who was responsible for this crime. Although the origin of the mortar was initially questioned, the Serbs were blamed for the incident, and each subsequent text neither supported nor elaborated this condemnation, but instead it was presented in the form of a fact. For example:

> Last night, President Slobodan Milošević of Serbia blamed the atrocity on "war criminals." Significantly, he did not repeat the Bosnian Serb claims that the Muslims were massacring their own people. (Traynor, Walker, Palmer & Fairhall, 1994)

> "The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić is so desperate to wriggle off the hook that he is accusing Sarajevans of laying out dead bodies in the market place for propaganda purposes" (O'Kane, 1994). "Early last year, after his Serbian chums had massacred 66 people in the marketplace at Sarajevo, he told British reporters that the Bosnians had carried out the attack themselves, blowing up their own citizens for propaganda purposes". (Wheen, 1995).

Researchers believe that this kind of writing is (partly) responsible for directing negative emotions caused by the description of Markale 1 and Markale 2 towards the Serb side. That is, it resulted in the Serbs living on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming the object of hatred, disgust, shock, and similar emotions that the actual descriptions of the incidents could lead to.

The next narrative chapter relates to worldwide public reaction. More specifically, these worldwide public reactions consisted of almost exclusively foreign officials' condemnations of the Serb side. Simultaneously, Bosniak/Muslim leaders' statements about how senseless negotiations are in a situation when the civilian population is under shelling created the image of the necessity of this attack as "the only language

that Serbs understand".

The mentioned theme is directly connected to the beginning of the NATO air and ground forces' attack on the VRS positions, whereby the articles dedicated to the mentioned stage of the war in BiH can be (albeit roughly) divided into two axes. Detailed descriptions of the attacks and their effects, statements by Western leaders and Bosniak officials and civilians and the like, together create a whole that speaks of justification and the necessity of the attack. Researchers believe that these contents have a cathartic effect on the reader because they represent a kind of *emptying* of emotions that the powerful images of Markale 1 and Markale 2 create.

On the other hand, the statements of Russian and Serb officials, the suffering of Serb civilians, as well as rare examples of problematization of NATO military actions serve as a "counterweight" to the previously mentioned axis. Although these lines and passages do not allow the vulgar simplification of historical episodes known as Markale 1 and Markale 2, their lesser representation necessarily implies a lesser expressed doubt in the meaningfulness of NATO military actions against the VRS forces. Moreover, researchers believe that the basic task of a lesser representation of this axis is to provide contextualization of events and to create the feeling that this is a very important and complex situation *on the ground* between the warring parties.

However, when all the articles are considered integrally, two *lessons* can be drawn as practically indisputable. The first relates to the horror of the act – the descriptions of how civilians were killed are some of the most explicit ones. The second one is more subtle – the interrelation of all the mentioned themes related to Markale 1 and Markale 2, although slightly problematic, brings the later actions of NATO forces under the general framework of necessity. In other words, the reactions of all warring sides, apart from the Serb (and Russian), provides a reason for the air and ground attacks on the VRS positions to be explained under the slogan "that something had to be done at last".

4. **Conclusion**

Researchers have started from one clear assumption – reporting on the events that led to the war and the war itself in BiH was biased if the suffering of one ethnic group at the expense of another was emphasized and/or if one side was consistently portrayed as an attacker, criminal, and aggressor.

This simple and common-sense assumption had to be concretized into verifiable hypotheses:

- The Serb side was predominantly portrayed as an attacker compared to the Croat and Bosniak / Muslim sides,
- the Serb side was predominantly portrayed as an aggressor compared to the Croat and Bosniak / Muslim sides,
- the Serb side is predominantly portrayed in a negative context (use of negative epithets) compared to the Croat and Bosniak / Muslim sides.

Having in mind that the conflict in BiH was extensively covered by the media, the researchers had to implement strict selection criterion in the methodology. In this regard, two dailies representing the leading news agencies in the Anglo-Saxon-speaking area (*The New York Times* and *The Guardian*) were selected. The justification for the selection of these daily newspapers and their influence is also the fact that *The New York Times* has received over 120 Pulitzer prizes, which is more than any other daily newspaper has, while *The Guardian* has won the British Press Award four times. Daily newspapers and weeklies from other countries were not considered due to restricted human resources, such as the need for translators, and time limitations.

The same goes for the media whose basic format is audio-visual reporting. Considering that, the researchers set out to form a database of all articles related to reports about the Serbian side prior to and during the war in BiH. This defined article selection criterion (explicit mention of the relationship between Serbs and other ethnic groups in BiH and specific actions taken against Serbs in BiH) gave us the necessary flexibility in forming the database – selected texts were of very diverse formats and contents (e.g., from readers' letters, to field reports, to critical recapitulations). Also, the combination of qualitative (thematic) and quantitative (computerized) analysis has allowed for the formulation of very precise conclusions about how media bias manifests.

At the same time, this sampling criterion resulted in enormous engagement and the formation of a database whose scope, as far as researchers are aware, has not been reported so far. In other words, the conclusions are based on an analysis of (almost) all texts regarding the events that led to the war and the war itself in BiH from the aforementioned newspapers. To complete this entire task, the researchers had only four months, which was largely an aggravating factor. Despite this, the number of analyzed articles allowed for robust conclusions and clear guidelines for further media research to be made.

Finally, it should be emphasized that all three of the above hypotheses were confirmed, both through the analysis of the entire database of articles and through thematic clusters that ranged from specific historical events to certain time intervals

of historical significance. Nevertheless, research results should not be interpreted as definitive answers. The reason for this is the fact that the formed database of articles refers only to the events that led to the war and the war itself in BiH, with an emphasis exclusively on the image that was formed of the Serbs living on the territory of BiH in that period.

It should be noted that the researchers could not single out a certain number of articles, due to objective reasons (poor resolution of scanned texts, destroyed and/or missing pages, etc.), which means that there is room to enrich the database. Nevertheless, the researchers believe that, as a whole, their endeavor was carried out competently and that the results obtained will serve as a basis for future research.[29]

Endnotes

1 The Institute for Political Studies is a scientific research institution based in Belgrade, active in the field of social sciences for 50 years now. Over the course of half a century of its activity, the Institute has developed into a modern and independent scientific institution, specialising in complex social research. For more details visit: http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/.

2 Stojadinović, M., PhD, Senior Research Associate, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade & Jevtić, M., MA, Junior Research Assistant, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade. (2020).

3 Stojadinović & Jevtić: Media Content Analysis during the during the events that led to war, and war itself in Sarajevo (1991-1995). p. 133, 2020. [Institute of Political Studies, Belgrade]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

4 Zaccaria, G. *Serbianness*. [Aspen Institute Italia, Aspen], n.8.

5 Dr. Schneider was the operative name of General Reinhard Gehlen.

6 Professor Liam Kennedy is Director of the Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College Dublin. He has diverse research interests and teaching experiences, spanning the fields of American urban studies, visual culture, globalization and transatlantic relations. He is the author of Susan Sontag: Mind as Passion (1995) and Race and Urban Space in American Culture (2000). He is co-editor of Urban Space and Representation (1999) and City Sites: An Electronic Book (2000), and editor of Remaking Birmingham: The Visual Culture of Urban Regeneration (2004). Professor Kennedy's work is interdisciplinary, blending cultural and political modes of scholarly analysis, and represents American Studies as a valuable framework to study both American domestic and international affairs. He is currently researching a monograph on photography and international conflict, and preparing two edited books, one on urban photography and one on cultural diplomacy and US foreign policy. For more details, see: http://www.ucd.ie/photoconflict/contributors/liamkennedy/.

7 Scott Lucas became Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham in 2014, having been on the staff since 1989, and a Professor of American Studies since 1997. He began his career as a specialist in US and British foreign policy, but his research interests now also cover current international affairs, especially North Africa, the Middle East, and Iran - New Media, and Intelligence Services. A professional journalist since 1979, Professor Lucas is the founder and editor of EA WorldView, a leading website in daily news and analysis of Iran, Turkey, Syria, and the wider Middle East, as well as US foreign policy. For more details, see: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/lucas-scott.aspx.

[8] Prof. Dr. Michael Hochgeschwender is the professor of North American Cultural History, Empirical Cultural Research and Cultural Anthropology at the Ludwig-Maximilians Univesity (LMU), Faculty of Languages and Literatures, Department of English and American Studies, Munich, Germany.

[9] Beal, Amy C., Associate Professor of Music, University of California, Santa Cruz.

[10] This paper was prepared by USSR-EE division, Office of Political Analysis, and was coordinated with the Office of Central Reference, the International Issues Divisions/OPA, and with several offices within the Directorate of Operations. It was requested by the Department of State, Research of Operations. Research was completed on 9 May 1980. Questions and comments may be addressed to Chief, East Europe Branch, OPA.

[11] This estimate is issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the intelligence organizations of the Department of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. Also Participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, the Director of Intelligence, HQ, Marine Corps.

[12] For more details, visit: https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/.

[13] Pratik Chougule is a researcher and a public affairs consultant. He was previously the executive editor at *The American Conservative*, and the managing editor at *The National Interest*. During the 2016 elections, Chougule worked as a policy coordinator in the campaigns of Donald Trump and Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee. Chougule has assisted a number of former senior government officials in writing their memoirs, as well as in the researches behind them. From 2008-2009, Chougule served at the State Department in the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. He graduated as a member of Phi Beta Kappa from Brown University and holds a J.D. from Yale Law School. For more details, see: https://pratikchougule.com/about/.

[14] Samuel Moyn is Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of History at Yale Law School and a Professor of History at Yale University. He has written several books in his fields of European intellectual history and human rights history, including The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2010), and edited or co-edited a number of others. His most recent books are Christian Human Rights (2015), based on the Mellon Distinguished Lectures at the University of Pennsylvania in fall 2014, and Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018). Currently, he is working on a new book on the origins of the humane war for Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Over the years he has written in venues such as Boston Review, the Chronicle of Higher Education, Dissent, The Nation, The New Republic, the New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal. For more details, visit: https://law.yale.edu/samuel-moyn.

[15] Melanie Philips is a British journalist, author, and public commentator. She began her

career writing for *The Guardian* and *New Statesman*. During the 1990s, she came to identify with ideas more associated with the right and currently writes for *The Times*, *The Jerusalem Post*, and *The Jewish Chronicle*, covering political and social issues from a social conservative perspective. Phillips has appeared as a panelist on the BBC Radio 4 program *The Moral Maze* and *BBC One's Question Time*. She was awarded the Orwell Prize for Journalism in 1996, while she was writing for *The Observer*. Her books include the memoir *Guardian Angel: My Story, My Britain*. For more details, visit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melanie_Phillips.

16 A Canadian Jewish Organization.

17 Mira Beham, born in 1956 in Munich, is a publicist, freelance journalist, and translator from English and Serbian. She is the author of a political-biographical book about the President of the German Parliament (Rita Submuth, 1993) and one book with her contributions is "Serbia Must Die" (Serbien muss sterbien, 1994). She lectured at the prestigious Deutsche Journalistenschule (School of Journalism) in Munich, the Bavarian Press Academy, and the University of Munich.

18 October 1, 1995 – U.S. Army Officer: Propaganda Machine Whipping Up Support for US Intervention in Bosnia. The Foreign Military Studies Office publishes a piece by Army Lt. Col. John E. Sray who writes that advocates of a U.S. intervention in Bosnia have formed a "prolific propaganda machine" to increase public support for deploying NATO forces to Bosnia. The propaganda machine is made up of a "strange combination of three major spin doctors, including public relations (PR) firms in the employ of the Bosniaks, media pundits, and sympathetic elements of the US State Department," he says, who use "[d]iffering styles, approaches, and emphases" to advance their views. He notes how some of them have gone so far as to attack anti-interventionists as harboring "pro-Serb" or even "Nazi" sympathies. The United States' European allies, who do not favor an intervention, are informed "from different information and a more realistic historical perspective," he says. "They retain the advantages of more in-depth, professional, and probing journalism and better reporting from their embassies. Furthermore, they pay less attention to the constant propaganda themes emanating from the Bosniaks [Bosnian Muslim government] and their agents—the PR firms." For more details, visit: http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=john_e__sray_1.

19 An advisor to *Rossiya Segodnya* International News Agency (since December, 2014). Professor at the Media Department of HSE University. An Academic Supervisor of the International News Production, an HSE Masters' Program. Oleg used to work as the News Director and Acting Managing Director of the English Service of the Voice of Russia Radio (now – Radio Sputnik). From 2007 to 2013 he was a Director of Training at RT television news channel. In the 1990s Oleg was a contributor to CNN World Report.

[20] Hannes Hofbauer was born in 1955 in Vienna. He studied economic and social history at the Viennese University and currently works as a publisher and editor. Some of his books, such as *Balkanski rat* (publisher: Filip Visnjić), *Eksperiment Kosovo* (publisher: Albatros plus), *Naručena istina - Kupljena pravda* (publisher: Jasen), were published in Serbian.

[21] Guy Mettan is a Swiss journalist, politician, author, and columnist for various Swiss newspapers. He is the Executive Director of the Geneva Press Club, President of the Swiss-Russian Joint Chambers of Commerce and former President of the International Association of Press Clubs. He was the Director and editor-in-chief of *La Tribune de Genève* from 1992 to 1998. As a Deputy in the Geneva Parliament since 2001, he was its Speaker in 2010. Authoring several books, he published *Russie-Occident: une guerre de mille ans* (publisher: Editions des Syrtes) in 2015. In the United States, the book was released with the title *Creating Russophobia: From the Great Religious Schism to Anti-Putin Hysteria* (published by Clarity Press in Atlanta, 2017). There are now French, Italian, Russian, Serbian, and Swedish editions of this book, in addition to the English one. His latest book focused on the destiny of Europe (Le continent perdu: Plaidoyer pour une Europe démocratique et souveraine, published by Editions des Syrtes in 2019). For more details, visit: https://fjawards.com/jury/7-guy-mettan.

[22] Thomas Deichmann is a freelance journalist and a researcher living in Frankfurt, Germany. His articles about the Yugoslav crisis appeared in numerous European publications and he has become an internationally recognized specialist and critic of the Western media. In 1996, he appeared as an expert witness before the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, called by the defense of Dusko Tadic. Short bio taken from: R. Clark (Ed.). *NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition*. New York, NY-US: International Action Center.

[23] Slobodan Despot is a Swiss/Serbian writer and publisher, born in 1967 in Sremska Mitrovica (then Yugoslavia). He has worked for 17 years with the famous publishing house L'Age d'Homme, in Lausanne and Paris, as a translator, editor, and deputy CEO. He translated, among others works, the works of indispensable Serbian writers such as Dobrica Ćosić and Miloš Crnjanski, as well as the great Russian philosopher Alexander Zinoviev. Since 2006, he has been running his own publishing house Xenia in Switzerland. He has also founded and/or ran several journals and magazines, with themes ranging from politics to health. Slobodan Despot also serves as a PR advisor to prominent Swiss personalities, such as ecologist Franz Weber and MP and Minister Oskar Freysinger. He is the author of 10 books, two of which are award-winning novels, *Le Miel* (*Honey*, 2014) and *Le Rayon bleu* (*The Blue Ray*, 2017), both of which were published by the famed French publisher Gallimard. Slobodan currently runs a weekly newsletter, *Antipresse* (antipresse.net), with a strong and ironic stance against the mainstream media manipulations.

[24] *Le Miel* is a book written by Slobodan Despot, which was published by Gallimard in 2014.

[25] For example: https://www.yorksj.ac.uk/schools/humanities-religion--philosophy/centres--resources/centr-for-religion-in-society/cris-resources/creative-media-arts-and-peacebuilding/balkans-and-bosnia-herzegovina-films/.

[26] For more details, see: http://www.zlocininadsrbima.com/EN/Crime.aspx?Naslov=The-death-of-12-newborns-from-Banja-Luka.

[27] The following text is an integral part of an analysis performed by Dr. Aleksandar Mitić in his paper *Manufacturing of the "good and evil" archetype in Western media before the beginning of armed hostilities in former Yugoslavia*. The paper can be consulted at the Government of the Republic Srpska Archives.

[28] The Institute for Political Studies is a scientific research institution based in Belgrade that has been active in the field of social sciences for 50 years now. Over the course of half a century of its activity, the Institute has developed into a modern and independent scientific institution, specializing in complex social research. For more details, visit: http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/.

[29] From the final report: *Media Content Analysis: The events that led to the war and the war itself in Sarajevo (1991-1995)*. (2020). Belgrade, SRB: Institute for Political Studies. The entire paper, together with the databases, can be consulted at the Government of the Republika Srpska Archives.

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CHAPTER V

The Suffering of the Serbs in Sarajevo

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter aims to provide objective and analytical research into the fate of the Bosnian Serb community in the city of Sarajevo in the context of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992-1995. It therefore also deals with the core issues of the war: analysis of the character of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the genesis and the military balance of the armed forces of the warring parties, and the battle of Sarajevo. The fundamental view of the author is that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992-1995 was an ethnic conflict, the essence of which is the struggle between mobilized ethnic groups for power – whether it is for equal rights within a state, or for the establishment of a fully independent state. This view has gained currency in the international academic community, and reflects the contradictory traditions of conflict and accommodation that characterized the relationship of ethnic communities in the Balkans for centuries. This chapter aims also to fill in the gap to the extent possible in the research related to the origins, dynamics and military operations related to the blockade of Sarajevo and their impact on the Serb community in the city, and consists of an introduction, several sections (outlined below), and a conclusion.

Section 1 (Character of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina) explores the subject of the character of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of the law of armed conflict.

Section 2 (Armed Forces of the Warring Parties) discusses the military context and describes the armies of the three warring parties (ARBiH, HVO, VRS), including their creation and evolution, organization and equipment and strong and weak points.

Section 3 deals with an early stage of the civil war and the SDA putsch in Sarajevo on 05 and 06 April 1992.

Section 4 aims to elucidate the least known aspects of the blockade and battle of Sarajevo, including the plans of warring parties, combat operations, and ARBiH 1st Corps shelling and sniper activities.

Section 5 provides an account of the suffering and fate of the Serb community in Sarajevo during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995.

The fundamental conclusion of the chapter is that the calculated policy of ethnic cleansing took a terrible toll on the Serb community in Sarajevo, which due to terror and intimidation virtually ceased to exist.

This analysis is based on a wide variety of sources: (a) a review of the recent literature and media; (b) analysis of ICTY documents in the public domain; and (c) analysis of documents available for research in the archive of the Republika Srpska Center for Research of War, War Crimes, and Search for Missing Persons.

1. **Introduction**

Of all the academic research related to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the theme of the ordeal and suffering of the Serb community in Sarajevo is the least explored. The capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, has been the centerpiece of the political and military developments of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995, and justifiably merits the attention of researchers to this day. However, conflicting perspectives and controversies are of concern for both the quality and quantity of research related to the theme of the character of the war and the battle of Sarajevo, and there is an obvious tendency to politicization.

In a wider historical context, of all the historical parallels with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most valid one is the parallel with the Spanish civil war of 1936-1939. “Bosnia is our Spain”, observed French public philosopher Bernard-Henry Lévy. A Saudi editor agreed: “The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish civil war. Those who die there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims.” Political scientist Samuel Huntington believed that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was fought between civilizations and religions (Huntington, 1988, pp. 290-291). Both comparisons are seriously misplaced.

The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina indeed had distinct similarities with the civil war in Spain of 1936-1939. The Spanish civil was a war between the political ideology of democracy and internationalism on one hand, and the ideology of European fascism on the other. Spanish republicans were fighting to defend the right to self-determination for Catalonia and the Basque Country. The Spanish fascists were supported by German Nazis and Italian fascists, and tacitly by British and French conservatives through the hypocritical policy of so-called "non-intervention."

In the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs from Republika Srpska of all political convictions were fighting against the threat of extermination, for self-determination and civil rights. They defended their rights to live in the constitutional and internationally recognized Yugoslavia in which they had been living for the past 70 years. The initial objective of the creation of Republika Srpska was the preservation of Yugoslavia. When Muslims and Croats rejected Yugoslavia, the objective of Republika Srpska changed from the preservation of Yugoslavia to political and cultural autonomy and equal rights for the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were fighting for a unitary state, in which there would be no place for political and cultural autonomy for Serbs. In this war Bosnian Muslims were supported by Muslim states and the "humanitarian intervention" of the United States and NATO.

In his memoirs on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, "Balkan Odyssey", international negotiator and Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia Lord David Owen emphasized that "never before I had to operate in such a climate of dishonor, propaganda and dissembling. Many of the people with whom I had to deal in the former Yugoslavia were literally strangers to truth" (Owen, 1996, p. 365).

In this regard, General Lewis MacKenzie, General Michael Rose, Yasushi Akashi, David Owen, Cyrus Vance, Thorvand Stoltenberg and Lord Carrington all formed the view that none of the parties was innocent when it came to violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those who failed to attribute all blame to the Serbs and who had more nuanced and less politicized views on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were accused of being "anti-Muslim" and "anti-democratic."

Some received death threats from the Alija Izetbegović' government. One such United Nations official was Philip Corwin, UN Civil Affairs officer in Sarajevo, who was a first-hand witness of the real situation in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Corwin, 2000, p. 216.).

In the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992-1995, the Muslim political elite pictured Sarajevo as a symbol of a tolerant multi-cultural and multi-confessional

city. Alija Izetbegović's regime presented Sarajevo as a city-victim and the bearer of high standards of human rights. However, when blurring stereotypes and platitudes are swept away by a magnifying glass scrutiny of wartime Sarajevo, reality becomes clear and shocking.

The methodology of this research combines general methods of political research and military intelligence cycles. This chapter hopes to present a factual side of the battle of Sarajevo, and overcome the chasm between the Western perception of wartime Sarajevo and the grim reality, and concentrates on the fate of the Sarajevo Serb community. This chapter draws on a broad variety of sources:

1. Document collections in the possession of the Republic Center for War Research, War Crimes and Search for Missing Persons;
2. Materials of institutions and organizations of the Republika Srpska (President's Office, National Assembly, Government, VRS) from the period of 1992-1995;
3. Materials from institutions and organizations of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Presidency, National Assembly, Government, so-called ABIH) from the period of 1992-1995;
4. Materials of relevant international institutions and organizations;
5. Monographs, memoirs, press reports, and other materials by domestic and foreign authors present in RBiH between 1992 and 1995;
6. Materials used in proceedings before international and domestic courts in reference to war-time events in Sarajevo.

After 10 years of work with the United Nations in Bosnia Herzegovina in war and peace, the author considers his moral obligation to complete his research, which is intended to serve as a lasting tribute to all civilian victims of this war, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

2. Character of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

2.1. Review of bibliography

To explore wartime Sarajevo, one first has to determine the context and the character of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992-1995. The views of the character of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina are far from being definitively established,

and continue to be contested by historians, politicians and public figures. British journalist Ivo Petkovski commented on perceptions of the war in the West:

> The way the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s will be remembered by future historians is still being established, however in the western media an overall impression is already starting to coagulate from the messy tangle that made up the reality of the conflict. This simplified narrative tends to cast Serbia as aggressors, Bosnian Muslims as victims, NATO as:
>
> rescuing heroes and Croatia as bemused onlookers. Perhaps it is always the fate of the loser in a conflict to play the bad guy in the resulting film – that certainly seems to be the case with the Bosnian Serbs … However, in the rush to assign the simplified roles of aggressor and victim, crucial details are being sidelined – this was not a war of aggression, but a civil war, with atrocities committed on all sides. (Petkovski, 2010)

The issue of the character of the war has been debated by the international academic community for quite some time. To this date, this debate has generated two mutually irreconcilable views. One is that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a war of aggression waged by SRJ (Serbia and Montenegro) against the internationally recognized and democratic Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second view is that the war fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 was a civil war among its three nations, which pursued mutually exclusive political agendas.

Bosniak[1] historians and politicians, as well as numerous others, regard the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an aggression. They believe that internationally recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina was "a victim of Serbian aggression" committed by Yugoslavia assisted by "local chetniks."[2]

These authors expound the view that the war of 1992-1995 was waged between the "Serb aggressor" and the multi-national army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) which allegedly was fighting for the common interests of its citizens of all nationalities and religions. Bosniak historians espouse the view that the ARBiH struggle under the command and leadership of BiH President Alija Izetbegović was morally justified and legitimate, while Bosnian Serbs were allegedly "aggressors". This Bosniak nationalist concept is seriously flawed.

Federation authors of Bosniak and Croat origin share the common view that SRJ (Serbia and Montenegro) committed an act of aggression against both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this sense the view of Bosnian historian Mustafa Imamović is predominant in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

> Serbia and Montenegro meticulously organized, planned, and executed aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina in the spring of 1992, with the active support of Bosnian and Herzegovinian chetniks. In 1992 and early 1993 Croatia became an aggressor. Ustasha elements of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) supported this aggression. (Imamović, 1998, p. 20).

Most Bosniak politicians and historians also regard Croatia's role in the war as an "aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina", despite the fact that the Croatian Army's involvement in the war was ambiguous at best. The Croatian Army initially was an ally of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, only to enter later into an armed conflict with Izetbegović's regime. After the creation of the Muslim-Croat Federation, the Croatian Army and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina again became allies, and participated in joint operations against the Army of Republika Srpska. Croatian historians do not divide the war into two separate conflicts – the one in Croatia and the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Croatian historian Dario Nikić Čakar:

> For Bosnian Croats the national history is not the Bosnian and Herzegovinian history. They always considered Croatia, not Bosnia and Herzegovina, as their true Fatherland. Therefore, for them, civil war was primarily the war in Croatia and the Croatian territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Čakar, 2011, p. 57)

President Alija Izetbegović (2001) repeatedly denied his responsibility for the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on numerous occasions stressed:

> This is not an ordinary war, not just occupation by Serbia, but is a genocidal war against a civilian population and its religious, national, and cultural values. (p. 129)

The general public in Serbia and in Republika Srpska are unanimous in their opinion that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 was a civil war, and had political and religious roots. In Serbia and in Republika Srpska this war is commonly referred to as the "Fatherland Defensive War", which was waged to defend and protect Serb people from extermination, and as Serb "never again" (Pandurević, 2012). Serbian historians maintain the view that the Serbs of Bosnia waged the civil war of 1992-1995 to defend their right to self-determination, and avert the threat of genocide. They believe that since Serbs were a constitutive nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they could not be aggressors against themselves (Avramov, 1997, p. 217).

Among those who believe that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 was a civil war is prominent public international law expert James Crawford. He described the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a civil war:

> Bosnia and Herzegovina, a component of SFRY, contained Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats, amongst whom in 1992 a civil war erupted. The central government, in which Bosnian Muslims kept key offices, did not exercise effective control outside Muslim majority areas; elsewhere Serbian separatists established the "Republika Srpska", putatively an independent state. (Crawford, 2006, p. 528)

Paul Shoup, Emeritus Professor at the University of Virginia, and co-author of the authoritative book "The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention" argues that a plan to partition Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia had real advantages, and that a real alternative to partition was a civil war. According to Shoup:

> If Bosnia was not regarded as having the right to statehood – and the history of Bosnia suggested how unprepared she was to undertake this task – then there could be no objection in principle to such a solution. In the end the Bosnian project, in whatever variant, could not win international backing, because the international community was firm in support of multi-ethnicity, existing republic borders, and international mediation for resolving the wars in the former Yugoslavia. But in the conditions that prevailed in 1991-1992, this meant a civil war. (ICTY, 2004, *Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin,* p. 26)

Serb military analyst Milovan Milutinović shares the same view:

> If the characteristics of the conflict in BiH are regarded in their reality, one can conclude that this was an internal conflict among national and religious groups, which were guided by respective political authorities. This makes this conflict a national and religious conflict of all three warring parties. (Milutinović, 2016, p. 35)

2.2. ICRC Definitions

An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. The ICRC and the practice of international tribunals has highlighted the following features of a non-international conflict (civil war):

- War is waged in the territory and within the borders of an internationally recognized state which has a sufficiently large population.
- Warring parties involved in the armed violence must have a minimum level of organization. Warring parties have their political programs, and profess their publicly articulated political goals.
- Warring parties have their organized armed forces.
- The state directly participates in war through the engagement of the army and police. If the state authority does not function, or collapses, then the group which represents the state at the international level and claims the state authority is a warring party.
- All warring parties utilize their internal human resources.
- All warring parties conduct hostilities in the form of offensive and defensive operations in accordance with their military manuals and regulations.
- A non-international conflict ends with settlement (cease-fire, armistice), military defeat of a warring party, or peace agreement, after which a relatively long period of peace ensues.[3]

The above ICRC definition of a non-international conflict fully satisfies the elements of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- Hostilities were limited to the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was granted international recognition on 6 April 1992. At that moment, RBiH had a population of 4.4 million people. The ethnic breakdown was 43.7 % Muslims, 31.3 % Serbs, 17. 3% Croats, and 7.7% Yugoslavs.

- There were four warring parties locked into a conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Muslim-dominated Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, the self-proclaimed Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and the self-proclaimed Muslim government of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. These warring parties were politically organized and governed by their political parties: Moslems had their Party of Democratic Action (SDA); Serbs had their Serb Democratic Party (SDS); Croats had their Croat Democratic Union (HDZ). They also had their political programs and articulated political goals. The SDA, despite all the public rhetoric about "multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Bosnia and Herzegovina", was holding out the hope that they would, in time, become the absolute majority in Bosnia and thus be the titular nationality reducing Serbs and Croats to minority status, and quietly worked on the ground towards this goal. The SDS declared that it stood for the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a constituent republic within Yugoslavia. However, when the SDA and HDZ rejected this option, the SDS in January 1992 declared the creation of the independent Republika Srpska, associated with Yugoslavia. While the SDA claimed to represent the entire "multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Bosnia and Herzegovina", the SDS presented itself as representing only the Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Croats also claimed to represent their Republic of Herzeg-Bosna in July 1992 and their intention to join Croatia.
- These warring parties had their own armed forces. Bosnian Muslims created the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH); Bosnian Serbs created their Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), and Bosnian Croats had their Croatian Defense Council (HVO). ARBiH claimed to represent all the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to protect the rights of all its citizens. However, ARBiH had no moral or legal rights for such claims, as its personnel was 95% Bosnian Muslim. While many analysts and historians of the Bosnian war tend to think of this conflict as one of irregular forces, a CIA study challenges this perception:

A key goal of our study was to dispel the many myths that have sprang up with regard to the conflict. Chief among these myths is the perception that the war was fought by hordes of heavily armed "paramilitary" thugs, operating outside of any government, or only loosely controlled by the government, or that the so-called "armies" consisted of nothing more than loosely organized regional warlords and militias and that it was these thugs who were responsible for the "ethnic cleansing" that infamously distinguished so many of the campaigns. In fact, virtually all of the fighting was done by professionally led, relatively well-organized citizen-armies, and the contrary view is largely the

> product of mirror-imaging by Western officers who regularly disparaged the appearance, discipline, and professionalism of the armies involved. In opposition to these superficial assessments, our research showed that each army quickly developed a regular structure with a centralized staff controlling a hierarchy of formations and units, including specialized tactical and support elements, such as air defense, transport, training, military police, and communications. Each force had a definite chain of command and all the features of a regular army… (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2002, p. xiii)

• All warring parties were engaged in intensive fighting. As a result, by early 1993, the state authority of RBiH had degenerated into a state of collapse, but the core group of Bosnian Muslim politicians under President Alija Izetbegović continued to represent the state at international level. According to David Owen:

> In all our meetings and papers we were scrupulous in treating Izetbegović as President and his ministers as members of the government of an independent state, while being aware that they constituted one of the three parties to a dispute which had to have a negotiated solution ... It became increasingly difficult to uphold and justify this politically correct position. We could not ignore the reality that Izetbegović was in control of only about 11 per cent of the country, while the Bosnian Croats controlled slightly more territory due to the wholehearted support they received from the Croatian government and the presence in considerable numbers of Croatian government forces. The collective Presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina elected in 1990 consisted of seven people, but by 1992 it was exercising less and less of the collective power given to it under the constitution … By the end of 1992 it was becoming clear to all that power had gone to a small group of Muslim ministers appointed by President Izetbegović and their nominee as Vice-President, Ejup Ganić. The collective Presidency as a democratic body with meaningful representation from the three constituent nations was in the autumn 1993 no longer a reality. The real decisions were made elsewhere. We were in effect dealing with a Muslim government for a predominantly Muslim population. (Owen, 1996, p. 365)

• The armies of all warring parties with the exception of a limited number of foreign fighters were drafted from the native citizenry of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All warring parties exercised massive mobilizations in the territories under their control (Bose, 2002, p. 20).

• In the course of the war, all warring parties conducted numerous offensive and defensive operations in accordance with their military concepts, manuals and regulations.

• The war ended in November 1995, when warring parties signed the Dayton Peace Accords. This was followed by an extended period of peace.

The above criteria largely correspond with the Yugoslavia Military Leksikon (*Vojni leksikon*) definition of a civil war:

> The civil war is an armed conflict within a country between distinct social classes, groups and opposing forces, in which each party strives to achieve certain political, economic and other goals. In this situation the warring parties construct their own political and military structures, that is armies, and organize their own authority and power. (*Vojni leksikon,* 1981, p. 152)

It is this definition which determined the perception of the war for all warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.3. ICJ and ICTY Verdicts

In 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina sued Serbia for alleged genocide in the United Nations International Court of Justice. Dr. Francis Boyle, an adviser to Alija Izetbegović, filed the claim. Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that Serbia and Montenegro committed aggression and genocide and attempted to exterminate the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and demanded reparations. Specifically, Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that

> Under the guise of protecting the Serbian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, [Serbia] in fact conceived and shared with them the vision of a 'Greater Serbia,' in pursuit of which it gave its support to those persons and groups responsible for the activities which constitute the genocidal acts complained of". (International Court of Justice, 2007b, para. 237)

The International Court of Justice dealt with the case over a period of 14 years. In January 2007, the Court pronounced its judgement. By thirteen votes to two, the Court determined that:

> Serbia has not committed genocide, through its organs or persons whose acts engage its responsibility under customary international law, in violation of its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. (International Court of Justice, 2007b, para. 471)

By thirteen votes to two, the Court also found that Serbia

> Had not conspired to commit genocide, nor incited the commission of genocide, in violation of its obligations under the Convention on the prevention of the Crime of Genocide ... In the view of the Court, the Applicant has not proved that instructions were issued by the federal authorities in Belgrade, or by any other organ of the FRY, to commit the massacres, still less that any such instructions were given with the specific intent (dolus specialis) characterizing the crime of genocide. All indications are to the contrary ... The Court concludes from the foregoing that the acts of those who committed genocide at Srebrenica cannot be attributed to the Respondent under the rules of international law of State responsibility: thus, the international responsibility of the Respondent is not engaged on this basis. (International Court of Justice, 2007b, paras. 471, 413-415).

By thirteen votes to two, the Court also found that Serbia had not conspired to commit genocide, nor incited the commission of genocide. The International Court of Justice established that there was no evidence that genocide had been committed on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

> In the light of its review of the factual evidence before it of the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991-1995, the Court has concluded that, save for the events of July 1995 at Srebrenica, the necessary intent required to constitute genocide has not been conclusively shown in relation to each specific incident basis. (International Court of Justice, 2007b, paras. 319, 370)

As to the contention of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the very pattern of the atrocities committed over many communities, over a lengthy period, focused on Bosnian Muslims and Croats, demonstrates the necessary intent to commit genocide, the Court ruled that it cannot agree with such a broad proposition. The International Court of Justice pointed out that:

Dolus specialis, that is the specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, has to

> be convincingly shown by reference to particular circumstances, unless a general plan to that end can be convincingly demonstrated to exist; and for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent. (International Court of Justice, 2007b, para. 373)

However, the International Court of Justice concluded that the acts committed at Srebrenica, falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention, were committed with the specific intent to destroy in part a group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and accordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed by members of the VRS in and around Srebrenica from about 13 July 1995.

But it has not been shown that the FRY army took part in the massacres, nor that the political leaders of the FRY had a hand in preparing, planning or in any way carrying out the massacres (International Court of Justice, 2007b, para. 386).

The CIA study "Balkan Battlegrounds" refuted, among the many misconceptions about this war, the notion that the army of FRY ground troops fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

> the most striking is that large numbers of Yugoslav Army ground troops fought in Bosnia during the conflict and that the VRS was under the command of the VJ General Staff. There is no evidence to support this notion, despite frequent assertions by ill-informed journalists. (CIA, 2003, p. 275)

It has not been shown that there was any such participation in relation to the massacres committed at Srebrenica. Further, neither Republika Srpska nor the VRS were de jure organs of the FRY, since none of them had the status of an organ of that State under its internal law (International Court of Justice, 2007b, para. 386).

Though international public law is not the task of the ICTY, the Tribunal has in many trial cases established the nature of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As charges under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) are based on the existence of international armed conflict, for jurisdictional reasons and as an element of alleged crimes, most of the Judges have ruled on the internal and international character of the conflict (Bogojeva, 2017). For example, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case determined that:

> The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could have been characterized as both internal and international, or alternatively, as an internal conflict alongside an international one, or as an internal conflict that had become internationalized because of external support, or as an international conflict that had subsequently been replaced by one or more internal conflicts, or some combination thereof. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia had been rendered international by the involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the involvement of the Yugoslav National Army ("JNA") in hostilities in Croatia, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina at least until its formal withdrawal on 19 May 1992. To the extent that the conflicts had been limited to clashes between

> Bosnian Government forces and Bosnian Serb rebel forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as between the Croatian Government and Croatian Serb rebel forces in Krajina (Croatia), they had been internal (unless direct involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) could be proven). It is notable that the parties to this case also agree that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 have had both internal and international aspects. (ICTY, 1995, *Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić,* para. 72)

The ICTY trial chamber judgement in the Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura case also established that the war in Central Bosnia was an internal armed conflict:

> Ruling on the evidence produced by the Prosecution in cross-examination and finding that it would be admissible only insofar as it provides further details about the general context of this case and that it cannot serve to establish the international nature of the conflict in respect of the applicable law, the Chamber recognizes that it is in fact dealing with an internal armed conflict. (ICTY, 2006, *Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura,* paras. 27-28).

3. Armed Forces of Warring Parties

3.1. Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

On 31 July 1990, the SRBiH Constitutional Commission adopted Amendments 59-80 to the SRBiH Constitution, which in their totality constituted an important constitutional reform within the legal framework of the SFRY (Begić, 1997, pp. 45-53). Item 7 of Amendment 69 expressly ruled out "any activities aimed at putting territorial integrity of the SFRY in jeopardy" (Official Gazette of Socialist Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990). This provision was in agreement with the SFRY Constitution.[4]

However, in violation of the Constitution, the SDA commenced vigorous clandestine activities to create the SDA's private paramilitary army. The JNA document "Report about the state of combat readiness" dated 23 January 1992, provided analysis of SDA activities:

> As far as the SDA is concerned, it is getting more and more obvious that it is pursuing an intention to create an independent and sovereign BiH out of the

> framework of Yugoslavia. With this agenda, it is expressing open antagonism towards Serbs and the JNA, and has started to create its armed formations. Taking advantage of the position of the ruling party, the SDA had begun augmenting armed formations of TO and MUP, and fused its own armed formations into them.[5]

According to Bosniak sources, the Bosnian Muslim population in the cities of the Drina River valley started acquiring weapons and creating paramilitary armed units as early as 1990. The first SDA paramilitary unit was formed on 2 August 1990 in the small town of Ustikolina in the valley of the river Drina in Eastern Bosnia. In the same period, underground Muslim armed units were also raised in Zvornik, Bijeljina, Bratunac, Srebrenica and Vlasenica (Hodžić, 1998, p. 248).

In mid-March 1991, the SDA Main Board sent a Directive to local SDA cells in all municipalities, instructing them to start the process of the creation of military units under the common title of the "Patriotic League". 31 March 1991 is considered to be the formal date of the creation of the "Patriotic League", as the first clandestine meeting of the organization took place in the Sarajevo quarter of Sokbunar on this date (Halilbegović, 2005, pp. 97-98).

The "Patriotic League" constituted the future Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. General Nenad Ajnadžić, one of the architects of the "Patriotic League", emphasized in his memoirs that the "Patriotic League" was a military-political and defensive organization of the SDA, and constituted the basis of the future Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) (Ajnadžić, 2002, p. 111). RBiH President and SDA leader Alija Izetbegović became an honorary member of the "Patriotic League" (ICTY, 2008, *Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić*, para. 134).

On 10 June 1991, the SDA held the Congress of Muslims in Sarajevo. Almost 400 delegates from all over SFRY attended the Congress. The Congress established the "Council for the National Protection of the Muslim Nation" and adopted Resolution 84, which called upon Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina to create their own army and commence preparations for war. In his book of memoirs, ARBiH Main Staff Chief of the Department of Ideology and Morale, General Fikret Muslimović, emphasized that the historical significance of the 10 June Congress was the expression of "the SDA's responsibility for preparation of the people for the preservation of the nation and the state" (Muslimović, 1996, p. 206). As ARBiH Chief of Logistics Centre and subsequently BiH Minister of Defense Hasan Čengić explained:

> We decided to form the Patriotic League organization through the structure of the SDA, because it was the only party we could rely on … The main

> idea was simple: we should have an organization of a military nature which would, in the case of a serious military attack, become the backbone of the total national and patriotic mobilization.[6]

The Congress Resolution 84 did not contain any references to the Serb nation or Croat nation, and only made an appeal to vague "patriotic forces." The Congress also made a decision "to organize armed defense", which in reality meant preparations for war.

The political wing of the "Patriotic League" comprised prominent SDA functionaries: Alija Izetbegović, Omer Behmen, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, and Nasih Rašidagić. SDA President Alija Izetbegović was the main organizer and chief ideological leader of the "Patriotic League." Izetbegović personally guided the process of the formation of the "Patriotic League", with the support of President Franjo Tuđman of Croatia.

The military wing of the "Patriotic League" included former Muslim JNA officers who left the JNA: Lieutenant-Commander Meho Karišnik, Major Sefer Halilović, Major Wahid Karavelić, Lieutenant-Colonel Sulejman Vranj, Lieutenant-Colonel Nenad Ajnadžić, Commander Mustafa Hajrulahović, aka "Talijan." Former JNA Major Sefer Halilović was promoted to "Patriotic League Commander" (Karavelić, 2004, pp. 198-201).

The staff of the Sarajevo "Patriotic League" headquarters was composed exclusively of leaders of SDA municipal organizations. They were Šerif Bečić, Munir Radača i Kemo Hrvoje (Pale), Mehmed Skaka and Faris Fočo (Stari Grad), Mirsad Trnka and Amir Oruč (Centar), Ahmed Isaković (Novo Sarajevo), Said Memić (Ilidža), Mustafa Delilović and Muris Ibrica (Hadžići), Haris Trnka (Vogošća). The head of the Sarajevo "Patriotic League" headquarters was Nihad Halilbegović, the president of Sarajevo branch of the SDA, and a close associate of Alija Izetbegović (Halilbegović, 2013).

The SDA created an unconstitutional para-military armed force when the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was still a constituent republic of the SFRY, and the only legal military formations in the territory of RBiH were the JNA and TO. The decision to create the "Patriotic League" was a major step towards the dismantling legal system of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Patriotic League's stated purpose was to defend a "united" Bosnia-Herzegovina, although what this meant was left somewhat unclear. Overwhelmingly Muslim in its membership, the Patriotic League included some Croats and even a small number of Serbs (CIA, 2002, p. 130).

Created out of the RBiH constitutional framework, the "Patriotic League" was an illegal paramilitary organization, and operated in secrecy. Former JNA officers Sulejman Vranj, Rifat Bilajac and Munib Bisić developed organizational and operational documents (Hodžić, 1998, p. 13). The SDA sent its members for military training in Croatia.[7] This training was organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Croatia. The members of the "Patriotic League" swore their allegiance to Allah:

> I swear to Allah, that I will protect the freedom and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, my sole Motherland, whose historic borders are eternal and untouchable, and I will protect people and citizens whose religion rights and freedoms are under threat. I am ready to sacrifice my life for this goal. (Hoare, 2004, pp. 87-88)

In early September 1991, the "Patriotic League" began the organization of its staff and battalions at municipal level, and commenced the process of covert mobilization. President Alija Izetbegović personally guided the process of the creation of Muslim paramilitary formations.

The SDA and the "Patriotic League" also had aspirations over the territories of Serbia and Montenegro. Providing his witness testimony to ICTY judges, former JNA KOS General Vasiljević stated that the SDA organized regional units of the "Patriotic League" in the SFRY area of Sandjak with a mainly Slavic Muslim population, with the purpose of staging an anti-government mutiny (ICTY, 2013, *Prosecutor v Karadžić and Mladić*, p. 34665).

In early 1992, the "Patriotic League" was organized with the Main Headquarters, 9 Regional Headquarters, 102 Municipal Headquarters, and numerous field units. Regional HQs were organized in Bihać, Prijedor, Livno, Doboj, Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo, Goražde, and Mostar. Their size ranged from a platoon to a brigade. The total strength of the "Patriotic League" reached 120,000 men (Halilović, 1997, p. 166).

There are numerous documents and statements in the possession of the RCIRZ indicating the SDA's and HDZ's role in arming Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The RBiH MUP was involved in the illegal distribution of arms to Muslim paramilitary formations. For example, MUP officer Senaid Memić in his statement said that "on the request and orders of some leaders of the SDA", he delivered and distributed 5,000 automatic rifles and 1,400,000 rounds of ammunition to the Muslim paramilitary units SRBiH in Sandjak. MUP Minister Alija Delimustafić and other high-ranking MUP officials facilitated these activities, arranging security for the transportation of weapons, and issuing forged documents to SDA activists involved in the smuggling of weapons.[8]

The Sarajevo newpaper *Oslobođenje* euphorically reported:

> On the orders of Kemo, Doctor, Sulet, and Bisić, in summer last year (1991), Mevludin Smajić was engaged for the purchase and delivery of weapons and explosives. "You can imagine how dangerous it was to travel in Croatia, which in summer last year was in war, and I was procuring weapons on the orders of the "Patriotic League". During two months, every second day, I used to deliver explosives from Croatia … He delivered, on his own, 120 kg of explosives to Sokolac, and was distributing it among patriots, explaining to them how to make bombs. ("Znali smo kako ćemo", 1992)

The first strategically important deliveries of weapons started on 20 June 1991, when Bulgaria sent a shipment of 5,000 automatic rifles, anti-tank weapons and ammunition worth $4.3 million to Croatia and Bosnia through the Bulgarian state company Kintex (Šurc & Zgaga, 2013, pp. 208-235). RBiH Minister of Internal Affairs Asif Delimustafić was secretly relocating MUP stores of weapons and ammunition from Serb-dominated to Muslim-dominated areas.[9]

According to the SDA delegate in the RBiH Parliament, Ibran Mustafić (2008, p. 161), in April 1992 "Patriotic League" units in Srebrenica had about 2,000 automatic rifles, mortars, and 30mm anti-aircraft cannon. On 2 December 1991, Alija Izetbegović held a meeting with Sefer Halilović and his officers in Hrasnica. Alija Izetbegović approved Halilović's plan to exercise a covert mobilization and mobilize 250,000 men (Halilović, 1997, pp. 54-55). The high mobilization potential of the Muslin nation and the steady flow of arms from Croatia for the "Patriotic League" made Alija Izetbegović confident of victory in the coming war. Halilović's report on the network and strength of the "Patriotic league" emboldened him to pursue a confrontational policy of separation from Yugoslavia. On 21 December 1991, Alija Izetbegović made a sinister public statement:

> I would not sacrifice independence of BiH for peace, but I would sacrifice peace for independence of BiH. (Čengić, 2015, p. 94)

Simultaneously with the creation of the "Patriotic League", another network of the Bosnian Muslim paramilitary organization was created. This network was commonly known as the "Green Berets." The Final United Nations Commission of Experts Report describes "Green Berets" as "units which may have different names, but are commonly identified as "Green Berets." The Report notes that "Green Berets" appeared to be well armed, and "were active in at least 17 counties throughout BiH" (United Nations Security Council [UN Security Council], 1994b, Annex III.A, pp.

14-15).

By the beginning of the war in April 1992, the manpower strength of the "Green Berets" amounted to 40,000 men (Burg and Shoup, 2000, p. 74). In Višegrad, the "Green Berets" unit under the command of a local SDA functionary Murat Šibanović had a strength of about 500 men, and were well armed (CIA, 2003, p. 299). The Final United Nations Commission of Experts Report emphasized that

> The Green Berets have been implicated in the killing of civilians, rapes, and operation of prison camps in which civilians were unlawfully detained and sometimes tortured and killed. (UN Security Council, 1994b, Annex III.A, p. 16)

SFRY authorities were aware of the illegal activities of the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets." As early as 17 September 1991, JNA military counter-intelligence obtained initial information about the clandestine activities of the "Patriotic League." According to Major-General Aleksandar Vasiljević, JNA Chief of Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS), ample information was collected on the SDA para-military formations:

> We intercepted a telephone conversation between Izetbegović and Tuđman on 27 July 1991. It was clear that Tudjman was keen to radicalize the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to open the so-called "Southern front" by pulling Bosnia and Herzegovina into war. About 1,500 SDA members went to Croatia for military training. At the top of the Patriotic League we had a man in a high position, from whom we received information about the way this illegal para-military army was organized, as well as complete SDA documentation, from the order to establish to the orders to form regional staffs. One of the nine staffs would be responsible for Sandjak and Kosovo. The Patriotic League and SDA were also seeking contacts in the intelligence services of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. It is not true that Muslims entered the war without arms. All parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina were arming themselves. KOS had a report from a meeting of the Patriotic League in February 1992 in Zenica, at which Sefer Halilović said that in Tuzla alone they had 700 fighters armed to the teeth. They even had rocket-launchers. (Vasiljević, 2012)

SFRY authorities attempted to stop the illegal activities of the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets." RBiH President Alija Izetbegović and Major-General Aleksandar Vasiljević had meetings in Sarajevo on 5 February and 25 April 1992. Vasiljević handed Izetbegović documents which proved the existence of the illegal paramilitary formations of the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets," and tried

to convince him to stop the SDA's escalation to a civil war. Izetbegović promised that "as long as he was the President, no one would touch JNA" (Vasiljević, 2012).

The strategic plan of the "Patriotic League" envisaged attacking SFRY institutions and Serb people without waiting for the referendum on the independence of SRBiH. According to one of the founders of the "Patriotic League" Munib Bisić.

The "Patriotic League" suggested starting the war in BiH at the moment the war broke out in Croatia. We suggested blowing up bridges across the Drina … Early this year (1992), the "Patriotic League" developed a plan to block communications and barracks to prevent the strategic operation of JNA pulling out of combat positions" ("Ljudu koji su dočekali agressora" , 1992).

On 25 February 1992 the military commander of the "Patriotic League", Sefer Halilović, prepared a classified document "Directive to protect the sovereignty of BiH," which identified the "forces of the territorial defense of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and the JNA" as "enemy", and instructed the "Patriotic League" to open up combat operations." The opposing forces of the "enemy" were assumed to comprise six JNA corps and up to 120,000 men. The main objective, as stipulated in the Directive, was "to protect the Muslim people and the territorial integrity of BiH", and did not speak about the protection of the national or civic rights of the Serb and Croat peoples. In the Directive assigned to the "Patriotic League" the task was:

> To block and seize military facilities, to provide weapons to the formed units, and continue hostilities … in order to destroy, rout, and expel the enemy from the territory of BiH, and to extend the hostilities in the territory of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. It also envisaged an appeal to the people of Sandžak, Kosovo, and Macedonia to open up combat actions immediately in order to contain the enemy and weaken its power in the territory of BiH.[10]

The Directive was illegitimate because in February 1992 the "sovereign" BiH did not exist, but was a constituent republic of Yugoslavia. The Directive was not approved by the BiH collective Presidency, and was prepared by an illegal paramilitary organization, which paradoxically was headed by the elected RBiH President Alija Izetbegović. The Directive was prepared a few days before 01 March 1990, the date of the referendum on independence. This means that the SDA and the "Patriotic League" had begun planning war irrespective of the anticipated results of the forthcoming referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The real goal of the SDA was war against the SFRY and the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Directive treated as the "enemy".

A few days after the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 April 1992, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a decision to subordinate all Muslim paramilitary formations to the Main Staff of the RBiH TO (Efendić, 1998, 118). In this way, the paramilitary "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets" became part of the RBiH Territorial Defense and obtained legal status. ARBiH General Stjepan Šiber in a book of his memoirs noted that "the bulk of our forces were "Green Berets," "Patriotic League" and groups of armed citizens" (Šiber, 2000, p. 40). It is noteworthy that four years after the beginning of the war, ARBiH authorities still treated the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets" as illegal paramilitary formations (ARBH, Komanda 2. Korpusa Tuzla, 1995).

On 27 May 1992, the RBiH Presidency decided to establish the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992). The data on the national composition of ARBiH refutes Izetbegović's propaganda about its multinational character. As of 26 May 1995, the ARBiH's total national break-down was as follows: 95.65 % Muslims, 0.73 % Serbs, 1.42 % Croats, 2.2% others.[11] With fewer than 5% non-Muslims, this army could not be described as multinational.

Despite the token presence of one Serb (Jovan Divjak) and one Croat (Stjepan Šiber) with the rank of General in the ARBiH Supreme Command structure, ARBiH was solidly mono-ethnic and Muslim, and therefore had no moral right to claim the task of securing the national and social equality of all three RBiH nations.

By mid-August 1992, the ARBiH had developed into a formidable force, and had 6 corps, 28 brigades, 138 various units, 16 independent infantry battalions, one armored battalion, and 2 artillery battalions. The strength of ARBiH manpower reached 170,000 men (Halilović, 1997, pp. 49-52).

By March 1995, ARBiH was able to field six corps with over 100 brigades of all arms and services, with a total manpower over of 250,000 officers and men. According to VRS sources, ARBiH had up to 120 tanks, 80 armored personnel carriers, up to 340 rounds of field artillery, 90 multiple rocket launchers, 1,800 mortars, 450 rounds of anti-aircraft artillery, 16 transport helicopters, and 17 light aircraft.[12]

ARBiH was created as a tool of the SDA and Islamized. BiH Presidency Member Nijaz Duraković strongly criticized Alija Izetbegović's policy of the Islamization of the army, and his personal cult:

> Cleansing the "non-Bosniak elements" began in the army. Some units initially had up to 20% Serbs and Croats (especially in Sarajevo and Tuzla), but their percentage dropped to a few insignificant percent. Intensive polarization of the army was accompanied by the application of Islam for political purposes.

> Exclusively Islamic greetings were introduced in an aggressive and rude manner, every barracks or HQ was under obligation to have a portrait of Alija Izetbegović on display. Religious literature was distributed among the troops, and numerous imams became real political commissars. (Duraković, 2004, p. 213)

Western observers dismissed warnings about the dangers of Islamism as crude Serb or Croat propaganda intended to undermine the RBiH. However, evidence drawn primarily from Bosniak and Western sources reveals a more-nuanced and alarming picture. Islamism in RBiH received a tremendous boost with the arrival of Islamic fighters, or mujahideen, to fight on the Bosniak side during the 1992-95 war. The accompanying financial and military support from Saudi Arabia and Iran was vital to the Bosnian Muslim war effort. While those two countries are rivals, they arrived at an accommodation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the mujahideen. Saudi Arabia focused on financing and logistical supplies, and Iran on importing the fighters and on military aid (Leble, 2014, p. 8).

Mujahedeen from Islamic countries Afghanistan, Algiers, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Tunis, Turkey, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates constituted a considerable portion of ARBiH personnel. Many of them, for example Moataz, were well known for their participation in the civil war in Afghanistan, where the Mujahedeen fought against the civic government supported by Soviet troops. They were war veterans with good combat experience. Considerable numbers of Mujahedeen started arriving in Bosnia to fight on the side of ARBiH in the summer of 1992 (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić*, 2008b, para. 26).

Mujahedeen were mobilized in Islamic countries through numerous Islamist terrorist networks, such as Hamas (Palestine), Hezbolla (Lebanon), the Armed Islamic Group (Algiers), and Jammant-al-Islamia (Egypt). Mobilization activities were coordinated by al-Qaida under Osama Bin Laden. Many Mujahedeen went through the so-called Service Bureau (Maktab al-Kidamat) run by al-Qaida, which supplied them with weapons and money (Schindler, 2007, p. 118).

Osama Bin Laden reportedly visited Sarajevo during the war. Renata Flottau, a German journalist from "Der Spiegel" alleged that she had seen Osama Bin Laden in Izetbegović's presidential office in Sarajevo in 1994. Salman Raduev, a Chechen terrorist who became notorious for the incident with 3, 000 hostages in Dagestan on 9 January 1996, confirmed that Osama Bin Laden met Alija Izetbegović (Schindler, 2007, p. 125). According to Dževad Galjašević, a Muslim politician and former head of Maglaj municipality, Bin Laden's deputy al-Zawahiri appeared in the Maglaj area in Central Bosnia in 1992 to visit the Mujahedeen camps (Schindler, 2007, p. 123).

The strength of the Mujahedeen component within ARBiH ranged between 4,000 and 15,000 fighters (Wiebes, 2001, p. 204). Various groups of Mujahedeen were fighting within the 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps, 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 7th Corps, 9th Muslim Liberation Brigades of the 3rd Corps, and 501st, 303rd, and 505th Brigades of the 5th Corps. Independent assault unit El-Mudjahid numbered up to 1,000 fighters within the framework of the 3rd and the 7th ARBiH Corps (Bodanski, 1998, pp. 65-72).

Former RBiH Presidency member Stjepan Kljuić, in his book "Betrayal of Bosnia", noted:

> The influx of African and Asian fighters into the Army was one of the most nefarious actions of Alija Izetbegović that proved that Izetbegović was not struggling for the state of BiH, but for his Muslims and the Islamic faith. (Kljujić, 2018, pp. 192-193)

Mujahedeen called themselves "Allah warriors" and did not recognize any authority but Alija Izetbegović's. They considered him their Supreme Commander, and lovingly called him Ali Izzat. According to ICTY, they had direct access to Izetbegović (ICTY, 2008a, *Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić*, para. 439). The ICTY Prosecution noted:

> The mere presence and employment in combat of the Mujahedeen during the war in BiH casts serious doubts on the sincerity of the ARBiH's stated goal of maintaining a secular and multi-ethnic Bosnia where all nationalities could live peacefully. (ICTY, 2008b, *Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić* para. 15)

Besides mujahedeen, ARBiH also integrated into its ranks numerous neo-Nazis from Western Europe. The *Baltimore Sun* described the foreign mercenaries in Bosnia in June 1993:

> The 30-year-old American, who declined to reveal his first name, admits that he came to Bosnia-Herzegovina because he likes "bang bang." But he also is polite and articulate. Another mercenary, a German with a swastika on his sleeve, was not a nice guy. He limped into the hotel, dropped into a chair and pulled up his trouser leg to show off a shrapnel wound. He said he came to Bosnia so that he could "kill Communists legally".
>
> It was a recent Sunday afternoon, and 10 mercenaries -- soldiers for hire who call themselves "Mercs" -- had gathered at a run-down hotel in this Bosnian town … The conflict has attracted hundreds of these mercenaries -- some

hardened professionals, others less well-trained. Some are simply looking for wars they can't find in their own countries.

But the Germans, many of them neo-Nazis, see the war as a fight waged against communism. They view themselves as being on a mission of solidarity with Croatians who formed the Nazi puppet government during World War II. ("Mercenaries in Bosnia have varying motives", 1993)

3.2. Croatian Defense Council (HVO)

In 1991, the HDZ began organizing Croat paramilitary formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the assistance and under the guidance of the President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman. On 12 November 1991, the HDZ created the "Croat community of Posavina," on 18 November 1991 the "Croat community of Herzeg-Bosna" was formed, and on 17 January 1992, the "Croat community of Central Bosnia" was proclaimed (Begić, 1997, p. 65). They had their own paramilitary formations. The HDZ created Croat paramilitary formations in the areas with a predominant Croat population in October-November 1991, mostly in Western Herzegovina and Posavina. These formations received weapons, ammunition and military equipment from Croatia through the Posavina Eastern Operational Group of the Army of Croatia under overall command of President Franjo Tudjman (Zovak, 2009, p. 78).

On 8 April 1992, the HDZ created the Bosnian Croat army – the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane - HVO). The HDZ statement emphasized that this decision had been taken due to the "ineptitude of the legal authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina," and that the HVO "assumed responsibility to defend the sovereignty of Croat people."[13]

The HVO was organized with 4 operational zones, 4 Guards brigades, 32 Domobran regiments, and 4 Domobran battalions. The HVO strength reached 60 000 men (Pandurević, 2012, p. 114). The regular army of Croatia trained and equipped the HVO, which, according to General Janko Bobetko, constituted an integral part of Croatian army (Bobetko, 1996, pp. 212-216, 220-221).

Apart from the HVO, Bosnian Croat paramilitary formations included units of the HOS (Hrvatske Odbrambene Snage) under the command of Blaž Kraljević, which were formed in the town of Ljubuški in Western Herzegovina on 18 December 1991. By the end of 1992, the HOS strength reached 5,000 men (Vego, 1993, pp. 99-103).

The HOS was initially organized in Croatia by extremist Dobroslav Paraga of

the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) in early 1991. The United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report described the HOS as the "paramilitary wing of the Croatian party of Rights." According to the Report, this party had "pro-ustaša character." The HOS wore black uniforms bearing the Croatian checkered shield, that were similar to those worn by the Ustaša of the Second World War, and reportedly used the Ustaša form of saluting. The United Nations report also noted that "majority of HOS units were proved to be under Croatian Army Command," and reportedly looted, destroyed Serbian property, including 24 Serbian churches, and killed, raped and mutilated civilians, including women and children" (UN Security Council, 1994b, Annex III.A, p. 19).

3.3. Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)

Bosnian Serbs were the last to create their national armed force. Prior to the formation of the VRS, the only Bosnian Serb armed units were those of the RBiH Territorial Defense in areas with a Serb majority population, with a total manpower strength of about 60,000 officers and men. In terms of manpower they were inferior to the combined force of the RBiH TO, "Patriotic League" "Green Berets", HVO, and HOS (CIA, 2002, p. 251). Therefore, the Serb population and RS authorities relied on the JNA for protection.

On 11 May 1992, the JNA received an order to pull out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The order covered the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro, serving in the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dimitrijević, 2019, p. 94). On 15 May 1992 the Security Council, by resolution 752, demanded that the units of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina "be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed". On 19 May 1992, the Yugoslav army was officially withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina (International Court of Justice, 2007b, para. 238).

Some Bosniak researchers assert that the JNA was arming the Bosnian Serb paramilitary formations, presenting "it as preparations for the genocide of Muslims." For example, Dr. Smail Čekić in his study "The Aggression on Bosnia and Genocide against Bosniaks 1991-1993" provides citations for a large collection of JNA and SDS documents that the Bosnian Government captured during the war (Čekić, 1994). However, according to CIA analysis of these documents, the JNA began issuing weapons to the Serb TO (at least on a large-scale level) many months after Croatia began arming the paramilitary HOS and HVO in Western Herzegovina and after SRBiH President Alija Izetbegović commenced arming the Muslim paramilitary

"Patriotic League" and "Green Berets, and months after the first attacks against the Serb population in RBiH (CIA, 2002, p.162).

The JNA troops of Bosnian Serb origin who were serving in Bosnia and Herzegovina had nowhere to go, as they had their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They joined the VRS and continued their service. Moreover, Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in JNA units in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia were transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and joined the VRS too. The remainder of the JNA in these republics was transformed into the Yugoslav army (VJ), and became the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

On 12 May 1992, the RS National Assembly made a decision to form armed forces of Republika Srpska. The decision stemmed from Article 70 of the RS Constitution.[14] The VRS was formed by amalgamation of the TO of Serb Autonomous Regions and skeleton units of the former JNA, manned by Bosnian Serbs after the JNA left Bosnia and Hercegovina. The VRS had a universal military conscription system; conscripts were drafted into the army irrespective of their nationality.

Contrary to the ARBiH propaganda about "ethnic cleansing in the ranks of the military", the VRS retained the JNA's multi-national character. The RS Army had 2,667 professional officers: 2165 Serbs, 294 Yugoslavs, 62 Croats, 33 Muslims, 13 Slovenians, and 39 others (Pandurević, 2012, pp. 224-228). Infantry unit "Meša Selimović" had 120 soldiers, and was exclusively Muslim (Ilić et al., 2018, p. 92). The VRS numbered about 210,000 troops, while 98% of them were mobilized conscripts (Milovanović, 2018, p. 71).

According to the data provided by Serb military analyst Gostimir Popović, in mid-1992 the VRS Ground Force had about 300 tanks, 257 APCs, 1,650 rounds of field artillery, mortars and MLRS, as well as 760 anti-tank weapons (Popović, 2008). The Air Force and Air Defense had about 20 aircraft and about 30 helicopters (CIA, 2003, p. 268).

At the beginning of the war, the VRS clearly enjoyed superiority over the ARBiH and HVO in armament, particularly in aviation, artillery and tanks. However, this superiority was lost by 1994. In early 1994, the CIA came to the conclusion that the ARBiH had reached parity with the VRS in terms of armament and combat material.[15] In terms of manpower, however, the ARBiH had been maintaining superiority over the VRS throughout the entire war.

4. Civil War and the SDA Putsch

4.1. Beginning of Civil War

By mid 1991, it became painfully clear that the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in a deep constitutional and political crisis. Every impartial observer could clearly see that that constitutional and political consensus which kept together "Yugoslavia in miniature" had collapsed.

While RBiH President Alija Izetbegović, together with the Croat representatives worked towards the international recognition and sovereignty of RBiH, the Serb representatives were unambiguously opposed to such a course of action. Their key political goal was to remain within Yugoslavia or to work out an arrangement for the internal transformation of RBiH on the basis of the country's ethnic composition. They believed that this would prevent the Muslim-Croat majority from ethnic and social domination, and from unilateral decisions in favor of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, to the detriment of their national interests. On 15 October 1991, the SDA and HDZ deputies, in the absence of the 72 Serb deputies, adopted the Memorandum of the BiH sovereignty, signaling their intention to separate from Yugoslavia.

According to the American expert on Yugoslav constitutional issues Robert Hayden (2002):

> The actions of the SDA and HDZ members of Parliament in regard to the adoption of the memorandum were contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was then valid. The provision of the memorandum that purported to proclaim a simple parliamentary majority to bind the policy and the political actors in the republic was contradictory to Amendment 70 of the constitution, and hence invalid. (p. 94)

While the Serb representatives in the state bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not resign in October 1991, they did reject the validity of the decisions by those bodies that did not meet the constitutional requirements of referral to the Council for Questions of the Establishment of the Equality of the Nations and Nationalities. As Bosnia and Herzegovina was moving towards international recognition, inter-ethnic tensions were running high across the country. The referendum on independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1992 may be seen as the ultimate step in the

dissolution of the political consensus that made the Bosnian state possible. The "referendum" was of extremely dubious legality and the insistence on its being held, at the urging of the European Union, destroyed all attempts to reach a political solution within the SRBiH Parliament (Hayden, 2002).

The date of ARBiH referendum on independence is widely considered as the day the civil war began. On 1 March 1992, in Sarajevo, agent of the RBiH SDB Ramiz (and criminal) Delalić Ćelo and a group of others attacked a Serb marriage procession, killing the father of the groom Nikola Gardović, and injuring a priest of the Serb Orthodox Church.[16] The attackers tried to seize the Serbian flag carried by the bridegroom's brother, well knowing that it was a Serb custom to carry national flags at weddings. When the father tried to protect his son, the attackers opened fire. Within the context of the referendum on independence, that attack symbolized the future fate of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This attack triggered the inter-ethnic armed clashes across Bosnia and Herzegovina (International Court of Justice, 1995, p. 61).

The murder was perceived by the Bosnian Serb community as politically and ethnically motivated, and had a religious element to it, as it was committed in front of an Orthodox Church. It was widely believed that this crime happened only because the SRBiH President Alija Izetbegović and SDA-dominated Ministry of Interior (MUP) turned a blind eye to ethnically motivated crimes against Bosnian Serbs. For many it cemented the idea that the Bosnian Muslims were not subject to the same laws as the rest of the populace, and due to their numeric superiority and the encouragement of President Alija Izetbegović they became a "superior race" for whom any crime was permissible.

The murder caused fears within the Bosnian-Serb community and brought about strong tensions between the ethnic groups in the city. People no longer trusted the MUP authorities or the Sarajevo police. They started to organize themselves in groups and set up barricades to prevent the SDA paramilitary groups and common criminals from attacking the Bosnian Serb population in Sarajevo.

Serb barricades were first erected at Vrbanja bridge and the cross-roads of Vojvode Putnika and Bratsta i Jedinstva streets. In a few hours, "Green Berets" set up their barricades in Vraca, Lapišnica, Zagrebačka street, Sokolje, Mojmilo, Zlatište, Vasin Han, Vjećnica (Bećkanović, 2016, pp. 70-71; Anajdžić, 2002, p. 103). According to ARBiH General Vahid Karavelić, in total 36 SDS and SDA barricades were erected in Sarajevo (Karavelić, 2009, p. 113). The barricades paralyzed the public transport in the city, and armed paramilitaries were controlling the movement of the population, checking people's identities (Donia , 2006, p. 305). The city effectively became divided between Serbs and Muslims.

JNA General Aksentijević noted that the JNA had a peacekeeping mandate and was trying to prevent inter-ethnic clashes:

> our task was at all costs to prevent armed clashes of the opposing parties and create conditions for the politicians to resolve the crisis. It is a fact that our Command and General Kukanjac many times removed enraged masses of people and paramilitary formations of all ethnicities from the barricades. We organized two meetings of leaders of BiH Karadžić, Izetbegović, and Ljujić, who were behind these clashes. (Petrović, 2010, p. 28)

Under JNA pressure, the 2nd Military District Commander General Milutin Kukanjac, Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović reached an agreement to remove the barricades and place crisis areas under the control of mixed JNA and MUP patrols. On the night of 3 March 1992, armed "Patriotic League" fighters again erected barricades in the part of the town where they constituted a majority, notably in Stari Grad and Dobrinja. This happened despite Alija Izetbegović's promise that the blockade would not happen again. There were several murders of both Serbs and Moslems (International Court of Justice, 1995, pp. 61-62).

Meanwhile, the war was spilling over from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 18 September 1991, the fist armed clash occurred in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when a group of Croats attacked a JNA vehicle close to Posušje, killing one soldier, and injuring another (Nikolić, 2011, p. 20). On 12 March 1992, the "Patriotic League" and probably the HOS opened fire at the JNA Headquarters of the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo. The Headquarters was attacked again on 23 March (Radinović, 2004, p. 96). On 26 March 1992, regular troops of the Republic of Croatia crossed the Sava River into Northern Bosnia in the area of the city of Brod and annexed the city from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croat soldiers killed 21 Serb civilians in the village of Sijekovac near Brod (Borojević, 2014, pp. 39-43). On 01 April 1992, the "Patriotic League" clashed with Serb paramilitary formations in Bijeljina. On 03 April 1992, similar clashes occurred in Zvornik. In both cities the inter-ethnic clashes brought about numerous casualties among civilians. The Federal JNA tried to interpose between the opposing parties and calm down the situation (CIA, 2003, p. 257).

On 4 April, the HOS attacked the JNA military depot in Travnik, capturing 31 JNA soldiers and all the weapons and military equipment (ICTY, 2013, *Prosecutor v Karadžić and Mladić*, p. 34673). On the same day, President Alija Izetbegović declared the mobilization of the Territorial Defense. He also demanded that the JNA give back to the RBiH Territorial Defense the weapons that were stored in JNA stores. Serb Presidency members Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević opposed mobilization,

but Muslim and Croat members of the Presidency, who constituted a majority, nevertheless pushed this decision through. Plavšić and Koljević resigned in protest, rendering the rump Presidency illegitimate in the eyes of an overwhelming majority of the Serb nation (Efendić, 1998, p. 116). On the same day, BiH Parliament Spokesman Momćilo Krajišnik called up Alija Izetbegović and asked him to stop mobilization, as "Serbs will take this mobilization as mobilization of Muslims and Croats against Serbs, and the common people will perceive it as a declaration of war." Alija Izetbegović responded by saying: "It is too late. I cannot do anything" (Krajišnik, 2011, p. 354).

4.2. RBiH Independence and the SDA Putsch

In anticipation of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslim paramilitary "Patriotic League" and "Green Berets' visibly increased their activity, occupying vantage points in the city, distributing weapons, and getting ready to take over power. On the night of 04/05 April 1992, about 150 Green Berets received weapons, ammunition and uniforms at the Urgent Medical Aid station in Sarajevo. The situation in the city was getting very tense. On 4 April, Sarajevo was very tense. Radovan Karadžić made the following entry into his diary:

> The night is on. "Green Berets" are occupying key points in the city. Our Headquarters, which is located in the Holiday Inn hotel, is receiving regular information about their actions. They are moving in vehicles from settlement to settlement, and their snipers are taking up positions in high-rise buildings. Automatic gunfire is heard everywhere in the city: Muslims are celebrating Bairam and intimidating Serbs. "Green Berets" killed two Serb police officers and injured many civilians. The city is in chaos. Sarajevo TV has been insulting Serbs for years and trampling upon their dignity. Now it is calling upon a false "peace movement" to stage a demonstration. Indeed, in the morning we see mobs of false "coal-miners", who carry guns under their coats. We see that these mobs are getting ready to occupy the center of the city. General Kukanjac again makes an attempt to play the role of mediator and peacekeeper. He suggests a meeting with Izetbegović at the Headquarters of the 2nd Military District. I asked Izetbegović if he knew what was going on in the area of Vraca. "There will be a sea of blood, I told him. This will not stop. Let us go to Kukanjac immediately. On the insistence of my family's security detail, my spouse Ljiljana and son Aleksander left the Holiday Inn. Buha and I decided to remain in the hotel and continue doing everything to avoid war. (Janković

& Karadžić, 1993, pp. 8-9)

In this situation, on 03 April, commander of the JNA 2nd Military District General Milutin Kukanjac deployed units on the hills around Sarajevo and the airport to ward off any potential attacks on the city's infrastructure (Mastilović, 2019, p. 26).

During the night of 4/5 April, paramilitary unit "Bosnae 22" of the "Green Berets" under the leadership of SDA commanders attempted a putsch. They occupied all government offices and vital facilities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, the Republican TO HQ, as well as police stations in Stari Grad, Centar, and Novo Sarajevo municipalities. At Novo Sarajevo police station, the "Green Berets" killed police officer Pero Petrović of Serbian nationality (Mastilović, 2019, p. 90). Former "Green Beret" Ferid Šalija stated:

> Then we were placed under the direct command of the Ministry of the Interior. In the action in Vraca on 5 April, we had killed two and wounded seven fighters. We also attacked the Holiday Inn together with the Ministry of Interior Special Police. ("Spasili obraz Sarajevu", 1992)

On the morning of 5 April, crowds of Sarajevo citizens and coal miners from Central Bosnia who had been bused in by the SDA to Sarajevo the day before staged a demonstration in the city. The huge crowd in front of the RBiH Assembly swelled to about 50,000 people. They carried portraits of Tito and slogans like "We want peace", "Bosnia is not dead", "We want a government of national unity". The demonstration was a genuine and spontaneous expression of popular protest against the coming war (Bojić , 2001, p. 415).

The demonstrators entered the building of the RBiH Assembly. Speakers demanded the resignation of the Presidency and the government, new elections, and the formation of "a government of national salvation." Some demanded the JNA intervene and prevent an approaching war, others wanted the JNA to leave. They demanded the resignation from power of the leaders of all political parties. Since the SDS deputies had already left the RBiH Assembly, this demand directly concerned Alija Izetbegović's SDA and Stjepan Kljuić's HDZ. The demonstrators displayed their mistrust of President Alija Izetbegović by preventing him from addressing them, but he took the floor nevertheless. RBiH Prime-Minister Jure Pelivan was going to tender his resignation. The legitimacy of Alija Izetbegović's rule was on the brink (Bećkanović, 2016, p. 93).

In the afternoon, a big group of demonstrators reached the Serb settlement of Pofalići, another group was moving along Brotherhood and Unity Street to Vrbanja Bridge (Bećkanović, 2016, pp. 92-93). Among them, there were many armed members

of the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets. As the crowd tried to break through the Serb barricades and cross over the Miljaćka River into the Serb settlement of Grbavica, an exchange of fire broke out. Two girls, Suada Dilberović and Olga Sušić, were killed (Kovačević & Dajić, 1994, pp. 57-58).

On 6 April, the European Union and the United States officially recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. Because of increasing tension and frequent incidents in the city, Radovan Karadžić in advance of these events moved from his apartment in Sutjeska Street in Sarajevo into the Holiday Inn hotel, which temporarily accommodated the SDS offices. Radovan Karadžić's bodyguard Vladimir Ilić, his lawyer Branko Kovačević and SDS activists Ristić and Baričanin overnighted in the hotel between 4 and 5 April 1992.

On the afternoon of 06 April 1992, the demonstrators left the RBiH Assembly building and moved to Marin Dvor and the Holiday Inn hotel. Another big group of demonstrators was moving towards the Unioninvest building and the Odžačara facility. The number of demonstrators swelled to 50,000 people. Behind them were armored vehicles from the Special Police Unit under the command of Dragan Vikić. Suddenly somebody started shooting. In the confused exchange of fire, five persons were killed (Mojsilović, 1992). According to other sources, eight persons were killed and about 50 injured (Sekulić, 1997, p. 338). For these deaths, Bosniak sources blame SDS "Serb terrorist snipers", who allegedly opened fire on the demonstrators from the SDS office in the Holiday Inn hotel, which, according to Bosniak historians, was "turned into a private SDS barracks" (Bojić, 2001, p. 415).

Full circumstances of the deaths of Sarajevo citizens on 6 April 1992 remain unclear to this day. Researcher Robert Donia also places responsibility for the killings on the SDS (Donia, 2006, p. 313). However, according to eye-witness accounts, it was the Ministry of Interior special unit under the command of Dragan Vikić that opened fire on the demonstrators (Lazanski, 2001, p. 34). This was the only RBiH armed unit in the city which had professionally trained snipers.

Some witnesses stated that a unit of "Green Berets" under the command of Juka Prazina shot at the demonstrators (Janković & Karadžić, 1993, p. 16). Radovan Karadžić's bodyguard Vladimir Ilić, who was arrested as an alleged "sniper", stated: "police and parapolice units under SDA control accused me and my three friends of sniper activities. No one of us was ever formally charged, and no one was held responsible for the so-called criminal act, because we did not commit it. The mass of demonstrators was targeted by the newly formed "Ševe" from two high-rise buildings which we called "Momo and Uzeir", and from the tower of the Catholic Cathedral."[17]

Whoever opened fire, the shooters wished to suppress the demonstration. The demonstrators dispersed and fled. ARBiH General Vahid Karavelić admitted that the

"we are for peace demonstration scenario" was aimed "to eliminate the recognized sovereignty of BiH and the elected parliamentarian government," and that "this scenario" was thwarted by police loyal to Alija Izetbegović (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009, pp. 123-125). Popular initiative to hold new elections and form a new presidency which would prevent the war was drowned in the blood of the demonstrators. Alija Izetbegović's government survived its first test. As a former member of the RBiH Presidency Nenad Kecmanović stated to the Commission, "the spontaneous anti-government protests did not suit the interests of all national parties, but the SDA and Alija Izetbegović gained the most advantages from the dispersal of demonstrators by firearms."[18]

General Milutin Kukanjac, former Commander of the JNA 2nd Military District in Sarajevo, in his interview to the filmmakers of the BBC film "Death of Yugoslavia" said:

> All this was staged…Izetbegović was behind all this. Of course, There were some honest people there—Muslims, Croats and Serbs alike, and they thought the rally was organised to seek protection for all the people in Bosnia. But they were actually skilfully manipulated. And then there was that shooting on the Holiday Inn hotel, for which the Muslims were responsible.[19]

In his ICTY statement former Chief of KOS General Aleksandar Vasiljević stated:

> On 6 April 1992, there was a new incident, when the premises of the SDS in the Holiday Inn Hotel was raided. There were a number of people there at the time, working on the archives. According to our information, the firing positions of the Muslim paramilitary formations at the Secondary Technical School near the Holiday Inn were held by Juka Prazina. These positions were behind the mass of people facing in the direction of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, across from the Holiday Inn. From there they opened fire at the people, wounding one or two, and after that, they spread misinformation that the Chetniks were opening fire from the Holiday Inn. At the same time, a special unit of the Bosnia Herzegovina MUP, led by Mirza Jamaković, whose members were dressed in workers' overalls, was on stand-by. They burst into the premises of the SDS at the Holiday Inn, capturing four or five persons who were packing things at the time, and declared that the Chetniks had fired at the people. This was a planned operation to radicalize the situation, to be used as an excuse to take over the BH territorial defense headquarters. (ICTY, Witness Statement by Aleksandar Vasiljević)

A special police unit under Dragan Vikić stormed the Holiday Inn hotel and arrested those SDS members that they found on the spot (Bećkanović, 2016, pp. 94-95, 104-105). They were taken to the police station in Lugovina Street, beaten up and interrogated. According to their statements, none of them had sniper rifles or shot at the demonstrators. No weapons were found on them. As there was no incriminating evidence against them, they were released after two days. All employees of the hotel whom the CSB suspected to be connected with the SDS were also arrested. International journalists were forcefully "evacuated", while the Holiday Inn was looted (Morrison, 2016, p. 113).

The Sarajevo police, as well as other state institutions, was practically ethnically cleansed of Bosnian Serbs long before these events. Former police officer Simo Tuševljak, speaking as a witness at the ICY, stated that in the months between the elections and the out-break of the war, the SDA was purposefully removing Serbs from positions within the SRBiH MUP (Ministry of Interior) and replacing them with SDA and HDZ members from the reserve police. The reserve police personnel were not professional police, and some were known to have a criminal record. By early 1992, the dominance of the Bosnian Muslims in the SRBiH MUP and the reserve police acquired such magnitude that at some police stations MUP policemen of Bosnian Serb ethnicity were beaten, disarmed and turned away, when they reported for work.[20]

In March 1992, the Minister of the Interior Alija Delimustafić and the Deputy Minister of the Interior Vitomir Žepinić made an agreement to divide MUP personnel and assets between RBiH and Republika Srpska. After the division of MUP assets the territory under the control of the RBiH MUP shrank to the central part of urban Sarajevo, while the greater part of the city came under the control of the RS MUP. Some police stations and facilities were bitterly contested. The police school in Vraca was supposed to come under the authority of Republika Srpska. However, on 05 April a violent clash occurred for the control of the school. Assistant to Minister of Internal Affairs Momćilo Mandić described these developments:

> Muslims were secretly arming their people until March, converting the Ministry of the Interior into a Muslim army. Then they openly started creating a Muslim Jamahiriya and created their own armed force of police. For example, they ethnically cleansed the police station in Stari Grad, and expelled all non-Muslim citizens. We concluded an agreement with Muslims that the Special Police could not undertake any missions without the explicit agreement of all three political parties, which practically meant the split of the Ministry ... We took some measures to create a Serb Ministry of the Interior. It was also agreed that special police would be accommodated in the police school in Vraca. Chaos was reigning in Sarajevo. Armed Muslim criminals with BiH

> insignia were shooting in the city, committing massive violations of law and order, and illegally arresting and maltreating Serbs. Two policemen of Serb nationality were killed. At precisely 14.45, our police started a movement in the direction of the police school, but were met with fire. About 170 armed Muslims defended the school. They used the police cadets as "human shields". Our special police employed sound tactics, and no one was killed. We released the cadets, and the rest surrendered. Two our policemen, Lizdek and Pupić, died. In the school building we found the lists of Serbs destined for liquidation. (Janković & Karadžić, 1993, p. 78)

The Serb police officers managed to take the school with minimum casualties. Member of Bosnia and Hercegovina Presidency and dean of Sarajevo University Nenad Kecmanović gave his recollection of those days in Sarajevo:

> One event that also illustrated well the atmosphere of disorder and violence in Sarajevo was the breaking of shop windows, the burglaries of shops, looting of goods, accompanied by shooting and the sound of glass breaking. This happened during several nights. By the morning, all the shops in the center of the city had been emptied and demolished. This was a showdown between paramilitary criminal groups grappling for control over certain parts of town. These gangs, dressed in the uniforms of the "Green Berets' and the "Patriotic League", with army and police ranks of the BH Army, took over control in the capital with the support of the authorities. Their motive was not primarily ethnic, however, Serbian property was their legitimate target, as all the Serbs were suspected of being the "fifth column", and were the least protected group in the city".[21]

Violence broke out in the streets of Sarajevo. Gangs under the command of Juka Prazina stormed and ravaged the SDS office in the Holiday Inn hotel, attacked the Serb cultural society "Prosveta", and destroyed the busts of Serbs – prominent Serb and Bosnian writers, politicians, and WWII partisans Ivo Andrić, Skender Kulenović, Meša Selimović, Branko Ćopić, Vasa Pelagić, Savo Skarić, Jovan Kršić, Đoro Pucar Stari, and Veselin Masleša in Sarajevo. They attacked and plundered the Mlada Bosna museum and took away the bronze footprints of Gavrilo Princip's shoes (Čalija, 2005, p. 104). They looted the apartment of SDS President Radovan Karadžić, stealing all family belongings and valuables (Janković & Karadžić, 1993, pp. 8-10). The "Green Berets" also attacked the apartments of SDS members and JNA officers, including that of JNA General Đurđević. Radovan Karadžić made the following entry into his diary:

> "Our long-time misgivings about the establishment of another NDH and St. Bartholomew's Day massacre proved to be justified. Guided by the instinct of self-preservation, Serbs organized their defense lines, and moved the population in need of protection behind them" (Janković & Karadžić, 1993, pp. 8-10).

There was extensive gunfire, and both sides shelled military and civilian targets (Calić as cited in Ingrao & Emmert, 2009, p. 124). The actions of the SDA and the "Green Berets" on 05 and 06 April 1992 meet the definition of a violent putsch to take back control of an entire city. The fact that the "Green Berets" on 05 and 06 April in Sarajevo lost nine fighters killed and 37 wounded, speaks volumes about this putsch (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 67). Nihad Halilbegović, a close associate of Alija Izetbegović and the President of Sarajevo branch of SDA, admitted that the putsch was organized by the SDA and Alija Izetbegović, anddescribed it as "actions to prevent the SDS take-over of police stations" ("Noć "D" za Sarajevo", 2017).

However, the SDA putsch in Sarajevo might have been camouflaged, it was aimed at dispersing anti-government demonstrations, consolidating the SDA's grip on power, getting rid of its SDS partner in the existing power-sharing arrangement, seizing MUP and TO assets, and establishing "Green Beret" control over settlements with Serb populations in Sarajevo. Sarajevo SDA-controlled media immediately declared the SDS "a terrorist party". SDS leadership and SDS deputies in RBiH Assembly, fearing for their lives, left the city.

Despite the ongoing chaos in the city, the SDS leaders were trying to preserve peace. Despite the risk of being killed, Speaker of the Parliament Momćilo Krajišnik returned to the city and on behalf of the SDS met Alija Izetbegović in Sarajevo in the deserted building of the RBiH Parliament. He suggested several options for rearrangement of the status of Sarajevo, but not its division, "because the international mediators were opposed to the new Berlin wall" (Krajišnika, 2011, p. 424). Alija Izetbegović refused. Krajišnik gave Izetbegović an expensive pen as a farewell gift, and they parted ways. On 14 April 1992, the 69th session of the RBiH Presidency of Alija Izetbegović proclaimed the SDS as an "aggressor and a totalitarian party":

> There exists a conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between forces that belong to the totalitarian type of regime guided by operational leaders of the SDS (aggressor) and institutions of the democratic authorities of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the clashes in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be described as an ethnic conflict or a civil war.[22]

Accusations of "SDS totalitarianism" came from the author of "Islamic Declaration", who in his notorious book proclaimed Islamic order "a sacred goal which cannot be a subject of any voting" (Izetbegović, 1990, p. 29).

Many years later Alija Izetbegović explained his strategy, admitting that Bosnia and Herzegovina under his leadership was heading for civil war. In 2008 he stated that by gaining international recognition for Bosnia and Herzegovina he "crossed the Rubicon" and "turned the civil war before independence" into a "Serb aggression after independence" (Izetbegović, 2008). He regarded the SDS as a dangerous political rival, and Serbs at large as "chetniks" and an obstacle on the way towards the establishment of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina with a Bosnian Muslim majority.

These tragic events gave the SDA a pretext for attaching the label of "terrorists" and "fifth column" to the entire Serb community in Sarajevo. RBiH Presidency member Ejup Ganić declared that "Serbs were collectively guilty" for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was a call for lynchings. Anti-Serb propaganda in Sarajevo media was systematically whipping up anti-Serb sentiment and inciting crime directed at Serb civilians (Pejanović, 2002, p. 145).

Violence and lawlessness in the streets of Sarajevo created a strong pressure for the Serb population to leave the city for other places in Bosnia and Herzegovina or for Yugoslavia. General Jovan Divjak, the only Serb officer in ARBiH, wrote in his book of memoirs:

> People continue leaving Sarajevo with assistance of the JNA. Military aircraft take off from the airport with civilians on board. They also leave in overcrowded buses and cars. Those who do not believe that the fighting will stop soon, mostly people of Serb nationality, are leaving. Total looting is going on in Sarajevo. Bandits are attacking shops, kiosks, storages, private houses. No one protects property. Police are either passive or incapable of stopping them. ("Jovan Divjak: Ne pucaj", 2011, p. 35)

The exact number of those Serbs who left is not known, but many Serbs who fell into a trap of Izetbegović's propaganda about a "democratic and multi-cultural" Bosnia and opted to stay in Sarajevo bitterly regretted their naivety later.

5. The Battle of Sarajevo

5.1. Aggression against Republika Srpska and the Serb People

As a result of the general mobilization declared by President Alia Izetbegović on 03 April 1992, by 30 April 1992 the RBiH TO had activated 676 units with a total manpower of 76,272 men (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 70). In terms of manpower, the aggregate strength of the RBiH TO, "Patriotic League", "Green Berets", HOS and HDZ was higher than that of the JNA in the RBiH. This made ARBiH Commander Sefer Halilović confident of a victory. On 10 April, JNA General Božidar Stevanović, in a letter to President Alija Izetbegović, noted an "increasing number of armed individuals and HOS formations in your territory, which openly attack the JNA" ("Pismo General-Potpukovnika Božidara Stevanovića", 1993).

On 12 April in Sarajevo, Chief of BiH Territorial Defense Staff Colonel Hasan Efendić released the "Directive to protect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, strictly confidential №02/2-1." The Directive was a carbon copy of the illegal Directive of the "Patriotic League" of 25 February 1992, and had an explicitly aggressive and offensive character. The Directive defined "the forces of the Serb Democratic Party – the SDS," the Serb Territorial Defense units in the Serb Autonomous Regions, and the JNA" as "enemy forces" (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 70). The Directive alleged that the goal of the "enemy" was "to create national confederal units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to join them to Great Serbia". The Directive also set an unrealistic task: "to destroy the enemy within 20 to 30 days", and was an example of a badly miscalculated assessment of the political and military situation (Halilović, 1997, pp. 166-168).

Militarily and politically, the "Directive" was nothing less than a declaration of war against the SFRJ and the JNA, as well as against the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in the 1990 elections the SDS received on average 75% of the votes in Serb dominated municipalities (Arnautović, 1996, p. 111). The Directive was mandatory for execution with immediate effect, and instructed the RBiH TO and "Patriotic League" to launch attacks against the "enemy". RS authorities received numerous copies of the top secret "Directive", which due to the negligence of RBiH TO officers was sent to a number of wrong addresses. Four days later, on 16 April 1992, RS declared the state of immediate danger of war, but not a war situation, which was declared only in 1995.[23]

On 23 April, "Green Berets" attacked Ilidža, a suburb of Sarajevo, captured the local hospital, and killed 10 persons (Kovačević, 2018, p. 139). On the same day, the "Patriotic League" unit of Kerim Lučarević captured eight JNA soldiers, when their vehicle broke down on a supply mission in the Sarajevo municipality of Dobrinja. MUP officer Herenda shot them in front of the Police House. Alibabić, 1996, p. 167). This was a war crime, which is still awaiting punishment.

On 27 April, under strong pressure from the international community the Yugoslav Presidency decided to withdraw JNA troops from the JNA. Exception was made for officers and men born in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This decision was supposed to be implemented in full by 19 May 1992. To make the withdrawal possible, the JNA and the RBiH Presidency concluded an agreement about a cease-fire on 2 and 3 May 1992, and all JNA troops stationed in Sarajevo were expected to depart at this time.[24]

On 29 April, "Green Berets" killed two unarmed JNA soldiers in a coffee bar next to the building of the JNA 2nd Military District Command in Sarajevo.

On 29 April 1992, RBiH Territorial Defense Staff ordered to the TO units to block all the roads and JNA military installations, and attack the "enemy" in the entire territory of BiH (Šiber, 2000, p. 62). In Sarajevo, the "Patriotic League," HVO and HOS in violation of the previously concluded agreement, besieged all JNA facilities in Sarajevo and disconnected them from the water and electricity supply. On 02 May, they simultaneously attacked all JNA facilities. The purpose of the attacks was to occupy all JNA facilities and kill the JNA personnel, seize weapons and ammunition, and plunder the JNA resources. The JNA facilities were targeted with small arms and mortar fire. The attackers demanded surrender of the troops inside. The JNA attempt to relieve the besieged facilities failed. On this day, the JNA lost 17 officers and men killed (Ivanišević, 2015, p. 69). In the course of the fighting, the Main Post Office in Sarajevo caught fire. Sarajevo media which for months have been attacking Serbs presented this incident as being the "chetniks' doing", taking anti-Serb propaganda to the highest pitch. Many ordinary Muslims adopted an extreme attitude to their Serb neighbors. Some individuals walked out into the streets and made public calls to kill Serbs in their apartments.[25]

To save its officers, soldiers, and their family members, on 02 May, 2nd Military District Commander General Milutin Kukanjac detained President Alija Izetbegović at the airport, and negotiated with him about lifting the blockade of JNA facilities in the city (Sekulić, 1997, p. 353). Alija Izetbegović called Sarajevo TV and said that he had been taken hostage. According to the CIA, "the JNA's capture of Alija Izetbegović may have been a direct response to the developing blockade of its forces" (CIA, 2002, p. 152). This Commission is of the opinion that it was the JNA's direct response to the blockade of its forces and the threat to the lives of hundreds of men.

This was the last desperate attempt of the JNA 2nd District Command to extricate its officers and men from the trap that was Sarajevo.

Alija Izetbegović personally assured UNPROFOR Commander General Lewis MacKenzie of his guarantees of secure passage of the JNA convoy out of Sarajevo. However, Izetbegović's guarantees were void of good will. On 03 May, "Green Berets" attacked the departing JNA convoy in Dobrovoljaćka Street, as it was pulling out of Sarajevo (MacKenzie, 1993, pp. 166-171). According to Serb sources, in this attack the "Green Berets" and BiH Territorial Defense soldiers killed 23 JNA officers, soldiers, and civilians.[26] Soldier Ivan Oršić recalled later:

> As the convoy was moving, the officers ordered us not to shoot, even if we heard shooting from all sides. They were shouting: "Surrender, chetniks!" They were killing officers. I saw them killing a truck driver. I do not know why they killed him. They forced us to lie down on the asphalt and were mercilessly beating us. They forced us to crawl … In early June, Muslims incarcerated us in a closet. They thought that we were physically strong, and they could use us for digging trenches and other hard work … For 50 days I was mercilessly beaten and was digging trenches and carrying dead bodies. (Petrović, 2010, pp. 90-91)

Another witness stated:

> When I saw what was going on, I told the military policemen to drop their white belts, because Alija's fighters were asking everybody if he was a military policeman, and if that was confirmed, they would kill him on the spot. There was one soldier lying on the asphalt in front of me, and a "Green Beret" asked him if he was a policeman. When this soldier said that he was not, the "Green Beret" hit him with his rifle butt with all his force. At that moment, Colonel Boško Mahajlević, lying in front of me, raised his head and asked this "zenga"[27] why he was beating this man. The "zenga" approached the Colonel, and without saying a word, shot a bullet into his head. He killed him on the spot. Then I felt terrible pain in my lungs and realized that he shot at me. They were killing officers and military policemen. He thought that he killed me, and walked away. I heard more shots. The "zenga" deliberately crippled prisoners, making them invalids. Among the 27 injured were those who were shot in the spine or pelvises, and would suffer consequences for their entire lives. (Petrović, 2010, pp. 92-93)

The incident in Dobrovoljaćka Street gained wide notoriety as the "Dobrovoljaćka Street massacre" and undoubtedly was a war crime. UNPROFOR Commander

General Lewis MacKenzie accused Vice-President Ejup Ganić of masterminding this crime (MacKenzie, 1993, pp. 168-171).

On 8 May, the "Patriotic League" ambushed and killed RBiH Parliament delegate Goran Zekić. The ambush took place close to the village of Zalazje, near Srebrenica. On 16 May, BiH Territorial Defense units attacked the Serb settlement of Pofalići near Sarajevo. RBiH TO Commander Colonel Hasan Efendić was concerned about the "chetniks" and the JNA cutting the city of Sarajevo in two parts along the axis Vogošća- Pofalići, Velešići –Maršal Tito barracks – Vraca (Efendić, 1998, pp. 272-274). Pofalići was key point along this axis. The anticipated Serb attack never came, but Novo Sarajevo was one the Sarajevo municipalities where the SDS had won the elections in 1991. It had a significant Serb population, and therefore was one of the primary targets of the ABiH TO.

Efendić assigned the task of attacking Pofalići to Novo Sarajevo TO Commander Salko Idriz. The latter accepted the task reluctantly, arguing that the Muslim and Serb neighbors "live well and in consent, and that the locals will not do it" (Efendić, 1998, pp. 272-274). The settlement was targeted by artillery and sniper fire in the end of April, in which a number of Serb civilians were injured. An unprovoked and brutal ARBiH attack occurred at 05.30 on 16 May 1992. In a relatively small area, ARBiH committed massive crimes. Having occupied the settlement, Muslim soldiers exacted numerous excesses on the civilian population, as 63 Serb civilians were killed and went missing.[28] Several girls, including a thirteen year old adolescent, were repeatedly raped.[29] About 500 Serb houses were burnt down (Hodžić, 2002).

According to other Serb sources, up to 300 Serbs were killed, wounded and went missing in the attack (Kovačević, 2018, p. 75). In May 1992, Croat HVO paramilitaries allied with the ARBiH killed 215 Romas in Bosanski Brod, including 115 children. Their mass grave with 59 dead bodies, including those of 23 children, was discovered in Sijekovac in 2004 (Borojević & Ivić, 2014, p. 43).

Despite the previous agreement about unhindered withdrawal, on 15 May 1992 Muslim paramilitary units attacked a JNA convoy in Tuzla, killing 77 JNA officers and men (Toholj, 2000, p. 290). On 24 May, Muslim paramilitary formations attacked the JNA in the area of Prijedor and Kozarac, attempting to block the Prijedor-Banja Luka road (RCIRZ, 2018, p. 115). Six "chetniks" were killed, and 20 wounded (Felić, 2002, p. 70).

After international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ARBiH immediately seized the initiative on the ground. The first ground offensive operation was launched on 03 May 1992. The objective of the operation was "to destroy the enemy in the area of Vogošća and Visoko and unblock the road Sarajevo-Vogošća-Visoko-Zenica." Seven infantry battalions and an artillery battalion were

committed to reach this objective. The operation failed due to insufficient manpower, weak fire support and the inexperience of the troops (Delić, 2005).

On 25 and 26 May, the ARBiH launched an attack against Serb villages and settlements along the Sarajevo-Jablanica-Mostar road, which connected Sarajevo and the ports on the Mediterranean coast. The thrust of the attack fell upon the Serb village of Bradina, which was razed to the ground. All houses and a church were destroyed. About 50 Serbs were killed. The survivors were kept for several days in a tunnel between Konjic and Sarajevo, and then taken to a concentration camp in Tarčin (Gavrilović, 2012). It is no surprise that in an apparent retaliation, the Serb TO attacked the ARBiH in the village of Ahatovići on 29 May.

According to Radovan Radinović (2004, pp. 64-65), between September 1991 and 19 May 1992, when the last JNA units left Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslim and Croat forces made 220 attacks solely against the JNA, killing about 500 officers and men, and injuring about 2,000).

A month after the "Directive to protect sovereignty and independence of Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, strictly confidential №02/2-1" triggered massive attacks against the Serb TO and the JNA, it became obvious that the deadlines of the Directive could not be met, and the RBiH government on 20 June 1992 proclaimed a state of war, stating that "aggression had been committed against BiH by Serbia, Montenegro, the JNA and the SDS." The alleged "aggression" was accompanied by an alleged "genocide." Izetbegović's regime claimed that by June 1992 "40,000 people were killed, over 60,000 were imprisoned, and over 1,400,000 (one million four hundred thousand) people became refugees due to the genocide of the people of RBiH." This data was grossly and flagrantly overinflated (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992b).

The ICTY made its own assessment of the human toll of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to ICTY research, the total losses of all three peoples during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 constituted a minimum of 67,500 people killed, among them being 45,980 Muslim men and women of Muslim. The latter figure includes 22,225 civilians and 23,755 military personnel (Tabeau & Bijak, 2003, p. 19). As the Serb-Muslim civil war began in May 1992, it was clearly impossible to inflict more than one half of these total losses in the span of one month.

5.2. Ethnic Break-down of the Population of Sarajevo

Sarajevo, the capital of BiH, is located in central Bosnia in the Miljacka River valley. Sarajevo is the political, industrial, social and cultural center of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. It is a long and narrow city (occupying 2,049 square kilometers before the war) surrounded by hills and mountains. The 1991 census indicates that before the war the city and its surrounding areas had a population of 525,980 (Federal Statistical Office, 1998). There are also estimates that on the eve of the war, the population of the city proper was 435,000. The United Nations Commission of Experts Report estimated that the number of persons living in Sarajevo at in the early stages of the war ranged between 300,000 and 380,000 residents ("United Nations Fifth Periodic Report", 1993, p. 7). According to the 1991 census, the city's multi-ethnic population distribution prior to the siege was as follows: Muslims 49.3 per cent; Serbs 29.9 per cent; Croats 6.6 per cent; Yugoslavs 10.7 per cent. Jews and other groups made up the remaining 3.5 per cent of the population (Tabeau & Bijak, 2003, p. 19). Together with Yugoslavs, who were mostly of Serb origin, Serbs constituted about 40 percent of the population of Sarajevo.

In 1992, the city of Sarajevo was composed of 10 municipalities: Stari Grad, Novi Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Hadžići, Vogošća, Ilijaš, and Trnovo. Out of the 10 pre-war Sarajevo municipalities, Serbs and Yugoslavs dominated in 5: Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Pale, Vogošća, and Ilijaš (Tabeau & Bijak, 2003, p. 19).

Prior to the war, it was a cosmopolitan city where persons of different religions lived and worked together. Inter-marriages between the ethnic groups were not uncommon. Observers have noted that at the beginning of the war many of Sarajevo's Serbs fled the city. The city's 400 year old Jewish community numbered 14,000 before World War II and 1,400 before the war of 1992-1995. It has been reported that as a result of evacuations and casualties, only a few hundred Jews remained ("United Nations Fifth Periodic Report", 1993, p. 7).

5.3. Sarajevo in the Plans of the Warring Parties

On 16 May 1992, the RS National Assembly held its 6th session in Banja Luka. The session adopted "the Decision on six Strategic Goals". These goals were:

1. Deliniation of the State from the other two national communities;
2. Corridor between Semberija and Krajina;
3. Establishment of a corridor in the Drina River valley, that is, the elimination of the Drina River as a border between Serb states";

4. Establishment of a border on the Una and Neretva Rivers;
5. Division of the city of Sarajevo into Muslim and Serb parts and the establishment of effective state authority in each part;
6. Access of Republika Srpska to the sea (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska, No. 02-130.92).

The goal under No. 5 was the "division of Sarajevo into Muslim and Serb parts." If the Muslim community claimed the whole of Sarajevo as the capital for a unitary "multi-cultural and multi-confessional Bosnia and Herzegovina", the strategic goal of Republika Srpska was the division of the city. Both Serb and Muslim communities and their political parties considered Sarajevo as their capital city. The logic of this approach stemmed from the idea to separate the Muslim community from the Serb community as a guarantee of preventing ethnic incidents and war. Speaking at the 16th session of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska in May 1992 Radovan Karadžić said:

> Our fifth strategic goal is to divide the city of Sarajevo into Serb and Muslim parts, and let each part have effective organs of power. From strategic point of view, Sarajevo for us is in the fifth place, but the struggle for Sarajevo strategically and politically is of decisive character.[30]

The International Court of Justice, having examined the Decision on Strategic Goals issued in May 1992 by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska in its context, emphasized that it did not see the 1992 Strategic Goals as establishing the specific intent to commit genocide.

According to the ICJ judgement,

> The Applicant relies on the alleged existence of an overall plan to commit genocide throughout the territory, against persons identified everywhere and in each case on the basis of their belonging to a specified group. The Court notes that this argument of the Applicant moves from the intent of the individual perpetrators of the alleged acts of genocide complained of, to the intent of higher authority, whether within the VRS or Republika Srpska, or at the level of the Government of the Respondent itself. Having examined, in context, the Decision on Strategic Goals issued in May 1992 by Momčilo Krajišnik as the President of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, which in the Applicant's view approaches an official statement of an overall plan, the Court does not see the 1992 Strategic Goals as establishing the specific intent. (International Court of Justice, 2007a)

5.4. VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

After the last JNA units left Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Assembly of Republika Srpska adopted a decision to create the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS). As part of the VRS, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was created on 19 May 1992 utilizing the remaining elements of the 4th JNA Corps. The Corps was initially commanded by General Tomislav Šipčić, who was soon replaced by General Stanislav Galić. By the beginning of the war, the Corps was made up of three infantry brigades, an artillery regiment, and an air defense regiment. By the end of 1992, the organizational structure of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps included four motorized brigades, six light brigades, one mixed artillery regiment, and one light anti-aircraft regiment (Karavelić, 2008, p. 93).

The United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report estimated artillery holdings of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to be between 600 and 1,100 pieces of field artillery and mortars (UN Security Council, 1994c, Annex IV, p. 11). This estimate is grossly exaggerated. According to CIA sources, the Corps held up to 80 tanks, up to 70 artillery pieces, and up to 120 mortars (CIA, 2002, p. 153).

According to the CIA study "Balkan Battlegrounds", the Corps manpower amounted to 15,000 officers and men. (CIA, 2002, p. 153). According to Serb sources, the manpower strength of the Corps varied between 15,000 and 18,000 men. However, some sources assert that at some points in time the Corps manpower did not exceed 13,000 men (Ilić et al., 2018, p. 96). Its brigades were holding the front-line of 55 kilometers of the inner ring of encirclement, and 220 kilometers of the outer ring. Because of permanent shortage of manpower, the brigades of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps were not fully manned to authorized strength level.

There was also a problem with motivation, as most soldiers were mobilized from settlements in the environs of Sarajevo, and having resolve to defend their homes only, were reluctant to take up assignments at other sectors of the front. Lord Paddy Ashdown noted in his report on his visit to Pale in August 1992:

> The UNPROPQR observer's opinion was that the situation was stalemated, with the balance being held between greater infantry numbers on the Muslim side and greater weight of fire-power and heavy guns on the Serbian side.[31]

The primary objective of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was to secure the defense of municipalities with predominantly Serb population claimed by Republika Srpska: Hadžići, Ilijaš, Vogošča, Pale, part of Stari Grad, part of Novo Sarajevo, and bigger

part of Ilidža. On 30 September 1992, RS authorities integrated these municipalities into Srpsko Sarajevo [32] with a population of about 130,000 people, including about 20,000 refugees ethnically cleansed from the Muslim-Croat Federation (Šehovac, 2020). Municipality Centar, as well as the municipalities of Stari Grad, Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo remained under the control of the ARBiH.[33]

Head of the respected NGO "Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs", Dušan Šehovac, explained to the Commission:

> The dominant narrative in the world is that the Serbs came to Sarajevo from somewhere, and besieged Sarajevo, that they were some savages from villages, who came from somewhere and took the hills around Sarajevo. Analysis shows that only about 280 out of the 7,178 Serb war victims did not have residence in Sarajevo. It means that they were the citizens of Sarajevo, who formed the defense lines on the fringes of their ethnic territory. It is not true that they besieged Sarajevo, but it is true that they formed defense lines around their own national territories.[34]

The secondary objective of Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was to prevent the breakout of ARBiH from Sarajevo to the east through Trnovo to the Drina valley, and to the north in the direction of Zenica. The third objective was to save as many Serbs who stayed in the city under ARBiH control, as possible. VRS officer Blagoje Kovačević stated:

> The main objective of the SRK was the following: not to allow Muslim forces to break through from Sarajevo and not to permit them to get engaged on other battlefields. This was the priority. The second objective was to protect Serbian citizens in the area of Sarajevo and its surroundings. The third objective was to save as many citizens who stayed in the city under Muslims' control as possible. The breakthrough of the ARBiH 1st Corps out of Sarajevo under the control of Muslim authorities would have had a huge impact on all other fronts and on the course of war in BiH, and not only on Sarajevo and its environs. The situation on the battlefields would have changed drastically to the detriment of the VRS".[35]

In fact, there were two encirclement rings around Sarajevo. One was the inner ring held by the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and facing the ARBiH 1st Corps in the urban Sarajevo municipalities of Stari Grad, Center, and parts of the municipalities of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo. The other, the outer ring, was held by the ARBiH 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps. These corps applied unremitting pressure on the

VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps from the rear. The 2nd Corps posed the permanent threat of breaking through to the north along the Vogošća-Sarajevo axis, while the 3rd Corps applied pressure on Hadžići in south-west. Therefore, municipalities claimed by Republika Srpska, such as Hadžići, Ilijaš, Vogošća, Pale, part of Stari Grad, part of Novo Sarajevo, and the bigger part of Ilidža, experienced double pressure from the ARBiH, from the front and from the rear, and were themselves besieged.

As former member of the RBiH Presidency Nenad Kecmanović stated to the Commission:

> Two rings closed the Sarajevo depression. The external ring was held by the Serbs who lived in the villages and suburban settlements close to the city. The internal ring was held by the Muslims, who were the majority in the urban municipalities. The Serbs had strategic advantages in the defense of their territories and did not try to conquer the center of the city, while the Muslims were trying to break out, without any success.[36]

The blockade of Sarajevo arose from the military necessity to isolate the ARBiH 1st Corps. VRS documents indicate that the VRS Main Staff expected the ARBiH 1st Corps to break out of the encirclement, occupy the whole of Podrinje and cut the Posavina Corridor. Assessing the significance of the Sarajevo front, Radovan Karadžić said that:

> If the Sarajevo frontline was broken, they [Muslims] would reach Drina and cut off the Posavina corridor, the Republic of Serbian Krajina would collapse, and Izetbegović would never haveentered negotiations. (Ković, 2015, p. 83)

5.5. ARBiH 1st Sarajevo Corps

Initially the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was opposed by units of the ARBiH units of loosely organized Territorial Defense, “Green Berets”, and the “Patriotic League”. On 18 August 1992, President Alija Izetbegović signed a decision to form the 1st ARBiH (Sarajevo) Corps (Radinović, 2004, p. 17). The ARBiH 1st Corps was raised and formed by 1 September 1992. The structure of 1st Corps included 5 motorized brigades, 3 mountain brigades, 1 mechanized brigade, 1 artillery brigade, 1 commando brigade, 1 HVO brigade, and an independent special unit “Delta” (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009, pp. 191-193).

Colonel Mustafa Hajrulahović, aka "Talijan" was appointed the 1st Corps Commander, Colonel Vahid Karavelić was appointed Deputy Corps Commander. Colonel Enver Hadžihasanović was appointed the 1st Corps Chief of Staff.

The ARBiH 1st Corps, which was drawn from the most ethnically mixed urban areas of the country, had the strength of 27,000 soldiers and officers: 92% Muslims, 2.6% Serbs, 3.7% Croats, and 1.7% others. By 1995, the percentage of Muslims had increased to 95 % and the percentage of Serbs dropped to 0.5 %, while the percentage of Croats had risen to 4.7 % (Ajnadžić 2002, p. 123). The 1st Corps national, despite the presence of 5% of others in its ranks, was clearly mono-ethnic and unfit to protect national equality and human rights of all three nations of RBiH.

In October 1992, the 1st National Sarajevo Corps consisted of the Corps Command, 7 motorized brigades, 3 mountain brigades, 2 independent infantry battalions, one light anti-aircraft artillery battalion, one military police battalion, a medical battalion, an air group, and a logistics base. Two Operational Groups, "Igman" (one infantry brigade and artillery group) and "Visoko" (3 infantry brigades) were organizationally and operationally integrated into the 1st Sarajevo Corps (Karavelić, 2011, p. 94).

By the end of 1992, the personnel strength of the 1st Sarajevo Corps had risen to 60,442, men and women (Ajnadžić, 2002, p. 236). The Corps had an impressive array of armament, including 7.62 mm semiautomatic rifles (made by Crvena Zastava, Kragujevac), 7.62 mm automatic rifles, 7.62 mm light machine guns, 7.9 mm M-53 machine guns, 7.9 mm semiautomatic sniper rifles, 7.62 mm M-84 machine guns, different kinds of pistols and bombs, 64 mm and 90 mm rocket launchers, all types of mortars (60 mm, 82 mm, 120 mm), 76 mm ZIS cannons, 100 mm T-12 anti-tank guns, and B-1 recoilless cannons.[37]

The ARBiH 1st Sarajevo Corps also had, besides a great number of small arms, numerous mortars, field artillery pieces and tanks. The entire array of weapons systems evacuated from the Zadar JNA Artillery School in Croatia was stored at Maršal Tito barracks, and seized by the ARBiH TO after the JNA evacuated the barracks. This armament included about 500 automatic rifles, six 82 mm mortars, six recoilless cannons, one T-55 tank, 3 pieces of field artillery, 360 antitank weapons, and about 300,000 rounds of miscellaneous ammunition (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009, p. 170). The military training range at Pazarić in the municipality of Hadžići was used as a store for a number of crew-served weapons, such as 82 mm recoilless cannons (around 20), mortars of all calibers (around 20), anti-aircraft defense weapons, two T-55 tanks and two T-34 tanks, four armored personnel carriers, and two M-80 IFVs with a 20 mm cannon. Besides all these weapons, the Pazarić stores also held anti-tank weapons, such as 76 mm ZIS cannons, 100 mm T-12 anti-tank guns, and Malyutka

and Fagot anti-tank rockets. After the JNA pulled out of Sarajevo, all these weapons fell into ARBiH hands.[38]

The United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report does not mention any ARBiH 1st Corps artillery assets, creating the impression that ARBiH units in Sarajevo simply did not have any artillery. However, according to a study by RBiH military officers, the Artillery Battalion of the 1st Corps was equipped with up to 30 artillery pieces and mortars: two 100 mm guns, three 76 mm guns, two 76 mm guns, two 120 mm D-30 howitzers, one152 mm "Nora" gun and 18 mortars (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 84). According to the CIA study "Balkan Battlegrounds", the Corps armored unit had 10 serviceable tanks (CIA, 2002, p. 408). According to 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelić, brigades under his command had 60 mm, 82 mm, and 120 mm mortars, while artillery and mortar ammunition was produced from metal pipes (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009).

The ARBiH also brought in heavy artillery pieces from Croatia. Lord Paddy Ashdown, on his visit to Pale on 2 August 1992 noted:

> For the first time, some heavy weapons were being used against the Serbs, chiefly 120 mm and 155 mm guns and multiple rockets. They are thought to have been brought up to the front line by the Croats, who were now fighting alongside with Muslims in Bosnia."[39]

The ARBiH was holding most of important geographical features in the wider area of Sarajevo (Treskavica, Bjelašnica, Igman, Ormanj, the Ćemerska plateau, and tactically dominating hills and elevations (Grdonj, Debelo Brdo, Ćolina Kapa, Kobilja Glava, Orlić, Hum, Žuć, Hill 804, Briješko Brdo, Mojmilo, Šanac). These hills and elevations provided excellent vantage points for observation and firing positions for artillery and mortars.

5.6. The Blockade of Sarajevo

The United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report gives a detailed account of the battle and siege of Sarajevo, but provides neither a military definition of a siege, nor references to relevant military literature. The report focuses on combat-related offences, unlawful targeting and the use of unlawful means and methods of warfare. The investigative team of UN experts met with a wide range of officials of the Bosnian Government and UNPROFOR officers, but was reportedly unable to meet with the RS side.

While the UN Commission Final Report makes liberal use of the term "operation", it does not mention any of several ARBiH and VRS military operations in and around Sarajevo, clearly identifiable by a coded name. This deficiency might be attributed to the fact that at the time of writing this report the documents pertaining to these military operations were out of reach for the UN experts. Nevertheless, this deficiency and reliance exclusively on ARBiH sources, as well as numerous factual errors which make the United Nations Commission Experts Report seriously flawed (UN Security Council, 1994e, Annex IV (Part 1). Now, almost 25 years after the end of the war, this report should be examined in the light of new evidence.

Contemporary military definitions of a siege are scarce. The US Army Rule of Law Handbook does not provide a military definition of a siege (Bowman & Child, 2017). Neither does the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2006), nor the US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2001, paras 1-23). Brassey's Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Land Warfare (Margiotta, 2000) defines siege in a historical context as a term:

> That comprises all measures related to battle over a castle or fortified town, namely, those by the attacker, necessary for conquering the fortress, and those of the defender, to prevent such conquest. (p. 941)

According to the US Army Field Manual FM 3-06 (90-10) "Urban Operations",

> In a fluid urban combat operation, both sides contend for position and advantage in the urban battlespace. Ultimately, one side will achieve dominance and the battle then either ends with a withdrawal or devolves into an urban siege. A siege situation can develop as a result of an initial fluid urban battle, or it may be a function of previous military operations that occurred outside the urban area.[40]

This is exactly what happened in Sarajevo, when on 05 and 06 April the SDA putsch met with a Serb uprising and this resulted in a fluid urban battle between Muslim and Serb TO forces. The resultant lines and positions determined the configuration of the frontline and de facto division of the city into Muslim and Serb parts. Sarajevo city municipalities with substantial Serb and Yugoslav populations on the Serb side of the confrontation line (Hadžići, Ilijaš, Vogošča, Pale, part of Stari Grad, part of Novo Sarajevo, and bigger part of Ilidža) were claimed by Republika Srpska and controlled by the VRS.[41]

As Head of the NGO "Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs" Dušan Šehovac explained to the Commission:

> first the Muslim (Bosniak) side decided to establish control and govern over the entire City of Sarajevo by armed force, under the euphemism of a multi-ethnic city - the capital of the entire and sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The other side, Serbian side, made a decision to participate in the control and management of the City of Sarajevo on the basis of ethnic rights and possession of the territory in the City of Sarajevo (150,000 to 180,000 ethnic Serbs lived in Sarajevo). When it became clear to the Serbs that this could not be achieved effectively and peacefully, the Serbs made a decision to exercise control and defense of the Serb ethnic territories in the territory of the City of Sarajevo by armed force. Based on these two opposing rights of the two nations to control and govern their ethnic territories, a civil war erupted. It follows from the previous that the terms "siege of Sarajevo" and "besieged Sarajevo" are incorrect, while the truth is that the City of Sarajevo was divided along ethnic lines.[42]

Siege is commonly understood as a method of warfare, characterized by the encirclement of a locality or area, leading to its isolation and followed by attacks to crush its resistance. In the event of an attack on a besieged locality, medical units and cultural property must be spared (Conventions I, Article 15; Conventions II, Article 18).

Two additional provisions are specified in the case of internal armed conflict:

> Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited; if the civilian population is suffering undue hardship because of a lack of supplies essential to its survival (such as foodstuffs and medical supplies), relief actions of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature can be undertaken for the civilian population (Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions II, Articles 14 and 18.2).

The use of sieges as a tactic of war is not prohibited under international humanitarian law, if directed solely at a military objective and is in conformity with all relevant international humanitarian rules. The capture of an enemy-controlled area is a legitimate military aim and military commanders often view laying siege to a town as less costly than fighting street-to-street.[43]

The JNA pre-war military doctrine did not emphasize urban operations, and did not have a military definition of a siege. JNA military doctrine had the concept of the blockade, which was described as

> Isolation of an area, city, objective, enemy forces, air-born groups in order to interdict their maneuver, resupply, care, and communications with external forces and to create conditions to destroy them [the enemy forces] or force them to surrender. (*Vojni leksikon,* 1981, p. 58)

Accordingly, the VRS Main Staff documents and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps used the professional term "blockade", while the ARBiH and media, for PR purposes, used the historical term "siege", which was professionally and historically misplaced. The main difference between siege and blockade is the choice of weapons by the attacking side. Historically, starvation has been the main weapon of a siege. However, because of the international relief effort and massive deliveries of humanitarian aid allowed by the VRS into Sarajevo, Sarajevo experienced no hunger, the primary weapon of any siege. The United Commission of Experts Final Report noted:

> The tendency of both sides to control food, water and electricity for publicity purposes, the intermingling of military forces and the civilian population and the fact that no one appears to have died during the siege from starvation, dehydration or freezing, combine to make difficult the establishment of a solid case that starvation is being used as a method of warfare. The conduct of this matter has been deplorable, but its criminality is debatable. (UN Security Council, 1994f, Annex IV (Part IV)

In this sense, the siege of Sarajevo cannot stand any comparison to the siege of Leningrad between 1941 and 1944, and the siege of Sebastopol between 1941 and 1942. The siege of Leningrad by German, Finnish, and Spanish forced in WWII resulted in the deaths of up to about 1,500,000 soldiers and civilians due to starvation and bombardment (Carell, 1966, pp. 205-210). The siege of Sebastopol by German and Romanian forces saw the use of the heaviest and most powerful individual siege engines ever to be used: the German 800mm long range cannon "Dora" and the 600mm mortar "Karl" (Nuzhdin & Ruzaev, 2015, p. 24). Regular deliveries of humanitarian aid and the absence of starvation in Sarajevo make it impossible to rank the blockade of Sarajevo with the sieges of Leningrad and Sebastopol in World War II. The fact that the suffering was less awful than the siege of Leningrad or Sebastopol does not mean that Sarajevo's battles were neither fierce nor devastating.

On 06 June 1992, United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 758, demanding:

> To create immediately the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herze-

govina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport (UN Security Council Resolution 758, 1992).

The VRS handed over Sarajevo Butmir airport to UNPROFOR as a result of negotiations between Republika Srpska authorities and General MacKenzie, Commander of UN troops in Sarajevo, and Cedric Thornberry, Head of Civil Affairs on 29 June 1992. Following the conclusion of the "Agreement of 5 June 1992 on the Re-opening of Sarajevo Airport for Humanitarian Purposes", Sarajevo airport was taken over by an UNPROFOR French battalion (Cutts, 1999, p. 23). Complying with the UNSCR 758, on 06 June 1992, VRS Main Staff released "Directive for further operations." The Directive estimated that "the enemy commenced a general offensive towards Sarajevo", emphasizing that the enemy's intention was to deblock Sarajevo from the north and the west.[44] The Directive also assigned to the troops the task

> By offensive actions with limited goals to improve the operational and tactical situation in the wider area of Sarajevo, and in northern and eastern Bosnia, and at the same time, firmly hold the lines and Serb territories and protect Serb people from genocide and extermination".[45]

An important element of the Directive concerned protection of the airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The Directive assigned to the troops the task:

> To mop up the area of the airport from remaining enemy groups and individuals and in this manner to ensure security of aircraft for delivery of humanitarian aid and normal supplies of food and medicines for the civilian population."[46]

UNPROFOR control of the airport made it possible to establish a humanitarian air bridge, which, though frequently interrupted, operated over the entire war. Initially, there was no inspection of humanitarian cargo, but when in spring 1993 weapons and heroin were discovered in a shipment of food, UNHCR and UNPROFOR agreed to allow VRS liaison officers to make random checks of incoming shipments to avoid abuse (Andreas, 2016, p. 55). The authors of the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (Final Report, 1994b, pp. 17-18.) had every reason to be aware of the abuse of humanitarian aid for delivery of drugs for the RBiH government. Nevertheless, the Report blamed "the besieging forces" for the "continued use of aid as a weapon in the siege."

Despite the blockade, the humanitarian situation in the city never reached critical level. Between June 1992 and January 1996, 12,951 United Nations flights landed at Sarajevo airport, delivering 160,677 tons of humanitarian cargo. Food accounted for 144,827 tons (Andreas, 2016, p. 39). The UNHCR was responsible for deliveries and distribution of international humanitarian aid. Despite inevitable security incidents, on average, the UNHCR in Sarajevo daily received 150 tons of humanitarian cargo for distribution. The worst single incident was the downing of an Italian Air Force G-222 cargo plane by the HVO on 3 September 1992 by a surface-to-air missile, killing all four crewmen on board.

Besides the humanitarian airlift, the UNHCR also delivered humanitarian aid to Sarajevo by road convoys. Humanitarian assistance was intended for the suffering civilian population, but in reality, up to 20% of aid ended up going to feed the ARBiH (Andreas, 2016, p. 45).

On 15 June 1995, UNPROFOR Civil Affairs officer in Sarajevo Philip Corwin (2000) made the following entry into his diary:

> Izetbegović's reference to "the siege" annoys me. Sarajevo is under siege, and the siege is cruel and unjust, but the Sarajevan people can survive another winter even if the siege remains in place. International aid will get through, and people will not starve. Izetbegović is exaggerating. He is playing the "victim", because it keeps him in power. (p. 216)

The UNHCR's own credibility was severely weakened when the humanitarian operation became so large that the UNHCR was no longer able to exercise effective control over all those who operated under its umbrella. By allowing the distinction between itself and other humanitarian organizations to be blurred, the UNHCR came to represent not only itself, but a motley collection of agencies. Some of them had dubious links with the warring parties, fundamentalist groups, mercenaries, secret intelligence agencies, arms smugglers and black-marketeers (Cutts, 1999, p. 23). Up to 150 humanitarian organizations were working in Sarajevo during the entire war, and up to 5% of the entire Sarajevo population was employed by various international humanitarian agencies and enjoyed various privileges (Cutts, 1999, p. 48).

The UNCHR and associated agencies often abused their humanitarian mandate. On numerous occasions, weapons and ammunition were smuggled into Sarajevo under the guise of humanitarian aid. The UNHCR reportedly smuggled ammunition and weapons in pallets with double bottoms (Andreas, 2016, pp. 39, 48). The WHO, in cooperation with the RBiH Ministry of Health, delivered medical oxygen cylinders with ammunition and anti-tank weapons hidden inside to Sarajevo hospitals (Lučarević, 2000, pp.

229-230). According to ARBiH General Sefer Halilović (1997), the same method was used for smuggling explosives:

> We already had a lot of experience, as for many months we delivered ammunition from Visoko in oxygen bottles from humanitarian agencies. We also delivered weapons, ammunition, and spare parts in humanitarian aid containers across the territory under the chetniks' control. (pp. 89-110)

Denial of water supply is banned under international humanitarian law. The Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) rightly noted that:

> The destruction of electric, gas, phone line and water facilities has been used as a weapon against the inhabitants of the city. Both the defenders and the besiegers have often accused each other of using these utilities as weapons of war. UN and local attempts to repair damaged lines and pumping stations have often been rebuffed with shell and sniper fire, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. (1994b, p. 18)

It is true that most water sources were located on the RS side, which made it easy for the VRS to stop the flow of water to the city. It was one of the UNPROFOR's standing tasks to negotiate and facilitate water supply repair missions, working on the confrontation line, often under fire. These missions were frequently obstructed by the ARBiH for tactical or propaganda purposes.

An UNMO report noted a meeting with officials in the RBiH Ministry of the Interior on 23 December 1992, at which the UNMOs stressed the following points: lack of freedom of movement and cooperation and general deterioration of cooperation for UNMOs; the lack of control the ARBiH 1st Corps had over the Butmir faction; the latter's continued firing at the white UN vehicles in the Butmir and Kassindolska street; the poor record of the Bosnian side on utility missions in recent times; and the poor performance of a particular RBiH liaison officer, requesting his removal.[47]

In 1993, Fred Cuny, an American disaster relief expert, launched an ambitious project to set up an emergency water treatment system in Sarajevo. If fully operational, the system would provide running water to most of the city's population. The idea was to filter the water from the Miljaćka river, which runs through the city. The first treatment plant was finally completed by the end of 1993, but to Cuny's great surprise and dismay, Alija Izetbegović's government proved more of an obstacle than the "besieging party." Sarajevo officials refused to give approval to turn the system on, arguing that the water was unsafe to drink. Cuny tested the water, and the results

proved that the water was safe. Then Cuny quietly turned water on, but RBiH authorities intervened and shut the water off (Andreas, 2016, pp. 101-102). Cuny came to the conclusion that the TV images of people queuing for water in long lines and lucrative deals of selling water were more important for Alija Izetbegović's government than the well-being of its own population. In one of his letters Fred Cuny noted:

> One of the officers in the UNPROFOR claims that they have information, that some members of [the Muslim] government are opposed to turning on the water because it will take away one of the most omnipresent images of suffering in the city. We have been told by someone close to Dr. Mohammed Zlatar that the reason that some officials are trying to prevent the water from being turned on is that the officials are engaged in selling water from the brewery and Bačevo. Tankers routinely take water from those sources and deliver it to a number of enterprises, including the Holiday Inn. Some is also sold to households. Water sales are brisk, especially during the winter. Our information tells us that the city will eventually allow us to turn on the water, but only after they have limited the area served (by closing critical valves) and after the winter, when the demand and price for water deliveries will drop - thus, the three-month testing regime. If the government continues to stonewall us, we have several options. I could ask General Rose to simply order us to turn on the system or turn it over to the UN. That may be the easiest and politically the best way for the Bosnians to deal with that. However, we have been unable to persuade the city authorities to allow us to turn it on, even during the heavy shelling that occurred in January. At one point, after several people were killed trying to collect water from the taps at the brewery, I ordered the water turned on my own authority, but the authorities intervened and cut it off. (Wilcoxson, 2010)

UNPROFOR Civil Affairs Officer David Harland left a powerful description of the strategy that Bosnian Muslims employed to win the war:

> Hoping to prompt the West into action, the Muslims tried to make things appear even worse than they were. Death tolls, particularly of civilians, were hugely exaggerated (and readily believed and repeated by Western observers). Civilians were prevented from leaving urban areas under siege. Even if this did not make them human shields per se, it exposed them, in the presence of the Western media, to Serb sniper fire and shelling. Convoys evacuating Muslim civilians from Srebrenica and elsewhere were blocked by the Muslim authorities. When the Serbs did not cut off the water and electricity to Sarajevo, the Muslims did. Ceasefires were violated, prompting murderous Serb responses, and UNPROFOR units were attacked by Muslim forces, who then blamed the Serbs. (Harland, 2017)

Sarajevo was not completely sealed from the outside world. Following the signing of the "Complete Cessation of Hostilities Agreement" on 31 December 1994, the RBiH and RS governments signed an agreement on 11 January 1995 to open "blue routes" across Butmir airport. Four routes were opened by this agreement: one joining the ARBiH-controlled territory of Dobrinja with the ARBiH-controlled territory of Butmir; one joining the VRS-controlled Lukavica with the VRS-controlled part of Ilidža; one joining urban Sarajevo to the ARBiH-held town of Visoko, and one joining the Muslim and Serb parts of the city across the Bratstva-Jedinstva Bridge.

The "blue routes" across the airport were opened for civilian traffic to and from Sarajevo on 06 February 1995. Three days later the bus route from Sarajevo to Visoko was opened via VRS-controlled territory. UNPROFOR was monitoring the traffic along the "blue routes." UNPROFOR reports provide exact numbers of people and vehicles that used the crossings on a daily basis. During February 1995, 115,000 people crossed along the "blue routes", over 88,000 people between the RBiH-controlled areas, and 28,000 between the VR-controlled areas. The UNPROFOR daily report dated 27 February 1995 indicated that on this day 656 vehicles and 3,662 people used the crossings.[48] According to UNPROFOR the daily report dated 07 March 1995, on this date 3,622 civilians and 554 vehicles used the crossings.[49] Enormous amounts of food, commercial goods, and fuel were brought into Sarajevo between 06 February and 17 March 1995. RS authorities closed the "blue routes" after an ARBiH sniper killed two Serb girls, 9 and 11 years old, in the VRS-controlled Grbavica part of Sarajevo.[50]

Sarajevo was open to numerous journalists and NGOs and for international visits and diplomatic activities. According to ARBiH data, numerous high-level international delegations visited Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995. All of them arrived through Sarajevo airport. These delegations included 11 presidents, 8 prime ministers, 31 ministers, and 29 ambassadors, as well as 11 high-level United Nations representatives inclusive the UN Secretary-General (Ajnadžić, 2002, p. 161). The embassies of the United States and Great Britain operated in war-time Sarajevo.

On 30 July 1993, ARBiH completed construction of "object T" - a 720 meter long tunnel under the runway of Sarajevo Butmir airport. The tunnel was 1.5 meters wide and 1.8 meters high. Construction of the tunnel lasted for four months. The tunnel connected the ARBiH-controlled Butmir and Hrasnica and from there across Mount Igman to the Adriatic coast and Croatia, and served primarily for military purposes, and was used for channeling weapons, ammunition, and military equipment into Sarajevo, but also to bring in food and commercial goods. Entire infantry brigades were moved through the tunnel into Sarajevo from Central Bosnia. According to ARBiH data, during thirty months of war, about 1,150,000 soldiers and civilians

used the tunnel to move in and out of Sarajevo (Delić, 2011, pp. 41-43), and 100,000 tons of weapons, ammunition and food were delivered to Sarajevo. Electric cables and a pipeline were connected to bring in electric power and diesel fuel (Izetbegović, 2001, p. 144).

UN officials pretended that the tunnel did not exist, and rejected the VRS demands to close it. French General Phillip Morillon said that the airspace above the airport was officially under NATO control, the surface area was under UNPROFOR authority, and the area 20 cm below the surface was under RBiH government authority (Andreas, 2016, p. 59).

UNPROFOR commanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have a common understanding of the nature of battle for Sarajevo, and debated the issue. UNPROFOR Commander General Michael Rose described one such debate:

> I had been visited by Fred Cuny, a strange shadowy figure straight out of a Graham Green novel. A tall, gangling ex-Marine Corps Officer, he was running a water project in Sarajevo for the International Rescue Committee, largely funded by the international financier George Soros. He lived in a well-maintained house behind the Residency, guarded by tough-looking people who reminded me of the US Secret Service. He also had close connections with Capitol Hill in Washington. At our first meeting, he was highly critical of the UN, which he clearly thought was manned by weak and corrupt people. He wanted to see tough military action taken against the Bosnian Serbs, and even though I explained to him that we were about to launch a new strategy based on a tougher military approach, he did not believe me. He said he would do everything he could to undermine me, unless I could demonstrate my resolve by action on the ground. At which point I threw him out. Unrepentant, he invited himself back next evening with a group of "concerned lawyers", as he called them, from New York. The leader of the group was Aryeh Neier, a lawyer, who worked for a New York organization called the Open Society Fund whose chairman was George Soros ... Neier asked me if I considered Sarajevo to be a city under siege. I replied that it was not a siege in the true sense of the word, as the UN generally succeeded in making a flow of supplies into the city, and this had at least kept people alive. A look of triumph crossed his face and he launched into a tirade against me. He said that, as a lawyer, he could prove that, under different international protocols, Sarajevo was legally in a state of a siege, created by the aggressive Montenegrin-Serb regime of Karadžić. He struck me something as a zealot, and I realized the pointlessness of any further attempt at logical debate … The next morning the headlines in the local newspaper *Oslobođenje,* reported that I did not consider the citizens of Sarajevo to be under siege. (Rose, 1988, p. 29)

According to US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali accepted a US complaint that two UN peace-keeping officers, Brigadier General Hayes, Chief of staff of the Commander of the UNPROFOR, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Frewer, the Sarajevo spokesman of UNPROFOR, had "made inappropriate remarks." Hayes and Frewer had told reporters that Sarajevo was no longer under siege, but was encircled by the Serbs. Albright expressed dissatisfaction at the officers' statements (UN Security Council, 1994c, Annex IV, p. 375). After the RBiH government declared Frewer "persona non grata" and threats were made against his life, he left Sarajevo (Nakedman Productions, 2020).

General Rupert Smith, who replaced General Michael Rose as UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1994, on the contrary, unequivocally considered the battle of Sarajevo as a siege (Smith, 2006, p. 368). However, academic and legal debate as to whether battle of Sarajevo was a siege or a blockade becomes pointless in the context of suffering and death of thousands of civilians and soldiers on both sides of the front line.

The United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report does not describe the organization of the defense of Sarajevo by the ARBiH 1st Corps. However, Sarajevo was a defended city, both in the legal and in the military sense. The ARBiH organized the defense of Sarajevo in accordance with JNA doctrinal documents, central of which was the JNA "Brigade Manual", which determined the principles of ground warfare, and was in use. According to this document:

> Combat for an urban area is waged by massive close-range fighting of individuals, groups, and main tactical units. (Savezni Sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu – Generalštab JNA [SSNO Generalštab JNA], 1984, pp. 32-33)

According to the Yugoslav Army "Brigade Manual", a brigade consisted of headquarters, 3 or 4 battalions, an artillery support unit, an air defense unit, an anti-tank unit, an engineer unit, a logistics unit, and a communications unit. The brigade defense area was made of 2 or 3 echelons. The first echelon directly facing the enemy, as a rule, was made up of 2 or 3 battalions. The second echelon was made of 1 or 2 battalions. The third echelon held brigade logistics units, a brigade artillery support unit, depots and storages, as well as a dressing station (SSNO Generalštab JNA, 1984, pp. 19-20).

The "Brigade Manual" also defined the size of the brigade defense area. This area had the front 15 to 20 km long and was 12 to 20 km across. The square surface of the brigade defense area could reach up to 400 square kilometers. The area accommodated numerous units, weapons and material which were legitimate military targets.

Normally the brigade defense area accommodated 3 brigade command posts (main, alternate, and logistics), 3 to 4 battalion defense areas, 6 to 8 battalion command posts (main and alternate), 3 to 4 mortar platoon areas, 9 to 12 company defense areas, up to 36 platoon defense areas, an artillery group area, up to 10 service and combat support units areas, numerous observation posts, communications centers, ammunition distribution posts, infantry weapon emplacements and so on. The "Brigade Manual" also described specific requirements for the defense of urban areas, and emphasized engagement in combat of "local authorities and entire population in all circumstances" (SSNO Generalštab JNA, 1984, p. 218).

The United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report provides a list of specific allegedly civilian targets targeted by the VRS artillery. This list includes the Sarajevo radio and television stations, the Oslobođenje Newspaper building, the public transportation system, the Holiday Inn Hotel, the Presidency and Parliament buildings, the main city brewery, the flour mill, the main bakery, the Olympic complex, the Post Telegraph and Telephone building, the industrial area of Alipašin Most near the railway station and main television tower, the Jewish cemetery, the Lion cemetery, the city airport, the tobacco factory, the Dobrinja apartment complex, the central district, Baščaršija quarter, the Stari Grad section, New Sarajevo, the main thoroughfare on Maršal Tito Street, and the shopping district in Vase Miskina (UN Security Council, 1994a, p. 13).

What the United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report failed to mention is the presence of numerous legitimate military targets in the above locations and areas. These very areas in ARBiH-held part of Sarajevo accommodated corps-level headquarters, brigade headquarters, military installations, various firing positions, depots, storages and barracks. Numerous military factories and production shops produced artillery and mortar rounds (120 mm, 105 mm, 100 mm, 82 mm, 76 mm, 60 mm), as well as grenade launchers, rifles and hand grenades (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009, p. 327).

Given the relatively limited space of urban Sarajevo under the control of the ARBiH and the number of brigades within the ARBiH 1st Corps, urban Sarajevo under control of the ARBiH 1st Corps was literally saturated with military targets. At the ICTY trial of Radovan Karadžić the ARBiH 1st Corps Chief of Staff Asim Džambasović confirmed that

> Since the area of responsibility in the town was a very narrow strip, it was impossible to make sure that military units went about their daily business and engaged in combat outside of residential areas. It was impossible because of the layout of the ground and because of the way the area of responsibility ran. (ICTY, 2011, *Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić,* p. 15189)

According to VRS documents, ARBiH armored personnel carriers and tanks were located in Velešiči, Dom Milicije, and Cigljane tunnel. Artillery and mortar firing positions were located in the densely populated areas of Stup, Azići, the Vrbanja bridge, Strojorad, the Koševo stadium, Bistrik, Mojmilo, Sedrenik, Hrasno, Halilovići, the Tito barracks, Otoka and the Čengić Vila and in the railway cars at Novo Sarajevo railway station. Brigade and battalion holding areas, as well as military industries and logistical facilities, were located in urban Sarajevo under ARBiH control. Sniper positions were established in Trg Pere Kosorića, the Bristol Hotel, the Elektroprivreda building, the Social Security (Socijalno osiguranje) building, the Mašinski Fakultet and the RBiH Assembly and Executive Council buildings.

ARBiH 1st Corps field artillery and mortar pieces were located in the municipality of Stari Grad and Centar, as well as on the surrounding hills and mountain ridges. According to VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps intelligence, a battery of 105 mm howitzers of the 102nd Motorized Brigade was located in the area of the village of Halilovići on Hum Mountain. The Brigade's battery of 82mm mortars was in the same location.[51]

Near the center of Sarajevo, in the Briješće area, the 102nd Brigade deployed an artillery group of 18 artillery pieces (ICTY, Radovan Karadžić trial transcript, 2010, pp. 4361-4382). Artillery pieces were regularly positioned in and fired from Koševo hospital.[52] Mortar positions were located in Fuada Midžića Street and in Trg Solidarnosti.[53]

According to a statement of an ARBiH prisoner of war, four T-55 tanks and three 105 mm howitzers were dug in on Orlič Hill. One ZIS cannon and 82 mm and 120 mm mortars were located at Hill 850.[54] Two 82 mm mortars were positioned in the area of Betanija, in the immediate vicinity of the Obstetrics Unit, another one was located close to Ranko Gaca's house.[55] Another tank and an armored personnel carrier had a firing position in the tunnel of Ciglane.[56] Two tanks and two armored personnel carriers of the Armored Battalion of the ARBiH 1st Motorized Brigade were positioned in the area of Buća Potok on the top of Žuć Hill.[57]

Overall, at the height of the war, there were between 1,800 and 2,000 military targets in the urban part of Sarajevo that was under ARBiH control (Radinović, 2004, p. 145).

The ARBiH 1st Corps also had numerous legitimate military targets outside the urban part of Sarajevo. For example, according to the war diaries of ARBiH Deputy Commander General Šiber, the artillery group on Igman Mountain included a 130 mm gun. Other pieces included heavy 120 mm mortars, and six 155 mm guns. General Šiber admitted that firing positions of the ARBiH artillery group on Igman Mountain were discovered by UNPROFOR in July 1992 (Šiber, 2000, p. 130). Soon thereafter,

the UNPROFOR counter-battery radar was attacked and destroyed by ARBiH troops. One Ukrainian soldier was killed, and three injured (MacKenzie, 1993, p. 321).

Siege warfare was not the exclusive monopoly of the VRS. Given the patchwork pattern of ethnic distribution, it was a common method of warfare employed by all warring parties. The HVO besieged the Muslim enclave in Stari Vitez in the HVO-held town of Vitez in Central Bosnia in 1993-1994. The battle produced heavy casualties on both sides. Finally, on 27 February 1994, UNPROFOR forces mounted Operation Stari Simon and broke into the enclave to evacuate the Muslim sick and wounded (Schrader, 2003, p. 99). The HVO laid siege to ARBiH-held East Mostar and the small Muslim town of Maglaj in Central Bosnia. At the peak of the Muslim-Croat war in Central Bosnia the ARBiH also briefly besieged six major Croat towns in Central Bosnia (Travnik, Vitez, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Kakanj and Vares) before overrunning them.

Among the less known sieges of the war are the ARBiH sieges of the Serb enclaves Smoluća and Vozuća. The small Serb settlement of Smoluća, 30 km northwest of Tuzla, was under ARBiH siege from June 1992 to 27 August 1992, when the VRS finally cut through a corridor and evacuated its 7,000 civilians to Ozren. ARBiH soldiers plundered the settlement and burned it down. Strategically located between Tuzla and Zenica, the Serb settlement of Vozuća was under ARBiH siege throughout the war. Initially having a population of only 2,000, Vozuća swelled to almost 10,000 due to the influx of numerous Serb refugees from Central Bosnia. The VRS garrison of Vozuća was under incessant attacks, and finally collapsed in September 1995 due to the combined effect of NATO airstrikes and ARBiH operation “Uragan” (“Hurricane”). The fate of 150 missing VRS soldiers was not revealed until several mass graves were discovered in the area in 2006. One of them contained 56 decapitated bodies (Cvetković, 2012, pp. 191-200). ARBiH Mujahedeen reportedly sent 56 human heads to RBiH President Alija Izetbegović in Sarajevo, and to Teheran, 28 to each (Schindler, 2007, p. 224).

5.7. Combat Operations at Sarajevo Front

The United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report does not mention any military operations that the warring parties conducted around Sarajevo, and takes the VRS shelling of the city out of the general military context. However, these operations had a profound effect on the dynamics of the battle for Sarajevo, and, in the final count, determined the outcome of the war.

The VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps faced three ARBiH Corps, and was significantly outnumbered by the opposing ARBiH 1st (Sarajevo) Corps. Its annual average manpower never exceeded 13,000 men (Kovačević, 2018, p. 146). At the inner ring of encirclement, the ARBiH 1st Corps had a manpower of 60,442 men in 1992, which rose to 87,009 men in 1995 (Ajnadžić, 2002, p. 87). By 1995, the ratio of manpower between these opposing Corps was 6.69:1 in favor of the ARBiH. It should be noted that besides the ARBiH 1st Sarajevo Corps, the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps also faced the ARBiH 3rd and 4th Corps at the outer ring. The 3rd and 4th Corps effectively encircled the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, which was thinned out around Sarajevo. Therefore, according to the strategic principle of economy of force, the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps assumed the strategic defense posture, and did not undertake any large-scale offensive operations. At the most, VRS tactical attacks were aimed at improving local tactical positions, and to push back ARBiH offensives. In any case, the VRS forces were under legal obligation to conduct combat activities in accordance with the accepted laws of land warfare and the international law governing the conduct of military operations, but they were under no obligation to remain inactive and permit the ARBiH to kill Serb soldiers and civilians with impunity.

ARBiH made use of its huge superiority in manpower and initiated numerous offensive operations around Sarajevo. On 06 June 1992, ARBiH launched its first full-scale offensive operation "Ljeto-92" ("Summer-92"). ARBiH units were attacking in three prongs: from the Mojmilo mountain range in southeast, Trebević Mountain in the north, and the Zuć plateau in the north-west. The main axis of attack was St-up-Ažići-Vrelo Bosne-Blažuj. Attacks were preceded by artillery barrage by the 1-st Artillery Brigade from Sarajevo, which opened fire on Serb positions and settlements (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 88). On 8 June 1992, operation "Zmaj-92" ("Dragon-92") was launched to break the ring of encirclement around Sarajevo in the area of Kobilja Glava. This operation failed (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009, pp. 181-183).

However, ARBiH units managed to take Orlić Hill on the Zuć plateau and captured a few artillery pieces and mortars. Heavy fighting was going on in Dobrinja, as well as on the Žuć plateau. On 18 July 1992, ARBiH units captured the important Golo Brdo hill on the Igman mountain ridge. ARBiH paid a terrible price for this limited success. According to ARBiH sources, Muslims lost 199 men killed, 738 wounded and 2 taken prisoner (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 97). According to Serb sources, the ARBiH lost 625 soldiers and officers killed in June (Kovačević, 2018, p. 152). The VRS lost 8 men killed and 62 wounded. Two tanks and two APCs were damaged.[58]

On 31 July 1992, ARBiH launched the offensive operation "Poljinje". Two operational groups were created for this operation. The 1st Operational Group was supposed to attack in the direction of Nedžarići-Ilidža and Nedžarići-Dobrinja.

The 2nd Operational Group was supposed to attack in the direction Poljinje-Blagovac-Semizovac. Subsequently, both Operational Groups were supposed to join up in the area of Šućurovići and seize Vogošća. The 1st Motorized Brigade was attacking, hoping to reach Trnovo and cut the Sarajevo-Lukavica road, thus preventing the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps from moving its reserves to the threatened areas. On 1 August, Muslims captured the town of Trnovo on the strategic road between Sarajevo and Goražde, and captured 30 artillery pieces. Tanjug reported 150 Serb soldiers and civilians killed (UN Security Council, 1994, Annex IVc, p. 254). According to ARBiH sources, "July of 1992 ended up with futile attempts to break through the encirclement, and a big success in the area of Trnovo and Igman." According to ARBiH sources, in July 1992 the ARBiH lost 105 soldiers killed and 416 wounded (Čekić et al., 2017, pp. 105-106). Between 04 and 11 August 1992, heaving fighting was going on in Dobrinja, Naselje aerodrome, Nedžarići and Stup.

At the end of August, General Sefer Halilović prepared the offensive operation "Jug-92" ("South-92"). The objective of the operation was to break through the encirclement around Sarajevo along the axis Hrasnica-Sokolović Kolonija-Butmir-Nedžarići. The Vojkovići-Donji Kotorac axis was selected as a secondary attack axis. The objective of the operation was to "destroy enemy strong points" in Hadžiči, Ilijaš, and Vogošća. Two Operational Groups "Konjic" and "Igman" were created. Thirteen brigades, 64 independent battalions, and 31 independent companies, totaling over 50,000 troops, were engaged in the operation (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 108). The operation began in late August 1992. Infantry attacks were preceded and supported by heavy artillery fire. On 20 August, the 1st Sarajevo Corps artillery fired 20 rounds on the Serb settlement of Hadžići, destroying the local medical clinic and injuring 9 civilians.[59] On 22 August, about 200 artillery rounds were fired into Ilijaš, killing one person and injuring 7.[60] On 23 August 1992, 500 rounds were fired into Ilijaš, killing 6 persons and injuring 8.[61] The ARBiH attacks had some initial success and gained some ground, but VRS counterattacks pushed the ARBiH troops back, and General Sefer Halilović ordered the suspension of the operation.

On 7 December 1992, the ARBiH Corps launched an offensive action to break the blockade of Sarajevo, attacking in the axis Hrid-Vodokovac- PTT radio-relay station on Mount Trebević. Further offensive actions followed on 14 December 1992 and 7 January 1993. All of them ended in failure (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009, pp. 221-222).

By December 1992, the manpower of the 1st Sarajevo Corps increased to 73,000 officers and men (Ajnadžić, 2002, p. 87). The last 1st Sarajevo Corps offensive operation in 1992 was the ambitious operation "Koverat" ("Envelope"). Alija Izetbegović personally monitored preparations for this operation. In the framework of restruc-

turing the 1st Sarajevo Corps, two Operational Groups "Igman" and "Visoko" were formed (Čekić et al., 2017, p. 139). The objective of the operation was to destroy the VRS forces by concentrated thrusts from Sarajevo and Visoko and link up with ARBiH forces in Central Bosnia. Troops were distributed in four sectors: Sector East (Hrasnica), Sector South (Operational Group "Igman"), Sector West (Zenica and Visoko), and Sector Center (Sarajevo). The total strength of ARBiH forces engaged in the operation was about 4,000 men. Operation "Konverat" began on 19 November 1992 in poor weather and heavy snow. Initially the attacks of the 1st Sarajevo Corps gained some ground, but deep snow and heavy losses forced General Sefer Halilović to order a halt to the operation. On 1 December 1992, the VRS Sarajevo Romanija-Corps launched a strong counter-attack along the Ilidža-Sarajevo road, which threw the soldiers of the ARBiH Sarajevo 1st Corps into panic. On 4 December 1992, VRS troops took Otes. On 5 December, the ARBiH 1st Corps shifted its attack to the north, committing into battle an armored battalion, an artillery battalion and an anti-tank artillery battalion (ARBiH Komanda 1. Motorizovane brigade, 1992). On 10 December 1992, ARBiH troops managed to capture elevation 850 on the Žuć plateau, a key feature dominating Sarajevo in the North. The UNPROFOR UNMO report reported 200 ARBiH mortar rounds fired into the area of Žuć and 58 artillery rounds fired into the VRS-controlled areas of Sarajevo on 29 December 1992.[62] The ARBiH's fruitless attacks dragged on until the end of December and brought no success. Operation "Konverat" in fact made the situation of the ARBiH 1st Corps worse than before.

On 30 May 1993, the ARBiH 1st Corps launched the offensive operation "Trebević" with the intention of cutting the road between Lukavica, the seat of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps Command and Pale, provisional capital of Republika Srpska. The Muslim attacks were repelled with significant losses. 27 ARBiH soldiers were killed, and about 60 were injured (Karavelić & Rujanac, 2009, pp. 233-236).

All cease-fires negotiated by UNPROFOR invariably failed due to the offensive actions of the ARBiH. Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie noted in his book of memoirs:

> Whenever we arrange any type of cease-fire, it's usually the Muslims who break it first. In addition, there is strong circumstantial evidence that some really horrifying acts of cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the Muslims against their own people, for the benefit of an international audience. (MacKenzie, 1993, pp. 255-256)

As Charles Ingrao of Purdue University noted:

> Because none of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions ever charged Alija Izetbegović's regime and the ARBiH with any responsibility aside from not harassing UNPROFOR units, it is hardly surprising that they regularly launched attacks against the Bosnian Serbs ... Few among the army of journalists were knowledgeable about the latitude that international law affords military commanders in warfare, let alone in siege operations, including finer points (such as the distinction between international and domestic conflict). (Ingrao, 2009, pp. 206-207)

By the end of 1992, the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was firmly holding the frontline around Sarajevo, while the ARBiH attacks to break out of the encirclement had been repelled with significant losses. By the end of 1992, combat losses of the 1st Sarajevo Corps amounted to 3,097 officers and men killed (Ajnadžić, 2002, p. 236).

On 6 May 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 824 that proclaimed Sarajevo a "safe area" (UN Security Council Resolution 824, 1993). The parameters of this protection were defined in the subsequent passage of the UN Security Council Resolution 836, on 4 June 1993. The status of "safe area" for Sarajevo under a UN protective umbrella and the presence of UNPROFOR in the city gave the ARBiH in Sarajevo a huge military advantage, deterred VRS attacks, granted humanitarian assistance, and largely mitigated the VRS preponderance in artillery.

The ARBiH made the last attempt to break out of the blockade of Sarajevo in June 1995 in the course of operation "Tekbir." This operation was the largest in terms of committed forces. Five ARBiH Corps were engaged in the operation. The total strength of the assembled force was about 46,000 officers and men with 24 tanks, 60 pieces of artillery, and up to 400 mortars. On the VRS side, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps could assemble and commit into battle 17,500 men, 42 field artillery pieces, 132 mortars and 24 tanks (Kovačević, 2018, p. 55). As with all previous ARBiH offensive operations to break the blockade of Sarajevo, Operation "Tekbir" ended up in a failure. After initially ceding some ground, the VRS counterattacked and repelled the ARBiH. Muslims again suffered significant losses. According to CIA assessment, between mid-June and mid-July 1995, the ARBiH may well have lost over 1,000 killed and 3,000 or more wounded in the battles around Sarajevo - a steep price in blood by any standard (CIA, 2003, p. 315). "The ARBiH June 1995 offensive to break the Sarajevo siege was a glorious sacrifice to preserve Bosnia's victim status in the eyes of the world", noted Lieutenant Colonel Jim Baxter, General Smith's military assistant (Ripley, 1995, p. 141).

During the entire war, the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps undertook only one offensive operation, known as "Lukavac-93", in the summer of 1993. The objectives of "Lukavac-93" were threefold: to directly link the Herzegovina region with the rest of Republika Srpska, to complete the encirclement of Sarajevo, and to force the ARBiH Presidency into peace talks. The VRS saw this offensive as determined by military necessity, and as a justified response to the incessant RBiH attacks by overwhelming forces both at the front and in the rear (Kovačević, 2018, p. 155).

The most intense day of fighting was 22 July 1993. On this day, the unities of the ARBiH 1st Corps attempted a counter-attack, which the VRS repelled with artillery fire directed at miscellaneous legitimate targets, including ARBiH positions on Mount Igman and mortars and artillery positions in the center of Sarajevo. Reportedly, the UN recorded 3,777 artillery and mortar impacts, of which 660 landed in the center of the city, but the majority were fired into the Mount Igman area (UN Security Council, 1994a, p. 586).

In early July 1993, the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps took Bjelašnica Mountain. On 01 August 1993 VRS troops scaled the plateau of Igman. VRS control of these two peaks threatened to make the blockade of Sarajevo complete. Under threats of NATO air strikes, on 14 August 1993, the warring parties signed the "Agreement for withdrawal of forces from Igman and Bjelašnica" which obliged both the VRS and the ARBiH to withdraw to lines existing before 30 June. The VRS agreed to give back the conquered territory to UNPROFOR, which undertook an obligation to guarantee implementation of the agreement and declared the disputed area "a demilitarized zone." However, UNPROFOR failed in its obligations. The ARBiH 1st Corps units remained in the "demilitarized zone" and delivered painful attacks against the VRS. On 6 November 1994, crossing the "demilitarized zone", an ARBiH special force group made a surprise attack on the VRS battalion command post, and killed 24 persons, including four female medical nurses. This killing constituted a violation of Geneva Conventions. UNPROFOR Commander General Michael Rose qualified the attack as a "war crime" (Rose, 1988, pp. 186-187).

Much controversy was caused by the "Bread-line Massacre" incident on 27 May 1992, and incidents "Markale 1" and "Markale 2" on 05 February 1994 and 28 August 1995 respectively. All of them were attributed to VRS artillery shelling.

But upon close scrutiny by UNPROFOR, it became very unclear whether the "bread-line" massacre had indeed been perpetrated by the Serbs. But upon close scrutiny by UNPROFOR, it became very unclear whether the incident had indeed been perpetrated by the Serbs. The people in Sarajevo could just as easily have been shelled by their own troops, on the instructions of their own government, in order to provoke international reaction at the Lisbon conference, and have the Serbs condemned for it

(O'Shea, 2005, p. 38). UN Commander Lewis MacKenzie in Sarajevo lent credence to the claim by noting the efficiency with which the government had blocked off the site of the Bread-line Massacre before the explosion, and brought in journalists immediately afterward, while suggesting that most of the victims were actually "tame Serbs" whose ethnicity rendered them suitable for sacrifice (MacKenzie, 1993, pp. 193-194).

In the "Markale 1" incident, UNPROFOR concluded that either side could have fired the shell which killed 68 people on 05 February 1994 (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 166). According to Dutch intelligence expert Cees Wiebes, various staff of the intelligence and security services from Canada, the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands established independently of each other that this was an act by the ARBiH to show the Bosnian Serbs in a bad light (Wiebes, 2002, p. 62).

During the joint press conference, UNPRFOR Chief of Mission Jasushi Akashi and NATO Admiral Boorda clearly stated that "if NATO forces use air power in the Sarajevo region on the UN request, it will be used impartially against all the violators of cease-fire" (Akashi, 2007, pp. 46-47). According to Jasushi Akashi (2007):

> This attitude, to maintain impartiality with regard to all three parties to the conflict (Serbs, Croats and Muslims), was in clear contrast to the subsequent NATO Council decisions which targeted only Bosnian Serb forces as an enemy. The hardheaded and pragmatic approach of Admiral Boorda to air attacks by NATO forces appeared to be in sharp contradiction to the approach advocated by the high leadership of the US administration, including President Bill Clinton. (pp. 46-47)

The evidentiary picture in "Markale-2" incident, in which an allegedly Serb mortar round killed 37 and injured 89 people on 28 August 1995, remained confused, and gave rise to similar suspicions (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 168). US Army Colonel Gray, head of the UNPROFOR intelligence section in Sarajevo, subsequently signaled in a publication that the ARBiH was responsible for both shelling. Even the most important British policy body in the field of intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), concluded that the shelling of Sarajevo market was probably not the work of the VRS, but of the ARBiH (Wiebes, 2002, pp. 61-62). According to US authors Steven L. Bourg and Paul S. Shoup(1999):

> The predominant assumption in the Western media that the RBiH government simply could not have engaged to such inhuman acts does not stand up to scrutiny. Incidents in which the Muslims fired on their own people did occur ... In November 1994, in the midst of the Bihać crisis … the UN provid-

> ed a detailed public report of evidence that the Bosnian army had launched a mortar attack against a Sarajevo neighborhood under its own control, killing a child. Another such case occurred in December 1994 when two persons were killed and seven wounded in Sarajevo. Former UNPROFOR military sources have described how the incident was blamed by the Bosnian government on a Serb tank firing from a UN-controlled weapons depot outside the city. A UN investigation of the incident determined that the shelf could not have been fired from Serb positions, and that the explosives involved were a mortar shell and a satchel charge, findings that implicated the Muslims. Whether the responsibility for the three key massacres lay on the Bosnian Muslim side – government or otherwise – was less clear. (p. 165)

Many years later, this analysis received further confirmation at the trial of General Ratko Mladić at ICTY. Protected witness GRM-116, who during the war was a member of Alija Izetbegovic's security, testified in the course of his cross-examination on the shelling of the Markale on 5th February 1994. GRM-116 said the Markale Market attack was suggested by Islamic community leader Mustafa Cerić, and was carried out by Bosnian Army Generals Sefer Halilović and Mustafa Hajrulahović, also known as "Talijan".

Both of these generals carried out a plan to place the firing system in line with the Špicasta stijena, near the village of Mrkovići, where Serbs had artillery positions, so our mortar would be fired. Alija and Cerić accepted this and Sefer turned towards the Italian and said, 'The Italian will do this,' GRM-116 said, adding that he was present when Izetbegović approved of this plan. At another meeting with Izetbegovic, Halilović reported that the first attempt to attack the Markale Market failed because the mortar hit the roof of the market … Alija told them to try again. They went and soon we heard what happened with Markale, GRM-116 said (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić*, 2015b, pp. 42642-42721).

The front lines around Sarajevo remained essentially static for the entire war. From the start, both sides had constructed elaborate trench complexes to protect their front lines, further contributing to the "trench warfare" style of the Sarajevo battle. Both the VRS and ARBiH used artillery to attain tactical and operational objectives based on JNA doctrine. ARBiH 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelić noted in his book that the SRK artillery "employed standard types of prohibitive fire: fire barrage, protective fire, selective fire and concentrated fire."[63] The JNA artillery doctrine did not envisage attacking civilian targets, but fire against numerous legitimate military targets within a relatively small space of densely populated urban municipalities inevitably caused civilian victims and substantial collateral damage. The UN Experts Final Report emphasized:

> The concealment of Bosnian Government forces among civilian property may have caused the attraction of fire from the Bosnian Serb Army which may have resulted in legitimate collateral damage. (UN Security Council, 1994a, p. 48)

A notable feature of the battle of Sarajevo was the shelling that occurred prior to and during the various peace conferences, suggesting a political objective or link to the attacks. There was an apparent correlation between the increase and decrease of shell fire in connection with political events such as: negotiations, meetings, the preparation for negotiations, the hardening or softening of public positions by international and local political leaders, and changes and potential changes of positions by certain governments (UN Security Council, 1994, Annex IVc, pp. 45-46).

According to the CIA, the intensity of fire directed at downtown Sarajevo was never as great as televised images led many observers to believe. Some sections of the city were laid waste, and numerous buildings were destroyed, yet other sections (indeed, some entire neighborhoods) were relatively unharmed, but failed to merit the scrutiny of drama-seeking television crews. Statistically, the volume of fire directed into urban Sarajevo was far less intense than in most sieges of most cities during the past century.

Before the February 1994 cease-fire, on an average day, approximately 300 artillery or mortar rounds were fired against targets of the ARBiH 1st Corps, that is less than one round per target. On days when the NATO exclusion zone was actually in effect, only a scattering of shots might be fired, or sometimes none at all (CIA, 2003, p. 307).

In the periods when the ARBiH was not active around Sarajevo, and did not provoke VRS response, relative calm reigned in the city. According to the estimates made in the United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report, the monthly average of civilians killed fell from 105 in September to December 1992, to around 64 in 1993 and to around 28 in the first six months of 1994 (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Galić*, 2003, paras. 578, 579). In the *Galić* case, the ICTY found that:

> The attacks on civilians were numerous, but were not consistently so intense as to suggest an attempt by the SRK to wipe out or even deplete the civilian population through attrition. (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Galić*, para. 593)

The Court thus found that it has not been conclusively established that the acts were committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy the protected group in whole or in part.

Comparative analysis of the losses of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the RBiH 1st Corps reveal the nature of operations of both warring parties in the area of Sarajevo. Normally, the losses of an attacker exceed the losses of a defender for obvious reasons. Throughout the 1479 days of blockade of Sarajevo the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps lost about 4,000 men killed in action (Kovačević, 2018, p. 146). The ARBiH 1st Corps (Sarajevo) lost 6,585 men killed in action (Ajnadžić, 2002, p. 111). The comparative death toll of the opposing forces convincingly shows that the ARBiH was the attacker and that the VSR was the defender.

5.8. ARBiH Tactics

The ARBiH Main Staff knew of the Geneva Conventions ban on shelling civilian targets, and purposely located key military centers, troop concentrations and logistics and weapons systems in and amongst the population. This tactic was used by the PLO during the siege of Beirut by the Israeli Defense Force in 1982 Operation "Peace for Galilee."[64] Tactically, they used the civilians to hide their forces. The ARBiH small and medium caliber artillery, as well as light and limited range fire assets, such as grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank hand-held weapons, were usually mounted on trucks, trailers or railway cars and positioned in the immediate vicinity of facilities of a civilian nature, such as schools, hospitals, kindergartens. Machine gun and sniper positions were located on the roofs of the buildings and flats, windows, and terraces of civilian buildings.

As early as April 1992, the ARBiH started firing mortars at JNA targets from the municipality of Stari Grad in the center of the city. The Chief of TO Main Staff Colonel Hasan Efendić, in his book of memoirs "Who defended Bosnia?" (1998), described the ARBiH tactics:

> It turned out that the Chief of the municipality of Stari Grad had two 82 mm mortars captured from JNA. These mortars would fire several rounds, and then change positions quickly. Chetniks would open fire at the locations where the mortars just fired from. Hadžibajrić's batteries again would open *fire from other* positions, and the chetniks would again respond by fire, destroying buildings, killing and injuring people. This is how the Chief of the municipality was playing with the Chetniks. (p. 270)

ARBiH mortars and snipers opened fire at Serb positions, soldiers and civilians from Tito Barracks, which accommodated the Ukrainian UNPROFOR Battalion,

from positions in the immediate vicinity of the PTT Engineering buildings, which accommodated the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Headquarters, and from the premises of the Koševo hospital, as well as from numerous positions located in densely populated areas of the city. UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Commander General Lewis Mackenzie in his memoirs noted:

> It was favorite technique of the TDF to set up their weapons close to our UN positions, in the hope that the opposition would not fire back. If fire was returned, it was still to their advantage, since we would then report that the Serbs were shelling us. (MacKenzie. 1993, p. 309)

On 22 July 1992, General Lewis MacKenzie entered into his diary a description of an incident when ARBiH mortars were placed into a position next to the Canadian UNPROFOR Battalion at Bevor Camp. All requests to ARBiH Command to remove the mortars were futile. When they opened fire, the Canadian Battalion went into shelter. Serbs returned fire, having caused heavy damage to the Canadian camp. The next morning General Lewis MacKenzie had an appointment with Vice-President Ganić, and told him that he would give orders to kill TO soldiers manning the mortars position next time they fired (MacKenzie. 1993, p. 309).

This was not an isolated incident. On 11 July 1992, a similar incident occurred involving the position of a UNPROFOR Ukrainian counter-battery radar. As with the Bevor Camp incident ARBiH soldiers moved their heavy weapons to the UNPROFOR position and opened fire. Serb forces opened return fire. In the ensuing skirmish ARBiH soldiers grenaded the UN position, killing one UN officer and injuring four (MacKenzie. 1993, p. 321). On 13 April 1994, the VRS Ilidža brigade command reported that Muslims "were firing single shots and volleys from infantry weapons from the Stup sector on flying UNPROFOR helicopters with the intention of attributing the fire to us."[65]

The most flagrant tactic was the ARBiH use of the medical facilities as "human shields". In his book of memoirs, former British Foreign Secretary, David Owen described the Muslim artillery attacks emanating from the Koševo Hospital as "the most flagrant and best-documented episode of Muslim army units provoking the Serbs to fire on their fellow Muslims." He stated:

> An UNMO (United Nations Military Observer) team near Koševo hospital in Sarajevo had witnessed a Bosnian government mortar crew set up in the grounds of the hospital and fire over the hospital into a Serb area. They had quickly packed up and gone, only for the UNMOs to see a television crew arrive and then record the retaliatory Serb shelling of the hospital. (Owen, 1996, p. 112)

UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina General Michael Rose in his book *Fighting for* Peace was of the view that the ARBiH installed their weapons in the midst of civilian areas, for instance, in the grounds of the hospital in Sarajevo and that:

> The Bosnians had evidently chosen this location with the intention of attracting Serb fire, in the hope that the resulting carnage would further tilt international support in their favor. (Rose, 1988, p. 254)

When Philippe Morillon, the French general commanding the UN force in Bosnia from 1992 to 1993, testified in the Slobodan Milosević trial he said the Muslims "very frequently used mortars at Koševo for provocation purposes" (ICTY, 2004, *Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic*, p. 32047).

Deputy Chief of Sarajevo CSB Zlatko Beckanović (2016) witnessed one such provocation and described it in his book:

> One day, when I was waiting for a bus about 100 meters away from the ruined maternity clinic, I heard firing and the hissing sound of rounds originating from the [Koševo] hospital compound. Three salvos were fired. Then I saw a luxury American-made car and two pick-up jeeps painted in black, dark-green and khaki colors, exiting the hospital compound. They had some kind of mounted guns with shields in front and on the sides. The gunners were sitting on small benches. The vehicles quickly disappeared. I understood everything and started walking away without waiting for the bus. A few minutes later four rounds impacted in the compound. (p. 183)

Judging by the description of the weapons mounted on the pick-up jeeps, the guns were M20 75 mm recoilless guns with a firing range of 6,000 meters, and probably belonged to the HOS or the HVO.

Cases of shelling from Koševo hospital by ARBiH forces are noted in ARBiH reports. On 28 December 1992, the ARBiH 7th Brigade Assistant Commander for Security Tomislav Jurić reported to the 1st Corps Command that "unknown persons were firing mortars from mobile trucks in the vicinity of Koševo hospital." The report noted that:

> On 27.12.1992, between 20.00 and 20.30 hours a mortar that was moving from location to location on a truck fired four mortar rounds. The rounds were fired from different locations close to Koševo hospital and the new settlement of Breka, probably in the vicinity of Marcela Šnajdera Street, Fuada Midžića, Luja Adamića, Jovana Bjelića, Ismeta Mjezinovića streets, and near-by streets. Sev-

> eral minutes later, as a reaction, the aggressor fired three to four artillery rounds at Koševo area, Grdonje, while one artillery round hit the apartment building in Spasoja Mičiča street. Such firing of mortar rounds from motor vehicles is not an infrequent event. Fifteen days ago, in the evening, mortar rounds were fired from Koševsko Brdo between No.97 and No.99 in Hane Ozmo Street. I suggest undertaking wide-ranging measures to identify the unknown perpetrators and organizers of the incidents of firing from unknown weapons."[66]

The above report indicates that the ARBiH 1st Corps Command had no effective system of command and control. Given the paramilitary nature of the ARBiH, the system of command and control was virtually non-existent, at least under the command of General Sefer Halilović. "Unknown individuals" could fire a mortar from any location in the city to any other location, targeting any area or object within the range. Given the numerous criminal gangs in the city, the motives behind cases of "anonymous shelling" could be of purely criminal nature, when various criminal groups and paramilitary formations could settle their scores for control of parts of the city with mortar fire, while victims were attributed to "chetniks shelling." However, the more likely motive was to deliberately attract fire on civilian targets in order to pin the guilt for the resultant civilian casualties on the "chetniks."

The above-mentioned report by ARBiH 7th Brigade Assistant Commander for Security Tomislav Jurić did not have any effect. Shelling from the premises of Koševo hospital continued. On 19 January 1993, UNPROFOR Commander General Philip Morillon sent a strong letter of protest to President Alija Izetbegović, accusing him of ARBiH provocations. The letter stated that ARBiH mortars were regularly fired from the premises of Koševo hospital:

> I have signed statements of specific witnesses that this really occurred at 14.30 on Monday 11 January. An 82 mm mortar was positioned in the premises of the hospital and fired nine rounds. The direct consequence of this dishonest and cowardly act was artillery and mortar shelling of the hospital.[67]

General Morillon's letter did not change the ARBiH pattern of behavior. In fact, the ARBiH became more brazen. Now the ARBiH started firing their mortars from a location 200 meters away from the PTT building which accommodated the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo HQ.[68]

As Dušan Šehovac stated to the Commission:

> There is one problem which I must say as an officer and as a human being. None of the ARBiH military commanders respected the Geneva conventions

> enough. In Sarajevo Bosniak forces placed their weapons around civil objects, hospitals, and schools, and directed towards Serbian territory."[69]

The provocative and treacherous nature of the ARBiH actions were well noted by numerous international observers. UNPROFOR Chief of Mission Jsushi Akashi noted:

> In the capital Sarajevo, the Commander of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia, General Francis Briquemont (a Belgian) and General Lewis MacKenzie (a Canadian) witnessed Bosnian Government forces carrying out artillery attacks on Bosnian Serb areas, bringing their cannons, mortars and tanks near hospitals, schools and UN facilities. By so doing, they provoked counterattacks by Serbs on these facilities, and succeeded in impressing upon world public opinion the inhuman nature of their adversary. In the "fog of war", there is always confusion and fear, misjudgment and misinformation, side by side. Under such circumstances, apportioning the blame and legal and moral responsibility between the warring parties becomes rather hazardous. (Akashi, 2007, p. 110)

5.9. ARBiH 1st Corps Artillery Attacks

The Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) presents the warring parties in the area of Sarajevo as "besieging forces" and "defensive forces", and describes the "systematic shelling of specific targets and patterns of random shelling by the besieging forces" (UN Security Council, 1994c, Annex IV, pp.13-14). The Report tacitly refrains from describing the shelling activities of the "defensive forces."

However, the reality was that both warring parties were involved into combat operations, and artillery and sniper fire were the brunt of their daily combat activities. From the military perspective, typical patterns of artillery action of the warring parties were artillery preparation fire, counter preparation fire, covering fire, defensive fire, suppression fire against pre-selected targets, interdiction fire, counter-battery fire, harassing fire. Despite the fact that in the first year of the war the VRS enjoyed considerable firepower, the ARBiH 1st Corps artillery was capable of fire missions, and had sufficient level of armament, organization and expertise.

Numerous documents in the possession of the Republika Srpska Centre for Research of War, Investigation of War Crimes and Search for Missing Persons provide

ample evidence of the shelling activities of the 1st Corps artillery and mortars. For example, 02 December 1992, United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) "registered 134 rounds outgoing from Presidency positions, while 110 rounds were recorded outgoing from Serb positions".[70] On 06 December 1992, 136 rounds were registered coming to the Serb side.[71] On 08 December 1992, 443 artillery rounds were registered impacting on the VRS-controlled areas and positions.[72] On 20 December 1992, 158 rounds were recorded coming to the ARBiH positions, while 533 rounds were recorded coming to the VRS-held areas and positions.[73] On this day, the ARBiH 1st Corps artillery fire mostly originated from Igman and was directed into Hadžići.[74] In total, in December 1992, the ARBiH 1st Corps artillery fired over 100 shells on a daily basis.

On 24 December 1992, the UNMO report noted:

> A relatively quiet day with 14 rounds coming to the Presidency side, and 82 rounds coming to the Serb side. Total rounds recorded outgoing from Serb positions - 3, from Presidency positions – 14. A shift in emphasis is evident with the Presidency dominating the high explosive exchange rate. It is amazing that these people keep killing on Christmas Eve! Even the IRA stop for a break![75]

ARBiH artillery fire was specifically targeted, but also indiscriminate and random. One of the reasons behind this phenomenon was the generally low level of military training of ARBiH personnel, and the lack of qualified officers. ARBiH General Jovan Divjak commented on the capabilities of some ARBiH commanders:

> For a year and a half, five unit commanders in Stari Grad were people who had not spent a day at a military school. These two did not even serve in the army, because they were mentally retarded. But Alija trusted them more than professional officers. (Stojaković, 2003)

According to Sarajevo-Romanija Corps Command reports, the ARBiH 1st Corps artillery often fired at Serb civilian settlements indiscriminately without any provoking fire from the Serb side. For example, on 23 December 1992, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps Command reported that on that day the enemy forces indiscriminately fired 110 artillery rounds on Hadžiči, 60 rounds on Ilidža, 50 on Rajlovac, 120 on Vogošča, and 70 rounds on Ilijaš. As a result, three civilians were killed, and four injured. The shelling also caused a significant material damage.[76]

After 31 August 1993, when a cease-fire was agreed between the ARBiH and the VRS at Sarajevo front, the ARBiH 1st Corps artillery indiscriminately fired 53 artillery rounds on Dobrinja, 101 rounds on Grbavica, 41 rounds on Lukavica, 44

rounds on Vojkovići, 250 rounds on Rajlovac, 280 rounds on Vogošća, 135 rounds on Ilidža, 179 rounds on Hadžiči, 108 on Ilijaš. During the ostensible cease-fire, the ARBiH 1st Corps fired 1426 rounds, killing 24 and injuring 62 civilians.[77]

Indiscriminate and random ARBiH shelling of VRS positions and settlements of Sarajevo under the control of Republika Srpska resulted in numerous civilian casualties. Serb surgeon Miodrag Lazić was working at the "Žiča" hospital in Blažuj. His book "Diary of a war surgeon" provides details of ARBiH shelling of the hospital and the suffering of civilian patients injured by ARBiH artillery shells: 27 November 1992 – 25 civilians wounded by shelling in Ilidža; 2 December 1992 – shelling of Ilidža, Hadžići, Rajlovac, Vogošća, many people are wounded, among them two girls of 3 and 6 years old; 7 December 1992 – shelling of the hospital, a shell fragment hit a girl of 15 years old; 13 December 1992 – shelling of the hospital, 11 shells exploded in the immediate vicinity; 31 December 1992 – 12 children are wounded in Hadžići; January 1993 – 5 children in Ilijaš are injured by shelling, including a 7 years old girl; 22 March 1993 – intensive shelling of Ilidža – 5 civilians are killed; 19 April 1993 – 4 children are wounded by a shell in Otes, one boy of 11 years old is killed; 31 May 1993 – shelling of Ilidža, Rajlovac, 2 children are killed; 17 July 1993 – shelling of the hospital; 13 May 1994 – a mother and a daughter are seriously wounded by a shell; 17 November 1994 – heavy shelling, two civilian workers are wounded 100 meters away from the hospital; 16 May – Muslims are attacking VRS positions with the intention to cut the road to Pale, heavy shelling of Ilidža; 24 May 1995 – a shell hit a sports hall, 8 girls are wounded, two of them very seriously; a boy of 13 years old killed by a shell in Vogošća; 1 July 1995 – 5 civilians are wounded by shelling in Hadžići; 3 July 1995 – 2 children, 6 and 12 years old are killed in Hadžići (Lazić, 2020). The data from the diary of surgeon Miodrag Lazić refer to only one of several Serb hospitals in the area of Sarajevo. Some specific cases of Serb civilian casualties from 1993-1995 are outlined below:

- On 15 January 1993, the ARBiH fired several high explosive shells of unidentified caliber from the direction of Sokolović Kolonija, which exploded in the Lužani settlement in Ilidža municipality. These explosions killed civilian Zdravko Džino, son of Jovo and Radojka (mother), born on 02 May 1930 in the Lužani settlement in Ilidža municipality. He was hit by a shell fragment in the neck.[78]
- On 11 February 1993, an artillery round of unknown caliber was fired from an ARBiH position from Sokolje or Igman, from where the ARBiH had been shelling Ilidža Municipality on a daily basis. This round exploded in Tome Međe street in front of number 15, Ilidža Municipality, killing Ilinka Krkeljaš, daughter of father Đokan and mother Milica, born on 03 August 1953 in

the village of Gornja Bioča, Ilijaš, a civilian, while she gathering drinking water to take to her children.[79]

- On 14 February 1993, the ARBiH fired one 120 mm mortar round from the direction of Hrasnica that exploded at the crossroads of Kneza Lazara Street and Mlade Bosne Street in Ilidža municipality, killing civilian Maksim Budimčić, son of Vlade, born 29 August 1930, in the village of Bančići in Ljubinje municipality. He was hit by a fragment in the abdomen.[80]
- On 15 February 1993, the ARBiH fired one artillery round of unidentified caliber from a position on Mountain Igman. The round exploded in Blažujski Drum Street in Ilidža municipality, killing a civilian boy, Dalibor Petričević, son of Mirko, born 23 January 1976 in Sarajevo in Centar municipality. The shell also seriously injured civilians Bojan Urta, son of Dušan, born on 6 January 1976 in Sarajevo in Centar municipality, and Vladimir Kuljanin, son of Sreten, born 24 October 1975 in Sarajevo in Centar municipality.[81]
- On 2 March 1993, ARBiH shelled the urban part of Vogošća municipality, viz. Moše Pijade Street, killing a civilian boy, Darko Đurić, son of Vaso and Slavica (mother), born in 1978 in Sarajevo. A shell fragment hit him in the left side of his rib cage while he was playing in a park with his friends.[82]
- On 13 April 1993, the ARBiH fired several 120 mm mortar rounds from positions in the area of Hadžići municipality. These rounds killed civilian boys Staša Samadžić, son of Zoran and Vinka (mother), born in 1980 in Sarajevo, a seventh-grader in a primary school, and Srđan Žuža, son of Vaso and Dušanka (mother), born on10 November 1981 in Bradina in Konjic municipality, at a fifth-grader in a primary school. Srđan's arm was torn off, while Staša had half of his head blown off.[83]
- On 21 April 1993, the ARBiH shelled the urban area of the Vogošća municipality with 82 mm mortar rounds, targeting the Vogošća Health Center with civilian residential buildings.[84]
- On 22 April 1993, an artillery round fired from ARBiH positions in the village of Otes, Ilidža Municipality, wounded a child, Ognjen Trišić, son of father Ljubomir and mother Svetlana, born on 19 June 1986 in Sarajevo, Center Municipality, while he was playing in the park. He was hit by multiple pieces of shrapnel all over his body, making him 60% permanently disabled.[85]
- On 03 May 1993, a 120 mm mortar round, fired from the ARBiH positions on Mount Igman, exploded at No. 7 Braće Jugovića street, Ilidža Municipality,

injuring a boy, Boris Domazet, son of Zoran, born on 29 November 1986, while he was playing on the apartment balcony. A piece of shrapnel hit him in the head.[86]

- On 03 May 1993, an artillery round of unknown caliber, fired from the direction of Pofalići, from an ARBiH position exploded in Banjalučka street, in Vrace, injuring civilian, Risto Kržić, son of father Jovica and mother Darinka, born on 19 January 1931 in Gornje Čićevo, Trebinje Municipality. A piece of shrapnel hit the victim in the lower part of the left leg.[87]
- On 5 May 1993, an artillery round of unknown caliber, fired from ARBiH positions, exploded across the road from the building of the Vogošća municipality, killing civilian Vitomir Blagovačanin, son of Risto, born on 02 August 1937. He was hit in the head as he walked along Moše Pijade street, Vogošća municipality. [88]
- On 30 May 1993, a 120 mm mortar round fired from the ARBiH positions on Mountain Igman exploded at Karpoševa street No. 14, Ilidža Municipality, killing a boy, Miroslav Čović, at the door of his family house. Civilians Đorđe Pindžo, son of Mlađen, born on 23 July 1980 in Sarajevo, and civilian Nada Čović, daughter of father Gavrilo and mother Ljubica, born 25 December 1948 in the village of Obrnja, Kalinovik Municipality, were wounded.[89]
- On 12 June 1993, an artillery round of unknown caliber, fired from the ARBiH positions, exploded in the urban area of the Vogošća Municipality, injuring civilian Snježana Jokić, daughter of father Radovan and mother Kosa, born on 31 March 1966 in Sarajevo, Center Municipality, while she was moving around her apartment.[90]
- 09 July 1993, several mortar rounds, probably of 82 mm caliber, fired from Mount Igman, from a position under the control of the ARBiH, exploded at no. 2 Radoja Domanovića street and nos. 30 and 32 Josipa Pančića street severely injuring an adolescent Dragan Radijeljac, son of father Luka and mother Stojka, born on 01 December 1975 in Sarajevo, Center Municipality, a civilian, while he was playing with his friend Nebojša Radojević.[91]
- On 12 July 1993, a 76 mm artillery round was fired from the direction of the ARBiH positions at Orlić - Žuć Hill. The round hit a bus that was carrying about 30 Serb civilians from Vogošća-Pale to Hotonj, killing Mileva Đorđić, born in 1933 and Zoran Draškić, born in 1972, and severely injuring Milojka Vukašinović, Trišo Marilović, Nenad Despotović, Radovan Skočo,

Dragica Skočo, Daliborka Skočo, Momir Radan, Borislav Jokanović, and Marko Stojanović. Shrapnel hit Mileva Đorđić in the neck area and blew her head off, while Zoran Draškić's head was blown up.[92]

- On 17 July 1993, in the area of the settlement of Vrelo Bosne, Ilidža Municipality, several rounds fired from the ARBiH positions on Mount Igman killed a civilian boy, Predrag Ćorić, son of father Živko and mother Anđelka, born on 08 February 1975 in Sarajevo, Centar Municipality, and his mother Anđelka Ćorić, daughter of father Vojin and mother Dragica, born on 26 June 1948, as they stood outside their family home.[93]
- On 02 August 1993, an artillery round of unknown caliber, fired from the ARBiH positions on Mount Igman, exploded in the village of Lužani, Ilidža Municipality, and wounded Desanka Tomić, daughter of father Žarko and mother Dragica, born on 25 December 1961 in Sarajevo. She was hit in the left side of the chest area.[94]
- On 24 December 1993, an artillery round of unknown caliber impacted the village of Jošanica, Vogošća Municipality, injuring a boy, Ognjen Pilipović, son of father Rade and mother Mira, born on 02 July 1983 in Sarajevo, while playing with his brother Denis Pilipović and their friend Tihomir Golijanin in front of his family home.[95]
- On 08 August 1994, projectiles fired from the HMG "Browning," caliber 12.7 mm, from an ARBiH position on Mount Ormanj, Hadžići Municipality, hit a bus full of civilian passengers traveling on the Hadžići-Ilidža-Rakovica route. On this occasion Dr. Tanja Grgić, daughter of father Đuro, born on 05 July 1949 in Kolašin, was killed, and Aleksa Grabovac, son of Milan, born on 26 June 1935 in the village of Miševići, Hadžići Municipality, was wounded.[96]
- On 17 November 1994, a shell of unknown caliber, fired from the ARBiH position on Mount Igman on 17 November 1994, exploded in front of the "Elektroprenos" office at no. 13 Vrelo Bosne, killing civilian Zoran Grahovac, son of Rade, born on 25 July 1960 in Sarajevo, Center Municipality. He was hit by shrapnel in his left eye, head, abdomen, and both hands. A civilian Boško Štaka, son of Risto, born on 07/01/1949 in Sarajevo, Center Municipality, was wounded in the abdomen and right arm. This shelling of the residential civilian settlement of Vrelo Bosne was deliberate, and targeted civilian houses.[97]

- On 18 December 1994, a rifle grenade, fired from the direction of Stup settlement under the control of the ARBiH exploded in the village of Neđarići, Ilidža Municipality, near the family home of Milan Lalović, killing Kosa Lalović, maiden name Elez, daughter of father Relja and mother Darinka, born on 14 November 1946 in the village of Borija, Kalinovik Municipality, a civilian, while she was performing daily household chores. The rifle grenade hit her in the right hip.[98]
- On 03 May 1995, ARBiH artillery on Mount Ormanj shelled the area of Hadžići Municipality, killing civilian Nenad Mrkaja, son of father Spasoje and mother Savka, born on 30 April 1934 while he planted onions in his garden, at no. 6 JNA Street in Hadžići Municipality.[99]
- On 17 May 1995, an artillery round of unknown caliber, fired from ARBiH artillery positions from the direction of the village of Sokolović kolonija, exploded at the pedestrian crossing in Trg Kralja Petra I street, killing civilian Gojko Popović, son of father Rade and mother Jela, born on 06 July 1936 in the village of Dražiljevo, Gacko Municipality, and severely injured civilians Mirko Nogović, son of father Jovan and mother Mara, born 22 October 1952 in Sarajevo and Mirjana Balaban, maiden name Šarenac, daughter of Nikola, born on 30 June 1967 in Sarajevo. [100]
- On 23 May 1995, a 128mm artillery projectile, fired from the direction of ARBiH positions Sarajevo, exploded on the roof of the Ilidža Cultural and Sports Center [*Kulturno-sportski centar Ilidža*]. At the moment of the impact, physical education classes were being held for students in the third grade of high school. The explosion injured students Sanja Lončar, Nedeljka Đogo, Tanja Mijović, Slađana Tamindžić, Slađana Božović and Svetlana Ćokić, while they were attending the physical education class. The building was severely damaged, and it can be assumed that the projectile was fired from a rocket launcher, and was unguided.[101]
- On 30 May 1995, a mortar round of 82mm caliber was fired from the direction of ARBiH positions in Hrasnica, hitting the northern entrance to the market in Milana Toplice street, Ilidža Municipality. This round injured civilian Vojislav Andrić, son of father Milan and mother Jelka, born on 05 October 1930 in Korča, Hadžići Municipality, while he was out buying bread. On the same day, another civilian Milan Semiz, son of Branko, born on 24 September 1938 in Nova Crnja, was injured, as well as ten other civilians who were moving along the Ilidža streets. They were targeted by an artillery attack.[102]

- On 05 June 1995, ARBiH fired projectiles of unknown caliber from the direction of Pazarić into the Hadžići settlement, hitting the Orthodox Church of the "Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary." The shelling caused considerable material damage to objects of historical and cultural value.[103]
- On 16 June 1995, a guided anti-tank projectile "Malyutka", fired from the direction of ARBiH positions on mount Mojmilo, exploded in front of the Gluvaković family home in Lukavica, and severely injured a boy, Njegoš Gluvaković, son of father Drago and mother Nada, born on 23 December 1982 in Sarajevo, Center Municipality. The boy was sitting in front of the house with his grandfather after prolonged shelling of the Lukavica area. The shell severed his right leg, and Njegoš remained permanently disabled. [104]
- On 17 June 1995, a 122 mm artillery round, fired from ARBiH positions, exploded in a meadow in the village of Šamin Gaj, Ilidža Municipality. The round killed two boys, Vlajko Lakić, son of father Stanko and mother Sofija, born on 07 January 1978 in Zenica, and Jugoslav Mišković, son of father Vaso and mother Dana, born in 1981 in Zenica, while they were picking strawberries.[105]
- On 25 June 1995, several 60mm rounds fired from an ARBiH position in Stojčevac exploded on 25 June 1995 at Ilidža Auto Camp in the Bokeljskih Mornara street in Lužani settlement. The rounds killed a civilian, Mladenko Vujinović, son of Nedeljko, born on 02 February 1968 in Travnik. They also wounded civilians Savo Simeunović, son of Veselin, born on 12 April 1969 and Drago Grujić, son of Dragomir, born on 15 July 1960.[106]
- On 08 July 1995, several rounds of unknown caliber were fired from ARBiH positions and exploded in the village of Dogladi, in front of the No. 113-A. They killed Jovanka Petković, daughter of father Mladen and mother Jovanka, born on 04 April 1944 in the town of Drivuša, Zenica Municipality, a civilian, while she was performing fieldwork in the garden.[107]
- On 28 August 1995, about twenty artillery and mortar rounds of caliber 120 mm and 82 mm, were fired from the position of ARBiH on Igman and hit the Orthodox Church of "Saint Sava" in Plandište, Ilidža Municipality, during the wedding of Vlastimir Glavaš and Gordana Golub. These rounds killed Jadranka Vitor, maiden name Kuljanin, daughter of father Ilija and mother Zorka, born on 03 March 1965 in the village of Živašnica, Konjic Municipality. This shelling also wounded about 50 civilians, including the priest, Đorđe Ilić, as well as nine children and nineteen women: Sretko Andrić, Savka

Benco, Rade Bjeloš, Tomislav Borovina, Stevo Berić, Pavle Despotović, Ilija Drašković, Tankosava Đokić, Borislav Glavaš, Blagomir Glavaš, Ilija Glavaš, Jovo Glavaš, Tihomir Glavaš, Vladimir Glavaš, Đorđe Ilić, Nikola Ješić, Goran Kapetina, Milka Kapetina, Saša Kapetina, Brana Karabatak, Jelisavka Kujača, Milijana Kuljanin, Siniša Kuljanin, Jelena Kuvač, Miloš Kuvač, Slađana Lazić, Mladenka Lubura, Dobrivoje Luketa, Milovan Marković, Gospava Milutinović, Vlado Milidrag, Vojka Mijović, Tihomir Motika, Sanja Novaković, Branislav Okuka, Jakov Ostojić, Marko Pejić, Marko Perišić, Dušanka Prole, Vlastimir Pušara, Predrag Šaraba, Tatjana Šaraba, Zoran Šehovac, Milorad Šinik, Duško Tešić, Milojka Todorović, Aleksandra Topić, Dragana Tomić, Slobodan Vejin, Ljubica Vujičić and Sofija Zečević. The shelling of the said religious object was pre-planned and deliberate, as the "St. Sava" Orthodox Church is located at a distance of about 400 meters from the front line. A large number of Serb civilians were clearly visible, and suffered simply because they had gathered on the occasion of the wedding of Vlastimir and Gordana Glavaš.[108]

- On 21 August 1995, an artillery round fired from the positions of ARBiH exploded at no. A-1Skendera Kulenovića Street, Vogošća Municipality on 21/08/1995, killing Ranka Jakovljević, a civilian, while she was standing by a window in her apartment.[109]

The above list is not exhaustive.

5.10. ARBiH Sniping Activities

The Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) describes "sniper attacks by the besieging forces", but ignores sniper attacks by "defensive forces". However, the reality was different. Snipers of both warring parties were engaged in combat. There were no separate sniping campaigns, as sniping was a routine combat activity, and a part and parcel of combined arms operations. ARBiH snipers were very active, killing Serb soldiers and civilians alike, who were all perceived as "Chetniks." ARBiH sniper activities were not limited to a particular location or time, and lasted for the entire duration of the war.

Sniper weapons and sniper activities is the field of military expertise in which the ARBiH had a distinct superiority over the VRS. Several shooting clubs existed

in Sarajevo before the war, so it was relatively easy for ARBiH to draft qualified sharpshooters. Among the ARBiH snipers were mercenaries from Western Europe. The Security Department of the ARBiH 1st Corps registered the presence of German sniper Rafael Schmid.[110] According to ARBiH General Stjepan Šiber, at an early stage of the war, ARBiH Main Staff removed 450 sniper rifles from the "Zrak" optical factory, and distributed them to the brigades of the 1st Sarajevo Corps.[111] The "Zrak" Optoelectronics Factory in Sarajevo worked and produced optical equipment for sniper rifles for the entire duration of the war. Also, the VRS did not have 12.7mm sniper rifles until the end of 1994, while the ARBiH 1st Sarajevo Corps already had this rifle in service in 1993.[112] ARBiH snipers also had rifles with night-vision sniper sights. All high-rise buildings in the urban part of Sarajevo (Executive Council, Elektroprivreda, "Loris", "Momo i Uzeir" and others) were in the hands of the ARBiH, and were used as observation points and sniper positions. For example, the commander of the group of snipers on the roof of the Executive Council was Mujo Selmanović.

ARBiH 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelić admitted:

> The 1st Corps employed their own snipers in accordance with the JNA military doctrine. Each section would have one sniper … Snipers were the common soldiers, who were given additional training. All weapons, including sniper rifles and the rifles of common soldiers were regularly inspected. Unit commanders could regroup their formations, including grouping of snipers, if this was necessary.[113]

One of the ARBiH commanders Kerim Lučarević described the activities of his subordinate snipers in his book:

> We were waiting for midnight to come. We installed our "owls". This is a sniper rifle PASP with a night vision telescopic sight. "Owl" sees in the darkness for a distance of 150 meters. It is like broad daylight. If the "chetniks" knew what we had, they would never try it. However, after midnight chetniks in pairs are moving towards the dead bodies [of Serbs left] on the battlefield. My "owls" acted with precision and in silence. Chetniks are liquidated without any noise, in complete silence. (Lučarević, 2000, pp. 157-158)

Obviously, Kerim Lučarević's snipers used sniper rifles with a night vision telescopic sights and silencers. Operating such weapons required a good deal of sophistication and special training. According to Kerim Lučarević, at an early stage of the war the ARBiH snipers had their positions in the rooms of the Bristol Hotel, and were shooting at "chetniks", killing 20 persons every day. Ultimately, VRS tanks shot at the hotel and put it on fire (Lučarević, 2000, pp. 138, 157-158).

A VRS officer in his witness testimony stated:

> I also had information that the enemy units of the 1st Corps of the ARBiH were opening fire on civilians in the city controlled by Serbian authorities. I remember the murder of a young woman who was on her way to the wedding in a column of wedding guests. The girl's name was Nada Guzina. Besides this case, I also had information about actions of special units, one under command of Dragan Vikić (the special unit of the MUP of the ARBiH), the "Mosque Pigeon", and the "Latas".[114]

A conservative estimate shows that ARBiH 1st Corps had up to 500 snipers, and committed them both on tactical and operational level. Numerous documents in the possession of Republika Srpska Centre for Research of War, Investigation of War Crimes and Search for Missing Persons provide ample evidence of the ARBiH 1st Corps sniper activities. On 2 October 1992, the Commander of the 1st Motorized Brigade Command Ramiz Bjelić ordered the formation of a sniping platoon under the command of Muhamed Medić. The platoon was deployed in the Blagoje Parović, school next to the Cenex company.[115] On 7 February 1993, the Commander of the 102 Motorized Brigade reported to the ARBiH 1st Corps Command that the artillery had shelled Serb settlements of Nedžarići and Lukavica, while "snipers were doing their routine work".[116] "Routine work" obviously meant indiscriminate shooting at VRS soldiers and Serb civilians. ARBiH 1st Corps 2nd Motorized Brigade Commander Safet Zajko on 05 March 1993 signed an order to "arrange sniper activities from secure positions and in a planned way."[117] According to the documents of the 1st Sarajevo Corps Security Department, the 10th Mountain Brigade had a sniper platoon under the command of Omer Tendžo.[118]

On 11 December 1993, ARBiH 1st Corps Command ordered the raising of the strength of the sniper personnel and organizing of maneuver sniping units under the direct command of the ARBiH 1st Corps Commander.[119] Twenty days after this order, the Commander of the 102nd Motorized Brigade ordered to his Battalion Commanders to select 15 soldiers from each battalion for the sniper training course at Pavle Goranin school, while practical training should take place on the ground under battalion command.[120] Practical training meant shooting at Serb civilians and VRS soldiers.

These documents indicate that sniper activities of the ARBiH 1st Corps, related to their training and combat engagement, were controlled at the Corps level, while the Corps had integrated sniper units at every level of the military hierarchy, from battalion to the Corps. Each brigade of the ARBiH 1st Corps had within its organization at least a reinforced sniper squad.

One of the first international victims of the ARBiH snipers was American journalist David Kaplan, who was seriously wounded by a Muslim sniper on 13 August 1992. He died in the UNPROFOR hospital a few hours later. Kaplan was accompanying Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić on a peace mission to Sarajevo, and was shot in the stomach when Panić's convoy came under ARBiH fire.[121] The fire was clearly aimed to kill Milan Panić. UNPROFOR rejected suggestions in the BiH media that it was indirectly responsible for the death of US journalist David Kaplan. Sarajevo radio and television said that BiH authorities had not even been informed that this "illegal" visit was being organized and that this "negligence" caused the death of the ABC journalist. "Of course, we know better. The Bosnian authorities were informed of the visit", said UNPROFOR spokesman Adnan Abd Elrazek (UN Security Council, 1994c, Annex IV, p. 268).

The ARBiH 1st Corps sniping campaign included attacks with special sniper rifles with telescopic sights to deliberately kill and maim civilians, including children. Specific cases of such attacks are outlined below:

- In June 1992, a civilian. Šoja Ostoja, was killed in Grbavica by an ARBiH sniper, who was shooting from the UNIS building (Bojić, 1996, pp. 72, 74).
- On 24 January 1993, a civilian, Tanja Ljuboja, daughter of Nikola, born in 1946 in Banja Koviljača, in the municipality of Loznica, was killed by a sniper shot. She was hit in her left breast in Lenjinova Street in Grbavica. The shot was fired from ARBiH positions.[122]
- On 15 February 1993, a civilian, Janja Radojčević, was wounded by a sniper shot in the upper arm in Rave Janković Street in Grbavica, the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. The shot was fired from ARBiH positions.[123]
- On 26 February 1993, a civilian, Borivoje Knežević, son of Milan, born on 18 December 1939 in the village of Gostilj, in the municipality of Travnik, was killed by a sniper shot. He received a hit to the right side of his back at 28 Rave Janković Street in Grbavica. The shot was fired from ARBiH positions.[124]
- On 1 March 1993, a civilian, Stevan Lugonja, son of Petar (father) and Jovana (mother), born on 17 June 1931 in the village of Ivica, in the municipality of Ljubinje, was wounded at 13 Butmirska Cesta Street by a sniper shot. He was hit in the abdomen in the municipality of Ilidža, in front of the house he was living in. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position. Furthermore, Stevan Lugonja was wounded for the second time on 26 June 1995 by a sniper shot to the left knee while he was picking onions. The shot was fired from the direction of the settlement of Butmir. [125]

- On 2 March 1993, a civilian, Vladimir Pojičič, son of Vojn, born on 4 February 1932 in Sarajevo, was killed by a sniper shot at the intersection of Dinarska Street and 14/c Lenjinova Street in Grbavica, in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. He was hit in the left side of his neck. The shot was fired from the ARBiH positions.[126]
- On 3 March 1993, a civilian Milivoje Divčič, was wounded by a sniper shot at 28 Ozrenska Street in Grbavica, in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. He was hit in the right leg. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position, more precisely from the Bristol Hotel.[127]
- On 14 March 1993, a civilian, Ljiljana Jovanović-Topalović, a daughter of Vladimir (father) and Koviljka (mother), born on 7 April 1962 in Pale, was wounded in both her shins by an infantry weapon shot fired from the ARBiH positions, more precisely from Sokolje in the settlement of Zabrđe-Rajlovac. She was sitting on the bus going from Rajlovac to Vogošća. These injuries made her permanently physically disabled.[128]
- On 20 March 1993, a civilian Desanka Tubić, daughter of Dušan, born on 9 November 1912 in Bosanski Novi, was killed by a sniper shot in the immediate vicinity of the Vrbanja Bridge in Grbavica. She was hit in the left side of her neck. The shot was fired from the ARBiH positions.[129]
- On 30 March 1993, a civilian Zorica Čeho, daughter of Mirko (father), born in 1967 in Čajniče, was killed by a sniper shot at 7 Petrovačka Street in Grbavica. She was hit in her left breast. The shot was fired from the ARBiH positions.[130]
- On 21 May 1993, a civilian, Nikola Kravljača, was wounded by a sniper shot fired from an ARBiH position. He was shot in the upper part of the right side of the thorax in the bb Bane Šurbata Street in Grbavica, in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo.[131]
- On 26 May 1993, a civilian, Ankica Fabijanović, was wounded by a sniper shot fired from an ARBiH position. She was shot in the right shin in Kupreška Street, in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo.[132]
- On 5 July 1993, a civilian, Slavica Budinčić, maiden name Bjelac, daughter of Đuro (father) and Stana (mother), born on 25 August 1954 in the village of Ljeskovica, in the municipality of Drvar, was wounded by a sniper shot in the neck and left side of the thorax. She was repairing the fence around her family home in front of 173-a Kassindolska Street, in the municipality

of Ilidža. The shot was fired from the direction of the ARBiH position at the monastery in Dobrinjska Street.[133]

- On 23 June 1993, a civilian, Gordana Petrović, daughter of Dušan, born on 19 December 1937 in Sarajevo, was killed by a sniper shot to the left side of her neck in front of the Health Centre at 113 Lenjinova Street in Grbavica. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position.[134]
- On 6 July 1993, a civilian, Lenka Stanković, born on 23 May 1993 in Sarajevo in Novi Grad, Sarajevo, was injured by a sniper shot to the chest while she was moving along Ernesta Telmana street, in the municipality of Ilidža. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position.[135]
- On 15 July 1993, a civilian, Alija Delalić, son of Derviš, born on 17 September 1947 in Foča, was killed by a sniper shot fired from an ARBiH position. She was hit in the right side of her thorax in Rave Jankovića Street in Grbavica, in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. [136]
- On 23 July 1993, a civilian, Ana-Julijana Čubela, daughter of Marijan (father), born on 17 October 1920 in Tuzla, was murdered by a sniper shot to the left side of her back as she was moving around in her own apartment at 42 Lenjinova Street in Grbavica. The shot was fired from the ARBiH side.[137]
- On 30 July 1993, a civilian, Simo Babić, son of Vasilije and Staka, born on 12 May 1914 in Foča, was killed by a sniper shot through his window. He was hit under the right ear. This happened at 47/4 Zagrebačka Street, while Simo was moving around in his own apartment. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position.[138]
- On 24 June 1994, a civilian, Koviljka Krajišnik, maiden name Šupić, daughter of Radivoje (father) and Persa (mother), born on 12 February 1951 in the village of Malo Polje, in the municipality of Han Pijesak, was killed by a sniper shot to her back, below the left scapula. The killing occurred in Zabrđe – Rajlovac, in the municipality of Novi Grad, Sarajevo, in front of her family home while she was putting her children's clothes into the car. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position, more precisely from the direction of Sokolje. [139]
- On 26 June 1994, a civilian, Đuro Kenjič, son of Nikola (father) and Stana (mother), born in 1920 in the village of Unčani, in the municipality of Trnovo, was killed by an infantry weapon shot fired at a distance of 120 meters in Kassindolska Street between numbers 197-D and 197-E. The shot was fired

from the direction of the Cenex building. The victim was shot in his thighs and both arms. After he fell on the ground, he was shot multiple times all over his body. The shots were fired by members of the Army of the RBiH.[140]

- On 30 July 1994, a civilian, Radojka Elez, daughter of Jovan (father), born on 21 October 1933, was murdered by a sniper shot to the head. At the moment of her killing, she was in her apartment at 22 Ilije Smiljanića Street, Aerodromsko Naselje, Ilidža municipality. The shot was most likely fired from the direction of Dobrinja from the Pancirka building – an ARBiH position.[141]
- On 5 December 1994, a civilian, Darko Aleksić, son of Dejan (father) and Brana (mother), born on 10 March 1983 in Sarajevo, Centar, was in the fifth grade of elementary school when he was wounded by a sniper shot while he, his mother Brana and his sister Miljana were walking down the street, heading towards his grandfather Vojislav's place. He was hit in the abdomen and suffered severe injuries. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position.[142]
- On 5 February 1995, a civilian, Branko Jokanović, son of Damjan (father) and Vukosava (mother), born on 2 July 1947 in Gladno Polje, municipality of Ilidža, was killed by a sniper shot to his neck, as he was driving a passenger motor vehicle in the settlement of Butmir, in the municipality of Ilidža. The shot was fired from the direction of positions controlled by the ARBiH.[143]
- On 17 February 1995, a civilian, Sretomir Mojević, son of Janko (father) and Jelka (mother), born on 16 February 1972 in Sarajevo, municipality of Centar, was shot and wounded in the right shoulder while moving around in front of his cousin's house in the settlement of Grlica, Ilidža municipality. He was wounded by a sniper shot fired from the direction of Igman, from an ARBiH position.[144]
- On 18 February 1995, a civilian, Ratko Šilj, son of Nedeljko (father) and Jelena (mother), born in 1962 in the settlement of Grlica, in the municipality of Ilidža, was killed by a sniper shot to the left shoulder in the doorway of his family home in the settlement of Grlica. The shot was fired from a position of ARBiH, more precisely from Gradina on the Igman Mountain.[145]
- On 11 March 1995, two girls, civilians: Nataša Učur, daughter of Nedeljko (father), born in 1986 in Sarajevo and Milica Lalović, daughter of Ranko (father), born in 1984 in Sarajevo, were murdered by sniper shots to the head at 3 Milutina Đuraškovića Street in Grbavica, in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. They were playing a rubber band jumping game with their friends. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position, more precisely from the Loris building.[146]

- On 1 May 1995, a civilian, Bojan Stijak, son of Rajko (father) and Ranka (mother), born on 9th June 1977 in Osijek, in the municipality of Ilidža, was killed by a sniper shot to the left side of his head while he was waiting for the beginning of a lesson in front of the school in Ilidža. The shot was fired from a position controlled by the ARBiH.[147]
- On 12 May 1995, civilians Vera Novaković, daughter of Stanko (father) and Ljubica (mother), born on 10 September 1946 in the settlement of Donji Kotorac, in the municipality of Ilidža and Mara Trapara, daughter of Jovo (father) and Zora (mother), born on 20 June 1945 in the settlement of Osijek, in the municipality of Ilidža, were killed by sniper shots in the settlement of Donji Kotorac. Mara Trapara was shot in the thorax, under the axilla. The same shot hit Vera Novaković in her left scapula. The shot was fired from the direction of the settlement of Donji Kotorac, from ARBiH positions.[148]
- On 19 May 1995, a civilian, Savo Ikić, son of Jovo (father) and Ljeposava (mother), born in 1929 in Donji Kotorac, the municipality of Ilidža, was murdered by a sniper shot in the back, at the level of his thorax, while he was planting crops in a field in the settlement of Gornji Kotorac, in the municipality of Ilidža. The shot was fired from an ARBiH position. [149]
- On 19 October 1995, a civilian, Ndeljko Toholj, son of Jovo (father) and Jelisavka (mother), born on 18 January 1953 in Ljubinje, was wounded by a sniper shot to the right arm while he was working in his garden. The shot was fired from the direction of an ARBiH position.[150]

Sniping activities were not limited to the ARBiH 1st Corps. According to an interview by Sefer Halilović with "Svijet" magazine in 1998, on Alija Izetbegović's personal order, the RBiH SDB (Security Service) formed special group "Ševe" ("Larks"), "which was a body parallel to the system" under Nedžad Ugljen, who reported directly to General Fikret Muslimović (Halilović, 1998). SDB operatives received a training course in Iran[151] ("Zloglasne Ševe", 2013).

Ševe was created within the RBiH SDB and controlled by Asim Dautbašić. Ševe specifically had two missions: providing security for VIPs, and secret assassinations. The group committed numerous crimes. In May 1992, members of the group shot six JNA soldiers (Halilović, 1998). According to some reports, "Ševe" snipers killed Serbs in the streets of urban Sarajevo. Sarajevo media presented the victims as "those killed by Serb snipers" (Schindler, 2007, p. 172).

In January 2002, *Slobodna Dalmacija* carried an article under the title "Ševe were training snipers, killing civilians in Sarajevo", based on the statement by AID[152] agent Edin Garaplija, who stated that "Ševe" snipers received their training in Metkovići in Croatia and Pogorelica camp in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Training in Pogorelica was provided by instructors from Iran. *Slobodna Dalmacija* noted that

> They would climb a high hill or a building, and would shoot at Serbs in Grbavica", selecting women who were wearing black dress ... They did not care at all if they were killing civilians, women, children, old people. They did not care about possible retaliation. Perhaps retaliation was their goal. For sure, yes."[153]

ARBiH started killing UNPROFOR personnel at an early stage of the war. International mediator David Owen in his memoirs described instances of ARBiH soldiers killing UNPROFOR soldiers. One of such incidents occurred on 9 September 1992. UNPROFOR reacted by sending a protest letter to President Alija Izetbegović:

> It is with a deep sense of outrage that I have to inform you that at approximately 1830 hours on 8 September 1992 troops under your command attacked an unarmed UNPROFOR logistical convoy at the entrance to the airport. This unprovoked attack in the broad daylight, on an unmistakably UN humanitarian convoy, caused the death of two French soldiers, injury to three more. And the destruction or damage of four UN vehicles. (Owen, 1996, p. 112)

Ukrainian soldier Viktor Solohin was shot and killed by an ARBiH sniper in the compound of Tito Barracks on 10 August 1992. The shot came from a bilding in the compound, occupied by an ARBiH unit.[154]

In February 2013, speaking as a witness to ICTY judges, RBiH SDB officer Edin Garaplija confirmed that Nedžad Herenda killed French UNPROFOR soldiers in Sarajevo in May 1995, "while he was setting up a barricade on the street in front of Holiday Inn hotel in Sarajevo in order to protect people from Bosnian Serb attacks." On 18 May 1993, "Ševe" sniper Nedžad Herenda killed a young couple on Vrbanja Bridge – a Serb boy Boško Brkić and a Muslim girl Admira Ismić, who had sold their apartment and were trying to escape from "Izetbegović's multi-ethnic and democratic paradise". They were both 25 years old. Western media immediately placed the blame on the Serb side (Schork, 1993). The witness said that "the Serb side was blamed for the couple's murder, as well as for the majority of sniper operations." At a hearing at the ICTY, Garaplija stated that Herenda received thousands of German marks for this murder (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić*, 2015a, p. 33909). Many years later CIA

analyst John Robert Schindler (2007, p. 172) confirmed they were killed by "Ševe".

Line-crossers and defectors from urban Sarajevo reported that:

> The enemy forces of the 1-st Corps of the ABiH were opening fire on civilians in the city under Muslim authorities' control; given the propaganda and desire of Muslim authorities to trigger NATO intervention, those stories were consistent with our organs' estimations".[155]

On 14 August 1994, the ARBiH and the VRS signed an anti-sniping agreement. After it was signed, sniping incidents significantly dropped on both sides. According to a witness statement:

> There was little doubt regarding the command and control of the warring factions over their snipers. The only doubt was sometimes that the French were not sure if the shots fired from a long distance at Bosniak civilians came from the Bosniaks instead of the Serbs."[156]

On 01 August 1995, UNPROFOR sources confirmed that ARBiH snipers were shooting at their own civilians. French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations unit, trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo, have concluded that some gunfire also came from Government soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what it called a "definitive" investigation, a French marine unit that patrols against snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally occupied by Bosnian soldiers and other security forces:

> French officers in the anti-sniping unit said they were inclined to believe that the Bosnian military were shooting at civilians in an attempt to generate news coverage that increased international sympathy for the Bosnian Government. (O'Connor, 1995)

The Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) emphasized:

> Based on the events reported over the course of the siege, any military personnel who has engaged in unlawful sniping or shelling activity is individually responsible if he knew that such acts would cause the death or injury of innocent civilians, the destruction of protected targets, or the destruction of public and civilian property which had no apparent military purpose, and for which there was no valid military necessity." (UN Security Council, 1994c, Annex IV, p. 18). This applies equally to "besieging and defending forces".

6. Suffering of Serbs in Sarajevo

6.1. The Situation of the Serb Community in Sarajevo

The Serb community has existed in Sarajevo for centuries. In socialist Yugoslavia, the Serb community in Sarajevo was a vibrant economic and scientific entity, and constituted 29.9 percent of the entire Sarajevo population (157,526 persons), while Yugoslavs of mixed ethnic background numbered about 56,000 people (Federal Statistical Office, 1998). Many entrepreneurs, doctors, economists, lecturers and professors of Serb and Montenegrin origin lived and worked in Sarajevo. Serb writers, artists, musicians, doctors, lecturers, professors, and athletes left a lasting cultural heritage in Sarajevo.

Among them are historian and poet Simo Milutinović Sarajlija (1791-1847), publicist and founder of "Bosanska vila" literary magazine Nikola Kašiković, historian and geographer Jefto Dedijer (1880-1918), historian Vladimir Ćorović (1885-1941), academician Vladislav Skarić (1869-1943), Nobel Prize winner for literature Ivo Andrić (1892-1975), writer Meša Selimović (1910-1982), historian and academician Milorad Ekmečić (1928-2015), poet Dara Sekulić (born 1931), poet and dissident Gojko Đogo (born 1940), writer and academician Vojislav Lubarda (1930-2013), writer and academician Rajko Petrov Nogo (born 1945), writer and poet Duško Trifunović (1933-2006), writer and artist Momo Kapor (1937-2010), writer Vladimir Nastić (1934-2010), artist Vojo Dimitrijević (1910-1980), artist Mica Todorović (1900-1981), Đoko Mazalić (1888-1975), artist and academician Lazar Drljača (1882-1970), artist Pero Popović (1881-1941), Todor Švrakić (1882-1931), sculptor Ivana Despić (1891-1961), Kosta Hakman (1899-1961), musician and singer Zdravko Čolić (born 1951), pop artist Neda Ukraden (born 1950) and numerous others.

On 26 June 1992, the RBiH Presidency published the document "Platform on the activity of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war conditions". The document was drafted by Alija Izetbegović personally, and purported to outline the political program of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war time. The document outlined basic principles for activity of the RBiH Presidency in the war: parliamentary democracy, market economy, political pluralism, human rights, internationally recognized borders of RBiH, constitutionality of all three nations, creation of a voluntary and multi-ethnic Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Platform guaranteed to the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina an independent, unitary, sovereign,

multi-ethnic, and democratic state, in which citizens of all nationalities would have equal rights, and condemned "SDS terrorists" (Izetbegović, 2001, p. 411).

Soon it became very clear what kind of equality, human rights, and European orientation Alija Izetbegović meant for the Serb community. UNPROFOR Civil Affairs in Sarajevo reported:

> Muslim radicals appear to be gaining the upper hand at the expense of moderates who favor a multinational B and H society. BH controlled Sarajevo is approximately 80 percent ethnic Muslim. Muslims are replacing the non-Muslims in government, and non-Muslims are increasingly uncomfortable. Organized crime appears to be spiraling out of control in Sarajevo. UNPROFOR has been drawn into the problem with its personnel and facilities being used as conduits for black market goods. Civil affairs personnel have also been touched (the local Mafia have evicted Daljeet Bagga from his apartment at 5 minutes' notice; threatening calls have been made to civil affairs by black marketeers wanting press cards. (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, 2010, p. 2182)

The personnel policy of Alija Izetbegović's regime was based on the openly declared goal of dismantling so-called "Serb domination." In Alija Izetbegović's opinion, in Yugoslavia Serbs allegedly "appropriated for themselves all important positions" (Izetbegović, 2001, p. 66). Izetbegović simply ignored the fact that Serbs were the demographically the biggest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. As soon as Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent, SDA started firing Serbs from all positions of significance and replacing them with trusted SDA Muslims.

Serbs occupying important positions were dismissed, pressured into leaving, or forced to resign because of the poisoned atmosphere around them. According to a member of the Presidency and dean of Sarajevo University Professor Nenad Kecmanović, within the framework of an SDA-organized campaign, Serbs were purposefully and systematically removed from the leading positions in industry, education, the health system, and culture. One year after the war broke out, there was not a single Serb in a position of company director, head of a clinic, dean of a faculty, chief of a municipal service, etc. Those few who were not removed were surrounded by the distrust and disobedience of employees, so they resigned on their own. The most resilient ones, such as for example the directors of Žitopromet, were accused of collaborating with the "Serbo-Chetniks".[157] In the field of education, culture, science, information, social activities, economy and government offices Serbs lost their former positions.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate this point. The Director of the Public Water Company for Sarajevo was Predrag Lukać. He had been elected a Member of

Parliament in November 1990, running on the list of the Reformist Party. After the war broke out, he remained in his job. This was a very difficult job, as the main water supply facilities were on the Serb side of the confrontation line, and water supply was often interrupted. Lukać was subjected to distrust and threats because he was a Serb, and eventually was forced to quit his job and left Sarajevo (Pejanović, 2002, p. 148).

Serb Manojlo Čalija before the war was a member of the Yugoslav national team for gymnastics, and worked as a coach. He was fired from his job and his food ration card (humanitarian aid) was taken from him on the false pretext of "dodging work duties"; he was subjected to different types of torture as well (Čalija, 2005, pp. 214).

Serb Đorđe Zarić was the Director of the Privredna Bank. He supported Izetbegović's regime and was co-founder of the Serb Civic Council. Zarić was attacked in a way that was typical. First, a hostile article about him appeared in the press, and then there were rumors about criminal charges had been raised against Zarić. In 1994, there was public clamor for Zarić to be demoted. Đorđe Zarić went to see Serb member of the RBiH Presidency Mirko Pejanović. He appealed to Izetbegović to protect Zarić. However, Izetbegović was not prepared to intervene. Đorđe Zarić had to quit the post of Director, and was replaced by SDA Muslim Fatima Leho (Pejanović, 2002, p. 149). Medical doctor Radomir Tišma left a statement about the intimidation and dismissals of Serb medical doctors:

> What was in store for each expert of Serbian nationality was dismissal from work for being "redundant." … During the war, all Serbs in the city of Sarajevo were expelled from social organizations and expert management functions. They were hunted down, abused, humiliated and exhausted by poverty. Priest Dragomir Ubiparipović was captured and abused seven times, while other prominent Serbs are being locked up and murdered in brutal ways (Dr Milutin Najdanović). Life in the city became extremely difficult and unbearable".[158]

The Serb employees of Sarajevo TV were exposed to a particularly marked extremist attitude by the ruling SDA. Top quality journalists and media professionals of Serb nationality left one by one due to political pressure, mistrust, and lack of support. Among them were well known professionals Mile Đurđević, Kosta Jovanović, and Budo Vukobrat (Pejanović, 2002).

All Serbs were on the MUP lists of suspected members of the SDS, irrespective of whether it was true or not, and were arrested en masse. Many of them were detained, mistreated, incarcerated and beaten in private prisons. Former member of the SDS Advisory Board Professor Slavko Leovac was arrested, detained in a private prison in the Hotel Zagreb, where he was beaten up and maltreated. Eventually he left

Sarajevo. Professor of history and academician Milorad Ekmečić "had been badly beaten in front of his family, his house was ransacked. The professor had been taken away without any order for arrest and kept in a private prison, where he was beaten and abused. Professor of medicine Milutin Najdanović was the SDS delegate in the RBiH Parliament, and opted to stay in Sarajevo despite the party's call to leave for security reasons. He was shot and killed by unknown individuals in broad daylight. To this day the perpetrators of this political murder have not been found (Pejanović, 2002, pp.77-78, 138-140).

A Sarajevo special police unit within the Ministry of Interior led by police officer Zoran Čegar, on the orders of the SDA, arrested about 800 Serbs and took them to Koševo stadium, which was turned into an improvised concentration camp (Pejanović, 2002, p. 134). Čegar claimed that all arrested Serbs and their family members were "Karadžić's supporters, SDS activists, and fifth columnists". This action drew a strong parallel between the concentration camp in Koševo stadium, and the Chile stadium in Santiago, turned into concentration camp by Chilean dictator Pinochet in 1973. Alija Izetbegović eventually gave orders to close the Koševo stadium concentration camp, and release all prisoners.

According to former member of the RBiH Presidency Mirko Pejanović, this incident amply demonstrated "revanchism of Izetbegović's regime, the persecution of ordinary people, and destruction of their trust in the legal government" (Pejanović, 2002, p. 134).

Arbitrary arrests, detentions, and police brutality against Serbs were a commonplace phenomenon in Sarajevo. In April 1992, Deputy Chief of Sarajevo CSB Zlatko Bećkanović made the following meaningful record in his diary:

> 09.04.1992. At about 08.00 four persons were kneeling in the corridor on the second floor, close to the offices of the the CSB Chief and the Secretary of the Sarajevo SUP. They were facing the wall with their hands tied up with wire behind their backs, they were beaten up on their heads, and were bleeding, their clothes were torn up … Small pools of blood were on the floor … Close to them were unknown persons without any uniforms and insignia, with weapons in their hands, who were watching the four tied up persons, occasionally screaming and hitting them. Yesterday, some unknown armed persons, mostly known to operative personnel as criminals, started to bring in men, allegedly "snipers" or "members of the fifth column." Judging by their names, they mostly were of Serb nationality. All of them were beaten up with blood all over. Some of them could not stand on their feet, their hands were tied up … In the afternoon they brought into the building one person with a white plastic bag on his head, his hands tied up behind his back, with his chest bleeding. His shirt was stained

with blood. They led him to the second floor, hitting him with rifle butts. One operations officer said that this person was brought in by a known criminal Kokora Jasmin …. They organized it, they were detaining and bringing people in, beating them up, torturing and humiliating them, searching apartments and offices, and practically had command of the city. It was obvious that all this was happening in the entire territory of the city. There was no valid evidence of hostile activity, no proof of compromising materials, nor documents substantiating the reasons for the searches of apartments and other premises. There were no apparent reasons for abuse, and no motives for bringing them to the CSB. There were no explanations of where and by whom they had previously been questioned, no written statements of witnesses or the accused persons and so on.

Friday, 10.04.92. Like on the previous day, the corridor in the second floor was full of beaten up "fifth columnists", which was not even mentioned at the Collegium meeting. From the office in which before the war travel authorizations were issued one could hear threats and screams of pain. An old man with bruises on the left side of his face was standing in the middle of this office, with his head slightly tilted down. A police officer dressed in a camouflage uniform (I later learned that he was a security officer of the then Assistant Minister of the Interior Jusuf Pušina), who was sitting on the desk opposite him, was hitting this old man in the face "lightly". When this officer dressed in camouflage started hitting him harder, I couldn't watch it, neither could other operations officers present, and I went out.

Saturday, 11.04.92. After 22.00, a man on his knees was crawling towards a chair. Above him is an operations officer, who is hitting this man with his left foot in his kidneys, and then again on the head. This old man has his skull cut open, his hair is in blood, and one can see the white brain. (Bećkanović, 2016, pp. 103-111)

With the advent of the war, the Serbs who for various reason chose to stay in Sarajevo became divided into three big groups: those who were averse to policies of Alija Izetbegović, but were stranded on the wrong side of the front line; those who publicly expressed their loyalty to the RBiH; and those tried to remain neutral. However, there was one thing that was common for all of them. All of them were of "the wrong nationality", and vulnerable to Bosnian Muslim chauvinism and terror. According to the memoires of Manojlo Čalija,

All of us, we were ethnic hostages, under ethnic oppression, and our lives depended on Alija's butchers and their will. (Čalija, 2005, p. 227)

The second group formally organized itself in June 1992 at the Forum of Citizens of Serb Nationality of the City of Sarajevo. Pre-war Prime Minister of the SRBiH government Dragutin Braco Kosovac became its first President. The Forum's press release condemned "extreme nationalist politics of SDS", and called upon "all citizens to take a stand against it through any means" (Pejanović, 2002, pp. 187-188). At the suggestion of scholar Ljubomir Berberović, the Serb Consultative Council (*SKV – Srpsko konsultativno vijeće*) was formed and operated during 1993. On 27 March 1994, the Assembly of Citizens of Serb Nationality founded the Serb Civic Council (*SGV – Srpsko građansko vijeće*). Professor of Sarajevo University Mirko Pejanović, who was coopted in to the RBiH presidency after elected Serb members Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević resigned in protest against Izetbegović's policy, was elected the SGV President. The SGV program upheld "coexistence of peoples and nations in a sovereign and internationally recognized state, as well as international standards of human and civil rights" (Pejanović, 2002, p. 188).

Despite the outstanding reputation which Mirko Pejanović had enjoyed in Sarajevo, due to the political significance of Serb participation in government, the RBiH SDB perceived him and RBiH Deputy Prime Minister Miodrag Simović as a threat to security in relation to "protection of Serbs in Sarajevo," and monitored his meetings.[159]

Many Serbs soon regretted their decision to remain in Sarajevo. As soon as the war began, Sarajevo Serbs, even those loyal to Alija Izetbegović, were subjected to discrimination, firing from jobs, as "chetniks", physical harassment, and worse. Even those Serbs who guarded their loyalty to Izetbegović's vision of a "unitary and multi-cultural" Bosnia and Herzegovina were utterly disappointed by the discrimination and violence they had to endure under his regime. In his book of memoirs, Mirko Pejanović admitted that:

> All people in Sarajevo suffered en masse as they endured bombardment and siege. Life was endangered at every step, and the basic necessities – water, electricity, gas, and food – were cut off by the siege. But along with deprivations suffered by all civilians, the Serbs had to live with an extra fear. This was the growing distrust of Serbs by certain other elements of the population. (Pejanović, 2002, p. 131)

Former member of the RBiH Presidency Professor Nenad Kecmanović described the anti-Serb hysteria in the city:

> After the fake news that Serbs killed 300,000 Muslims, Muslims became obsessed with revenge. Leading world media agencies carried this fake news

> around the globe. After the war, it turned out that the total losses of all three peoples did not exceed 100,000. Meanwhile Muslim Sarajevo readily took this fake news as true, and directed its rage at those Serbs who remained in the city and shared with Muslims the common deprivation of the war. After the fake news, Sarajevo Radio Hajat asked held a live poll on the phone, and asked listeners how should Muslims treat Serbs after such terrible crime. The majority of those who called the studio said that they "should kill their Serb neighbors in the streets where they live.[160]

As all other citizens in the city, Serbs were exposed to the hazards due to combat activities around the city, artillery shelling and small arms fire. But Serbs were collectively accused of being "terrorists" and "fifth columnists". It was widely believed that Serbs stayed in the city as "moles" to prepare the "Serb conquest of Sarajevo from inside", and sent signals with pocket flashlights to Serb gunners in the hills. This was an alibi to break into Serb houses and apartments, and commit robberies, arbitrary arrests, beatings and murders of Serbs. They were forced out from their apartments and houses, fired from their jobs, and chased away from the lines for bread and water" (Pejanović, 2002, pp. 138-140).

Mirko Pejanović's assertion is corroborated by the statement of lay judge in Sarajevo Marko Mikerević, who was involved in many trials in Sarajevo:

> Regarding trials, given that I participated in them as a lay judge, I noticed that crimes against Serbs, such as sending various signals, were fabricated. Evidence of possession of weapons was faked by calling in military police officers to give testimonies against the accused. These were those very military police officers who had planted the weapons in their homes in the first place, and participated in the search and arrests of those accused. The trials of Serbs for the same crimes were much more stringent than those of the Muslims, and they were often charged with crimes which they did not commit at all. Various machinations and violations of the law were committed, all with the aim of convicting Serbs as severely as possible. There were false accusations on the basis of which Serbs were convicted. For example, Ždrale Goran was accused of butchering and killing Muslims in Ahatovići, which had not been proven, but he was sentenced to three years in prison anyway.[161]

SDA extremists began to collect Serbs without any criteria and take them to local prisons. A dozen unarmed Serbs were gunned down in front of police headquarters in the first days of the war, a premeditated mass killing that brought no arrests. Seemingly random violence killed dozens more Serbs, as the spring became summer. Many killings were cold-blooded and intended to scare Serbs out of the city. In a

typical case, Dušan Đukić was knifed by his Muslim neighbors in May 1992; his wife was called "a Chetnik bitch" by neighbors she had trusted and liked as her husband lay dying. She and other Serbs in the neighborhood sensibly got out of town before they, too, were killed (Schindler, 2007, p. 104).

Prominent Serb athlete and a member of Yugoslav national gymnastics team Manojlo Čalija (2005) described the situation that Sarajevo Serbs suddenly found themselves in:

> The suffering of Serbs in Sarajevo cannot be measured against any other in the last war. This suffering is least known. No one cared about the suffering of the Serbs. It was hidden. Even today, it is shrouded in silence. The world has accepted and memorized Sarajevo as a city in which Muslims suffered. Therefore, even now the fact that it was Serbs who suffered most is still difficult for some to accept. Only Serbs in Sarajevo were under the control of an alien power, alien army, police, and various self-organized paramilitary groups. (p. 95)

According to Professor Mirko Pejanović, "A Serb was not protected as a citizen and as a person, because he was a Serb" (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997b). This first became manifest during the searches for arms, which provided a welcome and convenient opportunity for Muslim and Croat extremists to do their dirty work. People who were for most part innocent civilians were subjected to hostile investigations and were beaten. The situation was especially harsh in Sarajevo.

The first large-scale organized raid of Sarajevo Serb apartments in the total search for weapons was carried out on 08 May. During this raid, many Serbs were reportedly killed.[162] Subsequently these raids and searches repeated at regular intervals. During these searches, people who possessed arms and weapons but were not able to provide "satisfactory explanation" of their origin were immediately suspected of supporting the "terrorist SDS". People were taken for interrogation to local prisons and never came back. Such cases were in their hundreds. According to Professor Mirko Pejanović, hundreds paid with their lives in Sarajevo, Stolac, Konjic, Čapljina, Bugojno, Mostar and other cities, and "these crimes should figure one day as part of an investigation into the criminal and moral responsibility for the deaths of civilians in Bosnia. Homes of Muslims were searched too, but with less vigor and damage. Such discrimination against Serbs was part of the general atmosphere, in which arbitrary arrests and detentions occurred on a daily basis (Pejanović, 2002, p. 132). Manojlo Čalija (2005) in his book described the way the apartments of Serbs were searched:

> Every apartment expected a search and arrests. People were talking about the way the searches were perpetrated. They (the army and police) planted

> ammunition, pistols, bombs, and knives, only to find them later. Sometimes one group planted them, and another group found them. Whatever they were doing, one thing is well known – they made the apartments free from their owners, plundered their residences and they were occupied by new owners. For Serbs this did not matter in which way this was done. (p. 95)

The illegal appropriation of Serb apartments became a flourishing business in Sarajevo. On 15 June 1992, the RBiH Presidency issued a Decision with a force of law, declaring "abandoned" apartments in which "weapons and ammunition without an appropriate legal certificate are found" or "used for illegal actions. The Decision declared abandoned all the apartments belonging to JNA officers and employees of SFRY institutions in RBiH territory, and was signed by President Alija Izetbegović.[163] The Decree also stipulated that "an apartment which has been declared abandoned … is be handed over to an active participant in the struggle against the aggressor." This meant that any ARBiH soldier could plant weapons into an apartment he took a fancy to, and then claim it for himself as "an active participant in the struggle against the aggressor."[164] This Decision constituted a flagrant violation of the rights of legal owners, and served as a tool of subtle ethnic cleansing. Sarajevo inhabitant Pero Jeremić described how he lost his house:

> On 26th May, sometime around 1 p.m, a group of armed people in uniforms came to my house. They were "Green Berets". Their superior was a Muslim with last name of Rajković. I do not know his name, but I know that his mother was Fatima. There were around 10 or 12 people. They did a raid of the whole house and carried weapon detectors. By the way, my son's trade company "SINKOM" was in the basement. There was a cash register, computers and other things in the company's premises. These people asked me to give them the key of the cash register, which I did. They took 500 DEM and some documents. While the raid was taking place in the house, a shot was heard. After that, around 150 people gathered at a very short notice and accused me of shooting. I answered them that I did not shoot since I did not have a weapon. Then, they found a machine gun in a bush by the house and told that I hid it there. I replied that it was a lie and that it was not mine.

Pero Jeremić was beaten up and incarcerated into "Viktor Bubanj" prison. His house was confiscated for the ARBiH.[165]

A group of Serbs was taken away from their apartments in Dobrinja, and never came back. The dead bodies of Momir Pejović, Petar Gašić, and his 19-year-old son

Oliver, who had been taken away from their apartments in Dobrinja on 18 June 1992, were found only after the war. Former Director of the Feroelectro factory Milivoje Steković was taken from his apartment in Radojka Lakić Street, and is still missing (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997a).

Popular Serb musician and composer Slobodan Samardžić was killed in May 1992. His body was dumped into the Miljacka River and was identified by the official ID found on his pocket. Nevertheless, he was officially listed missing until 1999, as authorities did not want to admit the fact of his murder. As in numerous other cases related to missing Serbs, police failed to find the perpetrators.[166]

The six member Serbian family Ristović, including three children, was murdered while having lunch in their house on 8 July 1992. A group of armed men shot and killed Petar Ristović, his sister Bosiljka, brother Obren, mother Radosava and cousins Mila and Danilo. Danilo was only 14, and had reportedly only come to the house to bring his cousins some fresh bread. The murderers were dressed in the uniforms of the "Patriotic League" and left in a police car (Schindler, 2007, p. 104). Two days later, local media carried a statement by the Ministry of Defense and ARBiH Main Staff saying that three unidentified perpetrators committed a homicide. Subsequent investigation revealed that police officers from Marijin Dvor police station committed the murder (Halilović, 1997, pp. 111-112).

This was one in the chain of numerous acts aimed to intimidate the Serb population and pressure Serbs into leaving Sarajevo. Entire Serb families were killed in Sarajevo under the control of the ARBiH. Đuro Kozar, a prominent journalist from Sarajevo, cited the cases of the Elek and Krajisnik families. Đorđe, Božidar and Ljubica Elek were executed in their home in the Pofalići settlement on May 16, 1992. Another massacre occurred in November 1992, in the Buljakov Potok neighborhood, where Janja Krajišnik (55) and her twin children Boro and Borka (both 27) were murdered, while her youngest son Nenad, who was just a little boy, survived. The murderer allegedly fled to Germany (Ljubaš, 2019).

The murder of Ristović family highlighted the true picture of the situation of Serbs in Sarajevo. It was clear from the first moment that this murder was committed on ethnic grounds and with political motivations. After the murder of the Ristović family in June 1992, the Minister of Internal Affairs Jusuf Pušina made a public promise that the murderers would be found and held responsible (Mrkić,1992).

These were hollow promises. According to the diary of the Deputy Chief of Sarajevo CSB Zlatko Bećkanović "murders were a daily occurrence". He noted:

> Special concern was that the wounded and sick men were murdered at some clinics at the Koševo hospital. One old man was "was treated" by being

stabbed in various parts of his body". He received 17 wounds. Many people were killed by shelling, but many death cases were also due to shooting under suspicious circumstances, which "were mainly attributed to the snipers from the mountains. (Bećkanović, 2016, p. 192)

Murders were also covered up by statements that the victims were killed by snipers or by shelling (Bećkanović, 2016). According to a report by CSB Chief Munir Alibabić, 218 persons were murdered in 1992 alone, in the territory of Sarajevo under the control of the ARBiH. The ethnic break-down of the victims was 84 Serbs, 74 Muslims, 53 unidentified, 6 Croats and 1 Ukrainian.[167]

The Ministry of Interior Registry Book contains entries on murder victims in Sarajevo:

- On 11 May 1992, seven unidentified bodies were brought to the mortuary of the Koševo clinical center. The bodies were found close to the Koševo stadium.
- On 26 June 1992, four murder victims were identified. One victim was identified as Rajko Šekerović, born on 28 December 1953.
- On 28 June 1992, a body of a dead man was identified. He was 175 cm tall, and had wounds caused by edged weapons and firearms.
- On 29 June 1992, pictures were taken of several dead bodies found on the road close to Gaj in Sarajevo. The victims were taken to this location and killed, and their bodies burnt.
- On 30 June 1992, the dead body of Branislav Šiljević was examined in the mortuary of Koševo hospital. He was killed by firearms, and his body was burnt.
- On 01 July 1992, two unidentified bodies were examined. One of the victims had penetrating wounds caused by edged weapons on the right arm and left side of the back. The other victim died because his throat was cut.
- On 02 July 1992, the dead body of a man between 55 and 60 years old was found in the Mir café shop in Đure Đakovića Street. This man died of firearm wounds. The body also had wounds caused by edged weapons.
- On 03 July 1992, two dead bodies of unknown men were identified. One body was brought in from the location of Bare, and died of wounds caused by edged weapons. The other victim died of wounds caused by firearms. The origin of the victim's body is not known.

- On 20 April 1992, dead body of Ilija Krušić was found in a stream at Vinogradi 2 in Sarajevo. He had been killed by members of the Territorial Defense and police.
- On 17 May 1992, the dead body of Goran Simić was found in the apartment of Mire Ćorović. He was killed by Bahrudin Kartal.
- On 25 May 1992, a body of an unidentified man was found near the Bembaša restaurant.
- On 15 June 1992, the dead body of Desanka Šujić was photographed. She had her left hand grazed, and a bullet entry wound on the left cheek.
- On 16 June 1992, the dead body of a man was found in the storage space of the Magros company in Ćosića Street. The name of the victim was Ljubomir Šiljević. The body had a bullet entry wound in the head.
- On 19 June 1992, an unidentified perpetrator or perpetrators killed Rajko Podumić and his son Dragomir Podumić in their house. Both victims had bullet entry wounds in the back of the head.
- On 20 June 1992, the dead bodies of five men and two women were photographed near the Bazeni restaurant. One of the female bodies was identified as Nada Biberdžić, born in 1929 in Sarajevo. Nada Biberdžić did not live in the area where her body was found. She lived in Blagoja Parovića Street.
- On 08 July 1992, in the house of Pero Ristović, the dead bodies of Bosjilka Ristović, Radoslav Ristović, Mile Ristović and Danil Ristović were found. Obrad Ristović was wounded and died in hospital.
- On 09 July 1992, the dead body of Mira Kećan was identified. He was killed by a bullet.
- On 14 July 1992, the dead body of a female 65 years old was identified in Buća Potok in Sarajevo.
- On 21 July 1992, at 04.30 in the morning, Veljko Gavrilović was killed by a hand grenade which was planted by someone at the entrance of his house at 80 Sredrenic Street.
- On 25 July 1992, the dead body of a person aged 30 years old was identified.
- On 29 July 1992, the dead body of a man 25 years old was identified, height 185 cm.
- On 08 August, the dead body of Vasilije Ninković was photographed. He had received 17 penetrating knife wounds.

- On 15 August 1992, Professor Milutin Najdanović was shot dead.
- On 15 August 1992, the dead body of Dušan Kosi, born in 1934, was found in the forest across from a house without a number in Drinska Street. He had three bullets in the chest and one in the head.
- On 25 September 1992, Milan Vojnović was killed in the apartment of Marinko Pejić at 5 Žrtva Fašizma Street.
- On 06 October 1992, the dead body of Zoran Rundić was photographed.
- On 25 October 1992, Mate Ćeranić was taken from the Trauma clinic to the Central Prison and died there. He was incarcerated in the Viktor Bubanj barracks.
- On 06 November 1992, a female, Tomanija Nikolić, was killed. Her dead body was found in the Gaj area in Sarajevo.
- On 06 November 1992, the dead body of Pero Odović was found in Drinska Street. On the same date and in the same street the dead body of Milka Odović was found. Also, on 06 November, in another street in Sarajevo the dead body of Božana Vidović from the same family was found.
- On 13 November 1992, an unidentified dead body was found on the circular road of Sarajevo.
- On 19 November 1992, an unidentified perpetrator killed Aleksandar Milinković and Toda Milinković with a firearm.
- On 24 November 1992, in Gornji Velešići in Sarajevo, Mensud Marašćija killed Nenad Gojković in the house of Šefket Halilović.
- On 26 November 1992, an unidentified perpetrator fired and killed Janja Krajišnik, Bora Krajišnik, and Borka Krajišnik with a firearm.
- On 07 December 1992, injuries on the body of Drage Radočaja were photographed.
- On 30 December 1992, an unidentified perpetrator killed Kosa Šiljević and Risto Šiljević in their house. They were killed by a hard object.
- On 06 January 1993, in a house in Varaždinska Street the dead bodies of several persons were found. Among them were Nebojša Marković, Jagoda Janković, and Josip Gogalo. Jagoda Janković was raped and killed. Her body was burnt.
- In early January 1993, in the same house in Sime Milutinovića Street, Danica Savić and Jelena Tanasović were killed.

- On 07 February 1993, in Vojvode Stepe Street, ARBiH soldier Mirsad Berberović raped Marija Jokić twice.
- On 04 April 1993, the dead body of Branko Nikolić was found in his apartment. He had had his throat cut.
- On 11 June 1993, Branko Đuričić, born in 1930, was killed in his house at 31 Bentbaša Street.
- On 02 July 1993, the dead body of Momir Zoranović was found in the Mojmilo Sports Hall in Tetovska Street.
- On 08 July 1993, the dead body of Milorad Plazačić was found in his apartment in Gornji Velešići Street. The victim had penetrating wounds caused by an edged weapon, and had been strangled.
- On 19 August and 28 August, the houses of two persons of Serb nationality, Nevenka Knježević and Sreten Tuševljak were burnt down.
- On 12 September 1993, the dead bodies of Rade Šulić and Jeke Šulić were found at 18 Ahmeta Fetahagića Street.
- On 13 September 1993, Miloš Panić was killed by Damir Gradaščević at 38 Obala Street.[168]
- Given the fact that Serb victims were usually massacred and therefore were not identified, the number of Serbs in the above breakdown must be higher. The crimes committed against Serbs in Sarajevo were well known both to the wider Sarajevo public and to journalists, but were seldom discussed in open because the topic was too dangerous. Serbs in Sarajevo during the war also feared to discuss these crimes publicly.
- In October 1993, the perpetrators of the murders of the families of Krajišnik, Šuljević, and others were identified and arrested. They were Muslims. Among them was Samir Petrović, who had been awarded "Golden Ljiljan", the highest ARBiH award for military valor. All of them were released allegedly because of the lack of evidence.[169]

After Sarajevo media reported the murder of the Ristović family, the number of people trying to escape from Sarajevo increased dramatically. In September 1992, four Serb families of about 30 men, women and children sought a refuge with UNPROFOR at the PTT building. They provided UNPROFOR with first-hand information on the dreadful situation of Serb civilians in Sarajevo. Vice-President Ejup Ganić

demanded that UNPROFOR hand them over to the police. However, UNPROFOR handed them over to UNHCR, which had mandate to deal with DPs. ARBiH Deputy Commander Colonel Stjepan Šiber accused the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR of "working for the chetniks" (Šiber, 2001, p. 156). Obviously, the innocent Serb civilians were "chetniks" for the ARBiH Colonel.

On 30 July 1992, the RBiH Chief High Public Prosecutor Ivica Stanić sent a letter to the RBiH Presidency, the Minister of Defense Jerko Đoko and the ARBiH Chief of Main Staff Sefer Halilović, informing them that:

> Arrests and incarceration of people of mainly Serb nationality into so-called military prisons continue. Families are looking for a number of citizens who had been taken away from their homes by individuals with the insignia of military police. Dead bodies have been found in the territory under the control of the Army of the RBiH. As these bodies have been massacred, as a rule they could not be identified. All this has caused anxiety and dismay to citizens, especially to the citizens of Serb nationality.[170]

RBiH Chief High Public Prosecutor Ivica Stanić sent several letters of this kind to the Minister of Defense Jerko Đoko and ARBiH Chief of Main Staff Sefer Halilović, emphasizing that any arrests and incarceration without a court order were illegal. However, he received no response. The facts of killings of Serbs in Sarajevo were reflected in the report of the United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights Tomasz Mazowiecki in September 1993. Mazowiecki reported:

> The Special Rapporteur also received allegations of individual murders inspired by ethnic revenge. One concerned Radislav and Marina Komjenac, two elderly civilians - said to be Bosnian Serbs - who were taken from their homes in Sarajevo and summarily executed on 26 June 1993. The killings appear to have been in retaliation for a mortar attack that killed seven Muslim civilians in the old town. Government militia was alleged to be responsible. The Special Rapporteur wrote to the Government on 14 August 1993 expressing concern about the report and asking what steps had been taken to punish the perpetrators. In a reply dated 23 September 1993, acting Prime Minister, Mr. Hadzo Efendic, denied there was any ethnic motivation in the killing of the couple - whom he said were of Serb and Croat origin - and said that an investigation of the crime was underway. The Special Rapporteur will follow this case and others which have been brought to his attention. ("United Nations Fifth Periodic Report", 1993, p. 6)

Alija Izetbegović's regime manipulated Muslim DPs community in Sarajevo to exert pressure on the Serbs of Sarajevo, whenever it felt that its military reverses on the battlefield justified this pressure, thus making the entire Serb community hostage to his faulty politics. On 4 June the ARBiH, 285th Brigade defeated the VRS in Žepa, killing 264 VRS soldiers (Latić & Isaković 1997, p. 44). No prisoners were taken. In response, the VRS increased pressure on Žepa. Simultaneously a delegation of DPs from Žepa, residing in Sarajevo, made a threat against all Serbs in Sarajevo:

> If the people of Žepa suffer, we will make the Serbs in Sarajevo pay, starting with Mirko Pejanović. (Pejanović, 2002, p. 140)

These were not empty threats. The general atmosphere of hostility and hatred directly affected the situation of Serb community in Sarajevo, which was indeed made a collective hostage of Izetbegović's regime.

The religious life of the Serb community was stifled. The Old Orthodox Cathedral Church in Baščaršija was searched and plundered several times. The new Saborna Church (*Saborna crkva*) was closed for the entire duration of the war. The Church of the Holy Transfiguration was broken in and plundered, it remained closed during the entire war, and was only reopened at the end of the war. Several witnesses, including Sarajevo lay judge Marko Mikerević, stated that they saw two human heads on poles in front of the Church of the Holy Transfiguration, facing Grbavica under VRS control (Mikerević, 2004, p. 93). The Orthodox Chapels at the cemeteries of Saint Marco and Saint Archangel Gavrilo were emptied and used as lavatories for the visitors to the nearby markets. The old gravestones of the Orthodox graves were repeatedly desecrated. Desecrations of Serb graves continued after the war (Raški, 2010, p. 81).

Under moral and physical pressure, Serbs were fleeing for their lives, looking for any opportunity to leave. A few thousands of Serbs, Croats, Jews, but also Muslims, mostly women and children, but also men who were lucky to obtain "permissions to leave" left the city in three big convoys under the protection of UNPROFOR in November 1992. Crossing from Serbian territory to the Muslim one and vice versa was not a problem during the first days of the conflict. However, the situation rapidly deteriorated with time, to the extent that by May 1992, and especially later, it became practically impossible to leave Sarajevo.

Radovan Karadžić, speaking on RS TV, several times suggested to President Alija Izetbegović opening a corridor from the city for all people who wanted to leave. The RS government launched an initiative to make it possible for those citizens of Sarajevo who wished to leave the city, to do so. Regardless of their ethnicity, the

Serbian side guaranteed them safe passage across the territory under its control. However, Alija Izetbegović guarded his silence. The reason for his silence was two-fold. First, if numerous civilians of all nationalities were to leave Sarajevo through the corridor, the city would become a large military target. Second, Alija Izetbegović wanted to maintain the image of "the city-martyr under the Serb siege."[171]

Izetbegović's regime placed an official ban on leaving the city for civilians. Every attempt to leave Sarajevo was treated as "treason". In his book of memoirs "Balkan Odyssey" (1996), Lord Owen noted:

> In Sarajevo it became even clearer that there were in fact two sieges in the city: one by the Bosnian Serb army, with shelling, sniper fire and blockade, and the other one by the Bosnian government army, with internal blockades and red tape bureaucracy which kept their own people from leaving. A radio broadcast by the army – not the government – said that the able-bodied men aged 18-65 years and women aged 18-60 years were forbidden to leave because they were needed for the city's defense; but the main reason was different. In the propaganda war, the Serbian siege aroused the sympathy of the world, and for this, they needed the elderly and the children to stay. It was their most emotive propaganda weapon for bringing the Americans in to fight the war, and they wanted it never to be weakened. (p. 63)

The United Nations Rapporteur's fifth periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia stated:

> In Sarajevo, which is under siege by Bosnian Serb forces, most Serbs who have applied for permission to leave have been refused by the government Secretariat for Evacuations. Around 700 sick and elderly Serbs who were given permission to leave in December 1992 were allowed to go only on 8 November 1993. Fifty-nine of them are said to have died while waiting for the opportunity to leave. ("United Nations Fifth Periodic Report", 1993, pp. 7-8)

Following a bloody and protracted Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia and Herzegovina, under U.S. pressure Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tudjman eventually made peace. On 18 March 1994 Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim delegations signed an agreement in Washington which envisaged the creation of a Muslim-Croat Federation. The agreement came to be known as the Washington Agreement. According to the agreement, the Muslim-Croat Federation would be established in the territories under ARBiH and HVO control, which would then enter into a confederative relationship with Croatia. The agreement left unresolved the status of the Serb

population within the borders of the Federation. Only the Bosniaks (the newly adopted label for the Muslims) and Croats were identified as constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the solemn references to the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, the Washington agreement did not mention Serbs as a constituent people in the Federation, and made vague references to "others." Regarding the Serbs in Republika Srpska, their status was equally ignored. The agreement only stated that "the decisions on the constitutional status of the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority of Serb population shall be made in the course of negotiations toward a peaceful settlement" (US Institute of Peace, 1994). This meant that the future constitutional status of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina depended on their resilience to defend their rights and the final outcome of the war.

Article 1 of the Federation constitution explicitly referred to Muslima and Serbs as constitutive nations, denying the same status to about 400,000 Serbs, living in the Federation territory. Washington Agreement also envisioned creation of a Federation Parliament and a Federation government and federal institutions. Provisions of the Federation constitution determined allocation of offices and government jobs for Bosniaks and Croats, but not for Serbs. They now were deprived of basic human rights, such as the right to employment and education in their native tongue, not only de facto, but also de jure.

American expert on Yugoslav constitutional issues Robert Hayden described the Federation constitution as "an illusionary constitution for imaginary Federation." He wrote:

> Despite the inspiring statements about the democratic nature of the Federation, the constitution gives all authority to Muslims and Croats, effectively disenfranchising others. Thus, the constitution institutionalizes nationalism and permanent discrimination against minorities, manifesting the structure of rule that I have called "constitutional nationalism. (Hayden, 2002, p. 112)

The Washington Agreement buried Alija Izetbegović's "Platform on the activity of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war conditions" of 1992, with all its nice words about human rights, constitutionality of all three nations, and a voluntary multi-ethnic army, and once again demonstrated the real face of Alija Izetbegović's regime. This act had no parallel in modern European history, and had a devastating effect on the Serb community in Sarajevo.

By mid-1994, the Serb population in Sarajevo decreased approximately by half.

The Serb community in Sarajevo was rapidly dissolving, as many were selling their property and leaving. It was possible to leave the city only if one paid a bribe or allowed the Muslim paramilitary or police forces to use their apartment. People paid large sums of money in foreign currency just to leave Sarajevo. Those who tried to break the internal ring around Sarajevo and leave the city without such "assistance" lost their lives at the confrontation line or were caught, arrested and punished for "desertion".

This situation began gradually changing for the better only in 2000, when the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, under international pressure and despite virulent opposition of Muslim extremists, made amendments to the country's constitution, granting equal rights to all three peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the two entities – Federation and Republika Srpska.

6.2. ARBiH Criminality

The first Muslim paramilitary formations, the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets", in Sarajevo were organized in late 1991 and early 1992, when the RBiH was still a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, while the JNA and the RBiH TO were the only legal armed forces. The war created fabulous opportunities for enrichment for Sarajevo criminals, who filled the ranks of these organizations. Criminal gangs quickly turned into paramilitary units of the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets," but their newly acquired status of "defenders of Sarajevo" did not imbue them with any sense of military discipline and subordination.

Besides the permanent presence of the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets", HOS groups infiltrated Sarajevo, arriving from Western Herzegovina. As a rule, they were well armed with automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and truck-mounted mortars.

The presence of numerous criminal gangs in uniforms was a "public secret" for CSB Sarajevo. Numerous sources reveal criminal activities Sarajevo gangs under the veil of the "Patriotic League". For example, in April 1992 Deputy Chief of Sarajevo CSB Zlatko Beckanović described the situation in Sarajevo in the following way:

> At that time, numerous criminal groups were mushrooming in the city. They were well organized and armed either on their own, or on somebody's directions. Their goal was to oppose SDS paramilitary units and the JNA. They were plundering businesses, shops, and stores. We did not try to prevent this. (Bećkanović, 2016, p. 115)

ARBiH Deputy Commander General Stjepan Šiber in his book of memoirs described these gangs as:

> Well-armed groups, which were engaged in robberies, murders and torturing people. At that time, the names of Juka, Ćelo, Tope, Kruška and others were already well known. (Šiber, 2000, p. 65)

Police did not stir a finger to curb the criminal activities of the "Green Berets" and the "Patriotic League." They acted as a self-organized paramilitary army. Dressed in military uniforms and armed, they were roaming in the streets of the city before the war broke out, and staged their parades, as police watched.[172]

In February 1991, the SDA began the process of amnestying Sarajevo criminals. The SRBiH Presidency, at the 4th session on 07 February, created the commission for amnesty, which amnestied 54 convicted prisoners.[173]

At an early stage of the war, criminal groups divided Sarajevo into their fiefdoms, or zones of responsibility. Mušan Topalović (Caco) controlled the Stari Grad municipality, Juka Prazina was the "king" of municipality of Novi Grad, and Ramiz Delalić (Ćelo) was "the war lord" of the municipality of Centar. Their men committed murders, robberies, extortions, "requisitions and confiscations of property," and raped women.[174] They had their own bodyguards and killers, and staged "a systematic and unlimited terror over the Serb citizens."[175]

These paramilitary units were SDA party formations, and Alija Izetbegovic was their Supreme Commander. Their religious authority was the imam of the Careva mosque Muderis, who himself carried a Kalashnikov rifle. Their chief ideologue was SDA functionary Omer Behmen. Sarajevo media promoted these criminals to "peoples' commanders".[176] There is photo-documentation that shows that President Alija Izetbegović received and decorated these "peoples' commanders."[177]

Caco, whose real name is Mušan Topalović, was working in Germany as a musician at the beginning of the war. He returned to Sarajevo to lead the BiH army's 10th Mountain Brigade. He was wounded several times, and lost several fingers on his left hand. His career as a musician was finished.

Juka Prazina was a well-known pre-war criminal and debt-collector. Born into a poor family, he got his start stealing lunch money and sandwiches from schoolchildren (Pomfret, 1992).

The Guardian's Ian Traynor commented:

> He swiftly metamorphosed himself into a militia leader defending the city and a wheeler-dealer who smuggled goods and people through the siege lines … As the siege wore on, his enthusiasm for the fight yielded to his fervor for

> cash. He controlled the main checkpoint into the city through the siege lines and therefore one of the main channels for smuggling goods in and people out, at huge profit. (Traynor, 1994)

He was not qualified to serve in the capacity of a military officer, but made a remarkable career in the ARBiH. Alija Izetbegović made him a member of the Supreme Command Staff. Washington Post correspondent John Pomfret noted that "apparently, the only qualification for command in the militia is the taste for violence" (Pomfret, 1992).

Juka Prazina formed his own unit named "Juka's Wolves". ARBiH Main Staff intended to promote him to the rank of General, though Juka had no pre-war military experience.[178] Juka Prazina failed to distinguish himself on the battlefield, betrayed Alija Izetbegović and joined the HVO, which was at war with the ARBiH. In December 1993, he was murdered in Belgium under mysterious circumstances. The murder gave rise to speculations that the murder was masterminded by the RBiH government (Schindler, 2007, p. 175; Traynor, 1994).

Ismet Bajramović, aka Ćelo, in early the 1990s was serving a prison term in prison in Zenica for theft and robbery. In prison, he met and made friends with Alija Izetbegović, who served a prison term in the same prison. In April 1992, he had under his command a paramilitary unit which was made up of criminal elements and drug addicts, and established his headquarters at the "Mladen Stojanović" student dormitory. Jusuf Pušina, RBiH Minister of Interior at the start of the war, noted:

> I put Ismet in jail during peacetime, and during the trial the court found he was a psychopath. Then suddenly I found he had more authority than me. It was a surreal moment. (Pomfret, 1993)

Ramiz Delalić, aka "Ćelo 2", a Muslim from Sandjak, was before the war involved in crime in Sarajevo, Germany and Switzerland. In the early 1990s, he made connections with prominent Muslim politicians. He acted as a contract killer, enjoying the protection of the Sarajevo police and SDA politicians.

Various Muslim paramilitary formations were competing for favors that President Alija Izetbegović would bestow on them for the highest number of Serbs arrested and the larggest amount of ransom their relatives paid for their release. The amount of ransom was individual, and depended on the status of an arrested individual. Money obtained in this manner would be deposited into the SDA coffers. Lawyer and Caco's adviser Fahrija Karkin, known for his corrupt connections with the Sarajevo criminal underworld, in a serious of private deals exchanged 31 Serbs, and gained a fortune

from ransom. He admitted that Alija Izetbegović demanded him to facilitate the arrest of as many arrests of Serbs as possible in order to have them exchanged for a relative of his, who was in prison in Foča.[179] Those Muslims who tried to misappropriate the ransom money would be punished. Former Sarajevo lay judge Marko Mikerević in his book "Sarajevski Cauldrons of Death" recounted a court case in which he was involved as a lay judge, when a certain Rusmir Čakarević Rus was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for the misappropriation of 1000 DM in this kind of a deal (Mikerević, 2004, p. 35). Philip Corwin, United Nations Civil Affairs officer in Sarajevo, described the atmosphere of war-time Sarajevo:

> Bribery, extortion, and protection rackets are a way of life. The organized killers of pre-war Sarajevo are now paramilitary enforcers of the government, as well as their personal bodyguards. (Corwin, 2000, p. 59)

However, it should be said that Serb paramilitaries also committed crimes in the municipalities of Srpsko Sarajevo. One of the most notorious perpetrators was Veselin Vlahović Batko. In 2013 a court in Sarajevo sentenced him to 45 years of imprisonment for 30 murders and 14 rapes ("Bosnia jails Serb Veselin Vlahović", 2013).

The United Nations Experts Final Report duly noted that "a score of men with criminal backgrounds formed groups to defend the city", including Ramiz Delalić (Ćelo) and Mušan Topalović (Caco), who reportedly controlled gang operations on the Bosnian Serb siege line, bringing truckloads of contraband over the bridges across the Miljaćka river separating Grbavica from the city center" (UN Security Council, 1994a, p. 10). However, the report kept silent about other numerous and more serious crimes committed by these gangs.

The ARBiH absorbed numerous criminals into paramilitary formations under command of Jusuf Prazina, aka "Juka", Ismet Bajramović aka "Ćelo," Mušan Topalović, aka Caco, Samir Kahfedžić, aka "Kruško", Ismet Hadžić, Ramiz Delalić, aka "Ćelo 2" and others.[180]

The 9th Mountain Brigade and the 10th Mountain Brigade, commanded by Ramiz Delalić "Ćelo" and Mušan Topalović Caco respectively, were active in the area of Sarajevo in Stari Grad Municipality between April 1992 and late October 1993.

The 9th Motorized Brigade under Ramiz Delalić "Ćelo" and the 10th Mountain Brigade under Mušan Topalović Caco were especially notorious for their lack of discipline and their criminality. Vehbija Karić, a senior officer in the ARBiH Main Staff, stated that a number of soldiers within the two brigades had a criminal background,

acted unpredictably and were undisciplined (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Sefer Hahilović*, 2007, para. 122). According to the ICTY judgement of Sefer Halilović,

> "These two brigades had the worst reputation in terms of discipline and frequent incidents" and "those commanders surrounded themselves by groups by common criminals or semi-criminals".

The 10th Mountain Brigade under Caco had a strength of about 2,000 men, and was holding a defensive line on the Trebević mountain ridge (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Sefer Hahilović*, para. 120). Soldiers of Topalović's brigade observed Islamic customs, which were forced on everyone regardless of nationality. They also had distinct insignia, different from those common in the ARBiH. On their caps they wore a crescent and a star and the inscription Caco. According to CIA analysts:

> These patriotic criminals soon became a problem themselves; extorting money and coercing labor from the neighborhoods they were supposed to defend. (CIA, 2002, p.186)

There is ample evidence that the soldiers of the 9th and 10th Brigades were involved in systematic campaigns of extortion, abuse, torture, beatings and the murder of Serb civilians, who were *en masse* treated as "chetniks" in Sarajevo. Soldiers of these Brigades arbitrarily detained Serb civilians in the streets of Sarajevo and in their apartments and took them to the front line on the Trebević Mountain ridge to dig trenches. Many of them never came back.

According to ARBiH Chief of Military Security Jusuf Jašarević, soldiers of the 10th Mountain Brigade would pick up people off the streets of the city every day, and forcibly take them to dig trenches in whatever clothes and footwear they happened to be wearing at that time (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Sefer Hahilović*, para. 126). ARBiH soldier Dževad Tirak testified to the ICTY that "trench digging was risky because of sudden, haphazard fire by the enemy" (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Sefer Hahilović*, para. 126).

Serbs were forced to dig trenches at gunpoint at the most dangerous sectors of the front line. ARBiH soldiers usually fired a couple of mortar rounds at VRS positions and would run for cover leaving the people in the trenches. There is no doubt that many of those Serbs who had been killed by VRS artillery, mortar and small arms fire in the part of Sarajevo under ARBiH control were killed at the front-line while digging trenches. There are also numerous facts proving that the ARBiH used not only civilians, but also UNPROFOR soldiers and Red Cross installations and objects as "human shields". For example, United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki reported:

> Many reports have been received of the arbitrary detention and ill-treatment of civilians by government forces in and around Sarajevo. The Special Rapporteur has obtained direct testimony from a Serb refugee who arrived in Serbia from Sarajevo in December 1992 regarding the use of prisoners as human shields. The witness states that Muslim forces took Serbs prisoner on order to use them as human shields against snipers when going to and from their military posts. The witness reportedly saw this from the window of her home which was situated next to the Muslim forces' headquarters. (United Nations Commission on Human Rights,1992, para. 81)

According to SGV President Mirko Pejanović, many of those killed were reported not as victims of crimes, but as killed in action:

> The killings were committed in the following manner: you take an unprepared civilian to the front line and tell him "dig!" You leave him in an open space and shoot in the opposite direction. Then the opposite side returns fire, and this civilian is killed. This killing is reported as "killed at the front line", not as a crime. ("United Nations Fifth Periodic Report", 1993, pp. 7-9)

The dead bodies of the victims were tossed into a natural crevice, the Kazani ravine. at the foot of Mount Trebević on the eastern side of the city, which became a mass grave. To destroy the evidence of their crimes, ARBiH soldiers covered the dead bodies with quicklime and burned them together with automobile tires by pouring fuel on them. Witness 806/95-18 testified to the SRY Commission for Collection of Information on Crimes against Humanity:

> When I was an inmate in cell №2 in Central Prison in Sarajevo, I shared this cell with soldiers of the unit commanded by Mušan Topalović aka Caco, Alen Hatić and Emir Kapetanović. We spoke in the cell. Hatić was in prison because of an armed robbery and the murder of a child, Haris Kapetanović was his accomplice. They told me that they participated in many actions of this unit, when they arrested many Serbs in Sarajevo and took them to dig trenches. As they said, many Serbs were killed. The dead bodies were taken to a place called Kazani, between the settlement of Bistrik and the municipality Stari of Grad. As they explained, they first pushed 20 or 30 dead bodies into the crevice and then covered them with quicklime, then a layer of earth, and so on. As they said, there were ten layers.[181]

Mladen Milosavljević, witness to war events in Sarajevo, stated that "well-off citizens of Sarajevo were subject to extortion" and "were supposed to buy protection from Topalović and Delalić each month". Milosavljević cites the case of Mirsad Nikšić, who was "allegedly paying DM 10,000 a month", while another victim was popular singer Hanka Paldum. Duško Tomić, President of NGO Children's Embassy "Međaši" also was subject to extortion and blackmail and paid Ramiz Delalić for protection." According to Milosavljević, "he even had receipts for the money he paid to Ramiz Delalić."[182]

Crimes committed against Serbs in Sarajevo were public knowledge. In December 1993, *Dani* magazine published an extensive article about Caco and mentioned Kazani as one of the three locations where Serb victims were buried. The Kazani case, however, best highlighted the inability or unwillingness of the authorities to deal with the violent lawlessness in Sarajevo. On 10 November 1994, *Dani* published an article entitled "Truth about crimes" that in graphic detail described crimes committed at location Kazani:

> At this evil place, soldiers of the 10th Mountain Brigade under command of Mušan Topalović committed savage murders of citizens of Sarajevo, mostly of Serb nationality … The highest military, police and state officials were aware of crimes committed in Kazani. They kept silent when these civilians were taken away, butchered and killed. The secret about these crimes was kept in well- guarded dossiers. (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997f)

However, Kazani was not the only location where Serbs were tortured and killed, and "Caco and Ćelo were not the only criminals in RBiH Army uniforms who committed crimes against the Serb community in Sarajevo. Killings also occurred in the basement of the Hotel Europa and in the tunnel leading from Sarajevo towards Pale, as well as at different local prisons in Hrasnica, Alipašino Polje and Otoka. Omerović Edin, aka Edo, kept and managed a private prison in the kindergarten building in Otoka. There were many corpses in that location in the summer of 1992, and it can be assumed that these corpses were those of the Serbs killed in the prison run by Edo Omerović.[183]

Serb civilians were physically abused and killed during arrests and detention in local prisons. The main motive behind these murders was ethnic hatred. This was exacerbated by the desire to avenge repeated ARBiH military setbacks by killing innocent Serb civilians.

Many murders were also motivated by purely criminal interest to steal valuables and occupy apartments of Serb victims. Many ARBiH commanders ordered their soldiers to take Serbs out of their apartments purely to take their property. Some of these Serbs never returned home, and their fate is not known to this day.

Serb Božidar Šljivić went missing on 24 June 1992. His wife Behireta Sljivić was told the next day that Mušan Topalović's men had taken away and killed her husband because of their apartment (Mrkić, 1997). Marina Nevstrujev and Nenad Lojević were taken away from their apartment in Dimitrija Tucovića Street by ARBiH soldiers in June 1992, and never came back. Their apartment was immediately occupied by Topalović's relative (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997a). Many Serb civilians simply disappeared at night. In fact, they were kidnapped by Muslim paramilitaries. Such kidnappings started before the war broke out. Those kidnapped were commonly referred to as having been "swallowed by darkness" (Mikerević, 2004, pp. 172, 176, 177, 182, 183, 191-248).

Apart from Caco and "Ćelo", many other ARBiH units committed crimes against Sarajevo civilians. Soldiers of the 6th Muslim Brigade Izet Tinjak, Mirsad Ašahi, and Amir Husić, who were under command of Adem Alijagić, were responsible for killings of Serb civilians in the locality "Ivan Krndelj". Three Serb civilians Sreten Nikolić, Jagoda Janković and Jovan Popović were killed in the house of Gavre Ćeranić at 24 Varaždinska Street. These soldiers also killed prominent member of Sarajevo HDZ and the Director of Republican Revenue Agency Josip Gogala, who was of mixed Slovenian and Croat origin. The civilians were taken from the prison in which they were initially incarcerated and told that they would be taken to Grbavica for an exchange. Instead, they were taken to the house of Gavre Ćeranić at 24 Varaždinska Street, and shot in cold blood.[184] By Decision of the Sarajevo District Military Court I-28/93, dated 03.08.1993, the soldiers under Adem Alijagic were responsible for all these murders. Their victims' bodies were burned. Investigations revealed that Jagoda Janković was raped before she was killed. CSB Sarajevo Deputy Chief Zlatko Bećkanović confirmed the fact of the murder.[185]

ARBiH Command and President Alija Izetbegović were well aware of the criminal behavior of troops under their command. During his trial at the ICTY, Radovan Karadžić provided to the judges a report written by Fikret Muslimović, the head of ARBiH military security, dated December 1992. The report stated the following:

> We note that as regards the unlawful and destructive activity of Musan Topalović, Caco, we have provided information several times already, and in this connection, we have proposed certain measures in order to make it impossible for him to behave that way. Inter alia, in a document that we sent on 1 December 1992, when the 10th Mountain Brigade was still in the process of being established and Caco was considered as a candidate for the post of its commander, we presented the available information on his mistreatment and arrests of citizens and even his own soldiers, as well as liquidations of citizens who were ethnic Serbs, and forced mobilization and coercion of citizens to dig

> trenches. Among these citizens there were sick and disabled people. (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, 2010, p. 2255)

Another report by ARBiH military security was filed on 4 March 1993:

> With the help of MUP CSB Sarajevo, the SVB obtained 15 written statements and 13 official reports from authorized officials documenting that Caco alone or with the help from ten close associates committed multiple crimes which were sufficient to warrant criminal charges.[186]

After Caco's soldiers had severely beaten up and crippled the son of ARBiH General Jovan Divjak, the only officer of Serb nationality in RBiH Supreme Command, he sent to his Commander-in-Chief Alija Izetbegović his resignation letter, in which he compared the behavior of ARBiH units "in Sarajevo to behavior of armed tribal formations in Africa." The letter speaks of their disgusting practices:

> There is a concentration [camp] of citizens and ARBiH fighters in the area of Ablakovine. In most cases, their documents have been taken away from them. They are divided into 5 groups. The first group are inmates. There about a dozen of them. Their names are Dragan, Siniša, Ivo … They have been there for 40 to 50 days without items of personal hygiene and washing (believe me, they smell) …They are digging trenches daily between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. The other group are convicts …. The third group are those arrested. Some of them have been there for a month ... I am asking who is responsible for taking these people to the front line to dig trenches, often without any security. In 20 days, among these poor people five persons have been killed and 20 wounded. I do not know if their parents and families know where their sons, fathers and husbands are.

In his letter, ARBiH General Jovo Divjak emphasized that he never had any real command authority in the army, and was used and manipulated to create an image of a multi-ethnic Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[187]

By summer of 1993, the extent of the SDA's reign of terror had become impossible to hide. Tensions between Sarajevo's criminal military leaders and government authorities escalated during the summer of 1993, when Caco's men took hundreds of hostages and surrounded the Presidency building to protest the arrest of Senad Pećar, one of Caco's closest assistants (Andreas, 2016, p. 93). On 02 July 1993, the 9th Motorized Brigade and 10th Mountain Brigade staged a mutiny and started taking hostages off the streets. The part of Sarajevo under ARBiH control became virtually divided between the mutinous soldiers and the troops loyal to the government. Gun

battles broke out around the police stations in Centar and Stari Grad municipalities, and one police unit fired mortars at Caco's positions on Trebević. Before the battle ended it had involved machine guns, armored cars and mortars, and at least one policeman was killed. The mutinous soldiers left the streets of Sarajevo after Izetbegović promised to raise the money allowance and abolish most risky missions (Stanković, 2000, pp. 207-208).

ARBiH Commander Sefer Halilović protected Caco and Ćelo and obstructed any disciplinary measures against them. On 17 August 1993, General Stjepan Šiber wrote in his diary that ARBiH Commander Sefer Halilović at a meeting on Igman stated: "Sefer presented Caco, Ćelo, and Zuka as saviors of Sarajevo" (Šiber, 2001, p. 176). On 8 September 1993, General Stjepan Šiber made a note in his diary regarding evidence that Ramiz Delalić was engaged in racket, and that the soldiers of the 9th Mountain Brigade were making arbitrary arrests of Croats and Serbs in Sarajevo (Šiber, 2001, p. 192). On 24 September 1993, ARBiH General Stjepan Šiber and Head of CSB for Sarajevo Bakir Alispahić visited President Alija Izetbegović, pleading him to use force to arrest the commanders of the 9th and 10th brigades. Izetbegović plainly refused (Šiber, 2001, pp. 211, 212). On 27 September 1993, ARBiH General Stjepan Šiber had a meeting with Rasim Delić and Sefer Halilović. Halilović told Delić that "Topalović and Delta[188] were always out of the system [chain of command], and have the orders from certain structures to remove you or me when ordered." This was a hint that the10th Mountain Brigade under Topalović Caco and the special "Delta" unit were in fact Alija Izetbegović's personal Pretorian Guard, and followed his personal orders only (Šiber, 2001, p. 224).

In September 1993, the problem of the 9th Motorized Brigade and 10th Mountain Brigade had become so bad that a special session of the Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order was called to address the problem. Presidency member and SGV President Marko Pejanović chaired the session. According to the minutes of the session, the Commander of the ARBiH 1st Corps Vahid Karavelić believed that the problems, especially in 9th Motorized Brigade and 10th Mountain Brigade created by Caco and Ćelo, have become so serious, that they can be characterized as terror over citizens."[189]

ARBiH General Stjepan Šiber, who was present at the session, noted in his diary that CSB Chief Munir Alibabić spoke about the steep rise of criminality and murders in Sarajevo. Kerim Lučarević noted crimes including abductions and attempted murders by Sarajevo police. Ismet Dahić, the Deputy Commander of the 1st Corps, said that there was no common stand on the problem with Caco and Ćelo. Ministry of Interior official Omer Stambolić complained that someone from the Presidency supported them (Šiber, 2001, pp. 215-217). Everyone knew that this "someone" was

RBiH President Alija Izetbegović, but no one dared to say it aloud.

Numerous international media agencies present in Sarajevo could not but notice government-sponsored violence against the Serb minority in the city, but preferred to write about "Sarajevo multi-ethnic harmony", ignoring unpalatable reality.[190] However, it was impossible to hide the ugly truth for long. Eventually international media in Sarajevo began to notice that non-Muslims were disappearing and fleeing the city, contrary to the SDA-cultivated multicultural image of Sarajevo. The story, though considerably less reported than crimes committed by Serbs and Croats, was nevertheless becoming a serious nuisance for Alija Izetbegović and his entourage (Schindler, 2007, p. 105).

After many months of procrastination, President Alija Izetbegović finally decided to arrest Mušan Topalović Caco and Ramiz Delalić "Ćelo." The event that finally triggered this operation was an outrageous act which publicly embarrassed the Izetbegović's regime when his gangsters in uniform robbed Sarajevo funeral agency "Pokop" of digging tools. Funerals in the city became impossible. They also hijacked two UNPROFOR APCs (CIA, 2002, p.186). On 25 October 1993, the RBiH Presidency decided to relieve Mušan Topalović Caco and Ramiz Delalić Ćelo of their duties and disarm those soldiers of the two brigades who would oppose this decision (Delić, 2011, p. 47). On 26 October 1993, operation "Trebević 2" was executed in Sarajevo. Caco tortured and killed several policemen who were sent to arrest him. Mušan Topalović Caco and 132 soldiers of the two mutinous brigades eventually surrendered. Caco was immediately killed under unclear circumstances. As reported in Sarajevo media, Caco was killed on the orders of Izetbegović, who did not want a dangerous witness to stay alive (Berić, 1997). The total human toll of the "Trebević 2" operation was 12 police and army personnel dead (Andreas, 2016, p. 94).

Chief of Sarajevo CSB Munir Alibabić charged that Caco was eliminated not because he was an out-of-control commander, but because he had become a political liability for President Alija Izetbegović and his inner circle. Caco knew too much and could implicate political leaders as accomplices in his dirty work. While small fish were rounded up in an anti-crime sweep, larger crimes were never properly investigated. The MUP, Munir Alibabić charged, had become a small SDA-dominated group of profiteers (Alibabić, 1996, p. 98). The action received complimentary comments from the internationals working in the city. "It is high time they acted", a senior UN official said:

> It is the Wild West out here. If the Bosnian government cannot maintain order a few kilometers around the Presidency, they cannot expect international credibility. (Andreas, 2016, p. 94)

According to Mladen Milosavljević's statement he "heard from a colleague (Sreten Nović, crime scene investigation technician, who now resides in Australia) that letters from Alija Izetbegović were found during the search of Caco's apartment, on the day of the search or the following day, 9 November 1993." One of those letters allegedly urged Topalović "not to arrest all those people and be selective, as some were opposed to it".[191]

The government's crackdown was actually much more limited and selective than it first appeared. Most of the detained soldiers were quickly released. Caco's right hand Senad Pećar was promoted to brigade commander. Caco's personnel officer Timur Numić was elevated to the post of SDA Headquarters (Andreas, 2016, p. 94). Ramiz Delalić Čelo was spared because he was a secret agent of Izetbegović's SDB or state security service (Halilović, 2005, p. 33). After the end of the war, under pressure from international organizations, Sarajevo authorities finally initiated a formal investigation into the crimes of Ramiz Delalić Ćelo. However, Minister of Internal Affairs of Canton Sarajevo Ismet Dahić, in violation of procedure, gave him an ARBiH foreign passport, and Ramiz Delalić Čelo escaped abroad (Selimbegović, 2000). He was killed in broad daylight in Sarajevo on 17 June 2007. His murderer was never found (Fazlić, M. & Avdić, S. 2007).

According to CIA analyst John Schindler, "the Muslim gangs serving in the police and military nevertheless had done their work." They exhibited the hypocrisy and criminal nature of Izetbegović's regime and destroyed the pre-war spirit of cooperation between the Serb and Muslim communities (Schindler, 2007, p. 105). Murders and ill treatment of Serb civilians continued after operation "Trebević 2". Serb woman M. Šobot testified:

> I lived in a two room apartment with my husband Vid, son Goran, and daughter Gordana. Before the war, I worked at a road repair business, while my husband worked at a wire factory. My husband had been living in Sarajevo since 1968, and I had been living there since 1967. On 28 June 1994 two soldiers in the uniform of the Territorial Defense told my husband to pick up his things and go with them. They told him that they were taking him for an interrogation, and that Mute wanted to see him. This was a nickname, and I think that the real name of this person was Mustafa Diklić from Dobrinja in Sarajevo. They took my husband as he was, in sports overalls, which he had on. Since then I do not know anything about what happened to him. From the testimony of Jovo, who was in the camp Poljoskrba, and Mira Milovanović, I found out that he was killed on the same night. I escaped from Sarajevo on 12 December 1994 under the pretext of visiting my daughter. I have been living in Banja Luka since then. (Krstanović, 2003, p. 698)

In 1994, due to the severe problems that Serbs faced in Hrasnica, an SGV delegation held three meetings with the civilian authorities and the Serb community representatives in Hrasnica in order to overcome the problem of forced labor platoons. These platoons consisted of 150 people of exclusively Serb nationality, who were, according to the Information sent by the SGV to the "BIH President, Government, and RBIH Assembly" "were faced with an utterly humiliating relationship since the war began, and had been assigned to the hardest labor of digging trenches at the front lines, due to which 13 Serb citizens died".[192]

6.3. ARBiH Prisons and Prison Camps in Sarajevo

Private prisons run by Muslim and Croat paramilitary formations mushroomed in Sarajevo immediately after the beginning of the war. According to SGV President Mirko Pejanović, these local prisons existed in several locations in Sarajevo, and some became notorious for their cruelty. These were not suitable facilities to hold prisoners, and local mini-prisons were created at schools, in the basements of buildings, stores, etc (Bećkanović, 2016, p. 207). The local prisons were under the authority of local ARBiH commanders, and were scattered all over the city. Illegal detentions were particularly frequent in the area of responsibility of the 9th Mountain Brigade.

Many Serbs were incarcerated in the Central prison and "Viktor Bubanj" barracks which were turned into a prison. Some Serb inmates were incarcerated for months without official warrants for arrest or indictment. Numerous statements of Serb inmates speak of inhuman treatment, beating, torture, deprived of adequate food, sleep, and medical care. Female inmates were raped. Prison authorities reportedly demanded ransom for release from prison, but invariably cheated, when prisoners agreed. Money for release of prisoners was invariably misappropriated, while prisoners remained in custody. Official statements by former Serb inmates mention the names of Kerim Lućarević, Sobo Meho, Esad Osmanbegović, Ismet Bajramović, Besim Muderizović, Avdo Panjeta, Josip Pejaković and others who were stated to be responsible for crimes against Serb inmates. At least 12 Serbs reportedly died in Central prison of Sarajevo because of beatings, torture, and maltreatment.[193]

Apart from the official Central prison and "Viktor Bubanj" prison there existed Sarajevo numerous private prisons. The most notorious private prisons in the parts of Sarajevo under ARBiH control were:

• A prison under the control of Jusuf Prazina, aka Juka, next to the medical faculty of Sarajevo University near Koševo stadium. Members of Prazinaćs units were especially notorious for taking civilians away and stealing their valuables and appropriating their apartments.

• A prison under the control of military unit commander aka "Kinez" at the clinical center at Koševo;

• A prison in Alipašino Polje controlled by a man with the nickname "Kruško";

• A prison in the area of Otoka and Čengić vila;

• A prison in Dobrinja;

• A prison in Hrasnica;

• A prison in Pazarići. This prison functioned for the entire duration of the war.[194]

The settlement of Dobrinja was situated within the zone of responsibility of the ARBiH 5th Motorized Brigade under Ismet Hadžić aka Mutavelija. Military police unit of the 5th Motorized Brigade maintained control over a dozen improvised detention facilities.[195] The most notorious were the improvised prisons "Baltazar" and "Stela", in which Serb civilians were killed on a regular basis.[196] According to RCIRZ, 417 criminal acts were committed in Dobrinja against 248 identified victims. Out of this number, 98 were murdered and 11 persons went missing. It can be reasonably assumed that these 11 missing were also murdered, as they had not established any contact with their relatives since 1992.[197] Some prisoners could be released after paying a ransom or giving up all their property to RBiH authorities. After his release from "Stela" prison, Serb inmate Dragan Stanojević had given all his property and apartment to some officers of the RBiH Ministry of the Interior in exchange for an opportunity to cross the confrontation line into RS territory.[198]

In December 1996, the SRY Commission for Collection of Information on Crimes against Humanity published a report with 52 locations of camps and detention facilities under ARBiH control in Sarajevo municipalities.[199] CIA analyst John Schindler assessed that there were about 70 private prisons in Sarajevo, in which Serbs were detained for "questioning", meaning torture (Schindler, 2007, p. 104). Former Sarajevo lay judge Marko Mikerević indicated that at various stages of the war there were 126 prison camps for Serbs in Sarajevo (Mikerević, 2004, p. 71). A more comprehensive and detailed list of improvised prisons and detention facilities was prepared by RCIRZ in 2019. The list mentions 211 such locations in various municipalities and local communities of Sarajevo.[200] Given the flourishing ARBIH

criminal business of ransom, extortion, and exchanging people, as well as short-term detention of ethnic Serb hostages, this number does not appear exaggerated.

Juka Prazina alone controlled 35 prisons and prisoner camps. Among them were the prison "Stela" in Otoka, a prison at the building of the railway industrial school, a prison at the "Vladimir Nazor" building of mentally handicapped children, a prison at "Dragica Pavica" kindergarten, at "Iskrica" kindergarten in Hasan Brkić Street, a prison at the "Amerikanac" restaurant, and other locations.[201] Prazina's deputy Samir Kahvedžić, aka "Kruško", controlled prisons at the restaurant "Borsalino" in AVNOJ BiH Trg, and at the storage space of the "Novi Grad" restaurant.[202]

The "Viktor Bubanj" military barracks were converted into a prison under control of Ismet Bajramović Čelo. Between May and November 1992, over 200 Serbs were incarcerated in this prison. They "were not informed of the reasons of their detention" and were "tortured with the intention to inflict severe physical and psychological pain, which caused the death of 18 inmates" ("Optužnica Protiv Tri Osobe", 2011). The inmates suffered from brutal torture and beatings (Mikerević, 2004, p. 44). According to the SRY Commission for the Collection of Information on Crimes against Humanity, 64 Serb inmates in the prison "Viktor Bubanj" are still missing.[203] President Alija Izetbegović, Vice-President Ejup Ganić, and ARBiH Commander Sefer Halilović reportedly often visited the prison (Mikerević, 2004, p. 49).

Terror reigned in the settlements of Buča Potok and Buljkov Potok in the municipality of Novi Grad. Numerous crimes against Serb civilians were committed in the "Jaroslav Černi" camp in the Electrotechnical School building in the Buča Potok settlement. According to witness statements, at least 22 inmates were subjected to physical and mental abuse, torture, and beatings.[204]

According to the ICTY, the Čelebići prison camp was established by Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces in mid-1992 and located in a former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) facility near Konjic, about 50 km from Sarajevo. The majority of the prisoners were civilians captured during ARBiH attacks on villages in Bradina and Donje Selo and the surrounding areas on 27 May 1992. A large group was arrested in the center of Bradina on 27 May and made to walk in a column along the road to Konjic.

An atmosphere of fear and intimidation prevailed at the camp as a result of the beatings meted out indiscriminately to the prisoners. Each of the former detainees who testified before the ICTY Trial Chamber described acts of violence and cruelty that they themselves suffered or witnessed. The Trial Chamber stated that, though they were presented with extensive evidence regarding the physical and psychological abuse to which the detainees in the Čelebići were continually subjected, the evidence clearly demonstrated that those individual acts specifically proven by the Prosecution

in no way represented the totality of the cruel and oppressive acts committed against the detainees in the camp. The evidence further demonstrated how the detainees in the crowded detention conditions were obliged to helplessly observe the horrific injuries and suffering caused by this mistreatment, as well as the bodies of detainees who had died from the abuse to which they were subjected. The Chamber further found that the detainees were deprived of adequate food, access to water, medical care and sleeping and toilet facilities (ICTY, Mucić et al. IT-96-21). According to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, horrible crimes were committed against Serb inmates in the camp:

> Muslim prison guard Landžo "beat a detainee aged between 60 and 70 years for an extended period of time and nailed a Serbian Democratic Party badge to his forehead. The detainee died soon afterwards as a result of his injuries. He forced open the mouth of one detainee in order to insert a pair of heated pincers that he closed on his tongue, causing burns to his mouth, lips and tongue. He then used the pincers to burn the detainee's ear. He placed a gas mask over another detainee's face and tightened it to block his air supply. He then burned the detainee's hand, leg and thighs with a heated knife. He forced one detainee to do push-ups whilst being kicked and hit with a baseball bat. (ICTY, Mucić et al. IT-96-21)

Brutal torture of Serb women in this camp was described in another United Nations document:

> Physical torture to which Serbs from this area have been subjected by Muslims is particularly brutal. Serb women are charged with possession of radio stations and keeping of war journals. They are arrested on these charges and physically and mentally abused and humiliated.[205]

United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights Tomasz Mazowiecki reported:

> The government-run camp at Tarčin was notified to the ICRC, despite the clear obligation to notify promptly, and visited for the first time in November 1992. Conditions there are reported to be appalling with inadequate heating and coverings for those detained. (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1993, para. 69)

Another large concentration camp run by the ARBiH at an early stage of the war was established in Tarčin, about 25 km from Sarajevo. This camp functioned through the entire war. A large grain storage facility in Tarčin was turned into a concentration camp and the grain storage chambers into cells for prisoners. The camp was common-

ly referred to as Tarčin camp, or Silos (Silo). On 11 May, the ARBiH attacked and occupied the JNA barracks in Krupa, municipality of Hadžiči. Eleven captured JNA soldiers were the first prisoners of the camp.[206]

From 20 May on the ARBiH began massive forcible transfer of Serb civilians from Tarčin and Pazarići into the Silos camp. Many Serbs from Sarajevo also ended up in the camp. According to Serb sources, the prison population of the camp increased to about 550 men and women. All of them, with the exception of 11 JNA soldiers, were civilians between 14 and 85 years of age, and had never served in the VRS or any volunteer military formation. The inmates were forced to work at the front line in the Sarajevo municipality of Hrasnica, where they served as "human shields" and were exposed to sniper fire and artillery shelling. These prisoners were building the supply tunnel under the airport. At least 24 of them were killed or died in the camp because of torture, hard work, inhuman conditions, and malnutrition.[207] According to the witness statement of Radojka Pandurević, who was an inmate in the camp between 1992 and 1996, 24 detainees died of starvation or from the injuries sustained during beating, and 16 detainees were killed at the front lines where they were used as human shields and forced to dig trenches.[208] Overall, up to 150 Serbs went through the Hrasnica camp. They were arrested and thrown in the camp only because of their ethnicity, for the purpose of the creation of an atmosphere of total insecurity with no hope of further survival (Dželetović, 2000, p. 148).

Another report by Mr. Mazowiecki described use of Serb prisoners as "human shields":

> Under an agreement brokered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Government released 309 Bosnian Croats from Konjic detention center on 19 October 1993. At the end of October 1993, it was holding around 1,100 detainees in 24 registered detention centers, and an unknown number of others elsewhere. The largest registered detention centers were in Tarčin and Pazarići, on the road west from Sarajevo, and in Zenica, central Bosnia.
>
> Only a small proportion of the registered detainees were believed to be prisoners-of-war. The others were civilians of Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat origin, detained in order to provide a pool of prisoners to exchange for Bosnian Muslims held as prisoners-of-war, or for use on the front line as forced labor, or to protect the army's advance as "human shields". During the Special Rapporteur's mission to Sarajevo in August 1993 the Minister of the Interior admitted that civilians had been arrested, but claimed they had all signed statements volunteering to be exchanged for other detainees. The Special Rapporteur stressed at the meeting that statements made in such circumstances could not be regarded as voluntary. ("United Nations Fifth Periodic Report", 1993, pp. 7-9)

Professor and SGV President Mirko Pejanović in his memoirs tells a story of Professor of Medicine, Trifko Guzina, of the University Medical Centre in Sarajevo. He was renowned for his professionalism in the field of urology, and helped many people in Sarajevo and all over Bosnia. Professor Guzina had been arrested on his way home and taken to the prison of the Croat paramilitary HOS. The prison was intended for notable Serb intellectuals, particularly those who had any connection to the SDS. On Pejanović's and Kecmanović's intervention, Doctor Trifko Guzina was released and left for Serbia. He very much regretted that he fell into the trap of Izetbegović's propaganda about the multi-cultural paradise of Bosnia and Herzegovina under his regime.

Professor Guzina's ordeal was corroborated by former member of the Presidency and dean of Sarajevo University, Professor Nenad Kecmanović:

> At that time, the situation in Sarajevo was chaotic. The city was divided into zones controlled by the various paramilitary formations, which were connected to the authorities, but were not under their control. These violent groups, that sometimes acted as military units and sometimes as police, *de facto* held the territory of the city under their control. They had their own prisons, but one never knew their name or number, nor did they officially exist. Despite several interventions in the Presidency, we never received any specific information about these prisons, which were to all intents and purposes intended only for Serbs. I can talk personally about the existence of a private prison in the basement of the Zagreb Hotel in Marindvor. While searching for a missing doctor, Trifko Guzina, Professor Slavko Leovac and his wife, Ankica, because of an alarmed request by their relatives, I found them, they had been imprisoned for a few days just for being members of the political council of the Serbian Democratic Party. In a similar way, I found out that such a prison also existed in the basement of the Europa Hotel, when priest Drago Ubiparisović, his parish clerk and many Orthodox churchgoers were taken into custody and detained after leaving prayer at the Orthodox Church. The official police organs, including the Minister of the Interior Delimustafić, had no information about this and were unable to assist with freeing these people. It is symptomatic that in such cases it was very effective to intervene with Izetbegović".[209]

According to former RBiH Presidency member Professor Nenad Kecmanović, private prisons in Sarajevo were under the control of Alija Izetbegović:

> At the sessions of the Presidency, I many times requested Alija Izetbegović to make a public statement in protection of Serbs who on their own will stayed in the city with the Muslims, and suffered the terror of the paramilitary formations. He made hollow promises. When Trifko Guzuna and Slavko Leo-

vac disappeared, I became certain that Izetbegović controlled private prisons. When I asked for his intervention and gave him the address of the prisons that they were kept in, he made a phone call, and they were immediately released".[210]

Most of the local private prisons were closed in late 1992, and inmates were transferred to regular detention centers. Nobody in authority in the RBiH government ever investigated the exact number of private prisons in Sarajevo.

6.4. Sexual violence

Sexual violence is a feature in armed conflicts around the world, and is often used as a war strategy. United Nations Envoy for Human Rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his report on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized:

> Rape of women, including minors, has occurred on a large scale…There is clear evidence that Croat, Muslim and Serb women have been detained for extended periods of time and repeatedly raped. The team of experts is not aware of any attempts by those in positions of power, either military or political, to stop the rape. (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1994).

A letter from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 18 December 1992, identified 8 brothels run by the ARBiH in Sarajevo. The following locations have been identified in Sarajevo and surrounding area, where Serb girls and women were sexually abused: the Hotel Zagreb in Sarajevo, where between 40 and 50 Serbian women were abused; the Bjelave student dormitory in Sarajevo, in which about 30 Serbian women were raped; the Zetra sports center where around 30 Serbian women were also abused; the Borsalino coffee shop in Sarajevo where about ten victims were raped; in the premises of the former Đorđević company in Ciglane, Sarajevo, in which about 30 women of Serbian nationality were abused; in the premises of the High School of Electrical Engineering in Sarajevo, where 100 Serbian women were raped; in in the building of the elementary school in the village of Tarčin, the municipality of Hadžići, where around 50 women of Serbian nationality were abused, and in the village Urduk near Pazarić where about a dozen women were abused.[211]

A large number of women were also abused at the premises of public institutions, such as schools, hotels, stadiums, military barracks and sports halls, and in private apartments in houses. Many women did not report rape due to various factors: time, shame, political interference, migration and displacement, trauma, murders of raped women, and the period that followed, considering that a great number of the victims died of old age and/or poor health. As a result, we do not have an accurate number of women victims of rape and other forms of torture, even many years after the war (Simić, 2015, pp. 5-6).

The evidence of sexual abuse of Serb women and girls in Sarajevo is shocking. School teacher Mirjana Mimović, a Serb woman from Sarajevo was maltreated, beaten, and gang-raped by ARBiH soldiers under command of Ismet Bajramović, aka Ćelo. After all the torture and suffering, she was forced to leave Sarajevo, where she had been living for 36 years.[212] According to the statement of former ARBiH soldier Jasmin Šljivo, he and Jusuf Lendo, Suvad Milić, and Sakib Puškar, all of them soldiers of 10th Brigade committed regular rapes of Serb girls in Sarajevo. In February 1993, they gang-raped a 12- year old Serb girl in the room of the Brigade's Storm Company. The victim died as a result of the rape and torture. According to Šljivo's statement, in the course of 1993, they raped about 50 victims in the same location (Vranješ & Miodragović, 2016).

The aforementioned stories of torture and rape of civilian victims of war are all shocking in their own way, but the statement of the victim Mirjana Dragičević's mother deserves special attention. A girl, Mirjana Dragičević, was raped and killed on 28 December 1992 in the village of Donja Bioča near Ilijaš by mujahedeen from the 7th Muslim Brigade. Mirjana's mother Rada Dragičević described this tragic moment as follows:

> My daughter was in a red track suit, I dressed her. The track suit was too wide. They caught her, separated her from me, she was screaming, crying. When they started to take off her clothes, she screamed. She was crying. I could not help her. She called me "Mommy, Mommy!" I could not help her; they were holding me ... When the first one raped her, she was .... well, she was aware. But later she did not hear, she probably became unaware when those two .... Later she became quiet, she didn't cry or called me or anything. She just lay there on the floor. When they finished, they shot at her and then at me. ("Mujahedeen Killed My Child", 2013)

7. SDA Role in Crimes Committed Against the Serbs

To understand the SDA and RBiH President Alija Izetbegović's role in the crimes committed against the Serbs in Sarajevo, one has to analyze his political profile. Such an analysis was recently made by Bosniak researcher Mustafa Čengić:

> Alija Izetbegović did not have the political courage to pursue policy in the interests of all three nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He did not act as the President of all citizens of RBiH. His politics stemmed exclusively from Muslim national interests and confrontation with national interests of Serbs and Croats. He clearly declared himself to be the leader of one nation – Bosnian Muslims, and not of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Muslim political party SDA was founded by a group of political amateurs, who had no idea about politics, and regarded their activity as within the framework of a religious organization. Confronted with inevitable social and political changes, they were incapable of embracing them, and feared everything new and different, and therefore relied on conservative nationalist ideas. Insisting on the concept of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SDA was striving to secure its own dominant position, and instead of the right of peoples to live with each other, in its activity it advocated the right of people to live next to each other. (Čengić, 2015, pp. 71, 167, 596)

The SDA was divided into conservative and liberal wings which Alija Izetbegović tried unsuccessfully to span. The conservative wing was not willing to entertain thoughts of the existence of Republika Srpska, not excluding the reconquest of all or part of Republika Srpska at some future date. Their notion of a Bosnian state was bound up with, and indistinguishable from, the affirmation of the Muslims as a nation, which was in need of a capital and ethnically clean territory. This faction of the SDA was itself divided sharply into sub-groups, most notably the Islamic clergy and the nationalist intellectuals; the hawks within the military; and the radical nationalists from Sanžak, notable for their antipathy toward the Serbs (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 68).

The liberal wing included secularists within the SDA, who viewed the constitutional arrangement of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as something by which the multi-cultural traditions of Bosnia could be preserved. Some Bosnian Muslims within and outside of the SDA were willing to explore the possibility of tilting Bosnia towards Serbia and away from Croatia. To this group belonged Fikret Abdić and Adil Zulfikarpašić. But the SDA hard-liners eventually forced them out of the SDA (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 68).

Alija Izetbegović's ideology was based on religion, political Islam, and anti-communism. After the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, morale and humanism which for decades served as spiritual brackets keeping the society together, were broken and discarded by Islamic ideologists. Human rights and democracy could not take root in this atmosphere, which was dominated by religious fanaticism and clericalism. The most important thing for Alija Izetbegović was to make sure that no one challenged his political position (Čengić, 2015, p. 123).

The international mediators who dealt with Alija Izetbegović left unambiguous descriptions of this man. Lord Owen, for example, noted Izetbegović's toughness:

> A question is often asked if is whether Izetbegović is an Islamic fundamentalist. The answer is difficult to give in terms of "yes" or "no."... If he is, he hides it behind a self-disciplined portrayal as a secular politician, as any dissenter learned to do in Tito's Yugoslavia … My favorable appraisal of Izetbegović is not shared by others who have also spent long hours negotiating with him. Some feel he is the most difficult of all people they had to deal with in the former Yugoslavia, manipulative and untrustworthy, and that his closest advisors are shadowy fundamentalists who play on his chronic indecisiveness and make him hold out against any compromise. (Owen, 1995, p. 38)

UNPROFOR Commander General Michael Rose of the British Army described Alija Izetbegović's personality in the following terms:

> Small in stature and dignified in bearing, during my dealings with him he appeared to be detached from what was happening around him. He certainly affected to be so. When he acted, however, his authority was absolute, and though he used people like Ganić to protect his reputation, it is likely he was fully aware of the policies and actions of his officials. Tito had imprisoned him for his political and religious beliefs, and the experience had taken a physical toll. When under pressure he would purse his lips and fall silent for long periods before agreeing to some course of action, which was very rarely implemented. By the time I left Bosnia, I came to believe that his talk of creating a multi-religious, multi-cultural State of Bosnia was a disguise for the extension and furtherance of Islam". (Rose, 1988, p. 38)

General Michel Rose's estimate of Vice-President Ejup Ganić was hardly any more complimentary:

> Ruthless, without once demonstrating to me during my time in Bosnia a shred of human decency, Ganić seem to use other people to advance his own

> wealth and power. He had been the person in charge of the Bosnian Government during the massacre of Serb officers who were leaving Sarajevo under UN safe passage. A Sandjak Muslim, he had abandoned his name and birthright early on and thrown in his lot with Tito, who had sent him to America to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston. On his return, he entered politics, initially as Yugoslav representative in the Bosnian Parliament, but before long he had once again switched allegiance and ended up heading an extreme political element within the ruling Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA). His oily charm and good English endeared him to the international media and as a result, he acted as the chief propagandist and spokesperson for the Bosnian Government. He was also in charge of military operations.
>
> This arrangement enabled President Izetbegović to distance himself from some of the more unacceptable things that happened under his regime. As the person in charge of the Bosnian Army, Ganić was responsible for implementing the Government's strategy designed to drag the US and NATO into the war on the side of Bosnia. He seemed to be interested neither in peace nor in the continued suffering of the Bosnian people. Instead he fed the media the political concept of the "victim state." He once said that ultimately Muslims from Bosnia, Sandjak, Kosovo and Albania would form a single political entity. On one occasion, he offered me what appeared to be a bribe, but, when he saw the look of utter contempt in my eyes, he swiftly turned the offer into what seemed to be a veiled threat against my life. By the time I left Bosnia a year later, I regarded him as a contemptible individual. (Rose, 1988, p. 26)

Alija Izetbegović allowed corruption and crime to flourish in Sarajevo in the first two years of the war. While in jail, Alija Izetbegović had become friends with the criminal Mušan Topalović Caco, and "appears to have done little to stop the abuses committed against the Serbs in Sarajevo, or even excesses perpetrated by Muslim forces against Croats" (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 68).

Both Caco and Ćelo, as well as other BiH commanders, were SDA members, and reported to RBiH President Supreme Commander Alija Izetbegović through the military and party chains of command.

President Alija Izetbegović paid at least two visits to Caco, and reportedly had given him foreign currency for brigade expenses. ARBiH Main Chief of Staff Sefer Halilović on numerous occasions visited Caco's Brigade HQ. Caco also received at least one visit from Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić.[213] The Official Information no. 7/8.5.1993. about the visit of Alija Izetbegović to the 10th Mountain Brigade Commander, signed by Deputy Commander Senad Hasić, states that "the security depart-

ment had the incredible honor and the extremely complicated task of performing due diligence in order to ensure that Mr. Alija Izetbegović's visit went smoothly".[214]

ARBiH Military Security Administration documents suggest that Caco and Ćelo enjoyed the support and protection of RBiH Presidency member Ejup Ganić and Main Chief of ARBiH Staff Sefer Halilović, and the powerful Sandjak lobby.[215]

According the ARBiH Main Chief of Staff Sefer Halilović, 10th Mountain Brigade Commander Mušan Topalović Caco and 9th Motorized Brigade Commander Ramiz Delalović Ćelo reported directly to President Alija Izetbegović:

> I must admit that from the very beginning I knew about the direct contacts that individual commanders had had with Izetbegović. These contacts were maintained directly, or were maintained through Bakir Izetbegović or Haris Lukovac. Some commanders from some units sent their reports directly to Izetbegović". (Senad Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997e).

Comparing the situation in the two brigades, Chief of ARBiH military security Jusuf Jašarević believed that "the situation was more drastic" in the 10th Brigade regarding which he received information that people were physically abused (ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Sefer Hahilović*, para. 122).

ARBiH General Jovan Divjak in his memoirs stated that Caco was the worst of all local war lords, but "nothing changed, despite the information that we received daily about those bandits, who were stealing cars and terrorizing civilians, primarily non-Muslims." Due to their party status and special relationship with President Alija Izetbegović, Ramiz Delalić and Mušan Topalović had a unique opportunity to engage in criminal pursuits without any fear of being caught and punished, and were considered by the terrorized population as "masters of life and death" (Divjak & La Bruyère, 2004, pp. 228-229 ; Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997e). According to *Dani,* the SDA had a plan to eliminate the non-Muslim population:

> Crimes against Sarajevo Serbs during the war were committed not only by the executioners of the 10th Mountain Brigade under the command of notorious Mušan Topalović Caco, but also by soldiers from many other units. At any moment, Izetbegović knew what was going on. There was a plan to eliminate the non-Muslim population, and a certain highly placed SDA functionary was the creator of this plan. The number of those killed will never be revealed, because in 1993 their bodies were destroyed by acid, some bodies were burned, while some were destroyed in big military washing machines. But it would be easiest to visit Sarajevo graveyards and take a look at the graves with letters N.N. (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997d)

ARBiH General Jovan Divjak in his book written after the war summarized Alija Izetbegović's attitude to the problem of the security of the Serb community in Sarajevo:

> On one hand he demanded that Bosniaks respect Serbs and Croats, while on the other hand he protected the war lords who swept Sarajevo.[216]

Alija Izetbegović in his book of memoirs asserted that he learned about the crimes committed by Caco and Ćelo from the letter sent to him by General Jovan Divjak in May 1993, and that letter was the main reason to launch action "Trebević 2" (Izetbegović, 2001, p. 170). But it is also difficult to believe that Izetbegović did not know anything about crimes against Serb and other civilians in the city before May 1993. Alija Izetbegović in his capacity of the ARBiH Supreme Commander had reason to know about the crimes committed by his "best commanders", and was reading all the ARBiH reports of the SVB and the Military Security Service. The ARBiH Chief of Military Security Service General Fikret Muslimović in his memoirs admitted that the "Military Security Service had been collecting information about the abuse of citizens by Caco and his followers since early 1993" (Muslimović, 2006, p. 394).

The crimes committed by the ARBiH in Sarajevo revealed the criminal hypocrisy of Izetbegović's regime. While publicly and at international forums President Alija Izetbegović preached multiculturalism and the "common life of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in a single state", in reality the institutions that he controlled incited ethnic hatred, and the army of which he was the supreme commander committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against his own citizens, only because they were non-Muslims. According to Professor Mirko Pejanović, "this was the dark side of army and the state", which undermined the state from inside" (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997b).

A criminal nexus emerged between the SDA, CSB, police, and Muslim criminals in military uniform. According to Munir Alibabić, Head of CSB for Sarajevo Bakir Alispahić was a member of the SDA Executive Board, and the "right hand" of Alija Izetbegović. He provided "cover" for Sarajevo criminals, who "murdered entire families", and was behind "the black market" and extortion activities (Alibabić, 1996, p. 98). ARBiH General Jovan Divjak in a revealing interview to *Večernije Novosti* journalist Dušan Stojaković made a few shocking observations on the criminal nexus of Muslim Sarajevo authorities:

> Dušan Stojaković: In the interview to Svijet you said: In the first months of the war, as far as I know, about 800 Serbs were killed, literally eliminated

without any trial or reason. Can you tell us something specific about the suffering of Sarajevo Serbs in general, including the case of Kazani? These days information has been released about 400 camps for Serbs in BiH, out of which 88 were located in the Sarajevo area.

Jovan Divjak: I was trying to unmask this attitude towards Serbs in July 1992, when I asked Behireta Sljivić to appeal to journalists, because her husband, a Serb, had disappeared. She told the journalists that her husband was in the 10th Mountain Brigade of Mušan Topalović Caco, and he was killed in Kazani, and was burnt. This was reported. Every time that I had some new data, I tried to react officially through the Command, of which I was a member. In early January 1993, I had a list of 90 names of Serbs, but also Croats and Bosniaks, who were killed … Alija Izetbegović knew all this. Nothing could happen out of his field of responsibility. Sunce Prison was formally closed, but in reality, only changed location. Every unit at the Sarajevo front had two or three Serbs, who were there for exchange, if required … the 10th Mountain Brigade was within the 1st Sarajevo Corps under the command of Mustafa Hajrulahović Talijan. For a long time, I was highlighting the problem of Caco, Ćelo and others who were behaving in a similar manner. Together with my colleagues I was trying to make Alija Izetbegović resolve this problem. Caco could walk into his office any time, so could Ćelo. For a year and a half five commanders in Stari Grad were men who had not spent a day at a military school. These two did not even serve in the army, because they were mentally retarded. But Alija trusted them more than professional officers. (Stojaković, 2003)

In his book "Unholy Terror" CIA analyst John Schindler gave an accurate appreciation of President Alija Izetbegović's liability for crimes against Serb civilians in Sarajevo:

The culpability of the SDA leadership in such crimes, long denied by Izetbegović's defenders, is no longer in doubt. It is impossible to believe that that the government was unaware of the killing spree happening in front of them; besieged Sarajevo was a very small place, and those reporters who cared to know had no trouble discovering the outlines of the story. Moreover, it took Izetbegović a full half year to shut down Caco's gang after Jovan Divjak sent his protest letter that detailed the nightmare. The President had direct knowledge of what was happening" (Schindler, 2007, p. 105). According to CIA analyst Jon Schindler (2007, p. 104), "random" crimes were in fact part of a calculated SDA plan to drive the Serbs out of Sarajevo.

According to a witness statement in possession of the RCIRZ,

> Omer Behmen was the executor of the activities of the ethnic cleansing plan in Stari Grad Sarajevo and beyond", which were conducted "with the permission of Alija Izetbegović, and significant input from Bakir Izetbegović, Enver Bičakčić and others ... Military and civilian security authorities, led by Fikret Muslimović and Bakir Alispahić, passively encouraged the criminal behavior of Topalović and his subordinates, with the knowledge of Izetbegović, Behmen, Bičakčić, Čengić and other SDA representatives."[217]

Numerous SDA officials and top RBiH officials aided and abetted the crimes committed against Serbs in Sarajevo: former MUP Ministers Alija Delimustafić and Jusuf Pušina; Assistant Director of AID Asim Dautbašić; former Chief of ARBiH Military Police Kerim Lučarević, former Chief of ARBIH Security Administration Jusuf Jašarević, as well as wartime Director of RBIH Ministry of Defense Security Agency Enver Mujezinović.[218]

Alija Izetbegović received a number of major awards from the Islamic world: the King Faisal Award for services to Islam in 1993, the Thinker of the Year Award from the Ali Osman Hafiz Foundation of Medina in 1996, the Order of the Turkish Republic, an honorary doctorate from the University of Riyadh, and an honorary doctorate in law from Marmara University, Istanbul in 1997, the Order of Independence of the State of Qatar in 1998, and the Islamic Man of the Year Award from the United Arab Emirates in 2001 (Isaković, 2005, pp. 73-74). He also received the award of the American Institute for Democracy in Washington, and in his speech of thanks he mentioned "the importance of resolving relations between majorities and minorities as a vital element of democracy" (Pejanović, 2002, p. 125). He certainly knew how to resolve relations between majorities and minorities.

8. The Kazani Trial

After Operation Trebević 2, the government ordered the exhumation of bodies in the Kazani mass grave. Exhumation of the dead bodies was conducted by investigative judge of Sarajevo Military Court Nihad Šermet. The Military Court was under the complete control of the SDA. Investigators removed 29 bodies after a few days of digging, but the work was abruptly halted. According to witness 49/27-2, who gave his statement to the SRY Commission for the Collection of Information on Crimes against Humanity, the exhumation was halted on the orders of the BiH Presidency.[219]

In December 1993, the first exhumation occurred, and human remains of 29 persons were discovered in the Kazani mass grave (Mikerević, 2004, p. 78). According to criminal technician Mladen Milosavljević, who participated in the exhumation, all the dead bodies had been decapitated. Twenty-two dead bodies and 2 severed heads were found in the mass grave, 20 severed heads were missing. Mladen Milosavljević stated:

> The bodies were in various stages of decomposition, and it is possible that the two missing bodies were never found because they were too severely decomposed. All victims had their heads cut off, whether by hatchet or by knife, except for one body whose head was removed with a saw … It appeared that a victim would be taken to the edge of the pit, while the soldier chosen to carry out the execution would be standing next to the victim and cut off the victim's head with a saber or another weapon. It appears that the bodies then would fall down into the pit, while the heads were taken to Topalović as evidence.[220]

Caco's soldiers tried to destroy the bodies before investigators reached the mass grave. Criminal technician Mladen Milosavljević who was of Serb nationality was removed from the investigation team without any explanation, on the orders of CSB Chief Munir Alibabić. He was the only Serb in the investigation team.[221]

According to Mladen Milosavljević's statement:

> From December 1993, when I was excluded from all other scenes of that type of crime, I only performed my usual duties as a criminal expert … I do not know whether the forensic inspection of the Kazani crime scene continued. As far as I know, the teams of crime scene technicians and other persons did not spend a lot of time at other crime scenes from the Kazani case, and their work was merely symbolic.[222]

The New York Times carried a long article, stating that the exhumations were stopped on the orders of President Alija Izetbegović:

> There were clearly more than 29 bodies in the pit," said Munir Alibabić, who at the time was the police chief of Sarajevo and was in charge of the investigation, "but I was ordered to stop all work. When I questioned the Minister of the Interior, he told me this was a presidential order. I suspect that finding large numbers of bodies was politically inconvenient. (Hodges. 1997)

In December 1993, *Dani* magazine published an extensive article about Caco and Operation Trebević 2, and mentioned Kazani as one of the three locations where

Serb victims were buried.[223] Three exhumations were carried out after the end of the war at the Kazani ravine, which is some 30 meters deep and 70 meters wide. The remains of 21 people have been found, and 16 of them have been identified. Bosnia's Missing Persons Institute said that no further exhumations were planned at the site because it has no information about more potential graves (Ljubaš, 2019).

Investigators obtained evidence of horrendous brutality directed at the victims. Topalović established the rule of "initiation", which required each of his associates to prove his loyalty by killing a non-Muslim with a knife. Some of the suspects stated that they had each executed over 50 Serbs, and alleged that the crime was ideologically motivated. They also alleged a plan of ethnic cleansing of non-Muslim citizens from Sarajevo, and that it was instigated by high-ranking SDA official Omer Behmen. One of the killers claimed that they "killed Serbs to ensure the prosperity of Muslims and the spreading of Islam".[224]

The criminal case known to the public as the "Kazani case" was processed in the District Military Court and Military Prosecutor's Office in Sarajevo after Supreme Command Staff – Armed Forces – Security Administration filed a criminal charge no. 03/70-104 on 21 November 1993. The criminal charges in the case were filed in Sarajevo District Military Prosecutor's Office under the no. KTV-IV no. 11/93. This criminal charge targeted the following persons: Senad Hasić, Džemo Topalović, Nihad Hodžić, Husejin Hodžić, Asif Alibašić, Zijo Kubat, Sabahudin Žiga, Esad Tucaković, Samir Seferović, Suad Osmanović, Omer Tendžo, Sead Kadić, Samir Ljubović, Muhidin Rahić, Fahrudin Rondić, Esad Raonić, Emir Topalović, Refik Ćolak, Mevludin Selak, Meho Turčalo, Ekrem Dorić, Senad Haračić, Nijaz Sabljica, Samir Bejtić, Armin, Krek Haris Hodžić, Ismet Sadović, Đurđica Škorić, Haris Numić, and Osman Gežo. All in all, 30 members of the ARBIH 1st Corps were charged for violations of international humanitarian law, and committing multiple brutal murders of civilians during the war in Sarajevo in 1992 and 1993.[225]

Sarajevo District Military Prosecutor's Office filed a motion no. KTV-IV no. 11/93 dated 24 November 1993 with the District Military Court Investigative Judge, seeking to conduct an investigation into the alleged criminal offenses of all 30 above mentioned based on reasonable suspicion that they committed the criminal offenses of war crimes against civilians under Article 142, Point 1 of the previously valid SFRJ Criminal Code.[226]

Following the investigation, the District Military Prosecutor's Office filed charges no. KT-64/96-V with the Sarajevo District Military Court, dated 5 April 1994 against the total of 18 defendants, namely: Senad Hasić, Husejn Hodžić, Asif Alibašić, Zijo Kubat, Sabahudin Žiga, Esad Tucaković, Samir Seferović, Suad Omanović, Omer Tendžo, Sejo Kadić, Samir Ljubović, Fahrudin Rondić, Esad Raonić, Emir Topal-

ović, Refik Ćolak, Mevludin Selak, Senad Haračić and Armin Hodžić, on the counts of the criminal offense of homicide in a cruel and treacherous manner under Article 36, Subsection 2, Point 1 of the RBIH Criminal Code. The Prosecutor had decided not to prosecute the 12 persons who had initially been treated as suspects, but were not mentioned in the charges.

Dani magazine revealed graphic details of crimes committed against the Serbs from the Court files:

> On 20 December 1994 the Military Court found guilty soldiers Zija Kubat, Esad Tucaković, Omer Tendzo, Asif Alibašić, and Samir Seferović, aka Ceble, "because in October 1993 in Sarajevo, on the orders of the commander of the 20th Mountain Brigade Mušan Topalović, aka Caco, the accused had taken Vasil Lavriv and his spouse Ana from their home in Pionerska street in Sarajevo to the Headquarters of the 10-th Mountain Brigade in Bistrik, had beaten them up, and then in two cars brought them to the location of the Kazani ravine in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Battalion. Then Samir Selimović and Meho Turcalo went to the Headquarters of the 3rd Battalion, picked up Milena Drasković, who was detained in the Headquarters building, and brought her to the location of Kazani, where soldiers Zijo Kubat, Esad Tucaković, Omer Tendžo, Asif Alibašić, and Samir Seferović, had beaten up these three civilians, kicking and hitting them with fists and wooden sticks. Then Zijo Kubat took a knife, which he always carried on him, and slaughtered Vasil Lavriv by slitting his throat. Esad Tucaković took a knife with a blade of about 40cm long, which was called a "grenade", and slaughtered Ana Lavriv with the knife and severed the head from her body, and pushed the body into the ravine. Seferović Samir, Tendžo Omer and Alibasić Asif witnessed these murders, but did not report then to the prosecution bodies, therefore the perpetrators of these crimes were not arrested for a long time.
>
> At the trial, Asif Alibabić said: "I do not remember the date, but I know that it was 1992. I was in the trench on Bogušević. It was in the night, and I was sleeping. Selak Mevludin, Čollak Refik and Tendzo Omer were also sleeping. The telephone rang, and Omer picked up the receiver and spoke to somebody. Then he said that it was Caco, who ordered us to go to the place called Boguševac. We went there; Omer and I went up to a Golf car. Samir Beitić brought a man and a woman about 60 years old, the woman had a walking stick … Caco contacted Omer on the radio, and I heard that he talked about some packets, and said: "Do not make me come over to you." After this talk, Omer said: "We must immediately go to the trench". We got into the car, Omer, this man, the woman, and I and went to Boguševac. We parked the car and went

to the bunker. The woman had a difficulty walking, and I was helping her. The man and the woman were sitting next to the bunker. It was cold, and I gave a blanket to the woman … I was about 20 meters away and saw that Mevludin and this man who was lying on the ground with a slit throat and was dead, while Refik was sitting on the ground next to this woman, who was lying on her back with a slit throat. It is true that I knew about this criminal act, and did not report it, but the entire city, Supreme Command, and Minister of Interior knew about the crimes of the 10th Mountain Brigade.

The murder of Ergin Nikolić and Duško Jovanović: the Military Court also found guilty Sead Kadić, aka Gus, Armin Hodžić, Esad Raonić, aka Eso Maskirni, Sami Ljubović, aka Mica, and Senad Hasić because in mid-September 1993 in Sarajevo, they had beaten up soldiers of the 1st Battalion Ergin Nikolić, aka Ego, and Duško Jovanović, aka Tarli. So also did Samir Beitić and Sead Kadić. Then Mušan Topalović, Armin Hodžić, Ziga Šabahudin, Samir Bejtić, Senad Hasić, Sead Katić, Samir Ljubomir, Mevludin Selak, and Esad Raonić took the two persons to the bunker of a sniper platoon in the location of Boguševac, kicked and beat them with their fists, and finally killed them. Samir Bejtić took a sabre and hit Nikolić on the neck and Amin Hodžić hit Nikolić with a knife. Mušan Topalović, Armin Hodžić, and Sead Kadić repeatedly hit Duško Jovanović with a knife. Then they took the dead bodies to the edge of Kazani, Samir Bejtić cut off the head of Nikolić and dropped the two dead bodies in the Kazani pit. Esad Raonić, Samir Ljbović, and Send Hasić witnessed these murders, but did not report them to the prosecution bodies, therefore the perpetrators of these crimes were not arrested for a long time.

The murder of Radoslav and Marina Komljanac: Omer Tendzo, Asif Alibašić, Refik Čolak were found guilty because at the end of June 1993 in Sarajevo, after six children were killed in Dragice Pavice Street by the aggressor's shelling, on the orders of Commander Mušan Topalović, they took the elderly married couple Radoslav and Marina Komljanac from their apartment a 7 Dragice Pavice Street. Both were invalids, and were moving with walking sticks. They took the couple first to the Brigade Headquarters, and then brought them to the location of Kazani in Boguševac. There Samir Bejtić handed over the elderly married couple to Omer Tendzo and Asif Alibašić, and passed an order of Mušan Topalović to soldiers Mevludin Selak and Refik Čolak to kill the couple. Mevludin Selak killed Radoslav Komljenac with a knife, which he got from Omer Tendzo. Mevludin Selak pressed his hand on the mouth of Radoslav Komljenac, pushed him to the ground, and then slaughtered him, slitting his throat. Refik Čolak killed Marina Komljanac with a knife, which

> he got from Asif Alibašić, pressing his hand on her mouth, brought her on her knees, and slit her throat. After that, they dropped the dead bodies into the pit. (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997f)

Acting under the charges filed by the District Military Prosecutor's Office, the Sarajevo Military Court reached Judgment No. K-11/96-V. However, this judgement was overturned in the BiH Supreme Court following appeals from both defense and prosecution. In this verdict, some of the defendants were found guilty of the crime of homicide, while others were guilty of failure to report a criminal offense or to reveal its perpetrator. After appeals from both prosecution and defense, the verdict was overturned in the BIH Supreme Court and the case went to retrial.

In the retrial before the Sarajevo High Court, and after the decision of BIH authorities to abolish the military justice system, the High Court in its Final Judgment No. K-87/96 dated 26 September 1996 convicted Zijo Kubat, Esad Tucaković, Refik Čolak and Mevludin Selak to imprisonment for the duration of six years each, for the criminal offense qualified as homicide under Article 36, Subsection 2, Point 1 of the BiH Criminal Code. The remaining defendants Senad Hasić, Sabahudin Žiga, Samir Seferović, Omer Tendžo, Esad Raonić, Samir Ljubović, Senad Haračić and Armin Hodžić were convicted of the criminal offense of failure to report crime or its perpetrator under Article 188, Subsection 1 of the BiH Criminal Code, and were each sentenced to ten months imprisonment.

Following his extradition from abroad, defendant Asif Alibašić was convicted before the Sarajevo Canton Court in Judgment No. K-110/99 dated 8 October 1999 for the criminal offense of homicide and failure to report a criminal offense, and received a sentence of four years and three months imprisonment. With regard to the appeal filed by that Prosecutor's Office, the FBIH Supreme Court in its Judgment no. Kž-5/2000 dated 22 February 2000 changed the terms of this Sarajevo Canton Court sentence, and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment for the duration of eight years.

Under the same charge no. KT-64/96-V, following his extradition from abroad, defendant Suad Omanović was convicted before the Sarajevo Canton Court in Judgment No. K-11/96-V dated 29 December 1999 for the criminal offense of assisting a homicide, and sentenced to imprisonment for three years. With regard to the appeal filed by that Prosecutor's Office, the FBIH Supreme Court in its Judgment no. KŽ/486/2000 dated 23 November 2000 changed the terms of this Sarajevo Canton Court sentence, and sentenced the defendant to a consecutive term of imprisonment for 10 ten years for the criminal offenses committed.

Following his extradition to BiH, defendant Sead Kadić, who had spent a long time on the run, was brought before the Sarajevo Canton Court under charge no. KT-64/96-V and acquitted by that Court's Judgment No. K-69/05 dated 29 March 2006 of all charges filed against him in the aforementioned case – qualified homicide under Article 36, Subsection 2, Point 1 of the RBiH Criminal Code.

On 30 June 2006, that Prosecutor's Office filed an appeal with the FBiH Supreme Court against this judgment by the Sarajevo Canton Court, on the basis of a material breach of criminal procedure provisions and incorrectly established facts. The FBiH Supreme Court still has not made a final ruling on this appeal, more specifically, the ruling has not been delivered to this Prosecutor's Office to this day, however, we were able to determine based on information from the media from the previous few days that the Canton Court verdict has been upheld.

Following his extradition to BiH, defendant Samir Bejtić, who had spent a long time on the run, was brought before the Sarajevo Canton Court under the same charge no. KT-64/96-V and non-finally convicted by that Court's Judgment no. K-130/03 dated 13 July 2006, in which the defendant was found guilty of war crimes against civilians under Article 142 of the previously valid SFRJ Criminal Code and the criminal offense of homicide and assisting in homicide under Article 36, Subsection 2, Point 1 of the previously valid RBiH Criminal Code, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the duration of fourteen years and six months. The defense filed an appeal with the FBiH Supreme Court against this Canton Court verdict, on which the FBiH Supreme Court made the following ruling no. 070-0-KŽ-06-000568 dated 16 January 2007, which partly upheld the defendant's appeal and overturned the Sarajevo Canton Court verdict, and the case was brought back to the trial court for retrial.

The defendants were sentenced to total of 37 years in prison, but none of them actually served their sentences. There is not a single record that any of them ever expressed remorse for the crimes at Kazani (Ljubaš, 2019).

Lay Judge Marko Mikerević was following this trial from the start to the very end. None of the defendants was accused of murder, but rather of complicity in a murder. The spouse of killed Božidar Šljivić, speaking to the Court as a witness, stated that in the same area where the dead body of her husband was found, she saw many more burned bodies, about 250 (Mikerević, 2004, pp. 77-78). Defense lawyer Žarko Bulić stated that the trial did not meet the principle of legality:

> The qualification of the criminal acts in the indictment and, particularly in the verdict, was inadequate. This was done for political reasons to make sure that the international community remains ignorant of the fact that "the other side" too committed war crimes". (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997a)

There is no reasonable doubt that as the crimes in question were committed in time of war by Army personnel, and were committed against civilians, they should have been qualified as war crimes. However, for political reasons the Military Court ruled that the accused had to be tried on the basis of civilian Criminal Code, and qualified the murders committed as common murder, and not as war crime. All the convicts were released only after one year of incarceration. This trial stands out in the lame judicial system of BiH as a notable case of egregiously flagrant injustice.

The trial attracted the attention of Human Rights Watch, which emphasized the unwillingness of authorities in Sarajevo to prosecute ARBiH soldiers. According to the HRW report, President of the Military Court in Sarajevo Idriz Kamenica stated that:

> Bosnian Army soldiers in Sarajevo have not perpetrated any war crimes. However, we do try cases involving the individual criminal activity of some Bosnian Army soldiers.

Human Rights Watch did not support this view. The HRW report further commented by saying:

> Mr. Kamenica's remarks attempt to portray abuses by Bosnian Army soldiers as individual criminal acts. However, Bosnian Army soldiers have committed war crimes and other violations of international law in Sarajevo and in other parts of Bosnia Herzegovina and should be held accountable for such violations. (Human Rights Watch, 1995)

9. Public Reaction to Crimes against Serbs in Sarajevo

All the time up to Operation Trebević 2 media loyal to the regime of Alija Izetbegović glorified Delalić and Topalović as "heroic defenders of Sarajevo." The situation abruptly changed after Operation Trebević 2.

On 10 November 1997, *Dani* magazine carried an article entitled "The truth about Caco's crimes", which was reprinted in The New York Herald Tribune." According to the article, Mušan Topalović Caco was responsible for the murders of about 3,000 Serbs in Sarajevo. The article shocked the general public with revelations, and caused an avalanche of publications in Sarajevo media (Pećanin, 1997).

The state media such as *Oslobođenije* described Caco and "Ćelo" as "criminals", at the same time trying to minimize crimes committed by the ARBiH against Serb

civilians in Sarajevo. *Oslobođenije* was driving three main points: crimes were directed "against citizens of all nationalities" (Moll, 2015, p. 24); and "the number of Serb victims was relatively small;" murders of Serb civilians were common killings, but not war crimes (Moll, 2015, p. 24). ARBiH Commander Rasim Delić also tried to distance himself from crimes committed against Serb civilians in Sarajevo (Moll, 2015, p. 24).

Caco was secretly buried in an N.N. grave. By the end of the war, Caco and Čelo were almost forgotten. Everything changed on 6 November 1996, when Caco was re-buried at *Kovači* shehid cemetery with state honors. The "Green Berets" Association organized the reburial. The "Green Berets" were a military formation of the SDA, of which Caco was a member, and President Alija Izetbegović the Chairman (Moll, 2015, p. 24).

"Caco's" official status of "heroic defender of besieged Sarajevo" was officially recognized. First, according to Muslim custom, a hodža read a dženaza in Careva Mosque in Sarajevo, and then his body was carried across Baščaršija quarter of Sarajevo old town. About 10,000 people attended the funeral ceremony, including President Izetbegovic's son Bakir. This huge gathering gave rise to rumors that the reburial drew a record number of people in the modern history of Sarajevo.

Despite the fact that no representatives of the Bosnia and Herzegovina government attended the reburial it was clear that something of this scope could not have taken place without official approval at the highest level. Citizens of Sarajevo were shocked by the fact that President Alija Izetbegović, who three years ago ordered to kill Caco, now approved this chauvinist display.

Two years after the war crimes against Serb civilians continued to produce multiple media reactions in liberal *Dani* and *Svijet*, while three Izetbegović's media outlets (*Oslobođenije, Dnevni Avaz and Ljiljan*) remained notably silent. Journalist Gojko Berić wrote:

> Sarajevo media are silent, with the exception of Slobodna Bosna and Svijet. Leading western newspapers, including the New York Times, have carried extensive articles about Caco's crimes in the nightmare of besieged Sarajevo, but none of the Sarajevo three dailies displayed any interest in this topic. (Berić, 1997)

Reactions to the trial were also noted in international media. The *Los Angeles Times* reported:

> However, the biggest shock so far has been for Muslim-dominated Sarajevo. The deaths of more than 10,000 people in 3 1/2 years of siege had left

> residents with a self-image of righteous victims. Now, news magazines that muted their criticism of events inside the city during the war are revealing how Sarajevo criminals who fought off Serb attacks on the front lines also took advantage of the chaos to rob, torture and murder people. Muslim warlord Mušan Topalović, alias "Caco," and some members of his 10th Mountain Brigade primarily victimized Serbs in Sarajevo, but they attacked prosperous Muslims and Croats too. They killed at least 30 people in 1992-93. The remains of their victims were strewn along the front line, and the true number probably never will be known. Documents from those trials, which were kept secret until recently, detail how Caco's men slaughtered a Serb couple, Vasilj and Ana Lavliv. Vasilj's throat was slit; his wife's head was severed with a single blow of a foot-long knife, and her remains pushed over a hill on the front line. Even though few people question the personal integrity of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović, they do wonder how close the warlords' connections reached to him, how exactly Caco died after he was arrested, and why the courts handled others so gingerly. (Porubcanski, 1998)

The crimes against Serbs in Sarajevo were also covered by the Italian *Republika* and the *Corriera della Sera* and the Austrian *Der Standard,* which reported that Mušan Topalović Caco had close connections with the highest representatives of the Bosnian Muslim government, and with President Izetbegović.[227] The *Corriera della Sera* reported that "between 2,000 and 3,000 Serbs were killed in Sarajevo in a most brutal manner, and that the government of Izetbegović knew about these crimes".[228]

However, coverage of Muslim crimes in in Sarajevo by international and particularly US media was scanty, if at all, because these crimes could hardly fit into the preconceived rosy picture of "the multi-ethnic Sarajevo" (Moll, 2015, p. 58). Western media was "politically correct", and simply followed the line of the "friends-of-Sarajevo lobby in Washington, which included nearly all the bureaucrats who mattered in the Clinton administration", and "who simply ignored the news they did not want to hear" (Schindler 2007, pp. 111-112).

For Izetbegović Caco was "a hero and a criminal" (Interview with Izetbegović as cited in Moll, 2015, p. 41). This assessment encouraged war veterans in Sarajevo to glorify war crimes committed by the ARBiH against Serb civilians. Public debate is Sarajevo, regarding who Caco was, a hero or a criminal, continues to this date. For example, as recently as on 26 October 2017, on the 24th anniversary of Caco's death, a delegation of the Sarajevo Canton "Green Berets" Association laid a wreath on Caco's grave and hailed him as a "hero'.[229]

In 2015, activists of the NGO "Because it concerns me" ("Jer me se tiče.") in Sarajevo placed a commemorative plaque in honor of civilian victims of war crimes committed by the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Brigade. The plaque was removed and smashed by unknown perpetrators an hour after the ceremony (Balta, 2015).

10. The Fate of the Serb Community in Sarajevo

Many of the systematic violations of international humanitarian law against the Serb community in Sarajevo occurred in the context of ethnic cleansing, defined as a purposeful policy aimed at "rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area" (UN Security Council, 1994d, Annex IV, para. 129).

The exodus of the Serb population from Sarajevo has been going on for many years. Between 1992 and 1995, pressure on the Serb community and numerous crimes committed against Serbs between 1992 and 1995 caused a "quiet exodus of Serbs from the territories under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO", which amounted to an ethnic cleansing campaign (Pejanović, 1999, p. 167).

The number of Serb civilians who became victims of Alija Izetbegović's regime in Sarajevo is difficult to establish primarily because of huge cover-up campaigns by police and security services (Schindler, 2007, p. 105). Some of the killed were registered as missing. Many innocent victims are those Serb civilians who were illegally arrested and forcibly taken to dig trenches around the city. More were killed when they trying to escape from the city, others died from torture and abuse in private prisons.

However, the issue of missing Serbs in Sarajevo has never been the subject of research at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina central institutions. Nevertheless, from all available data, it is clear that the number of Serb civilians killed exceeds the number that the Bosniak members of the Presidency are ready to admit. The estimates of the number of victims vary, depending on the reliability of sources and credibility of information. The most credible sources are witness statements and documents of the international community.

According to the statement of former member of the RBiH Presidency and SGV President Mirko Pejanović, the number of Serb victims in the part of the city under control of the ARBiH is between 2,000 and 3,000 people, which includes both killed and missing (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997b).

SGV Deputy President Mladen Pandurević in an interview to *Večernje Novine* said that the SGV had data on at least 1,000 missing Serbs in Sarajevo. He also stated that the murders continued to occur between October 1993 and the end of the war in the municipalities of Centar, Novi Grad, and Novo Sarajevo.[230] According to Serb researcher Danilo Dželetović, 55 Serb civilians and a number of VRS prisoners were killed in several camps in Hrasnica. The dead bodies were buried in various locations in secret. The families of the victims were not allowed to visit the burial sites (Dželetović, 2000, p. 180). According to BiH SDB Chief Munir Alibabić, the number of Caco's victims alone is between 200 and 300 people (Pećanin & Selimbegović, 1997c).

Other sources provide different estimates. According to the database of the Republika Srpska Center for Research of War, Investigation of War Crimes and Search for Missing Persons, 2,770 Serb civilians and 256 VRS soldiers were killed in the territory of Sarajevo pre-war municipalities. The database contains relevant records for each victim killed between 1992 and 1995. The database also includes the names of 174 missing persons, who disappeared in Sarajevo during the war.[231] This assessment appears credible, given the fact that the ARBiH burned down and destroyed 56 Serb settlements and villages. After the war, 28 Serb mass graves were identified (Pašalić, 2002, p. 53).

According to the data of the Belgrade-based Institute for the Investigation of Serb Suffering in the 20th Century, the number of Serb victims in Sarajevo recorded by the Institute amounts to 8,504, which includes 7,524 civilians and 856 missing persons ("Ivanišević Tvrdi", 2012).

Former RS police officer Simo Tuševljak, speaking as a witness at the ICTY, said that more than 3,000 Serb civilians were killed in Sarajevo during the war. According to his witness statement, in Grbavica alone during 1992 and 1993 snipers killed about 700 Serb civilians, while the total number of those killed in Grbavica, including VRS soldiers, amounted to 1,600 men and women ("Tuševljak: U Sarajevu ubijeno", 2015).

According to the Director of the Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo, Mirsad Tokaća, "in the Sarajevo-Romanija region alone about 2,500 Sarajevo Serb civilians were killed." Mirsad Tokaća also stated that the total number of Serb civilians killed in the war was 4,178, of whom "about 2,000 were killed by Serb shells." He also added that the VRS lost 20,775 officers and men killed, while the Muslims lost 62,000 men and women, both civilian and military, 50% of whom were civilians (Knežević, 2018).

The ICTY refuted Mirsad Tokaća's assessment of the number of the Muslim victims of the war. According to ICTY research, based on a wide variety of sources, the

total losses of all three peoples during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 constituted a minimum of 67,500 people killed, among them 45,980 Muslim men and women. The latter figure includes 22,225 civilians and 23,755 military personnel (Tabeau & Bijak, 2003, p. 19). As for Serb casualties, they reportedly constituted 2,130 civilians and 10,512 soldiers (Tabeau & Bijak, 2003, p. 19).

According to the ICTY, within the front lines,[232] between 10 September 1992 and 10 October 1994, 135 Croats, 2,340 Muslims, 330 Serbs, 158 Others, and 835 persons of unknown nationality were killed (Tabeau, 2009, p. 472). This data does not include the number of Serb military and civilians killed "outside the front lines," that is, in the part of Sarajevo under the control of the VRS.

In 2003, demographic researchers Ewa Tabeau, Jakub Bijak, and Neda Lončarić of the the ICTY OTP Demographic Unit produced the report "Death Toll in the Siege of Sarajevo, April 1992 to December 1995." According to the report, the estimated overall number of deaths in the area of Sarajevo Six233 from April 1992 to December of 1995 is 18,888. This number includes four categories of death: war-related deaths of civilians (4,954), war-related deaths of soldiers (4,548), deaths of civilians that occurred as natural and not related to war (8,285), and a number of deaths of civilians, which could not be classified as war-related or war-unrelated (1,102). According to the report, in total there were 9,502 direct casualties of the siege (civilians and soldiers: 4,954 and 4,548) (Tabeau, Bijak & Lončarić, 2009, p. 554). The report does not provide the ethnic breakdown of the deaths.

Due to terror and intimidation between 1992 and 1995, Sarajevo Serbs were leaving the territory under control of the ARBiH and the HVO *en masse*, and moving either to SRY or Republika Srpska, settling down wherever they could. Former RBiH Presidency member and SGV President Mirko Pejanović described this process as "a quiet exodus of Serbs from the territories under control of the ARBiH or the HVO" (Pejanović, 1999, p. 167).

After the Dayton Peace Accords, several municipalities of the former Srpsko Sarajevo (Vogošća, Ilijaš, Hadjići and Ilidža) were to be reintegrated into the Federation starting from 3 February 1995. The reintegration was supposed to be completed within 45 days ("Nakon Sastanka Koordinacione Komisije", 1996). As the news of the expected reintegration reached the Serb population of these municipalities, Serbs started leaving for other locations in Republika Srpska and abroad. The period of this transfer of the territories of Eastern Sarajevo saw the peak of the Serb exodus. According to UNHCR, in this period between 50,000 and 65,000 Serbs left the territories of re-integrated Sarajevo.[234] As Dušan Šehovac explained to the Commission, the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo had several reasons:

> The first reason was fear of how to live with neighbors with whom we have been at war till yesterday. The second reason was the fear of what to live off. Employment in one of the most developed cities in Yugoslavia - Sarajevo - no longer existed. The third reason is that the Serb side demanded at Dayton, and after Dayton, that the central part of Sarajevo should be proclaimed as a District under International Control, with mixed administration and police. But the Bosniak side was given the right to form its own police, army and government. And that is when Serbs felt unprotected. That is the reason why they left. The Bosniak side wanted Sarajevo to be its war booty, and they talked about that publicly.[235]

According to award-winning American journalist Peter Brock, "enlightened Western journalism" still refused to acknowledge the flight of tens of thousands of Sarajevo's Serbs along with its entire Jewish community, both with palpable memories from World War II atrocities, on the eve of the recognition of Bosnian "independence" in early 1992. However, the Serb exodus eventually forced foreign journalists "to reconsider their initial judgment" about Sarajevo's harmoniousness (Brock, 2005, p. 286).

UNMiBiH spokesperson Aleksander Ivanko stated that the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely concerned:

> We have received numerous reports about gangs from Sarajevo who terrorize Serb population and plunder their houses. Serbs who were going to stay in Ilidža now say they have no other option but to leave, he said.[236]

There were also numerous cases of desecration of Serb Orthodox cemeteries and churches. For example, the Cathedral of the Nativity of the Most Holy Theotokos, built in 1872, suffered heavy damage. The Church of the Transfiguration of Christ was looted and desecrated several times. The Metropolitan Residence library and archives were looted (Mileusnić, 1997, p. 72).

Alija Izetbegović spoke the language of hatred, insulting Serbs and using the derogatory term "Chetniks." On 04 January 1996, he stated to *Dnevni Avaz*:

> We are offering Serbs a chance to stay, but we are not asking them to. Probably those who do not feel guilty will stay, and I would like that they should be the majority of the population there … Serbs who are not guilty, who did not commit crimes, will stay there, and all our people will stay there. With amnesty, it is not logical to free people who were in chetnik units, or generally people who cooperated with chetniks, from persecution. (Alija Izetbegović's interview, 1996)

Given the fact that practically the entire Serb male population of draft age was mobilized in the VRS, Izetbegović called for imprisonment of all Serb males. Under pressure from the international community, the RBiH Assembly eventually adopted amnesty law on 12 February 1996. International media on numerous occasions commented on the situation of Serbs in reintegrated Sarajevo.

On 5 May 1996, the Los Angeles Times carried an extensive article on the situation of Serbs in reintegrated Sarajevo under Federation control:

> When the Serb-controlled Sarajevo suburb of Ilidža reverted to Muslim-Croat government control several weeks ago, a hardy group of Bosnian Serb doctors and health workers vowed to remain behind, and pledged to work with the new government and help rebuild Bosnia. International mediators promised they'd be safe and praised them as a model of inter-ethnic cooperation in peacetime Bosnia. And then, the Muslim-led government in effect fired them. In addition, the government dismissed 12 of Ilidža's 15 schoolteachers, according to the office of the international community's high representative, who is in charge of implementing civilian aspects of the Dayton, Ohio, Peace Accord that ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 12 were Serbs; the three who were spared were a Muslim and two Croats.
>
> It raises serious questions about the Bosnian government's oft-stated commitment to ethnic diversity and tolerance - its stock in trade through the last four years of war. And it has disillusioned many of the government's longtime supporters, as well as more recent partners in peace such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
>
> This cadre from President Alija Izetbegović's Party of Democratic Action (SDA), diplomats say, has little real interest in the ideals of multi-ethnic tolerance publicly proclaimed by leaders such as Prime Minister Hasan Muratović. (Muratović declined repeated requests for an interview for this story.) Under SDA direction, a regional parliament devised for the Sarajevo area gave 35 of 37 seats to Muslims. The scheme so outraged the Muslim mayor of Sarajevo, Tarik Kupusović, that he resigned in protest … The day after Ilidža was put under Muslim-Croat federation control, scores of Muslim refugees barged into Serb-owned homes, then claimed them, illegally, as their own. Six weeks later, the refugees remain, despite a government promise to evict them. And an internationally brokered agreement to include Serbs in the interim Ilidža government has been ignored. (Wilkinson, 1995)

Dušan Šehovac, Deputy President of the NGO "Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs", which represented over 10,000 Serbs who remained in Ilidža and other Sa-

rajevo suburbs, said the Federation government's actions are designed to discourage Serbs who left from returning. The dismissal of the teachers left about 100 children without a school to attend. Serbian parents had received assurances that their children could at least finish out the school year with their original teachers and curriculum, which differs substantially from the material taught in Federation schools" (Wilkinson, 1995).

On 6 June 1996, *The New York Times* reported:

> Undermining the vision of a multi-ethnic Sarajevo espoused by the Bosnian Government, some of the remaining Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo's suburbs are being threatened, beaten or expelled from their homes by groups of Muslims the police say they cannot control.
>
> Though diplomats and human rights workers are divided over whether the effort reflects official policy, there is unanimity on the effect: moderate Bosnian Serbs hoping for reconciliation with Muslims are being intimidated and urged to leave.
>
> The affected Serbs are from a small minority, some 7,000, who remained in the suburbs of Sarajevo in March, when those areas were returned to the control of the Muslim-dominated Bosnian Government. Most of the estimated 50,000 Serbs who had lived in those suburbs during the war fled.
>
> United Nations police officers say they are investigating some 400 reports of harassment, beatings and evictions of Serbs at the hands of Muslims. It is not clear how many of the harassed people have actually left for Serb-held territory. (O'Connor, 1996)

In October 1996, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina reported:

> Persons residing in areas dominated by members of another national group continue to face the threat of harassment, assault, forcible eviction and even mortal injury because of their nationality ... For example, evictions based on nationality have been a serious problem in the Sarajevo area. It was reported in Vogošča on 20 August 1996 that a Bosniak family had moved into a flat belonging to a Serb, evidently with official approval, when the latter left the area for a two-week visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Tensions in Vogošća have been high between the few remaining Serbs - some 500 or so - and displaced Bosniaks, particularly from Srebrenica, seeking accommodation in the area. In Novo Sarajevo a Serb resident reportedly left her home one morning to go to the post office and when she returned, found that two men had broken the lock and moved into the premises, with a permit from the municipality. The

permit stated that the property was unoccupied. Another incident was reported on 29 September 1996, when four Bosniaks allegedly broke into an apartment in Novo Sarajevo and threatened to kill the occupant, a Serb, unless he left the premises immediately. (UN Economic and Social Council, 1996, paras. 21-22)

Serbs, especially young and able-bodied, continued leaving Sarajevo, where they felt very insecure. The 1991 population census provided the following ethnic breakdown of population in the city of Sarajevo municipalities:

Municipality	Total	Serbs
Vogošća	24,707	8,843 (35.79%)
Ilijaš	25,155	11,339 (45.07%)
Ilidža	67,438	25,061 (37.16%)
Novi Grad	136,293	37,736 (27.68%)
Novo Sarajevo	95,255	33,014 (34.65%)
Pale	16,310	11,269 (69.09%)
Stari Grad	50,626	5,178 (10.22%)
Trnovo	6,996	2,063 (29.48%)
Hadžići	24,195	6,391 (26.41%)
Centar	79,005	16,632 (21.05%)
Total	**525,980**	**157,536 (29.94%)**

Sarajevo media lashed out at brave Serb Maksim Stanišić, pre-war Deputy President of the Assembly of the city of Sarajevo and the President of NGO "Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs." This NGO was formed in the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidža in February 1995 for the protection of human rights of Serbs in the territories transferred to the Federation rule under the Dayton Peace Accords (Daly, 1996). After Maksim Stanišić publicly called on the Serb people not to leave the municipalities which were to be transferred under the Federation rule, Federation media smeared him as "a man with Pale mud on his shoes"."[237]

The data from the 2013 population census indicates a dramatic decrease in the size of the Serb community in Sarajevo Canton:

Municipality	Total	Serbs
Vogošća	26,343	542 (2.06%)
Ilijaš	19,603	421 (2.15%)
Ilidža	66,730	1,600 (2.40%)
Novi Grad	118,553	4,367 (3.68%)
Novo Sarajevo	64,814	3,402 (5.25%)
Pale-Praća	904	33 (3.65%)
Stari Grad	36,976	467 (1.26%)
Trnovo	1,502	97 (6.46%)
Hadžići	23,891	218 (0.91%)
Centar	55,181	2,186 (3.96%)
Canton Sarajevo	413,593	13,300 (3.21%)

The table below provides the ethnic break-down of the population of the Sarajevo Canton according to population census of 2013.

Bosniaks	356,575	83.80%
Croats	17,520	4.24%
Serbs	13,300	3.22%

According to the 2013 population census, the city of Sarajevo within the boundaries of the Muslim-Croat Federation had a total of 413,593 inhabitants, among them 13,300 Sebs (3.21%). After all the suffering that Serbs in the Federation part of Sarajevo had endured between 1992 and 1995 and the exodus of the Serb population after reintegration of the territories of Srpsko Sarajevo into the Federation, the BiH Constitutional Court changed the name of Srpsko Sarajevo into Eastern Sarajevo. According to the 2013 population census, the city of Eastern Sarajevo had 49,495 inhabitants (not counting the municipality of Sokolac). Among them there were 46,703 Serbs.

According to the analysis of Dušan Šehovac, 113,508 Serbs and Yugoslavs left the city of Sarajevo in three clearly defined periods, as a result of ethnic cleansing and forced departure:

Period of 1992-1995 41,108

Period from the start of 1996 55,000

Period between 1996 and 2013 17,400.[238]

11. Conclusion

The International Court of Justice adjudicated the fact that there was no evidence of genocide against Bosnian Muslims committed on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniak nationalist myth of intended Serbian genocide of Bosnian Muslims is definitively dispelled.

The immediate *casus belli* for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the 1992 referendum for independence which ignored the explicit will of Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina to stay in Yugoslavia, the country in which they had been living since 1918. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was essentially a civil and ethnic war among its three peoples – Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, in which the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were fighting to prevent what the Serbs considered a genocide like in 1941 and for their human and civil rights as a constitutive people. In this sense, the war of Republika Srpska was a defensive war.

The newly internationally recognized state RBiH committed an act of aggression against the SFRY by attacking its army – the JNA – in the sense of Article 3 (d) of the Definition of Aggression under United Nations Resolution 3314. The "smoking gun" of thiWhats aggression is the "Directive to protect sovereignty and independence of Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, strictly confidential №02/2-1," of 12 April 1992. The Directive referred to the SDS, the legal political party of the Serb people with 72 seats in the RBiH Parliament as the "enemy," and directed the ARBiH troops on the ground to attack the JNA and Serb Autonomous Regions with Serb population. Militarily and politically, the "Directive" was nothing less than a declaration of war against the SFRJ and its federal institution the JNA, as well as against the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sarajevo was the main geographical and operational area of combat operations of both the ARBiH and VRS. The VRS had no intention to take and occupy the entire capital of Sarajevo, since this did not agree with the RS strategy of the territorial and constitutional rearrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the population census of 1991. The VRS chose the strategy of blockading Sarajevo in order to coerce the RBiH government to accept their terms of peace, by which the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska was expected to receive territorial, political, and cultural autonomy. The RBiH government strategy was to deny any political and cultural autonomy to the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unitary state. Any attempt at reasonable autonomy and constitutional rearrangement was taken by the SDA was seen as an "ethnic division." This strategy

was selfish and retrograde in nature, and ran counter to the wishes of a very sizable portion of the population. The ARBiH was keen to preserve the whole of Sarajevo under its control for a variety of strategic political and military objectives, of which not least was to project Sarajevo as the symbol of unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the ensuing struggle, the VRS succeeded in keeping a considerable part of Sarajevo under control.

The cruelty of the war inevitably resulted in numerous crimes committed on both sides of the confrontation line. However, the SDA's strategy was calculated to drive the Serb community out of Sarajevo. The SDA aided and abetted crimes committed against the Serb population of Sarajevo by numerous criminal gangs and ARBiH regular units at least until October 1993. These included arbitrary arrests, incarceration in concentration camps, torture, rape, and murder. Coupled with the systematic anti-Serb propaganda and ethnic pressure, these crimes constituted a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign, which culminated in the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo after the Dayton Peace Accords. This campaign took a terrible toll on the Serb community in Sarajevo. As a result of the targeted campaign of terror and intimidation, the vibrant pre-war Serb community in Sarajevo virtually ceased to exist.

Endnotes

[1] Bosniaks were known until 1993 as Muslims or Bosnian Muslims. In September 1993, the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals renamed the nation of Bosnian Muslims into the nation of Bosniaks. Other ethnic groups (Serbs and Croats) objected to the name as a ploy to monopolize the history of Bosnia and make them seem to be foreign invaders. To avoid confusion, the term Bosnian Muslims is consistently used in this text.

[2] Derogatory terms Bosnian Muslims use for Serbs.

[3] *Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić*, (Decision of the Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, para. 70, *Prosecutor v. Boskoski*, Case No. IT- 04-82, (Judgment, Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para. 175 as cited in Vite, 2009.

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[5] Referat o stanju borebene gotovosti za 1991 [Report about the state of combat readiness for 1991]. Komanda Druge vojne oblasti JNA od 23.1.1992. godine br 09/63-26 as cited in Stanišić, 2017, pp. 55, 56.

[6] Ljiljan 13-20 November 1996, Interview with Hasan Čengić, "The Crisis of the Dayton Agreement Will Not Be Solved by My Removal" as cited in Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.

[7] SDA. To Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. Recommendation for a candidate, 11 July 1991, Nos. 1256-2/91 to 1258-2/91.

[8] Statement by Senaid Memić dated 14 April 1992. RCIRZ.

[9] Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova. Sarajevo. Nalog za izmještavanje naoružanja u municije [Ministry of Internal Affairs. Sarajevo. Order for relocation of weapons and ammunition], 3 July 1991. RCIRZ.

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[13] Predsjedništvo Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna, Odluka o formiranju Hrvatskog vijeća obrane [Presidency of Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna. Decision about the forma-

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16 Dokumentacija Komiteta za prikupljane podataka o izvršenim zločinima protiv čovečnosti i međunarodnog prava. Beograd, decembar 1996 Godine [Documentation of the Committee for Collection of date on committed crimes against humanity and international law, December 1996]. RCIRZ.

17 Video snimak, izjave Vladimira Ilića [Video of the statement by Vladimir Ilić]. RCIRZ.

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20 ICTY, Testimony by Simo Tuševljak, T.37068. RCIRZ.

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28 Pofalići. RCIRZ.

29 Statement by Stojanka Kretija. RCIRZ.

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[31] Report on the visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina by Paddy Ashdown and Sir Russel Johnston. 8-12 August 1992. RCIRZ.

[32] After the war it was renamed Eastern Sarajevo.

[33] Dušan Šehovac's testimony to the Commission on 12 March 2020.

[34] Ibid.

[35] ICTY, Witness Statement by Blagoje Kovačević. RCIRZ.

[36] Statement by Professor Nenad Kecmanović given to the Commission, 12 March 2020.

[37] ICTY, Witness Statement by Blagoje Kovačević. RCIRZ.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Report on the visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina by Paddy Ashdown and Sir Russel Johnston, 8-12 August 1992. RCIRZ.

[40] FM 3-06 (90-10). Urban Operations. – Headquarters, Department of the Army. 2002, p. 1-9.

[41] Dušan Šehovac's testimony to the Commission on 12 March 2020.

[42] Dušan Šehovac's testimony to the Commission on 12 March 2020.

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[44] Glavni Štab Vojske Republike Srpske BiH. Direktiva za dalja dejstva [Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. Directive for further operations]. Str. Pov. Br. 02/5-22 dated 6 June 1992. RCIRZ.

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[46] Ibid.

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[48] UNPROFOR Sitrep dated 27 February 1995. RCIRZ.

[49] UNPROFOR Sitrep dated 7 March 1995. RCIRZ.

[50] Record of witness statement given by witness Nedeljko Učur, Record on witness statement given by a witness Ranko Lalović, Record on oral report No. 12-02/4- 233 dated 6th December 2004, a copy of Milica Lalović's Death certificate, a copy of the newspaper article "Nataša's biggest wish was to take a tram again", Milica Lalović's Birth certificate, Nataša Učur's Birth certificate. RCIRZ.

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81 Extensive pieces of relevant evidence are enclosed. RCIRZ.

82 Extensive pieces of relevant evidence are enclosed. RCIRZ.

83 Record of the Witness Hearing for Dušanka Žuža, copy of the Excerpt from the Register of Births for Srđan Žuža, copy of the Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Srđan Žuža, copy of the Decision No. 03-534-36 from 01/08/1998, Record of the Witness Hearing for Slađana Žuža, Record on the collection of the statement by the witness Zoran Samardžić, Record of the Witness Hearing for Nikola Kovačević, Excerpt from the Register of Births for Staša Samardžić, Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Staša Samardžić).

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[87] Record on the collection of the statement by Risto Kržić, copy of the Finding and opinion for Risto Kržić No. 227/96, Official Note from 01/07/1993, Photo documentation no. КУ 64/93 wounding of Risto Kržić from 03/05/1993. RCIRZ.

[88] Record in the collection of the statement by Dubravko Blagovačanin, copy of the Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Vitomir Blagovačanin. RCIRZ.

[89] Record on the collection of the statement by Đorđe Pindžo, Record in the collection of the statement by Nada Čović, copy of the Death Certificate for Miroslav Čović, copy of the Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Miroslav Čović, copy of the Death Certificate for Miroslav Čović, copy of the Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Miroslav Čović, copy of the Medical Record for Nada Čović, copy of the History of Illness No. 1834 for Đorđe Pindžo). RCIRZ.

[90] Record in the collection of the statement by the witness Snježana Jokić, copy of the Decision on Disability No. 09.534-25/03 from 28/10/2003, copy of the Discharge Paper for Snježana Jokić No. 1976, copy of the Discharge Paper for Snježana Jokić No. 3494, copy of the Discharge Paper for Snježana Jokić No. 137/94.RCIRZ.

[91] Record in the collection of the statement by the witness Dragan Radijeljac, copy of the Discharge Paper for Dragan Radijeljac, copy of the Referral for Dragan Radijeljac, copy of the History of Illness No. 2407 for Dragan Radijeljac.RCIRZ.

[92] Record of the Witness Hearing for Marko Stojanović, Record on the collection of the statement by Borislav Jokanović, Record on the collection of the statement by Dušan Trbić, Record on the collection of the statement by Milojko Vukašinović, copy of the History of Illness No. 2446/93 for Milojka Vukašinović, copy of the Discharge Paper for Milojka Vukašinović, copy of the Release File for Milojka Vukašinović, copy of the Findings and opinions for Milojka Vukašinović, copy of the Discharge Paper with epicrisis No. 93414/11981 for Milojka Vukašinović, copy of the Discharge Paper with epicrisis No. 33331/4481 for Milojka Vukašinović, copy of the Discharge Paper with epicrisis No. 66880/8469 for Milojka Vukašinović, copy of the Discharge Paper with epicrisis No. 66880/8469 for Milojka Vukašinović, Inspection Record from 12/07/1993, photos of the hit bus. RCIRZ.

[93] Record in the collection of the statement by the witness Živko Ćorić, copy of the Certificate No. 15-01-2-02/2-131/98 from 01/10/1998, copy of the Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Anđelka Ćorić, copy of the Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Predrag Ćorić. RCIRZ.

[94] Record on the collection of the statement by Desanka Tomić, copy of the Findings and opinions of the specialist doctor for Desanka Tomić, copy of the Medical finding for Desanka Tomić. RCIRZ.

[95] Record on the collection of the statement by the witness Ognjen Pilipović, copy of the History of Illness No. 4640 for Ognjen Pilipović, Record on the collection of the statement by Denis Pilipović. RCIRZ.

[96] Record on the collection of the statement by Aleksa Grabovac, Record of the Witness Hearing for Radmilo Stanojević, Inspection Record No. 15-1/02- 280/94 from 13/08/1994, Photo documentation No. 239/94 murder of Tanja Grgić from 08/08/1994, Excerpt from the Register of Deaths for Tanja Grgić. RCIRZ.

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[99] Inspection Record No. 15-9/02-24/95 from 05/05/1995, copy of the Medical finding for Nenad Mrkaja from 03/05/1995, Photo documentation No. 15- 9/02-24/95 murder of Nenad Mrkaja of 03/05/1995. RCIRZ.

[100] Inspection Record No. 15-02-458/95 of 23/11/1995, copy of the Medical finding No. 2088 for Gojko Popović, copy of the Medical finding for Mirko Nogović, copy of the Medical finding No. 2087 for Mirjana Balaban, Report on Criminal-technical inspection of 25/05/1995, Photo documentation No. 140/95 murder of Gojko Popović from 18/05/1995.RCIRZ.

[101] Record of the Witness Hearing from Slađana Moljević, Inspection Report No. 15-02/2-243/95 of 24/05/1995, Official Report No. 15-02/4- 247/95 of 25/05/1995, copy of the Medical finding for Dragana Božović, copy of the Medical finding for Tanja Mijović, copy of the Medical finding for Sanja Lončar, comp of the History of Illness for Sanja Lončar, copy of the Medical finding for Slađana Tamindžić, copy of the Medical finding for Svjetlana Đokić, copy of the Medical finding for Nedeljka Đogo, Photo documentation No. 145/95 shelling of the CSC Ilidža from 21/06/1995.RCIRZ.

[102] Record of the Witness Hearing for Vojislav Andrić, copy of the Discharge Paper for Vojislav Andrić No. 2282). RCIRZ.

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[116] Borbeni izveštaj, pov. Br. 01/1946, 7. februar 1993 [Combat report No. 01/1946, 7 February 1993]. RCIRZ.

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CHAPTER VI

The Physical and Psychological Aspects of Suffering

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From 1992 to 1995, the Serbs in Sarajevo were subjected to a double blockade, both internal and external. The first blockade, which followed the demarcation line between Bosniak forces and Serbian forces, affected all Sarajevo residents. The second, more impenetrable blockade, set up by the Bosniak forces, was aimed exclusively at Sarajevo's Serbian citizens. Nearly all of the humanitarian aid arriving through the airport, tunnel and road convoys was controlled by the Bosniak government and the ruling SDA party. The problem was not so much the volume of humanitarian aid as was the discrimination in how this aid was distributed, to the detriment of the Serbian population of Sarajevo. The UNHCR transferred the responsibility of "managing" humanitarian aid to Bosniak ministers. The UNHCR was the de facto supplier for the Muslim sector of Sarajevo and more specifically the Bosnian army in its war effort. For these reasons, it seems inappropriate to call Sarajevo a "besieged" city.

A campaign of terror targeting Serbs was planned at the highest level of the state by the SDA and carried out by a joint criminal enterprise that included all Bosniak state institutions. The key players in this terror campaign were recruited and armed by the SDA towards the end of 1991. They were well-known figures in Sarajevo's organized crime world, as well as convicts, rapists and drug addicts, often released from prison thanks to amnesty granted by AIija Izetbegović. They built up groups of thousands of criminals in Sarajevo.

Between 1992 and 1995, thousands of Serbs were imprisoned arbitrarily and suffered the worst violence in prison solely because of their ethnicity. One of the specific aspects of this terror campaign was the creation of a vast network of private prisons where the worst atrocities (torture and gang rapes) were committed. A preliminary

list of 211 prisons for Serbs has been established. Almost 3,000 Serbian civilians were killed in Sarajevo and nearly 1,700 were seriously injured. The majority (two thirds) of the dead and wounded were not linked to acts of war but to criminal acts.

This campaign of terror was preceded and accompanied by a campaign of discrimination and demonization targeting Serbian citizens of Sarajevo, who were relegated to the rank of excluded citizens. The city of Sarajevo turned against its own Serbian citizens and Serb lives didn't matter. The media and NGOs played a major role in the demonization campaign by spreading false information and focusing their attention and compassion exclusively on the very real suffering of Muslim citizens while completely ignoring the suffering of Serbian citizens.

If the referendum of 29 February 1992 was the *casus belli*, the Dayton Peace Accords of 14 December 1995 were the cause of the great exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo. The massive exodus of the citizens of a city taking with them the exhumed remains of their loved ones was an unprecedented event in the history of civil wars.

Crimes against Serbs have never been qualified for what they were: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocidal acts. This denial of justice is largely the result of threats and pressures exerted on judges and certain witnesses by states which do not shrink from any form of violence. Crimes that should have been classified as war crimes or crimes against humanity have been qualified as mere common crimes or as concealment of a crime. Almost all perpetrators of crimes against Serbian citizens have escaped justice: either they have not been charged, or their crimes have not been adequately qualified, or they have been declared not criminally liable due to psychiatric disorders, or they have been acquitted or given laughable sentences in view of the seriousness of the crimes. This denial of justice is a factor that aggravates the psychological after-effects of the victims and maintains tensions between communities.

In the end, the Serbian population of a city that claims to be tolerant and multi-ethnic has been totally eliminated by those who still claim to be the main victims of this conflict.

1. Civilian Suffering During Times of Conflict

Human suffering, whether physical or mental, is a painful experience with sensory, emotional, cognitive, behavioral and spiritual aspects. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, epidemics, etc. can lead to loss of human lives, destruction and large-scale suffering. However, armed conflicts are unique in that they cause suffering that is voluntarily inflicted by people on other people, often through inhumane and dehumanizing acts.

In times of war, everything that human beings need is threatened or destroyed. Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of the most basic human needs is generally shown as a pyramid divided into five levels: at the base are physiological needs such as hunger and thirst; these are followed by the need for safety/security; love/belonging; esteem; and finally, self-actualization (Maslow, 1954). War compromises all of these levels, and particularly the bottom three. It causes physical and tangible losses (a person's loved ones, home, employment, etc.) as well as symbolic and abstract losses (life-style, self-esteem, feelings of invincibility or faith in mankind, belief in God, etc.).

The suffering of civilian populations in times of war leads to two very different types of interventions by international organizations and institutions:

* International human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, work to denounce human rights violations. International criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), are responsible for identifying crimes as well as prosecuting and convicting the perpetrators.

* International humanitarian aid organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, also known as Doctors Without Borders) or Médecins du Monde (MDM, also known as Doctors of the World), offer emergency medical assistance to the victims of armed conflicts.

Consideration for war victims does not always stem from humanitarian motives. The disavowal and violation of ethical rules of many professions have made it possible for human suffering to be instrumentalized and exploited for political purposes, allowing impartiality and objectivity to be replaced by bias and raw emotion. In recent decades, we have witnessed the influence of partisan interests with regard to humanitarian rights and action, in turn leading to the right of interference and biased courts (Halimi, 2006; Bricmont, 2009). Human suffering has become a question of law rather than a question of humanity.

1.1. Armed Conflicts and Civilian Populations

The wars of the twentieth century killed many civilians – often, civilian deaths largely outnumbered military casualties. Extremely powerful means of destruction were used during these wars, such as large-scale aerial bombings and State organized extermination campaigns. Generally speaking, the number of civilian casualties directly related to fighting is much lower than the number of civilian victims of terror campaigns.

1.2. International armed Conflicts

International armed conflicts are conflicts between two or more States. A casus belli is an act that provokes an armed conflict, but the underlying causes of international, geopolitical and economic tensions can be found in the decades leading up to the war. The real motive of a war is often hidden behind a fabricated casus belli used to justify triggering the conflict. When a country is occupied, armed conflicts can pit civilians defending their State (guerrilla or resistance fighters) against occupying forces and their collaborators. There can also be armed conflicts between different resistance movements. The concept of total war refers to an armed conflict that no longer makes the distinction between military or armed targets and civilian or city-wide targets. In this case, international conventions are openly violated, and war crimes and crimes against humanity surge.

1.3. Non-international Armed Conflicts

Non-international armed conflicts are confrontations between a State and one or more armed groups, or one armed group against another armed group. Some of these conflicts are referred to as “high intensity”.

Non-international armed conflict or civil war is a conflict between two sides within a single State. The casus belli is usually an attack, coup d’état or a declaration of secession or independence. However, the roots of the conflict are old and deep. The breakdown of national cohesion is a result of tensions and social divides stemming from political, ethnic, religious or economic issues. These tensions and divides are tied to feelings of fear and frustration in one part of the population with regard to their basic needs (safety, identity, autonomy, etc.). They may be caused by identity-based politics or discriminatory practices against certain groups that are deemed to be second-class or even excluded citizens. Conflicts between communities are not due to the differences themselves, but rather discrimination based on those differences. The reminder of historical atrocities and the fatal spiral of violence can sometimes make it difficult to distinguish between primitive aggression and retaliation. Civil war is also a war between brothers, neighbors and friends.

The term “armed forces” with regard to a State applies to regular armed forces. Individual membership is subject to domestic law and is characterized by formal

inclusion in permanent units identifiable by their uniforms, insignia and equipment. The same applies to armed units of the police or other uniformed forces when they are incorporated into State armed forces.

Membership in a State's irregular armed forces (militia, paramilitary groups) is not governed by domestic law and cannot be reliably determined. The degree of control that a State must have over the conduct of an organized armed group is not set out in international law. In practice, it would appear essential for the group to conduct hostilities in the name of and with the consent of the State.

"Organized armed groups" may comprise the irregular armed forces of any non-State party to the conflict. Organized armed groups of a non-State party to an armed conflict include dissident armed forces and other organized armed groups. Dissident armed forces are chiefly formed by part of a State's armed forces that have turned against the government. Other organized armed groups recruit their members mainly from the civilian population, but they acquire a sufficient degree of military organization to conduct hostilities and carry out continuous and concerted military operations on behalf of a party to the conflict. They include only individuals whose continuous role is to participate directly in hostilities ("continuous combat function"). It follows that, under international humanitarian law (IHL), the decisive criterion for determining individual membership in an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function involving direct participation in hostilities for the group.

For the purposes of distinction in non-international armed conflicts, all individuals who are not members of State armed forces or of organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are considered civilians and are therefore entitled to protection from direct attack. Under conventional and customary IHL, civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, just as those who take on a continuous combat function for an organized armed group of a party to the conflict, lose their right to protection from direct attack. Conventional IHL does not define "direct participation in hostilities", and there is no clear interpretation of this concept from State practises or international jurisprudence. The idea of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts committed by individuals in the context of conducting hostilities between the parties to an armed conflict with the aim of supporting one party over another.

The jurisprudence of the international military tribunals established after the Second World War, such as from the ICTY and ICTR, confirms that even civilians can violate IHL provisions and commit war crimes. The type of acts committed and their link to the conflict determine their relevance under IHL, rather than the status of the perpetrator of those acts. There is no doubt that civilians taking a direct part in hostilities must respect IHL rules (including those relating to conducting hostilities), and they can be held responsible for war crimes in the same way as members of State armed forces and organized armed groups.

The use of force by civilians against other civilians is not included in the conduct of hostilities if it specifically aims to support a party to an armed conflict in its military confrontation with another party (link to belligerent acts or direct participation in hostilities). However, this is not the same as when civilians simply take advantage of the breakdown of law and order that facilitates violent crime. In many armed conflicts, common criminals act in ways unrelated to the conflict. The person responsible for making these distinctions must be able to do so on the basis of information that is reasonably accessible, and which can be inferred from objectively verifiable factors.

When a conflict becomes international, it is usually due to several other States intervening. In practice, many parties to non-international conflicts receive various types of external support: weapons and military equipment often sent in violation of embargoes, or volunteers or mercenaries who may take direct part in hostilities. Private military companies (PMCs) have played a major role in recent conflicts (Leslie, 2002; Singer, 2003; Avant, 2005; Dunigan, 2011). The involvement of American PMCs, namely Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) and Blackwater (now called Academi), is well documented during the conflicts in Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. MPRI, a former company based in Alexandria, Virginia (USA), was a PMC under contract of the US Department of Defense. It was founded in 1988 by the former Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono and seven other retired generals, including Harry E. Soyster, the former director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). It employed several high-ranking retired members of the US army. Contracting with a PMC allows the United States to defend its geopolitical interests without committing its regular armed forces. The American "advisors" from MPRI were identified on all battlefields in the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia). MPRI benefited from contracts with the Croatian army (Democracy Transition Assistance Program) and the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Train and Equip contract). MPRI played a key role in the expulsion of the Serbs from Krajina by the Croatian army (Buisson, 2015). In particular, and in violation of the UN arms embargo, MPRI organized the delivery of weapons to Croatia for the "Lightning" and "Storm" operations in 1995. In August 1995, the Croatian army invaded Krajina, resulting in 1,000 casualties during the bombings, conducted with indifference to the civilian population, and the exodus of nearly 200,000 Serbs. The Croatian army carried out summary executions, killings and looting. Most Serbian villages were ransacked and burned. In August 1995, Carl Bildt declared that the ransacking of Knin was "an extremely serious offence that could to lead to the indictment of [Croatian president Franjo] Tuđjman" by an international criminal tribunal. The official American version maintains that MPRI's role was to train the Croatian army for the democratic transition.

The right of interference is the recognition of the right of one or more States to violate the national sovereignty of another State under an explicit mandate granted by a UN Security Council resolution. The United Nations can intervene in a conflict by making an armed force such as NATO available to the Security Council or by sending an intervention force with a coercive mandate. In international politics, the concept of humanitarian interference emerged following the Nigerian Civil War (1967–70) and was developed in the late 1980s by French politician Bernard Kouchner and French jurist Mario Bettati (Bettati & Kouchner, 1987; Bettati, 1996). It stipulates that certain health emergencies can justify challenging a State's sovereignty. This right of interference, applied by several Western States (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom and France), imposes ipso facto regime changes in the States whose sovereignty is violated and most often conceals geopolitical ambitions (Halimi, 2006; Bricmont, 2009). These interventionist Western powers have on several occasions acted without an explicit UN mandate, particularly by using the NATO air force. This was the case in the former Yugoslavia (1995–99), Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011). This right of interference, exercized in the name of sovereign principles such as democracy or human rights, has been used for the purposes of political or economic domination. It has been the subject of considerable controversy in international law, namely when it comes to taking sides in a civil war and helping a community that claims to be oppressed by a central government acting on its territory against a threat of secession.

1.4. Three main types of victims

There are three main types of victims during armed conflicts among civilian non-combatants.

1. Civilian casualties directly related to the fighting between belligerents, especially among populations located on the front lines or in bombed or besieged cities.

2. Civilian casualties of campaigns of terror that seek to punish, control or wipe out populations or groups of populations deemed hostile or simply detrimental. These campaigns of terror are carried out by the foreign occupier or collaborators of the occupier, as well as by fellow citizens in the event of civil war.

*** Victims of intentional killings.** These may be individual crimes, premeditated or not, motivated by profit or sexual or sadistic impulses. Mass killings usually involve executions of hostages or prisoners and extermination campaigns. Bodies may be left on the spot as an instrument of terror, thrown into pits or hidden in mass

graves, or burned and reduced to ashes. Mistreatment of the dead may be seen in the mutilation of corpses, such as decapitation and display of severed heads, dismemberment or emasculation. Desecration of graves and cemeteries is also observed. These behaviors towards human remains can cause pathological grief among survivors.

*** Victims of abduction and arbitrary detention.** Such abductions can have several aims: to obtain a ransom in return for the release of hostages, to allow prisoner exchanges, or to subject prisoners to forced labor or prostitution. Places of detention may be institutional prisons, prison camps or private prisons. In armed conflict situations, enforced disappearances are often synonymous with executions. Enforced disappearances are cases where individuals are arbitrarily arrested and detained by a State or political organization (with the authorization and support of that State or organization), with the intent to remove them from the protection of the law. The perpetrators then refuse to reveal to the families the fate or whereabouts of the person's remains.

*** Victims of forced population transfer or deportation.** Forced transfer refers to the displacement of people, through expulsion or other coercive means, from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law. Forced population transfers may result from campaigns of terror, changes in the delimitation of borders or new territorial delimitations, or during or after hostilities (consequences of peace agreements and treaties).

*** Victims of torture and barbaric acts.** Torture is any criminal act of exceptional gravity inflicting severe physical or mental suffering on a person in the custody or under the control of another person. Physical and psychological torture are inextricably linked. While torture is sometimes used as a means of coercion to obtain information, it is mainly used as punishment or a way to terrorize and control a population. Some individuals in a community are targeted so that others remain passive for fear of being victimized as well. Torture is often associated with inhuman detention conditions and staging: death threats and mock executions, sexual humiliation, being forced to witness the torture or rape of someone close to them (spouse, child, friend, etc.). The consequences can include physical mutilation and severe psychological trauma.

*** Victims of forced labor.** In times of war, prisoners are often forced to carry out defense and fortification work (digging anti-tank ditches, trenches, etc.) for the enemy, often in extremely harsh and dangerous conditions (exposure to enemy fire, the cold, etc.).

*** Victims of rape and sexual violence.** Rape in times of war is a way of punishing and humiliating the enemy. Many forms of sexual violence are observed: rapes followed by murder, repeated rapes of women who are kidnapped and held in illegal

prisons (private prisons), rapes with psychological torture (being forced to watch as one of their relatives is raped, men forced to rape one of their own relatives), forced pregnancy (illegal detention of a woman forcibly made pregnant). Men can also be victims of sexual assault, especially young boys and prisoners. Sexual violence can cause serious physical trauma (mucus or visceral lesions, perforations, hemorrhages, infectious diseases, etc.) and psychological trauma (feelings of shame and guilt, post-traumatic stress syndrome, sexual dysfunction, etc.). Cases of pregnancies resulting from rape raise issues regarding the termination of the pregnancy (difficult or even impossible in this context) or children born following the rape.

*** Victims of property crime.** During wars, entire cities are decimated by bombings, which cause massive building destruction and homelessness. Thefts and looting targeting certain categories of the population may be carried out by the occupier as well as by individual citizens or organized gangs.

3. Indirect victims linked to the often appalling living conditions in times of war: lack of shelter, water, food, electricity, heating, sanitation services or medical care.

1.5. The Historical Spiral of Violence

The events of an armed conflict should not be studied in a compartmentalized or cookie-cutter way, but rather considered within a historical context and continuum. Criminal atrocities committed during a previous conflict on the same territory, especially if they have gone unpunished, can cause trauma within a community over several generations. The intergenerational and transgenerational transmission of war trauma is now an established fact. In the event of social tensions, recalling the past by glorifying the perpetrators of atrocities or using threatening symbols increases the risk of recurrence and escalation of violence.

* Throughout 1991 in Croatia, the fighting took place in areas where Nazi and Ustaše massacres were perpetrated during the Second World War. Historian Aleksandar Đilas has written that "the violence of contemporary war sites follows the map of the violence of the Second World War". Ethnic cleansing against the Serbs in Croatia was planned and tools were implemented in 1990. General Franjo Tuđjman, an ultranationalist, revisionist, anti-Semite (he once boasted at an HDZ pre-election rally in Dubrava, Croatia, 16th April 1990 that his wife was "neither a Serb nor a Jew")[1] and author of *Wastelands: Historical Truths*, came to power in May 1990. He had previously founded the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), an ultranationalist

party whose program included the abolition of the constitutional rights of Serbs in Croatia. May 1990 marked the beginning of the violations of Serbs' fundamental rights in Croatia and their political, economic and cultural marginalization. The HDZ increasingly adopted symbolic gestures recalling and glorifying the Ustaše Greater Croatia, which triggered panic among the Serbs in Croatia: return of war criminals to Zagreb, official tributes to Ante Pavelić, introduction of the works of Mile Budak in school curricula, appearance of the red and white chequered flag, changing of the names of streets and city squares (streets and schools were renamed Mile Budak), replacement of the dinar by the kuna, reintroduction of Ustaše ranks in the Croatian army. Immediately after the 1990 elections gave power to the HDZ, the Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia created illegal militias to terrorize the Serbs living in the areas from which the central government in Zagreb wanted to drive them out. On 22 December 1990, the Croatian Parliament adopted a new constitution (the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia no. 56/1990, Croatian parliament 22nd December 1990) that radically altered the political and constitutional status of the Serbs in Croatia established in 1947: Croatia was the State of Croats only[2]. The new constitution stripped the Serbs of their status as a constituent people and relegated them to the status of a national minority, second-class citizens who were to be persecuted.

* A similar process was observed at the same time in Bosnia. In early 1991, Alija Izetbegović and Sefer Halilović formed the Patriotic League (*Patriotska Liga*), a paramilitary organization at the service of their political party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) created in 1990. The aim of this paramilitary organization was to eliminate its rivals, including moderate Muslims such as Fikret Abdić, and rise to power. According to Marko Attila Hoare, Izetbegović was well known for his proselytizing for radical Islam and his membership in the organization of "Young Muslims" whose members were part of SS Handzar Divison and collaborators with the Ustaše during the Second World War (Attila Hoare, 2014, p.12). His program was clearly announced in his book *Islamic Declaration*, written in the late 1970s and reissued by the SDA in 1992 for widespread distribution in Bosnia. Izetbegović and Halilović recruited gang leaders and organized crime figures (Ramiz "Ćelo" Delalić, Mušan "Caco" Topalović, Jusuf "Juka" Prazina, Ismet "Ćelo" Bajramović, among others) to head up various units of the Patriotic League. Many of them were granted amnesty to get out of prison. These units sowed terror among the Serbian population in Sarajevo, recalling the atrocities of the Second World War. The independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognized from April 1992 without prior negotiation, led to the dissolution of the multi-ethnic government of Sarajevo. The SDA seized power by excluding the moderate Muslim voices. The main leaders of the Patriotic League units were appointed to leadership positions in the army and police by Izetbegović.

* General Jean-René Bachelet's book on Sarajevo begins with a historical reminder of the atrocities perpetrated by the Ustaše and their Bosnian collaborators during the Second World War. General Bachelet, who commanded the Sarajevo sector as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1995, underscored the lasting traces of the Second World War, which are deeply engraved in the collective consciousness. "When Hitler invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, the invasion of Serbia – marked by a devastating bombing of Belgrade – was considered that of a hereditary enemy, whereas Nazi troops were welcomed by cheering crowds in Zagreb. The Ustaše State was created, encompassing Bosnia, while Serbia was occupied by the Nazi troops. At the Ustashe meeting in Gospic on 11th of June 1941, the chief ideologists of the Croatian fascist Ustaša movement Mile Budak said: "We shall kill one part of the Serbs, expel the second part, and convert to Catholicism the third part of them" The Ustaše program Cf. Legal provision on the purity of the Croatian nation no: XLV-67 Z.p. 41, 30th of April 1941, issued by Ante Pavelić,: eliminate the Serbs[3], Jews[4] and Roma[5]. Tens of thousands of Serbs disappeared in the Ustaše concentration camps, the most infamous of which is the Jasenovac extermination camp. This murderous madness, which was no less atrocious than that by the Nazis, left an indelible mark on Sarajevo. From 1941 to 1944, the Ustaše engaged in ruthless persecution against the Serbs and Jews, victims of atrocities that deeply impacted the survivors. Muslim populations, for their part, rather benefited from the Ustaše's rule. Bosnian Muslims, encouraged by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, were recruited to one SS division, the Handschar. The traces remain deeply embedded in the collective consciousness. […] Alija Izetbegović, born in 1925, a student in Sarajevo in 1943, was a member of the 'Young Muslims', a movement that collaborated with the Ustaše regime" (Bachelet, 2016, pp. 34-45).

* The inability of a State to prevent atrocities, or a State's encouragement to commit them by justifying the violence against a community, is a determining factor in the spiral of violence. Large-scale violence requires a certain level of preparation and planning that only a State is capable of: the creation of militias or paramilitary groups, or the implementation of instruments of terror. From 1991, Franjo Tuđman and his HDZ party, like Alija Izetbegović and his SDA party, reopened the wounds of the Second World War, creating illegal militias and inciting their supporters to commit atrocities against the Serbian population.

2. Two Historical Examples on European Soil

Each new conflict gives rise to comparisons with previous conflicts. Unfortunately, too often these comparisons are inappropriate, inadequate or misleading. Indeed, they are not made with the aim of better understanding human suffering to avoid repeating it, but rather to stigmatise and demonise one of the parties to the conflict. This results in people holding on to the anger and hatred. To better understand the suffering of civilian populations during armed conflicts, the crimes and traumas that affect these populations must be analysed. 'War crime' is a criminal concept, whereas 'trauma' falls within the fields of medicine and social science. Before examining the case of the former Yugoslavia and Sarajevo, we will briefly mention two major conflicts on European soil during the twentieth century: the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War. Indeed, numerous comparisons with these two conflicts have been made with regard to Sarajevo.

2.1. The Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War followed the Nationalist coup d'état of 18 July 1936 against the government of the Second Spanish Republic and officially ended on 1 April 1939. It resulted from political, social and economic tensions that had accumulated over several generations. It pitted the Republican camp against the Nationalist camp, led by General Francisco Franco. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy sided with the nationalists. The Soviet Union and volunteers from around the world supported the Republicans in the International Brigades. France and the United Kingdom opted for non-intervention and the blockade of arms exports, but allowed the International Brigades to fight alongside the Republicans and encouraged weapons deliveries to the Republicans. The war ended with the victory of the Nationalists, who established a dictatorship that lasted 36 years until 1975. The war caused nearly 500,000 casualties among a population of 26 million, or almost 2% of the population. The total number of deaths is very difficult to establish. The victims of the repression that followed the defeat of the Republicans must also be taken into account, as Franco's government ordered tens of thousands of executions. Further mortality due to famine or epidemics is not known. The Spanish Civil War divided public opinion across the world. It found strong media and cultural resonance because of many writers' activism (Ernest Hemingway, André Malraux, George Orwell) and Pablo Picasso's famous painting *Guernica*, which depicted the bombing victims.

2.2. Victims Directly Related to the Fighting

Some battles claimed thousands or tens of thousands of lives, such as the Battle of the Ebro or the Battle of Teruel. The city of Madrid, held by the Republicans, was bombed during a siege that lasted from October 1936 to March 1939. The artillery and aerial bombardment of the city was ordered by Franco in order to terrorize the civilian population and force their surrender. It was one of the first deliberate bombings of a civilian population. The siege and bombardment of Madrid killed around 10,000 people, with comparable losses in terms of victims for both the Republicans and the Nationalists. The besieged city finally fell to the Nationalists on 28 March 1939. The bombing of Guernica was an aerial bombardment carried out on the Spanish Basque town of Guernica on Monday, 26 April 1937 by the air forces of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This highly symbolic event of the Spanish Civil War contributed to international media coverage of the conflict through intense propaganda and was condemned by a large part of the international community. The number of victims of this bombing has been the subject of controversy and has been revised downwards. The bombardment of Barcelona from 16 to 18 March 1938 by the German and Italian air forces killed several thousand civilians.

2.3. Victims of the White Terror and the Red Terror

Civilian deaths were primarily due to executions outside the fighting, by both the Nationalist and Republican sides. Nearly 100,000 summary executions took place in the Nationalist zone, with just as many in Republican-held areas. Prisoner releases (*sacas de presos*) consisted of the release of mass numbers of prisoners with the stated aim of freeing them, but in fact, the purpose was to execute them. For the most part, these crimes were perpetrated during the first six months of the war (July to December 1936) by both sides.

*** The White Terror** refers to the crimes and abuses committed by the Nationalists against those defending the Second Spanish Republic. Franco's armed forces included seasoned, merciless troops from Spanish Morocco (Foreign Legion). The advance of the troops resulted in high numbers of summary executions, rapes and looting of property. The Badajoz massacre (14 to 15 August 1936) occurred in the days following the Battle of Badajoz, as part of the brutal repression by the Nationalist army. Between 1936 and 1939, 114,000 people were declared missing in Spain.

The number of mass graves of Republicans and Franco opponents is estimated at between 600 and 800 – more are still being discovered today. Two prison camps were set up by the Francoists, first during the Spanish Civil War, then as an instrument of repression during the Franco dictatorship. Mutilation of the wounded and dead was reported and confirmed: ears and noses cut off, emasculations and beheadings. Sexual crimes were committed along with summary executions and the ransacking of properties. Soldiers subjected women suspected of belonging to the Republican camp to all sorts of humiliations: they shaved their heads, forced them to drink castor oil to induce defecation, made them strip down half-naked and beat them violently. Women were forced to clean and cook in the troops' camps, where they were raped. Gang rapes and rapes of underage girls were common. Many women were raped in front of their husbands or children, and young girls were raped after seeing their parents murdered. Rapes were often followed by murder, with the perpetrators parading around with women's underwear hanging from their rifles as trophies. Summary executions of prisoners and systematic rapes of women were carried out with the consent of the military command.

*** The Red Terror** refers to the violent acts committed by the various Republican activist groups. Anyone suspected of supporting the Nationalists was executed without trial. Several thousand Nationalist prisoners held in Madrid's prisons were massacred by the Republicans. Some 5,000 people were shot in Paracuellos and Torrejón de Ardoz and buried in mass graves (November 1936). The Red Terror also targeted Catholic figures. Many Spanish Catholic clerics were executed by the Republicans. Thousands of priests, monks and nuns were among the main victims of these massacres. Churches and convents were burned, and altars and graves were desecrated. Acts of great violence, accompanied by rape, were perpetrated against nuns and young girls from Catholic organizations who fell into the hands of the Republicans. According to the Catholic Church, these Catholics died because of their faith, but for the Republicans, they died because of their support for Franco.

2.4. Post-War Justice

The Franco dictatorship (1939–75) created special courts and enacted emergency laws that aimed in particular to repress communism. Only crimes committed by the Republicans were officially investigated and tried (this process was known as *Causa General*). An amnesty law ruled out any possibility of prosecuting crimes by the Nationalists. The victims of the Francoist regime had to wait until 2007 to finally

be recognized as victims following the passing of the "Historical Memory Law" in Spain, officially known as "Law 57/2007 that recognizes and broadens the rights and establishes measures in favor of those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War and the Dictatorship". This law recognizes the unjust nature of the convictions and penalties imposed during the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. The Francoist courts have been declared "illegitimate" and any request for review must be examined, without any opposition from the judiciary. Aid to the victims of Franco's regime and their families (pensions, financial compensation) has been extended. The State has committed to help locate, identify and possibly exhume victims of the Francoist repression whose bodies have not been found.

2.5. The Second World War

The Second World War (1939–45) opposed the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers, led by Nazi Germany. While the casus belli was Germany's invasion of Poland, the origins of the conflict in Europe go back much further, namely stemming from the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles and the 1929 economic crisis. Nearly 40 million Europeans died during the Second World War, most of whom were civilians. In some countries, especially Eastern Europe, mortality rates were extremely high, exceeding 10% of the pre-war population. The USSR paid the heaviest price with 26 million victims, or nearly 15% of its population.

2.6. Victims Directly Related to the Fighting

During the Second World War, entire villages were devastated by the Luftwaffe air raids and strategic bombing by the Allied forces. These aerial bombardments could kill tens of thousands of civilians in a matter of days, with the number of wounded usually more than double those killed.

* Many cities were besieged and bombarded by air and artillery: the battle and siege of Leningrad from 8 September 1941 to 27 January 1944 (300,000 civilians killed by the bombardments), the battle and siege of Warsaw from 1 September 1939 to 28 September 1939 (25,000 civilians killed), the battle and siege of Stalingrad from 17 July 1942 to 2 February 1943 (300,000 civilians killed), the battle and siege of Budapest from 29 December 1944 to 13 February 1945 (40,000 civilians killed).

* The strategic bombings by the American and British air forces (Hamburg, Dresden, Cologne, etc.) aimed to weaken the enemy's morale and military and industrial potential. Thousands of tonnes of bombs, namely incendiary bombs, were dropped on large cities. The campaign of repeated air raids on Hamburg (Operation Gomorrah) between 25 July and 3 August 1943 killed at least 40,000 people (80,000 wounded). The bombing of Dresden from 13 to 15 February 1945 killed at least 25,000 civilians. Around 200,000 civilians lost their lives during the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

2.7. Victims of Campaigns of Terror

Some unarmed and inoffensive populations, who were citizens of the States where they resided, were considered by the Third Reich as detrimental or simply undesirable (e.g., Jews, Roma, disabled persons and homosexuals). These populations were subjected to campaigns of terror and extermination of unprecedented violence. In occupied territories, Nazi forces were guilty of all types of war crimes: destruction of entire villages, summary executions of hostages and massacres of villagers (including women and children), and torture and killings of civilians in connection with the resistance. Torture took the form of "medical" experiments in concentration camps.

* The Nazi extermination policy targeted Jews in all occupied countries. The Jews were forced to live in ghettos and deported to extermination camps to be methodically eliminated through mass executions by firing squads ("Holocaust by bullets"), gassing in trucks or gas chambers, forced labor and starvation. The physical extermination of the Jews was accompanied by the plundering and seizure of their real estate and personal property, and especially the looting of works of art and valuables from the apartments of deported Jews. A significant part of their cultural and religious heritage was destroyed or desecrated, including synagogues and prayer books, sacred objects and cemeteries. The genocide benefited from individual and collective complicity throughout Europe, particularly within movements of collaborationists inspired by fascism and Nazism, such as the Independent State of Croatia or the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party. The genocide of the Jews was also helped through complicity within governments or administrations having made the choice to collaborate, such as Vichy France.

* In the Balkans, the Independent State of Croatia – a satellite state created by the Third - implemented a political policy to exterminate the Jews as well as Serbs

and Roma. The Ustaše planned the elimination of the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia, namely at the Jasenovac extermination camp. Coercive measures against the Serbs also took the form of forced conversions to Catholicism. The 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar was comprised almost entirely of Muslims from Bosnia, which had been annexed by the Independent State of Croatia. During the Second World War, Alija Izetbegović was a member of the "Young Muslims" (*Mladi muslimani*) organization, which collaborated with the Croatian fascist Ustaše regime and the Nazi occupiers.

* Extermination by starvation was also planned. The siege of Leningrad was part of the famine plan set up by the Nazis to starve the Soviets to death. This siege, which lasted 900 days, resulted in nearly a million civilian deaths, some 700,000 from starvation. In January 1942, several thousand civilians starved to death every day. The Dutch famine during the winter of 1944–45 (known as "Hunger Winter") occurred in the German-occupied part of the Netherlands. The German blockade, set up to punish Dutch reluctance to support the Nazi war effort, cut off food deliveries. Nearly 22,000 civilians died of starvation. The children of pregnant women who lived through this famine were more vulnerable to a number of diseases due to epigenetic changes that were passed on to the next generation (see section on transgenerational transmission of war trauma). The organized famine in the ghettos was also part of the plan to exterminate the Jews.

* The deportation to the Nazi extermination camps was organized with industrial efficiency. Forced population transfers were frequent following changes in the delimitation of borders or new territorial delimitations, and included population transfers as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the transfer of populations from annexed territories, and the transfer of millions of Germans after the German defeat (with more than 600,000 dead).

* During the Second World War, soldiers from all nations committed widespread rape during the invasion, occupation and liberation phases. Millions of Soviet women were raped by the German army, with between 750,000 and 1,000,000 children were born as a result of those rapes. When Nazi Germany fell in 1945, two million German women were raped by the Soviet army (10% to 20% of the female population was raped during the Red Army's takeover of Berlin). The Red Army was explicitly encouraged to terrorize the German populations through rape and large-scale looting as retaliation for the mass abused of the Third Reich in the USSR. American, British and French troops were also guilty of many rapes of not only German women and girls, but of German men and boys as well. Thousands of rapes (an estimated 14,000) were committed by American GIs in France and England (Lilly, 2007).

2.8. Post-War Justice

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which was held from 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946, was formed to bring Nazi war criminals, accused individually or as members of criminal organizations, to justice. It was the first time an international criminal court was established. The tribunal's indictments did not distinguish between war crimes and crimes against humanity. The characterization of genocide was made later, notably in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Most of the accused were convicted of both war crimes and crimes against humanity. Admiral Karl Dönitz was the only person to be convicted of war crimes without being charged with crimes against humanity. Nazi criminals were not tried by neutral States during the conflict but by four victorious powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain). During the proceedings, it was forbidden to show that the Allies had committed criminal acts comparable to those of the accused, including the strategic bombardment of major German cities. The impartiality of this court was therefore challenged, in particular because of how judges were selected and the ban on invoking *tu quoque*. On 11 December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly confirmed the principles of international law recognized by the statute of the Nuremberg tribunal and the judgements handed down, thereby giving them permanent value. The establishment of a permanent international criminal court did not come to fruition until the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.

3. Humanitarian Law and Violations

3.1. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

I. International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of rules that seeks to limit the impacts of war operations, in particular with regard to civilian populations and facilities and individuals who do not or no longer take part in combat (prisoners of war, refugees). The Geneva Conventions relating to war (1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols of 1977) are the main treaties applicable to international armed conflicts and non-international conflicts, more commonly referred to as civil wars. One of the primary goals of IHL is to protect civilians. The rules governing the con-

duct of hostilities provide the civilian population as a whole, and individual civilians in particular, with general protection against the impacts of the hostilities. The law imposes on the parties to an armed conflict the dual obligation to distinguish at all times between the civilian population and combatants (principle of distinction), and to direct their operations only against military targets. Civilians must not be deliberately attacked. In the same spirit, humanitarian law stipulates that civilians who have fallen into enemy hands must be treated humanely. The provisions of humanitarian law set out rules prohibiting all forms of endangerment to life, as well as torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

3.2. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Protocol II of 1977

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Protocol II of 1977 relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts stipulate that the following grave breaches are prohibited at all times and in any place:

* Violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment
* Collective punishments
* Taking of hostages
* Acts of terrorism
* Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault* Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms
* Pillage
* Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts

3.3. The Concept of Crime

The concept of crime falls within the area of human laws and the criminal domain, with criminal law qualifying crimes and setting the penalties incurred. The

concept of crime is closely linked to law and punishment: there is no crime without a law that characterizes it as such and without a corresponding penalty (*nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege*).

Ordinary or common law crimes are individual crimes, whether premeditated or not, often of an opportunistic nature. They are profit-driven or the result of the indulgence of sexual or sadistic impulses. They are common in times of war due to the inability of government and law enforcement agencies to protect citizens and control urban violence. As a result of social disorganization, homicidal violence can proliferate, as can looting, all types of trafficking, the black market and racketeering. Governments and authorities sometimes tolerate or promote such crimes against a community designated as hostile or detrimental.

Mass crimes are motivated by hatred based on nationality, ethnicity, political party membership or religion. They are intended to punish or terrorize all or part of a population. They sometimes aim to exterminate all or part of a population according to a vast plan of domination. These crimes are methodically planned and executed. They require the use of large-scale means of coercion involving State institutions.

3.4. Qualification of Crimes

The crimes committed in violation of IHL are subject to criminal qualification by courts. However, such criminal qualifications, particularly for genocide, are sometimes disputed by historians.

3.5. War Crimes

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg of 8 August 1945 defined a war crime as a serious violation of the laws and customs of war committed during an armed conflict. These include the grave breaches against civilians listed in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: willful killing, torture and inhuman treatment, taking of hostages, unlawful detention, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, deportation, destruction of towns or villages, extensive destruction not justified by military necessity, the looting of public or private property.

3.6. Crimes against Humanity

The concept of crime against humanity first appeared as a legal concept in 1945 in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. It was the result of a desire to hold those responsible for the horrendous atrocities committed during the Second World War to account. A crime against humanity is defined as any inhuman act committed against a civilian population, in particular on ethnic or religious grounds. Crimes against humanity involve either large-scale violence (quantitative element) or a type of methodical violence (qualitative element). Ordinary crimes can be qualified as crimes against humanity when they are committed on an authority's order as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against civilian populations on **account of their ethnic origin, political affiliation or religion.** There is no statute of limitations on crimes against humanity.

3.7. Crime of Genocide

The crime of genocide is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. According to the convention, genocide refers to any act committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, and specifically killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. This definition was upheld in the charters of the ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.

Whereas a crime against humanity is a crime against individuals, genocide is a crime against a specific group of people. **For Yves Ternon, a historian specialized in genocide, "**Genocide is an extreme form of crime against humanity. Genocide can be considered to exist when several conditions are met: physical destruction of a whole or a substantial part of a human group; people are killed for belonging to that group without distinction of age or sex; this mass murder is planned, and only a State or an organization that takes the place of the State is in a position to plan genocide on the geographical scale of a nation, or even a continent" (Ternon, 2007a; Ternon, 1995; Ternon, 2007b). The crime of genocide is not a spontaneous act: it occurs only when the ground has been laid for years or decades and is characterized by

the planning of the crime (Les génocides dans, 2004). The killing of civilians is not seen as an operational necessity to gain an advantage over the enemy, but as an end goal in itself. From a legal point of view, an act of genocide is not qualified as such because of the number of deaths, but according to the criteria of the Convention of 9 December 1948. Historians recognize three genocides.

* The Armenian Genocide was a genocide carried out from April 1915 to July 1916 during which the majority of Armenians living in what is today Turkey died due to deportations, famine and large-scale massacres. It was planned and executed by the ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), better known as the "Young Turks". These massacres cost the lives of nearly 1,300,000 Armenians, representing about two-thirds of the Armenian population at the time.

* The genocide against the Jews, or the Holocaust, refers to the systematic extermination of Europe's Jews by Nazi Germany (Hilberg, 2006). Women (including pregnant women), children (including newborns) and the elderly were killed alongside adult men. A third of world Jewry was exterminated (6 out of 18 million in total). The European Jewry was eliminated in its majority and never recovered from that disaster. The Holocaust stands apart for its industrial-scale, bureaucratic and systematic organization that made the Nazi genocide act the only of its kind in the history of humanity. For historians, this was the only planned genocide on European soil during the twentieth century and the only industrially organized genocide in the history of humanity.

3.7.1.1. Genocide against the Roma

The Nazi racial policy paid significant attention to the Roma. Heinrich Himmler was especially interested in them, as he believed that the Roma were of Aryan origin, but that their Aryan purity was disturbed by mixing with other races. In the beginning, he supported the plan to deport the Roma to reserves. Since 1935, the Roma have been imprisoned in camps where medical experiments have been carried out on them. During 1937, they were designated as a separate race, and in 1936, the Nuremberg Laws were extended to include them as well, depriving them of citizenship and the right to vote. Discussions on the final fate of the Roma lasted until 1942 when Himmler ordered them deported to concentration camps. Not all countries within the Nazi New Order had the same attitude towards the Roma. For instance, France handed over its Roma to the Germans, Romanian Roma were deported in mid-1942, while the Roma community in the ISC was mostly destroyed in the country itself, as

the genocide against Serbs radicalized and accelerated the process of extermination of Jews and Roma. On the other hand, there were countries, mainly in the Caucasus, that provided shelter to the Roma population in various ways. Certain estimates of the number of Roma killed during World War II range from 250,000 to 800,000, with the most relevant estimate being that some 500,000 European Roma were killed.

3.7.1.2. Genocide against Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia

According to relevant estimates, between 1,800,000 and 2,200,000 Serbs, who represented around 30% of the total population, lived in the Independent State of Croatia[6]. The ISC was formed on the territory of the occupied Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and it comprised the territory of today's Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and a part of Serbia.

According to Raul Hilberg, the ISC was Hitler's satellite par excellence. This means that, in order to solve the "Croatian question," it relied on the fabricated social and political climate created in Europe at that time by the Third Reich. Its essential specificity reflected in the fact that it was the only country in the Nazi New Order in which Jews were not the primary victims, but nonetheless, they were not spared persecution. On the contrary, the Jewish community in the ISC suffered in a proportionally higher degree in regards to the total number of the Jews living in it, several percent higher than the European average.

The primary victims of the genocide in the Independent State of Croatia were Serbs, as well as Jews, and Roma. Aside from them, anti-fascists of all nations also suffered. The official policy of the ISC stated that there was no place for Serbs in it, and their destruction was to be conducted in such a way that one third would be killed, one converted to the Roman Catholic faith and then assimilated, and one third expelled from the state.

In the areas where Serbs made up the majority, the endangered people, that is, the part of them that managed to avoid death, rebelled against the criminal policy of the Independent State of Croatia and launched one of the first anti-fascist resistance movements in occupied Europe. Until the end of the war, resistance movements on the territory of the occupied Kingdom of Yugoslavia had a predominantly Serbian character, and only after the capitulation of Italy, there was a somewhat increased number of Croat and Muslim soldiers present.

The final results of the four-year existence of the ISC were devastating. Between 20% and 25% of the total Serbian population living in the Independent State of Croatia

were expelled to the territory of occupied Serbia, and approximately as many were forcibly converted to the Roman Catholic faith. About 30% of the total Serb population was killed. During this period, the Serb communities in the territory that was under the effective control of the ISC were almost completely destroyed.

3.7.1.3. Genocide in Cambodia

In Cambodia, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime and his "Angkar" organization was responsible for the deaths of nearly two million people – a quarter of the country's population – between 1975 and 1979 (Kiernan, 1998). The Khmer Rouge set up nearly 200 detention and torture centers and more than 300 killing fields. After 1979, with the support of Western powers (United States, Great Britain and others), the executioners represented their victims at the UN, with Khmer Rouge official Thiounn Prasith holding the ambassador post from 1979 to 1991. The Khmer Rouge crimes were prosecuted in 2010 by a UN-sponsored court: the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge defector who has been in government since 1979, presided over the criminal proceedings and demanded that charges be limited in the name of national unity, while threatening civil war if new charges were brought. Kaing Guek Eav, also known as "Duch", oversaw the Tuol Sleng (S21) detention and torture center and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2012. Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were given life sentences in 2014 for crimes against humanity, namely for having ordered the forced evacuation of the population of Phnom Penh in April 1975. The destruction of the Khmer people by the Khmer Rouge, described by some as autogenocide, has not been qualified as genocide by the United Nations. In November 2018, some forty years after the events, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were found guilty of genocide against two communities eliminated by the Khmer Rouge because of their ethnicity: the Chams (Muslim minority) and the Vietnamese in Cambodia. David Scheffer, the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Expert on United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials, welcomed the ECCC's assessment. "The verdict is essentially the Nuremberg judgement for the ECCC and thus carries very significant weight for Cambodia, international criminal justice, and the annals of history." The charter of the court prohibited any reference to the role of certain Western powers in the outbreak of the Cambodian conflict.

3.7.1.4. Genocide in Rwanda

The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was carried out in 1994. Estimates show that between 70% and 80% of the Tutsi population of Rwanda (around 800,000 people) were massacred in three months, from 7 April 1994 to 17 July 1994 (Prunier, 1998). According to the UN, **between 250,000 and 500,000** women were raped during the genocide. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created on 8 November 1994 by a UN Security Council resolution.

3.7.2. The Distinction between Crime Against Humanity and Crime of Genocide

The distinction between crime against humanity and crime of genocide is not clearly established in law. Governments and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) frequently use the term genocide, which is then disseminated by the media, to justify the right of interference. A crime can be qualified as genocide by a criminal tribunal, whereas historians may not agree to the qualification and even challenge it.

* During the Nigerian Civil War, the suffering of the Biafran population was staged and horrible images were instrumentalized by the Western media, which had the intended effect of relegating the political stakes of the conflict to the background. The Geneva-based Markpress PR agency organized a communication campaign around genocide in Biafra. This campaign included hundreds of articles about genocide through starvation, with images of malnourished children used to make a comparison with the extermination of Jews during the Second World War. In its 21 August 1968 edition, the French daily newspaper *Le Monde* wrote, “The most horrific genocide since the Second World War continues”. Bernard Kouchner and other French doctors founded an organization to fight the genocide in Biafra, which raised considerable funds. Humanitarian aid was used to support the Biafran independence cause, i.e. for political gain. Several years later, it was found that there had been no genocide in Biafra and that the use of the term genocide was unjustified (Brauman, 2006, pp. 188-204; Semo, 2002; Brauman, 2004, pp. 58-59; Deux ou trois choses, 2008). It was also found that the use of the term genocide had been prompted by the French intelligence services (the SDECE) and largely taken up by Kouchner, the Markpress agency and the mainstream media.

***** The Srebrenica massacre in 1995 was not qualified as a crime against humanity but rather a genocide by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ICTY (Bastié, 2015). No UN resolution recognized a crime of genocide committed in Srebrenica and the ICJ considered that the Serbia had not committed genocide, had not participated in an agreement to commit genocide, and had not been complicit in genocide. While two-thirds of the Armenians, Jews and Tutsis were killed in genocides documented by historians, the total number of Bosnian Muslims killed in Srebrenica and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina during the civil war accounted for around 1% of the community. The term genocide was used only for the town of Srebrenica and not for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Never before had a massacre been confined to a municipality or a battlefield characterized as genocide. The ICJ decision opened a Pandora's Box by making a crime against humanity a crime of genocide.

For historian Yves Ternon, the countless crimes against humanity perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia from 1990 to 1995 do not constitute genocide. Srebrenica would have been a genocide if this type of act had been carried out in many other places, as was the case with the Armenian genocide in 1915–16, the genocide of the Jews during the Second World War, and the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994. Ternon stated that "What is most troublesome about the excessive use of the term genocide is that it leads to a competition amongst victims: groups claim to be victims of genocide when they have not experienced the same thing as the Armenians, Jews or Tutsis" (Ternon, 2007a).

Stephen Smith also criticized the ICTY's ruling that the Srebrenica massacre was genocide. "The ICTY judgement has been widely disseminated but not well analyzed. However, the sons and daughters of the victims of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide or the survivors of the genocide of the Tutsis of Rwanda must have been affected. Was it the same crime committed against their own ? […] Genocide stands apart in that the killing of civilians is not seen as an operational necessity to gain an advantage over the enemy, but as an end goal in itself" (Smith, 2004). In the case of the Srebrenica events, the civilian population was transported to Muslim-controlled territory at the request of the representatives of the civilian population and of the United Nations, and the largest group (other smaller groups were exchanged later on) of prisoners of war and able-bodied men were subsequently executed.

Rony Brauman, former president of MSF, said, "The facts are clear and accepted by all, but it was called a genocide. Srebrenica was the massacre of men of military age. It is an indisputable crime against humanity, but women, children, old people, people who were not considered potential threats were let go" (Deux ou trois choses, 2008).

General Lewis MacKenzie made the same observation. "The Bosnian Muslim

men and older boys were singled out and the elderly, women and children were moved out… If you're committing genocide, you don't let the women go since they are key to perpetuating the very group you are trying to eliminate" (MacKenzie, 1993).

General Philippe Morillon, the French general commanding the UN force in Bosnia from 1992 to 1993, testified that the Bosnian forces of Naser Orić, stationed in the enclave of Srebrenica, had committed horrible massacres in the local Serbian villages. "This led to these protected areas […] gradually becoming areas within which Bosnian forces could feel relatively secure and which they used as a base from which to launch attacks against the Serbs. […] Naser Orić, who was the commander of the Bosnian army forces in this enclave, himself admits that he ended up conducting a war from this enclave that resulted in massacres of the Serb population in the surrounding villages. He had thus become public enemy number one for the Serbs, particularly as a result of an action for which they never wanted to forgive him and which took place on Orthodox Christmas Eve, a sacred night in January 1993, when he carried out raids on Serbian villages and massacred the population. […] There were severed heads. There had been abominable massacres committed by the forces of Naser Orić in all the surrounding villages" (French National Assembly, 2001, pp.140-154).

General Morillon also stated that the fall of Srebrenica was ordered by Alija Izetbegović. "And, as you probably know – if not, I published it without ever being refuted – the Bosnian forces withdrew before the fall of Srebrenica. […] I am convinced that the population of Srebrenica fell victim to the raison d'état, but a raison d'état in Sarajevo and in New York. […] I am not afraid to say that it was Sarajevo that deliberately caused the tragedy. It was the president, it was Izetbegović. Naser Orić obeyed orders from the Bosnian president in Sarajevo" (French National Assembly, 2001, pp.140-154).

* In the spring of 1998, the ethnic Albanians accused the Serbs of genocide. This unfounded accusation was taken up by the American government (Doggett, 1999). Officials at NATO and the US State Department repeatedly referred to a "genocide" in Kosovo. German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping, whose words were picked up by the media, also claimed that the Serbs were committing "genocide". According to information released by Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer and German military authorities, the Serbs had planned the deportation of ethnic Albanians in a plan called "Operation Horseshoe" (*Potkova*) (Loquai, 2000). US president Bill Clinton stated that the NATO campaign that was launched without a UN mandate was intended to thwart "deliberate and systematic efforts of ethnic cleansing and genocide". Nathalie Duclos, a university lecturer in political science, wrote in *Le Monde* on 30 March 1999 that "NATO's intervention is therefore timely, when the

UN Security Council would have blocked it. Due to the presence of non-democratic countries such as China and Russia, this Council lacks the credibility to carry out peace missions in the world. NATO is therefore playing a welcome role in taking over from the UN to ensure regional stability and prevent genocide". It has now been clearly established that there was no genocide in Kosovo and that the Horseshoe plan was a crude sham (Halimi & Rimbert, 2019). For Jean-Arnault Dérens[7] and Laurent Geslin[8], journalists specializing in the Balkans, the Horseshoe plan was "archetypical fake news disseminated by Western armies and spread by all the major European newspapers"(Halimi & Rimbert, 2019). The leader of a Spanish research team published an article upon its return from Kosovo entitled "War Crimes, Yes, Genocide, No!". If the figure of 10,000 victims killed is considered, this would mean that less than 1% of the total population of Kosovo was killed in this war. The investigation by Daniel Pearl and Robert Block, published in *The Wall Street Journal* on 31 December 1999, wrote that "Ethnic-Albanian militants, humanitarian organizations, NATO and the news media fed off each other to give genocide rumors credibility" (Pearl & Block, 1999; Steel, 2000). French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy was one of the greatest propagators in France of these rumors of genocide (Halimi, 2003; Beau & Toscer, 2006).

***** During the summer of 2004, the US and British governments claimed that a genocide was taking place in Darfur (Darfour: Powell accuse, 2004; Les Etats-Unis qualifient, 2004; Darfour: Bush parle, 2004; Querelle sémantique autour, 2004; Bradol, 2004; *Kofi Annan nomme,* 2004). Thierry Allafort-Duverger, from Médecins Sans Frontières, rejected this characterization, saying, "For us, looking at the analysis and the facts, there is no genocide going on in Darfur. There is a tendency nowadays to overuse this term and there is a propaganda-like distortion that can only harm relief efforts. This is not to deny the deaths, the killings, the hundreds of villages burned and the millions of refugees. We are simply trying to tell the truth" (Un drame humanitaire, 2004). Renaud Muselier, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said, "This characterization of genocide was not repeated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, nor by Jan Pronk, the Special Representative for Sudan, in his report on the situation, by Médecins Sans Frontières or by me when I visited the region in June. What is clear is that Darfur is the scene of a major humanitarian crisis and massive and serious human rights violations. We support the idea of an accurate UN survey" (Muselier, 2004). On 31 January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations published its report concluding that the abuses in Darfur did indeed constitute crimes against humanity, but that the accusations of genocide were unfounded (United Nations, 2005; UN Clears Sudan, 2005).

3.8. Ethnic Cleansing

Ethnic cleansing is not clearly defined from a legal point of view and is not recognized as a specific crime under international law. This term refers to a violation of international humanitarian law, consisting in expelling persons belonging to a particular ethnic group from a territory. Ethnic cleansing has a territorial purpose; it aims to create an ethnically homogeneous geographical area by force. Its intent is not the physical or biological destruction of a group. From the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the term "ethnic cleansing" was attributed only to the Serbs, before being assimilated to a genocidal intention where "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide" were associated (Krieg-Planque, 2003). Crimes that should be qualified as war crimes or crimes against humanity (forced population transfer, rape, etc.) have been characterized as methods of "ethnic cleansing". The definition of genocide has been broadened with terms such as "genocidal acts" and phrasing such as "rape as an act of genocide" or "genocidal rape". Why was the idea of 'ethnic cleansing' introduced if not to avoid the qualification of war crimes and crimes against humanity, to maintain semantic confusion and to suggest that the Serbs planned to carry out genocide? The term also suggested that Croats, Muslims and Bosnian Serbs belonged to three different ethnic groups. Accusations of ethnic cleansing have been made against Serbs in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, while the only actual ethnic cleansing of the war in the former Yugoslavia was carried out at the expense of the Serb population in Croatia and Kosovo.

3.9. International Criminal Courts

The signatory States to the Geneva Convention have agreed to take all necessary legislative measures to establish adequate criminal sanctions for those who have committed or ordered grave breaches of the Convention. The signatory States accept the obligation to search for those who have been accused of committing or ordering grave breaches. If the criminal escapes the law and the sanction of the courts, the reality of the crime can be challenged and justice is not delivered. The absence of justice can aggravate individual or collective trauma, compromise the reconciliation process and encourage the repetition of crimes.

1. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the first international criminal court, was set up to judge war crimes and crimes against humanity committed

during the Second World War. The charter of this tribunal, which was set up by four victorious powers, did not allow the Allies' war crimes to be judged or *tu quoque* to be invoked.

2. The crime of genocide is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 26 November 1968.

3. Two ad hoc tribunals were established by a UN Security Resolution in the 1990s:

* The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was a temporary court, established on 25 May 1993 by a Security Council resolution and not by the UN General Assembly. The purpose of this ad hoc court, which was dissolved on 31 December 2017, was to prosecute persons guilty of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo) taking place from January 1991.

The many pressures exerted on the judges and witnesses of this court always served the cause of Croats, Bosniaks and ethnic Albanians. War crimes trials have resulted in acquittals due to the retraction, disappearance or murder of prosecution witnesses. Many of the witnesses called by the prosecution did not dare to continue their testimony, fearing for their lives and noting the inability of the court to protect them. Many suspects were not charged (Sefer Halilović, Agim Čeku, Hashim Thaçi, among others), while some were acquitted on appeal or had their sentences considerably reduced (Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markač, Naser Orić, Ramush Haradinaj, Rahim Ademi and many others). The Serbs, however, were always punished with the utmost severity, and one only has to compare the number of charges and the severity of the sentences against the different parties to the conflict to be convinced of the bias of this court.

French journalist Florence Hartmann-Domankušić, who is close to Croatian nationalist circles, was a spokesperson and advisor to ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte from 2000 to 2006. As a journalist with *Le Monde* for more than ten years, Hartmann covered the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s with an anti-Serb bias, a bias that was also reflected in her books (Hartmann, 1999; Hartmann 2007; Hartmann 2015). In 2006, she testified against officers of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) who were charged with war crimes in Croatia. She was awarded the Human Rights Prize by the Croatian Helsinki Committee. In 2008 Hartmann was convicted by the ICTY for the disclosure of information relating to confidential ICTY decisions. By divulging this information, Hartmann was attempting to have the Serbian State condemned by the International Court of Justice for a "genocide" in Srebrenica.

Other journalists acted as zealous collaborators of the ICTY prosecutor. In its Friday, 19 December 1997 edition, *Le Monde* ran a front page headline announcing the publication of the names and addresses of the persons indicted by the ICTY. On page 2, Rémy Ourdan divulged sensitive information from the ICTY that should never have been disclosed and that was likely to endanger the lives of Serbian individuals: detailed home addresses, places frequented outside of professional activities, the colour of their private vehicles, identifying tattoos and even the towns where these individuals' parents lived. At a time of civil war, this type of article could be considered as a call to murder and score-settling. Being indicted by the ICTY did not in any way prove these individuals' guilt, if one considers the number of indicted non-Serbs who were later acquitted by the tribunal.

On 16 December 2010, the Council of Europe took note of the report by Dick Marty, a Swiss parliamentarian, on organ trafficking organized by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Dérens, 2011a; Dérens, 2011b; Dérens, 2012). Hashim Thaçi compared Marty's report to "Goebbels' propaganda". The organ trafficking was carried out by the "Drenica group", a core group of KLA fighters under the orders of Thaçi. In 1998 and 1999, several hundred Kosovo Serbs, as well as Roma and Albanians accused of "collaboration" with the Serbs, were deported to Albania and executed for organ harvesting. This trafficking continued at least until 2011, two years after the entry of NATO troops into Kosovo and the establishment of the UN protectorate in the region. The European Union considered that an investigation should be carried out by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which was set up in 2008 to assist Kosovo's institutions in building the rule of law. Due to a lack of genuine political will, *neither the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) nor EULEX conducted any real investigations into the missing Serbs or Roma.* Several hundred records even disappeared when the EULEX mission took over from UNMIK in December 2008.

This organ trafficking had already been mentioned in Del Ponte's 2009 memoir (Del Ponte, 2009). In various interviews, Hartmann, who was Del Ponte's former spokesperson, criticized Del Ponte's "irresponsible actions", calling them "facts created from hypotheses", underscoring the investigations carried out by the ICTY that had not turned up any conclusive evidence. Hartmann told the Swiss newspaper *Le Temps* that "Carla Del Ponte encourages confusion between rumor and fact, and thus risks giving revisionists wide latitude. Her work at the ICTY was to seek the truth despite the obstacles, and thus to combat denial and manipulation. She is now taking us back into the darkest hours of propaganda" (Hartmann, 2008). However, the investigations Hartmann referred to were never carried out, mainly because of the Albanian authorities' refusal to cooperate. The authorities refused to comply with ICTY investigators' requests in 2003 to exhume bodies in the Rripë cemetery, with

'cultural grounds' given as the official justification. In her book, Del Ponte described the wall she ran up against when she tried, from 2000 onwards, to investigate KLA crimes, citing UNMIK chief Bernard Kouchner by name. In an attempt to explain these road blocks, she wrote, "I am sure that the UNMIK and even KFOR [Kosovo Force] officials feared for their lives and for the lives of the members of their missions" (Del Ponte, 2009). Canadian Captain Stu Kellock, former head of the UNMIK Police Force, said on 21 December 2010, 'I can't say that Kouchner knew about the organ trafficking, but it is impossible that he had no information about organized crime in Kosovo'. When asked in 2010 by a Serbian journalist about organ trafficking during an official trip to Kosovo, then Foreign Minister Kouchner burst out laughing scornfully and suggested that the journalist 'go and get his head checked'. Captain Kellock also explained that any criticism of Hashim Thaçi and his entourage was systematically rejected in the circles where he worked. It should be noted that Thaçi, a friend of Kouchner, was advised during the Kosovo war by Western military intelligence services, in particular French foreign intelligence.

On Tuesday, 29 July 2014, US prosecutor Clint Williamson presented the findings of a three-year investigation carried out in Kosovo and Albania by an investigative body set up by the European Union (Dérens, 2014). Williamson fully confirmed the facts reported by lead investigator Dick Marty as early as the end of 2010 to the Council of Europe and stated that there was sufficient evidence to bring charges against several leaders of the former KLA, including Hashim Thaçi. Because these crimes were not tried by the ICTY, and some of them were committed after the 1999 war, it was decided to create a new special tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed in Kosovo. This special court, which was established in 2016 in The Hague despite fierce opposition from the Kosovo parliament, did no better than previous courts. Thaçi had declared that this "unfair" court was "the greatest insult to Kosovo". On 18 December 2019, Nazmi Rrustemi, a 63-year-old former forest ranger and protected witness of the special prosecutor of this court, was murdered near Pristina. Rrustemi had been imprisoned in KLA camps, making him an important source of information on crimes committed by the KLA. This murder once again shows the ineffectiveness of the prosecution witness protection program against certain war criminals.

The ICTY was unable to try the crimes of the NATO forces, which intervened without an explicit UN mandate and repeatedly bombed civilian targets. During the war against Serbia, NATO sought the "Dresden effect", which aims to exhaust the morale of a people whose buildings, bridges, power stations, factories, oil refineries, switchboards and television relay stations are bombed. The distinction between anti-force strikes and anti-city strikes has been eroded in favor of "legitimate military targets". During the night of 22–23 April 1999, the NATO air force targeted the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) studios in the heart of Belgrade, killing 16 journalists at

their workstations. For NATO, the media was included as a legitimate military target. The "Dresden effect" was explicitly claimed by US Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Short when he stated in *The Washington Post* on 24 May 1999 with regard to the Serbian civilian population that "If you wake up in the morning and there is no electricity at home, no gas, the bridge you use to go to work is destroyed and may be in the Danube for twenty years, you start to wonder how long you will have to put up with all this." Collusion between NATO and the ICTY was revealed on numerous occasions. Based on the Geneva Convention and the laws and customs of war, international lawyers have accused NATO of committing serious violations of international law against the Yugoslav civilian population. Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, they sent a detailed dossier to the ICTY, but Del Ponte said the court had more urgent tasks than prosecuting the Western leaders who were its best supporters. Amnesty International also accused NATO and its leaders of deliberately attacking civilian targets. In a statement issued on 7 June 2000, Amnesty International said that "NATO Member States must bring to justice each of their nationals suspected of being responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. […] The 23 April 1999 bombing of the headquarters of Serbian state Television and Radio (RTS), which killed 16 civilians, was a deliberate attack on a civilian target and as such constitutes a war crime". ICTY Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt said that Del Ponte "did not believe there was a sufficient basis to prosecute NATO or NATO personnel" in relation to the bombings. NATO Secretary General George Robertson, relying on the statements of Carla Del Ponte and her deputy, called Amnesty International's accusations "baseless" and responded to the association by saying that "the accusations are unfounded". "NATO scrupulously respected international law, including the humanitarian law of war, throughout the conflict." Del Ponte closed the debate by stating that the ICTY would then focus on "its real task, which is the arrest and prosecution of Yugoslav officials who have committed crimes against humanity".

* The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was the second largest international criminal court in the world and was set up on 8 November 1994 by the UN Security Council. Its headquarters were based in Arusha, Tanzania. This tribunal completed its work on 31 December 2015 with an assessment that was criticized by many experts. The ICTR's mandate was to prosecute persons allegedly responsible for acts of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda, as well as Rwandan citizens allegedly responsible for such acts or violations of international law committed in the territory of neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The ICTR was also meant to contribute to the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the maintenance of peace in the region. The court's scope of investigation was limited to crimes related to the genocide of the Tutsis. The ICTR took no action against war crimes or crimes against

humanity attributable to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)[9]. Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte[10] oversaw unsuccessful attempts to conduct investigations against the RPF. The Rwandan government, a result of the RPF victory, refused to cooperate as it considered that it alone had jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes. It should be noted that some countries have options within their legislation to prosecute persons in their territories accused of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes (universal jurisdiction). Belgium, France, Switzerland and Canada have used the universal jurisdiction of their national courts to prosecute individuals suspected of involvement in the Tutsi genocide.

A report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published in 2010, called the Mapping Exercise report, lists the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed between March 1993 and June 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations, 2010). During this period, six million people were killed, hundreds of thousands of women and children were victims of sexual violence, and four million people were forcibly displaced. Regarding the massacres committed against Rwandan Hutu refugees and Congolese Hutu citizens, the report states that the attacks committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and its allies "reveal a number of inculpatory elements that, if proven before a competent court, could be characterized as crimes of genocide". The RPA, now known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front, was a rebel Tutsi army that became the regular army of the Rwandan regime following its victory in 1994. The mapping report recommended establishing a special court and transitional justice to ensure that these crimes did not go unpunished. The identities of the perpetrators of the crimes are not given in the public report, but they do appear in a confidential database containing the names of senior political and military officials in the Great Lakes Region. The report went unheeded. In March 2016, Dr Denis Mukwege wrote an open letter signed by nearly 200 NGOs to the OHCHR, calling for the publication of the database identifying those mainly responsible for the crimes described in the mapping report. The OHCHR replied that disclosure of such information could endanger victims and witnesses of the violations. On 10 December 2018, on the occasion of his Nobel Peace Prize reception speech, Dr Mukwege once again mentioned the forgotten mapping report, saying, "As I speak to you, a report is gathering mold in an office drawer in New York" (Mukwege, 2018). The mapping report was buried and those responsible for the atrocities described in it have so far enjoyed total impunity (Hogard, 2016; Hogard, 2009).

4. The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague (Netherlands) is the first permanent, treaty-based international criminal court with jurisdiction to prosecute the most serious crimes, regardless of where they are committed. The Charter of the ICC was adopted in July 1998 in Rome. The United States has never ratified the ICC. In

2002, the US Congress passed the American Service-Members' Protection Act, a law designed to protect members of the US government and military from prosecution by the ICC. The United States prohibits any extradition of a US national to the ICC and is prepared to release by force any US citizen who is brought before the ICC. Furthermore, the United States will only participate in UN peacekeeping operations with the guarantee of full immunity from the ICC's jurisdiction. When the ICC considered opening an investigation into war crimes committed in Afghanistan by US soldiers, US National Security Advisor John Bolton threatened ICC prosecutors, as well as any State taking part in an ICC investigation involving the United States, with very explicit sanctions (Paris, 2018). In March 2020 the ICC validated the opening of an investigation targeting American soldiers for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan (La Cour pénale, 2020). President Trump reacted by taking economic retaliatory measures against magistrates and ICC officials (Executive order on blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court, June 11, 2020) (Donald Trump menace, 2020; Trump OKs Sanctions, 2020).

5. International criminal courts are responsible for investigating, indicting and prosecuting criminals who have acted individually or within joint criminal enterprises. Anyone who has planned, incited, ordered, committed or in any other way aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of a crime against humanity is individually responsible for that crime. The following acts are also punishable: genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempted genocide and complicity in genocide. Individual responsibility is sometimes hard to establish, especially for members of irregular forces who are difficult to identify (paramilitary groups, mercenaries, snipers, etc.). Criminal investigations and expertise in various fields (ballistics, forensics, etc.), conducted with rigor and impartiality, are often necessary to obtain proof of guilt.

The establishment of 'ad hoc' international courts in the aftermath of armed conflicts is primarily for political purposes of power. The justice rendered by these courts is a negotiated and partial justice that ensures the impunity of one party to the conflict and prohibits Western powers being blamed for any part of the outbreak or development of the conflict. It should be noted that to date no international criminal court has agreed to prosecute war crimes committed by Western military personnel, whether American, British or French. Dr Mukwege has repeatedly said that "There is no lasting peace without justice. Yet, justice is not negotiable" (Mukwege, 2018).

3.10. Transitional Justice

Transitional justice refers to a range of judicial and non-judicial measures to address the consequences of human rights violations in post-conflict societies**.** The establishment of impartial justice and the recognition of victims promotes the return to a peaceful functioning of society and reduces the risk of recurrence of violence. The main objectives of transitional justice are to establish the truth and re-establish the law, uncover the responsibility of those who committed violations, compensate victims and promote reconciliation.

*** The right to truth.** Truth-seeking encompasses all initiatives that help uncover human rights violations and the suffering endured by victims. For relatives of missing persons, suffering can be alleviated by providing information on the circumstances of the disappearance or the possibility of finding and identifying the bodies. Measures to facilitate the search for truth may include declassification of archives, independent investigations and "truth commissions". Truth commissions are non-judicial investigative commissions tasked with uncovering the war crimes and human rights violations committed by a government or by non-State actors.

*** The right to justice.** Transitional justice aims to identify and punish those responsible for human rights violations. It is only by delivering fair justice for victims that civil war will not resume. The use of amnesty for those guilty of serious crimes can jeopardize the reconciliation process. As such, it is worth recalling the statement by Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY, before the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 29 August 1994. "Some apprehensions were expressed lest the establishment of the Tribunal might jeopardize the peace process. In fact, the Tribunal will contribute to the peace process by creating conditions rendering a return to normality less difficult. How could one hope to restore the rule of law and the development of stable, constructive and healthy relations among ethnic groups, within or between independent States, if the culprits are allowed to go unpunished? Those who have suffered, directly or indirectly, from their crimes are unlikely to forgive or set aside their deep resentment. How could a woman who had been raped by servicemen from a different ethnic group or a civilian whose parents or children had been killed in cold blood quell their desire for vengeance if they knew that the authors of these crimes were left unpunished and allowed to move around freely, possibly in the same town where their appalling actions had been perpetrated? The only civilized alternative to this desire for revenge is to render justice: to conduct a fair trial by a truly independent and impartial tribunal and to punish those found guilty. If no fair trial is held, feelings of hatred and resentment seething below the

surface will, sooner or later, erupt and lead to renewed violence."

*** The right to reparations.** Reparations aim to compensate victims to at least partially redress the harm done to them, help them overcome the consequences of the violence they suffered and enable them to rebuild their lives. Reparations may include material and financial compensation and social benefits such as free access to health care or education, as well as symbolic compensation such as a public apology.

3.11. Memorials and Memory Laws

Memorials are intended to preserve and maintain the memory of people or events through ceremonies and monuments. In the context of transitional justice, they provide an opportunity to honor those who died during conflicts and show respect for the victims. They can preserve the memory of certain events to prevent denial and avoid their repetition.

Long after the fact, commemorative days remain an opportunity to celebrate the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs or to perpetuate the lies and the demonization campaign against the Serbs. In 2015, 20 years after the war, Croatia, a member of the European Union, celebrated the ethnic cleansing of the Krajina Serbs. A well-known reporter at the French daily *Le Figaro*, Jean-Christophe Buisson, was one of the few journalists to be outraged. "The President of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, gave an exalted speech in which she spoke of a 'brilliant, justified and legitimate operation'. Willingly lyrical, and slightly martial, she told fellow citizens they should be 'proud of and commended for the event'. But behind this lovely military celebration with a fair-like atmosphere was nothing less than an operation of ethnic cleansing that Croatia, a member of the European Union for two years, has joyously celebrated. Just twenty years ago, with the unofficial help of American military advisers circumventing the hypocritical UN embargo, the Croatian army launched a vast operation to reconquer Krajina. And today, is there not a single voice to publicly denounce these cheerful celebrations of an act as serious as ethnic cleansing? 'Storm' (*Oluja* in Serbo-Croatian), the frenzied attack by the Croatian troops, was a triumph. This seemingly traditional act of war was accompanied by ethnic cleansing and an outbreak of violent anti-Serb reprisals in the days and weeks that followed. With Croatian army planes flying overhead and sometimes machine-gunning them down, tens of thousands of Serbian families had to abandon their homes, their land, their neighbors, and their history overnight without any hope of return, forced out into exile by tanks whose red and white chequered flags, let us remember, are the same as those of the pro-Nazi

Ustaše – who half a century earlier were guilty of genocide against Jews, Serbs and Gypsies living in the former kingdom of Yugoslavia. Centuries of living in the region and resistance to the Ottoman invasion were erased in a few hours. Loaded up on tractors, carts or trucks for the luckiest (the others on foot, a meagre bundle slung over one shoulder), forming a human and mechanical traffic jam of several hundred kilometers, these 200,000 men, women, children and old people fleeing to the east were not, in their overwhelming majority, the bloodthirsty warlords complacently described by reporters and novelists seeking to whip up emotion. Some ended up in refugee camps in the suburbs of Belgrade (without electricity, heating and sometimes water), others were sent to the south of the country to 'repopulate Kosovo'... from where they were chased away again, this time by the Albanians, after 1999! Operation Storm was approved on the island of Brioni in late July 1995 by the ultranationalist president of Croatia, Franjo Tuđjman, and orchestrated by generals Čermak, Markač and Gotovina. The latter, who had no qualms about raining shells down (more than 900!) on the town of Knin when it no longer put up any resistance, was arrested in 2005, charged with war crimes by the ICTY in The Hague, convicted ... and then acquitted. On his return to Croatia, he was received as a national hero for his grisly act. Is it really appropriate for the current Croatian government to celebrate it with great pomp and circumstance, before and still today?" (Buisson, 2015). Jean-Christophe Buisson's article refers in many respects to the exodus of Serbs from both Sarajevo and Kosovo: three major exoduses with no hope of return.

* **Historical negationism or denialism** is the denial of historical facts, despite the presence of blatant evidence reported by historians. The term "Holocaust denial" was coined in 1987 to refer to the denial of the reality of the genocide carried out against the Jews by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. It also refers to the denial or minimization of the crimes against humanity condemned by the tribunal at Nuremberg. By extension, it refers to the denial or minimization of other historical facts characterized as genocide or crimes against humanity. In some countries, specific laws punish genocide denial.

* A memory law is a law declaring a State's official view of historical events. Some laws contain criminal sanctions and prohibit the expression of other views. In France, criminal sanctions are provided for in the event of denial or outrageous minimization of the Jewish genocide during the Second World War. The memory law on the Armenian genocide was found to be contrary to the French constitution by the Senate Law Commission and the former president of the Constitutional Council Robert Badinter, for whom "the French Parliament has not been granted the constitutional competence to tell history. It is for historians alone to do so" (Badinter: "Le Parlementn'est, 2012). Many historians have spoken out against memory laws. *Liberté pour l'histoire* (freedom for history) is a French association opposed to memory

laws. It is chaired by historian Pierre Nora and takes its name from a call launched in December 2005 by 19 historians, including Pierre Vidal-Naquet. The call, initially presented in the French daily newspaper *Libération* and reprinted in the magazine *L'Histoire*, protests against the abuses that have led to legal proceedings, based on memory laws, against historians and philosophers (Azéma et al., 2005). The association of historians stated that "In a free state, it is not for parliament or the judiciary to define the historical truth". The association believes that articles of law "have restricted historians' freedom, have told them, under penalty of punishment, what they must seek and what they must find, and have prescribed methods and set limits". It is important to point out that in most trials involving various forms of historical denial, judgements have been handed down without recourse to specific laws but to the law punishing incitement of racial hatred, since this legal mechanism appears to be sufficient.

* A draft law adopted in early February 2018 by the Polish parliament included provisions that allowed up to three years' imprisonment of any person who "publicly and contrary to the reality of the facts, attributes to the Republic of Poland and the Polish nation responsibility or co-responsibility for Nazi crimes perpetrated by the German Third Reich" (Un regrettable projet, 2018). This memory text on the Holocaust has aroused strong reactions, particularly in Israel and the United States. It was interpreted as the desire of the Polish government, led by the nationalist Law and Justice party, to rewrite Poland's history. While it is true that there were no "Polish death camps" during the Second World War, there were extermination camps created and run by Nazi Germany on occupied Polish territory. The Polish State did not collaborate with the Third Reich and did not participate in the Holocaust. However, the wording of the charges in this law was broad enough to dissuade historians and journalists from talking about the participation of some Polish people in the crimes and pogroms of the Occupation. In June 2018, the Polish Parliament had to amend this controversial law and abolish prison sentences. At the time, the Polish and Israeli Prime Ministers, Mateusz Morawiecki and Benjamin Netanyahu, issued a joint declaration. "We support free and open historical expression and research on all aspects of the Holocaust so that it can be conducted without any fear of legal obstacles (...). We reject the actions aimed at blaming Poland or the Polish nation as a whole for the atrocities committed by the Nazis (...). Unfortunately, the sad fact is that some people – regardless of their origin, religion or worldview – revealed their darkest side at that time" (Iwaniuk, 2018).

In December 2019, Poland and Russia blamed each other for the outbreak of the Second World War (Tensions entre la Pologne, 2019). The Polish president referred to the German-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 and the Soviet hostile acts towards Poland before and during the Second World War. The Russian

president, referring to the Munich Agreement of 1938, blamed the conflict on the Western powers and accused Poland of collusion with Hitler on the eve of the Second World War. The Russian president strongly criticized the "European Parliament Resolution of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe". This resolution, which equates communism with the Nazi regime, has also been criticized by a Belgian association of academics and intellectuals who reject an official history dictated by parliament, as historians must pursue their research free from political intimidation **(**Group of academics, intellectuals and artists, 2019**)**. The discord between Russia and Poland continued until the commemoration of the liberation of Auschwitz in January 2020 (Vitkine & Su, 2020).

4. Humanitarian Action

Several international institutions and organizations intervene during armed conflicts to provide humanitarian assistance and/or ensure compliance with humanitarian law. Their impartiality and neutrality are often the subject of fierce controversy.

4.1. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an international institution that monitors the application of the Geneva Conventions. The fundamental principles that guide the ICRC's humanitarian practice are impartiality, neutrality and independence. To maintain trust among all parties, the ICRC refrains from taking part in hostilities and, at all times, in controversies of a political, racial, religious or philosophical nature. It is neither its purpose nor its mission to influence the development of the legal and social order or to take part in national or international power struggles. In accordance with its fundamental principles, the ICRC refuses to share any information relating to its activities in the context of commissions of inquiry. For this reason, the ICRC has refused to respond to our Commission's requests for information on prisons where Serbs were being held, in particular the Silos prison in Hadžići. The ICRC Legal Division's response to our request, dated 19 July 2019, is as follows: "Dear Sir, I am following up on your message below, which Mr De P. forwarded on to me. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is not in

a position to grant your request to authorize Mr De P. to share with you information concerning the ICRC's visits to the Silos prison in Hadžići in November and December 1992. Disclosure of such information would be contrary to the ICRC's mandate and Fundamental Principles, as recognized by States through the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional Protocols of 1977, and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. In order to preserve its ability to fulfil this mandate, and to fully conduct its operational activities for the protection and assistance of victims of armed conflicts and other situations of violence in a manner consistent with the above-mentioned Principles, the ICRC shall operate through bilateral and confidential dialogue with the parties concerned and shall refrain from sharing any information relating to its activities in judicial, public inquiry, fact-finding or similar procedures. Accordingly, ICRC staff members are required to show the utmost discretion regarding information acquired in the course of their activities on behalf of the ICRC and are bound in this respect, even after their duties have concluded, by an obligation analogous to professional secrecy. In particular, they are required to refrain from testifying about facts learned and information collected in the course of their activities for the ICRC. Moreover, the ICRC enjoys a privilege of non-disclosure under international law, under which its confidential information is protected from use in administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, including the testimony of its current or former employees. Thus, for the reasons mentioned above, the ICRC is not in a position to allow Mr De P. to disclose the information you are seeking. Thank you in advance for your understanding. Yours Sincerely, Signed: Elem Khairullin, Legal Counsel". However, in June 1992, a Bosniak representative of the Red Cross described a prison camp controlled by Serbs as follows: "What else would you call a camp where civilians die a slow death or disappear, other than an extermination camp?" (Sarajevo appelle à, 1992).

The major international humanitarian organizations came into being in the 1980s after the Nigerian Civil War. In the 1970s, a group of French doctors went to Biafra at the ICRC's request. This conflict, set against a backdrop of ethnic and religious tensions, pitted the Biafran independence fighters and the Nigerian government against each other. The former colonial powers of the United Kingdom and France were the main external protagonists in this conflict, with the British supporting the Nigerian federal forces and France supporting the Biafran secessionists. Bernard Kouchner and the French doctors decided to break with the principles of neutrality of the Red Cross and took up the cause of the Biafran secessionists. For the first time in the ICRC's history, some of its volunteers decided to violate the rule prohibiting the public expression of its delegates and rejected the principle of neutrality *(Le Monde*, 23 October 1968). In response to the main principles defended by the Red Cross, these doctors demanded the possibility of political involvement and of denouncing, with

the help of the media, breaches of international conventions. Their stated aim was to raise public awareness and to influence political institutions. One of the consequences of the Nigerian Civil War was a shift in the doctrine of humanitarian aid, which began to support the intense media coverage of conflicts and the right of interference. The group of French doctors decided to create NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières – MSF (1971), which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999, and Médecins du Monde – MDM (1980). Kouchner embodied a form of complicity between humanitarian action and political commitment (Floquet & Coq, 1993; Péan, 2009). He co-founded MSF and MDM and later served as French Minister of Health and Humanitarian Affairs (1992/1993), Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Kosovo (1999/2001), and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs (2007/2010). Throughout the war in the former Yugoslavia, MSF and MDM displayed their bias in favor of one side in the conflict.

On 7 December 1992, Médecins Sans Frontières published a public report that gathered sixty testimonials from former Bosniak prisoners. In a televised speech that received considerable attention from the town of Velika Kladuša, Rony Brauman, president of MSF, denounced "the industrialization of murder" and "the concentration camps" set up by the "Serbian ultra-nationalists" (INA & France, 1992). An anonymous Bosniak ex-convict also spoke, who talked of "a butchery, a slaughterhouse" where Serbs amused themselves by skinning one of their prisoners "like a sheep". Brauman was flanked by celebrities such as French actor Roger Hanin.

Victims' accounts gathered by Médecins du Monde were submitted in May 1994 to the ICTY. At the time, Claire Boulanger, MDM programme manager, called on NGOs to collaborate with the ICTY. "The Tribunal's Statute indicates that 'the Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained from ... non-governmental organizations'. NGOs are therefore entitled to exercise their 'right to notify'. […] MDM, which works with victims, considers that it has a responsibility to gather accounts from witnesses. This action is an incentive: we believe in justice and understand the value of reparations. Based on this principle, we hope to see many other organizations collaborate with the International Tribunal" (Boulanger, 1994).

On its website, MDM sums up its activities during the war in the former Yugoslavia as follows: "From 1991, Yugoslavia was in the process of a violent and bloody break-up. Doctors of the World intervened in Croatia and Bosnia from the first year of the Wars of Independence, organizing deliveries of medicines to besieged towns and cities and to the first refugees. It arranged the first international convoy which, on 10 June 1992, opened up the route to Sarajevo, two months after the start of the siege of the city. Faced with the systematic brutality of ethnic cleansing, a campaign was organized in December of the same year to condemn the Serbian detention camps and

the crimes against humanity. Our action in Bosnia lasted 6 years, moving from emergency to mother-and-child and mental health programs from 1993-1994. In 1995, we published a collection of eyewitness accounts of ethnic cleansing, which was submitted to the International Criminal Court for Ex-Yugoslavia: this contribution placed Doctors of the World at the heart of the fight against impunity" (Médecins du monde, 1993). MDM qualified the wars in Croatia and Bosnia as "wars of independence" and placed itself at the center of the fight against impunity by collaborating with the ICTY.

Under the leadership of Bernard Kouchner, MDM chose its side from the beginning of the war by financing a poster campaign aiming to demonize the Serbian president by comparing him to Hitler (Appendix I to chapter VI)[11]. During the war in Kosovo, MDM was involved in staging "the greatest humanitarian catastrophe since the Second World War" and fueled rumors of genocide. This humanitarian NGO was tasked with collecting the testimonies of the ethnic Albanians to immediately share them with the ICTY. Under the spotlight of television cameras, Dr Anne-Marie Guilleux of MDM reported unverifiable testimonies that often vilified the Serbian community on a daily basis. Journalist Daniel Pearl highlighted the role of NGOs in spreading rumors of genocide. "Ethnic-Albanian militants, humanitarian organizations, NATO and the news media fed off each other to give genocide rumors credibility" (Pearl & Block, 1999). MDM maintained total silence on abuses by the Kosovo Liberation Army, and especially on organ trafficking, which continued until 2001 when Kouchner, a friend of Hashim Thaçi, was Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Kosovo and head of the UNMIK.

For its part, MSF showed bias throughout the war by exaggerating the suffering of Bosnian Muslims and ethnic Albanians, while keeping silent about Serbian suffering (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015a; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2006; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015b). MSF relayed Bosnian propaganda which, according to the statements of General Philippe Morillon, "knowingly" exaggerated the seriousness of the situation in the eastern enclaves. General Morillon stated that "The eastern enclave affair is essentially political. The Bosnian government wants to focus world attention on them in the hope of obtaining a change in the UN mandate". For two years, MSF lobbied intensively to launch a French parliamentary fact-finding mission on the fall of Srebrenica and "France's responsibility" (French National Assembly, 2001). In particular, MSF criticized French general Bernard Janvier for failing to give the NATO air force the order to bomb Serb forces approaching Srebrenica. However, MSF never mentioned the massacres perpetrated against Serbs by Naser Orić's militias from 1992 to 1995. In Kosovo, MSF supported the NATO bombings and excluded its Greek division from the international movement on the grounds that it had come to the aid of Serb victims and did not share the movement's bias (Mens, 1999).

Weapons deliveries and military intelligence were often carried out under the guise of humanitarian aid. On 17 September 1993, Bernard-Henri Lévy had just travelled from Sarajevo to Ankara, where he wrote: "The real purpose of my trip is this man – let's call him "Bey" – for whom Izetbegovic gave me his contact information in Geneva last month, and I couldn't meet him until he gave me the go-ahead. The green light came the day before yesterday in Sarajevo. The president was in Jeddah. He had someone pick me up at my hotel to call him back from his office on a secure line. And he said, 'OK, now is the time, we can launch the operation, if you still agree.' I said, 'Yes, of course' (Lévy, 1996, pp. 190-191). Bey, a French-speaking Turk with aircraft at his disposal, described part of the operation to Lévy, who had gotten the go-ahead from President Izetbegović. "We're repainting the planes in UN colours. Before each take-off, we'll take several wounded with us. Each operation on the ground will last no longer than six or seven minutes, provided the engines don't shut down. When an Allied fighter attempts to board the aircraft, we'll cut the radio and not respond" (Lévy, 1996, pp. 190-191). There can be no doubt: these were weapons deliveries via airplanes disguised to look like UN planes transporting wounded victims. This mode of transport has been confirmed by various sources. "Weaponry financed by Iran [...] is transferred to small planes or, more frequently, loaded onto trucks to be transported in perilous conditions to Bosnia, often under cover of humanitarian aid" (Nelson, 1994).

The 12 February 1994 edition of the French daily newspaper *L'Humanité* noted that "Weapons would be transported in trucks disguised as UNPROFOR or UNHCR vehicles. Several months ago, a shipment of ammunition was discovered in a UNHCR humanitarian convoy bound for Sarajevo" (Pierot, 1994). In early 1993, medical oxygen cylinders meant for the Koševo hospital were mistakenly delivered to the Serbian Žiča (Ilidža) hospital. Surprised by the abnormally high weight of two cylinders, the hospital technicians examined them carefully and discovered a screwed-on compartment at the base. In fact, the cylinders did not contain medical oxygen but rather 40 kg of gunpowder and 350 detonators. The Žiča hospital immediately alerted UNPROFOR about this shipment of war material under cover of medical equipment. The event was even included in a detailed report and recording[12].

Lévy also referred to "foreign fighters arriving in Bosnia with the accreditation card from a Saudi humanitarian organization" for "sensitive operations" (Lévy, 1996, p.454). In Bosnia, as in Pakistan and Afghanistan, several Muslim charities, particularly those financed by Saudi funds, played a key role in spreading radical Islam among the population. Organizations such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) or the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) supported networks of combatants (Engelberg, 1992; Gordon, 1992; Hedges, 1992a; Hedges, 1992b).

The participation of humanitarian NGOs in military intelligence missions for the benefit of Western forces is often mentioned and has indeed been confirmed (Shah, 2011; Boone, 2015; Jouan, 2013; Vernet, 2001; Pierre Camatte, Espion, 2010; MSF et Médecins, 2008; Brauman, 2000), namely in Bosnia and Kosovo. General Francis Briquemont, commander of the UNPROFOR from 12 July 1993 to 24 January 1994, stated that "It was as unverifiable as the identity of certain NGO members, veritable nests for spy agents of all kinds" (Briquemont, 1997, p. 258). In June 1992, Bernard-Henri Lévy and French author Gilles Hertzog entered Bosnia with the NGO Equilibre, about which questions had been raised about it harboring secret agents from the French foreign intelligence agency. During the war in Kosovo, the Canadian branch of the American NGO CARE signed a contract with the Ottawa government to recruit "volunteers" to carry out military intelligence activities in Kosovo under the guise of humanitarian NGO status (Semo, 2002; Crouzatier, 2008, pp. 27-28).

4.2. Amnesty International

During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Amnesty International strongly denounced the crimes committed against civilians by the Serbian side, which led to the authorities of Republika Srpska being stigmatized (Amnesty International, 2009; Amnesty International, 2012a; Amnesty International, 2012b; Amnesty International, 2017). Amnesty International campaigned for a UN resolution recognizing a "genocide" in Srebrenica. In 2015, Amnesty described the Security Council's failure to recognize the Srebrenica "genocide" as "an insult to the memory of the victims" when it rejected the British draft resolution on the subject. Amnesty International's Director for Europe, John Dalhuisen, said that "This text aimed to go beyond recognition of the genocide to validate long-term support for the families of the victims of Srebrenica, but also for the victims of sexual violence. The Security Council has still not been able, 20 years on, to recognize the genocide". According to Dalhuisen, recognition of the genocide was a necessary precondition for the reconciliation and restoration of cohesion among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Martine Royo was one of the coordinators of **Amnesty International**'s work in the **Balkans**. After declaring that there were no **reliable figures on the number of female victims of sexual crimes** during the Bosnian conflict, Royo stated that "The overwhelming majority of the victims are Bosniak – Muslim women – in line with **a political strategy of the Serbs. Serbian forces systematically raped Muslim women. The Serbs categorically refuse to acknowledge the horror of their crimes" (**Royo, 2012)**. Royo added, "In the camps set up by the Serbs, Bosniak women** were raped and

then forced to keep the children. When you were subjected to **sexual slavery**, if you refused, if you rebelled, the sentence was immediate: a bullet in the back of the head". Royo did not provide any investigative reports or forensic expertise to support these charges. She did, however, cite the film by Hans-Christian Schmid: "As the film *Storm* shows, when these women refused to submit or when they were sick, it was a bullet in the head". Royo found "this film to be historically correct, especially the attitudes of the Serbian soldiers" (Royo, 2012).

Amnesty International's Black Book on Kosovo reveals the basis for how the events were described. "The descriptions of events are largely based on interviews with victims and witnesses by Amnesty International delegations. The additional information comes from press reports, accounts of victims and witnesses collected by Amnesty International contacts and non-governmental organizations operating in the former Yugoslavia. […] Amnesty International has, however, assessed the available information and has reported only those accounts that it considers to be fundamentally accurate" (Amnesty International, 1999). Amnesty International therefore described the events in Kosovo based on accounts from victims and witnesses, as well as press reports, which are considered to be "fundamentally accurate". Amnesty International has never written a report on the suffering of the Serb community or called for sanctions against Bosnian Muslim or ethnic-Albanian criminals.

4.3. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), based in Geneva, is a UN program that was originally established in 1951 to protect refugees[13] and ensure the application of the Geneva Convention on refugees. The UNHCR is politically dependent on the States that fund it. It received two Nobel Peace Prizes in 1954 and 1981. Each year, the UNHCR, which maintains close ties with certain NGOs, bestows the Nansen Refugee Award. In 1993, Médecins Sans Frontières received the award during the Bosnian War for its work on behalf of war victims. Along with Bernard Kouchner and Bernard-Henri Lévy, who were both awarded honorary doctorates from the University of Sarajevo in January 1983, ambassadors for the UNHCR supported the victims on one side of the conflict. American singer Barbara Hendricks is a Lifetime Goodwill Ambassador for the UNHCR. In 1992, she and Kouchner co-founded the association "Première heure du premier jour" (The first hour of the first day). With Kouchner's help, she held a first New Year's Eve concert for peace on 31 December 1991 in Vukovar and a second one on 31 December 1993 in Sarajevo. The day after this last concert, *Le Monde* reported

that "Barbara Hendricks said 'It's the most absurd war' after Serbian shells had again fallen on the city". Barbara Hendricks received the Medal of the City of Sarajevo in 2007. Since 2001, actress Angelina Jolie has been a UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador. She wrote and produced a film in 2011 entitled *In the Land of Blood and Honey*, which depicts atrocities committed by the Serbians against Muslim women during the siege of Sarajevo. The film won an award at the Sarajevo Film Festival upon its release in 2011. For the Parisian premiere of her film on 17 February 2012, Angelina Jolie appeared alongside Bernard-Henri Lévy and Gilles Hertzog.

In Sarajevo, the UNHCR was coordinating NGO actions with UNPROFOR and the Bosnian government. General Valentin noted that "apart from the distribution of aid in the suburbs near the airport by UNPROFOR soldiers, we have not been able to identity the other distribution channels; they are managed by the Bosnian government" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p. 58). General Jean-René Bachelet mentioned his meeting with Bosnian minister Hasan Muratović, calling him "the man who controlled all financial flows – including the resources procured from the tunnel below the airport – and who has only recriminations against UNPROFOR. […] The political relations are monitored, but except for a few fleeting meetings with President Izetbegović or Prime Minister Siladzić, they go almost exclusively through Muratović" (Bachelet, 2016, pp. 100, 196). General Francis Briquemont declared that "During a meeting with the Bosnian minister in charge of relations with UNPROFOR, Mr Muratović complained to N. Morris that the UNHCR was not hiring enough Muslim staff" (Briquemont, 1997, p. 255). The UNHCR then transferred the responsibility of "managing" humanitarian aid to Muratović. The UNHCR was the de facto supplier for the Muslim sector of Sarajevo and more specifically the Bosnian army in its war effort.

5. Individual War Trauma

The concept of 'war trauma' falls within the fields of medicine and social science. Such trauma is subject to diagnostic criteria and an assessment of morbidity and mortality rates. Patients can be treated to reduce the after-effects of certain conditions.

5.1. Physical Trauma

This refers to physical harm to the body resulting from violence: acts of war, aggression, torture or rape. This physical harm may be external and/or internal and

may be life-threatening or cause functional issues. Specialized medical or surgical treatment is often necessary to reduce the severity of the sequelae.

5.2. Psychological Trauma

Psychological trauma refers to the psychological and physiological damage resulting from a dramatic event or any form of violence, experienced physically or morally (Crocq, 1999; Crocq, 2012; Yehuda, 1998). Symptoms may be physical, emotional, cognitive, behavioral or spiritual.

5.3. Types of Exposure to a Traumatic or Stressful Event

Victims may face death or the threat of death, serious injury or sexual violence in one or more of the following ways: being directly exposed to one or more traumatic events, being a direct witness to one or more traumatic events, learning that one or more traumatic events happened to a close family member or friend, being repeatedly or acutely exposed to horrific details of a traumatic event (historical research, criminal investigations, exhumation and identification of corpses, etc.). The event may be real or potential in the form of a threat. Exposure may be brief or prolonged, occur once or multiple times, involve several repetitive events or take place over a long period of time. Depending on the type of exposure, certain sensory stimuli can be significant and later be a trigger: visual stimuli (horror or crime scenes), auditory stimuli (screaming, yelling, gunshots, explosions, bombings, etc.), and olfactory stimuli (blood, semen, etc.). Remembering the traumatic event can be more painful than the event itself and witnessing a traumatic event experienced by a loved one can be more traumatic than experiencing it oneself. It was once considered that only someone directly exposed to a traumatic event could suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It is now accepted that people may be traumatized because of their emotional closeness to a direct victim or because they have been repeatedly confronted with sordid stories as a result of their professional activities.

5.4. Trauma and Pathological Reactions to Severe Stress

A person's initial reaction to the event may include intense fear, feelings of helplessness (inability to respond appropriately to violence), horror, anger or shame. After a phase of acute stress, most people recover spontaneously from a single event. However, the intensity, repetition or accumulation of emotionally charged situations, with violence inflicted voluntarily by human beings, increase the risk of lasting effects and sequelae requiring treatment.

Two components must be clearly distinguished: the traumatic or stressful event (the stressor) and the resulting pathophysiological process (the stress state). The stress state is a neurobiological and neuroendocrine process involving the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal or neurohormonal stress axis, with cortisol appearing as a harmful stress agent. It also involves several areas of the brain (prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex) and neural circuits involved in cognition, affective sensation, memory and behaviour. Memory can become pathologically fixed on the event and retain biological traces. PTSD results from a memory disorder related to the consolidation of a traumatic memory. The links between the hippocampal system (in charge of memory storage), the amygdala (in charge of emotions) and the prefrontal cortex (analysis of the environmental context) play a key role in PTSD. The person becomes a prisoner of his or her past.

When faced with a traumatic event, the individual deploys defense and adjustment mechanisms that depend on individual, genetic and acquired characteristics (personal history, education, beliefs, culture). This means that the same stressor can lead to highly variable pathophysiological consequences depending on the individual. Many factors of vulnerability come into play, such as poverty, unfavorable living conditions, child abuse, mental disorders and disabilities. If the defense and adjustment mechanisms are effective, the individual can recover and return to equilibrium (homoeostasis). But under intense and prolonged stress, the defense and adjustment mechanisms may be overwhelmed. The consequences then become harmful at the somatic and psychological levels. Physical and mental health problems, including PTSD, may become apparent in the days, weeks or even years following the stressful event(s). This pathological or morbid reaction with symptoms persisting for longer than one month disrupts a person's daily family, professional or social life.

5.5. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

PTSD is characterized by the onset of psychiatric symptoms after exposure to one or more traumatic events (Yehuda, 2002; Yehuda, 1999). It is described in the two main manuals for international classification of mental disorders: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association, and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), published by the World Health Organization. PTSD was initially classified as an anxiety disorder, but was added to the 'Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorders' category in the fifth edition of the DSM (DSM-5) published in 2013 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). PTSD symptoms are assessed using international scales (e.g., Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale or PTSD Checklist) with severity scores. The PTSD rate following a disaster is around 20%. The rate varies according to the type of event, from 4% or 5% after a natural disaster to 34% after a bombing. PTSD results in clinically significant suffering and impaired functioning in family, social or professional situations. The symptoms are as follows:

- Constantly remembering or reliving the stressful event.
- Persistent avoidance of reminders or stimuli that bring back painful memories; thoughts or feelings associated with the traumatic event: people, places, conversations, activities, objects, situations or sensory stimuli. When the person's mental, relational or verbal faculties are severely impaired by these avoidance reflexes, this is referred to as a dissociative state.
- Negative disturbances in cognition and mood associated with the traumatic event.
- Reactive disorders with persistent symptoms indicative of hypervigilance and neurovegetative hyperactivation.

PTSD symptoms last longer than a month. Because a PTSD diagnosis can only be made after a latency period of at least one month, acute stress disorder (ASD) was introduced. Acute stress includes both immediate onset reactions and early responses for up to four weeks after the event. ASD symptoms significantly increase the likelihood of developing PTSD. PTSD may lead to fears of death, separation anxiety, pathological fear, feelings of permanent insecurity, dysfunctional thoughts, anniversary reactions or survivor syndrome, social disorders, unjustified anger, crying spells, emotional indifference and loss of trust in friendship, fraternity and humanity. The person may have dissociative symptoms of depersonalization and/or derealization.

PTSD is frequently associated with co-morbidities found in about two-thirds of cases: chronic fatigue, generalized anxiety disorder, depression, panic disorder, social phobia, eating disorders, addictive disorders (alcohol, drugs), affective disorders, suicidal behavior, somatic syndromes (chronic pain, fibromyalgia, etc.). Pathological grief and complicated grief are accompanied by anxiety disorders and suicidal thoughts. They are more common in certain circumstances of death or where there is mutilation of a body, absence of a body and burial, grave transfers and grave desecration.

Beyond general adaptation syndrome – a purely biological and physiological reaction at the centre of the stress response – individuals develop adaptation or adjustment strategies known as 'coping'. Coping strategies include all the cognitive and behavioral efforts made by an individual to control the harmful consequences of stress on his or her physical and mental well-being. The coping process involves both action (behavioral efforts) and a thought process (cognitive efforts). There are two main types of coping. Problem-focused coping strategies are behavioral efforts to actively eliminate stressors. Emotion-focused coping strategies are cognitive efforts to reduce or eliminate the emotions triggered by the event. Emotion-focused strategies sometimes rely on addictive behaviors (use of medication, alcohol or drugs, etc.). At the community level, coping and resilience mechanisms, which can be fostered through social support, play an important role in the reconciliation and forgiveness processes.

6. Collective War Trauma

Collective factors of vulnerability, both historical and cultural, are found in populations suffering from inter- or transgenerational transmission of war trauma, denial of their suffering or stigmatization by their communities. Traumatic experiences and psychological wounds can spread from person to person in the manner of a contagion or be passed on from generation to generation as a sort of a legacy. A person may show post-traumatic effects of events they did not experience and that sometimes occurred before they were born. Psychogenealogy is a clinical practice that postulates that the events, traumas, family secrets and conflicts experienced by an individual's ancestors condition his or her constitutional weaknesses, psychological disorders, illnesses, and even strange or inexplicable behaviors. These phenomena are of undeniable importance in medicine and social science. There are two types of transmission: intergenerational transmission and transgenerational transmission.

6.1. Intergenerational or Family Transmission

Intergenerational or family transmission refers to observable exchanges between two generations that are in actual physical contact, starting with the relationship between parents and children. This transmission can be conscious and explicit, through speech, stories and narration. It is based, among other things, on family conversations, readings (family library), and family viewing of photographs, films and documentaries. Commemorative ceremonies with rituals and places of remembrance (cemeteries) as well as birthday rituals with the anniversary effect play an important role in this transmission. It is not uncommon to give a child the first name of a missing family member. Some Dutch families commemorate Hunger Winter with a frugal meal. This transmission can also be subconscious and silent, as the trauma spreads from person to person without passing through narrative. A parent can transmit trauma through behavior and attitudes (non-verbal language). Children can decode the body language of their parents and feel a dissonance between silence and the perception of silent suffering. The attempt to forget trauma is what is known as a "rift" in psychology, as some people need to forget in order to survive. Jorge Semprún says that when the camp where he was deported was liberated in 1945, the prisoners met to discuss whether or not they would talk about their experiences upon their return. The prisoners divided themselves into two groups. Some said they could only survive by talking about it, while others said that they could only readjust by forgetting. Semprún even cites the example of a deportee who said, "I'm going to put everything I've experienced here in a trunk, lock it, bury it, throw away the key and forget where it is" (Semprun, 1994).

6.2. Transgenerational Transmission

Transgenerational transmission refers to the influence of previous generations on individuals with whom they have had no physical contact, but who are present through their impact on their family. This transmission of traumatic experiences and attitudes inherited from past trauma helps shed light on repeated conflicts. Research in molecular biology shows that trauma can cause changes in the expression of genes that can be transmitted to descendants. These so-called epigenetic modifications do not concern the DNA sequence of the genes but affect molecules that determine the expression of the genes and which play a sort of gene switch role (activation or

inactivation) leading to the DNA being read differently. These epigenetic changes can be transmitted over several generations via germ lines. In particular, they can affect stress regulation mechanisms and cause permanent deregulation of the neurohormonal stress axis. An epigenetic modification of a gene involved in stress regulation has been identified in the descendants of Holocaust survivors (Yehuda, et al., 1998a, pp. 841–843; Yehuda, et al., 1998b, pp. 1163-1172; Yehuda, Halligan, & Bierer, 2002, pp. 171-180; Yehuda, Halligan & Grossman, 2001, pp. 733–753). The trauma of the Holocaust was passed on to descendants and may have left a biological imprint on the next generations with *a disruption of the physiological circuit of stress management. De*scendants of Holocaust survivors are at greater risk of developing depression or PTSD. The descendants of those who originally suffered the trauma may not necessarily develop these same disorders, but there is a strong likelihood that they will be more vulnerable than other people to anxiety, stress and depression. A cohort study conducted by epidemiological researchers found that the children of pregnant women who endured the Dutch famine of the winter of 1945/46 experienced health problems (weight and metabolic issues, etc.). The famine thus had consequences on the health of the descendants of those who lived through it. More surprisingly, these children's children (second generation) also had health problems. These data suggest that the famine experienced by the mothers caused epigenetic changes that were passed on through germ cells to subsequent generations.

7. Assessment of Suffering

The assessment of suffering is based on the use of objective and verifiable qualitative and quantitative indicators from independent and impartial sources. Frequently used sources include reports from official international commissions and institutions, reports from non-governmental organizations, reports from human rights organizations, criminal investigations by courts, work by historians, studies by social scientists and epidemiologists, population studies, archival studies, analysis of books and newspaper articles published on the subject, etc. With regard to armed conflicts, early assessments are generally very different from later assessments, which may be made several decades after the conflict.

7.1. Quantitative Indicators

Quantitative indicators (figures, percentages, etc.) must be based on data relating to verifiable facts or events. They include the numbers of people killed, mass graves, rapes, missing persons, people imprisoned, people forced to flee, and hospital admissions by type of disease. For overall mortality figures, it is often difficult to make an exact distinction between civilians and military personnel. These indicators also cover the number of indictments and convictions for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

With regard to mortality, an absolute value must be reported for a population in order to obtain a percentage of that population. The Spanish Civil War, which lasted three years, caused the violent death of nearly 500,000 people out of a population of 26 million, or 2% of the population. The Bosnian Civil War, which lasted four years, caused the violent death of nearly 100,000 people out of a population of 4.5 million, or 2.2% of the population. For nearly 15 years, newspapers around the world claimed that the Bosnian War killed between 250,000 and 300,000 people, suggesting that these were primarily Muslim civilians killed by the Serbs. In fact, the war claimed about 100,000 lives. More than half (60,000) were soldiers, and thus men who died in battle. These soldiers were Muslim, Serbian and Croatian. Not all Muslim soldiers were killed by Serbian soldiers. Many were killed by Croatian soldiers as well as other Muslim soldiers (such as during the clashes in autumn 1993 in the Bihać enclave between Fikret Abdić's (non radical muslim leader) troops and the Bosnian 5th Corps commanded by Atif Dudaković, and during the shootings between rival Bosniak criminal gangs in Sarajevo in 1992 and 1993). Many Muslims, who disagreed with the SDA's ideology of creating an Islamist state, also fought in the Republika Srpska Army and the Croatian Defense Council, and a number died as members of these armies[14]. As for the 40,000 civilians, they were not, as journalist often suggest, 40,000 Muslims killed by Serbs. There were many Serbs and Croats among these 40,000 victims. And not all Muslim civilians were killed by Serbs. Many of them were killed by Croats as well as other Muslims. Indeed, one has to take into account, among others, the Muslims killed during the Bosniak provocations aimed at blaming the Serbs (explosions and sniper fire in Sarajevo) and the moderate Muslims killed by the secret police organization Ševe because they were obstructing the ruling SDA party's plans.

7.2. Quantitative Assessments

Quantitative assessments are regularly the subject of controversy. In 2004, *The Lancet* published a first study on the mortality of the Iraq war that reported 100,000 civilian casualties (Irak: le conflit, 2004; Irak: les protestations, 2004; Demande de commission, 2004). The journal's second study on excess mortality linked to violence in Iraq during the invasion and occupation of that country from March 2003 to June 2006 estimated excess mortality at 655,000 deaths, 601,000 of which were directly linked to the violence, representing 2.5% of the Iraqi population (about 25 million in 2003) (Burnham, et al., 2006, pp. 1421-1428). This study, carried out with scientific rigor, was strongly criticized, notably by US president George Bush and his administration. According to them, the study was not at all credible and the number of deaths did not exceed several tens of thousands.

In modern wars, when an aggressor has unquestionable superiority, the rate of the aggressor's human losses compared to those of the aggression is less than 1%. A rate of under 1% indicates a planned war, waged by a well-equipped and trained army. During the "Lightning" and "Storm" operations conducted in 1995 by the Croatian Army and the American private military company MPRI, Croatian forces suffered very little casualties, while hundreds of civilians were killed in western Slavonia and more than a thousand in Krajina. During the attack on Serbia by NATO forces, the alliance did not report any deaths (so-called "zero casualty warfare"), despite several sources reporting several hundred or several thousand civilians killed regardless of age or gender.

Very high-intensity international and non-international conflicts lead to extreme numbers of civilian casualties, especially in two situations:

*Total war. During the Second World War, mortality in some countries, given as a percentage of the 1939 population, reached appalling levels, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (nearly 15% of their populations), with a majority of civilians killed.

* Large-scale campaigns of terror. During the three genocides of the twentieth century, the number of victims within a community as a proportion of the total number of members of that community, spread over a national territory or over several States before the conflict, is equally appalling. Two-thirds of Armenians (1,300,000 Armenians) living in what is today Turkey died in the Armenian genocide. Two-thirds of Europe's Jews (six million) were exterminated by Nazi Germany during the Holocaust. An estimated 70% to 80% of the Tutsi population (around 800,000 people) were killed during the genocide in Rwanda.

With regard to forced population transfers and exoduses, it is important to know, based on reliable demographic studies, the number of people who were able to return to their homeland and homes after the war and the number of people who settled permanently in another country. Almost all of the ethnic Albanians who fled to Macedonia and Albania in 1999 have returned to Kosovo. Nearly all of the Serbs expelled from Kosovo have never returned to Kosovo. Almost none of the Serbs from Sarajevo who were forced to flee during the winter of 1995/96 have not returned to Sarajevo. Almost none of the Krajina Serbs expelled in 1995 have returned to Croatia.

7.3. Qualitative or Descriptive Indicators

Qualitative or descriptive indicators must also be based on data relating to verifiable facts or events. They are mainly based on the testimonies of victims and observers: eyewitnesses, soldiers under UN mandate, humanitarian NGOs and investigative journalists. These indicators make it possible to show deliberate atrocities against civilian populations, planned and methodical forms of violence, the use of instruments of terror, repeated inhuman or dehumanizing acts (sexual violence, torture) aimed in particular at vulnerable persons, and the dissemination of crimes over a territory.

These descriptive indicators, gathered in investigative reports, are valuable in establishing the responsibility and culpability of the perpetrators. When bodies are exhumed, forensic expertise is essential. An exhumed body is indeed a casualty, but not every exhumed body is a victim of a criminal atrocity and every mass grave is not necessarily a criminal mass grave. Only forensic expertise makes it possible to identify the victim (DNA identification), to specify the circumstances of death and to differentiate between a victim of a summary execution and a victim of war.

7.4. Difficulties and Obstacles Hampering the Collection of Indicators

Difficulties and obstacles hampering the collection of indicators are frequent and varied:

- Many testimonies cannot be collected. For some victims, especially women who have been raped, talking about their experience can be unbearable. Pressure on some witnesses, accompanied by death threats and murders, leads to refusals to testify and retractions.

- Destruction of evidence or the prohibition of access to archives (e.g., confidential, classified "defense secrets").
- The lack of forensic expertise carried out rigorously by confirmed and impartial specialists.
- Obstacles to the search for missing persons, inability to locate criminal mass graves or to carry out excavations.
- Administrative and financial difficulties in conducting rigorous and large-scale medical and epidemiological investigations, particularly with regard to female victims of sexual violence, the suicide rate, the prevalence of PTSD or transgenerational transmission of war trauma.

8. Instrumentalization of Suffering

Since the Nigerian Civil War, human suffering resulting from armed conflict has been instrumentalized for political purposes. The victimization of one party to the conflict and the demonization of the opposing party is now the rule. There are victims on one side and aggressors on the other, with serious consequences for the post-war reconciliation process.

8.1. The Main Objective of the Instrumentalization

The main objective of the instrumentalization of suffering is to mobilize Western public opinion in the name of higher humanitarian principles in order to convince Western powers to support the main interventionist States' objectives. During the Bosnian War, the goal was clear: the best way to support Bosniaks was not to provide them with humanitarian aid but to provide them with weapons in their "just war".

In a letter to Bosniak president Alija Izetbegović dated May 1993, Bernard-Henri Lévy and Gilles Hertzog made a proposal to organize a campaign to "raise awareness among the general public of the ordeal endured by the population of Sarajevo, and among French and European political leaders" (Lévy, 1996, p.170). In July 1993, Lévy was appointed Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Franco-German television channel Arte. On 22 January 1994, Lévy wrote in his notebooks that Jérôme Clément, president of Arte, "accepted to make his channel an instrument of combat"

for Sarajevo. In 1993 and 1994, Lévy made his film *Bosna* "so that Bosnia does not become the Warsaw Ghetto" (Lévy, 1996, p.314). The aim of the film was "to help Bosnians forge an image of themselves as combatants and resistance fighters" (Lévy, 1996, p.289). This documentary was created "in close collaboration with the Bosnian crews for the shooting, Sarajevo Television for the production and the respective staff of Divjak, Alagić and Dudaković for inspiration" (Lévy, 1996, p.500). The Bosnian army staff were therefore Lévy's sources of inspiration. This documentary was produced thanks to the financial support of billionaire François Pinault, a friend of André Lévy (Bernard-Henri Lévy's father) and a close friend of Jacques Chirac, through the creation of the production company Les Films du lendemain. From May 1994, Lévy made the rounds among influential venues and capital cities to screen his film. On 7 May 1994, he was in Paris with Kemal Muftić (a close advisor to Alija Izetbegović) to attend a preview screening organized for *Le Monde* director Jean-Marie Colombani and the newspaper's journalists. Lévy presented *Bosna* on 15 May in Cannes, 28 September at the Vatican, 29 September to Margaret Thatcher, and 11 October to Hillary Clinton. He also screened it for various politicians, military figures, intellectuals and journalists. In June 1995, he presented the film to Jacques Chirac, who had just been elected president of France. Gilles Hertzog, who co-wrote the *Bosna* screenplay, filmed a documentary on the Bosniak army called *Armija* in 1995 for Arte. Lévy said of his friend Hertzog that he was able to "wake up a French president in the middle of the night to warn him of the imminent fall of a security zone, to bring Abbé Pierre to Bosnia, President Izetbegović to the Pope, and the Pope to a journalist to whom he will say that there are 'just wars'" (Lévy, 1996, p.493). In fact, Lévy and Hertzog organized a meeting between Alija Izetbegović and the Pope on 15 June 1993, during which Izetbegović declared to the Pope that "Humanity is bleeding in Bosnia. Today, Sarajevo is the world capital of pain" (Lévy, 1996, p.176). They also arranged a visit by Abbé Pierre in Sarajevo in July 1995. During the siege of Sarajevo, Lévy compared himself to renowned authors from the Spanish Civil War period and promoted his "desire to follow in the footsteps of Malraux, Hemingway, Orwell and others". Several "unquestionable moral authorities" from the world of art, culture and entertainment were invited by Lévy and Bernard Kouchner to take part in this "just war".

In their May 1993 letter to Izetbegović, Lévy and Hertzog also proposed raising "national funding, supported by unquestionable moral authorities, for 'weapons for Bosnia' (the equivalent of the famous 1936 campaign 'trucks and planes for Spain')" (Lévy, 1996, p.170). Lévy felt confident in 1993 in his ability to recruit "unquestionable moral authorities" to deliver weapons to Bosnia. On 8 February 1994, during a demonstration on the Esplanade des Invalides in Paris, Lévy cried out, "Since the

States are not doing their job as States, we will do it in their place; since they so stubbornly refuse to deliver to the Bosnians the weapons they so urgently need to defend themselves, it's up to us, citizens, to deliver them and take their place; planes, cannons, for Bosnia! Let's launch a great national call today: 'Weapons for the Bosnians!'" (Lévy, 1996, p.249).

On 15 May 1994, Bernard-Henry Lévy announced the establishment of a new political party to run for the European elections during a television program to promote his documentary film *Bosna* at the Cannes Festival. The stated intention of the party, called "Europe Begins at Sarajevo", was for each European Member of Parliament to consider Bosnia and take action to raise the arms embargo on the Bosnian government (Pierot, 1994a). Bernard Kouchner claimed credit for idea and said he had almost launched the party in January 1994.

8.2. Instrumentalization Techniques

Instrumentalization techniques have been proven to be effective, especially during the war in the former Yugoslavia.

8.2.1. The Appeal to Emotion and Simplistic Ideas

The appeal to emotion and simplistic ideas reduces the complexity of reality and offers a black-and-white perspective of the conflict through the constant use of simplified dichotomies (good vs. evil, victims vs. offenders, aggressors vs. aggressees, humanity vs. barbarity) and the power of images to arouse emotion rather than promote understanding. The victimization of one party to the conflict allows a community to present itself as the main victim in order to encourage interventionist Western powers to get involved in the name of the right of humanitarian interference. The vilification and dehumanization of the other party to the conflict generates hatred against it, deprives it of any form of compassion and justifies all coercive measures against it (e.g., strikes or economic sanctions). One community as a whole is seen as the only real victim of the conflict while the other community as a whole is considered to be the criminal. General Philippe Morillon stressed the danger of the simplistic

ideas spread during the war in the former Yugoslavia. "I experienced the crisis since it began in April 1992 and I always refused to consider that there were aggressors and aggressees. The Bosnians reproached me for this for a long time" (Morillon, 1996).

General Jean-René Bachelet said that "At the time, I had my doubts, and I wondered about the accounts I heard from the field reporting actual media events held all around to maintain and accentuate the demonization of the Serbs. It wasn't until I returned in 1996 that I became aware of the remarkable communication campaigns designed by the American agency Rudder & Finn, initially for the benefit of the Croatian and Bosniak causes, and then only the Bosniaks, that sought to swing global public opinion their way. […] The terrible siege of Sarajevo had had the effect of polarizing information into two categories: the victims and the executioners. The victims were the Bosniaks, the executioners were the Serbs. On the ground, however, we were well aware of who the victims of this terrible war were: the unfortunate people on all sides" (Bachelet, 2016, pp. 57, 185).

Humanitarian organizations bear a heavy responsibility for this intentional instrumentalization, even if Rony Brauman, former president of Médecins Sans Frontières, offered the following defense: "The two great founding events of contemporary humanitarianism – the genocide in Biafra (1979–80) and the famine in Cambodia (1979–80) – make us aware of the gap between our representations and reality. Indeed, there was no genocide in Biafra and no famine in Cambodia. The complexity of reality was translated into a simple checklist, created by an exclusive, devouring, victimizing vision of the world [...]. In spite of themselves, many NGOs reproduce a black-and-white vision of good and evil [...]. Far from accurately reflecting reality, humanitarian imagery is in fact dependent on mental schemas structured around grand simplified oppositions, such as humanity vs. barbarity or victims vs. executioners" (Brauman, 2006, pp. 188-204).

8.2.2. Disregard for the Political and Historical Context

Disregard for the political and historical context**,** ignorance of the deep roots of the conflict, and cookie-cutter analyses without any context are perpetuated to more effectively mobilize public opinion. Historian Yves Ternon recalled the importance of the events of the Second World War. "In the conflict between three of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia – Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims – crimes were committed on all sides. We must not forget the breeding ground from which this return of hatred developed: the destruction, during the Second World War, of Jews, Roma and Serbs by the Croatian State under Ante Pavelić, which was a Nazi satellite" (Ternon, 2007a).

8.2.3. Partisan Staging of Suffering

Disinformation is often based on the spread of rumors and misinformation, but it can also hinge on an incomplete representation of reality. Bernard Kouchner, co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières and Médecins du Monde, invoked the "law of noise", saying that "There is no misery without the staging of misery" (Pierre & Kouchner, 1993). During the war in the former Yugoslavia, MSF and MDM staged the suffering of the civilian population in a partisan way. Throughout the conflict, attention was focused on the suffering of the Muslim community and silence was maintained regarding the suffering of the Serbian community. These NGOs and the media quoted the arguments and accusations of the Bosnian authorities word for word and applied a double standard to the civilian population's suffering.

This partisan staging of misery benefited from the support of the cultural and artistic community, which was committed to the Bosniak cause and totally hostile to the Serb community. Many artists participated in televised appeals to rescue Muslim victims and call for sanctions against Serbian criminals. A media-fueled anti-Serb hatred invaded television platforms, film screens and theatre stages. Several works of fiction depicting the atrocities committed against Muslim women by Serbs were produced while trials were ongoing before the ICTY, including three films: *Storm* by Hans-Christian Schmid (2009), *As If I Am Not There* by Juanita Wilson (2010) and *In the Land of Blood and Honey* by Angelina Jolie (2011).

Storm is a German film by Hans-Christian Schmid depicting the trial by the ICTY of a Serbian politician accused of crimes against humanity and violence against Muslim women. Florence Hartmann was the technical advisor for the screenplay of this film, which was screened by Bernard Kouchner at the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs on 20 January 2010. On behalf of Amnesty International, Martine Royo quoted this film in support of her accusations against the Serbs (Royo, 2012). *As If I Am Not There* is an Irish film by Juanita Wilson, inspired by the novel written by Croatian journalist and author Slavenka Drakulić[15]. Both the film and novel are based on testimonies of women imprisoned and raped during the Bosnian War. Angelina Jolie's film *In the Land of Blood and Honey* features a camp, overseen by the son of a Bosnian Serb nationalist leader, where Muslim women are enslaved and raped by Serbian troops. It is impossible to list all the works of fiction, especially film and television, which refer to violence against women during the Bosnian War, but they all have one thing in common: the victim is a Muslim woman and the perpetrator is a Serb. It should be noted that the rape of Serbian women has not been a source of artistic inspiration.

Many intellectuals have participated in this double standard by systematically lending their support to the enemies of the Serbs, be they Croats, Bosniaks or ethnic Albanians. The French "philosopher" Bernard-Henri Lévy even said that the Muslim war criminals Caco and Ćelo were in fact only "thugs with a big heart" *(Le Point,* 26 August 1995). In 1999, Lévy was one of the greatest propagators in France of the rumors of genocide in Kosovo. In the 7 May 1999 edition of *Le Monde*, Lévy co-authored an article with Marie-Françoise Allain, Pascal Bruckner, Paul Garde, André Glucksmann, Pierre Hassner, Olivier Mongin and Véronique Nahoum-Grappe calling for "moral, political and financial support for the KLA". The few intellectuals who have expressed doubts about this black-and-white representation of the conflict or who have expressed any sympathy for the Serbian victims have been insulted or censored.

8.2.4. Manipulation of Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators

The dissemination of false information, unverified information and falsified images has also helped to instrumentalize suffering. With regard to quantitative indicators, a multiplying coefficient, varying from a factor of two to ten, which could be called the "demonization coefficient" or "victimization coefficient" depending on the situation, was applied.

* For years, the number of people killed in this war according to the newspapers was between 200,000 and 300,000. It has now been found that around 100,000 people died, half of whom were civilians. General Valentin, who commanded the Sarajevo sector in 1993, wrote the following in his memoir: "No one knows exactly how many people died in Bosnia. When I arrived (in 1993), the count was 200,000 dead. When I left after six months, the death toll was still 200,000, and when the Dayton Agreement was signed, the figure was still the same! There's something wrong with this picture" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p.65).

In mid-April 1999, the US State Department and NATO announced the probable execution of 500,000 ethnic Albanians by Serb forces, a figure widely reported in the media. In France, Antoine Garapon, magistrate, Secretary General of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (*Institut des Hautes Etudes sur la Justice*) and member of the editorial staff of the magazine *Esprit*, mentioned in late June 1999 in *Télérama* "the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians massacred". On 2 August 1999, Bernard Kouchner, then Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, falsely reported the exhumation of 11,000 ethnic Albanians, a figure that was refuted shortly afterwards. There were never "hundreds of thousands of victims" but around 10,000 victims, or 0.5% of the population of Kosovo.

From May 1992, the Serbs were accused of using the systematic rape of Muslim women for the purpose of ethnic cleansing. In January 1993, *Paris Match* published a double-page photograph of three crying women with the following caption: "Like them, 60,000 Bosnian women were raped by the Serbs". However, this claim of systematic and planned rape was based on unpublished reports, unproven claims, unverified rumors, anonymous testimonies and extrapolated estimates (Merlino, 1993a; Merlino, 1993b; Colomès, 1993; Schindler, 2007). There is no doubt that there are many cases of rape during a civil war, as there are already in peacetime in so-called civilized countries (in France, for example, there are 75,000 rapes every year, i.e. 10 rapes per 10,000 inhabitants), but there is no evidence to suggest that only Serbs committed this type of abuse or that it was a planned campaign. John MacArthur, referring to the manipulation of the number of women raped, pointed out that Simone Weil had resigned from a commission of inquiry tasked with investigating the rapes after she became convinced that it was simply a "propaganda campaign". Furthermore, the EU Commission of Inquiry's mandate excluded testimony from Serbian women who had been raped altogether.

Colonel Valentin made the same observation in 1993. "At one point I saw an all-female UN delegation come in to investigate the rapes in Bosnia. The head delegate came to me and asked me questions. I told her that I had never heard of rapes in Sarajevo but that I couldn't possibly know everything. She did her investigation, came back to me and said, 'I've got the figures: there were 60,000 rapes'. I congratulated her and asked her how she got the figures; she replied that they came from the Bosnian authorities. I said I was surprised – 60,000 rapes, people would have heard about it! There certainly would have been some, but frankly 60,000 seemed like a lot. She came back the next day after further checks and finally the figure dropped to 6,000!" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p. 65).

* Descriptive indicators have also been manipulated on many occasions. Individuals in positions of authority have accused the Serbs of inhuman behavior or barbaric acts, especially against pregnant women and children, on the basis of unverifiable and unconfirmed testimonies, with the clear aim of demonizing them. During the war in Kosovo, novelist Ismail Kadare stated in an article entitled "The Triumph of Crime" (*Le triomphe du crime*) published in *Le Monde* on 4 May 1999 and reprinted in the *Le Monde* supplements on 8 and 9 October 2000 that "Crime triumphs once again in the heart of Europe. Human limbs amputated, children massacred with axes, pregnant women disemboweled, minors raped, old men burned to death." German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, whose words were picked up by the media, claimed that the Serbs "play football with severed heads, cut up corpses, tear out the fetuses of pregnant women and grill them" (Halimi & Rimbert, 2019). In Bosnia, the media used doctored photographs to support Serbian concentration camp claims. Anthropologist

Véronique Nahoum-Grappe (who called for "moral, political and financial support for the KLA") referred to the role of doctors in the Serbian camps in Bosnia who were responsible for ensuring that raped women did not have intrauterine contraceptives, in order to guarantee that they could be pregnant with the "enemy's child". "In a culture where lineage is passed on through men, it is important to destroy the enemy's lineage" in order to annihilate them" (French Senate, 2013). We would like to know the sources of this information.

With regard to the eastern enclaves, Médecins Sans Frontières lied about the situation in Goražde, claiming that the Serbs had carried out massacres. MSF relayed Bosniak propaganda which, according to the statements of General Morillon, "knowingly" exaggerated the seriousness of the situation in the enclaves. General Morillon stated that "The eastern enclave affair is essentially political. The Bosnian government wants to focus world attention on them in the hope of obtaining a change in the UN mandate. He told us about famine and cannibalism in the Žepa enclave. We were very surprised, when we arrived on 17 January 1993, to find a rural population, not at all hungry, surrounded by their chickens and cows" (Bosnie orientale: L'enclave, 1993). Journalist Jean-François Kahn confirmed this manipulation, saying "The town of Goražde, during its first siege, was littered with corpses and was overwhelmed by the wounded. But when the peacekeepers returned to the city, they found the hospitals practically empty" (Crépin & Barriot, 2005, p. 64).

During the attack on Goražde in the spring of 1994, various non-governmental organizations and the UN – the main sources of the Western media – repeated the information provided by the Bosnian authorities: *"The main NGO sources were Bosniak. During the final week of the siege, the UNHCR representatives and UN observers apparently passed on as their own – and without acknowledging it – the daily reports drawn up by local authorities. These figures are by definition questionable, since the Bosnian authorities were trying to dramatize the situation as much as possible to encourage intervention by the international community"* (*Semo*, 1994). Max Clos, an editorial writer for *Le Figaro*, claimed that the French media had been manipulated by the Bosnian authorities, who deliberately broadcast *"fake news"* and figures with no bearing on reality. Clos added that the media had repeated verbatim several testimonials from humanitarian organizations, which had "gathered rumours that they then amplified and transformed into facts" (Clos, 1994).

8.2.5. The Use of Rhetoric from the Second World War

The use of rhetoric from the Second World War**,** outrageous analogies, inappropriate comparisons and indecent amalgamations. The same process is regularly used: the designated enemy commits unprecedented atrocities and can be likened to absolute evil, namely Hitler, the Nazis, genocide and extermination camps. The victims of such barbarity can then be compared to the Jewish victims of the Second World War. Anyone who might have any doubts about this perspective is accused of revisionism and silenced. In fact, it is a double instrumentalization of suffering: the instrumentalization of the suffering of the victims of the war in the former Yugoslavia but also the instrumentalization of the memory of the victims of the Holocaust.

From the start of the war in 1992, the Bosnian presidency denounced a genocide against Muslims and drew a parallel with the Holocaust during the Second World War. In June 1992, Alija Izetbegović asked Bernard-Henri Lévy to pass on the following message to French president Mitterrand: "We're the Warsaw Ghetto, you see? Is the world really going to let the Warsaw Ghetto die once again?" (Lévy, 1996, pp.51,64). Lévy noted that French politician Simone Veil was shocked by the comparison between Sarajevo and the Warsaw Ghetto. On 29 December 1993, during an interview with Lévy, Alija Izetbegović declared, "Considering the two great crimes, these two systematic genocides in twentieth-century Europe, against the Jewish people by the Germans and against the Muslims by the Serbs […] A new genocide is underway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We thought genocide was over here forever. It turned out that it started again in a much more horrible, much more brutal way than during the Second World War" (Lévy, 1996, pp. 525, 530). On 4 July 1995 in Paris, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić told Lévy, "I don't feel that you've put out the necessary propaganda here on our genocide" (Lévy, 1996, pp.426). Those are Silajdžić's words verbatim: "all the necessary propaganda". For Lévy, the Bosnian fighters were "the worthy heirs of the Vercors fighters [French resistance forces known as *maquisards* during the Second World War] and General De Gaulle's companions," to which General Jovan Divjak replied, "These citizens in arms are like your *maquisards* of '42 who fought the Germans" (Lévy, 1996, pp.211).

In January 1993, Médecins du Monde launched a widespread poster campaign likening the Serbs to the Nazis and their prison camps in Bosnia to extermination camps. An article by José Fort in *L'Humanité* on 6 January 1993 described these hate posters. "Two posters created by 'Médecins du Monde' have been displayed in recent days on billboards all over France. The first depicts an emaciated man standing behind barbed wire, the symbol of a concentration camp. The second shows Hitler

and Serbian president Milošević side by side. Think what you will of the leader of Belgrade, but the amalgamation constitutes a very real demonization of the Serbian people, an odious call to hatred, a trivialization of Nazism, a scandalous assimilation that dishonors its perpetrators. 'Médecins du Monde' is playing a very dangerous game. The official mission of this organization, which was created following a split with 'Médecins Sans Frontières' and largely sponsored by minister Bernard Kouchner, is to provide humanitarian relief. And here it is waging a political campaign of incitement to war". Simone Veil, former president of the European Parliament, took part in a fact-finding mission on the practice of rape in the Bosnian War and warned against the "disinformation" equating the Serbs with the Nazis and their prison camps in Bosnia with extermination camps. With regard to the Médecins du Monde poster campaign, Veil said on the French radio network *France-Inter* that "When you put Milošević and Hitler on the same billboard, it's disinformation," and that "talking about extermination camps is disinformation". It is important to note that these posters have been carefully removed from image banks and are now impossible to find on the Internet, as if Médecins du Monde had wanted to erase all traces of this hateful disinformation that was inappropriate coming from a humanitarian association. In his book published in 2004, Kouchner discussed a conversation with Alija Izetbegović, a few days before his death (Kouchner, 2004, p. 386-387). Kouchner asked Izetbegović, "During the meeting (with French president Mitterrand) you mentioned the existence of 'extermination camps' in Bosnia. You repeated it in front of reporters. This caused considerable commotion around the world. François Mitterrand sent me to Omarska and we visited other prisons. They were horrible places, but people weren't systematically exterminated. Did you know that?" Izetbegović answered Kouchner, "Yes. I thought my revelations might incite bombardments. (...) Yes, I tried, but the statement was false. There were no extermination camps no matter how horrible the places were" (Kouchner, 2004, p. 386-387).

On the subject of Srebrenica, French judge Claude Jorda declared that "Since Auschwitz, no crime as great as this has been committed". In Kosovo, the media reported that the Serbs were incinerating their victims in "ovens, such as those used in Auschwitz" (*The Daily Mirror*, 7 July 1999). In an interview given by Kadare to *Le Figaro* (7 and 8 March 1998), the famous Albanian writer stated that "in Serbia, discrimination against Albanians is similar to that suffered by the Jews in Europe" and that "this crime was prepared, planned for a long time". During the war in Kosovo, Kadare stated in an article entitled "The Triumph of Crime" (*Le triomphe du crime*) published in *Le Monde* on 4 May 1999 and reprinted in the *Le Monde* supplements on 8–9 October 2000 that "Crime triumphs once again in the heart of Europe. […] After the Holocaust against the Jews, this new defilement weighs very heavily on consciences". Zlatko Dizdarević wrote that the city of Sarajevo "is a concentration camp in the classical sense of the term" (Dizdarević, 1993).

8.2.6. Accusations of Collective Responsibility

Each time a crime was mentioned, it was not the responsibility of a political party or a government that was denounced, but the collective responsibility of the entire Serbian people, provoking hatred and justifying collective sanctions against it, prohibiting any form of compassion for its civilian victims.

Alija Izetbegović declared on 29 December 1993, "Given what they did, the Serbian people will forever be remembered as the people associated with the genocides, murders, raping of women, destruction of cultural property, etc. The Serbian people therefore bear the moral weight of the crimes" (Lévy, 1996, p.543). Bernard-Henri Lévy gave the following description of Belgrade and its inhabitants on 20 June 1992, writing that "Germany, in 1943 or '44, must have looked like this. All the people of the world must look like this when they commit a great crime, or have agreed to it" (Lévy, 1996, p.54). General Jean-René Bachelet denounced the article by Rémy Ourdan ("one of the best journalists working in Sarajevo", according to Lévy) published on 2 December 1995 in *Le Monde*, saying, "For the journalist of *Le Monde*, the Serbian populations (of Sarajevo) for whom we are demanding guarantees are essentially made up of 'thugs' and 'killers'. It is as if the misfortunes of the Bosniaks, especially the unfortunate people besieged in Sarajevo for three years, disqualified any attention paid to the Serb population, which is regarded, as a whole, as criminal. This is the exact view of the Bosniak extremists" (Bachelet, 2016, p.230). General Bachelet was clear: the newspaper *Le Monde* was repeating the arguments of the Bosniak extremists.

Kadare had no qualms in declaring that the Serbian people as a whole had consented to the barbarity. "In fact, very few voices among the Serbs themselves have spoken out against the barbaric acts committed. Stressing the collective responsibility of this country is the only correct attitude towards it." This condemnation was also included in Kadare's book, *Il a fallu ce deuil pour se retrouver* ("This grief was necessary to find ourselves again", published by Editions Fayard). "In light of the kind of perverse enjoyment that this tragedy has caused in a whole part of the country, one can safely speak of Serbia's collective responsibility."

Sabri Hamiti wrote an article in *Libération* on 13 May 1999 entitled "The Serbs are all responsible" (*Les Serbes sont tous responsables*). In an article in *Le Monde* of 15 and 16 October 2000 entitled "Serbia: duty of vigilance" (*Serbie: devoir de vigilance*), Marie-Françoise Allain and Alain Joxe, together with Faik Dizdarević, denounced the collective responsibility of the Serbian people. "Milošević and his clan, but also very broad sectors of Serbian society, were responsible for this policy."

8.2.7. For the Serbs, Presumption of Guilt and Instructions for the Prosecution

One of the consequences of the demonization campaign was that the presumption of guilt became the rule against the Serbian side. The most deadly artillery and mortar fire as well as sniper fire was systematically blamed on the Serbs. In almost all cases, however, no serious ballistic investigations were conducted and there were no expert findings to support these accusations. On the contrary, high-ranking military officials have stated that many of these crimes were committed by Bosniaks deliberately targeting their own population or peacekeepers coming to their aid.

8.2.7.1. Regarding Artillery and Mortar Fire

On 27 May 1992 an explosion along a pedestrian street in Sarajevo killed many people queueing up outside a bakery. The Serbs were immediately accused of having fired a mortar shell and threatened with international sanctions. Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, who commanded the UN Peacekeeping Forces, described the exact circumstances of the explosion and expressed serious doubts about whether the Serbs were responsible. General MacKenzie wrote that "People lined up for bread were attacked, and at least 17 killed. Presidency claims it was a Serb mortar attack, Serbs claim it was a set-up using explosives. Our people tell us there were a number of things that didn't fit. The street had been blocked off just before the incident. Once the crowd was let in and had lined up, the media appeared but kept their distance. The attack took place, and the media were immediately on the scene" (MacKenzie, 1993, p.194).

The 22 August edition of *The Independent* wrote that "United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe some of the worst recent killings in Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread queue, were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders – not Serb besiegers – as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military intervention. The view has been expressed in confidential reports circulating at UN headquarters in New York, and in classified briefings to US policymakers in Washington. […] UN officials said then that they were suspicious about the circumstances but could not go public without jeopardizing the UN mission and possibly endangering UN peace-keepers' lives. Classified reports to the UN force commander, General Satish Nambiar, concluded, however, that Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb.

'We believe it was a command-detonated explosion, probably in a can,' a UN official said then. 'The impact which is there now is not necessarily similar or anywhere near as large as we came to expect with a mortar round landing on a paved surface' (Doyle, 1992). The same article points out that "The attack came shortly before a meeting of European Community ambassadors to consider imposing sanctions on Serbia."

Witnesses stated that television cameras had been in position before the explosion at the post office, and confirmed the presence of Jusuf Prazina's accomplices (Haris Advić and Adnan Solaković) and explosives maker Mirza Jamaković. Witnesses also heard two shots giving the signal to detonate the explosive device (Appendix X to chapter VI, p. 1241)[16]. Yet *Le Monde* correspondent Florence Hartmann, who would later become the spokesperson for the ICTY prosecutor, claimed that "At 10.15 am, three shells fired from the heights of Trebević, a hill south-east of Sarajevo controlled by Serbian militia, struck the queue precisely, right in the middle of the city."

On 5 February 1994 an explosion occurred in Markale market square in central Sarajevo (Fort, 1994; Gallois, 1994). Before any ballistics investigation, the Serbs were again accused despite all experts' reservations and a NATO ultimatum was issued against them.

Te following was written in *Le Monde* in February 1994: "UNPROFOR military experts explain that while the (north-eastern) axis of Saturday's shell in the central market is certain, the distance at which it was fired is not. Investigations indicate a region through which the front line passes. However, the margin of error (500 meters) to be taken into account in these calculations, they claim, does not allow us to say from which side of the front the shell was fired" (Après le massacre, 1994).

Colonel Valentin wrote that "The shell that killed so many in the Bosniak market that day seems to have been fired from the front line, near the market. However, any soldier who thinks about it would say that it's a mortar shell, and that the Serbs use very few mortars, and would wonder why they would advance to the front line to fire when they could move further back, which would be less risky and have the same outcome. Meanwhile, if the Bosniaks wanted to make it look like a Serbian shell, they would get as close as possible to the Serbs, and so on the front line" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, pp. 234-235).

Colonel Valentin concludes: "So is it not the Bosniaks who benefit from the crime, the Bosniaks who have an interest in the whole world thinking the Serbs are still bastards?"

Colonel Gildas Sonnic, Chief of Staff of the Sarajevo sector and deputy to General André Soubirou, who was present at the scene, said that "An explosion was heard around 12.15 pm. As soon as the extent of the losses – all civilian – became known,

in-depth intelligence work was relaunched in all directions. We then learned that a convoy, intended to evacuate the last Israeli families from Sarajevo, was leaving the city around 11 am. Serbian, Croatian and Muslim families had joined the convoy. Negotiations between the representatives of the different faiths had apparently been difficult, and extremists from all sides had, as usual, expressed their disagreement. This operation, presented as 'routine' by the UNHCR and the Red Cross, turned out in reality to be supervised by American and Israeli officials. Bosnian fire from Butmir took the convoy by surprise at about 11.30 am to 11.45 am as it advanced along the runway to enter the Serbian zone. The shell may not have actually been aimed at the market. The tailfin and all fragments were gone before they let us into the square. The range, reduced by a third or a quarter, could have been due to a typical charge delay failure, or worse, the absence of a base plate (makeshift pneumatic mortars are common among the Bosniaks). The Bosniaks could therefore be behind a mortar aimed at the convoy, with a technical failure resulting in the carnage at the market". *Le Monde* confirmed the departure of the Jewish association's convoy on 5 February 1994: "A few hundred meters from the market (Markale), 250 people, evacuated under the auspices of the Jewish center in Sarajevo, said goodbye to their loved ones and set off for the Adriatic coast" (Après le massacre, 1994).

General Sir Michael Rose and several ballistics experts claimed that the mortar was of Bosniak origin. Jean Daniel, director of the *Nouvel Observateur*, gave important testimony about the Bosniak snipers and the explosion at Markale market on 5 February 1994: "I remember the first attack on the central market, the one that provoked the first NATO bombings. I have to say it today. One after another, I heard Edouard Balladur, François Léotard, Alain Juppé and two very 'responsible' generals, whose trust I will not betray, tell me that they were convinced that many French UN soldiers, shot or wounded in Bosnia, had been killed or wounded by Bosniak snipers. And even that the shell fired on the market was also Bosniak! I said it was frightening to see that they might have caused carnage on their own population. Yes, replied the prime minister without hesitation" (Daniel, 1995). General Rose roundly criticized the large-scale bombing of Sarajevo by Bosniak forces. "We also clearly saw Bosniaks firing large-caliber weapons, violating the ceasefire agreement, NATO ultimatums, and Resolutions 836 and 824. On 17 September 1994, using Cymbeline radars, more than 200 shells were detected. That's unacceptable! That was two days before President Izetbegović left for Washington to discuss lifting the arms embargo. This case could appear to be an attempt at manipulation on his part. Awkward, isn't it? I went into his office to show him the trajectory logs proving the mortars came from his troops. […] Two hundred shells! A bombing of this scale can only be coordinated at the highest level of the army" (Mari, 1996, pp. 54-55).

Colonel Valentin said, "When I was in my room/office in the PTT building in Sarajevo, which served as our headquarters, the Bosniaks used to fire multiple launch rocket systems around six in the morning. They set up close to our building to shoot at the Serbs and then took cover. The Serbs, ever subtle, fired at the Bosniaks who had already left, and the shells fell right by us" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p. 235). The same happened with the case of the shelling of Sarajevo City hall (Vijećnica) where a witness said that it was fired on because there was a multi-barrel rocket launcher nearby, and when the rocket launcher was hit, the City hall caught fire in that explosion (Appendix X to chapter VI, p. 1265)[17].

There is evidence that Bosniak mortar fire became more intense while foreign officials were visiting to observe the extent of the Serbian attacks. The Independent newspaper described "a 'choreographed' mortar salvo 30 seconds after Douglas Hurd entered a building for a meeting with the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, on 17 July" (Doyle, 1992).

Colonel Valentin described Mrs. Sadako Ogata's visit in July of 1992: "I was told of the official visit of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Miss Ogata, a Japanese woman. She had barely gotten off the plane when the Bosniaks, who were always good at showing that they were the victims of the conflict, provoked the Serbs by shooting mortars at them. The Serbs, who were less subtle than the Bosniaks, returned the favor a hundredfold, right when Miss Ogata arrived. She spent the day under bombardment. Shells fell very close to where we were, killing two and wounding three civilians. Later I received a phone call from my Bosnian liaison officer, who said, 'The Bosnian Interior Minister, Mr Pušina needs to see you.' I met him at around 11 am and he said,

> – Minister Pušina: 'Did you see? You were bombed earlier.'
>
> – Colonel Valentin: 'Yes, we were bombed, the shells fell 300 meters away, but we didn't get hit.'
>
> – Minister Pušina: 'Well, I have information from a reliable source: this afternoon the Serbs are going to bomb the PTT building just as Miss Ogata will be coming to visit you. You need to evacuate.'
>
> – Colonel Valentin: 'How do you know that? (While thinking: every time he does this so that she isn't able to visit headquarters or meet employees who work for us, most of them locals, who would say how things really are.) Tell me, who are your sources?'
>
> – Minister Pušina: 'No, that's confidential!'
>
> – Colonel Valentin: 'I'm not going to evacuate the whole building on your word alone. So, thank you very much for this information, but know that

> I will not evacuate; however, since you are my source, and if the building is bombed, I'll consider you at fault because it could only come from your camp. And your liaison officer will stay with me and we'll die together!'
>
> He left in a hurry, and there was no bombing of the PTT building that afternoon. In hindsight, I'm sure that the shots that morning that killed and wounded Bosniaks ... were Bosniak!". (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p. 232-234)

In his book *Balkan Odyssey*, former British foreign secretary David Owen described the Muslim artillery attacks emanating from the Koševo hospital as "the most flagrant and best-documented episode of Muslim army units provoking the Serbs to fire on their fellow Muslims" (Owen, 1995). He wrote that "An UNMO (United Nations Military Observer) team near Koševo hospital in Sarajevo had witnessed a Bosnian government mortar crew set up on the grounds of the hospital and fire over the hospital into a Serb area. They had quickly packed up and gone, only for the UNMOs to see a television crew arrive and then record the retaliatory Serb shelling of the hospital" (Owen, 1995).

When General Philippe Morillon testified in the Slobodan Milošević trial he said the Muslims "very frequently used mortars at Koševo hospital for provocation purposes" (ICTY, 2004). An official letter dated 19 January 1993, from General Morillon to Alija Izetbegović, denounced the use of mortars on the grounds of Koševo hospital and the abuses by Bosniak forces (Appendix II to chapter VI)[18]: "You will I am sure be aware that the firing of weapons from a hospital is against the Geneva Convention. I regret to have to inform you that for some time now I have been receiving reports that some mobile mortars have been operating from the vicinity of Koševo hospital. This has sadly been confirmed and I now have concrete evidence from witnesses with signed statements that this was in fact the case at 14:30 hours on Monday 11 January. An 82 mm mortar had been set up on the western side of Koševo hospital, within the hospital grounds. This mortar and its crew then proceeded to fire nine rounds, using the hospital as a screen. The direct consequence of this disreputable and cowardly act was that shortly afterwards the hospital came under fire from anti-aircraft gun fire, artillery fire and mortar fire. I must point out to you the harm that such blatant disregard of the Geneva Convention does to your cause and insist that you take the strongest measures to prevent reoccurrences taking place. I am also becoming increasingly concerned at the recent increase in indications of a lack of discipline amongst your forces. I must urge you to take immediate preventive action. I regret also to have to inform you I have been asked to pass the details of this particular incident to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva."

On 28 August 1995, a second explosion took place near the Markale market square. Once again, no ballistics expertise was taken into account and NATO launched

Operation Deliberate Force against the Serb positions. General Bachelet, who was commanding the Sarajevo sector, and Colonel Andrei Demurenko, Chief of Staff of the Sarajevo sector, expressed serious doubts about the responsibility of the Serbs (Bachelet, 2016, pp. 128-130).

The attack against Bosniak General Sefer Halilović, which was also blamed on Serbs, was actually carried out by Bosniak militias. The New York Times reported on this attack: "One, Jusuf Prazina, known as Juka, was driven from the city in the summer of 1992 by Gen. Sefer Halilović, the former commander of the Bosnian Army, who made a crusade of trying to put the gangs under Government control. Juka vowed revenge. In July, General Halilović's wife and her brother were killed when a shell exploded beside them as they sipped coffee on the balcony of the general's apartment near the center of Sarajevo. The deaths were blamed publicly on 'an aggressor's shell,' meaning that it was fired by Serbs. But police investigators quickly determined that the explosion was caused by a bazooka fired from a facing apartment block. Aides to the general said at the time that he believed that the killers were local criminals, possibly working for Juka. No one has been arrested, and there have been no new efforts by the army to crack down on the gangs" (Burns, 1993a).

8.2.7.2. Regarding Sniper Fire against UNPROFOR Peacekeepers

The AFP dispatch from 6 February 1994 analyzed a statement by the French Armed Forces Chief of Staff, in which he referred to the Bosnian Muslim snipers. "The Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, warned on Sunday against 'simplistic ideas'. In an example intended to dispel 'simplistic ideas', the admiral pointed out that most of the 18 dead and 300 wounded among the French peacekeepers had been Muslims, while French troops were precisely on the ground to protect Muslim populations. 'You have to beware of simplistic ideas,' said Admiral Lanxade in the aftermath of the bloody attack that killed 66 people and wounded 197 in a Sarajevo market" (Déclaration de l'amiral, 1994).

Lt. Gen. Francis Briquemont also mentioned the Bosniak sniper fire aimed at the UN peacekeepers: "I will never forget that French soldier who was seriously wounded in Dobrijna by a Bosniak sniper. For me, it was the height of horror, because he was distributing food to the Bosniak population" (Haget & Leblond, 1994). Between January 1992 and December 1995, France lost 55 military personnel in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. Of these 55 deaths, 23 were caused by hostile fire, 14 of which were in Sarajevo. Nearly all the French soldiers killed in Sarajevo

are linked to hostile fire (Didier, 1992). Of the 11 soldiers who died on Mount Igman, none were attributable to hostile fire.

General Hervé-Michel Gobilliard, who commanded the Sarajevo sector in 1995, said, "I had a guy who was killed by Bosniaks. When I said on television that I was 90% sure it was the Bosniaks, I got told off. 'That's not possible, it could only be the Serbs!' […] The French serving on the UNPROFOR tried to remain impartial. They tried to analyze as clearly as possible who it was that initiated military actions: since they did not always say it was the Serbs, they were qualified as pro-Serbs" (Gobilliard, Guibal & Desert, 2007).

Edin Garaplija, a witness called by the ICTY, who was head of a Bosnian intelligence service unit, said that one of the leaders of the Ševe secret police unit, Nedžad Herenda, told him during an interrogation that he had killed a French UNPROFOR soldier in order to frame the Serbs for the crime (Mladic witness: Bosnian, 2015). Herenda said that he fired from the Bosnian Executive Council building at the soldier, who was on the street in front of the Holiday Inn hotel and who was trying to protect passers-by from sniper fire. Herenda said that for that action and for other actions as well, he did receive certain amounts to the tune of thousands of Deutschmarks to carry out this crime (ICTY, 2007).

8.2.7.3. Regarding Sniper Fire against Civilians

Several UNPROFOR officers have accused Bosnian Muslim snipers of deliberately shooting Serb children as well as members of their own community to provoke sanctions against the Serbs. Commandant Franchet, the pseudonym of a French senior officer for UNPROFOR, wrote, "You have to have seen a Muslim sniper from Sarajevo shooting at Muslims, just a few dozen meters from the UNPROFOR headquarters, to understand that the Bosnians, are completely desperate and ready to use any provocation to incite the multinational force to intervene against the Serbs" (Franchet, 1995).

Mike O'Connor's article in *The New York Times* on 1 August 1995, discussed a report that was never released. The article reported Bosniak snipers targeting their own civilians: "French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations unit trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo have concluded that until mid-June some gunfire also came from Government soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what it called a "definitive" investigation, a French marine unit that patrols against snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally occupied by

Bosnian soldiers and other security forces. […] Members of the United Nations anti-sniping unit, who said they are equipped with infrared and thermal viewing devices to watch suspected snipers' nests, said they began their investigation after studying the trajectory of bullets striking near central Sarajevo. They concluded that some of the shooting was coming from the former Parliament building. […] French officers said they came to believe that the same Bosnian soldiers who shot at Serbs also fired at Bosnian civilians. […] The officer insisted on anonymity, saying the findings are politically sensitive. Six French peacekeepers in the anti-sniping unit who took part in the investigation were interviewed and were willing to be identified by name, but their commander, General Hervé Gobilliard, insisted that their names be withheld to avoid putting them at risk. […] The results of the French investigation were not officially reported to upper-level United Nations officials here, and no report was written, a senior French officer said. One benefit of not making the matter official – thereby risking that it would become public – is to avoid a dispute between the Bosnian Government and the United Nations" (O'Connor, 1995).

On 5 April 1992, two young Muslim women, Suada Dilberović and Olga Sučić, were killed by gunfire while standing on Vrbanja Bridge over the Miljacka River. The Bosniak authorities immediately blamed Serbian snipers who reportedly fired from the Holiday Inn known to house the premises of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). The announcement that "Chetniks" were firing on the crowd was made on live television and foreign newspapers[19]. Dozens of Green Berets with Mirza Jamaković and members of the special unit for the Interior Ministry with Zoran Čegar (deputy to Dragan Vikić) immediately swarmed the hotel and arrested Vladimir Ilić and three other members of the SDS security service who had nothing to do with the shooting. They were taken to the police station on Logavina Street (Stari Grad) for interrogation. After a week of physical violence and psychological abuse, they were freed in exchange for a prisoner release. No evidence was ever found against them[20]. This event had significant international repercussions as the Serbians were accused of deliberately shooting civilians demonstrating for peace. However, it is impossible for a sniper to see Vrbanja Bridge from the Holiday Inn, regardless of their position in the hotel or even from the roof, because the Parliament building completely blocks it from view. General Aleksandar Vasiljević, former head of security in the Sarajevo military district and deputy head of the counter-intelligence service of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), told the ICTY that the shots came from Green Berets who fired from a vocational school adjacent to the Holiday Inn. General Vasiljević's teams intercepted a radio communication from the Green Berets announcing the start of the operation, with the order to open fire coming from Jusuf "Juka" Prazina. Caco was also caught on film leaving the vocational school shortly after the shootings (ICTY, 2003). After the war, Zoran Čegar confirmed having heard directly from Juka

Prazina that his and his men had fired on the crowd from buildings near the Holiday Inn (engineering school, the "Momo and Uzeir" buildings, church bell tower, among others)[21]. In 1996, Vrbanja Bridge was renamed "Suada and Olga Bridge".

The Serbs were also accused of the shooting that killed television producer David Kaplan. An article in *The Independent* covered this event by quoting UNPROFOR soldiers: "UN officials also believe the bullet which killed the American television producer David Kaplan near Sarajevo airport on 13 August 1992 was probably not fired by a sniper from distant Serbian positions. 'That would have been impossible,' one UN military officer said. 'That shot came in horizontal to the ground. Somebody was down at ground level'" (Doyle, 1992).

On 24 December 1992, Bernard-Henri Lévy wrote the following in his journal: "A bar on Marsala Tita Street. I'm supposed to be meeting with a young Bosniak girl who I was told was blonde, very beautiful, and a 'woman sniper' (obviously on the Bosnian side). She didn't come. But instead, a man came. 'Razija will not be coming; and I suggest you do not insist, and do not meddle in this.' The man told me his name was Caco. He was, eight months ago, one of the city's first defenders" (Lévy, 1996, p.111). The message was clear: the criminal Caco was suggesting that Lévy worry about other things than Bosniak snipers.

On 19 May 1993, a young couple of 25-year-olds, Admira Ismić and Boško Brkić (Sarajevo's "Romeo and Juliet"), were killed by sniper fire as they tried to cross Vrbanja Bridge into the Grbavica neighbourhood[22]. In his testimony before the ICTY, Edin Garaplija stated that the Ševe unit was responsible for this double murder (ICTY, 2015, p. 33899). Nedžad Herenda admitted shooting the couple with one of his accomplices from the Ševe unit. Herenda also confirmed the involvement of snipers from the Ševe unit in the killings of Serbs in Grbavica, namely "Serbian women dressed in black"[23].

Regarding the Bosnian sniper fire against civilians, General Francis Briquemont said that Bosnian leaders never condemned or tried to prevent these crimes. "Bosnian leaders on all sides have never publicly condemned these civilian killings, except of course for those committed by the other side. They never tried to stop them in their own camp" (Briquemont, 1997, p. 241).

8.2.8. For the Bosniaks, Presumption of Innocence and Mercy

On 11 September 1993, Bernard-Henri Lévy wrote the following in his journal: "The thugs of Sarajevo. I've been fascinated, for the past year and a half, with these famous thugs who, on the first day of the war, went around the bars, rounded up the bad guys, gave them old blunderbusses or .32 ACPs and took them to the hills where they formed, like it or not, the first defense units of the city. There's Juka, whom Ravalet told me about. Caco, whom I saw again last night at the Hérisson – but he was so drunk I couldn't get anything out of him. There's Čelo, who looks like some kind of Robin Hood. And then there is, if not the most legendary, at least the most striking: Ismet Bajramović, known as or 'Baldy', whom I met earlier in rather funny circumstances." (Lévy, 1996, p.187) Lévy also wrote in his journal of "the idealism of Juka, Čelo and Caco – these big-hearted thugs who were the first, in April 1992, to take the road to the hills in Sarajevo to defend them against the attacker..." (Lévy, 1996, p.454). Lévy was fascinated by these "Robin Hoods", these big-hearted thugs who were legendary, striking, idealist and funny at a time when they were murdering and torturing the Serbs and raping Serbian women in their private prisons. As for Naser Orić, who was responsible for the massacre of Serbian villagers and who left Srebrenica on the orders of Alija Izetbegović, the media still to this day refers to him as the "defender" or even the "charismatic defender of Srebrenica".

9. Reparations and Rehabilitation

I. During the social and economic reconstruction phase, victims await official recognition of their status as war victims, restoration of their rights, restitution of their property, and material and financial compensation for the damage suffered. The restoration of law and justice is based on the establishment of national and international criminal courts. The judiciary is responsible for acknowledging the reality of the crimes, identifying the culprits and punishing them, bearing in mind that war crimes often continue for several months after the official end of the conflict due to social instability. The search for missing persons is one of the priorities during this phase.

II. Treatment for physical and psychological trauma is based on individual and collective measures. Management of physical damage requires specialized medical and surgical care to limit the extent of the sequelae. Free access to health care should be extended to as many victims as possible. The introduction of collective measures includes gynecological and psychological follow-up care for women who have been raped and treatment for PTSD.

PTSD treatment techniques are most effective if they are implemented **quickly,** i.e. as soon as the stress becomes abnormally persistent (more than a month after the traumatic event). The effectiveness of treatment varies, with many patients retaining the diagnosis of PTSD after treatment and many not completing treatment. *The unmet need for PTSD treatment concerns a significant number of patients.* During armed conflict and its aftermath, treating large numbers of individuals, or even a large part of a population, poses organizational, technical and logistical problems. In all cases, social support is an essential element in the care of victims.

Psychotherapy, and especially cognitive and behavioral therapies, are the best treatment for post-traumatic stress states. **Cognitive therapy** focuses on **modifying irrational and dysfunctional thoughts** that cause distress and anxiety. **Behavioral therapy** aims to **change the person's attitude** by reducing avoidance behaviors and developing strategies to reduce the signs of anxiety. These therapies are associated with techniques of progressive exposure to memories and elements related to the trauma (e.g. situations, places, images, sensations, sounds and smells). Hypnosis and e**ye movement desensitization and reprocessing** (EMDR) have been shown to be effective for some in treating PTSD (although there are certain contraindications to bear in mind).

Pharmacological treatments can be used in combination with cognitive and behavioral therapies to enhance their effectiveness. Antidepressant medications[24] from the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor family, such as paroxetine and sertraline, have been proven effective in clinical studies. They are considered a **first-line treatment**. Propranolol, a noradrenergic beta-blocker, in combination with psychotherapy, is thought to interfere with the process of reconsolidation of traumatic memory and to degrade the memory trace that plays a key role in PTSD. MDMA (3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine), commonly known as ecstasy, *is a pro-serotonin agent classified as a narcotic drug*. A medical application is being considered for the treatment of PTSD. MDMA treatment, administered in a controlled manner, is combined with psychotherapy, with the aim being to bring up memories while reducing the emotional response caused by remembering traumatic events. During the psychotherapy session, MDMA gives patients the strength to face their trauma and to free themselves from it. *It allows them to gain a new perspective on their trauma without being over-*

whelmed by fear and anxiety. Several clinical studies were organized by the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS, Santa Cruz, California), which has been authorized by the American authorities to launch a large-scale clinical trial and evaluate the *possibility of generalizing MDMA-assisted psychotherapy*.

10. Sarajevo in 1992-1993

10.1. The Double Encirclement of Sarajevo

A 'siege' is a military operation that consists in surrounding a city to deprive it of any outside aid (supplies, weapons, soldiers) and to prohibit the escape of the besieged people. Rémy Ourdan[25] wrote the following in *Le Monde* on 8 April 2018: "The siege technique is not illegal under the laws of war. It has been used since Antiquity, but was considered a 'crime against humanity' after the siege of Sarajevo" (Ourdan, 2018).

The "siege" of Sarajevo, which lasted 1,425 days (from spring 1992 to winter 1995/96), has often been inappropriately compared with the 900-day siege of Leningrad (in the former Soviet Union). The siege of Sarajevo has been characterized as the longest siege in history, and "lasted a year longer than the siege of Leningrad by the Nazi forces during the Second World War" (Crosby, 2017). The siege of Leningrad by the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich, from 8 September 1941 to 27 January 1944, killed more than one million civilians out of three million residents – a third of the population (Salisbury, 1970). Nearly all of the civilian deaths were caused not by bombings but rather famine due to the blockade. Prior to the war, the population of today's territory of the canton of Sarajevo was 493,687 (While on the prewar territory of 10 municipalities of the city of Sarajevo the number was 527,049). The number of civilians killed – around 10,000 – was around 2% of the population[26]. These deaths were caused by gunfire exchange between armed forces (mortars, artillery, war weapons) and criminal acts (summary executions, murder, sniper fire). There is another fundamental difference: as in most international war sieges, the population of Leningrad was united against an outside invader (the Nazis), whereas the city of Sarajevo turned against its own Serbian citizens. The situation in Sarajevo was more akin to a civil war, such as the siege of Madrid during the Spanish Civil War. However, the term siege seems inappropriate for reasons we will discuss in further detail.

The city of Sarajevo is located in a depression where the Miljacka River runs from east to west (Appendix III to chapter VI)[27]. The city is surrounded by high mountains, namely Mount Igman and Mount Trebević. At the beginning of the war, the Serbian population of Sarajevo (157,143 people) was spread over two areas[28]. Part of the population was trapped in the zone of Sarajevo controlled by the Bosnian army and delimited by the front line. This zone included most of the four municipalities in the canton of Sarajevo: Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Stari Grad and Centar Sarajevo. Colonel Valentin, who was in command of the Sarajevo sector as part of UNPROFOR from 6 January to 13 July 1993, describes this population as follows: "A Serb minority inside Sarajevo is completely blocked, surrounded by Bosniaks" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p.63). Meanwhile, a second part of the population was located in the neighborhoods near the demarcation line, particularly the neighborhood of Grbavica and the districts west of Sarajevo: Ilidža, Hadžići, Vogošća, Ilijaš, Rajlovac. Bernard-Henri Lévy shared the words of a Bosnian army lieutenant. "'Because look at a map', he said. 'The city clearly remains under siege. But the Serbian suburb of Ildža is, virtually, too. Grbavica, the Chetnik outcropping, which has been registered for three years in the heart of our city, is almost cut off from the world. Hadžići is surrounded to the north and south by our men ...'" (Lévy, 1996, p.437). Grbavica, located on the left bank of the Miljacka River near Vrbanja Bridge, was effectively trapped like a tenon in a mortise. Grbavica was surrounded on three sides by the Bosniak army, which controlled Hrasno (part of Hrasno Brdo) in the west, the northern bank of the Miljacka river, and Debelo Brdo in the east. In the Grbavica area, the Miljacka river was the northern line of the conflict : the Bosniak army was north and the Serbian army south of the river.

10.2. Entry and Exit from Sarajevo

10.2.1. The Sarajevo Airport

The Sarajevo airport is located southwest of the city between Ilidža to the west and Lukavica to the east, with Dobrinja to the north and Butmir to the south. It was closed at the start of the war and reopened in July 1992 when French president

François Mitterrand and Bernard Kouchner travelled to the country on 28 June 1992 (Braunstein, 2010).

According to Alija Izetbegović, François Mitterrand's trip with Bernard Kouchner on 28 June 1992, which led to the reopening of the Sarajevo airfield, had negative consequences for the Bosniak cause. For Izetbegović, the opening of the Sarajevo airfield sidelined the military solution and transformed a political problem into a humanitarian one. "Things ceased to be a matter of law, of justice, of respect for international law. Everything slowed and went into charity. Instead of defending the rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community decided to take up charity and send alms" (Lévy, 1996, p.531). Izetbegović continued, still in reference to Mitterrand's trip, "Many regret the reopening of the airfield and the West's "humanitarian" policy, which has definitively pushed back the fight for rights, justice and the rule of law. Instead, the policy of almsgiving was imposed on us, which of course did not meet our expectations" (Lévy, 1996, p.533). For Bernard-Henri Lévy, the consequences were clear: "Since everyone gave up thinking politically, since the big states behaved like branches of Médecins du Monde and the ambulance strategy became the general rule, it was up to individuals to make an exception and to remind people that fascism cannot be stopped with ambulances" (Lévy, 1996, p.501).

Until the end of the war, a media campaign ensued that aimed to discredit UNPROFOR's humanitarian action to better support the option of military strikes against Serbian positions. On 7 December 1992, during a televised speech from the city of Velika Kladuša (INA & France, 1992), Rony Brauman, then president of Médecins Sans Frontières, denounced UNPROFOR's impotence and the "sending of blankets that will be used as shrouds". Bernard-Henri Lévy wrote in his notebooks that "Sarajevo, a prison in which the Blue Helmets are the gaolers", "the Belgian Briquemont, the most naively pro-Serb of the Blue Helmets' leaders", "the UNPROFOR soldiers who just make up things to indulge the Serbs", "General Janvier, whose name is still associated with the abandonment and then the massacre of Srebrenica". The culmination was Rémy Ourdan's article in *Le Monde*, entitled "The French UNPROFOR officers took the side of the Serbian extremists in Sarajevo" (Ourdan, 1995). In his book *J'accuse l'ONU* (I accuse the UN), Zlatko Dizdarević wrote, "By proclaiming neutrality in the face of the appalling camps, the rape of women and massacres of children, the UN has definitively disqualified itself as the supreme embodiment of the noble values of international law. A powerless receptacle of the respective cowardice of its Member States, it has served as a screen, through its obscene gesticulations, for the unspeakable secret of modern times: democracies brandish the duty of humanitarian interference but no longer want to assume the risk of military conflict" (Dizdarević & Riva, 1995).

The agreement on reopening the airport stipulated that the airport area was a neutral zone that was off limits to Sarajevo civilians and military personnel of the parties to the conflict. Colonel Valentin described the reality of the situation and how it was used by the Bosniak side. He wrote the following about negotiating to ensure the protection of civilians: "The real problem we have is the agreement signed with the Serbs in June 1992. It clearly states that we, the UN soldiers, must prevent Bosniaks from using the airfield runways as a means of communication with the outside world; that is one of our tasks. The Serbs have, of course, observed that the Bosniaks are finding ways to cross the runways in spite of the UN. All we can do is pick up the Bosniaks who cross into the zone and return them to their starting point. We can identify them using our night-vision devices. The goal is to prevent them being shot like rabbits. Some nights, we intercept up to a thousand people – that's a lot. I've never seen children hurt, but women, yes. This scandalous situation cannot go on like this, I have to find a solution. So I've decided to bring everyone to the negotiating table. My proposal was this: I considered all men between the ages of 16 and 60 to be soldiers. If they decided to cross the airport, it was at their own risk. However, women, children and the elderly were not combatants, and so we would allow their passage. I suggested setting up a line of armored military vehicles to transport women, children and the elderly – both Serbian and Bosniak – for one hour before nightfall. Everyone agreed ... and then who do you think torpedoed the deal? The Bosniaks! Because it was in their interest to continue having dead and injured Bosniaks at the airport for journalists to see to support the Bosniak cause. They wanted to keep swaying global public opinion!" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, pp. 62-63). The neutral airport zone was also used by the Bosniaks to smuggle weapons hidden in the double-bottomed UNHCR containers and red arrow rockets on stretchers[29].

The airlift set up in July 1992 was used to transport diplomats, journalists and humanitarian workers. Several Sarajevo residents who were also able to obtain a UNHCR card also left this way. UNPROFOR Commander General Francis Briquemont spoke of "unavoidable permissions" and "organized fraudulent boarding passes on a UN plane" (Briquemont, 1997, p. 240). The airlift also served to evacuate wounded UNPROFOR military personnel and a few dozen injured civilians, namely children, treated by the UNPROFOR surgery team (based at the PPT building) or the Koševo hospital. On average, 20 planes a day (13,000 flights during the war) landed at the Sarajevo airfield. The airlift brought in 1,500 to 2,000 tonnes of food to the city of Sarajevo per week. Colonel Valentin reported that for 1993 "five to 20 planes landed each day—that's about 200 tonnes of food. Sarajevo is adequately supplied with medicines and food" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p. 58).

10.2.2. The 800-Meter-Long-Tunel under the Airport (D-B Facility)

The 800-metre-long tunnel under the airport (D-B Facility), connecting the Dobrinja and Butmir neighbourhoods, was built in total secrecy from January to June 1993 with the resources of the Bosnian army's 1st Corps (Kreševljaković, 2013). The work was supervised by Bakir Izetbegović and the engineer Nedžad Branković (Selimbegović, 2002). Two companies of the Bosnian army were charged with securing the operation and preventing any UNPROFOR member from approaching[30]. The tunnel, which was of major strategic importance to the Bosnian government, was initially used by the Bosnian army to transport military equipment and troops. It later allowed the passage of many officials and diplomats from Muslim countries, as well as intervention from Muslin charity associations. General Briquemont mentioned the tunnel in the second half of 1993. "There is a tunnel under the airport, primarily reserved for the Muslim army's operational needs. It is also probably being used by those who have enough marks to pay their way through" (Briquemont, 1997, p.98). Each day, around 3,000 people on average took the tunnel. The toll brought in several tens of thousands in Deutschmarks every day. Depending on traffic intensity, the transit time ranged from 20 minutes to two hours. A medic complained that he had to wait 45 minutes to evacuate four wounded Bosniak soldiers because the tunnel was being used to transport a shipment of Coca Cola by Alemko Nuhanović's company (Andreas, 2011, p.63). The tunnel allowed through large quantities of food, merchandise, medicines and medical equipment. Tens of thousands of tonnes of food and equipment (around 30 tonnes per day on average) as well as millions of liters of fuel and a cable to supply electricity to the city passed through the tunnel during the war. A black market proliferated, allowing war profiteers to build their fortunes with the complicity of civil and military authorities (Andreas, 2008). General Briquemont noted that "the black market flourished, which allowed the rich to buy almost anything" (Briquemont, 1997, p. 235). The financial flows generated by the tunnel were controlled by minister Hasan Muratović.

10.2.3. Road Convoys

Road convoys operated by the UNHCR and many non-governmental organizations enabled thousands of Sarajevo residents to be evacuated and considerable humanitarian aid to be delivered. These convoys linked Sarajevo to the Croatian

city of Split on the Dalmatian coast. During the Bosnian War, the Jewish community organized the evacuation of citizens from Sarajevo and humanitarian aid deliveries (Ourdan, 2019; Filipović, 1993). Ivan Ceresnjes, president of the Jewish community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Jakob Finci, director of the humanitarian aid association La Benevolencija, received support for these operations from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (known as the JDC or "The Joint"). Between August 1992 and 5 February 1994, eight bus convoys were organized to evacuate some 2,000 Sarajevo residents to Croatia (Ourdan, 2019). The JDC's convoys also enabled humanitarian aid to be brought into Sarajevo. Boris Kozemjakin, director of the logistics center run by the Jewish community, said, "I made 70 round trips between Split and Sarajevo, 25 of them with humanitarian convoys, until the end of the war."

Given the huge number of people who could enter and leave the city and the enormous amount of food and equipment brought in, it seems inappropriate to call Sarajevo a "besieged city". Nearly all of the humanitarian aid arriving through the airport, tunnel and road convoys was controlled by the Bosniak government and the ruling SDA party (Selimbegović, 2002). In 1993, Amila Omersoftić, co-founder of the SDA and vice-president of the SDA executive office, was a minister for the Bosnian government in charge of refugees and displaced persons. Minister Hasan Muratović monitored the humanitarian aid delivered by the UNHCR and NGOs. The problem was not so much the volume of humanitarian aid as the discrimination in how this aid was distributed, to the detriment of the Serbian population of Sarajevo.

10.3. Campaign of Terror Targeting the Serbian Population

10.3.1. The Planning and Key Players of the Campaign of Terror

The National Defence Council set up by the SDA on 10 June 1991 was chaired by Alija Izetbegović. Its members included Ejup Ganić and Haris Silajdžić[31]. This council entrusted Sefer Halilović with creating the Patriotic League, an illegal paramilitary organization under the SDA's authority. The Patriotic League's emblem featured six fleur-de-lis, recalling the coat of arms of King Tvrtko I, who reigned from 1353 to 1391 and claimed the title of King of Bosnia and Serbia (Bosnae and Serbiae Regibus, Charter of 10 April 1378). Meanwhile in Croatia, Franjo Tuđjman and the ruling HDZ party were displaying the chequered flag of the Independent State

of Croatia. During the summer and autumn of 1991, the National Defence Council organized and armed the Patriotic League units, and the Green Berets in particular. The Patriotic League was created as the embryo of the future Bosnian army. At the start of the war, the SDA had recruited nearly 100,000 men, with combatants arriving from different Islamic countries, Muslims from the Raska region in Serbia and Albanians from the Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Metohija. Some units were placed under the command of senior officers of the Territorial Defence Force, and later the 1st Corps of the Bosnian army (Hasan Efendić, Sefer Halilović, Jovan Divjak, Rasim Delić), while others were under the order of the ministers of the interior (Alija Delimustafić and Jusuf Pušina)[32].

A campaign of terror was planned and organized by the SDA at the highest level of the state. The key players in the terror campaign were recruited and armed by the SDA towards the end of 1991. They were well-known figures in Sarajevo's organized crime world, as well as convicts, rapists and drug addicts, often released from prison thanks to amnesty granted by AIija Izetbegović (Burns, 1993b). They built up groups of thousands of criminals in Sarajevo. From the very first days of the war, these men took over institutions, official buildings, the radio and television network, and the central Koševo hospital. They set up roadblocks and checkpoints at intersections. They established their command posts and private prisons in all parts of the city[33]. Some leveraged their relationships with top Bosnian authorities to be appointed to command positions in units of the army or Interior Ministry. Four leaders of organized crime gangs earned fearsome reputations:

* Ismet "Čelo" Bajramović was released from the Zenica prison, where he was incarcerated for rape, following intervention by Alija Izetbegović. From March 1992, he headed up a paramilitary unit made up of organized crime figures and drug addicts. Several districts of Sarajevo (Centar and Novo Sarajevo) were under his control. Čelo was close to Minister of the Interior Alija Delimustafić and served as his bodyguard. In May 1992, he succeeded Kerim "Doktor" Lučarević as head of the military police and the military prison.

An article in *The New York Times* from 1993 mentions Čelo and his gang of criminals: "All of this is sustained, on Čelo's side, by a personal army that stirs as much fear among ordinary residents as the encircling Serbian guns. Čelo's army numbers hundreds of men and has a reputation for ruthlessness. Almost every week brings fresh accounts of people who have been beaten, and sometimes killed, in disputes with his men. Commonly, the victims are shot and their bodies driven off and dumped. The police say they have no record of anyone brought to court in the killings" (Burns, 1993a).

Čelo appeared to be a senior officer of the Bosnian army, as described by *The New York Times*: "Čelo reached an understanding with the army command, and began appearing around the city in a camouflage uniform decorated with an officer's shoulder boards. Two photographs of Čelo in uniform appear in a portfolio of photos of the siege by Annie Leibovitz that appear in the October issue of Vanity Fair" (Burns, 1993a).

Čelo's influence was clear, and his authority inescapable: "How far Čelo's influence extends is a matter of conjecture, but many in Sarajevo believe that he is as powerful, in his way, as President Alija Izetbegovic, who has made no public denouncements of the gangs. Officials say this is because the gang leaders are too strong, and because the Muslims cannot afford an open war while the city remains under Serbian guns. Others say the relationship is more intimate. 'The Government is so entangled with these thugs that it can't break free,' one official said" (Burns, 1993a).

Bernard-Henri Lévy wrote in his journal about a street fight in the spring of 1993 between Čelo and Caco's rival gangs. Sanctions by the highest level of the Bosnian government were to be taken against Čelo, who had acquired too much autonomy. But Lévy noted that Alija Izetbegović had intervened in Čelo's favour, invoking filial relationships: "Izetbegović finally decided that Čelo was, in spite of everything, one of the first defenders of the city and that he could not bring himself to punish him in this way. 'This man is a son of Sarajevo', he said. 'And he [Izetbegović] is the *Dedo*, the grandfather, of Sarajevo'" (Lévy, 1996, pp. 514-515).

* Mušan "Caco" Topalović controlled Sarajevo's historic centre, especially the left bank of the Miljacka River (Stari Grad) to the Jewish cemetery and Grbavica, as well as the Kazani zone on Trebević Mountain. Caco was appointed commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade of the 1st Corps of the Bosnian army. He was close to General Sefer Halilović, Chief of Staff of the Bosnian army, who often visited his headquarters. During the summer of 1992, Alija Izetbegović went to inspect the Bosnian troops on Trebević Mountain. While there, Izetbegović congratulated Caco in front of the television cameras[34].

* Jusuf "Juka" Prazina, a criminal released from the Zenica prison, formed a Green Beret unit at the start of the war and took control of part of the city (Centar Sarajevo to Ilidža). In late July 1992, Prazina was appointed member of the staff of the Bosnian Armed Forces. The act of appointment was signed by Jerko Doko, Minister of Defence; Sefer Halilović, Chief of Staff of the Bosnian army; Jusuf Pušina, Minister of the Interior, and President Izetbegović. Following this appointment, Juka had an office and bodyguards in the presidency building. He was addressed as a general (Pomfret, 1992; Robin Hood-like, 1992; Burns, 1992a).

* Ramiz Delalić, the assassin of Nikola Gardović, took command of a Green Beret unit controlling part of the right bank of the Miljacka (Stari Grad, Centar) before being appointed commander of the 9th Mountain Brigade of the Bosnian army. Delalić was close to Interior Minister Jusuf Pušina.

* Ševe was the name of a secret police organization created by Alija Delimustafić in April 1992. Ševe's leaders included Nedžad Ugljen, Asim Dautbašić and Nedžad Herenda. This organization never had a legal existence but part of its operations were revealed in 1996 thanks to the testimony of Edin Garaplija, a witness summoned by the ICTY in the trials of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. Garaplija, who was born on 14 November 1968 in Pljevlja, was a member of the State Security Service in the Bosnian Interior Ministry from 1992. In 1996 he was in charge of a Bosnian secret intelligence service and an anti-terrorism unit within the Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID). In the spring of 1996, Garaplija was ordered by the director of the AID, Kemal Ademović, to investigate the Ševe unit ("Eagle" mission) and to bring in for questioning Nedžad Herenda, one of Ševe's leaders. Herenda was detained and interrogated by Garaplija from 25 to 29 June 1996 on AID premises. While detained in one moment Herenda took advantage of the guards' fatigue and tried to take the gun, but during the commotion the gun fired and Herenda was wounded in the leg (Edin Garaplija: Ševe, 2000). After this Alija Izetbegović formed the Commission with 5 members and ordered an investigation into the Herenda wounding[35]. During the interrogation Herenda claimed that he received his orders from Nedžad Ugljen and that the Ševe assassins committed a large number of crimes against members of the JNA, UNPROFOR members, Serbian civilians and Muslims. The Ševe assassins, recruited by Alija Izetbegović's close entourage, were charged with eliminating both political opponents and "enemies from within" (the so-called fifth column). At the beginning of the war the unit of Ševe snipers included 19 members[36].

10.3.2. The Start and Spread of the Terror Campaign

In the first three months of 1992, the atmosphere of the city changed noticeably, especially in the historic center (Stari Grad) and the Baščaršija district. The Serbian population of Sarajevo included many figures who were well-known and respected on the international stage, as well as university professors and artists. At the time, taxi drivers were writing down the addresses of wealthy Serbian families whose beautiful apartments were coveted. Sarajevo became "the city of nicknames", in reference to the delinquents and criminals who were preparing their exactions.

In early January 1992, the Green Berets occupied the premises of the radio and television broadcaster under the pretext of ensuring security. The head of security, Zdravko Šipka, tried to oppose the operation and was killed by the Green Berets. The media in Sarajevo, largely under Bosniak control, played a major role in preparing the secession and campaign of discrimination and demonization against the Serbs[37]. The Serb Democratic Party was labelled a terrorist organization.

On 1 March 1992, Nikola Gardović was murdered in Baščaršija – while participating in his son Milan's wedding procession – by Green Berets led by Ramiz Delalić. After the religious ceremony, the procession went to a restaurant near the town hall in the city center. The procession was attacked by armed Muslims who tried to seize a flag wrapped around a mast. One of the assailants fired four shots at the priest Radenko Mitrović, who was seriously injured, while Ramiz Delalić shot Nikola Gardović, who was killed instantly. Members of the procession attempted to catch Delalić and his accomplices, but a uniformed policeman, armed with an automatic rifle, intervened and allowed the assassins to escape. The event caused a huge stir in the Serbian community. However, the assassins were unconcerned, and Delalić was later appointed commander of the 9th Mountain Brigade of the Bosniak army. Delalić publicly bragged about this crime in front of Bosniak television cameras and appeared on a television program arm in arm with Jusuf Pušina[38].

From the early days of March, weapons were openly distributed, namely by Čelo, to Muslims only who simply had to show their IDs. A distribution center was located on Boris Kovačević Street in front of the Interior Ministry. Esad Osmanbegović, director of the Sarajevo central prison, freed dozens of Muslim prisoners while supplying them with weapons[39]. The mosque in Velešići was surrounded by armed men and automatic rifle bursts were often fired during religious gatherings. The supply of arms to the SDA was organized by Alija Delismutafić and Munib Alibabić, among others. Delimustafić, a former police officer who was appointed Interior Minister, had neither the education nor the experience to hold such a position. Along with his brother, Delimustafić founded the company Cernex, which was implicated in arms trafficking for the SDA. He was named Interior Minister in recognition of his financial backing of the SDA. The Interior Ministry, and more specifically the secretary in charge of state security, S. Škipina, established lists of Serbs to be arrested and set up phone taps on private and professional lines of Serbs in important posts.

The demonstrations on 5 and 6 April in front of Parliament, which followed the declaration of Bosnian independence, were not spontaneous but organized by the SDA. Dozens of buses brought in miners from Zenica, Tuzla and Banovići. The aim of the demonstrations was for the European Union to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence and the seizure of power by the paramilitary organization SDA.

Snipers stationed on top of various buildings (the mechanical engineering school, church tower, the Momo and Uzeir buildings, etc.) targeted civilians, especially on Vrbanja Bridge. Sniper fire in April and the explosion in May along Vase Miskina Street were held up by the Bosnian authorities and media as justification for sanctions against the Serbs.

The first roadblocks and checkpoints appeared in April. The internal blockade of the city was set up by the Green Berets in early May, and it became impossible to leave the city. The armed conflict was not triggered by military operations but by a succession of assassinations perpetrated by common criminals who were employed and armed by the SDA. The criminal acts became widespread during April and May, starting with killings of Serbian police officers and JNA soldiers. Serbian police officers, including reservists, had their weapons confiscated and were removed from all operational security missions. Access badges to the Interior Ministry buildings were changed and the Green Berets prohibited Serbs from entering. On 4 and 5 April, Serbian police officer Pero Petrović[40] was murdered by Green Berets at the Novo Sarajevo police station, and two Serbian police officers, Mile Lisdek (aged 32) and Milorad Pupić (aged 29), were killed in the Vraca police academy[41].

On 15 April, a presidential directive signed by Hasan Efendić was sent to all Bosniak units, instructing them to attack JNA facilities, seize their weapons and ammunitions, and detain the soldiers[42]. On 22 April, Green Berets attacked the JNA offices in Ilidža and the headquarters in Sarajevo. On 22 April, a group of eight Serbian soldiers from the JNA who had been captured were brutally murdered in Veliki Park in Sarajevo: Milivoje Lalović, Đorđe Bjelica, Zoran Marković, Dragomir Đerić, Stevan Đokanović, Vlajko Golubović, Nedeljko Vujicić and Miladin Vukmanović. The bodies of these eight JNA soldiers were burned in containers behind the television building and then dumped in the city landfill[43]. On 2 May, violent attacks were launched against the JNA facilities (headquarters and the 'Maršal Tito', 'Viktor Bubanj' and 'Jusuf Džonlić' barracks). On 3 May, a JNA military column withdrawing from Sarajevo was attacked in Dobrovoljačka Street[44]. The peaceful withdrawal of this column from its offices in Sarajevo had been agreed to by the Bosnian authorities and representatives of the international community, including General Lewis MacKenzie (Pierot, 1994). But in blatant violation of this agreement, Bosnian forces ambushed the column in Dobrovoljačka Street and executed many soldiers after disarming them. Some were young men completing their military service who were murdered without ever even firing a shot. The JNA Mercedes-style ambulance was in the second half of the convoy with eight people on board. As soon as the vehicle was stopped, a Green Beret approached and pointed the barrel of his rifle at the driver, ordering all passengers to exit the vehicle. Colonel Budimir Radulović then opened the door on his side to negotiate. An 18-year-old Green Beret came up to him and

fired several rounds into his head with an automatic rifle, killing him instantly. The other Bosniak soldiers opened the back door and shot at the occupants. Colonel Miro Sokić was killed with a bullet to the head. Colonel Dušan Kovačević then ordered the ambulance driver, Captain Curcilo, to leave the convoy and proceed with the wounded to the military hospital. In Skenderija, the ambulance – clearly signalled with its siren and flashing light – was caught in crossfire coming from the presidency building and the mosque. Normela Suko, a civilian employee of the JNA, was killed and Colonel Kovačević was seriously wounded. Thanks to the driver's composure, the ambulance was able to reach the military hospital. Wounded soldiers were directed to Koševo hospital and were finished off by the Green Berets. Dozens of soldiers were killed or taken prisoner[45]. On 4 May, nine captured JNA soldiers were taken to Novi Grad police station, where they were viciously tortured and executed that night. On 5 May, Ratko Mirković, a driver for the burial company Pokop, saw the bodies of six JNA soldiers in the gutter along Đure Đakovića Street near Koševo stadium. According to the preliminary records of the Republic Center for War Research, War Crimes and Search for Missing Persons, at least 32 people were tragically killed during these events, including the events in Dobrovoljačka Street, that occurred on May 2 and May 3 while the JNA was trying to pull out of the center of Sarajevo. Ejup Ganić, Hasan Efendić, Sefer Halilović, Mustafa "Talijan" Hajrulahović, Zaim "Zagi" Backović, Jovan Divjak, Stjepan Kljuić, Fikret Muslimović and Kerim Lučarević are, among others, associated, in public, with these events and the crimes committed.[46]

Several of the bodies were not returned to their families, while some bodies were recovered after the war. The body of Colonel Boško Mihajlović, who was part of the convoy, was found and exhumed on 1 October 1999. He had multiple skull fractures caused by extremely violent blows after his capture. The body of Corporal Ivica Simić, killed at Koševo hospital, was returned to his family in February 1999[47].

All Serbian personnel of the military hospital evacuated their hospital on 10 May 1992. Dr Tomislav Taušan, director of the military hospital and a JNA officer, was the victim of several assassination attempts on his way to his apartment in Vraca near the Jewish cemetery (Šošić, et al., 2013, p.97). Dr Mladen Purković, a dental surgeon from the military hospital, was arbitrarily detained for six months in the Ramiz Salčin prison.

On 6 April 1992, the dean of the faculty of medicine, Professor Boriša Starović, was the victim of an assassination attempt at his front door as he was leaving for work. One of the fundamental points of the Hippocratic Oath says that doctors have an almost filial duty to respect the masters who taught them medicine. Unfortunately, these events were a prelude to serious and repeated violations of the Hippocratic Oath by a large number of Bosniak doctors[48].

Koševo hospital, the largest hospital centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was presented by the media throughout the war as a symbol of the suffering of the Bosniak population alone (Burns, 1992b). Until 10th of April 1992, the Green Berets took control of the whole hospital[49]. Armed men were posted at the hospital doors, in the hallways and on the roof. Locations within the hospital perimeter – including hospital wards – were regularly used by Bosnian forces to fire at Serb positions[50]. In May 1992, a Crisis Management Committee was established within the hospital. The committee (which included Prof. Dr Faruk Konjhodžić, Dr Adan Dizdar and Dr Naim Kadić) discriminated against Serbian staff and drew up lists of non-Muslim staff to be dismissed. Serbian department heads were dismissed without notice or cause, often to the detriment of department operations; for instance, Dr Boris Strekozov, the hospital's only vascular surgeon, was fired by the Crisis Management Committee[51]. Dr Mustafa Hiroš dismissed the head of urology dr Trifko Guzina while he was detained for being Serb[52], took his place and turned one wing of the department into a prison, where wounded JNA soldiers were grouped together. The psychiatric ward sheltered Bosniak criminals declared mentally incompetent to stand trial to avoid prison time. Management positions at the hospital were not filled by competence but on the basis of links to the ruling SDA party (Šošić, et al., 2013, p.113). Unknown armed individuals regularly checked the identity of Serbian personnel and could threaten them or take them away for questioning. Prof. Mirko Šošić was accused of failing to save a Bosniak solider who arrived already dead at the hospital. The university hospital rapidly deteriorated due to the ousting of so many competent specialists and was relegated to the rank of a general hospital. Many Serbian doctors left the hospital, including Dr Milan Pejić, who took charge of the Zica hospital (Blažuj, Ilidža), and Dr Slavko Ždrale, who joined the Kasindo hospital. The hospital's sadistic head of security, Almir Husić, aka "Kinez", terrorized Serbian staff and patients[53]. The hospital morgue, run by Alija Hodžić, received the bodies of Serbians executed in the city and in Bosniak prisons, such as the Ramiz Salčin prison. The Green Berets sometimes entered the morgue to beat and defile the corpses. Pokop employee Ratko Mirković was assigned to the Koševo hospital morgue in the second half of 1992. He saw the body of Prof. Milutin Najdanović, which bore multiple traces of abuse and remained in the morgue for several days. The foreign press alerted to the case was denied access to the body. The medical examiner, Ilijaš Dobraca, was under pressure to provide false autopsy reports to conceal the criminal origin of these deaths. Mirković also saw the bodies of the Ristović family, with both gunshot wounds and traces of violent blows[54].

The famous musician and songwriter Slobodan Samardžić[55] was arrested on 11 May 1992 in his apartment in the Vojničko polje area of the Alipašino polje neighborhood, along with his neighbor Radomir Gojković. At the time, Alipašino polje

was controlled by the Green Berets under Juka Prazina. Samardžić worked in music and had no political affiliations or activities. He said he was not afraid of deliberate action against him because he was known and appreciated in Sarajevo for his music. His wife Nada and son Stefan, age seven at the time, were not in Sarajevo when he was arrested. His sister Ljiljana lived in Grbavica. Samardžić was placed under house arrest for the first three days after his arrest, after territorial defense officers (Faruk Hadžarić and his deputy Fadil) demanded a permit for an old pistol found at Samardžić's home – a trophy from the Second World War he kept in remembrance of his father. Samardžić was then removed from his apartment and killed along with two of his Serbian neighbours, Radomir Gojković and Stana Šehovac, who had been arrested in front of her two young daughters. Their bodies were dumped on the banks of the Miljacka River at the Alipaša Bridge (former Ivo Andrić Bridge, the first bridge down the river after the radio and television building), where they remained exposed for several days. The bodies were examined by the official Sarajevo police in mid-May 1992. Crime scene photos taken by the police near the Alipaša Bridge attest to this (Appendix VII to chapter VI, Documnet 3a, p. 1179)[56]. The photos show three bodies: Slobodan Samardžić (his identity papers were placed on his chest) with a gunshot wound to the head, Stana Šehovac and Radomir Gojković. An armed police officer in uniform is visible next to the three bodies. His weapon bears the emblem of the Bosniak army. These photos were developed in the police laboratory; the technician recognized the famous musician and kept the negatives. The family only became aware of these photos when they received an anonymous letter in 2000. Until 1999, there had been only a missing person search followed by a criminal investigation. Juka Prazina's deputy, Samir "Kruško" Kahvedžić, is among the main suspects in this triple murder, along with Davorin Matić and Mišo "Žmiro", although today, those accused before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina are Senad Džananović, Gadžo Edin and Kimun. A few weeks after these murders, on 25 June, Samir Kahvedžić was celebrating his birthday at the Borsalino cafe, along with Jusuf Pušina (who was to become Interior Minister) and several notorious criminals from his entourage such as Senad "Glavoguz" Džananović and Gadžo "Kimun" Adnan. The basement of the Borsalino cafe and a nearby shop called Konzum (Alipašino polje neighbourhood) housed two of Juka Prazina's many private prisons where Serbs were tortured and Serbian women were raped. After leaving Sarajevo there were many testimonies about rapes. Witness N.V said that as well as daily torture there were even organized gang rapes during the night with five and more Bosniak soldiers[57]. Another witness S.K said that sometimes even 20 Muslim Bosniak soldiers shared her, and this was not the only humiliation on one woman's body, because they didn't even let her wash and bathe herself [58].

The bodies of murdered Serbs were thrown in the Miljacka River, in garbage dumps or in ditches in front of cemeteries. During the months of May and June 1992,

Ratko Mirković worked as a gravedigger for Pokop at the Lav cemetery. He described the dead bodies of Serbs, killed during the night, who were tossed in front of the cemetery and found every morning. The bloody bodies, without any IDs, showed many traces of violence (gunshot wounds, multiple stab wounds, burns, bruises and more). They were buried in a mass grave without any kind of record. In the second quarter of 1992, Mirković noted the existence of two mass graves in the Lav cemetery with 50 to 60 bodies each[59]. The corpses were sometimes mutilated to make them unrecognizable and to terrorize the Serbian population. The heads of beheaded Serbs were seen hanging from the Orthodox Church of the Holy Transfiguration (Novo Sarajevo)[60]. Caco was seen at the Hamam Bar with a sack containing the heads of decapitated Serbs. The corpses thrown in ditches and garbage dumps and were often burned.

The Serbian civilian populations of the districts of Velešići and Pofalići (Novo Sarajevo) were victims of numerous deadly raids throughout 1992, conducted mainly by Muslims from Kobilja Glava (the gang led by Murat Šabanović and the brothers Hamid and Uzeir Balović). On 15 and 16 May 1992, the Bosniak paramilitary units launched a large-scale operation to terrorize the Serbian citizens of Velešići and Pofalići. Hundreds of Serbs were murdered, sometimes by their neighbors, and their homes were set on fire[61]. Krsto Buha's body was found on 17 May by his son Novica in the rubble of his burned-down house[62]. Casings from 7.62 mm bullets littered the streets in front of Serbian houses. Women, children and the elderly were massacred during this operation. Some were tortured. Families who were trying to flee to the hills of Hum and Žuč were mowed down by machine gun fire. Among many others, Nada Vasković and Bozo Kovačević were killed by sniper fire. The attack was led by Juka Prazina, Čelo Bajramović, Dragan Vikić and Kemal Ademović. Many bodies were dumped in the Buća Potok landfill[63]. Successive raids continued over the following months.

On 8 July 1992 at 2pm**,** five members of the Bosniak Interior Ministry (Mirsad Hodžić, Osman Hodžić, Admir Adilović, Meho Ibišević, Ismet Ćutuk) broke in from Marin Dvor's security post to the house of Obren and Pero Ristović in Velešići[64]. The Ristović family was a large and wealthy family in Velešići. They opened fire on the family gathered around the dining table, killing Obren Ristović, Pero Ristović, Bosiljka Ristović, Radosava Ristović, Mila Ristović and Danilo Ristović. Danilo was the 12-year-old son of Todor Ristović who used to bring bread to his uncle. Unfortunately, Danilo's uncle asked him to stay for lunch that day. The bodies were taken to the Koševo hospital morgue, which was overseen by Alija Hodžić, father of the criminal Mirsad Hodžić. The remains were subjected to post-mortem abuse. Obren did not die immediately, but was taken to Koševo hospital where he was finished off. His body showed traces of gunshot wounds as well as bruising caused by violent

blows. Obren's body was claimed by his brother Todor, who was not at the meal. The bodies of the Ristović family were buried by the Pokop company in the Lav cemetery near Koševo hospital[65].

In his book *Lukava Strategija* (Cunning Strategy), Bosniak army general Sefer Halilović speaks about the killing of the family Ristović, saying "The very same day, I personally informed President Izetbegović in detail about the Ristović case. First verbally, and then in writing, and after that all other members of the Presidency, who then continued to pressurize minister Pušina to take action, since it was not within the jurisdiction of the Army. Seven months later, on 20 January 1993, to be precise, Bakir Alispahić, head of the Public Security Service in Sarajevo, lays criminal charges against five persons. The investigation revealed that the murderers of the Ristović family were all members of B/H MUP, more specifically, of the public security station Marin Dvor" (Halilović, 1997, p. 111).

In 1993, the five Bosniak assassins were brought before the High Court in Sarajevo for this massacre. Admir Adilović and Ismet Ćutuk were acquitted while Mirsad Hodžić was declared not criminally liable due to psychiatric problems. He was hospitalized in the psychiatric ward of Koševo hospital to evade justice. Osman Hodžić and Meho Ibišević "could not be found". One of the judges was Vasvija Vidović, who became the liaison officer for the Bosnian government with the Hague Tribunal. The case was covered by Fikret Muslimović, head of security for the Bosnian army, and Bakir Alispahić, head of public security in Sarajevo. In July 1993, Aleksandar Trninić, a Serbian prisoner with psychiatric issues after being tortured in the Ramiz Salčin prison, was admitted to the psychiatric ward of Koševo hospital. He was placed in the same room as Mirsad Hodžić, who was released shortly after. Before regaining his freedom, Hodžić vowed to find Aleksandar Trninić and kill him, just as he had killed members of the Ristović family (Popović, 2006). Todor Ristović, who was demanding justice for his brother and his family, was arrested on 25 November under the pretext of "armed rebellion" and "illegal possession of weapons". He was sentenced to four years in prison and released on 1 April 1995 through a prisoner exchange.

Dr Milutin Najdanović, a professor at the Sarajevo faculty of medicine and foremost leader in thoracic surgery (department of thoracic surgery at Koševo hospital) was murdered during the night of 14 August 1992 (Šošić, et al., 2013, pp.94-104). He was a Member of Parliament before the war and a member of the Serb Democratic Party. At around 9pm on 14 August 1992, three armed men in camouflage uniforms posing as members of the Interior Ministry came to pick up Najdanović for questioning for the third – and last – time. Twice before, between April and July 1992, men presenting themselves as "defenders", "the police", or "Juka's army" had

taken Najdanović in to question and brutalize him. The first time, he was taken to a kindergarten classroom, where Juka Prazina tied him to a radiator and subjected him to physical and psychological torture, allowing dogs to urinate on him and playing Russian roulette with a pistol held to his temple. The second time he was taken to a classroom at the faculty of sports and physical education. Although Najdanović was released following the intervention of Muhamed Čengić, he returned with many bruises. Each time, these men searched the apartment for weapons and claimed that a sniper had been seen from a window or that Najdanović was sharing information with the "Chetniks from Pale". They took anything they wanted – his car, alcohol etc. The men insulted Najdanović's family and threatened them with weapons, even pointing them at his daughter's three-month-old baby Stefan. Najdanović's Muslim colleagues from Koševo hospital and the faculty of medicine were keeping their distance, and some even said they realized that he had always been a "Chetnik". A week before Najdanović was murdered, his family had managed to leave Sarajevo: his wife Rikica was Jewish and his family was able to join a convoy organized by the Jewish community headed to Split. On 15 August at around 11 in the morning, the military police reported a bullet-riddled body at the entrance of the Koševo stadium. Najdanović's body was taken to the hospital morgue and remained there several days. This event was reported in the 29 July 1993 edition of *The New York Times* (Burns, 1993c), but did not arouse indignation from his Bosniak colleagues. Najdanović was initially buried in the Lav cemetery in Sarajevo. His remains were later transferred to Belgrade after the war because his family did not want him to rest alongside his killers. The family has been involved in years-long legal proceedings to repossess the apartment located at 14 Marcela Snajdera Street, which they won in the end after several years of seeking justice. The assistant to the Koševo hospital director at that time, Zilha Ademaj, moved into the apartment, saying that the Najdanović family had never lived there (in 2015, Ademaj was appointed Minister of Health)[66].

In December 1992, several members of the 6th Mountain Brigade of the Bosniak army (Hrasno detachment) committed war crimes ordered by Enver Zornić. Jagoda Janković and Sreten Ninković were arrested, interrogated and beaten at the military police premises of the Hrasno detachment. Jagoda was raped. They were both accused of hiding weapons in their apartments. No weapons were found during the search of their apartments, which were looted by the soldiers. Jagoda and Sreten were taken to an abandoned house at 34 Varaždinska Street. Jagoda was shot in the head by Mirsad Ašani. Sreten was also killed by a bullet to the head by Izet Tinjak. The bodies were doused with petrol (a petrol can had been provided for this purpose) and burned. Jagoda's first-floor apartment on Heroes' Square was given to Jusuf Delić[67]. Sreten's apartment and Volkswagen Golf were given to a Bosniak soldier. Jovan Popović was later murdered by Semir Pašir and Amir Husić from the same military unit.

The perpetrators of these crimes (Enver Zornić, Mirsad Ašanai, Izet Tinjak, Semir Pašir, Air Husić, Ismet Tinjak, Enver Džanko, Džemal Hrustemović) appeared before a Bosniak court in 1993, but these premeditated crimes were not classified as war crimes committed by Bosniak army soldiers but as ordinary common crimes[68]. Moreover, the court dismissed the reprehensible nature of these crimes and concluded that the victims had voluntarily donated their property to the Bosniak army. Thus, the prosecutor's office covered up these crimes by inappropriately characterizing them and putting up obstacles to the truth. The commanders of the 6th Mountain Brigade had also taken control of the warehouses of the Jugokomerc company and were siphoning off part of the company's assets for their personal enrichment. Other assets were used in trafficking, and especially the trafficking of arms and ammunition with UNPROFOR.

On 28 December 1992, around 5.30 am, three soldiers from the Bosnian army burst into the family home of Rada Dragičević in Donja (Iljaš municipality). Rada, who was divorced, lived in the house with her two children: her son Janko and her 10-year-old daughter Mirjana. Her mother Milojka (aged 52) and aunt Lenka Skočo (aged 54) also lived there. The three men, armed with automatic rifles, wore the uniform of the Bosnian army. Two of them, with dark skin, spoke a foreign language. The third man spoke the local language of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The soldiers first shot Milojka and Lenka. Little Janko ran to hide in his room, which saved his life, but Mirjana ran to her mother for safety. The first Mujahideen tore Mirjana from her mother's arms and raped the girl on the kitchen floor, while hitting her violently in the face, while the other soldiers restrained Rada. The violence of the blows caused her nose to bleed, and then her cries stopped. The second Mujahideen then took his turn raping her. Rada managed to escape the soldiers' grip, and ran towards her daughter. The first Mujahideen shot her and she collapsed with serious injuries to her abdomen and leg. While lying on the ground, she watched as the third man also raped her daughter, bleeding from her face and perineum. The first Mujahideen approached Mirjana's body and shot her in the head. The three men were in the kitchen for about half an hour. They hurried out as the noise of the fighting drew nearer. The three women and young Janko were rescued by a Serbian army unit and taken by ambulance to the Žiča hospital in Blažuj. Rada was then evacuated to the military hospital in Pale and later taken by helicopter to the hospital in Belgrade, where she was hospitalized for six months. Lenka died at the Žiča hospital the day after the attack, and Milojka was treated there. Mirjana was first buried in the cemetery near the Iljaš church. Her coffin was later transferred to the Sokolac cemetery[69].

The case of V.B. is a good example of the situation of the Serbs at that time. V.B. was an employee of the Vaso Miskin Crni factory, managed by Abdulah "Avdo" Muslaosmanović. From 1991, this factory was quietly producing explosive devices.

Nikola Gardović, killed on 1 March by Ramiz Delaliz, was one of V.B.'s co-workers at the factory. While V.B. was on his way to work one day in May 1992, Bosniak soldiers ordered him to deviate from his usual route and to take the bridge over the Miljacka River, 300 meters from the state television building, towards Džemal Bijedić Street. Their intention was to terrorize V.B. by forcing him to see the bodies of seven JNA soldiers that had been thrown into the river and were clearly visible from the bridge. The phone and gas in his apartment were cut off in the second half of 1992 while his Muslim neighbors continued to receive these services. V.B.'s daily commute to work passed near Juka Prazina's headquarters and his private prison in Alipašino, where he could hear the screams of prisoners. Twice, in December 1992 and February 1993, while he was looking for pieces of firewood in the annexes of the Vaso Miskin factory, V.B. came across dead bodies with black plastic over their heads. On 5 January 1993, the Orthodox Christmas Eve, he was abducted at about 8.30 pm behind the post office in Novi Sarajevo and pushed into a vehicle. His kidnappers tied his hands and covered his head with a black plastic bag. When they reached their destination, his captors removed the bag. He was standing over a huge pit, dug by an excavator and filled with corpses. On the top of the mass grave were the bodies of a five or six-year-old child and a woman, probably the child's mother, both horribly mutilated. V.B. was forced to look at the bodies while being subjected to violent blows until he lost consciousness. He was then driven back and thrown out of the car near the Energoinvest building. He was later able to recognize that the pit was located in an area of Pofalići. Despite numerous injuries, including a broken leg, he returned to work the next day, permanently supervised at his post by a Mujahideen. The factory produced an average of 120 bombs or grenades every day. Young Bosniak youths came to pick up these grenades and transported them in backpacks (12 per bag). They were tasked with detonating them around the city. These weapons were not intended for the front line but were used in attacks on Serbs and sometimes even Muslims in Sarajevo. When his health seriously deteriorated, he sought help from a Bosniak doctor who refused to treat him. Luckily, a Croatian doctor, Dr Marija Kušić, treated him and put him on sick leave. V.B. says that Dr Kušić saved his life. On 27 April 1993, on his way to the church, V.B. saw the heads of three beheaded Serbs hanging from the gate of the Church of the Transfiguration of the Lord. This Orthodox church was defiled by Bosniak soldiers, who used it as a latrine. When Bosniak soldiers talked about selling off his young daughter into prostitution, V.B. decided to get her out of town. However, he needed to come up with the 5,000 Deutschmarks demanded by Juka Prazina's men, which was well beyond his means. A Croatian friend, K.D, agreed to get his daughter out of Sarajevo without asking for any compensation. His monthly salary of 70 DM did not allow him to support his family. Several times, his wife had been insulted and excluded from humanitarian aid queues, being told that

Bosniak soldiers had priority. V.B.'s friend also helped his wife to leave Sarajevo[70].

Throughout 1992 and 1993, Bosnian forces also carried out deadly raids and attacked Serbian civilian populations living near the Kazani settlement (Boguševac, Bistrik, Stari Grad) on Trebević Mountain. Dozens of bodies were dumped in ditches, their bodies set on fire with old tyres or covered in quicklime. Vasilji and Ana Lavriv were horribly murdered. Predrag Salipur, aged 28, who was one of the "defenders of Sarajevo", was barbarically murdered by Caco Topalović's gang. He was abducted on 18 October 1993 from his Sarajevo apartment, stabbed seven times and beheaded before his body was thrown into a Kazani ditch. Most of the crimes were committed by members of the 10th Mountain Brigade commanded by Topalović. Members of Ramiz Delalić's unit were also involved in these massacres[71].

Sniper fire became commonplace in the months following the episodes on 5 and 6 April 1992 (Doyle, 1992; Burns, 1993a; Didier, 1992; O'Connor, 1995). On 19 May 1993, Admira Ismić and Boško Brkić were killed by snipers as they crossed Vrbanja Bridge towards Grbavica. Admira was Bosniak and Boško was Serbian. Their intertwined bodies ("Romeo and Juliet in Sarajevo"), photographed by Mark H. Milstein, remained where they fell for eight days before being taken away by the Serbs, as Colonel Valentin had refused to do it. The so-called 'Sniper Alley', which referred to the streets Zmaja od Bosne and Meša Selimović, became a particularly dangerous place for civilians in the area. Foreign media set up in the Holiday Inn hotel across from the area used the term in their reports to fuel anti-Serb propaganda. However, if the respective positions of the Serbian army and the Bosniak army are analyzed in detail, it is clear that the Serbian positions could not target certain areas of this alley, whereas the Bosniak positions had access to the entire area. Later, "Sniper Alley" was used in the American film *The Peacemaker* with George Clooney (1997).

From the beginning of the war, sniper groups were formed by the Bosniaks (Buffon, 1992), such as snipers from Dragan Vikić's Lasta unit, snipers of the unit commanded by Omar Tendžo (10th Mountain Brigade), snipers from the Ševe unit, snipers from the 101st Mountain Brigade. Bosnian television showed the sniper school class graduates with the presentation of the insignia and the first prize for the top graduate, who received a rifle as a reward. Refik Čolak publicly boasted that he personally received a sniper rifle from Alija Izetbegović. Modern rifles with optical sights were manufactured in the Bosniak army-controlled factory called Zrak. During April-May 1992, 540 sniper rifles from the Zrak factory were distributed to the units of the 1st Corps of the Bosniak army (Šiber, 2001). Bosniak snipers were posted in particular on the heights of official buildings (the building of the Executive Council, the building of the Assembly of BiH). The Bosniaks, charged with handling ID checks at the roadblocks, sometimes signalled to the snipers from their camp, using

a hand gesture or radio message, that Serbian citizens had just been checked so they could be targeted.

The law no. 1197/92 of 15 June 1992 on abandoned apartments, signed into law by Alija Izetbegović, legalized the expropriation and seizure of Serbs' apartments. Article 2 of the decree stipulated that "Every apartment that had been abandoned or temporarily not used by the occupancy rights holder and members of his/her household living in the household shall be declared an abandoned apartment. By virtue of this legislation, an apartment in which weapons and ammunition without appropriate certificate in accordance with the law had been found, as well as an apartment which had been used for illegal actions shall also be declared an abandoned apartment" (Appendix IV to chapter VI)[72].

This decree was a de facto authorization to plant a weapon, to imprison and to expropriate the assets of any Serb falsely accused of possessing a weapon or involved in illicit activity[73]. Such things as being a cardholding member of the Serb Democratic Party or having a radio or a pair of binoculars, as it was in case of Dr Najdanovic, was enough to put you in prison. The alleged presence of a sniper was one of the main pretexts for searching, looting and seizing the apartments of the Serbs. The decree made it possible to expropriate property from many Serbs from the neighborhood of Dobrinja, as part of the "Dobrinja Housing Project" run by Ismet Hadžić, a close associate of AIija Izetbegović. The project sought to provide accommodation near the tunnel for the foreign Muslim fighters from the Raška region in Serbia or by Muslims "so called Sandžak region" and from Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, as well as premises for foreign Islamic organizations. Along with these expropriations, incursions by armed groups into Serbian homes increased under the pretext of searching for weapons or snipers. These raids were accompanied by looting and often deadly violence. Serbs were murdered by people they knew well or by neighbors who coveted their apartments. Prof. Tomo Radulović died after being thrown out of a window from his nine-storey building on Tetovska Street. His apartment was immediately occupied by Bajro Frašto, one of the building managers[74].

Zlatko Dizdarević wrote that the city of Sarajevo was "a concentration camp in the classical sense of the word" (Dizdarević, 1993). While he meant a concentration camp aimed at Bosniaks, the reality was that Serbian civilians faced a double blockade. The first blockade, which followed the demarcation line between Bosniak forces and Serbian forces, affected all Sarajevo residents. The second, more impenetrable blockade set up by the Bosniak forces was aimed exclusively at Sarajevo's Serbian citizens. Colonel Valentin mentions this internal blockade in 1993: "There was a Serbian minority inside Sarajevo that was completely blocked, surrounded by the Bosnians, who were surrounded by the Serbs laying siege to the city. I wanted to get

an elderly Serbian woman with terminal cancer out, whom the Bosnians refused to allow to leave. It was preposterous! An example of human foolishness. I told them it was unacceptable! The negotiations to get this elderly woman with cancer out took up three weeks of my time with meetings every other day. At the time of signing, when everything was finalized and the parties were all in agreement, I arranged a final meeting where each side had to bring back its paper signed by the higher authority. The Serbs and Croats showed up with the paper, but not the Bosnians! And so the negotiations failed. Once again, who benefited from the crime?" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, pp.63-64).

From spring 1992, arbitrary arrests increased because the Bosniaks needed a large pool of Serbian prisoners for two main reasons. Firstly, they could be used as bargaining chips for the release of Bosniak soldiers captured by the Serbs. They could also be released in exchange for large ransoms and used for trafficking. Lawyer Fahriha Karkin stated, with supporting evidence, that Alija Izetbegović had asked him to negotiate the release of a group of Sarajevo Serbs in exchange for the release of Haris Jasenković, who was being held in Foča and was a friend of Izetbegović's wife. Secondly, the prisoners were used for forced labor, particularly to dig trenches at the foot of Trebević Mountain, where they were exposed to fire and sometimes served as human shields. Women were often subjected to gang rape and sexual slavery in private prisons. These arbitrary arrests filled Bosniak police stations and institutional and private prisons. These arrests for "interrogation" were based on false charges (possession of a weapon, illegal activity, attempt to leave the city). Serbs were exposed to the worst physical and psychological abuse in these prisons out of sheer sadism or to obtain signed confessions under duress. The two main institutional prisons were Ramiz Salčin and the Central prison. Ramiz Salčin was a military prison established in the JNA's former Viktor Bubanj barracks. It was under the control of Ćelo Bajramović and the military police attached to the 101st Brigade. Both Serbian soldiers and civilians were held there. The military tribunal at the prison (the name of judge Muhidin Kapo is often cited) was expeditious and imposed heavy and false sentences on Serbs[75]. Dozens of Serbs imprisoned in Ramiz Salčin were never seen alive again. Bernard Kouchner visited the central prison. Several Serbian detainees questioned by Kouchner said they had been violently beaten right after Kouchner left the prison[76]. Serbian soldiers and civilians experienced hell in the prison, which was located in Tarčin and established in grain silos (16 silos that were ten meters long by five meters wide and five meters high), and guarded by Muslim combatants from Serbia, mostly from the Raška region or by Muslims from the "so called Sandžak region". The starving prisoners lived in appalling conditions. The International Committee of the Red Cross visited the silos at Tarčin, but we were unable to gain access to their findings. Alija Izetbegović was well aware of the existence of this prison be-

cause his helicopter landed several times on the heliport located a few dozen meters from the silos[77].

During the years of war in Sarajevo, the Bosniaks developed criminal activity at a level of intensity and organization that has rarely been seen: the creation of private prisons in all parts of the city. From 17 June 1992, the Attorney General Ivica Stanić sent a letter to Sefer Halilović, commander of the Bosnian army, and Jerko Doko, Minister of Defence (Appendix V to chapter VI)[78]. In the letter, Stanić pointedly noted that crimes were being committed in private prisons by members of the Bosnian Army, "The existence of private prisons in which arrested persons are abused, as well as killed, which is confirmed by a number of human bodies found in the areas controlled by the Army and Military Police of BiH. There are rumors in the public about a private prison owned by a person nicknamed "Kruško", who is a member of the BiH Army".

A preliminary list of 211 camps and locations of confinement for Serbs, including private prisons with the precise addresses, was drawn up from survived witness statements and documents (Appendix VI to chapter VI)[79]. Juka Prazina and his accomplices (e.g., Samir "Kahvedžić", Adnan Solaković, Senad "Glavoguz" Džananović, Nervin "Šok" Uzunović, Davor Matić) as well as Ćelo Bajramović and his accomplices (Fahrudin "Pukovnik" Alić, Slavko Erceg, among others) brutally murdered hundreds of Serbs in private prisons scattered throughout the city. These private prisons were not, of course, visited by the ICRC.

The Serbs, like all residents of Sarajevo, faced the difficulties of daily life: getting water, firewood, pieces of plastic to close up windows. But in many buildings, cuts in power and telephone services were selective and targeted only apartments occupied by Serbs. The vulnerable suffered most from hunger, cold and lack of healthcare: the poor, prisoners, elderly people in hospices, children in orphanages and sick people. Colonel Valentin wrote that "The day after my arrival, 7 January 1993, Colonel D'Avout d'Auerstaedt took me to a Serbian area near the airport where there was a hospice for the elderly. It was freezing cold – remember that this was the middle of winter – and most of the windows in the hospice were broken. The sanitary conditions were unbelievable, just appalling" (Dancourt & Valentin, 2006, p. 52).

10.3.3. The Elimination of Groups Attracting Too Much Attention

In autumn 1993, the Bosnian authorities decided to neutralize Ćelo and Caco, not because of the horror of their crimes, but because they were attracting too much attention from certain observers. In September 1993, Ćelo Bajramović told Bernard-Henri Lévy, "They're going to get rid of us." Lévy asked, "Who is 'they'?" Ćelo

answered, "Izetbegović! He used us, and now he's ashamed. He wants to get rid of us" (Lévy, 1996, p.188). Ćelo was wounded by a Ševe sniper in late September 1993. The bullet lodged near his heart.

On 4 October 1993, *The New York Times* noted that "Outside the main surgical clinic at Koševo Hospital, and along the corridor to the intensive care unit, men wearing steel helmets and carrying rifles and bazookas stand guard 24 hours a day. Nobody passes without their consent. Sometimes, even surgeons are turned back. The men with guns are protecting a patient shot through the heart a week ago, a man who has received the kind of attention accorded to none of the thousands of wounded people who passed through here during Sarajevo's 18 months under siege. He has been attended by the city's top doctors, and powerful military and Government officials have visited his bedside. He is known as Ćelo" (Burns, 1993a). On 6 October 1993, Lévy wrote the following in his journal: "Call from Sarajevo. Ćelo, the thug from the library, was ambushed and wounded in the middle of town. Hanging between life and death, under high surveillance, at Koševo hospital" (Lévy, 1996, p.195). Ćelo was evacuated from Sarajevo and did not return until 1997. He reportedly committed suicide by shooting himself in his Sarajevo home on 17 December 2008.

Caco Topalović was shot dead on 26 October 1993 after violent clashes in his headquarters between his men and units of the Bosnian police and army who came to arrest him. *The New York Times* reported that "On Oct. 26, 1993, Muslim police units disbanded Caco's paramilitary group, arrested 16 soldiers and killed Caco, who General Halilović said had become 'an inconvenient witness' to wartime atrocities" (Hedges, 1997).

In his memoirs, General Briquemont mentioned these police operations: "A serious incident occurred in mid-October 1993 […] It was no longer possible for Rasim Delić to allow such actions on the part of these 'independent' Muslim brigades. A few days later, the Muslims decided to solve the problem of these brigades the hard way. It was a very hard operation." General Francis Briquemont stated that he supplied tear gas grenades to Rasim Delić to help him neutralize these "independent" brigades (Briquemont, 1997, p.221).

Juka Prazina, who was in conflict with Sefer Halilović, had to leave Sarajevo in late 1992. He was murdered and his body discovered on 31 December 1993 in Belgium near the German border. Ramiz Delalić was discharged from the Bosniak army in late 1993 and ran a cafe just after the war. He was shot dead in front of his Sarajevo apartment on 27 June 2007. As for the Ševe group, which was much more discreet, it continued its missions until the end of the war. At the end of the war, Nedžad Ugljen was murdered and Nedžad Herenda disappeared.

10.3.4. A Campaign of Terror Waged by a Joint Criminal Enterprise

This crime wave could not be ignored. The dead bodies remained on display for several days, especially along the banks of the Miljacka. The screams of tortured prisoners and raped women in the private prisons could be heard by passers-by. And yet no journalist or non-governmental organization saw the corpses or heard the cries. The letters from Attorney General Ivica Stanić, dated 17 June and 22 July 1992, denouncing the crimes committed in private prisons to the highest levels of the state authorities, went unheeded. General Jovan Divjak claimed to have written several letters to Alija Izetbegović during the conflict to alert him to the crimes against the Serbs. General Divjak told Agence France Presse that "They knew in 1992 and 1993 what was happening in Sarajevo" (Pour le général Divjak, 2017).

The New York Times confirmed the general's statements: "But Gen. Jovan Divjak, the deputy commander of the Bosnian Army, said he sent a five-page letter to President Alija Izetbegovic on May 27, 1993, that not only detailed the killings being carried out by the paramilitary groups, but also listed more than a dozen names of those who had been abducted and apparently slain. 'People at the highest levels, people in the Presidency, knew these killings were going on and did nothing until October 1993 to stop them' he said. 'I informed them about these killings. But the support of these paramilitary groups was convenient for the authorities'" (Hedges, 1997).

This campaign of terror was led by a joint criminal enterprise, comprised of the SDA paramilitary organization and placed under the direct authority of the Bosniak presidency. The crimes were covered up by the State apparatus and the highest levels of civilian and military authorities in an attempt shift their responsibility to "uncontrolled" groups. The elimination of some of these groups in late 1993 did not put an end to the campaign of terror against Serbs in Sarajevo: it continued throughout 1994 and 1995 in a more secretive and anonymous manner.

11. Sarajevo in 1994 - 1995

The ruling SDA party also controlled Bosnian state radio and television and the Ministry of Culture, Radio M, *Ljiljan* magazine, and the *Oslobođenje* and *Behar* newspapers, which largely contributed to the campaign of discrimination and

demonization of Serbian citizens in Sarajevo. In February 1994, Alija Izetbegović appointed Amila Omersoftić as head of the state radio and television broadcaster. Bernard-Henri Lévy confirmed that Omersoftić was "the real co-producer" of the films *Bosna* and *Armija*: "Amila Omersoftić ... She's said to be close to the president – and she is. […] She helped me produce *Bosna*! She is now providing Gilles with the material, archives and team to make *Armija*" (Lévy, 1996, p.440). In his notebooks, Lévy mentions a lunch with Izetbegović and Omersoftić during which they discuss "Enes Karić, the Minister of Culture, who has taken a stand against intercultural marriages and has banned songs written by Serbs from being played on the radio" (Lévy, 1996, p.371).

This ban on Serbian music and mixed marriages has been confirmed by various observers, "A few weeks ago, the popular host of a radio show here received a letter from the Bosnian Culture minister ordering him to stop playing 'aggressor music' – songs performed by Serbs. "I was outraged", Mimo Sahinpasić, the radio host, said. "There are Serbian singers – like Đorđe Balašević – whose antiwar songs have done more for Bosnia than 80 percent of our leaders. So I ignored the letter. I'm in Bosnia to fight for what's left of the Yugoslav idea, not to live in a one-party state". The ban on 'aggressor music', issued by culture minister Enes Karić and supported by the governing Party of Democratic Action, which is dominated by Muslims, has been flouted and ridiculed. But it is part of an anxious debate over what is widely seen as the party's growing Islamic authoritarianism. This debate has intensified as influential party figures have suggested that mixed marriages – those in which Muslims wed Serbs or Croats – are a bad thing, encouraged by the former communists rulers of Yugoslavia and tending to sap the Muslim soul of Bosnia. Behind Mr. Karić, there stand the Islamic religious authorities in Bosnia, who see the Party of Democratic Action as an essential vehicle for the defense of Muslims in Bosnia and the advance of religious observance" (Cohen, 1994a).

SDA officials demanded and supported these measures. Mirsad Cernan, the secretary-general of the SDA, said "Our culture minister acted on his own but he did not make a mistake in banning aggressor music. Our authentic Bosnian culture has been diluted by all kinds of things, especially new folk songs from Serbia. Our attitude is that mixed marriages should not be a model, as they were under the communists. We think mixed marriages are a condition we have to tolerate, but not the way to have good communication between nations. Now, a normal Muslim will marry a Muslim woman and others will be the exception" (Cohen, 1994a). Religious leaders were at the forefront in this identity fight. Mr. Ceric, a spiritual leader, said "The party of Democratic Action is hardly even a party, it is a movement for the protection of Muslims, for the preservation of our biological existence against Serbian aggression. We Bosnians – that is Muslims – have accepted Islam as the blueprint of our existence" (Cohen, 1994a).

After the ban on songs written by Serbs, Enes Karić attacked Serbian literature. When interviewed by Damir Hrasnica for the newspaper *BH Dani*, Karić said, "I would just like to draw your attention to the Arab word for literature. It is *edeb*! And *edeb*, before everything else, means having a nice upbringing, good behavior towards people, the world, all creatures. Take, for example, *One Thousand and One Nights*. All those stories seek enrichment, moral improvement. You know, the issue with humans is that they need to be raised, admonished, taught what is good. And plenty of Serbian literature is far from *edeb*. What is a book good for if it leads its reader to draw a knife and spill another man's guts!".

On 5 February 1994, as the last convoy of the Jewish association left Sarajevo, a shell fell on the Markale market killing 68 people and wounding 200. Colonel Gildas Sonnic, Chief of Staff of the Sarajevo sector, noted the prohibition of UNPROFOR's access to the site of the explosion and the reluctance of the Bosniaks to entrust wounded people to the UNPROFOR medical unit: "An explosion was heard around 12.15 pm. At 12.40, I was at the square with Colonel Dr Ambrosi, and was soon joined by one and then two armored medical vehicles. The Bosniak army and police were denying us access. We helplessly assisted in the evacuation of the last dead and injured, some of them just placed haphazardly in car trunks. At 1.15 pm, we entered Koševo hospital, where the situation was catastrophic. Only a few injured people were entrusted to the UNPROFOR surgical team at the PTT Building. That evening, a child victim of a heart wound was evacuated to Italy."

Between 1992 and 1995, thousands of Serbs were imprisoned arbitrarily and suffered the worst violence in prison solely because of their ethnicity. This is the number of people registered but the actual number is certainly much higher. The prisons were either institutional prisons (Central Prison, Viktor Bubanj / Ramiz Salčin Prison) or private prisons (Appendix VI to chapter VI[80]; Appendix XI to chapter VI[81]). Sexual violence against Serbian women increased during these years (Naša ispovijest – Žene, 2016). The Commission had access to 178 files of Serbian women raped in Sarajevo. Eighty-eight women or 50% were raped in their house or apartment. The other women were raped in Bosniak private prisons, most often during gang rapes and repeated rapes. This number is largely underestimated, most of the women refusing to testify and to mention their ordeal. Pregnancies caused by these rapes resulted in termination of pregnancy when possible.

Within Koševo hospital, discrimination was practiced against doctors but also against Serbian patients. [redacted], born on [redacted] in [redacted] was a Serbian police officer who was seriously wounded in the legs and abdomen in August 1994 by members of the Bosniak unit called the "Black Swans". When he was admitted to Koševo hospital on 24 August 1994, he was tied to the bed, deprived of

care and food and left in his excrement. [redacted]s beaten, in particular by Dr Faruk Kulenović, who hit him with a hammer on the external fixator on his leg. Families of Bosnian army soldiers were allowed to come into his room to beat him and urinate on his wounds. On 8 September 1994, uniformed men offered to evacuate him to the Serb positions in exchange for 6,000 Deutschmarks, giving him the opportunity to make phone calls to arrange payment. Since he could not raise this sum, the order was given to transfer him to the Ramiz Salčin prison where he was beaten and tortured. On 10 September 1994, he was strapped to a stretcher and transferred to the central prison for interrogation by judge Muhidin Kapo. During the interrogation, Kapo jammed his ballpoint pen into [redacted]'s hand. He was sentenced to ten years and six months in prison for terrorism. On 20 September 1994, [redacted] was released in exchange for Bosniak prisoner Ramiz Šalko, who had been captured at Foča[82].

During the three years of war in Sarajevo, snipers reportedly wounded 1,030 people and killed another 225, including 60 children (Rufin, 2012). Without forensic expertise or a criminal and ballistic investigation report, it appears impossible to distinguish a sniper wound from a short- or medium-range firearm wound. It is therefore very difficult to count the sniper casualties, and the reported figures are generally unverifiable. There was an upsurge in Bosnian sniper activity in 1995. Between 1992 and 1995, 14 French UNPROFOR soldiers were killed in Sarajevo by hostile fire: two in 1992, one in 1993, one in 1994 and ten in 1995. Of the ten soldiers killed in Sarajevo in 1995, two (Marcel Amaru and Jacky Humblot) were killed by Serbian soldiers during an exchange of fire between two identified units in uniform (act of war) on 27 May 1995 on Vrbanja Bridge. Based on what we know so far, we can assume that Bosniak snipers killed most of them (criminal acts). Serb civilians from Grbavica were particularly exposed to sniper fire from Mojmilo hill, Debelo Brdo, Hum hill, Pofalić. Many Bosniak snipers' nests that targeted Serbs in Grbavica were precisely located:

- Skyscraper No.4 on Pero Kosorić Square (now called Trg heroja, or Heroes' Square), 18th and 19th floors
- Elektropriveda building on Vilsonovo setaliste Street
- Faculty of Mechanical Engineering
- Executive Council Building (now the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH)
- Skyscraper behind the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering
- Skyscraper on Ivan Krndelj 4 Street (now Aziza Sacirbegović), 20th floor
- Building on Milutina Djuraskovica Street (now Topal Osman pase), the only building with 12 floors on that street

- Building at Bratstvo i jedinstvo Street (now Hamdije Cemerlica) behind the Simpo trade center
- The only skyscraper at the intersection of Darovalaca krvi and Bratstvo i jedinstvo" streets (now Kolodvorska and Hamdije Cemerlica), the sniper nest was on the 14th floor
- Faculty of the Natural Mathematics building
- Hotel Bristol
- National Museum building
- Energoinvest building
- Buildings around Pere Kosorić Square: Loris building, among others
- Floors above the Kolos bar (Dinarska Street)
- Jewish cemetery

On 11 May 1995, at approximately 3.30 pm, two young Serbian girls, Milica Lalović, aged ten, and Nataša Učur, aged nine, were killed in Grbavica while playing with a rope in front of the building located at No. 59 Rave Janković Street. Two Bosniak snipers, posted in the Loris building located in Pere Kosorić Square (now called Heroes' Square), targeted the two girls specifically. According to various corroborating testimonies, Milica and Nataša were killed by Sejo Piskić, born in 1956 at Gračanica and a soldier in the 101st Mountain Brigade of the 12th Division (1st Corps) of the Bosnian army. Senad Piskić, Sejo Piskić's brother, a soldier and sniper from the same brigade, was usually stationed in the Kolos bar building. Sejo Piskić publicly boasted about the murder of the two young girls as well as 20 other Serbs from Grbavica. A witness claims that in the early afternoon of 11 May, General Nedžad Ajnadžić, in the military offices of the INA building, offered 200 Deutschmarks to anyone who killed two Serbians in the following hour. A group of five soldiers, including Sejo Piskić and Bahrija Hrvat, left the INA building, located just a ten-minute walk from the Loris building. They came back half an hour later to celebrate their successful mission in a nearby cafe[83]. Milica and Nataša were immediately taken to Kasindo hospital. Milica was declared dead on arrival at the hospital and Nataša died within 15 minutes of her admission. Nataša and Milica were buried side by side in the cemetery of Miljevići (east Sarajevo). General Sir Michael Rose said, "I was in Sarajevo when Bosnian Muslim snipers killed two girls playing near the front line in the Serb neighborhood of Grbavica" (Merlino, 1993b).

The assassinations of doctors (Dr Milorad Tomašević, Dr Vladimir Bilenjki, among others) continued during these years. Dr Gojko Šurbat was killed by a sniper.

Dr Slavko Marković and his wife Dr Milica Gutović-Marković paid 4,000 Deutschmarks to a Bosniak soldier to help them leave Sarajevo. As they were walking along the Miljacka River towards Ilidža, the soldier following behind them shot them. Milica was shot in the back and died instantly. Slavko was seriously injured but survived and was operated on at Žiča hospital (Domazet, 2013). Arbitrary imprisonment also continued. Dr Marko Vuković was arrested on 1 January 1994 and imprisoned for six months at the central prison just for trying to leave Sarajevo, which confirms status of hostages for Serbs. Nearly 500 Serbian doctors from different specialties suffered from the campaign of terror and left Sarajevo. More than 200 of them were specialists from Koševo hospital. None have returned to Sarajevo.

About 3,000[84] Serbian civilians were killed in Sarajevo from 1991 to 1995. The Commission had access to 2,907 complete and preliminary files (2,788 adults and 119 children). Out of these 2,907 civilians killed, 714 or 25% were killed in their apartment or house. Almost two thirds of these deaths were linked to criminal acts. During this period 1,665 Serb civilians were seriously injured, 755 of them from war wounds and 910 (or 55%) from criminal acts. The majority of the dead and wounded are therefore not linked to acts of war but to criminal acts.

During the war, the Serbian Žiča hospital (municipality of Ilidža, at the entrance to Blažuj) was the only hospital within 200 km of the front line, west and north of Sarajevo. It provided war surgery services for a population of nearly 100,000 inhabitants in five main districts: Ilidža, Hadžići, Vogošća, Ilijaš and Rajlovac. From 1 November 1992 to 1 February 1996, Dr Miodrag Lazić managed the war surgery activities (219). He reported the details of his surgeries and the hospital's activity during these three years. In all, some 8,123 wounded were treated, with 69% soldiers and 31% civilians. Two-thirds of those injured (66.8%) were victims of multiple injuries caused by explosives (74.6%) or firearms (25.4%). Victims suffered from injuries to the limbs (50.6%), abdomen (24.2%), chest (12.04%) and pelvis (4.28%). Nearly 20% of these injured patients (496) were children. Of these 496 children, 78.23% had injuries caused by explosives and 21.77% by firearms. Overall hospital mortality was 1.78% (145 of 8,123) but mortality among the children was 9.68% (48 of 496). Some 298 victims, 33 of which were children, were declared dead on arrival at the hospital and not included in the official figures. The number of wounded who died on the spot and never taken to hospital is unknown. Dr Lazić indiscriminately operated on the Croats and Bosniaks who were taken to Žiča hospital. Dozens of wounded Croats from nearby regions (Kakanj, Vareš, Kiseljak, Kraljeva Sutjeska etc.) were treated every month at the Žiča hospital and then transferred to Split. The Croatian officer Niko Lozančić, injured in Kakanj and taken to Žiča hospital, testified that Dr Lazić had saved his life. Nenad Rajić, brother of the Croatian general Ivica Rajić, was operated on by Dr Lazić. The doctor also provided assistance to wounded Bosniak

soldiers. A man named Pustahija from Visoko, who told us that he had received some medals for bravery, was seriously wounded on Serbian territory between Rajlovac and Ilijaš during a battle in which many Serbian soldiers were killed. Pustahija, who had been shot several times in the chest and abdomen, was taken to Žiča hospital in agony and operated on in extreme urgency by Dr Lazić. A few days later he was part of an exchange and was transferred to Koševo hospital. In his testimony, Dr Lazić mentions a Muslim doctor whom he calls a hero. This doctor was Vlado Mehmedbašić, a gynecologist and son of Mehmed Mehmedbašić. Dr Mehmedbašić, who lived in Ilidža, offered his services at the Žiča hospital, where he was the only gynecologist during the three years of war, and where he delivered babies for hundreds of Serbian women[85].

On 9 September 1995, Žiča hospital was hit by artillery fire from the Franco-British Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). A shell landed in front of the hospital, killing many people, including the family that ran the canteen where RRF soldiers often stopped to drink fruit juice. A second shell hit the church and wounded a priest named Đuro who was officiating a wedding. General Bachelet referred to this tragic error, which did not appear to shock anyone in the international community:

> The presumed Serb position was meant to be the target of an artillery strike. The strike was carried out, but at least one shell crossed the ridge past the identified target and exploded at a bus stop near the Serbian hospital in Blažuj. There were many victims, but we didn't know the exact number. We settled for a press release expressing our condolences. However, we were the only ones to express such sentiments: the Western press did not react, since it was the Serbs .... (Bachelet, 2016)

In August and September 1995, thousands of depleted uranium shells were fired by NATO aircraft in Bosnia, particularly in the areas of Han Pijesak and Hadžići (a suburb of Sarajevo). In the years after the war, an abnormally high mortality rate was observed in these two regions, particularly from cancer in young people. Many soldiers from the European Union who served in Bosnia or Kosovo died of leukemia, lymphoma or other cancers. A mysterious "Balkan syndrome" has been mentioned, but the courts have not formally established a causal link with depleted uranium from the NATO missiles (Les cas européens, 2001; La polémique du, 2001; Le "syndrome des, 2001; Le mystère du, 2001). Gendarmerie Captain Henri Friconneau died in 2015 of angiosarcoma. He worked for the French environmental and public health protection agency (Oclaesp), and in 2000 was part of the surveillance and investigation platoon of the French Gendarmerie based in Mitrovica (Kosovo). After a protracted legal battle against the French government, Captain Friconneau's widow

won her case in 2019 and was awarded a pension. The Rennes Court of Appeal concluded (judgement of 21 June 2019) that Captain Friconneau's cancer was linked to the toxicity of depleted uranium released by NATO missiles fired against the Serbian army in Kosovo in 1999. Evidence attributed his military service as being the cause. In particular, the Rennes Court of Appeal stressed that the investigative reports conducted by international bodies recognized the toxicity of this type of ammunition. Following this legal decision, in 2020 Captain Friconneau was declared as having died in service to his country during a foreign mission. His name will be inscribed on the war memorial of his town and place of birth, as well as on the war memorial for foreign missions. A French court therefore concluded, some twenty years after exposure, that a case of angiosarcoma was linked to the depleted uranium particles present in the environment following the NATO bombings. NATO experts consistently question the increased risk of cancer from exposure to low doses of depleted uranium. Dr Chris Busby, one of the leading experts on the subject, said that:

> The military authorities and scientific committees have continually denied or minimized evidence of the health effects of Depleted Uranium (DU). However, their methods have been generally pathetic and demonstrably inaccurate. In the US Department of Defense report on the Balkans DU, almost all of the references contained in the report were to the NATO website and none of the references were to any peer reviewed report. My conclusion is that there is enough evidence to show that DU is a serious health hazard and that its effect are being covered up systematically by the politicians, the military and scientists employed by them. (Busby, 2003; UNIDIR, 2008)

The ruling by the Rennes Court of Appeal is expected to set a precedent and, with the help of independent experts, to spark collective action against NATO for endangering the lives of civilian populations.

General Bachelet stated that Richard Holbrooke and General Rupert Smith were unconcerned about the civilian populations. In October 1995, General Bachelet wrote that

> The Americans, with Richard Holbrooke, are leading the game; but it is very much the Bosniak game, which cares little about the fate of the Serb populations. […] But in hindsight, I am troubled by the fact that General Smith never alluded to the plight of the people, except to say that the RRF was not there to protect them" (Bachelet, 2016, p.169). On 2 December 1995 journalist Rémy Ourdan published an article in *Le Monde* distorting General Bachelet's

> remarks, entitled "The French officers of UNPROFOR have taken the side of the Serb extremists in Sarajevo". For *Le Monde*, "The UNPROFOR has become the voice of the soldiers of Ilidža, Grbavica and Vogošća," and that "by supporting Ilidža and Grbavica, the UNPROFOR is condoning the ethnic cleansing by the Serbs who have been working since 1992 to break up and divide Sarajevo", and finally that "the capital city's security depends on the departure of the 'thugs' from Ilidža and the 'killers' from Grbavica. (Ourdan, 1995)

When the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, the Bosnian authorities (Alija Izetbegović, Haris Silajdžić, Hasan Muratović, among others) issued more threats urging Serbs to leave Sarajevo. General Bachelet regretted that "President Izetbegović and Prime Minister Silajdžić, while stating that 'civilians could remain without fear', added that 'soldiers had to leave or face justice for their crimes'" (Bachelet, 2016, p.219). And yet, throughout the war, the Bosnian authorities made no difference between Serbian military personnel and civilians: any soldier who was captured was convicted of terrorism, just like any civilians attempting to defend their families or homes against criminal gangs; possessing a Serb Democratic Party card; or owning a gun, even if kept at home. In short, the Bosnian authorities considered any Serb citizen of Sarajevo to be a terrorist who should be mercilessly punished.

Bosniak authorities openly demanded sanctions against Serbs and claimed their Muslim identity. Roger Cohen reported Amila Omersoftić's statements in *The New York Times*:

> 'First we have to judge the Bosnian Serb criminals, then perhaps there can be peace,' said Amila Omersoftić, the general manager of Bosnia's Government-run television. […] Mrs Omersoftić's conviction is widely shared in Sarajevo" (Cohen, 1995a). Elizabeth Neuffer also quoted Amila Omersoftić in *The Boston Globe*: "The party is aimed at reestablishing Muslim identity, arguing that because religion was suppressed under communism, Muslims were denied the same rights as ethnic Serbs and Croats. Says Amila Omersoftić, a leading party member: 'We are open to everybody, but we act on behalf of the Muslim population. Muslims didn't have their national rights'. (Neuffer, 1995)

12. Sarajevo after the Dayton Accords

12.1. The Exodus

After the Dayton peace accords, the Serbs in the Sarajevo districts (Grbavica, Ilijaš, Vogošća, Hadžići, Ilidža, Rajlovac, among others) spontaneously and unanimously decided to leave the city because they had no other choice, since the Dayton Accords allotted these neighborhoods to the Federation of BiH and cut them off from the territory of Republika Srpska. They were given no instructions to leave and no help. They knew only too well the threat they faced and that no one could ensure the safety of their families and peace for their dead. If the referendum of 29 February 1992 was the casus belli, the Dayton peace accords of 14 December 1995 were the cause of the great exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo, from January to March 1996 (Par dizaines de, 1996; Hatzfeld, 1996; L'exode serbe se, 1996; La minorité serbe, 1997). That winter was one of the worst in Sarajevo, with temperatures reaching minus 30°C. The Serbs left Sarajevo in droves knowing they would never return. They left their houses, apartments and possessions, but they did not abandon their dead. Most rightly feared that their graves would be desecrated, while others refused to leave their loved ones to rest near their killers. So they dug up the frozen ground of the cemeteries, sometimes alone, sometimes with the help of a neighbor or a friend. Often at night, in the midst of snowstorms and with makeshift lighting, they pulled the corpses out of their graves, exhuming the decomposed bodies of their children and parents. It was unprecedented and one of the most tragic events of this war: the great exodus of the living and their dead. The Serbs had to choose between a suitcase and a coffin. In fact, they left with both, leaving behind them deserted cemeteries, dotted with holes and empty graves. They headed east in search of safety for their families and peace for their dead, in an endless line of vehicles with women, children and old people squeezed between suitcases and coffins. There were no plans to offer shelter to such an influx of homeless people and no plans to rebury so many of the deceased. Most slept in their vehicles for several days, waiting to dig up the frozen earth in Sokolac, Bratunac, Knežina and Miljevići to give their thousands of dead a new place to rest. They were sent to collective reception centres where they often stayed for several years in particularly difficult living conditions.

Rémy Ourdan, who retained his bias even with such events, wrote in *Le Monde* that

In the cool dawn air, Nikola Ljesić watches the three gravediggers digging the frozen earth. He swallows another glass of šlivovica (plum alcohol) in one gulp. In the Ilidža cemetery, Nikola Ljesić has laid out bacon, bread and brandy on a wooden table. He knows the strange ceremony will last several hours. An Orthodox cross lies on the ground: 'Dragoslav Ljesić, 1974–1992'. Nikola has come to dig up the body of his son, killed by a sniper in the first year of the war, and intends to take it to Sokolac, a village that will remain under Serbian control after the implementation of the Dayton peace accords. Since Serb separatists in Ilidža learned that their neighbourhood is to be returned to Bosniaks at the end of March, they have carried out about 50 exhumations, according to the cemetery's director. The Serbs are gradually leaving Ilidža and Grbavica. Each day, cars and trucks set off for Pale and eastern Bosnia. People are heading off in search of a new home, far from Sarajevo and the promise of 'reunification', far from these hated Muslims and Croats. They leave with their bitterness, their furniture and ... their dead. There's a faint smell of death floating over the cemetery. Nikola Ljesić hits the ground with a hammer, grumbling against Bosnian Muslims, America and the whole world. Next to him, a man is digging furiously into the ground to exhume his brother's body. Regularly, the gravediggers stop, insult Bill Clinton and the peace plan, drink a glass of šlivo and resume their work. Some coffins are secured shut with old rusty nails; others are too rotten. The bodies are then transferred. Under the gazes of their parents, wives, husbands or children, half-decomposed corpses change beds. It can sometimes take quite a while to put a human shape back together from fetid piles of flesh. (Ourdan, 1996)

Denis Hautin-Guiraut's account is not tinged with the same bias:

On the small dirt road that winds through the mountains between Sarajevo and Pale, there were several thousand of them on Wednesday and Thursday, despite the snow that has been falling for four days. Entire families have deserted Vogošća or Hadžići, and others are already starting to leave the suburbs of Ilidža or Grbavica. Most Serbs have hastily organized their departure. Their words are almost always the same: 'I'm afraid,' said one young woman. 'My husband was killed by the Bosniaks during this war, and I don't believe in their promises, or in the protection of IFOR. It's best to leave while there's still time." The luckiest – those who can pay the equivalent of 4,000 francs – have packed their belongings into mostly antediluvian trucks, or even into refrigerated vans converted for the purpose. The others have installed DIY containers on their small cars, and loaded up the essentials, leaving behind most of their

> furniture in their houses and apartments. And then there are the most destitute, who have set off with a garden tractor hooked to a trailer, a horse cart, or simply on foot, with a meagre bundle slung over their shoulder. Some were pushing a wheelbarrow, others leading a cow, or pulling a sledge. They have all travelled nearly 50 kilometers in the cold before reaching Pale, the capital of the Bosnian Serbs. (Hautin-Guiraut, 1996)

The Commission heard as Dr Miodrag Lazić spoke of the exhumations of the Vlakovo cemetery (Ilidža). Aleksa and Ljubinka Barjaktarević (from Ilijaš) transferred the bodies of their two sons, Goran and Duško, killed during the war. Aleksa and Ljubinka said they would have preferred to commit suicide at their sons' graves rather than leave Sarajevo without them[86]. Milanka Tomanić-Đuričić (from Vogošća) moved the remains of her father and two brothers, Milomir and Milan, all three killed during the war. Her father and one of her two brothers were killed by a sniper while rescuing a wounded man in the street. Milanka remembers passing a haggard-looking man in Vogošća, not knowing where to go with the body of his son in a wheelbarrow[87]. Mitar Čolić (from Nahorevo) left Sarajevo with the remains of his brother, whose grave had been desecrated[88]. Slavica Popić Hart (from Vogošća) was left alone with her two children aged four and seven after her husband was killed in 1993 in Sarajevo. She was unable to transfer her husband's remains in 1996, but she decided to do so in 2010, after seeing his grave desecrated 15 years after the war[89]. Of the 150,000 (about 30%) Serbs who lived in Sarajevo, officially 3% still live there today (although some Serbs who do not live in Sarajevo still declare themselves residents in the hope of recovering their apartments). More than a thousand reburials have been recorded in Sokolac (960), Bratunac (141) and Knežina (120), in addition to those in Bijeljina and Miljevići (3,000). In total, housands of bodies were reburied.

After the war, former general Jovan Divjak expressed open concern about Bosniak nationalism and the growing influence of Islam,

> Today in Bosnia the young people are with the nationalists and have more hatred than during the war. We do not learn in schools or in the media that there were war crimes on the side of the Bosnian army. (Pour le general, 2017)

Following the Dayton Accords Muslim pressure intensified in Bosnia (Cohen,1995b; Foreign Islamic fighters, 1995; Hedges, 1996). The few remaining Serbs in Sarajevo were threatened and considered indesirable. On 13 March 1996, well after the Dayton peace accords, several Bosniaks barged into V.B.'s apartment. After violently beating him, they threw him out of his apartment. That same day, V.B. was

fired and brutally thrown out of the Vaso Miskin Crni factory by the director Adbulah "Avdo" Muslaosmanović. He later filed several complaints with the Sarajevo court but Prosecutor Vesna Ilić refused to investigate them. All of his registered letters (six in total) with acknowledgement of receipt addressed to Bakir Izetbegović remained unanswered. V.B. also tried to tell his story on Bosniak television but was dismissed and insulted on January 2012 by the Sarajevo journalist Amarildo Gutic[90].

12.2. Search for Missing Persons

In accordance with a Commission request dated 16 March 2020, Mr. Dušan Pavlović delivered a report on the problems and obstacles in the process of searching for missing Serbs in a part of the Sarajevo city which was under Muslim control during the war but today part of the Sarajevo Canton in the FBiH, with particular reference to the case of Slobodan Samardžić (Appendix VII to chapter VI)[91]. Mr. Dušan Pavlović worked over 5 and a half years at the Missing Persons Institute of BiH (MPI of BiH) and assumed the position of Head of the Search, Exhumation and Identification Sector. Several excavations have uncovered many bodies of murdered Serbs, especially the excavations of the mass grave of the Lav cemetery (Appendix VII to chapter VI, Document 3c, p. 1183)[92] and the mass grave of Kazani. Unfortunately these excavations were in almost all cases interrupted and were never completed**.**

Concerning the case of Slobodan Samardžić, the many requests for information by his family submitted to the institutions of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were never answered. Excavations were undertaken near the Alipaša Bridge on 16 November 2012 in the presence of Samardžić's and Šehovac's families (his wife, sister and two daughters of Stana Šehovac) and Milan Mandić. However, the excavation was suddenly and inexplicably interrupted by Eldar Jahić from the prosecutor's office of Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as higher-ups were notified by telephone that skeletal remains had been found (Appendix VII to chapter VI, Documents 6&7, p. 1190/1191)[93]. The prosecutor's office (Vesna Ilić) were unable to provide any justification for stopping the search. After being hidden, the human remains were moved and eventually disposed of in Sarajevo's garbage dump under cover of the city's sanitary clean-up, likely during or just after the war. From 11 May 1992 to date, the institutions of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been guilty of the crimes of aiding and abetting a crime, concealment of a body, concealment of evidence, destruction of evidence, and obstruction of justice in a criminal investigation

for war crimes. The Samardžić case was supposed to have been transferred from the ICTY to the Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When Stefan Samardžić asked Gunter Schweiger from the ICTY Prosecutor's Office about the status of his father's case, Schweiger responded that he was unaware of any case regarding Slobodan Samardžić.

Radomir Gojković was abducted by Bosniak forces on the same day as Stana Šehovac and Slobodan Samardžić. Tanja Petrović-Gojković, the older daughter of Radomir Gojković, testified in May 2020 for the Commission, "To my knowledge, on 14 May, 1992, my father, his neighbor from the same block of flats and his friend Slobodan Samardžić, as well as Stana Šehovac whom they had not known before the war and who had lived in a neighboring building in Vojničko polje, were killed by the army whose commander was Juka Prazina from Alipašino polje. The news that they had been killed came many years later. I believed that my dad was alive and would show up at any moment. We had no news of his death, but there were indications that he had been in prisons in Sarajevo. After the war, there were rumors about the remaining prisons. All of this was misinformation, which fueled the hope that my father was still alive and that he would suddenly appear and fill us with indescribable happiness and joy. I had waited for 10 years, hoping to hug him again, imagining those moments with tears of joy and how we as a family would move on. I had been making plans. I missed protection and fatherly love. I still miss him. I carry a great pain, sadness in my heart and soul! Even to this day, it is not known where my dad's bones are. Didn't he deserve to be buried with dignity, that his grave be known, that we can light a candle on the grave, visit the grave and plant flowers?

Bogomils in Bosnia marked their graves with tombstones with this engraving: "Don't step on me!". Since ancient times, the cult of ancestors and graves have been nurtured and celebrated in this area as a monument to life, rather than death. Will I live to see the day when I erect a tombstone over my dad's grave and leave this world in peace? My soul cannot and will not calm down until that happens. It has been 28 years since the cowardly and brutal murder of innocent civilians in Sarajevo, and time is running out. We, the children of the tragically killed are slowly getting older. It is not fair to let our children, and their grandchildren, fight battles doomed to defeat. Because that wall of silence and hiding the evidence of the crimes by moving bodies and bones under a veil of secrecy, has been impenetrable to this day. Many fortresses have been destroyed throughout history, and the Sarajevo fortress of lies and deception has lasted for 3 decades. I have had imaginary conversations with my dad all these years. In the 1990s, it was a talk between a child and his dad about dilemmas, advice, help, difficult decisions, joys or sorrows. Today, when I am 41 years old, my dad is younger than me, because he was killed at the age of 41, so I often get angry with him, asking him how come he did not see what was in store for us. Why didn't

he listen to our mom and run away from Sarajevo with us? Why was he so naive to believe so much in the Sarajevo paradise, in love, friendship, humanity, intellect?

I am still hoping that those of us who have been waiting and suffering for such a long time will live to see the day when we bury our loved ones! It is my greatest wish and hope, my last thought before I fall asleep and the first when I wake up! One day the phone will ring and someone will say: "Your DNA samples match the samples from the human remain of Radomir Gojković. Until then, if someone reads this and knows how to read between the lines, they will know how life can be cruel and that one man's trash is another man's treasure".

An article in *The New York Times* provided clarification on why searches were being blocked: "When it began the investigation of the killings, the Government began to exhume the mass grave at the Kazani pit. Police investigators removed 29 bodies after a few days of digging, but the work was abruptly halted by the Interior Ministry and never resumed. "There were clearly more than 29 bodies in the pit," said Munir Alibabić, who at the time was the police chief of Sarajevo and was in charge of the investigation, "but I was ordered to stop all work. When I questioned the Minister of Interior, he told me this was a presidential order. I suspect that finding large numbers of bodies was politically inconvenient." Mr. Alibabić said police investigations pointed to the existence of other mass grave sites around Sarajevo that had never been investigated. Muslim officials, who spoke on condition that they not be identified, said those sites included a huge garbage dump near the edge of the city and a spot on the left bank of the Miljacka River in Toplić" (Hedges, 1997).

Some 800 Serbs have been reported missing from the part of the city controlled by the SDA. Institutions led by Bosniak SDA officials have made immense efforts to cover up the crimes committed against Serbian citizens and clear example of this is case at Bentbaša of five killed persons from Blagoja Parovića street (Appendix VII to chapter VI, Document A3b, Page 1182)[94]. To this date about 260 Serbs have still not been found. The number of missing Serbs is probably higher because entire families having been killed without a survivor being able to report it, these missing persons are neither identified nor counted (Despić-Popović, 1998).

Mr. Dušan Pavlović thus concludes his report for the Commission, "SDA-controlled Sarajevo citizens who were picked up from their apartments in the capital of a European country at the end of the 20th century, tortured and killed in their own town and country, and eventually thrown into a major city dump are still waiting to be found. Their families are still waiting for the relevant institutions in that part of Sarajevo, as well as international organizations and diplomatic missions of reputable countries to take the necessary step and make it possible to find their loved ones in order to bury them in a dignified manner and finally get peace at least in this respect. Perhaps the experience and bitterness of the Serbian families of missing persons and victims of war crimes are best exemplified by their numerous letters addressed to

relevant political and judicial, foreign and domestic institutions and organizations. A small amount of this grievousness can also be felt through several letters sent by the president of one such association, Mr. Milan Mandić, who is still searching for his missing father, which I enclose herewith" (Appendix VII to chapter VI, Document 9, p. 1212)[95].

12.3. Desecrations of Orthodox Graves and Memorials

Since the Dayton peace accords, desecrations of Orthodox churches and cemeteries have become the rule, and often coincide with Orthodox holidays. Since the arrival of Father Danilović in 2011, the Church of the Transfiguration of the Lord in Pofalići (Novo Sarajevo) has suffered more than thirty attacks. The Church of St. Sava in Ilidža has been vandalized: the front door burned, windows broken, altar destroyed, icons and sacred objects stolen, and offensive graffiti sprayed on the walls. The material damage can be assessed, but the psychological and spiritual damage is incalculable. On Easter 2020, the Orthodox cemetery of Bare (Hadžići) was vandalized and the words "Never forget Srebrenica" were painted in capital letters in English on the graves (Appendix VIII to chapter VI, p. 1227)[96]. The Osijek (Ilidža) cemetery was also vandalized in 2020. In the previous year, seven tombs were destroyed and many tombs were splashed with paint. The families trying to clean up the cemetery have had horrible insults and stones hurled at them. Serbs, even dead, are undesirable in Sarajevo and they cannot even rest in peace in a city that claims to be tolerant and multi-ethnic. No investigation has been able to identify and trace the perpetrators of these desecrations. The silence of intellectuals, civil society representatives and non-governmental organizations specializing in the denunciation of ethnic discrimination can only be interpreted as a form of approval. It is a continuation of the war by other means, aimed at inciting the few Serbs present to leave and deterring those who might intend to return.

Contempt for dead Serbs has taken many forms. A rally in memory of the fallen JNA soldiers was organized in 2010 with the laying of flowers and candles. The Sarajevo authorities banned the group from the precise location of the ambush on Dobrovoljačka Street (now Hamdije Kreševljakovića Street). Survivors as well as families and friends of the victims were kept at a distance near Skenderija at the beginning of the street. Since 2011, all requests for a commemorative plaque at the site of the ambush have been rejected by the Bosnian authorities on the grounds that it was a provocation. At the last rally in 2016, the flowers and candles were removed and thrown into the Miljacka River. Since then, commemorations have been held in

the military cemetery at Miljevići (East Sarajevo). No monument in memory of the victims of Pofalići and Kazani has been erected. A plaque placed by citizens in the park in December 2015 remained there only two days before it was broken. On the plaque of the Faculty of Medicine erected in memory of the students, doctors and professors who were victims of the war, the names of the Serbian doctors do not appear, in particular the name of Prof. Milutin Najdanović. Busts of famous Serbian doctors have been destroyed. A tribute to Dr Miodrag Lazić (the "surgeon of the anguished Serbian people"), painted on a wall in Ilidža, was vandalized on 6 May 2020 (Appendix VIII to chapter VI, p. 1227)[97]. Dr Lazić had died a few days earlier, on 14 April 2020.

12.4. Long-Term Psychological Suffering and Intergenerational Transmission of PTSD

Major psychological consequences, including PTSD, can be observed in individuals who have been directly or indirectly exposed to one or more traumatic events. Two questionnaires (Appendix IX to chapter VI)[98] were used to assess the psychological consequences of the war trauma 25 years after the Bosnian War ended. A total of 300 people were chosen at random from a list of individuals now living in Republika Srspka who had lived in Sarajevo from 1992 to 1995. These 300 people were divided into three groups based on birthdate: Group 1 (G1, born before 1938): 73 people; Group 2 (G2, born between 1946 and 1985): 146 people; and Group 3 (G3, born after 1985): 81 people. The first questionnaire was an internationally validated questionnaire commonly used to study PTSD: the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5) with the Life Events Checklist for DSM-5 (LEC-5). The DSM-5 refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – 5th Edition. The presence and severity of PTSD were assessed using the PCL-5. Exposure to the traumatic event was assessed using the LEC-5 adapted for this study. The PCL-5 includes 20 items corresponding to the 20 PTSD criteria described in the DSM-5 and is used to calculate a severity score from 0 to 80. A score of 38 or higher is indicative of PTSD. A score of less than 33 means this diagnosis is unlikely. The second questionnaire was an original and context-specific questionnaire that we called the "Sarajevo Questionnaire" (SQ). It includes aspects that were specific to the wars in the former Yugoslavia, especially with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It aimed at assessing the psychological consequences of war trauma (Second World War and the Bosnian War) in this region of the Balkans as well as the possibility of intergenerational and/or transgenerational psychological disorders. This 30-item questionnaire was used to calculate a severity

score from 0 to 30. A score of 15 or higher indicates psychological trauma. Both questionnaires were completed during a structured interview as recommended by the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-5 (CAPS-5). Interviewers had to be able to establish a climate of trust, know how to rephrase questions and have a thorough knowledge of the historical events experienced by the respondents.

Analysis of the first questionnaire (PCL-5 with LEC-5) shows that all members of the three groups were exposed to several traumatic events. In more than 80% of cases, respondents reported the death or disappearance of a close relative (family or friend). For groups G1 and G2, exposure was direct. G1 was exposed to both the Second World War and Bosnian War events, with an accumulation of traumatic events. G3 respondents, given their average ages (10 years) at the beginning of the Bosnian War, were not on the whole directly exposed to the events their parents and grandparents experienced (prison, torture, rape etc.). The G3 group was primarily exposed to the events of the Bosnian War indirectly through family imprinting. Groups G1 and G2 both showed a PCL-5 score over 38 (43.9 for G1, 39.4 for G2), indicating PTSD 25 years after the events, with clinically significant suffering and impaired family, social or occupational functioning. There is a strong correlation in both groups regarding the need for psychotropic drugs, with 90% of those in G1 and 50% of those in G2 taking these medications. G3 had a PCL-5 score below 33 (31.7), indicating that PTSD was not an issue. The rate of psychotropic drug use is much lower in this third group (8% of the group).

Analysis of the second questionnaire (SQ) shows that all three groups have an SQ score above 15 (18.8 for G1, 17.2 for G2 and 15.9 for G3). More than 50% of the G1 and G2 respondents reported that they had been betrayed by a neighbor or friend, severed all ties with the Muslim and Croatian communities, and felt significant resentment. Those in G3 did not share these feelings or behaviors. The interviewers noted restraint in the oral and emotional expression of suffering as well as a strong reluctance to talk about certain events, especially sexual violence. Respondents adopt strategies to avoid reminders and evocations of the Bosnian War in their everyday lives. A general sense of concern for the future emerged from the interviews, as Republika Srpska was unanimously regarded as a safe haven capable of ensuring the protection of its citizens. None of the respondents were planning to leave. The final question on the SQ (an open-ended question), highlighted the most traumatic events: murders and disappearances, private prisons with torture and rape, looting of apartments and expropriations. There was also a high rate of pathological mourning related to the absence of a body, the impossibility of gathering at the place where a loved one died, the mutilation of corpses (Cohen, 1994b) or the desecration of graves. Almost everyone who lived in the Hadžići region spoke of their fears about depleted uranium. After the Dayton peace accords, around 7,000 Serbs left the Hadžići region

and took refuge in Bratunac. In the years after the war, the mortality rate of the inhabitants of Bratunac was higher than in the rest of Bosnia (11.2 per thousand versus 7.9 per thousand).

Comparison of the two questionnaires shows that groups G1 and G2 have a high PCL-5 score (PCL-5 > 38) and a high Sarajevo Questionnaire score (SQ > 15), with both scores being consistent. G3 has a low PCL-5 score (PCL-5 <15), with a large discrepancy between the two questionnaires. The PCL-5 is a standard tool designed to detect and assess the severity of the psychological consequences of any traumatic event, whether individual or collective. The Sarajevo Questionnaire is a context-specific questionnaire designed to assess the psychological consequences in a Balkan population exposed to two high-intensity armed conflicts during the twentieth century. It seems that the PCL-5 score alone does not highlight the psychological impact of the wars in the group of those who were not directly exposed. The PCL-5 assessment could therefore lead to false negatives and underestimate the intergenerational and/or transgenerational transmission of war trauma. We would like to draw the attention of social science researchers to this point and to the opportunity to develop a context-specific assessment capable of detecting collective factors of psychological vulnerability and the family transmission of psychological trauma of high-intensity wars, particularly after time has passed (several years or decades).

12.5. Continuation of the War by Other Means

Since the end of the war, the traces of the Serbian presence have been erased. The inscriptions in Cyrillic letters have been deleted. Streets have been renamed, some in honor of Bosniak forces. The Hasana Brkića Street, one of the largest in Sarajevo, has been renamed into the Street of the Patriotic League. After the end of the war, criminals like Caco were glorified and received the greatest tributes from the Bosniak nation: “Caco was buried in a grave marked N.N. (Nomen Nescio) close to the Sarajevo Olympic Stadium. In 1996 under pressure from various groups the Bosnian government revealed the location of his grave, and his remains were exhumed. On 2 December 1996 he was given a war hero’s burial, which was broadcast on television and attended by approximately 12,000 people in Sarajevo, mostly members of the Green Berets and other quasi-formal military formations. Caco’s public funeral was condemned by Jovan Divjak[99], an ethnic Serb who was an army general for the Bosnian army during the war, as the ‘glorification of a gangster’. He wrote to President Izetbegović: ‘I cannot understand why, in the days when you are making

superhuman efforts to preserve Bosnia as it is, you organize the funeral of those who inflicted the greatest harm. Is this funeral not a sign to all of those who violated the laws? A sign that they can come pillage the houses, steal cars and the belongings of others with impunity?' Divjak had on May 27, 1993—four months before Caco's arrest, denounced Caco's crimes in a letter to the general staff and Izetbegović. Caco was buried in the cemetery for soldiers killed during the war" (Andreas, 2008; 194, Hedges, 1997).

Lord Arthur Ponsonby, in his book "Falsehood in War-Time" (1928), stressed that one of the basic principles of any effective war propaganda was to gain the support of known intellectuals and artists. At the call of NGOs, many intellectuals and artists took sides alongside the Bosniaks in this civil war, most often in a virulent way. The fiction and entertainment industry has fully adopted Bosniak propaganda in all its productions (television serials, fiction movies, novels, songs …). Twenty-five years after the war, public opinion is still exposed to this Hollywood representation of the war in Sarajevo. It is outrageous that no intellectual rebels against this insidious propaganda under the guise of entertainment. Considering the recent debate about the film "Gone with the wind" and the call to contextualize certain films, it seems useful to recall the prevailing situation in Sarajevo from 1992 to 1995: Serb lives didn't matter.

Many organizations use memorial ceremonies (Day of Truth, Memorial Day, Remembrance Day …) not to honor the dead but to foster hatred between communities. Several so-called scientific research institutes have purely political or religious objectives. For example, the Institute for Research of Genocide (Canada) presents itself as a scientific research center. In reality it is an organization which uses lobbying strategies and which launches hateful petitions targeting intellectuals and artists who do not share their dogmas. This institute has notably launched smear campaigns against the Nobel Prize winner Peter Handke and the director Emir Kusturica. For Bernard-Henri Lévy, Emir Kusturica is a "collaborator from the Great Serbia" who "displays his neurotic hatred of the Bosniak cause and misfortune".

More than 20 years after the war ended, the newspapers take up word for word the Bosniak propaganda of the 1990s. Referring to the demonstrations and sniper fire on 5 and 6 April 1992 in Sarajevo, newspapers ran front page stories in 2012 such as: "Twenty years later, the memories haven't faded. On 5 and 6 April 1992, tens of thousands of Bosnians believed they could achieve peace by peacefully demonstrating in Sarajevo. Their hopes were quickly destroyed by Serbian sniper fire" (Vingt ans après, 2012). This article is illustrated by a photograph showing a Bosniak soldier protecting civilians and returning fire from a sniper. Another paper ran the headline: "Bosnia: 20 years ago, they wanted to believe in peace, instead they got bullets". The

article that followed referred to "the demonstration on 5 April 1992 in Sarajevo when Serbian snipers fired on the crowd", with a photo showing a memorial plaque of the Suada and Olga Bridge.

With rare exceptions (Merlino, 1993a; Schindler, 2007; Collon, 1998; Collon, 2000; Kahn, 1995, pp. 8-14), western journalists took part in anti-Serbian demonization campaign for a variety of reasons (Trickey, 1993; Sremac, 1999; Barstow, 2008a; Barstow, 2008b; Ulfkotte, 2014; Ulfkotte, 2017; Ulfkotte, 2019; Péan & Cohen, 2003). Only a few investigative journalists have carried out independent investigations, interviewing reliable witnesses such as the UNPROFOR high-ranking military. The rest contented themselves with disseminating information provided by the Bosniak authorities from their office at the Holiday Inn hotel.

12.6. Denial of Justice

Perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocidal acts against Serbs have benefited from exceptional leniency from judges and often complete impunity. Both international (ICTY) and Bosniak courts have contributed to this sham of justice. *The New York Times* confirmed the denial of justice: "Accounts of the killings, described by witnesses and previously secret court documents, are the first public indication that Muslim soldiers were involved in significant wartime atrocities against ethnic Serbian civilians. Further, some of the Muslims involved in the killings were eventually tried by their own army. But the trials were held in secret, and several former Bosnian Government officials said the Government had been slow to take action against the paramilitary units, and had curtailed investigation of the cases. General Halilović acknowledged that many of those who had committed atrocities had escaped prosecution" (Hedges, 1997).

Crimes against Serbs have never been qualified for what they were: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocidal acts. This denial of justice is largely the result of threats and pressures exerted on judges and certain witnesses by states which do not shrink from any form of violence. Crimes that should have been classified as war crimes or crimes against humanity have been qualified as mere common crimes or as concealment of a crime. The perpetrators of these crimes have escaped justice: either they have not been charged, or their crimes have not been adequately qualified, or they have been declared not criminally liable due to psychiatric disorders, or they have been acquitted or given laughable sentences in view of the seriousness of the crimes.

The obstacles to the restitution of illegally seized property (houses, farms, apartments, vehicles, valuables …) and the lack of compensation for the serious damage suffered (physical violence, layoffs, exposure to depleted uranium …) are part of this denial of justice.

13. Conclusion

From 1992 to 1995, the Serbs in Sarajevo were subjected to a double blockade (both internal and external) and a campaign of terror planned at the highest level of the state by the SDA and carried out by a joint criminal enterprise that included all Bosniak state institutions. One of the specific aspects of this terror campaign was the creation of a vast network of private prisons, led by military units under the orders of the SDA, where the worst atrocities (torture and gang rapes) were committed. This campaign of terror was preceded and accompanied by a campaign of discrimination and demonization targeting Serbian citizens of Sarajevo, who were relegated to the rank of excluded citizens. In Sarajevo, from 1992 to 1995, Serb lives didn't matter. The media and NGOs played a major role in the demonization campaign by spreading false information and focusing their attention and compassion exclusively on the very real suffering of Muslim citizens while completely ignoring the suffering of Serbian citizens. The massive exodus of the citizens of a city taking with them the exhumed remains of their loved ones was an unprecedented event in the history of civil wars. Almost all perpetrators of crimes against Serbian citizens have escaped justice with the active assistance of Bosniak state institutions. This denial of justice is a factor that aggravates the psychological after-effects of the victims and maintains tensions between communities. In the end, the Serbian population of a city that claims to be tolerant and multi-ethnic has been totally eliminated by those who still claim to be the main victims of this conflict.

Endnotes

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2 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia from 22 December 1990, December 22 adopted by Croatian Parliament. No. 56/1990. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

3 At the Ustashe meeting in Gospic on 11th of June 1941. the chief ideologists of the Croatian fascist Ustaša movement Mile Budak said: "We shall kill one part of the Serbs, expel the second part, and convert to Catholicism the third part of them".

4 Legal provision on racial affiliation and protection of Aryan blood and purity of the Croatian people issued by Ante Pavelic. 30 April 1941. No. XLV-68 Z. p. 41. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

5 Ibid.

6 The Independent State of Croatia (ISC) was formed on the basis of Ante Starcevic's ideology and political program that postulated, since the middle of the 19th century, that only Croats could live in the territory of Croatia. The Independent State of Croatia was built on the basis of a fascist ideology supported by the Ustasha terrorist organization. The other ideology was the fascist one, that was in full swing at the time when the terrorist Ustasha organization was formed. The Ustasha movement itself, which combined right-wing political heritage and fascist ideology, was created in 1929 with the aim of destroying the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and creating a Croatian state on its ruins. The Ustashas believed that Muslims from B&H were an integral or even the purest part of the Croatian people. Therefore, the Croatian political people in the ISC consisted of Croats of the Catholic, Muslim and Protestant religions. The rest of the population in the ISC had no political rights and were destined for destruction.

7 Historian and journalist, specialist in the Balkans. Born in Watford (England) in 1968, Jean-Arnault Dérens is an associate professor of history (1993). He lives between Paris and Belgrade or Skopje, where he is a correspondent for the Balkans of *Ouest-France*, *Le Temps* (Geneva), *La Libre Belgique* (Brussels) and *RFI* (Paris). J.A. Dérens is the founder, in 1998, and co-editor-in-chief of *Courrier des Balkans*. He also contributes to *Le Monde diplomatique*. Available at: http://www.bibliomonde.com/auteur/jean-arnault-derens-169.html.

8 Laurent Geslin is a geographer and journalist, specialist in the Balkans. Together with Jean-Arnault Dérens, they lead the collegial editorial staff of the *Courrier des Balkans*. They also publish works analyzing different developments and analyzing processes taking place in the Balkans. Available at: https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/

boutique/.45-essai-comprendre-les-balkans.-histoire-societes-perspectives-nouvelle-edition-revue-et-augmentee.html.

[9] The ruling political party in Rwanda since 1994.

[10] Swiss lawyer and diplomat. Former Swiss attorney general, she was appointed Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in the Hague - prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). She investigated war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda between 1999 and 2007. Available at: https://www.swisslife.com/en/home/hub/interview-carla-del-ponte.html.

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[13] As defined in the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html.

[14] Video of Muslim troops fight on side of Serbs in Bosanski Brod because they believe in former Yugoslavia instead of independence, [Statement by Ismet Djuheric].6 December 1992. Reuters. [Video available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[15] The book *Kao da me nema: Roman* [As if I am not there: A Novel] was written by Slavenka Drakulić and published by Feral Tribune in 1999 in Split, Croatia.

[16] Main court in Ilidza. (1995, November 5). Record of witness statement of Susic Borislav. [Appendix X (1241) to chapter VI]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[17] 1st Sarajevo motorized Brigade in Lukavica. (1992, October 6). Record of witness statement of Goran Stojakov. [Appendix X (1265) to chapter VI]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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[21] Delalić, M. (2000, November 9). Juka Prazina told me that It was our snipers who shoot at the people in front of the Assembly!, [Interview]. *Slobodna Bosna*. [Available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[22] *Death Arrived Before Freedom*. (1993, May). By Serbian Radio-Television journalist Zeljko Stojanovic, edited by Marinko Ucur, shown on TV magazine VIDIK at the end of May in 1993. [Transcript of video]. [Available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

[23] The same warning about "Serbian woman dressed in black" was also mentioned in the record of witness statement of Čungalović Vojislav (1996, March 4) Municipal court in Kikinda, Serbia. [Judge: Spasić Radivoje]. P.5. [Appendix X (1269) to chapter VI]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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[25] Rémy Ourdan's publications in *Le Monde* available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/signataires/remy-ourdan/.

[26] 2013 Population Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at: http://www.statistika.ba/#link7.

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[28] 1991 Population Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine [Bureau of Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina]. Bilten br. 234 [Bulletin No. 234], Sarajevo, 1991.

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[30] Order of the Commander of the First Corps Hajrulahović Mirza dated from 1 December 1993, No. 07/21-16/93.

[31] Announcement about establishing of the National Defence Council of the SDA signed by Hasan Čengić dated from 13 June 1991. No. 1360/91. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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34 Lower court in Trebinje. (1996, March 11). Record of witness statement of dr. Vuković Marko. P.3. [Appendix X (1286) to chapter VI]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

35 Document issued by the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic, dated from 1 August 1996. ICTY No. 01824617. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

36 Document entitled *List of Reserve Employees of the Department Engaged to Perform the Tasks and Duties of the Service* issued by MUP R BIH SDB Department dated from 7 April 1993. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

37 International Court of Justice. *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia*. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Committee 407/96 [Evidence]. P. 178. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

38 Ramiz Delalić remained a powerful figure throughout the Bosnian war. Unlike a number of Sarajevo's criminals (such as Jusuf 'Juka' Prazina), he remained loyal to Izetbegović. He was charged with the murder of Nikola Gardović at court although the accusations against him were not proven. He was murdered in what appeared to be a 'gangland hit' in Sarajevo in June 2007. For the events that led to his court case, see *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, 3 February 2005, pp. 20–23.

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92 Photos from excavation Lav mass grave Sarajevo. [Appendix VII to chapter VI, Document 3c, p. 1183]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

93 Dušan Pavlović official note on the circumstances surrounding the exhumation. [Appendix VII to chapter VI, Document 7, p. 1191]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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95 Letters for help - Milan Mandić. [Appendix VII to chapter VI, Document 9, p. 1212]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

96 Desecration of Serbian grave and memorial. [Appendix VIII to chapter VI]. [Document available in the electronic database of the International Commission].

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99 Jovan Divjak was a Commander of the Territorial Defence in Sarajevo when the Civil War in Bosnia and Hercegovina began. Because of his collaboration with the Territorial Defense, Divjak was sentenced by a military court to nine months imprisonment. He avoided this sentence by leaving the JNA. On 8 April 1992, Divjak became the Deputy Commander of the Territorial Defense Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and served as such until 1994, during the Civil War in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

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- Record of witness statement - Ratko Mirković (1326)
- Record of witness statement - Dr Vladimir Šimunović (1332)
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- Record of witness statement - [redacted] (1338)
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CHAPTER VII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, like all wars of this kind, did not by itself answer any questions as to which side was in the right and which was in the wrong. However, what is sadly certain is that all the parties to it were also its victims. This war had detrimental ramifications and long lasting effects which will forever leave their mark on what originally seemed to be the harmonious and integrated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Significantly, both these authoritarian regimes had been able to maintain the appearance of a unified federated country which encompassed such divergent components as Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, Muslims, Slovenes, Macedonians and the Albanians living in the territory of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija. These widely differing groups with their ethno-religious minorities were intertwined into each other. But when that system of rule stumbled and fell, the entire state structure faltered and collapsed. As long as the federation was held together, it was at the price not only of eclipsing ethnic, national and religious competition, but also of banning any open discussion of these matters by any party, lest the debate should escalate into argument and open up a rift that could break the nation apart, as indeed happened after Tito's death in 1980.

What was left from the generations of mutual repressed resentment between the component members of the Yugoslavian state was the perpetuation of the intolerance which pitted each of them against the others, as they regard the perennial struggle between them as one continuum. For example, the Serbs' outbursts of animosity (and outbursts of animosity took place on all sides during the civil war) against Croats and Bosniaks during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place as a conse-

quence of their painful remembrance of the genocide committed against them in the Independent State of Croatia under the Ustasha regime in the Second World War, in collaboration with the Nazis, and who had sworn to annihilate the Serbian people, either by forced conversion (into Catholicism), or by outright genocide, and who had established dozens of concentration camps including Jadovno and Jasenovac where they engaged in implementing their deadly design. In effect, the essence of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the deadly interplay between its three major ethno-religious actors: Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks.

For reasons that remain unclear Western Europe, acting in concert within NATO under the leadership, instigation and military cover of the Bill Clinton Administration in the US, determined to side with the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 1993 Bosniaks) in this struggle, and moved to provide them with weapons and to sanctify their "justified" struggle for independence. By adopting this policy they blindly ushered into South East Europe two Muslim political entities (Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo) in addition to existing Albania, thus unwittingly driving a Muslim wedge into the heart of the Christian Balkans and allowing it to reach the Adriatic and the Aegean Sea. The US was apparently hoping to link the former Soviet-Muslim states that were disengaging from the Russian grip (Turkemenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyztan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azarbaijan) as one "moderate" Muslim continuum to NATO member and American client, the Turkey of the pre-Erdogan era. But by the time radical Erdogan won his country's elections in 2002 and dislodged the civil governments that had been the anchor of the moderate Islam the West had hoped for, the US had already been deeply engaged and committed to an Islamic Balkans, which the radical Turkish President has been trying hard to Islamize under Neo-Ottoman aegis.

Be that as it may, to justify their choice of the Islamic side of the struggle in Bosnia, the Americans, seconded by other NATO members, tagged the Muslims as saints and "innocent victims" and the Serbs as the "evil aggressors" who deserved Western military bombing and condemnation, and of outright double crossing, in spite of leading the Serbs, during negotiations concerning the Yugoslav Wars, to believe that their territory and sovereignty, as well as their military assets and diplomatic rights would be strictly preserved, only for the Serbs to end up betrayed and bombed and their status demeaned. The net result has been the development of three divergent, and often contradictory narratives of the war, each lauding and inflating the allegedly positive role of its party, hiding the horrors its troops, leaders and followers had committed and imputing to the others all the imaginable, but often imagined and manufactured evils and calamities that were blamed on its enemies. In short, there is

enough blame to go around all parties: yes, there was a Srebrenica and other crimes to blame on the Serbs, but no less barbaric blood-letting to blame on Muslims and Croats in Sarajevo and elsewhere throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Independent Commission of Inquiry that was established by the Government of Republika Srpska to inquire into the events in Sarajevo during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was structured precisely to produce a more objective account where most of the crucial events of that complicated and hatred-motivated war are reported, no party is favored with credit it did not earn and no party is condemned for evil it did not commit. Every statement, contention, claim or argument is mentioned only after it has been checked and cross-checked for verification, while all rumors, gossip, propaganda and unfounded accusations are shelved, so that, to the extent humanly possible, only what is considered "objective" evidence and independent and cross-verified facts have become part of the reported narrative. It is clear that the contradicting narratives are not only geared to create imaginary histories in order to idealize a past but also to direct certain policies and to prescribe certain positions and actions. And when the stated narrative is anchored on a religious base or belief, this becomes all the more crucial in both making up the stories, and imparting them to young generations in order to perpetuate hoaxes into solid "patrimony" and rationalize myths *post-factum* as veritable history.

The Independent Commission was composed of a team of independent international experts and was formed to conduct research, first having taken care to eliminate any subjectivity by making objective and impartial assessments of historical events that took place during the Civil War in Bosnian and Herzegovina. It reached relevant all-encompassing conclusions which have crucial meaning and historical value not only for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with special emphasis on the Serbian families of the war victims that suffered unrepairable losses, within the context of the reconciliation policies supported by all parties, including the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo, and the International Community. Importantly, it also achieved historical justice, commemorating with proper respect all human victims who fell as a result of a human savagery in the heart of Europe, and it aims to prevent, by all means possible in a collective action of joint forces of all nations, any repetition of such tragedies that cause large-scale trans-generational psychological, physiological and emotional trauma and which have far-reaching consequences for separate nations and for humanity as a whole.

We can now analyze the long-term findings of this investigation into results and consequences, none of which was necessarily intentional. The direct results of this

war, which was fatal for the core participants and only marginal for the outsiders who intervened uninvited, were multiple:

a. The crystallization of separate nation-states from the constituents of Yugoslavia, as a result of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other ethno-religious wars in the Balkans, has shown that despite the EU and other regional political and economic pacts where single countries seek membership, comfort or security, when contradictions are too deep, enmities too divisive and the ideological and / or religious gaps which separate them are too wide, the likelihood of forging them together into one single identity or nationhood is very flimsy.

b. The accepted assumption during the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that the Serbs and the Croats were united under Tito's Serbo-Croatian leadership, with Tito being a Croat by origin but electing to have his seat in Belgrade, and presiding over a state where the Serbo-Croatian tongue was the *lingua franca* of the Kingdom and then of the federal state, created the false image of the harmonious co-existence of its various docile peoples. When, in the sixties, the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina advocated for their separate ethnic identity, on the basis of the principle of equality, they were accorded the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a place for their political activity, although altogether they constituted the minority there.

c. The mutual intolerance as well as hatred between all the former Yugoslavian nationalities, especially among the three main components of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbs, Croats and Muslims) which had been compressed for the duration of the Yugoslavian state, exploded immediately once the limitations and restrictions were removed during the armed conflict which was kindled simultaneously in all parts of former Yugoslavia.

d. The immediate *casus belli* for the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the 1992 referendum for independence which ignored the explicit will of the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina to stay in Yugoslavia, the country in which they had been living since 1918. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was essentially a civil and ethnic war among its three peoples – Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, in which the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were fighting to prevent what was considered a genocide like in 1941 and for

their human and civil rights as a constitutive people. In this sense, the war of Republika Srpska was a defensive war. On the other hand, the formation of the El Mudžahid Detachment as an official unit of the Seventh Muslim Brigade of the Third Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of foreign terrorist fighters from all around the world, as well as their modus operandi, methods of propaganda dissemination, and links to international terrorist organizations reveal the character and the nature of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the point of view of the Muslim political and religious elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegović, the SDA and the Bosnian ulama). In their eyes the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina was undoubtedly a *jihad* for liberating Muslim lands from the infidels and establishing an Islamic State based on Sharia law in the Western Balkans. ARBiH was created as a tool of SDA and Islamized, and as such it was solidly mono-ethnic and Muslim, and therefore had no moral right to claim the task to secure national and social equality of all three RBiH nations.

e. The newly internationally recognized state RBiH committed an act of aggression against the SFRY by attacking its army – the JNA - in the sense of Article 3 (d) of the Definition of Aggression under United Nations Resolution 3314. The "smoking gun" of this aggression is the "Directive to protect sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, strictly confidential №02/2-1," of 12 April 1992. The Directive referred to the SDS, the legal political party of the Serb people with 72 seats in the RBiH Parliament as the "enemy," and directed the ARBiH troops on the ground to attack the JNA and Serb Autonomous Regions with Serb population. Militarily and politically, the "Directive" was nothing less than a declaration of war against the SFRJ and its federal institution the JNA, as well as against the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the new Croatian state made huge efforts to transfer the war to Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to bring Muslims onto their side against the Serbs with the aim of obtaining a part of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for themselves as a result of the war.

f. Sarajevo was the main geographical and operational area of combat operations of both the ARBiH and VRS. The VRS had no intention of taking the entire capital of Sarajevo, since this did not agree with the RS strategy of

the territorial and constitutional rearrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the population census of 1991. The VRS chose the strategy of blockading Sarajevo in order to coerce the Muslim leadership to accept their terms of peace, by which the Republika Srpska was expected to receive territorial, political, and cultural autonomy. The RBiH government strategy was to deny any political and cultural autonomy to the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unitary state. Any attempt at reasonable autonomy and constitutional rearrangement was seen by the SDA as an "ethnic division." This strategy was selfish and retrograde in nature, and ran counter to the wishes of a very sizable portion of the population. The ARBiH was keen to preserve the whole of Sarajevo under its control for a variety of strategic political and military objectives, not least of which was to project Sarajevo as the symbol of unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the ensuing struggle, the VRS succeeded in keeping a considerable part of Sarajevo under control.

g. At the beginning of the war, the VRS clearly enjoyed superiority over ARBiH and HVO in armament, particularly in aviation, artillery and tanks, however in some territories VRS was unable to use them due to restrictions by the international community and in some due to the nature of combat. This superiority was lost by 1994. In early 1994, the CIA came to the conclusion that the ARBiH reached parity with the VRS in terms of armament and combat material. In terms of manpower, however, the ARBiH had been maintaining superiority over the VRS throughout the entire war.

h. The cruelty of the war inevitably resulted in numerous crimes committed on all sides of the confrontation line. However, the SDA's strategy was calculated to drive the Serb community out of Sarajevo. The SDA aided and abetted crimes committed against the Serb population of Sarajevo by numerous criminal gangs and ARBiH regular units. These included arbitrary arrests, incarceration in concentration camps, torture, rape, and murder. Coupled with the systematic anti-Serb propaganda and ethnic pressure, these crimes constituted a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign, which culminated in the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo after the Dayton Peace Accords. This campaign took a terrible toll on the Serb community in Sarajevo. As a result of the targeted campaign of terror and intimidation, the vibrant pre-war Serb community in Sarajevo totally ceased to exist.

i. In the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs of Republika Srpska of all political convictions were fighting against the threat of extermination and for self-determination and civil rights. They defended their rights to live in the constitutional and internationally recognized Yugoslavia in which they had been living for the past 70 years. The initial objective of the creation of Republika Srpska was the prevention of any possibility of experiencing a repetition of the events that took place during the Second World War that is the genocide committed against the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, and the secondary objective was the preservation of Yugoslavia. When Muslims and Croats rejected Yugoslavia, the objective of Republika Srpska changed from the preservation of Yugoslavia to the political and cultural autonomy and equal rights for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were fighting for the establishment of an independent Islamized state that should have been based on Sharia law, in which there would be no place for genuine political and cultural autonomy for Serbs. However, the failure to establish an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina was facilitated mainly by the United States, as such an outcome did not conform to American regional and global geopolitical interests. Instead, the United States insisted on establishing an EU-oriented, quasi-multi-ethnic federation that has mutated with time and proven to be completely dysfunctional in all ways. Facing such an outcome, radicals slightly modified their tactics and began gradually to develop and expand regional terrorist infrastructure.

j. The political activity and the struggle to establish an Islamized state as a result of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by the Muslim political and religious leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, the Iranian revolution and the creation of the Islamic Pakistani state. Alija Izetbegović, member of the organization *Young Muslims* acting for a certain period of time as a youth section of the Muslims association *El-Hidaje,* elaborated this vision in his Pan-Islamic political program called the *Islamic Declaration*, which subsequently became the political program of his political party SDA, the core of which was consisted of the former *Young Muslims* members. His son, Bakir Izetbegović, the SDA, and the Bosnian Islamic Religious Community headed by Mustafa Cerić continued to implement his vision.

k. In this war Bosnian Muslims were supported by Islamic states (primarily Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar), "humanitarian intervention" by the United States and NATO, and actions from other out-of-region states (United Kingdom and some EU countries) and non-state actors, specific entities within international organizations, such as the UN, NATO and OSCE, private military companies (especially Military Professional Resources Incorporated), global Islamic NGOs, trans-national banks and companies, intelligence services, international terrorist organizations, radical Islamic groups and so on.

l. According to all criteria described in internationally established and applied definitions for the term *siege*, Sarajevo experienced a *blockade* rather than a *siege*. VRS Main Staff documents and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps used the professional term *blockade*, while for PR purposes ARBiH and media used the historical term *siege*, which was professionally and historically misplaced. The main difference between *siege* and *blockade* is the choice of weapons by the attacking side. Historically, starvation has been the main weapon of a siege. However, because of the international relief effort and massive deliveries of humanitarian aid allowed by the VRS into Sarajevo, Sarajevo experienced no hunger, the primary weapon of any siege. UNPROFOR control of the airport (29 June 1992) made it possible to establish a humanitarian air bridge, which, though frequently interrupted, operated throughout the entire war. In this sense, the siege of Sarajevo cannot stand any comparison with the siege of Leningrad between 1941 and 1944, and the siege of Sebastopol between 1941 and 1942. The siege of Leningrad by German, Finnish, and Spanish forces in WWII resulted in the deaths of up to about 1,500,000 soldiers and civilians due to starvation and bombardment.

m. From 1992 to 1995, the Serbs in Sarajevo were subjected to a double blockade (both internal and external) and a campaign of terror planned at the highest level of the state by the SDA and carried out by a joint criminal enterprise that included all Bosniak state institutions. One of the specific aspects of this terror campaign was the creation of a vast network of private prisons, led by military units under the orders of the SDA, where the worst atrocities (torture and gang rapes) were committed. This campaign of terror was preceded and accompanied by a campaign of discrimination and demonization targeting Serbian citizens of Sarajevo, who were relegated to

the rank of excluded citizens.

n. Radical Islamic regimes, notably the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, Iranian Shi'ites, and terrorist movements as Al-Qa'ida, have used the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina to send in *mujahidin* and to train Bosniak scholars to lead radical groups in Sarajevo and across Bosnia, based on older Muslim radical thought and organizations like *Young Muslims* (Muslim organization established in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1930s and from its outset copying the ideology, organizational structure and *modus operandi* of the Muslim Brot*herhood* in Egypt, operating as such and having close link with the Brotherhood*)* and *El-Hidaje* which had been active there since the 1930s.

o. The developments during the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina paved the way for the development and expansion of the contemporary regional terrorist infrastructure in the heart of Europe which *de facto* represents the cornerstone of the so called Balkan Caliphate, whose operational base consists of the "*paradžemati*" network, the *Wahhabi* settlements, the military terrorist camps, the constantly increasing network new mosques and Islamic schools, the regional network of international Islamic NGOs and international Islamic financial institutions, and Muslim political parties. The post-modern nature of Islamic fundamentalism (Pan-Islam), which forms the basis upon which the Balkan Caliphate is being built, is a direct threat to regional security and territorial integrity, especially that of such countries as Serbia, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Republika Srpska, but also to global security as well since it implies the strengthening of transnational Islamic structures and the elimination of national borders with a view to the integration of Islamic communities from all western countries into a single political Pan-Islamic space.

p. It can definitely be determined that the image projected in the West of the Muslims as victims of the "evil Serbs" was promoted by the use of American public relations companies to boost their upgraded reputation. Such companies were also used by the Croats. Conversely, the Serbs were advertised as the infamous villains who deserved to be fought and destroyed. Accordingly, the former's atrocities were ignored or covered up, sometimes in collusion with the press, while the latter's activities were artificially ornated with manufactured "crimes" that were never perpetrated. The In-

ternational Court of Justice adjudicated the fact that there was no evidence of genocide against Bosnian Muslims committed on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniak nationalist myth of the intended Serbian genocide of Bosnian Muslims has definitively been dispelled. During the Civil War in Bosnia and Hercegovina the goal was clear: the best way to support Bosniaks was not to provide them with humanitarian aid but to provide them with weapons in their "just war". The communication campaigns designed by the American agency Rudder & Finn, and some others, initially for the benefit of the Croatian and Bosniak causes, and then only the Bosniaks', represented the blockade of Sarajevo as a *siege* with polarizing information into the two categories of the victims (the Bosniaks) and the executioners (the Serbs). On the ground the *de facto* victims of this terrible war were the unfortunate people on all sides.

q. Our analyses show that months before the outbreak of violent conflict key Western media participated in the manufacturing of a Manichean archetype of the fight between "Good" and "Evil", in which the role of "Evil" was exclusively given to one side, the Serbian side. In such a constructed discourse the accompanying narrative was simple, and the processes of choosing one – right – side, policy formulation, and decision-making were intellectually and morally facilitated. This viewpoint on the wars and conflicts taking place during the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia spread to the majority of Western countries and continued during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbs were predominantly portrayed in a negative context as attackers and aggressors, while Muslims/Bosniaks were portrayed exclusively as victims or as the side that was attacked. The media and NGOs played a major role in the campaign of demonization of Serbs by spreading false information and focusing their attention and compassion exclusively on the very real suffering of Muslim citizens while completely ignoring the suffering of Serbian citizens. There was a certain lack of interest among journalists for the research that would have given us a deeper perspective about some crucial events. Despite the huge number of texts about Sarajevo, the key part of investigative journalism has almost always been absent.

r. If the referendum of 29 February 1992 was the *casus belli*, the Dayton Peace Accords, formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, were the

cause of the great exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo, from January to March 1996. After the Dayton Peace Accords, the Serbs in the Sarajevo municipalities (Grbavica, Ilijaš, Vogošća, Hadžići, Ilidža, Rajlovac, among others), which, in accordance with the mentioned agreement, belonged to the Muslim-Croat Federation, due to the implementing of the policy at the time aiming at destroying the Serb community in total in the part of Sarajevo under Muslim control, decided to leave the city, their houses, apartments and possessions, having no other choice. Also, they decided to take the bodies of their loved ones from local graves with them as they feared that their graves would be desecrated. The mass exodus of the citizens of Serbian nationality of the city of Sarajevo taking with them the exhumed remains of their loved ones was an unprecedented event in the history of civil wars. *De facto* the outlawing of Serb citizens in the part of the city of Sarajevo under Muslim control, which was reflected in the destruction of the Serb elite, forcible relocation of Serbs to camps and other places of detention, mass and systematic torture, rape and murder, seizure of their property, dismissal from work and other forms of torture (concrete examples can be found in the Report) resulted in the destruction of the Serb community in its entirety in this city, which directly led to this exodus.

s. Almost all perpetrators of crimes against Serbian citizens have escaped justice with the active assistance of Bosniak state institutions. Perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Serbs have benefited from exceptional leniency from judges and often complete impunity at both the international court (ICTY) and at courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Crimes against Serbs have never been qualified for what they were: war crimes and crimes against humanity. The obstacles to the restitution of illegally seized property (houses, farms, apartments, vehicles, valuables and so on) and the lack of compensation for the serious damage suffered (such as physical violence, layoffs, exposure to depleted uranium) are all part of this denial of justice. War crimes trials have resulted in acquittals due to the retraction, disappearance or murder of prosecution witnesses. Many of the witnesses called by the prosecution did not dare to continue their testimony, fearing for their lives and noting the inability of the court to protect them. Many suspects were not charged, while some were acquitted on appeal or had their sentences considerably reduced. The Serbs, however, were always

punished with the utmost severity, and one only has to compare the number of charges and the severity of the sentences against the different parties to the conflict to be convinced of the bias of this court.

t. This denial of justice is a factor that aggravates the psychological after-effects on the victims and maintains tensions between communities. In the end, the Serbian population of a city that claims to be tolerant and multi-ethnic has been virtually eliminated by those who still claim to be the main victims of this conflict.

u. Some 800 Serbs have been reported missing from the part of the city of Sarajevo controlled by the SDA. Institutions led by Bosniak SDA officials have made immense efforts to cover up the crimes committed against Serbian citizens. Until this date 260 Serbs have still not been found. The number of missing Serbs is probably higher because of entire families having been killed without a survivor being able to report it, these missing persons are neither identified nor counted.

v. Victims of physical and psychological abuse, such as those associated with the Civil War in Bosnian and Herzegovina, have been viewed through the prism of this "white supremacist" perspective, with the more acceptable Whites, those associated with Western Europe, such as Slovenians, Croats, Bosniaks, being considered as more vulnerable to suffering than those supposed to be lesser Whites, such as Serbs, Jews, Roma, etc. According to this point of view, rape, torture, witnessing the murder or torture of one's family has far more of an impact on Western or white victims of the Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina than on the lesser Whites, such as Serbs, Jews, and Roma.

w. While any reassessment of the Civil War in Bosnian and Herzegovina is loudly dismissed as falsely based on the views of self-serving revisionists who want to maintain the adversarial victim versus offender model with its intransient polar opposites, the fact remains that accurate assessments were made during the conflict itself only to be ignored or dismissed by the more powerful proxy nations that wanted to promote their own narrative of a singular aggressor forcing its will on a non-violent, innocent victim.

x. Today, for those not having been directly involved in the conflict, the common narrative is that the "evil Serbs" then descended upon the peaceful

Bosniaks, and engaged in a campaign of killing and rape in their quest for a Greater Serbia. It was now the paternalistic duty of America, NATO, and the European Union to act as protectors for the hapless Bosniaks. This narrative of a conflict between aggressive Serbs and innocent Bosniaks is still adhered to today, as evidenced by the concerted media effort to constantly remind the world of the evils the Serbs perpetrated upon the peaceful Bosniaks, a narrative with little mention of the role the more so-called "civilized" northern Yugoslavians — the Slovenians and Croats, and their proxies — played in the conflict.

y. People on all sides of the Balkan conflict, veterans and civilians alike, were subjected to war-related trauma, either directly or indirectly.

z. Twenty-five years following the Dayton Accord ending the Bosnian conflict and the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there remains a prominent narrative characterizing the Serbs as the wayward, truculent aggressors attacking the mostly innocent Bosniaks and to lesser degree Croats. This anti-Serb narrative has emerged as the acceptable, unchallenged version of the Civil War in Bosnian and Herzegovina, especially in major media outlets (TV, movies, books, academic papers, etc.). This version has also prejudiced "official" agencies, such as courts and supposedly, neutral NGOs and international organizations like the OSCE.

The long-term consequences for the concerned peoples and countries, for the powers who cared to meddle in those affairs as well as for the world public opinion at large, are as far-reaching and even more likely to extend into the indefinite future:

a. It is very unlikely that the former Yugoslavian states will at any point decide to coalesce again into one unified or confederal/federal state.

b. The Serbo-Croatian language, which used to constitute one single communicational and cultural space in major part of Yugoslavia, has split into several "national" languages (Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Bosnian/Bosniak) each claiming its originality and even extraneity from all the rest. Linguistic alienation produces in the long run ethnic, cultural, political and identity estrangement.

c. The heavy residue of enmity and conflictual narratives about the past that remained between the various ethno-religious groups of former Yugoslavia

will in the long run prevent not only cooperative and amicable relations between the now independent states, but will also necessarily deepen the suspicion between them, like the incomprehensible and absurd controls erected on their boundaries, in places which were previously open and welcoming.

d. As substantial cadres of radical Muslims have been groomed in Bosnia, based on a long succession of Jihad fighters and ideologues, the country has been growing and promoting itself as a hub of Islamic Salafi thought and activity aided by its Iranian and Turkish foreign supporters to achieve by open *daw'a* and diplomacy, and by covert subversive activity, including youth movements and secret military training. A whole terrorist Islamic infrastructure was developed in the region. Today, in the global Islamic terrorist organizations' networks, the Western Balkan region as a part of South East Europe is being used for recruiting new fighters, planning and preparing terrorist acts abroad, providing asylum to both local fighters returning from "hot spots" and foreign terrorist fighters non-residents of Balkan countries, and providing logistical, medical, social, ideological and political support for the activities of international terrorist groups. These activities are accompanied by the spread of radical Islam in the region, and from there throughout Europe. This regional Islamic terrorist network, with a center in Sarajevo having close links to the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo (more precisely, to the SDA and its satellite Muslim parties) and, as such, represents a direct security threat not only for the Balkans countries as part of southeast Europe and Europe as a whole, but to many countries and regions, such as Russia, the United States, Israel, the Middle East, Central Asia, and more.

e. The anti-Serbian bias which has been established in the West, though harshly contended by Russia, will be very difficult to eliminate, in view of the abundance of fake texts and manufactured atrocities that were imputed to Serbs and concocted with the initiative of the American Administration and actively supported by the European press, rationalized *post-factum* by the active participation of NATO forces in the bombings of Serbia. Building on the actual Serbian atrocities like Srebrenica, it was expedient to take them as proof of the inherently bad character of the Serbs. Conversely, many acts of horror against the Serbs, which are described and documented throughout the chapters of this Report, have been intentionally ignored or whitewashed in the Western media, thus unfairly laying the burden of blame on the Serbs.

To have redressed the balance of truth will have been the chief achievement of this Commission of Inquiry. Only an objective examination of the conflict employing a non-selective process of restorative justice will serve to reduce the degree of human suffering to a minimum and eventually lead to reconciliation.

The General Conclusions are an integral and inherent part of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Suffering of Serbs between 1991 to 1995.

Signatures:

Viktor Bezruchenko

Darko Tanasković

Laurence Armand French

Giuseppe Zaccaria

Patrick Barriot

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APPENDICES

Chapter III
APPENDIX I

Visual supporting evidence: photos of the 7th Muslim Brigade marching through Zenica during Bosnian Civil War, 1995. Alija Izetbegović was the main guest at the parade; photos of the El Mudžahid Dettachment; photos of Abu Abdel Aziz "Barbaros" in Bosnia and Herzegovina; photos of Alija Izetbegović and Bakir Izetbegović with TWRA and Fatih Al Hassanein; photo of Fatih Al Hassanein with Ahmet Davutoğlu, inter allia former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2014) and chief advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003 to 2009); photo of Fatih Al Hassanein with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; photo of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Fatih Al Hassanein and Alija Izetbegović; photos of widely known international jihadists having links to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The 7th Muslim Brigade marching through Zenica during Bosnian Civil War, 1995. Alija Izetbegović was the main guest at the parade.

Link to the video of the parade: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvS6f7tPxLs.

El Mudžahid Dettachment directly subordinate to the Third Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In central Bosnia during the visit of Alija Izetbegović

Flag of the El Mudžahid Dettachment

Alija Izetbegović visited the mujahedin at their base after the occupation of Serb territories in Ozren in September 1995. Next to him is the commander of the 3rd Corps of the ABiH, Sakib Mahmuljin. The photo also shows Abu Mali and Sheikh Anwar al Shaban, director of the Islamic Institute in Milan, and the chief emir of the El Mujahid Squad.

Serbs captured in a mujahedin camp (Kamenica camp near Zavidovići) in central BiH in September 1995. About 150 Serbs are still listed as missing in connection with these mujahedin and ABiH actions in the area.

**Serb heads as a trophy for Bosnian Muslims mujahedin.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, summer 1992.**

The name of the mujahideen holding the head is Christophe Caze, a French citizen, one of the members of the terrorist Rubeška group in France.

The names of these three Serbs are Blagoje Blagojević, Nenad Petković and Branislav Đurić

Abu Abdel Aziz "Barbaros" in Bosnia and Herzegovina

[The photos were taken on September 1, 1992. in Mehurići. Photographed by French photographer: Pascal J Le Segretain].



Mujahedin Trainings Camp, Mehurići, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Supposed Future Islamic State?

The projected phase of the Islamic State-Caliphate in Europe. Southeast Europe and the Iberian Peninsula - Spain and Portugal.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ I EBU ALI

Alija Izetbegović with an Arab terrorist, the first Islamist on European soil

Alija Izetbegović's and SDA links with TWRA and Fatih Al Hassanein

Alija Izetbegović and Fatih Al Hassanein

Alija Izetbegović, Bakir Izetbegović, and Fatih Al Hassanein

Fatih Al Hassanein and Ahmet Davutoğlu

Fatih Al Hassanein and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Fatih Al Hassanein and Alija Izetbegović

President Clinton meeting with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović in Tuzla

Bakir Izetbegović links with Muslim Brotherhood

November 2017. Bakir Izetbegović had shown the four – finger symbol in support of the opposition, who fights against General Sisi who deposed Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a protest note to the BiH Embassy in Cairo due to diplomatic scandal provoked by a Bosnian Muslim member of the BiH Presidency Bakir Izetbegović, who exposed a Muslim brotherhood symbol (Rabia), in public. Egyptian media reported that it was at a meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood delegation, which was held at the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After the meeting, no press release was issued, though it is a practice of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina after all official meetings.

* *Rabia/ Rabiah* is a Muslim brotherhood symbol – notice the places MB considers as part of their network.

International Islamist terrorism and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Photo of Chechen terrorists and their leader Shishani (Omar Al-Shishani) in ISIL with a person named Al Harbi al Safri, who was in BiH under the name Al Harbi Teufik and who killed Rada Rogić in Gudavac near Bosanska Krupa at the time, for what we have a recording, and there is an indictment.

October 2013, in ISIL

The Bosnian *jihad* produced a huge number of highly trained Bosnian *jihadi* veterans with military experience and combat skills and having strong connections to international terrorist organizations who became widely-known recruiters, suicide bombers, masterminds of major terrorist attacks, promotors and financiers of radical Islam and terrorism. They dispersed and continued their *jihad* throughout the world. As a result, a large international terrorist infrastructure and network of *jihadist* operatives was formed, operating in different parts of the world but having strong links with Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, ISIS and other terrorist organizations.

Chapter VI

APPENDIX I

The posters campaign aiming to demonize the Serbs





Chapter VI
APPENDIX II

An official letter dated 19 January 1993, from General Morillon to Alija Izetbegović, denounced the use of mortars on the grounds of Koševo hospital and the abuses by Muslim forces.

→ HQ Sector Sarajevo
Please copy to SMO Pale
HEADQUARTERS PWT
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 20/1
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCE

00479801

19 January 1993

President A Izetbegovic
Presidency of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mr President

SUBJECT: BREAKING OF GENEVA CONVENTION

You will I am sure be aware that the firing of weapons from a hospital is against the Geneva Convention. I regret to have to inform you that for some time now I have been receiving reports that some mobile mortars have been operating from the vicinity of KOSEVO Hospital. This has sadly been confirmed and I now have concrete evidence from witnesses with signed statements that this was in fact the case at 1430 hours on Monday 11 January.

An 82 mm mortar had been set up on the western side of KOSEVO Hospital, within the hospital grounds. This mortar and its crew then proceeded to fire nine rounds, using the hospital as a screen. The direct consequence of this disreputable and cowardly act was that shortly afterwards the hospital came under fire from anti-aircraft gun fire, artillery fire and mortar fire.

I must point out to you the harm that such blatant disregard of the Geneva Convention does to your cause and insist that you take the strongest measures to prevent reoccurrences taking place. I am also becoming increasingly concerned at the recent increase in indications of a lack of discipline amongst your forces. I must urge you to take immediate preventive action.

I regret also to have to inform you I have been asked to pass the details of this particular incident to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

With warm regards.

P MORILLON
Major General
Commander
Bosnia Herzegovina
Command

Chapter VI
APPENDIX III

The map of the central part of the city of Sarajevo.



Chapter VI
APPENDIX IV

The law no. 1197/92 of 15 June 1992 on abandoned apartments, signed into law by Alija Izetbegović, legalized the expropriation and seizure of Serbs' apartments.

Monday, 15th June 1992, Sarajevo

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Under the Amendment LI, Point 5, Paragraph 3 to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina's proposal, issues

LEGISLATIVE DECREE

ON ABANDONED APARTMENTS

Article 1

Under the Law on the Housing Relations – consolidated text ("The official Gazette of the SRBiH[1], 14/84 and 12/87), the occupancy right of the right holder is temporarily cancelled for the apartments previously used by him/her and members of his/her household in case they abandoned the apartment after the 30th April 1990.

Article 2

Every apartment that had been abandoned or temporarily not used by the occupancy right holder and members of his/her household living in the household shall be declared an abandoned apartment.

By virtue of this legislation, an apartment in which weapons and ammunition without appropriate certificate in accordance with the law had been found, as well as an apartment which had been used for illegal actions shall also be declared an abandoned apartment.

Article 3

An apartment shall not be declared abandoned in cases in which occupancy right holders and members of their households abandoned the apartment under pressure by the aggressor with the aim of ethnical cleansing in a certain area, or in the process of pursuing the aggressor's goals.

An apartment which had been demolished, burned down, or directly endangered by

[1] Translator's note: abbreviation for the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

military actions (threats of liquidation, physical abuse, expelling by the aggressor and other similar reasons) shall not be considered abandoned.

An apartment which is about to be used again by the occupancy right holder and family members of his/her household who live and permanently reside there within seven days after this Decree enters into force occupancy right holders in BiH or within 15 days for occupancy right holders outside the territory of the RBiH.

Article 4

The initiative for launching a proceeding to determine whether the apartment is abandoned can be issued by state authorities, a political organization, a social organization, a citizen association and a housing association.

At the official authority for defence's recommendation, the municipal administrative authority responsible for housing affairs shall determine which former JNA's[2] apartments are declared abandoned, in terms of provisions of Article 2 of this Decree.

Article 5

Municipal administrative authority responsible for housing affairs, ex officio or within seven days upon the receipt of proposal or of the initiative from Article 4 of this Decree, shall issue a decision on whether the apartment is abandoned.

If the competent authority from Paragraph 1 of this Article does not issue a decision within the time frame, the decision shall be issued by the Minister of Spatial Planning, Civil Engineering and Environment (hereinafter: the Minister).

The decision from Paragraph 1 of this Article may be appealed to the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Civil Engineering and Environment.

The appeal does not have suspensory effect.

The decision from Paragraph 2 of this Article may not be appealed, but a legal dispute may be initiated.

Article 6

The apartments which are found abandoned by the relevant authority from Article 5, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Decree, shall be listed, sealed and records on them shall be kept.

Minister of Defence and Minister of Spatial Planning, Civil Engineering and Environment shall formulate regulation on listing, sealing and keeping records on abandoned apartments within eight days from the date these Decree enters into force.

Article 7

An apartment which has been declared abandoned as referred to in Article 5 of this Decree may be assigned for temporary use to an active participant in a struggle against the

[2] t/n: abbreviation for the Yugoslav People's Army

aggressor on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to a person left homeless because of the immediate war danger.

The Government of the RBiH is authorized to establish criteria for allocating abandoned apartments for temporary use as suggested by the Ministry of Defence for allocating abandoned apartments from the fund taken over from the former JNA, and as suggested by the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Civil Engineering and Environment for other apartments that had been taken over.

Criteria referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article established that the abandoned apartment of the former JNA from Article 12 of this Decree shall be allocated for temporary use to members of Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the members of families of the soldiers killed in a struggle against the aggressor on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Article 8

The temporary use of the apartment can last no longer than one year after the end of immediate war danger.

The competent authority responsible for the control of the use of apartments, after the listing of objects and furniture in the apartment, shall issue a decision which orders all listed objects and furniture to be placed in one of the smallest rooms in the apartment to be stored there, while the room shall be locked and properly sealed.

A temporary user of the apartment is required to vacate the apartment after the time limit for temporary use and make it available to the authority that allocated the apartment to him/her. The apartment shall be free of people and things and undamaged.

In case the temporary user does not vacate the apartment pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 3 of this Article, he/she shall be evicted in accordance with the law, without providing him/her with emergency accommodation. Eviction from Paragraph 4 of this Article is performed by the authority who issued a decision on allocating accommodation from Article 9 of this Decree.

The appeal against eviction decision does not have suspensory effect.

Article 9

The authority allocating the abandoned apartment for temporary use is a municipality administrative authority responsible for housing affairs. In municipalities which do not have such authorities functioning, the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Civil Engineering and Environment is entitled to allocate the apartments. For former JNA's apartments, the entitled authority is the Ministry of Defence.

Article 10

When the end of the immediate war danger is proclaimed and the occupancy right holder from Article 1 of this Decree does not start using the apartment again within the time limit set out in Article 3 of this Decree, the apartment is considered to be permanently abandoned.

After the expiration of time limit set out in Paragraph 1 of this Article, the occupancy right of the holder shall be cancelled and it shall be verified by the decision issued by a municipality administrative authority responsible for housing affairs.

Article 11

Provisions of the Law on Housing Relations shall apply to rights and obligations of the temporary use of an apartment based on this Decree.

Article 12

Provisions of this Decree apply to the former JNA's apartments and to the apartments of other federal authorities in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The provisions of this Decree shall apply to apartments owned by citizens, as well.

Article 13

Provisions of the Law on Housing Relations regarding the apartment exchange shall not apply during the immediate war danger in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unless otherwise specified by a special legislative decree.

Article 14

This Decree enters into force on the date of publishing in the "Official Gazette of the RBiH".

Number 1197/92 15th June 1992 Sarajevo

Presidency Chairman of RBiH, **Alija Izetbegović** (sgd.)

Chapter VI
APPENDIX V

Attorney General Ivica Stanić letters to Alija Izetbegovic and other officials.

HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
S A R A J E V O
[handwritten: A] No. [handwritten: 104/92]
Date: 30 July 1992

[stamp: **P R E S I D E N C Y**
[illegible] **REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**
S A R A J E V O

Received: [handwritten: 30 July 1992]			
Organisational unit	Number	[illegible]	Values
[handwritten: 02]	011-571		—]

TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

S A R A J E V O

In accordance with three Legislative Decrees (one on the non-application of the provisions of federal laws and regulations for the enforce of those laws on the territory of BiH[1], one on the amendments to the Law on Regular Courts, and one on the transposition of the SFRY Criminal Code) military courts were abolished, while at the same time regular courts obtained jurisdiction to try perpetrators of crimes that had been under the jurisdiction of military courts. Therefore, pursuant to these Legislative Decrees, the regular courts now have the jurisdiction to try civilians serving in the Armed Forces of BiH and prisoners of war, with respect to all actions under Articles 13 and 14 of the former Law on Military Courts.

[1] Translator's note: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Likewise, ordering the detention of military personnel or civilians serving in the Armed Forces for committing crimes which were under the jurisdiction of the former military courts is now under the jurisdiction of regular courts, as well as law enforcement authorities, provided that the duration of the detention is limited to up to three days. In view of the content and importance of the aforementioned Legislative Decrees, the decision to order detention of civilians for criminal offences under the jurisdiction of a military court can no longer be issued by any military officer or any authorised official of the Military Police, but instead the regular court is the only body that has the jurisdiction to issue such decisions.

The same is the case with military prisons that no longer exist as institutions according to the law.

In letters of 17 June 1992 and 22 July 1992, addressed to Minister Jerko Doko and Commandant Sefer Halilović, personally, I pointed to the occurrence of criminal conduct of persons with Military Police insignia, with special reference to unlawful conduct in connection with the apprehension and detention of citizens, mainly Serbs, emphasising that such conduct contained elements of a crime, that members of the Military Police performed such acts because they were not acquainted with the legal regulations (in my personal belief), and that it was necessary for these persons to be acquainted with them, while at the same time it should be requested that the jurisdiction of the Military Police be regulated.

Considering that citizens, mainly Serbs, are still being arrested and detained in so-called military prisons, that recently there has been an increase in the number of families searching for their members that had been taken from their houses/flats by persons wearing Military Police insignia, and

[Beginning of the 2nd page of original text.]

2.

of whom nothing has been heard since, that there have been cases of finding dead bodies in the territory controlled by the Armed Forces of BiH, identity of whom, due to the mutilation of the bodies, cannot, as a rule, be established, and that the dissatisfaction and anxiety in citizens, mainly Serbs, is increasingly evident, which is why, due to all these occurrences, I find it necessary to acquaint you, as the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina during wartime, with this situation.

We understand that you have other responsibilities in the current war situation, but rest assured that solving this problem is also a priority, since on it depends the serenity not only of the part of the Serb population who do not participate in the war on the side of the aggressor but also of the rest of the population of all nationalities, which will also affect the people's confidence in your wishes expressed through the adopted Platform.

For this reason and considering the fact that there are no legal provisions that determine the existence, jurisdiction, and work of the Military Police, as well as the existence of the so-called military prisons, that the current actions of persons in these military formations are unlawful, and that the competent officers in the Armed Forces of BiH have been informed thereof in a timely manner, as the current Public Prosecutor, and in order to protect the interests of the community, I will be forced to institute criminal proceedings against all persons who participate in such unlawful actions or hide the perpetrators of such unlawful actions, unless the status and the jurisdiction of the Military Police are urgently regulated.

Respectfully,

HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Ivica Stanić
[signature: illegible]
[stamp: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Sarajevo]

Addendums:
- Letter to Minister Jerko Doko.
- Letter to Sefer Halilović

HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
S A R A J E V O
No.A. 83/92
Date: 17 June 1992

TO THE MINISTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE OF BiH
- to the Commandant of the BiH TO[1], personally -

S A R A J E V O

Through an information document from the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of BiH (June 1992) we were informed about the occurrence of a rapid increase in all forms of crime, with an indication that among the perpetrators of crimes there have also been persons with insignia of the Territorial Defence and the Military Police.

Usually, these are crimes against property (aggravated theft, robbery, etc.), which are often accompanied by violent behaviour and physical abuse of the victim.

We hereby indicate to 8 such cases that were mentioned in the information document:

- A group of TO members with Military Police insignia, on 9 May 1992, threw two grenades inside the Magnum Restaurant – 18 Kranjičevićeva Street – after which they looted a certain amount of foodstuffs, technical goods, art paintings, and alcohol.

- From the apartment of Desanka Žerajić – 7 Braće Vujčića Street – TO members with Military Police insignia, on 12 May 1992, looted 520 Swiss Francs, DM[2] 1080, 114 dollars, and 30,000 dinars.

- A group of TO members with Military Police insignia, on 9 May 1992, broke into and moved into the flat of Safija Gackić – 23 6. Novembra Street.

- In 3 Kidričeva Street, members of the Military Police, on 13 May 1992, with

[1] t/n: Territorial Defence
[2] t/n: Deutsche Marks – German Marks, a currency

committing violent acts of assault, confiscated a gun from Dr Omer Bezdrob, without issuing a certificate of confiscation of weapons.

- A group of Military Police members securing the President of the Stari Grad Municipal Assembly, on 8 May 1992, robbed the warehouse of the Bosnaplod company. The selling of the stolen goods at the market was later organised and realised.

- TO Military Police stole DM 200 and 100 Swiss Francs from Professor Predrag Vuksanović on 14 May 1992.

- A group of TO members, on 18 May 1992 broke into the Pulmonary Clinic Unit – 4 Dositejeva Street – and looted medical supplies.

[Beginning of the 2nd page of original text.]

2.

Most shops and warehouses in the city of Sarajevo were robbed, and many citizens stated that they had personally seen such objects being broken into by uniformed persons with insignia of the TO and the TO Military Police.

Since these are serious crimes and since their perpetrators (in my personal belief, there is a small number of those persons) with their conduct do enormous damage to the hard-earned reputation of members of these honourable military formations of our republic, practically doing the same things that the aggressors are doing in the area of Sarajevo and other occupied parts of the Republic, it is necessary for your authorised commanders or officers of the Territorial Defence and Military Police formations to provide us with information on these persons, as well as any evidence, material or subjective, about their involvement in those actions, in order for criminal proceedings against these persons to be instituted. This also applies to all other crimes not covered in this letter, in which members of the TO or Military Police participated as perpetrators. We are convinced, given the above, that it is in your Ministry's interest not to include such persons in the aforementioned formations but to have them prosecuted, which will best preserve the reputation of the members of the TO and Military Police.

<u>Please note that the act of failing to report a crime or perpetrator of a crime entails criminal liability within the meaning of Article 188 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of BiH.</u>

There is an acute problem of the apprehension and detention of citizens by the members

of the TO Military Police, who are not authorised by law to execute such actions, regardless of the reasons for detaining the citizens in custody.

According to the existing Law on Criminal Procedure, which was transposed, as well as the amendments made to that Law, adopted Legislative Decrees, the right to determine and detain citizens in custody as suspected perpetrators of crimes is no longer held by the law enforcement bodies either, but, instead, this right is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts, in accordance with strictly prescribed legal procedure.

Since such actions of the members of the TO Military Police contain elements of the crime of unlawful deprivation of liberty as specified in Aricle 52 of the Criminal Code of the RBiH[3] and since their actions, according to my personal belief, are exclusively the result of ignorance of the law and the result of their belief that with those actions they were contributing to the rapid defeat of the aggressor, and not the result of the misuse of their position, it is necessary to indicate such unlawful conduct to the command staff of the TO Military Police and its members, noting that they are to apprehend the suspected persons, upon discovering them, and bring them to the Security Services Centre.

As the jurisdiction of the Military Police is currently in dispute, I believe that the above information will be useful for the prompt and comprehensive legal resolution, in which your Ministry will participate, especially when it comes to the jurisdiction to search flats and persons in accordance with the existing Law on Criminal Procedure of the RBiH.

Respectfully,
HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Ivica Stanić
[signature: illegible]
[stamp: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Sarajevo]

[3] t/n: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
S A R A J E V O

No.A. 83/92
Date: 17 June 1992

TO THE MINISTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE OF BiH
- to Minister Doko Jerko, personally -

S A R A J E V O

In the letter No.A.83/92 of 17 June 1992, we informed you of the occurrence of a rapid increase in crime, with an indication that among the perpetrators of crimes there have often been persons with insignia of the Territorial Defence and the Military Police.

To support that claim, we have provided you with 8 such cases and a request (paragraph 3 of Article 153 of the transposed Law on Criminal Procedure) to deliver us the information on those persons, as well as all material evidence you possess in connection with these cases.

However, to date, we have not received any information from you, despite the fact that such persons in your ranks do enormous damage to the reputation of the Army of BiH and its Military Police, and despite the fact that this crime has become more drastic since in some cases it ends in murders.

In addition, the apprehensions of persons, mainly Serbs, by the persons with Military Police insignia, and their detention in custody still persist, even though only the MUP[1] and the regular court have jurisdiction over this type of restriction of citizens' freedom and even though we have already been acquainted with this negative occurrence. Please note that this Prosecution has been informed, though off the record, about the existence of private prisons in which arrested persons are abused, as well as killed, which is confirmed by a number of human bodies found in the areas controlled by the Army and Military Police of BiH. I am convinced that the perpetrators of these crimes are persons that have spun out of your control and the control of your subordinate officers, and that you are also interested in such persons leaving your ranks and having them punished for the crimes

[1] t/n: Ministry of the Interior

they have committed. The actions of these persons, in relation to the acts of abuse and killing, are no different from the actions of the aggressor against the civilian population. There are rumours in the public about a private prison owned by a person nicknamed "Kruško", who is a member of the Army of BiH.

Pursuant to all of the above, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 153 of the Law on Criminal Procedure, you are required to immediately provide us with information on such perpetrators of crimes, and if your services do not possess the information requested or if you know nothing of the aforementioned occurrences, you are also required to inform us thereof.

Respectfully,

HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Ivica Stanić
[signature: illegible]
[stamp: illegible]

Delivered to:
- Defence Minister Jerko Doko
- Commandant Sefer Halilović

HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
S A R A J E V O
No.A. 83/92
Date: 17 June 1992

TO THE MINISTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE OF BiH
- to Commandant Sefer Halilović, personally -

S A R A J E V O

In the letter No.A.83/92 of 17 June 1992, we informed you of the occurrence of a rapid increase in crime, with an indication that among the perpetrators of crimes there have often been persons with insignia of the Territorial Defence and the Military Police.

To support that claim, we have provided you with 8 such cases and a request (paragraph 3 of Article 153 of the transposed Law on Criminal Procedure) to deliver us the information on those persons, as well as all material evidence you possess in connection with these cases.

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In addition, the apprehensions of persons, mainly Serbs, by the persons with Military Police insignia, and their detention in custody still persist, even though only the MUP and the regular court have jurisdiction over this type of restriction of citizens' freedom and even though we have already been acquainted with this negative occurrence. Please note that this Prosecution has been informed, though off the record, about the existence of private prisons in which apprehended persons are abused, as well as killed, which is confirmed by a number of human bodies found in the areas controlled by the Army and Military Police of BiH. I am convinced that the perpetrators of these crimes are persons that have spun out of your control and the control of your subordinate officers, and that you are also interested in such persons leaving your ranks and having them punished for the crimes they have committed. The actions of these persons, in relation to the acts of abuse and killing, are no different from the actions of the aggressor against the

civilian population. There are rumours in the public about a private prison ran by a person nicknamed "Kruško", who is a member of the Army of BiH.

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Respectfully,

HIGHER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Ivica Stanić
[signature: illegible]
[stamp: illegible]

Delivered to:
- Defence Minister Jerko Doko
- Commandant Sefer Halilović

Chapter VI
APPENDIX VI

Preliminary List of camps/locations of confinement/prisons/detention centers for Serbs.

CITY OF SARAJEVO

PRELIMINARY LIST OF[1]

CAMPS/

LOCATIONS OF CONFINEMENT/

PRISONS/

DETENTION CENTERS

Municipality of

ILIDŽA

SOKOLOVIĆ KOLONIJA:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the tropical fruit containers owned by Enver Hodžić near the community center (office of the Local community center (LCC)), the Headquarters of the Military Police (MP); 1[2]
2. c/loc/p/dc in the flat of Budimir Radojević; 2
3. c/loc/p/dc in the garages in the basement of a residential building; 3
4. c/loc/p/dc in a big house – the so called Officers'club, 105 Đerdapska Street; 4

DONJA KOLONIJA:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the back building by Ilidža; 5

[1] This preliminary list was submitted by the Republika Srpska Center for the Research of War and War Crimes and the Tracing of Missing Persons;
2 Sequence numbers are marked with red colour.

STARA KOLONIJA:

1. c/loc/p/dc by the new kindergarten; 6

HRASNICA:

1. c/loc/p/dc at Aleksa Šantić Elementary School (PS) (now called Druga osnovna škola [The Second Elementary School]); 7
2. c/loc/p/dc brothel in the flat behind the Aleksa Šantić Elementary School; Školska Street, unit no. 5 – brothel; 8
3. c/loc/p/dc at the Culture/Community Center (Military Police Headquarters); 9
4. c/loc/p/dc in the garages/shelters in the basements of two skyscrapers (under the Police Station [PS]) at 1a, 1b Igmanskog Partizanskog bataljona Street; 10
5. c/loc/p/dc under the stands, in the locker rooms and associated facilities of the Famos Sports Center; 11
6. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the new Famos Hotel building, on Alekse Bojovića-Brke Street (now street of Reisa Efendije Hadžiomerovića), towards Kovači (military prison; military security headquarters); 12
7. c/loc/p/dc in the Visoko supermarket, across to the building at 20 Jahorinska Street (now Derviš-Paše Bajezidagića Street); 13
8. c/loc/p/dc – brothel in a flat across the street from the Visoko supermarket; 14
9. c/loc/p/dc in the skyscraper at the bus station (Military Police premises); 15
10. c/loc/p/dc at the Famos Culture and Entertainment Center: library, movie theatre, dance hall, kitchen, dining room and basement premises (a pre-war outpatient clinic), on the central town square; 16
11. c/loc/p/dc; on the ground floor of a building (6 Jahorinska Street, now Derviš-paše Bajezidagića Street)17

STUP:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the house above the market street (ground floor premises); 18
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Betonara (warehouse); 19

OTES:

1. c/loc/p/dc by the new kindergarten building. 20

Municipality of

NOVI GRAD

DOBRINJA (1-5)

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the "Mašinpromet" construction company, on Oktobarske revolucije Street (now Dobrinjske bolnice street); 21
2. c/loc/p/dc at Simon Bolivar Elementary School (now Skender Kulenović Elementary School); 22.
3. c/loc/p/dc Territorial Defence (TD) Dobrinja HQ – Systematic detention camp complex in the area below the "Privredna banka" and the "Sunce" grocery store in the basement / atomic shelter at 11 Marka Oreškovića Street (at Simon Bolivar Elementary School (now Skender Kulenović Elementary School]); 23
4. c/loc/p/dc in the basement/warehouse of the "Jugoeksport" shop on Džavaharlala Nehrua Street (now Hamdije Kapidžića Street); 24
5. c/loc/p/dc at the Military Police headquarters, there was an investigative prison; 25
6. c/loc/p/dc at the "Bristol" restaurant; 26
7. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of the "Neretva" convenience store, across the street from the "Bristol" restaurant; 27
8. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a building in Dobrinja 3; 28
9. c/loc/p/dc in the "Jugodrvo" shop premises, on (7 Omladinskih radnih brigada Street, now Branilaca Dobrinje Boulevard); 29
10. c/loc/p/dc at the Local Community Center in Dobrinja 3; 30
11. c/loc/p/dc in Dobrinja 3a and 3b atomic shelters; 31
12. c/loc/p/dc in one ground floor apartment at 1 Emila Zole Street; 32
13. c/loc/p/dc in the facility of "Poljooprema" (*Poljoopskrba*) (6 Salvadora Aljendea Street, [now Branilaca Dobrinje Boulevard])"; 33
14. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a dental clinic, former car parts store "Titogradpromet" (across from the address of what was once 14/3 Olimpijskih Pobjednika Street [now Sarajevske olimpijade Square]); 34
15. c/loc/p/dc in the pantry, public garages and basement in the building at 4 Sulejmana Filipovića Street (where there used to be a café, as well as Ivica Gracić's electro service); 35
16. c/loc/p/dc in a building on Sulejmana Filipovića Street, entrance F6 or F7 (the

headquarters of a police force that referred to itself as the "MCV" ("Muslims chase Vlachs [Serbs]"); 36

17. c/loc/p/dc in the shed, near the headquarters of the Dobrinja Territorial Defence; 37
18. c/loc/p/dc in a private apartment (8 Danka Mitrova Street (now Salke Lagumdžije Street); 38
19. c/loc/p/dc in the "Baltazar" café at 5 Franz Rozman Street (now Kunovska Street); 39
20. c/loc/p/dc in the basement/warehouse of the "Borovo" store on Danka Mitrova Street (now Salke Lagumdžije Street); 40
21. c/loc/p/dc in the "Radin" store building; 41
22. c/loc/p/dc in the "Tik-Tak" café (run by Hamid Efendić); 42
23. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a residential building (1 Lava Tolstoja Street); 43
24. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of the "Gavrilović" butchery; 44
25. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the "UPI" supermarket on AVNOJ Boulevard (the company Command was located there); 45

OTOKA:

1. c/loc/p/dc Territorial Defense (TD) headquarters in the offices on the ground floor/basement of the UPI building at 16 or 17 Žrtava Fašizma Street (the entrance to the atomic shelter was on this ground floor); 46
2. c/loc/p/dc in the basements of the skyscraper at 16 Street of Socijalističke revolucije Street (now Brčanska Street); 47
3. c/loc/p/dc on the ground floor of the kindergarten in the barracks across from the "Viktor Bubanj" prison, Edo Omerović's headquarters at around 88 Prvomajska Street (now Kraljice Jelene Street); 48
4. c/loc/p/dc at the former "Tvin" furniture store on Džemala Bijedića Street; 49
5. c/loc/p/dc at the "Šipad" company on Džemala Bijedića Street; 50
6. c/loc/p/dc in the shacks between the Health Center on Proleterske Brigade Street and the Cosmetics and Soap Factory on Džemala Bijedića Street; 51
7. c/loc/p/dc in a basement; 52
8. c/loc/p/dc at the elementary school; 53

BUĆA POTOK:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement premises of the ŽIŠ (Jaroslav Černi Railway Industrial School) on 21. May Street (now Safeta Zajka Street); 54
2. c/loc/p/dc at the Military Police (MP) Command; 55
3. c/loc/p/dc at the "Zrak" Company; 56
4. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the "Balkan" hotel on Trebinjska Street; 57
5. c/loc/p/dc in the garage of a private house not far from the "Balkan" hotel on Trebinjska Street; 58

ALIPAŠINO POLJE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement/warehouse of the "Mali Konzum" supermarket (next to the Borsalino café/bar), ZAVNOBIH-a Square No. 21; 59
2. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the "Borsalino" café and the "Vemeks" shop, neighborhood number 2, ZAVNOBIH-a Square No. 23; 60
3. c/loc/p/dc on the ground floor of the building at 27 ZAVNOBIH-a Square; 61
4. c/loc/p/dc at the "Novi Grad" restaurant, ZAVNOBIH-a Square, across the street from the "Mladost" Local Community Center; 62
5. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of the "Mladost" Local Community Center; 63
6. c/loc/p/dc at the Heating Plant in Block/Phase B; ZAVNOBIH-a Square; 64
7. c/loc/p/dc at the atelier above the Heating Plant in Block/Phase B (brothel), ZAVNOBIH-a Square; 65
8. c/loc/p/dc in the former premises of the Peštar/Belje Butchery, ZAVNOBIH-a Square; 66
9. c/loc/p/dc at the sports/recreational hall (brothel) on Tetovska Street (now Semira Frašta Street) parallel to the ZAVNOBIH-a Square; 67
10. c/loc/p/dc at the main boiler room in Alipašino Polje (headquarters in the building in the back of the "Borsalino" café/bar); 68
11. c/loc/p/dc at the Block/Phase B, on Španskih Boraca Street; 69
12. c/loc/p/dc at Andrija Rašo Elementary School; 70
13. c/loc/p/dc at 21. Maj Elementary School (now Alipašino Polje Elementary School); 71
14. c/loc/p/dc at the "Stela" café; 72
15. c/loc/p/dc at the "Solid" café; 73
16. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of some building; 74
17. c/loc/p/dc in the garages of the City Tram Company; 75

ŠVRAKINO SELO:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the Viktor Bubanj/Ramiz Salčin barracks on Prvomajska Street (now Safeta Hadžića Street), nowadays the Headquarters of the Court and the Prosecutor's Office of BiH; 76
2. c/loc/p/dc at the Police Station by the elementary school; 77
3. c/loc/p/dc at a private residence; 78
4. c/loc/p/dc at a basement of Pavle Goranin Elementary School on Prvomajska Street (now Džemaludin Čaušević Elementary School on Safeta Hadžića Street); 79
5. c/loc/p/dc in the 25. maj kindergarten (now called Djeca Sarajeva [The Children of Sarajevo]); 80
6. c/loc/p/dc in the boiler room of the heating plant; 81

IVO ANDRIĆ LLC:

1. c/loc/p/dc HQ of Military police in the premises of Ivo Andrić Local Community Center; 82

ANEKS:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the Aneks neighborhood; 83
2. c/loc/p/dc in the house Rajko Furtula at 13 Fočanska Street (now Safeta Hadžića); 84

25. NOVEMBAR LCC:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Territorial Defence (TD) HQ, Rade Končara Square (now Nezavisnosti Square); 85

AERODROMSKO NASELJE:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Miro Popara Local Community Center (now Saraj Polje Local Community Center); 86

MOJMILO – OLYMPIJSKO NASELJE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the Territorial Defence (TD) HQ, M1 facility (across the street from the kindergarten); 87
2. c/loc/p/dc in the kindergarten at 50/3 Olimpijska Street; 88

ALIPAŠIN MOST:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of wire factory "RMK", prison of 102. Brigade in 160 Džemala Bijedića Street; 89

SOKOLJE:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Territorial Defence (TD) HQ on Braće Simića Street (now Numan Paše Ćuprilića Street); 90
2. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a house under construction at 87 Nadežde Petrović Street, where the Territorial Defence (TD) HQ were also located; 91

LLC ROSA HADŽIVUKOVIĆ

1. c/loc/p/dc police/military police station on Vase Butozana Street (TD HQ); 92
2. c/loc/p/dc at the 5th Motorized Brigade Ismet Hadžić HQ (near the student residence halls); 93

LLC KVADRANT C-5:

1. c/loc/p/dc in one house (12 Josipa Kraša Street, now Habibe Stočević Street); 94
2. c/loc/p/dc in one house (10 Josipa Kraša Street, now Habibe Stojčević Street) and TO headquarters (5 Ivice Marušića Ratka Street, now Rejhana Demirdžića Street); 95

DOLAC MALTA:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the "Jugokomerc" building; 96
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Dolac Malta SJB Police Station; 97

VOJNIČKO POLJE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in a residential building (4/5 Milanke Vitomir Street, now Senada Mandića Dende Street); 98

RAJLOVAC:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Novi Grad Police Station; 99

Municipality of

NOVO SARAJEVO

GORNJI POFALIĆI:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Juvenile Correctional Facility; 100
2. c/loc/p/dc at the Community Hall; 101

DONJI POFALIĆI:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Privredna banka on Bratstva i Jedinstva Street (now Hamdije Čemerlića Street); 102
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Territorial Defense (TD) HQ at the Local Community Center; 103
3. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the Vranica Construction Company Hotel; 104

POFALIĆI:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the "Vranica" building where the Police Station was stationed near diary factory and tobacco factory; 105
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Railway Industrial School (ŽIŠ) facilities, on Bratstva i Jedinstva Street (now Hamdije Čemerlića); 106
3. c/loc/p/dc at the Sarajevo Tobacco Factory; 107
4. c/loc/p/dc – a private prison; 108
5. c/loc/p/dc in the Bosna Construction Company canteen; 109
6. c/loc/p/dc in the Avić family house (42 Humska Street); 110
7. c/loc/p/dc in Radivoj Kovač's house; 111

GORNJI VELEŠIĆI:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the "Kan" restaurant in Kenan Ušanović's house (member of the Military Police) on Livanjska Street; 112

DONJI VELEŠIĆI:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the Traffic Engineering School in Donji Velešići; 113

VELEŠIĆI:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Velešići Local Community Center where was the Police Station situated (near the hotel, by the new train station); 114
2. c/loc/p/dc at the "Alhos" facilities (now the Avaz Tower); 115
3. c/loc/p/dc in the house of Boško and Danilo Radović (Street Hum brdo); 116
4. c/loc/p/dc in the building by the shooting range; 117

ČENGIĆ VILA:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Komunalno-Rad facilities on Blagoja Parovića Street (now 57 Paromlinska Street); 118
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Kumrovec movie theatre; 119
3. c/loc/p/dc at Petar Dokić Elementary School (now Osman Nakaš Elementary School); 120
4. c/loc/p/dc in the old gas plant hut, near Petar Dokić Elementary School (now Osman Nakaš Elementary School); 121
5. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a residential building across the street from the "Slon" car wash; 122
6. c/loc/p/dc in the building of the old narrow-gauge train station behind the "Slon" car wash (headquarters); 123
7. c/loc/p/dc in the building of the branch office of the Sarajevo Privredna Banka on 3 Jovana Cvijića Street (now Nedima Filipovića); 124
8. c/loc/p/dc in the Slobodan Vuković Elementary School (now Čengić Vila 1 Elementary School) at 2 Danila Đokića Street (now Dr Fetaha Bećirbegovića Street); 125

HRASNO:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the Matović family house on Milorada Pejdaha Street (now Hadži Mustafe Penjave Street); 126
2. c/loc/p/dc at Vladimir Nazor School for Children with Special Needs, Ivana Krndelja Street (now at 54 Aziza Haćirbegovića Street), (Muslim military or police Command); 127
3. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of Ivan Goran Kovačić Elementary School (now Hrasno Elementary School); 128
4. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of the Ivan Goran Kovačić Local Community Center; 129
5. c/loc/p/dc in the private house at 44 Varaždinska Street; 130

6. c/loc/p/dc in one residential building – atomic shelter (102nd Brigade Headquarters) on Pere Kosorića Street, now Trg heroja Street; 131

LOCAL COMMUNITY OMER MASLIĆ:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the Local Community Center; 132
2. c/loc/p/dc at the "Monik" bed and breakfast (brothel);133
3. c/loc/p/dc at the Novo Sarajevo Ministry of Interior building; 134
4. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the "Velepekara" complex; 135

Municipality of

CENTAR

KOŠEVO/KOŠEVSKO BRDO:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the University of Sarajevo Koševo Medical Center (and/or its administrative building) on Moše Pijade Street (now Bolnička Street); 136
   i. Trauma department; 137
   ii. Urology department; 138
   iii. Internal Medicine department; 139
2. c/loc/p/dc at the Koševo Olympic Stadium on Hasana Brkića Street (now 35 Patriotske lige Street); 140
3. c/loc/p/dc at the Faculty of Construction on Hasana Brkića Street (basement – brothel) (now 30 Patriotske lige Street); 141
4. c/loc/p/dc at the Iskrica kindergarten on Hasana Brkića Street (now 30 Patriotske Lige Street); 142
5. c/loc/p/dc at the Zetra Complex; 143.
6. c/loc/p/dc at Franjo Kluz Elementary School on Livanjska Street (now Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak Elementary School on Braće Begić Street); 144
7. c/loc/p/dc at the "Leptir" tavern, where the Military Police was also located, on Livanjska Street (now Braće Begić Street); 145
8. c/loc/p/dc in the "Konzum" store on Muhameda Džudže (now Muhameda Hadžijahića Street); 146
9. c/loc/p/dc in the kindergarten (opposite the "Šetalište" Tavern at Đure Đakovića Street (now Alipašina Street); 147

10. c/loc/p/dc in the Pahuljica/Pčelica kindergarten on Mitra Trifunovića Uče Street (now Antuna Hangija Street); 148
11. c/loc/p/dc at the School of Medicine (now on Čekaluša Street); 149
12. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the 2nd High School Ognjen Prica building (Territorial defense HQ) (across the street from the Šetalište pub) on Đure Đakovića Street (now Sutjeska and corner of Alipašina Street); 150
13. c/loc/p/dc in apartment at 128 Muhameda Džudže Street (now Muhameda Hadžijahića Street); 151
14. c/loc/p/dc at the School of Physical Education (DIF) (Territorial defense HQ); 152

BJELAVE:

1. c/loc/p/dc at Vuk Karadžić Elementary School (now Alija Nametak Elementary School); 153
2. c/loc/p/dc in building of the "Dom milicije" (1 Tina Ujevića Street); 154
3. c/loc/p/dc at the Institute of Meteorology; 155
4. c/loc/p/dc at the Police Station building; 156

CIGLANE:

1. c/loc/p/dc; in the building of the BiH Institute of Acupuncture, the former building of the BiH Central Committee (41 Alipašina Street) 157
2. c/loc/p/dc in the former premises of the "Đorđević" Company; 158

MARIJIN DVOR – MEJTAŠ - VIŠNJIK

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the Zagreb Hotel (brothel) on 1 Valter Perić Stret; 159
2. c/loc/p/dc at the Belvedere bed and breakfast (brothel); 160
3. c/loc/p/dc in the building of the city Ministry of the Interior on Augusta Cesarca Street (under the "Sarajka" department store); 161
4. c/loc/p/dc – Central Prison on 8 and 9 Jugoslovenske Narodne Armije (JNA) Street (now Branilaca grada Street); 162
5. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of the "Amerikanac" restaurant (near the Central Prison); 163
6. c/loc/p/dc in the "Vranica" Construction Company basement/pavilions

(across the street from the Central Prison, near the „Sarajka“ department store) on JNA Street (now Branilaca grada Street); 164

7. c/loc/p/dc at the dorms on JNA Street (now Branilaca grada Street); 165
8. c/loc/p/dc at the JNA Hall on JNA Street (now Branilaca grada Street); 166
9. c/loc/p/dc in the Mladen Stojanović student residence halls (for women) on Radićeva Street (more precisely, the corner of Radićeva, JNA, and Mis Irbina Streets), number 4c (brothel); 167
10. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the Mladen Stojanović dorm which used to be the an underground club called “Barutana” (the club existed until the 1980s); 168
11. c/loc/p/dc in a building across the street of city Ministry of Interior and FIS premises, (there is a tailoring shop next to a café on the ground floor), on 9-11 Mis Irbina Street; 169
12. c/loc/p/dc in the basement and premises of the Naš dom company, on Sutjeska Street; 170
13. c/loc/p/dc in Dragica Pravica kindergarten on Skerlićeva Street (now Josipa Vancaša Street); 171
14. c/loc/p/dc at the School of Dentistry (basement and ground floor) on Moše Pijade Street (now 4 Bolnička Street); 172
15. c/loc/p/dc in the Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs / CSB in 5 Branka Šotre Street (now Alija Isaković Street); 173
16. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a brick facade building (which was being used as a shelter), across the street from the Radio Sarajevo pub; 174
17. c/loc/p/dc in the Presidency building; 175
18. c/loc/p/dc in the Marshal Tito military baracks (8b Vojvode Putnika Street, now 8b Zmaja od Bosne Street); 176
19. c/loc/p/dc in the Institute of Hygiene building, near the Radnik cinema; 177
20. c/loc/p/dc in the Bank of Ljubljana building, in Mali Park; 178
21. c/loc/p/dc in the SUBNOR building near the Bank of Ljubljana; 179
22. c/loc/p/dc at the FIS sports hall; 180

DŽIDIKOVAC:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a building in the settlement called “Karingtonka” (4 or 6 Sutjeska Street); 181

Municipality of

STARI GRAD

BISTRIK:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement premises of Ilija Grbić Elementary School – prison and headquarters of the 110th Brigade and Mušan Topalović Caco; 182
2. c/loc/p/dc in the premises of the Toka-Džeka Local Community Center; 183

VRATNIK:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of a newly built house; 184

BAŠČARŠIJA:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the "Hamam Bar" brothel;185
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Bezistan building on Čaršija (Baščaršija); 186
3. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the Foreign Languages Education Center on Vase Miskina Street – 109th Brigade Prison HQ; 187
4. c/loc/p/dc at the Evropa Hotel (brothel); 188
5. c/loc/p/dc at the Beograd Hotel (brothel) on 9 Slobodana Principa Selje Street (now Bosnia Hotel 9 Kulovića Street); 189

Municipality of

HADŽIĆI

TARČIN:

1. c/loc/p/dc in Silos (the Silos camp was located in a pre-war grain silo in the settlement of Tarčin, Hadžići municipality); 190
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo Elementary School (now 36 Civilnih Žrtava Rata Street); 191
3. c/loc/p/dc at the Community Center and the barracks; 192

PAZARIĆ:

1. c/loc/p/dc at 9. Maj Elementary School (now Meša Selimović Elementary School) (now at 59 Bjelašnička Street); 193

ZOVIK:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) barracks Krupa; 194

IGMAN:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the Igman Hotel bomb shelter (on Veliko Polje); 195
2. c/loc/p/dc at the Mrazište Hotel (on Malo Polje); 196
3. c/loc/p/dc in the "Šumarstvo" building; 197

GRADAC LOCAL COMMUNITY:

1. c/loc/p/dc at Zaim Selimović's old house.198

Municipality of
TRNOVO

TRNOVO:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the kindergarten building; 199
2. c/loc/p/dc in the Secretariat of National Defense building;200
3. c/loc/p/dc at the Treskavica Hotel; 201
4. c/loc/p/dc in the Sercretariat of Interior Affairs building; 202
5. c/loc/p/dc in the basement of the health center; 203

BOGATIĆI VILLAGE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the prison premises; 204

DEJČIĆI VILLAGE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the elementary school building; 205
1. c/loc/p/dc at the Local Community Center facilities; 206

GORNJA PRESJENICA VILLAGE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the Ploskić family house; 207

GODINJSKE BARE VILLAG:

1. c/loc/p/dc in a private shed; 208

SLAVLJEVIĆI VILLAGE:

1. c/loc/p/dc at the prison facilities; 209

HRASNIČKI STAN VILLAGE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in a wooden cabin; 210

Municipality of
VOGOŠĆA

GRAHOVIŠTE VILLAGE:

1. c/loc/p/dc in the local graveyard premises (below the Orbić hill); 211

Most of, if not all, ABiH's military and police formations had certain c/loc/p/dc in their headquarters and premises.

Chapter VI
APPENDIX VII

Statement of Mr. Dušan Pavlovic to the Commission member Mr. P. Barriot.

Mr Patrick Barriot

Member of the International Commission of
Inquiries on Sufferings of Serbs in Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995

Dear Mr. Barriot,

In accordance with your request dated 16 March 2020, in which you kindly request that I deliver a report on the problems and obstacles in the process of searching for missing Serbs in a part of the Sarajevo city which was under Muslim control during the war but today part of the Sarajevo Canton in the FBiH, with particular reference to the case of Slobodan Samardzic, it is an honor to deliver the same to you.

I worked over 5 and a half years at the Missing Persons Institute of BiH (MPI of BiH). The MPI of BiH started its work in 2008, which, under the BiH Missing Persons Law, was in charge for the search for all missing persons related to the civil war in BiH during the 1990s and in the context of the war of the Yugoslav succession. Pursuant to the Law, all institutions in BiH, as well as international organizations having the mandate related to our competencies, were obligated to provide us with all information regarding the cases of missing persons under our mandate. Article 30 of the same Law specified that it has the status of *Lex Specialis* and that it is above all other laws in cases of missing persons. This meant that the MPI was responsible for the entire process of seeking information and operational knowledge regarding the circumstances surrounding the deaths of *nomen nescio* persons (N.N. persons) and the location of a grave (individual or mass), through exhumations, the forensic processing of exhumed remains and bone sampling for the DNA analysis, final identification upon the arrival of the preliminary results of the DNA analysis, and the burial of the identified remains in collaboration with the missing person's family. Of course, all institutions (prosecutors' offices, police agencies, DNA laboratories, that is, ICMP) did their part of the job according to their mandate, but everything was done according to the request which was coordinated by the MPI. It is important to emphasize that the MPI was not a scientific institute because it was not established

for this purpose. It is simply an agency which had the authority to search for N.N. persons. The reason why it was named the Institute probably lies in the fact that it is also a political project of several stakeholders, specifically the Bosniak political leadership and a number of diplomatic missions of Western countries. Operationally, this was reflected through the work of the ICTY and the ICMP as a type of its operating body. In this sense, the MPI was and still is under a very unprincipled influence of these stakeholders.

In my first year at the MPI, I was employed in the Central Registry of Missing Persons (CRMP) Department where I was also a member of the Commission for verification, that is, confirmation of the status of persons who are actually missing. The central registry of missing persons consisted of just over 30 different missing person databases submitted by BiH Entity commissions for missing persons, the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICMP, the associations of families of missing persons and the like. Subsequently, I assumed the position of Head of the Search, Exhumation and Identification Department where I worked for less than 4 and a half years. This Department was the backbone of the MPI. Out of the 52 employees at the MPI, including administrative workers, there were 30 employees in my Department. I had 5 regional and 10 field offices within the Department. My colleagues in this Department were operatives of various profiles related to public, state and military security and of all three constituent peoples in BiH. The position of Head of this Department is in fact the position of the first operative in BiH concerning missing persons.

Concerning the problems, obstacles and obstructions in the process of searching for missing Serbs in the Muslim part of war Sarajevo, several facts need to be emphasized first.

Problems and obstructions in the process of searching for missing persons existed throughout BiH. This is understandable in the sense that missing persons are at the same time victims of war crimes as well, and groups and individuals responsible for these acts have tried ways to hide the bodies of missing persons in various ways. This could more or less be found in all warring parties in the BiH civil war. Among such cases is the displacement of the graves of missing persons. The cases of relocation of graves in central Podrinje are particularly known to the public in connection with the events in and around Srebrenica in July 1995. They are probably less aware of the displacement of the remains of victims of radical Islamist Mujahideen and other formations in the Ozren area in the summer of 1995. Or hiding missing persons at today's Adil Besic barracks in Bihac and the Muslim army's war barracks, the so-called ARBiH. Or the concealment and removal of missing persons from the so-called "Kupreška Group", that is, the members of the Kupres TD in BiH, who were captured alive by regular units with the Croatian Army and who, among other things, were in

the infamous Serb camp "Lora" in Split, Croatia. According to the available evidence and witness statements today, they had experienced barbaric torture therein. To this day, their families have not received a response from the competent institutions in Croatia about the fate of their missing members and where their bodies are located in order to bury them in a dignified manner and get peace.

Unfortunately, there are many such examples and there is much more to be said. Families of missing persons belonging to all peoples in BiH, who still have not found their missing family members, suffer the most.

Regarding the issue of missing of ethnic Serbs in the part of Sarajevo under Muslim, that is, the SDA[1] control during the war, I think this is a specific case in relation to all other communities in BiH. Specifically, to the best of my knowledge and experience, nowhere has war crime been "washed" and hidden through the channels of official institutions to such an extent. By this I mean all the relevant institutions in the chain handling procedures related to the investigation and proving of war crimes. From employees in health care institutions, prosecutorial offices and burial companies, through the Commission for Searching of Missing Persons, to intelligence, police, military-security and prosecutorial-judicial bodies and institutions. It takes a normal person a long time to comprehend the extent and all the civilizational tragedy of the monstrosity of this project. It is hard to believe with your own eyes that there was a whole system that concealed hundreds and thousands of cases of the most destructive types of deprivation of basic human rights and dignity, mass rape, torture, daily terror, detention in camps, and murder. What further adds to the experience of encountering evil are the experiences and testimonies of Serbian citizens who lived in this part of Sarajevo, from the fact that they were virtually outlawed in mid-April 1992 to the sufferings they experienced, which were inflicted the military-police structures under political control the SDA party and, what is most painful, by their fellow citizens, Muslims neighbors. Unfortunately, in a large number of cases, their Muslim neighbors had been involved in the persecution of Serbs, looting and torture, including killings. Through my search for missing persons so too missing Serbs, Muslim citizens remained silent in our attempts to find out what happened to their Serb neighbors and where to find their skeletal remains, which I found most disturbing.

As Raul Hilberg, a well-known scholar, very well observed that, during the mass killings of members of one group, in addition to the perpetrators and victims, there is a third group called bystanders. Bystanders are ordinary citizens who, through their active or passive behavior, allow criminals to commit their wrongdoing. In that sense, they are accomplices to these crimes, as opposed to positive examples of civic

[1] The SDA political party, according to certain views, is essentially an Islamist movement whose ideology is directly rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood movement from Egypt, which is considered to be the source of all radical Islamist movements today.

courage when free citizens assist various members of the vulnerable group in various ways. Regarding this part of Sarajevo, unfortunately, the vast majority of today's citizens could be perceived as bystanders. Especially in light of the fact that even 25 years after the end of the civil war in BiH, they do not want to say what they know and help solve the fate of their missing Serbian neighbors. Perhaps this also contributed to the phenomenon I first experienced while working in Sarajevo. Specifically, there were instances when we had to bring a Serbian witness to show us where he, as a detainee, had buried Serbian victims who had been killed in order that we could exhume their bodies and, after final identification, give them to their families. To my astonishment, these witnesses, completely stable and mature men, would start trembling and running around and half-lost begged us to get them out of the Muslim part of Sarajevo and take them back to the Republika Srpska. At that time (2010-2014), these people lived in the Republika Srpska safely and far from that part of Sarajevo, but the mere presence in that part of the city brought back trauma to a degree I had never met before. I must emphasize that for many years I have recorded personal testimonies of Serbs who survived many camps during the genocide against Serbs in the ISC[2] during WW2 and who survived tortures incomprehensible to common sense, but I have never experienced such a degree of trauma in Serbian citizens who survived the war in Muslim part of Sarajevo. I suppose psychology and psychiatry experts would have a lot to discover, especially in light of transgenerational trauma in these people. It can also be said that the Serbs who had witnessed the burial of their fellow nationals and fellow citizens or buried them themselves were additionally shocked to see empty graves during the exhumation we did, which had been disturbed, robbed and the bodies displaced and hidden.

What also frustrated and annoyed me as a citizen was the obstruction of institutions in today's Sarajevo Canton[3] in our attempts to obtain official data pertinent to the fate of the missing Serbs and the locations of mass and other graves. Despite the fact that we operated under the Law on Missing Persons, which obligated all institutions to submit all available documents and information, they did not do so and they were not sanctioned for that. In certain cases, when we (MPI) sent an official request to all competent institutions in Sarajevo with a list of missing Serbs, requesting to give us a response regarding their fate, a Bosniak member of the MPI Collegium of Directors[4], Amor Masovic, would then send an act to all those institutions, without his colleague's knowledge, a Serbian member of the Collegium, not to act according to our previous request, making up inappropriate reasons. The obstruction within the MPI's search process for missing Serbs as well corresponded to the Muslim war

[2] Independent State of Croatia

[3] It is situated in the Federation of BiH entity which is predominantly controlled by the SDA.

[4] MPI has a collective governing body consisting of three members, that is, one representative of each constituent people.

political goals according to which it had to be shown in every possible way that only Muslims were the victims of war, while the other two nations were not and could only be criminals. It sounds unbelievable, but I, as Head of the Search Department, could not obtain the entire CRMP database to prepare operational plans and analyses with my operatives to speed up the search process. This was partially prevented by the aforementioned Masovic and a Croatian member of the Collegium of Directors, Marko Jurisic, who blindly followed Masovic's instructions. In support of this are documents we have in our possession by the courtesy of Mr. M. Mandic, who, as a member of the MPI Advisory Board and president of the Association of Missing Serbs of the Sarajevo Romanija Region, received certain MPI documents upon his personal request[5].

Regarding the case of the missing Slobodan Samardzic, there are several things that needs to be said. Slobodan Samardzic was a very famous figure in Sarajevo and beyond. He was a famous musician, editor of the pre-war music program on the main TV public service channel in BiH, author of well-known music hits throughout Yugoslavia performed by the most famous musicians. The man who brought pop culture to Sarajevo, Leon Cohen, Bob Dylan and others. He was highly respected in musical and cultural circles in Sarajevo with many distinguished and influential friends within that milieu. As such, he remained in his apartment, which came under the control of the SDA Party-led military-police force headed by Alija Izetbegovic[6] as developments unfolded. He managed to transfer his wife and toddler to Serbian-controlled territory until the situation calmed down, as he and tens of thousands of other Serbs in that part of Sarajevo thought everything would calm down quickly and that no one would hurt him because everyone knew him and knew that was an honorable and honest man.

So did Stana Sehovac and Radomir Gojkovic think, who were killed along with Slobodan Samardzic in the same manner as several thousands of Serbs in the Muslim part of Sarajevo. They were all taken from their apartments and homes as civilians and after barbaric torture, rape and other terror, in order to dehumanize and humiliate them, eventually being killed. Despite the fact and evidence that the crime scene was

[5] Appendix N°1-2

[6] In BiH, in the first democratic elections in 1990, Fikret Abdić was elected Muslim member of the BiH Presidency, who was democratically oriented and did not advocate a war option. However, after he won the election, he was dismissed and replaced with Alija Izetbegovic, the author of the Islamist Declaration Pan-Islamist pamphlet. Since Mr. Abdic did not support the war option in BiH, an armed attack against him and the northwestern region of BiH he led was carried out. This armed conflict was waged between these two Muslim fractions in BiH throughout the civil war. This was just one of the segment of the civil war waged in BiH where, depending on a part of the territory, everyone fought against everyone: Muslims against Muslims, Muslims against Serbs or Croats, Muslims and Croats against Serbs, Muslims and Serbs against Croats, and so on.

inspected by police because there are photographs of them, as well as reports[7], three of them, along with hundreds of other Serbian citizens, are still missing. Some 800 Serbian citizens have been reported missing from this part of the city, while it can be assumed that a few hundred have never been registered for many reasons.

The majority of the victims of war crimes and missing persons were mainly concealed from the competent institutions controlled by the SDA political party. In that sense, it is clear why today we are still looking for over 260 Serbs missing in that part of Sarajevo. The example that clearly shows is a group of Serbian citizens living in Blagoje Parovic Street. Five of them (Biberdžić Nada, Biberdžić Savo, Daničić Pavle, Mandić Bosiljka, Zarić Stevo) were taken by the SDA-controlled military-police formations from their apartments in mid-June 1992 and killed. Their bodies were then found in a completely different part of the city, in Bentbasa, where they usually threw and often burned the bodies of Serbian citizens of Sarajevo and where Ambassadors' Alley is situated today (where foreign ambassadors plant trees to support the city of Sarajevo). Here, the officers of the Minister of the Interior under the control of the SDA conducted a crime scene investigation and took away the bodies of the victims[8]. In the following 7 to 27[9] years, the families of these missing persons sought the remains of their loved ones and tried to find out the truth about the circumstances surrounding their deaths. These war crimes victims were exhumed in 1999 from one of the mass graves for Serbs in Sarajevo[10]. The relevant authorities in the SDA-controlled part of Sarajevo have known all along the whereabouts of these victims' remains and have been hiding it from families all along, and of course this crime has never been prosecuted by these authorities. If the Republika Srpska institutions had not received operational information on the location of that mass grave, as well as other graves, these victims of war crime would still be hidden. This is a modus operandi and a general rule when it comes to missing Serbs and Serbian victims of war crime in this part of Sarajevo. Competent institutions do not prosecute war crimes against Serbian civilians in that part of Sarajevo because they participated, in one way or another, in concealing these crimes during and after the war[11].

7 Appendix N°3a Crime scene S. Samardzic and others.

8 Appendix N°3b Crime scene investigation raport-Blagoje Parovic group.

9 Šuković Branko who was seen alive at the Viktor Bubanj camp for Serbs (where the BiH Prosecutor's Office is situated today) and identified using the DNA analysis only in 2019.

10 Appendix N°3c Photos from excavation Lav mass grave, Sarajevo.

11 More serious estimates of the number of Serbian victims of war crimes within the territory of pre-war Sarajevo range from at least 2600, as stated by the head of the SIPA war crimes department Ivica Divkovic, to 3300 collected so far by the RS Ministry of the Interior. The Republic Center for Research of War, War Crimes and Missing Persons currently has preliminary list of about 3,000 registered victims, but the processing of this data is still ongoing due to the complexity of this activity, which is rooted in the problems mentioned above. About 120 - 150,000 Serbs left this area of the city of Sarajevo, which fell under the control of the SDA and their allies during the war and after the Dayton Peace Agreement. According to official statistics, about 2.5% of Serbs (mostly older people) live in this part of Sarajevo today. About 30% of Serbs had lived there prior to the war.

Slobodan Samardzic, Stana Sehovac and Radomir Gojkovic are just one of hundreds of other cases. The relevant institutions in that part of Sarajevo still hide the circumstances surrounding the crime and the remains of these victims. Despite the fact that we have evidence that the site investigation had been conducted, as in the case of the group of victims from Blagoje Parovic Street, no one from these institutions wants to respond to these families. The issue of the responsibility of diplomatic missions of the most influential states or representatives of international organizations such as the UN or ICRC is particularly important here because they are deeply engaged in these processes regarding non-Serb victims. They were also present in this part of the city during the war and there is evidence that they must have seen the bodies of the Serbian victims in certain cases.

Given that I was officially involved in the search for these three victims, I remember while we were carrying out exhumation work on a section of the bank of the Miljacka river near the bridge at Alipašino Polje where, the bodies of these killed persons had lain for several days in the then very shallow riverbed and where the aforementioned crime scene investigation had been conducted. According to eyewitness information, we were carrying out exhumation work at that micro location where a witness to the event showed us. After we had begun working on exhumation, we realized that the riverbank had previously been disturbed and that soil had been brought from another location. During the day, we found skeletal remains of human origin but in the soil brought from another location. After that I had asked the representative of the Prosecutor's Office of BiH who was present there, to invite the following day (since exhumation work had to be carried out for at least two days), the construction company that carried out work on that part of the riverbank and take the statements from the responsible persons and determine where the soil in which skeletal remains were found had been brought from and find out who was working on the heavy machinery that was loading the soil and the like. The representative of the Prosecutor's Office said that exhumation work ought to be brought to an end the same day and would not be continued. In spite of my protests, he did not change his decision. The heavy excavator was rapidly digging and scattering soil around so it was impossible to search the excavated soil thoroughly. When I said that exhumation work ought to be carried out more slowly and carefully so as not to destroy possible skeletal remains with this heavy machine, the ICMP anthropologist or archeologist Almir Jugo and another person, I don't remember his name, began commenting on my request in an unpleasant and unprofessional manner and scattering the soil around. I have to admit that I was shocked by this behavior because I had never experienced anything like this at exhumation. By courtesy of Mr. Milan Mandic, we have been provided with documentation describing this unfortunate situation.[12] That is when

[12] Appendix N°4-7

the exhumation was stopped, and the DNA analysis subsequently determined that the skeletal remains found belonged to a Serb, Stojan Odzakovic, who disappeared in a completely different part of the city. Subsequently, in 2013, exhumation work continued under pressure exerted by the families of the missing Serbs and new parts of skeleton of human origin were found. Neither the BiH Prosecutor's Office representative was punished, who illegally interrupted the first exhumation, nor has the prosecutor's office so far made it possible for bone samples to be taken from newly found skeletal remains for the DNA analysis.

Further operational work determined that the remains of Slobodan Samardzic and the other two victims, after lying in the Miljacka River bed for several days, were first buried on the riverbank and then moved to an unknown location. Subsequent operational work revealed that their bodies were most likely dumped at the main city dump in Buca Potok, part of Sarajevo under the SDA control.

The relocation of their bodies corresponds to the announcement of the visit of French President Miteran to the SDA-controlled part of Sarajevo, and therefore to the cleansing of the city from the corpses of Serbian citizens from Sarajevo who had been lying in the Miljacka riverbed for days, or next to waste containers or covered with soil in green areas throughout the city. According to the operational information at our disposal, in the second half of May, in 1992, the SDA-controlled military police used City Hygiene Service vehicles and collected at night the bodies of their brutally killed fellow citizens. They were taken to the main city landfill at night, unloaded and then pushed into the abyss using baggers, where all the city waste and garbage had been unloaded before the war. It is important to emphasize that in the case of displacement of remains, especially a large number of them, there must always be a system behind such activities. It is clear that in this particular case this system was completely controlled by the SDA political-military structures. This is especially evident in the case of the displacement of the remains of Serbian citizens from the mass grave and the killing site Kazani[13].

There is ample and more than sufficient evidence and testimonies that Serbian civilians were slaughtered in this part of Sarajevo driven by trucks of City Hygiene Service to the main municipal landfill at Buća Potok and dumped them there[14].

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13 In 1993, being pressured by a number of international representatives, the SDA-controlled law enforcement agencies exhumed the victims' skeletal remains from the site and officially buried them at the Kosevo Pomocni Stadion site. However, after the war when the exhumations of these bodies were carried out and the same remains were identified, it could be seen that over 80 or 90% of skeletal remains were missing for a certain number of persons. Also, the bodies of certain victims known to have been killed and thrown into this mass grave have never been found at the site where the authorities removed the bodies from Kazani, that is, to Kosevo Pomocni Stadion. According to operational findings, most possibly the missing bodies and body parts also ended up in the city landfill.

14 Appendix N°8 Group of documents-City dump

Aside from the existing evidence, I insisted that my operatives find irrefutable evidence so that

they could begin carrying out the most complex exhumation ever performed in BiH. When more independent sources-Bosniak witnesses were ensured, who did not know about one other and whose information completely coincided, the decision was made to undertake this extremely complex endeavor. I must point out that many were very surprised because no one expected us to accept the challenge and dig through the city landfill tens of meters long and hundred meters wide, taking risks with various types of mine explosives and toxic chemicals found on the way to at least a few dozen skeletal remains of Serbian victims.

Many institutions in Sarajevo launched obstruction immediately in terms of minimizing cooperation or even not cooperating with us at all. Eventually, after months of digging with heavy machinery, we reached the skeletal remains of human origin at the depth of 27 meters, so those who, during and after the war, participated in killing and displacing the bodies of the victims, went into action to stop this exhumation. Particularly when the preliminary results of the DNA analysis of these skeletal samples arrived, which was related to a Bosniak who died in December 1994 as a protégé of a hospital for mental patients in Sokolac, Republika Srpska; they realized that they had to stop exhumation work at all costs. The reason was the fact that the city landfill was under the control of SDA political-military formations during and after the war, and that no one else could have left the body of the identified person but those formations. In my humble estimation, the skeletal remains of that person came to the Muslim part of Sarajevo through an illegal exchange of bodies (exchanges made by criminal individuals and groups from all sides of the war) that existed during the war. After it was probably determined that it was not the person who was to be delivered, the skeletal remains somehow ended up in the city dump.

The exhumation of the skeletal remains dating back to the beginning of 1995 meant that it was possible for us to reach a level equivalent to mid-1992 after about ten meters of additional digging. The only way to prevent this was to stop the exhumation work. This was achieved by the Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina refusing to finance exhumation under extremely offensive pretence, citing reasons that never existed in the post-war exhumation and search for missing persons practice. The Chief Prosecutor personally supported this decision. Who and what influenced him can be easily inferred from all the above. At one of the meetings with this Chief Prosecutor Goran Salihovic held at the Prosecutor's Office, where we addressed the issue of the continuation of this exhumation, in addition to three members of the MPI Board of Directors and myself, representatives of the ICMP and the US Department of Justice from their Embassy in Sarajevo were present also. At that meeting, the

Chief Prosecutor stated that no one had been found at the exhumation and that it was therefore terminated. I replied that we had found the skeletal remains and that they were identified and that our operational information certainly confirmed that the missing persons - victims of war crimes were there. Afterwards, Amor Masovic, a Bosniak member of the MPI Board of Directors, who was at the top of the SDA party, said that what was exhumed was actually brought by one of the workers carrying out exhuming work (the exhumation firm was from Republika Srpska and its workers were Serbs) and left at the exhumation site to claim that someone had been thrown/buried there. I responded to this unscrupulous insult by requesting a chemical analysis of the material on the skeletal remains found in the city landfill and the skeletal remains of the same person who remained in the primary grave (since small remains remained in the same, which was established in the meantime) in Sokolac. In this way, it would be clear and safe to determine where the skeletal remains found on the city landfill were located the years before.

After this request, the aforementioned Masovic no longer raised this issue. Despite all of the above said at this and other meetings, where all of the above persons were present, this exhumation was stopped and to this day that part of the city dump is open. SDA-controlled Sarajevo citizens of Serbian origin who were picked up from their apartments in the capital of a European country at the end of the 20th century, tortured and killed in their own city and country, and eventually thrown into a major city dump are still waiting to be found. Their families are still waiting for the relevant institutions in that part of Sarajevo, as well as international organizations and diplomatic missions of reputable countries to take the necessary steps and make it possible to find their loved ones in order to bury them in a dignified manner and finally get peace at least in this respect.

Perhaps the experience and bitterness of the Serbian families of missing persons and victims of war crimes are best exemplified by their numerous letters addressed to relevant political and judicial, foreign and domestic institutions and organizations. A small amount of this grievousness can also be felt through several letters sent by the president of one such association, Mr. Milan Mandić, who is still searching for his missing father, which I enclose herewith[15].

Banja Luka, 23 April 2020

Dušan Pavlović

[15] Appendix N°9 Group of Letters for help

Appendix VII/1
Missing Persons Institute

Collegium of Directors
Attn: Mr. Marko Jurisic, Chairman

Sarajevo: 27 January 2012

Subject: Missing Persons Institute's database

Dear Sir/Madam,

According to the agreement on the decision of the Collegium reached at the session held on 18 January 2012, you are kindly asked to approve the Head of CRMP (Central record of missing persons) to submit the database of the Missing Persons Institute in electronic format to the SEI Department (Department for Search, Exhumation and Identification).

As already explained and agreed at the above Collegium session, this is necessary so that the investigators may prepare operational lists of missing persons in municipalities, perform analyzes of hitherto identified persons using classical and DNA methods, and take an additional step toward a more professional approach to addressing the issue of missing persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Additionany, this will be of great assistance to the CRMP Department in updating information pertaining to the missing persons in the MPI database. All this will contribute to the operational and functional integration of these two Departments and thus to the speeding up of the search process.

If deemed necessary, the Heads of Branch Offices and the investigators may, when taking over the mentioned database, sign a legal document which would obligate them to act professionally and responsibly.

I am asking for an expedited procedure so that the investigators can prepare the aforementioned lists before the exhumation season begins and do the necessary analysis before going out to the field.

Respectfully,

Head of the Department for
Search, Exhumation and Identification

Dušan Pavlović

Appendix VII/2
Missing Persons Institute

Collegium of Directors
Attn: Mr. Marko Jurišić, Chairman

Sarajevo: 18 April 2012

Subject: Missing Persons Institute's database

Dear Sir/Madam,

In addition to all stated in the request I sent to you on 27 January, 2012, which briefly explains why the entire database of missing persons of the Missing Persons Institute (MPI) of BiH should be de livered to the SEI (Department for Search, Exhumation, and Identification) Department, a few other, otherwise unclear facts may be added.

As defined in Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Law on Missing Persons of BiH, all competent authorities in BiH, as well as certain international organizations operating in BiH, submit all available information on missing persons and the circumstances surrounding their disappearance and possible locations of graves to the Institute.

Article 7 of the same law stipulates that the Institute is established "with the purpose of improving the process of searching for missing persons and more effectively identifying the remains of missing persons ..."

Within the Institute, the Department for Search, Exhumation and Identification, as its name indicates, deals with the search for persons until the final resolution of each particular case.

All information concerning missing persons, which are in possession of the Institute, and in order to fulfill the purpose of establishing the Institute, should be submitted to the Department for Search, Exhumation and Identification. Article 25 of the Law on Missing Persons of BiH clearly defines the possible occurrence of misuse of the above information and data. If there is a need that a statement on keeping a particular type of data be signed by the SEI Department employees, the existing practice that applies to the CRMP (Central record of missing persons) Department employees may be used.

In addition to these few facts, the situation is perhaps most clearly illuminated by the fact that the Head of the SEI Department does not have the lists/databases of missing persons in BiH in its office or in the Department, which are in the possession of the Institute.

Respectfully,

Head of the Department for Search,
Exhumation, and Identification

Dušan Pavlović

Appendix VII/3a

Photos from the on-site investigation carried out by the police in the Muslim part of Sarajevo. The victims in the picture are Stana Sehovac, Radomir Gojković and the famous musician and artist Slobodan Samardzic, who were taken from their apartments, tortured and killed on May 14 or 15, 1992. They are still listed as missing.

Appendix VII/3b
Blagoja Parovica group-Crime Scene Report

With regard to a number of human dead bodies found along the river Miljacka on Bentbaša, an investigation into five dead bodies was conducted at the site of Bentbaša, on 20 June 1992 - enclosed. The reported disappearance of five persons from Blagoja Parovic Street in Sarajevo, who were exhumed from a mass grave in the Lav cemetery, and identified through DNA testing: Biberdžić Nada, Biberdžić Savo, Mandić Bosiljka, Zarić Stevo, Dančić Pavle.

High Court in Sarajevo
No. 60/92
Sarajevo, 20 June 1992

CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION REPORT

With regard to the discovery of several human dead bodies near the Miljacka River on Bentbaša, an investigation was conducted on 20 June 1992.

Investigation was conducted by:
Investigating judge: Potparić Milorad

Officers at the Police Department of the City of Sarajevo:
Kurteš Predrag i Hadžifejzović Safet
Inspector from Stari grad Tenović Kenan i Miličić Željko

The place where the corpses are located is the old road above the basin and the riverbed of the Miljacka River, at the end of the high metal fence of the pool. On the left side of the road, four corpses were found next to the slope, two of them female. They were covered in flies and apparently in the early stages of decomposition. Then, on the right side of this road, and next to the river, there were two more corpses apart from each other, while one corpse was in the Miljacka riverbed.

At the very start of the identification of the corpses, shelling and shootings with anti-aircraft

machine guns started, so only one female person was identified, named Nada Biberđić, born in 1929, with an apartment in Blagoje Parovic Street. This identification was made on the basis of a therapeutic card that had fallen out of the purse, while the rest of the medical records were in the purse with the same personal information of this person. The purse was with the body of this person.

These bodies were photographed and it was ordered that the corpses be taken to the morgue for autopsy and identification. At first glance, it could be seen that some of the corpses were massacred because parts of the brain could be seen in some of them, and leg bone fractures as a result of shelling. It can also be stated that these bodies were not thrown out by the river because there are no such traces. They were probably thrown out here by someone using any means of transport.

Investigative judge
Potparić Miodrag

Appendix VII/3c

Photographs of some of the mass graves in the Muslim-controlled part of Saraje where Serbs were exhumed. These exhumations were done after the war. Missing Serb citizens who remained in the Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo were found in these graves.

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1

First day of excavation.



Second day of excavation. Bodies from Blagoja Parovica Street are from No 29-35.



Appendix VII/4
Response to Mr. M. Mandić with attachments

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Missing Persons Institute

Number: 02/1-40-2883/12
Sarajevo, 18 December 2012
Mr. Milan Mandić
Cara Lazara 4
Lukavica 71123
Istočno Sarajevo

Subject: Response to the request

Based on your request dated December 3, 2012, in which you ask us to inform you of the steps we have taken regarding the exhumation at the Alinpašin Most and Meše Selimović Boulevard sites, as well as information on where the skeletal remains were found at this location and whether bone samples were taken for the DNA-based analysis, we are able to say the following:

Following the cessation of exhumation at the site in question, 2012, despite the insistence of the authorized representatives of the Institute and forensic pathologist to complete the exhumation, on November 20 we sent the Prosecutor's Office of BiH a letter requesting an urgent continuation of exhumation work, document number: 02/4-40-2619/12.

On December 17, 2012, we sent a request No. 02 / 4-40-2619 /12 to the Prosecutor's Office of BiH to provide additional information about the site in question regarding the disturbance of the site and information about the fate of the victims' bodies buried there.

Fragments of the skeletal remains found at the site have been transported to the Miljevic ossuary in Istočno Sarajevo in accordance with the order by the Court of BiH and the Prosecutor's Office of BiH. Bone samples of the skeletal fragments exhumed at the site in question were taken, according to the order of the Prosecutor's Office of BiH, ought to have been taken within 30 days of the date of exhumation. According to the information available to us, even thoug the acting forensic pathologist and Mr. Eldar Jahic with the Prosecutor's Office of BiH were urged to do so by the Head of the East Sarajevo Regional Office, bone samples have not yet been taken at the exhumation site in question.

Respectfully,

Attached:

- Urgency for continued exhumation, document number: 02/4-40-2619 of 20 November 2012
- Request for information, document number: 02/4-40-2619 of December 17, 2012
- Response to the Prosecutor's Office of BiH, document number: 02/4-40-2619 of 18 December 2012

Member of the Collegium of Directors
Milutin Mišić

Appendix VII/5
MPI Request for information

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Missing Persons Institute
Number: 02/4-40-2619/12
Sarajevo, 17 December 2012
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Prosecutor's Office of BiH
Attn: Mrs. Vesna Budimir
War Crimes Department

Subject: Request for information
Connection: Your document No. T20 0 KTAR3 0005700 at your request No. 02/4-40-2619/12 dated 20 November 2012

Dear Sir/Madam,

In accordance with your authority and mandate and the Law on Missing Persons of BiH, Article 4, we need you to provide the following available information for the Sarajevo, Novi Grad, and Alipašin Most sites:

Did the relevant police agencies investigate the area from 14 April 1992 to 14 February 1996?

Determine when cable laying works for cable TV were performed (date, contractor name, workers who performed the work).

Determine when the billboard placement work was performed (date, contractor name, workers who performed the work).

Determine when the river bank was refurbished (date, contractor name, location from which the material was brought).

Determine whether, for exchange purposes, the remains of victims were exhumed at this site during the war.

Respectfully,

Attached:

Report from the journalist of the Independent Magazine "Dani", Belma Becirbasic

Member of the Collegium of Directors
Milutin Mišić

Appendix VII/6
Official Note

Srpko Batinić, Head of Regional Office
Istočno Sarajevo Number:
Date:19 November 2012

OFFICIAL NOTE

Taken at the premises of the Istočno Sarajevo Regional Office in regard to the circumstances of exhumation work conducted on 16 November 2012, at the location of Alipašin Nost, Novi Grad-Sarajevo.

Specifically, on the said day, an exhumation was carried out at the aforementioned site at the request of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina after human remains had been located during experimental digging. The said exhumation work was led by the authorized representative of the Prosecutor's Office of BiH, Mr. Eldar Jahić, and was attended by representatives of the Ministry of the Interior of Sarajevo Canton, employees of the Public Utility Company "Sveti Marko" from Istočno Sarajevo, the ICMP representatives, Head of the Department for Search, Exhumation and Identification within the Missing Persons Institute (MPI), Mr. Dusan Pavlović and myself as Head of the MPI Istočno Sarajevo Regional Office of BiH. We submitted the request for exhumation at the stated location on behalf of this regional office, after being shown the site by the witness who claimed that he was present at the burial of at least 4 Serbs at this site in 1992, and after an extensive analysis of the documentation we have and comparison with the statement given by this witness. According to our MPI report and the drowing we provided, the same size of digging length regarding the said site, which is located on the bank of the river Miljacka, should have been 20 meters. In the course of exhumation work, human remains or bone fragments were found at different depths, and even beneath the billboard which was removed that day to carry out exhumation work. The finding of bones and bone parts at different depths and distances from one another indicated that the soil at the site in question had been previously disturbed, that is, excavations had been carried out with construction machines. On the said day, exhumation work was completed at 4.30 pm upon the order of the authorized representative of the Prosecutor's Office of BiH, and on that occasion the target area of 20 meters as we suggested based on the available information was not completely dug.

I firmly believe that it is necessary to continue exhumation work at the mentioned site as we have previously suggested and, if necessary, to extend the digging site given that the remains were found in different places without any compactness or connection.

I submit the official note to the competent authorities for further review and treatment.

Submitted by
Srpko Batinić

Appendix VII/7
Official Note of Head of SEI Department

Collegium of Directors
Attn: Mr. Milutin Misic, Collegium Member
Subject: Official note, submitted, -
Dear Sir/Madam,

Upon your oral request, I am submitting an official note on the circumstances surrounding the exhumation on 16 November 2012, at the site Alipašin most – Trg Meša Selimović, Novi Grad -Sarajevo.

On 16 November, 2012, upon the Order of the Prosecutor's Office number:

Exhumation work was carried out at the sites Alipašin Most - Trg Meša Selimović, Novi Grad-Sarajevo.

Investigator Eldar Jahic was present on behalf of the Prosecutor's Office of BiH, but we were not told who oversaw his work or who was the acting prosecutor. This exhumation was also attended by the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior of Sarajevo Canton, the employees of Public Utility Company (JKP) "Sveti Marko" from Istočno Sarajevo, the anthropologists of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), Head of the Istočno Sarajevo Regional Office of the Missing Persons Institute of BiH (MPI), and myself, upon a request by a member of the Collegium of Directors, Milutin Mišić.

Exhumation work proceeded fairly normally until 12.00 o'clock, after the break, when the investigator with the Prosecutor's Office of BiH started talking about how the site had to be processed that day. I was first warned about this by Srpko Batinić, Head of the regional office, and it took me by surprise, given that there was no mention of ceasing exhumation work before checking the entire site nominated in the drawning in our MPI report in previous discussions with Mr. Jahić.

When I asked Mr. Jahic what it was about, he responded that the site had been searched enough and that exhumation work ought to be brought to an end that day. I then asked Mr. Jahic if he had consulted the Institute about this matter since we had nominated the location according to the witnesses' statements and that I expected the entire nominated area be searched accordingly. He responded that the duty of the Institute was to submit information and that he was the one who decided what, how much and how it ought to be done.

Having exclusively consulted the anthropologist Matthew (Vememayer?) of the ICMP about this matter, I reminded him that the Institute had hired the ICMP anthropologists to help us identify skeletal remains of human origin rather than manage exhumation work and determine what ought to be done and by what time. He responded that he decided who to consult and what to do and when.

At the same time, the mentioned anthropologist of the ICMP very rude and unprofessional in his comments (in English) and behavior that eventually one of the family members, standing two meters away from us, living abroad, called me to warn me of the anthropologist's

behavior and expressed his outrage at such scandalous behavior at the site where the search for the victims was being conducted, that is, their missing immediate family members.

Following my requests, Mr. Jahic, in collaboration with the aforementioned anthropologist of the ICMP, continued working on the speedy completion of exhumation. This was done in such a way that a large excavator was tearing up huge chunks of the site in question and moving soil to another location to make a driveway to get to the bank and dig over that part. When I insisted that each bucket must first be carefully inspected and that such a heavy machine must not be driven in the vast terrain because there was a possibility of crumbling skeletal fragments, Mr. Jahic replied to me with an unpleasant question whether I always insisted that a careful search be conducted during every exhumation or only this one, alluding to the victims' nationality.

This extremely incomprehensible and very painful situation lasted for hours, that is, throughout the afternoon. Even though I related to the investigator Jahić that the member of Collegium of Directors, Milutnin Misic, insisted that the entire site nominated for exhumation must be properly searched, especially because we had a reliable witness (which was also confirmed by the fragments of human skeletons found), it was futile.

Unfortunately, even though I had repeatedly pointed out to investigator Jahic that it was more than evident from the work done so far that the entire site was too disturbed and the skeletal remains were apparently scattered and dragged by construction machines around the site, it did not help. Mr. Jahic was talking to someone on his cell phone all the time, but we were not aware of what the conversation was about and who he was talking to.

When, at about 3.30 pm, forensic pathologist Hamza Zujo, appeared at the site, we agreed that it was necessary to carefully search the soil in the dug-out area of the site and carefully dig and search the entire nominated site. I and my colleague Batinic witnessed the conversation between investigator Jahic and pathologist Hamza Zujo who kept insisting that exhumation work be finished the following day (Saturday) or Monday. However, investigator Jahic was uncompromising and persistently invoked the decision of the mentioned anthropologist of the ICMP, thereby defending his own decision to cease searching the remainder of the nominated site. Sometime around 4.30 pm, Hamza Zujo, visibly upset, ceased exhumation work and said that there was no point in continuing the work because it was getting dark anyway. Given that exhumation work was ceases and more than half of the nominated site had not been searched, I again asked investigator Jahic whether he intended to continue exhumation work, and he replied that exhumation work was finished. Then again I asked Mr. Hamza Zujo in front of everyone whether he thought exhumation work had to be continued, he replied that, in his opinion, exhumation work had to be continued because the site had not been fully searched. None of this helped and it was obvious that, for reasons unknown to us, exhumation work had to last one day only.

It should be further emphasized that during the course of exhumation work several representatives of the families of missing persons who were being searched for at the site in question were present, and that all the time during my insistence that the exhumation be completed, they could clearly hear the conversation between investigator Jahic, pathologist Zujo, and myself. At the same time, during all that time, investigator Jahic did not make contact with the families of the victims nor did he protect them from the provocations of

passersby and bystanders. I am also not aware whether, with the help of the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior of Sarajevo Canton, he talked to the families of the victims about their possible knowledge of the circumstances of the disappearance and suffering of their loved ones, despite the fact that some of them came from Sweden or Novi Sad because of this exhumation work hoping to finally find their mothers, grandmothers, brothers, or husbands.

In my opinion, in this case, intentionally or not, obstruction was made in the course of searching for missing persons in BiH and the Missing Persons Institute was prevented from executing its mandate as defined by the Law on Missing Persons.

Also, I am of the opinion that exhumations at the site in question must continue until the search, according to the drawing of the nominated location, is completed, for the following reasons:

1. During the course of exhumation, several skeletal remains of human origin were found, exactly as the witness showed at the site.

2. The fragments found were damaged and scattered throughout soil, which was disturbed as a result of construction work and construction machines. The structure of soil and the materials found confirmed this, as well as the places where the fragments were found (at the river level along the coast and up to a meter under the billboard stand at a distance of several meters from the original fragments found.

3. According to the opinion of all those present at the exhumation, except for Mr. Jahić and the mentioned anthropologist of the ICMP, neither the site nor the entire area nominated in the drawing in the MPI report were properly searched.

4, Due to the disturbance of soil, it is necessary to expand the location to be searched, as there is a possibility that the bones are scattered over the entire area.

It is also important to note that the problem of limiting exhumation work at the site to one day started after I had commented in front of investigator Jahić, when we found fragments under the billboard stand, that on the second day of exhumation, that is, on Monday I would ask that the contractors and excavator drivers who had previously disturbed soil be brought here because it is impossible that, if nothing else, they did not see the skeleton's skull whose fragments we found.

Respectfully,

Head of the Department for
Search, Exhumation and Identification

Dušan Pavlović

Appendix VII/8
City Dump-Set of documents

[handwritten and circled: 73]

[stamp in Cyrillic: [illegible]
State [illegible] war
detained and missing persons
BANJA LUKA

No.__[handwritten: 152/98___
Date: _[handwritten: 30 September] 19[handwritten: 98]]

R E P U B L I C O F S R P S K A
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
CRIME INVESTIGATION POLICE DEPARTMENT
BANJA LUKA

No.02-2-[handwritten: 756/98]
Date: 28 September 1998

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA – GOVERNMENT
State Commission for the Exchange of
Detained and Missing Persons
BANJA LUKA

SUBJECT: Information submission.-

Through the Prijedor Public Security Centre we received information from Nada Lazić, daughter of Svetozar, born on 22 December 1957, residing in Prijedor in 15 Save Kovačevića Street, a doctor by profession, that after the beginning of the war and conflict in Sarajevo, her parents remained in Sarajevo and that they disappeared in June 1992.

She also learned that her parents had been taken from their flat in 68 Triglavska Street in Sarajevo and were then liquidated at the city dump above Buća Potok. Nada Lazić got the information from one Muslim from the Federation [of Bosnia and Herzegovina]. She also got the information that three other Serbs perished together with her parents, and they were Mara Saratlić and Mila Saratić[16], and Spasa Ujić, and they were also liquidated

[16] Translator's note: as printed

at the same location as her parents.

Nada Lazić's parents are Svetozar Mijanović, son of Ilija and Krstinja, born on 25 July 1925, who was residing in Sarajevo in 68 Triglavska [Street], a driver by occupation, a retiree, and Miluša Mijanović, daughter of Vaso and Ruža, born on 16 February 1933 in Čepelica, Bileća, who was residing at the same address.

Nada's brother, Ljubomir Mijanović, who lives in Trebinje, is most likely familiar with the information as well. Nenad Mijić, Spasa's son, who was a pilot and probably lives in the area of Sarajevo, and Dobrivoje Planojević, Spasa Ujić's son-in-law, who was a member of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Srpska before the war, as he is now, can be contacted regarding this information.

We submit the above details so as to inform you of it.

UKP[17] CHIEF
Živko Bojić
[signature: illegible]

RV/RT[18] [stamp in Cyrillic: Republic of Srpska
Ministry of the Interior 4
Sarajevo]

[17] t/n: Crime Investigation Police Department

[18] t/n: abbreviations unknown

[Stamp: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MISSING PERSONS INSTITUTE
MISSING PERSONS INSTITUTE
SARAJEVO
[Cyrillic: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MISSING PERSONS INSTITUTE
MISSING PERSONS INSTITUTE
SARAJEVO

[bar code]
3836313

[emblem: Republic of Srpska]

[?received] [illegible]: [handwritten: 27 May 2013]				
ORGANISATIONAL UNIT [Cyrillic: ORGANISATIONAL UNIT]	[illegible] [?mark] [illegible]	No. [Cyrillic: No.]	Number of [?addendums] [Cyrillic: Number of ?addendums]	
[handwritten: 02/14	40-1	1248	1]	]

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
PUBLIC SECURITY CENTRE
ISTOČNO SARAJEVO

Serdar Janka Vukotića [Street] bb[19], Pale, tel: 057/204-100, Fax: 057/204-113

No.11-02-[handwritten: 230-310]/13
Date: 16 May 2013

MISSING PERSONS INSTITUTE
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
To Director Milutin Mišić, personally

SUBJECT: Information about mass graves is hereby delivered.-

On 14 April 2013, from a person with the initials E.Z., who in this case wanted to remain anonymous in any further procedure, and who resides in Pofalići settlement, Sarajevo Canton, we received information about a location where there might be a mass grave in Pofalići settlement. According to witness E.Z., in Pofalići settlement, with the start of

[19] t/n: no house number

belligerent actions in 1992, bodies of two men and two women, all of whom were Serbs, were thrown into the well of the Radović family, which is located in a yard between a family house and a stable. The persons who were thrown in the well were first killed by the RBiH[20] Army Members with a blow to the head using a hammer, and then those same soldiers ordered Dobro Koprivica from Pofalići to push them into the well.

Two days before he died, Dobro Koprivica had told this to witness E.Z., who still lives in the area of Pofalići, and to Ljubica Milošević, who had died during the war. The witness knows that after the war had ended, in accordance with the order of the then President of the Pofalići Local Community, Mirsada Hodžić, from the burned-out remains of the Radović family house, a large number of mortal remains of Serbs, who had been brought there during the war and were [?burned] there, were taken to the city dump by trucks of the Rad utility company. The clean-up campaign lasted several days, but the witness does not know whether the well, into which the bodies of the four killed persons had been thrown, had also been cleaned in that campaign. The person with the initials E.Z. witnessed the [?burrying] of a large number of bodies near Sarajevo RTV[21] Dom. According to this witnesses' statement of 16 [illegible] 1995, the entire June 1992, in a location behind the RTV Dom, bordering the Gras company, an excavator operated on a daily basis in the Miljacka river bed, burying bodies that were floating on the river. One of the persons buried there, whom the witness [?remembers], was wearing a JNA[22] uniform.

[Beginning of the 3rd page of original text.]

In the conversation with the police officials, witness E.Z. stated that prior to this he/she had shown the Commission for Tracing Missing Persons one location in the area of Pofalići, in which bodies of a killed woman and child were found, which was subsequently verified as true.

The witness would be prepared to show the exact location of the well into which the 4 persons had been thrown, as well as the location where the excavator dug behind the RTV Dom, on condition that he/she is provided with maximum protection and that he/she goes to the site with the police officials who interviewed him/her.

CHIEF OF CENTRE
[illegible]nko Va[illegible]ević
[signature: illegible]

[stamp: illegible]

[20] t/n: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
[21] Radio-Television Hall
[22] t/n: Yugoslav People's Army

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SRPSKA
OFFICE FOR TRACING MISSING PERSONS
OF THE RS[23] – BANJA LUKA
- Srpsko Sarajevo Office -

No.80/03
Date: 2 July 2003

To the Acting Director of the Office for Tracing Detained
and Missing Persons of the RS - Banja Luka,
Mr ALEKSANDAR RADETA, personally

I N F O R M A T I O N
about the details and collected evidence that the Office for Missing Persons in Lukavica possesses in connection with the **area of the city dump** in Federal Sarajevo, Novi Grad SO[24], coordinates: V[illegible]6198/59926

According to several witnesses, and I will mention here the testimony of Milena Zeljković from Sarajevo (the Office has her telephone number and address) who, at the indicated site, in the vicinity of the city dump, where she was often passing by while looking for firewood during the war years of 1992 and 1993, personally saw in the vicinity of the city dump a large number of bodies of Serbs, among whom she recognised the bodies of Mara and Jovo Pikulić who had gone missing in Pofalići. According to the same witness, the bodies were thrown one on top of another and were buried using a machine excavator, which was done for several days in a row.

Given that the city dump is near Pofalići, where in August 1992, from 1st to 10th August, a group of around thirty persons from Pofalići was reported missing, namely: Jovo and Mara Pikulić, who went missing on 1 August 1992, Mirko and Rosa Savić, who went missing on the same date, Vida Bratić, who went missing on 3 August 1992, and others, and we assume that they were buried in the vicinity of the city dump.

Furthermore, missing persons from the settlement of Buća Potok, Milenko Govedarica, Anđelko Simanić, Živojin Dadić, and others, as well as missing persons from Boljakov Potok, which is next to the very city dump, Jovo Krunić, Miloš Bandić,

[23] t/n: Republic of Srpska
[24] t/n: Municipal Assembly *or* Municipality

and others, and also missing persons from Omer Maslić Street, Goran Koprivica and Jadranko Jerković, who, according to newspaper reports from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oslobođenje[25] newspaper), were driven to the town city dump after they had been killed at Hrasno Brdo.

Moreover, the many disappearances of Serbs from Adema Buće Street, which is located at the foot of the city dump, and in close vicinity of which was the Wartime Headquarters of the infamous Zajko Vahid (the current owner of Žuti taksi[26]) indicate to the fact that their mortal remains should as well be searched for at the city dump. Question forms were filled out for all the persons mentioned above and they are filed in the Office in Lukavica.

[Beginning of the 5th page of original text]

Other information that we have collected from various witnesses during our work in the field indicate to the fact that a large number of Serbs from the above-mentioned places, as well as from the general sector of the city of Sarajevo, are buried at the site of the city dump.

I would also like to mention the testimony of Rade Krunić, who before the war had a house which was located in the present-day vicinity of the city dump, and whose father Jovo Krunić was killed together with two young persons in the 25. Maj School. According to Krunić, the workers who were working in the animal pound building were responsible for the burying of bodies brought from Sarajevo. He mentioned another site in the vicinity of the city dump, specifically within the immediate vicinity of the building that is used for the disposal of dog carcasses.

Bearing all this in mind, I believe that the exhumation at the site of the city dump should be continued, namely with a large excavator – a crawler excavator, so-called "the nine", and the terrain searched thoroughly with it.

For this reason, I am asking you to urge the ICMP[27] to lend us the adequate excavator we need in order to work.

Information compiled by

Vladimir Vukša

[25] t/n: Liberation

[26] t/n: Yellow Taxi

[27] t/n: International Commission on Missing Persons

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
OFFICE FOR TRACING MISSING PERSONS
OF THE RS – BANJA LUKA
- Srpsko Sarajevo Office -
No.130/04
Date: 7 September 2004

- to the Director of the Office for Tracing Detained and Missing Persons of the RS – Banja Luka,
Mr ALEKSANDAR RADETA, personally
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON MISSING PERSONS
- to Ms Kathryne Bomberger, personally
- to ASSOCIATIONS OF FAMILIES OF MISSING PERSONS OF THE RS
- Member of the Presidency of BiH[28],
To Mr BORISLAV PARAVAC, personally

Subject: Information.

On 7 September 2004, together with witness K.P., a Serb, I tried to investigate one site in the Novi Grad municipality – the area of the city dump – as part of conducting a planned and announced previsit of the site. The planned activity was monitored by the International Commission on Missing persons, by the deputy-supervisor Boris Martinović.

We could not enter the above-mentioned area because we were not allowed to enter it by the responsible person employed there. It should be noted that the facility is a civil one, that in order to tour such sites one does not need any permission or authorisation, particularly since I was not planning on digging anything on the above-mentioned day but instead I planned to check for the elements of a possible exhumation at the site in question. It should be noted that even the smallest child in the city of Sarajevo knows that Serbs were driven in trucks towards the city dump, and that this city dump is still being set on fire to this day. That is very hard to locate the site where we will need to work, that after today it will be very hard to persuade the witnesses to go to the site and show us anything, which speaks of a synchronised action and coordination between those people

[28] t/n: Bosnia and Herzegovina

who would have to be obliged to honour the agreements and execute the tasks, if nothing, in the context of humanities.[29]

I do not wish to comment on the attitude of the ICMP, because it is clear that they do not want to and refuse to honour something that had been agreed on and signed a long time ago. For this reason, as of today, in the future, I will not ask for ICMP deputies to be present during the processes of investigating or exhumation. Should the ICMP deputies appear during the process of any exhumation, I will cancel the exhumation and inform the public thereof immediately.

I telephoned Mrs Klaudija Kuljuh, who told me that she would telephone Amor Mašović and see what the problem was. I cannot understand how come Mašović is the one deciding and giving consent and affecting the ICMP regarding where the Office for the Tracing of Missing Persons of the RS is allowed to conduct investigations, because I cannot not see why would Klaudija Kuljuh need to ask for his approval, and I cannot see why is ICMP not honouring our agreements and not honouring the mandate that is the same for both the deputies of the Office for the Missing Persons of the RS and the Federal Commission. I think that Amor Mašović has nothing to do with this issue, unlike the ICMP that, I can now publically say, is unilaterally on the side of the Federation in this process of searching. For these reasons, as well as many other reasons, I do not want them present at any exhumation at which I am present, and I will first inform the families of the missing persons about all of this, since they are the reason we exist.

I think that the time has come for the public revealing of the attitude of the ICMP towards the Office for Tracing Missing Persons of the RS in this process of searching.

MEMBER OF THE OFFICE

Slobodan Škrba

[29] t/n: as printed

INDEPENDENT MAGAZINE
DANI[30]
[illegible]

Address: 31a Skenderija
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Tel: ++38771 84 99 43
Fax: 65 17 89

"CIVITAS"
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

DANI

Office for Tracing Missing Persons of the RS
Telephone/Fax: + 387 051 302-150
To whom it may concern,

As we agreed, I hereby send you the information from the Oslobođenje, dated 4 June 1992, on the basis of which we wish to conduct an investigation and learn the truth.

"According to what we have learned from the press department of the Sarajevo Security Centre, in the Miljacka river bed – in the section ranging from the RTV building to the Zora factory – ten decomposing bodies were found! The POKOP undertaker firm was ordered to collect the bodies, considering the risk of spreading disease. Although there is no record of identifications being made, it is assumed that the persons in question are killed Chetniks[31]".

We are, above all, interested in whether you have any information about this event, whether any of the relatives came looking for persons who had gone missing in this period, and, in general, what information you possess in connection with the above-mentioned.

Thank you in advance and please answer as soon as possible.

Respectfully,

Belma Bećirbašić (061/504-347)

[signature: illegible]

[30] t/n: The Days

[31] Derogatory term for Serbs - members of Yugoslav royalist and Serbian nationalist movement in World War II in Yugoslavia

No.02/2-

LIST
of known micro-locations of graves

On the basis of intelligence collected up to this point regarding the existence of mass graves of killed Serbs in the territory of the Muslim-Croatian Federation, this UKP possesses the following information:

- In Sarajevo, at the Zlatište site, there is a large mass grave of murdered Serbs;
- In Sarajevo, in the Zetra site, in the direction of the birthing clinic, in the area where garbage is being disposed nowadays, there is a large mass grave of murdered Serbs;
- In Sarajevo, at the auxiliary field of the Koševo stadium, near the goalposts, in the direction of the Lav[32] cemetery, there is a large mass grave of Serbs who had been murdered and were brought there from some pits, most likely dislocated from the Kazani mass grave;
- In Sarajevo, by the Plavi put, near the airport, where trenches had been dug, a number of Serbs who had been brought there in order to dig the tunnels were buried there;
- In Sarajevo, at the city dump above Buća Potok there is a large mass grave of Serbs who had been murdered after the attack on the village of Pofalići;
- In Sarajevo, near the Sinon Bolivor[33] OŠ[34], in the settlement of Dobrinja II, there is a large mass grave of murdered Serbs;
- In the area of Želeća-Ozren there are three mass graves of VRS[35] members and Serb civilians that had been killed, one at the site where the playground near Rade Đošen's house used to be, the other one at the Orthodox graveyard, and the third one at the small port near the bridge on the Želeća River, where a total of 63 bodies were buried;
- In Jajce, at the site of Bravica and the town cemetery, there are [?mass] graves of murdered Serbs;
- At the town cemetery in Krnjuša, there is a [?mass] grave of murdered Serbs;
- In Tuzla, a number of killed Serbs were buried at the town cemetery;

[32] t/n: the Lion
[33] Simón Bolívar
[34] t/n: primary school
[35] t/n: Army of the Republic of Srpska

- In the area of Bihać, in the settlements of Klenovac, Prkosi, Pritočki Grabež, and at the town cemetery, in a wider area, there are [?mass] graves of murdered Serbs;
- In Petrovac, near the Plastics Factory, there is a [?mass] grave of murdered Serbs;
- In Vozuća, in a place called Livade, there is a mass grave of dislocated bodies of Serbs that had been murdered;
- In the village of Brovice, near Jajce, near the [?mill], around 6 km away from Jajce, there is a mass grave of murdered Serbs from the village of Šatori;
- In Sarajevo, near the Lav monument, in the Jewish tomb, around 21 bodies of Serbs who had been murdered were buried in the communal burial tomb no.17;
- In Sarajevo, near Pavle Goran-Kovačić OŠ, within the immediate vicinity of the Police Station, there are two [?mass] graves in which, most likely, members of the JNA – the personnel carrier crew - were also buried;
- In Bradina in Konjic municipality, next to the Orthodox church there is a [?mass] grave of murdered Serbs;
- In Sarajevo, in the settlement of Nedžarić, at a site by the Orthodox cemetery, behind Aleksa Šantić School, there is a [?mass] grave of murdered Serbs.

DRAGINJA KOPRIVICA

26/II Envera Šehovića [Street], SARAJEVO

PERSONAL STATEMENT.- to THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER

At night, on 24 June 1992, around 2300 hours, a group of armed men forcibly entered my flat; they were wearing military uniforms and they had white belts. One of them pointed him automatic rifle at me. I told him, "Please, put that automatic rifle away. If a single hair on your head is harmed in this apartment, then go ahead and kill me." They beat and abused my son Goran and took him away. I immediately started searching [for my son] and tried to find out anything about him, and at that time one man told me, "Go to Hrasno Brdo. Your son is there." I do not know that man's name. I went to the Command and told them this, and one of them told me to wait for him and that he would go to Hrasno Brdo and check, and I begged him to let me go with him, and he told me that I could not go because there was shooting there. That man returned and told me that he had seen my son Goran; the man's nickname is "BUCO".

I received papers that said my son was registered as a civilian war casualty.

A crime was committed against my son, and it is enough I personally saw and survived him being taken away; I could not bear to see his life being ended.

I personally guarantee that my son had done nothing to deserve to be murdered, and to this day I do not know where his bones are.

Sarajevo, 5 February 2002

DRAGINJA KOPRIVICA

[signature: Koprivica Draginja]

TO THE SRPSKO NOVO SARAJEVO RED CROSS,

SERVICE IN CHARGE OF TRACING MISSING PERSONS

If you ask Edin Branković, known as "Ekica", he will tell you everything, of course, if he is obliged to tell you. He knows everything, knows who took my son Goran away, and he certainly knows where my son's bones are.

In 1992, a woman, whose name is Slavica and who used to live in the same block of flats that I live in, was killed in Markale, and I went to offer my condolences, and there was this Edin Branković there and he asked me where Goran was so I responded, "He's at home. He lied down, he has a headache." Not long after that, that man Edin went out, and half an hour later he returned – he was excited – and soon people started saying that Goran had been taken away. I went downstair to my apartment around 12 o'clock and Goran was not there. Come night, Goran telephoned me and said, "Mum, don't worry, they won't hurt me". After Goran said that to me, I heard an unfamiliar male voice. "Madam, don't worry about your son. He will spend the night here because there's a curfew and he can't come [home]. *Nothing bad will happen to him; we don't kill like those from up on the hill do." My Goran came back the next day around 10 o'clock; he could barely walk, all beaten up, he could not eat or drink anything, and he just kept saying, "Why are they doing this to me when I haven't done anything bad to anyone?" Two days later, on 24 June 1992, they took him away. I went and searched* [for Goran] *in order to find out anything, but without success, and I was joined by a neighbour of mine called Azra. We agreed to go to the Central Prison, but since I was suspicious from the start, I went downstairs to see Branković and I praised Azra* [in front of him]*, saying how nice she was and that she would be joining me in my search for Goran. This man, Branković, got up immediately, and his wife asked him, "Where are you going? It's too early to go to bed," and he responded that he was going upstairs, and upstairs was a flat adjacent to mine which was occupied furnished*[36]*. Come night, at 12 o'clock, Azra telephoned me and let me know that she could not go to the Central Prison with me and she never wanted to come with me again. I lived in hope that my Goran was alive. I first heard from Mustafa Branković(that is Edin's father) that Goran was killed. We were waiting in line for water, and Edin was intervening in something there, and when he saw me he approached the line and, ostensibly, asked others to let me go first so I would not wait; he said, "Let this madam go first, her son was killed". I did not want to cut the line. He is the man who brought police to my door during the war more than once. There was some sort of a military command near my flat, and I often went there so as to find something out about Goran. This one time, I waited an entire day there for the doorman to give me my ID card*

[36] Translator's note: as printed

back. Then one armed man in a military uniform appeared and he said that I would be arrested. I told them that they did not have to come over at night since I was there already. I asked him where my son was, and he said that he had joined the Chetniks[37]. I heard that his name was Enver Zornić. On 10 April 2003, around 11 o'clock, two men in civilian clothes came to me, showed me some credentials that they did not allow me to read, and they interrogated me about the disappearance of my son. (I am sure that it was them who took my son away because I recognised them), and I replied

[Beginning of the 2nd page of original text.]

to all their questions by saying that I did not know. They asked me whether I would be able to recognise those who had taken my son away and I said I would not because 10 years had passed, and their faces were changing colours. They went downstairs but they did not exit the building stairwell. I was watching from my balcony because the balcony was above the entrance. They did not exit the building. They probably stopped by Branković so as to agree with him on what they would do with me and how they would liquidate me. The next day I went to buy something and a woman came up to me, saying that she had, allegedly, come from Zagreb on business and heard that I had a flat with no men in it and asked me to take her in to live with me for a month, saying that she would pay me well. "This was some sort of a setup."

When I was searching for Goran, my neighbour Slavka Janičić told me not to search for him and that he was safe and on the Serb side, saying that someone from over there had requested for him, and someone from over here pushed him through. I begged her to tell me who had told her that, but she would not tell me because she feared that would lead to the revealing of who had accused my Goran. She was friends with the Branković family at the time. (She must tell someone what she knows if she will not tell it to me.) We all live in the same block of flats: 26 Envera Šehovića [Street]*, Dolac Malta, Sarajevo.*

[37] t/n: derogatory term for Serbs - members of Yugoslav royalist and Serbian nationalist movement in World War II in Yugoslavia

BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA

- State Commission for Tracing

Missing Persons –

No.06/5-[handwritten: 3046]E/98

Sarajevo, [handwritten: 3 July 1998]

C E R T I F I C A T E

certifying that _[handwritten: GORAN KOPRIVICA]_ son/~~daughter~~ of _[handwritten: MARINKO]_ born in _[handwritten: 1964]_ in _[handwritten: SARAJEVO]_ in the municipality of _[handwritten: CENTAR]_, residing in _[handwritten: 2/II OMERA MASLIĆA STREET, NOVO SARAJEVO]_, is registered as a captive/missing person starting with _[handwritten: 24 June 192[38] [sic]]_ until further notice.

The registration is based on information received from the representatives of the aggressor, ICRC[39], prisoners who were exchanged, freed, or who defected, family members, eyewitnesses of the capturing, and so on.

This certificate is issued at the request of family members.

[stamp: illegible]

P R E S I D E N T

OF THE STATE

COMMISSION

[signature: illegible]

Amor Mašović

[38] t/n: 1992

[39] t/n: International Committee of the Red Cross

No.65/03
Date: 30 May 2003

R E C O R D
of an oral statement given about the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the missing person GORAN KOPRIVICA (son of Marinko)

made on 30 May 2003 in the premises of the Office for Tracing Detained and Missing Persons of the RS in Srpsko Sarajevo with the aim of collecting facts and information from Draginja Koprivica from Sarajevo, whose residential address is 26 Envera Šehovića Street (former 2 Omera Maslića Street), Novo Sarajevo municipality, Sarajevo, and whose telephone number is 033-616-792, and she gave the following

S T A T E M E N T

My son – Goran Koprivica, born on 20 September 1964 in Sarajevo in Centar municipality, resided in 2 Omera Maslića Street (the current name of the street is 26 Envera Šehovića[40]), was unmarried, and lived in his family's flat together with his mother and brother at the above-mentioned address at the time when the war conflicts began.

On 22 June 1992 I went to offer my condolences to a family who lived in my block of flats (their Slavica died at Markale), and there I found our neighbour Edin Branković, known as Ekica, who asked me where Goran was. I responded, "Goran is at home, he's lying down, he has a headache." Not long after that, Edin went out, and half an hour later he returned visibly excited and told me that my Goran had been taken away. I went downstairs to my flat immediately, but Goran had already been taken away.

Come night, Goran telephoned me and said, "Mom, don't worry, they won't hurt me." After Goran said that to me, I heard an unfamiliar male voice. "Madam, don't worry about your son. He will spend the night here because there's a curfew and he can't come [home]. Nothing bad will happen to him; we don't kill like those from up on the hill do." My Goran came back the next day around 10 o'clock; he could barely walk, all beaten up, he could not eat or drink anything, and he just kept saying, "Why are they doing this to me when I haven't done anything bad to anyone?"

At night, on 24 June 1992, around 2300 hours, a group of armed men forcibly entered my flat; they were wearing military uniforms and they had white belts. One of them pointed him automatic rifle at me, and they started beating and abusing my son Goran, and soon after that they took him away. I went and searched for my son in one military command and in other places order to find out where he was, but without success. At

[40] t/n: as printed

first, a neighbour of mine called Azra went searching together with me, but after she was threatened by the above-mentioned Branković, she soon gave up on it. Edin Branković most certainly knows who took my son Goran away and where he ended up.

[Beginning of the 2nd page of original text.]

From a newspaper article published in the Sarajevo Oslobođenje[41] entitled "Rasvjetljavaju se ubistva u Sarajevu[42]", it can be seen that the District Public Prosecutor's Office in Sarajevo opened an investigation on the basis of a criminal charge filed by the Military Police against a total of 9 suspects, members of the ABiH's[43] 6th Mountain Brigade, namely: Enver Zornić and Izet Tinjak, Mirsad Pašanija, Amir Husić and Enver Džanko, as there were reasonable grounds for supposing that they had committed the murders of Josip Gogalo, Jagoda Janković, Sreten Ninković, Jovan Popović, and three other, unidentified, persons, all of whom were Serbs (one man and two older women). It was established through investigation that the same group, led by Enver Zornić, in June/July 1992 murdered Goran Koprivica and three other persons, whose identity had not been determined. They drove the four bodies to the landfill in Boljakov Potok and disposed of them there. Regarding this case, statements were given to the Oslobođenje by the Military Police Commandant, Ismet Bajramović-Ćelo, the legal advisor to the Military Police, Fakrija Karkin, as well as the Chief of the Crime Investigation Department of the Military Police, Kemal Dumanjić.

Miro Lazić, member of the Presidency of BiH, when he was speaking of the murder of Josip Gogalo, stated for the press that Goran Koprivica had been murdered without being proven guilty [of anything].

It should be noted that I have hereby stated all the facts and circumstances that I know in connection to the disappearance and death of my son Goran Koprivica.

STATEMENT TAKEN BY:	RECORDING CLERK:	STATEMENT GIVEN BY:
[signature in Cyrillic:	[signature in Cyrillic:	
? V.Vukša]	Drašković. M]	[signature: Koprivica Draginja]

[41] t/n: Liberation – a daily newspaper
[42] t/n: Light is Shed on Murders in Sarajevo
[43] t/n: Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

PAGE 4 Oslobodjenje news [handwritten: December 1992]

LIGHT IS SHED ON MURDERS IN SARAJEVO

Nine Suspects

The investigation involved nine persons suspected of having committed the crime of murder and aggravated theft

As there were reasonable grounds for supposing that they committed the murder of Josip Gogala and other persons, followed by the crime of aggravated theft, at the instance of the Military Police, the Sarajevo Military Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation against a total of nine suspects who are in detention. The investigation involved six members of the Sixth Mountain [Brigade] that have already been mentioned in our newspaper – Izet Tinjak (born in 1969), Rifet Zornić (1956), Enver Zornić (1964), Dževad Omerbegović (1965), Amir Husić (1969), and Mirsad Ašani (1968), as well as three new suspects: Ismet Hajradinović (1963), Maid [?Keć] (1964), and will be returned to their owners if they recognise them. [As printed.]

— This is an association to commit criminal offences — says Bajramović. — There is physical evidence that the suspects murdered Josip Gogala, Jagoda Janković, Sreten Ninković and Jovan Popović, and then robbed and burned them in December last year. They also raped Janković. Dragan Brnić knew of these murders but has kept them secret. As we extended out investigation, we have further established that in June and July they also killed Goran Koprivica and three other persons, whose identity has not yet been determined. They drove the bodies of these four persons to the city dump at Boljakov Potok and disposed of them there.

Appendix VII/9
Group of Letters for help

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

Alliance of Associations of Families of Imprisoned and Missing Persons of Republika Srpska in BiH

Mob. Phone:065/731-722
Email: saveznestalihrs(@yahoo.com

Document No.2-09/11
Date: 21 February 2011

OHR
High Representative
Mr. Valentin Inzko

Dear Sir,

Because of your recent visit to Tuzla and the support you then publicly gave to the BiH Missing Persons Institute, we believe that we can expect you to use all your competencies and, as the High Representative, take the necessary steps to address the following issues:

1. Ensure that the decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH on the appeals filed by Serbian families of missing persons from Sarajevo are enforced, and that those responsible for preventing the enforcement of these decisions for 6 years, thus discriminating against Serbian victims, are broughtto justice.

2. Ensure the speeding up of the process of searching for missing persons in BiH, which is the purpose of establishing the Missing Persons Institute, and that a Serbian member be promptly chosen for a vacant position within the Collegium of Directors.

3. Ensure a full depoliticization of the process of searching for missing persons in order to avoid a full politicization of this process in the future, which is of no interest to the families of missing persons.

4. Ensure that Sarajevo, as the capital of BiH, resolves all the problems regarding missing persons, war crimes and criminals, thus demonstrating, with its own example, to everyone in BiH that there should be no mystery and secrets. Only then will they have every right to criticize all cities in BiH, which have not resolved these problems yet.

5. The Sarajevo authorities must enforce the decision of the BiH Parliament and establish a Commission to investigate war crimes against Serbs in Sarajevo (following the example of the Srebrenica Commission).

As you know, the Alliance of Missing Persons of Republika Srpska has always supported the process of searching for missing persons of BiH, and therefore the Missing Persons Institute and the ICMP, and it will remain so as long as the legitimate demands of the families of missing persons we represent and ave a responsibility to are respected.

Thank you in advance.

Yours sincerely,

Milan Mandić, President of the Alliance

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

Alliance of Associations of Families of Imprisoned and Missing Persons of Republika Srpska in BiH

Mob. Phone:065/731-722
Email: saveznestalihrs(@yahoo.com

13 April 2011

Hague tribunal

To Chief Prosecutor

Mr. Serge Brammertz personally

Dear Sir,

On behalf of our Alliance, we thank you for inviting us to speak specifically and openly. Mr. Brammertz, you surely know that your Tribunal is not popular among the Serbian people because of strange decisions in our view. We Serbs perceive the Hague Tribunal as a political tribunal intended only for Serbs and against Serbs. It is not clear to us how it possible that an officer of the Army of Republika Srpska of the same rank as an officer of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the same position within the chain of command, a Serb received 30 or 40 years in prison, and a Muslim Bosniak received 2 years in prison.

How will you explain to us that the prison in Scheveningen is overcrowded with Serbs and only a few Bosniaks? You can also correct all of our dilemmas about and antipathy to the Hague Tribunal if you decide and invest your undoubtedly large authority and undertake decisive measures to resolve the following issues:

1. To ensure that the decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH on the appeals of Serbian families of missing persons from Sarajevo be enforced, and that those responsible for preventing the enforcement of these decisions for six years, thus discriminating against Serbian victims, be brought to justice.

2. To ensure the provision of answers to Serbian families of missing persons by the institutions of the FBiH and BiH regarding the fate of their loved ones, with a particular emphasis on Sarajevo as the capital. In this way, the

FBiH and BiH, along with Sarajevo, would send a positive message and help Serbian victims to restore, to some extent, totally lost trust in the legal system and institutions of BiH.

3. To ensure that the Hague Tribunal provide information on the locations of the graves of missing persons requested by Serbian families, to the extent that it provided information for missing Bosniaks. Thus, great injustice to Serbian victims would be remedied, who are, unfortunately, discriminated against, consequently losing their trust in the rule of law.

4. To ensure that Sarajevo, as the capital of BiH, resolves all the problems regarding missing persons, war crimes and criminals, thus demonstrating, with its own example, to everyone in BiH that there should be no mystery and secrets. Only then will they have every right to criticize all cities in BiH, which have not resolved these problems yet.

5. The Sarajevo authorities must enforce the decision of the BiH Parliament and establish a Commission to investigate war crimes against Serbs in Sarajevo (following the example of the Srebrenica Commission).

Thank you in advance.

Yours sincerely,

Milan Mandić, President of the Alliance

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

Alliance of Associations of Families of Imprisoned and Missing Persons of Republika Srpska in BiH

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Mob. Phone:065/731-722
Email: saveznestalihrs(@yahoo.com

USA Embassy

Date: 23 May 2011

Attn.: Ambassador Mr. Patrick Moon

Dear Sir,

I am grateful to you and on behalf of the families that I represent for giving me this opportunity to visit your distinguished and respected Embassy, a mirror of your powerful, rich and prosperous country. I use this opportunity to thank your people and leadership for the immense help you have given to my Serbian people, which have been your friends and allies throughout history. I have resided in your country and personally seen the wealth and hospitality of your people and the country.

With all due respect and gratitude, I must also complain about my country BiH. We, the families of missing persons in BiH, have been suffering unprecedented discrimination. In this country, laws are not abided by, refugees have not been able to return to their homes even after nineteen years since the expulsion, the missing members of our families have been gone for nineteen years, we have no employment, no free schooling or life.

I am aware that crimes were committed by all sides, but no criminal got a permission from me and my family to commit a crime.

But I have to look specifically at the Sarajevo-Romania region. Mr. Ambassador, the sidewalks in Sarajevo swallowed people. People were disappearing in the city center, urban areas, and from their own houses and apartments. Children aged eight months to old people over ninety years old had been killed. And they are neither among the living nor the dead, they have disappeared. I have to kindly ask you, the representative of the most powerful country in the world, to use your undoubtedly great reputation in the world to help us with the following:

1. To ensure that the decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH on the

appeals of Serbian families of missing persons from Sarajevo are enforced, and that those responsible for preventing the enforcement of these decisions for 6 years, thus discriminating against Serbian victims, are brought to justice.

2. To ensure the provision of answers to Serbian families of missing persons by the institutions of the FBiH and BiH regarding the fate of their loved ones, with a particular emphasis on Sarajevo as the capital. In this way, the FBiH and BiH, along with Sarajevo, would send a positive message and help Serbian victims to restore, to some extent, totally lost trust in the legal system and institutions of BiH.

3. To ensure the Hague Tribunal provide information on the locations of the graves of missing persons requested by Serbian families, to the extent that it provided information for missing Bosniaks. Thus, great injustice to Serbian victims would be remedied, which are, unfortunately, discriminated against, consequently losing their trust in the rule of law.

4. To ensure that Sarajevo, as the capital of BiH, resolves all the problems regarding missing ersons, war crimes and criminals, thus demonstrating, with its own example, to everyone in BiH that there should be no mystery and secrets. Only then will they have every right to criticize all cities in BiH, which have not resolved these problems yet.

5. The Sarajevo authorities must enforce the decision of the BiH Parliament and establish a Commission to investigate war crimes against Serbs in Sarajevo (following the example of the Srebrenica Commission).

Our Alliance has supported the work of the Missing Persons Institute and the ICMP from the beginning

Due to the overt support given to these, we in the Managing Board and our families have gone through numerous problems.

To our great delight, Mr. Miller, the former US ambassador, has become the Chairman of the ICMP, which was established on Mr. Bill Clinton's proposal.

We greatly appreciate your help.

Yours sincerely,

Milan Mandić, President of the Alliance

Contact address:

Milan Mandić,

Cara Lazara 4

71123 lstočno Sarajevo

To Registrar of the ICTY

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

Alliance of Associations of Families of Imprisoned and Missing Persons of Republika Srpska in BiH

Mob. Phone:065/731-722
Email: saveznestalihrs(@yahoo.com

Mr. John Hocking personally

Dear Sir,

It is an extraordinary honor to be invited to a meeting to present our views on the Tribunal's work. We have also met with Mr. Serge Brammertz, Chief Prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal. We have expressed our dissatisfaction with the work of The Hague Tribunal and the Prosecution. Your slowness, unilateralism and impartiality are the main causes of our dissatisfaction. The disproportionate amount of sentences imposed on the Hague indictees, Bosniak and Serbian officers is unacceptable. It is unacceptable that a Serbian officer be sentenced to 30 years in prison, while a Bosniak officer of the same rank and command responsibility be sentenced to 2-3 years, or, in most cases, acquitted.

We cannot be satisfied with the fact that the entire political and military leadership of the Serbian people in in The Hague Tribunal, while that of Bosniaks and Croats is free, or with an excuse - if they had not died, they would have been indicted. We also express our dissatisfaction with the work of the Court and the Prosecutor's Office of BiH.

They work selectively and biasedly and have fully copied your work style. Please note that more serious war crimes have been committed against the Serbs, which are on boundary of genocide. The crimes against Serbs in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Kravice, Bratunac, Central Bosnia, the Neretva Valley, Podrinje, Tuzla, Zenica, Goražde, all committed in 1992 and 1993, lie in your drawers and those of the Court of BiH and the Prosecutor's Office of BiH. We ask that these cases be activated as they have been lying therein for ten years. The butchering, burning, and raping of Serbs seems to be collateral damage for you and you do not pay attention to it. How we can respect you for that. Please find attached the Letter delivered personally to Mr. Brammertz.

We hope you will consider our remarks favorably. We are looking forward to hearing from you.

.

Address:

Milan Mandić

Lukavica Cara Lazara 4.

71 123 Istočno Sarajevo

Date: 29 June 2011

President of the Alliance

Milan Mandić

Association of Missing Persons
of the Sarajevo-Romanija Region
Lukavica-Cara Lazara br. 4
71123 Istočno Sarajevo
E-mail: saveznestalihrs@yahoo.com
Tel/mob.+38765731722

Istočno Sarajevo, 26.10.2012.

Security Council
United Nations Secretariat
New York, NY 10017

Your Excellency,

I am writing in reference to the disagreeable and shameful event which reopened our painful and unhealed wounds, completely destroyed our fragile faith in the rule of law and international institutions which implement it, and scattered our last hopes for the satisfaction of justice for us, victims of war.

It is the latest visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Prosecutor General of the Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Serge Brammerz, held on October 15-17, 2012.

After we had found out that Mr. Brammertz was going to visit BiH and meet, among others, with the representatives of families of war victims in BiH, we realized that a phone call was made only to the representatives of the Bosniak people. Upon that finding, we reacted passionately and in disbelief that it is possible, and protested by means of all public media on October 15 and 16, and demanded that we, the representatives of the other two constituent peoples of BiH, also attend the scheduled meeting.

In spite of our bitter reactions and demands, the representatives of families of Serbian and Croatian war victims were not allowed to attend the abovementioned meeting, as Mr. Brammertz refused to hear our cries for help and justice.

After the meeting between Mr. Brammertz and the representatives of war victims of only one people, i.e. the Bosniaks, which was covered by all media, the justification for this shameful event, pronounced by Mr. Brammertz himself, was that he had met with those families because of their cooperation with the Hague Tribunal on the indictments against the accused Mr. Karadžić and Mr. Mladić.

However, the representatives of families of war victims who had attended the meeting said for the same media that other topics discussed included also exercise of the right of war victims to material compensation in BiH, operation of BiH Court and Prosecutor's Office, cooperation between Serbia and BiH regarding prosecution of war crimes, etc.

After everything that was said, we, the representatives of families of non-Bosniak war victims, Serbs and Croats and others, find the message sent by Mr. Brammertz horrifying, i.e. that the rights valid for Bosniak war victims in BiH do not apply to us, the non-Bosniaks, that the Hague Tribunal does not try for crimes against non-Bosniak victims, that for non-Bosniak victims in BiH there is no justice or rule of law, that the international community and the founder of the Hague Tribunal find any form of discrimination against the non-Bosniaks and selective justice acceptable, that apartheid and segregation on racial and ethnic principle is possible and acceptable in the 21st century for the international community, and that it is allowed to commit crimes against non-Bosniaks in BiH since they are others and different.

Regretfully, such statement is further substantiated by the fact that the Hague Tribunal representatives have on many occasions performed exhumations and submitted information

about the locations of graves of exclusively Bosniak victims, and not even one of non-Bosniak victims!!!
How can we justify such horrifying facts and findings to our children or explain why no one answered for the crimes committed against their grandfathers, grandmothers, fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts, whom they in many instances have never had an opportunity to meet or remember and without whom they have been condemned to grow up.
How can I explain to my children why no one answered for the 4 years my mother, an old lady of 65, had spent in the camps of the BiH Army in Sarajevo, for the abduction of my brother, a civilian, from his apartment in Sarajevo and his brutal torture in 4 camps of the BiH Army in Sarajevo and his release only in January 1996, or for the disappearance of my father in 1992 from his Sarajevo home and continued refusal by Sarajevo institutions to give me an answer concerning my father's destiny, in spite of the valid verdict by the BiH Human Rights Chamber of 2006 instructing them to do so???
Yes, there is a whole generation of growing youth who have no reason whatsoever to believe in justice and rule of law, but rather in rule of force, brutal force.

Against this background, we must assert that Mr. Brammertz has committed a serious form of discrimination against victims of war on ethnic, political and other grounds, and that he has violated all international conventions and declarations which prohibit all forms of discrimination, the Statute of the Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as well as all resolutions and principles on which it was established by the Security Council of the United Nations.

We expect and demand that you, being responsible and conscientious, initiate all necessary measures set forth by law and call Mr. Brammertz to account and initiate his dismissal, in order to protect what used to be known as justice and rule of law, and to restore at least a grain of faith in a more just and better future to our children.

Sincerely hoping that reason, professionalism, and human and institutional responsibility shall prevail over the evil of discrimination and violation of fundamental human rights of those who need them the most, we are looking forward to receiving timely information from you about the undertaken measures.

Sincerely yours,

Milan Mandić

President of Association of Missing Persons
of the Sarajevo-Romanija Region and
Member of Advisory Board to BiH
Missing Persons Institute

Association of Missing Persons
of the Sarajevo-Romanija Region
Lukavica-Cara Lazara br. 4
71123 Istočno Sarajevo
E-mail: saveznestalihrs@yahoo.com
Tel/mob.+38765731722

Istočno Sarajevo, 26.10.2012.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
United Nations Secretariat
New York, NY 10017

Your Excellency,

I am writing in reference to the disagreeable and shameful event which reopened our painful and unhealed wounds, completely destroyed our fragile faith in the rule of law and international institutions which implement it, and scattered our last hopes for the satisfaction of justice for us, victims of war.

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Yes, there is a whole generation of growing youth who have no reason whatsoever to believe in justice and rule of law, but rather in rule of force, brutal force.

Against this background, we must assert that Mr. Brammertz has committed a serious form of discrimination against victims of war on ethnic, political and other grounds, and that he has violated all international conventions and declarations which prohibit all forms of discrimination, the Statute of the Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as well as all resolutions and principles on which it was established by the Security Council of the United Nations.

We expect and demand that you, being responsible and conscientious, initiate all necessary measures set forth by law and call Mr. Brammertz to account and initiate his dismissal, in order to protect what used to be known as justice and rule of law, and to restore at least a grain of faith in a more just and better future to our children.

Sincerely hoping that reason, professionalism, and human and institutional responsibility shall prevail over the evil of discrimination and violation of fundamental human rights of those who need them the most, we are looking forward to receiving timely information from you about the undertaken measures.

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of the Sarajevo-Romanija Region and
Member of Advisory Board to BiH
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of the Sarajevo-Romanija Region
Lukavica-Cara Lazara br. 4
71123 Istočno Sarajevo
E-mail: saveznestalihrs@yahoo.com
Tel/mob.+38765731722

Istočno Sarajevo, 26.10.2012.

Judge Theodor Meron
President of the ICTY
UN-ICTY
P.O. Box 13888
2501 EW The Hague, The Netherlands

Your Excellency,

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Sincerely yours,

Milan Mandić
President of Association of Missing Persons
of the Sarajevo-Romanija Region and
Member of Advisory Board to BiH
Missing Persons Institute

United Nations
Nations Unies

International
Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia

Tribunal
Pénal International
pour l'ex-Yougoslavie

H.E. JUDGE THEODOR MERON
PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE: +31 70 512.86.85
FAX. : +31 70 512.53.07

S.E. JUGE THEODOR MERON
PRÉSIDENT

TELEPHONE : +31 70 512.86.85
FAX. : +31 70 512.53.07

22 November 2012

Dear Mr Mandić,

I thank you for your letter of 26 October 2012, which was received by my office on 22 November 2012.

As you may appreciate the Office of Prosecutor is an independent organ of the Tribunal and as President of the Tribunal I have no authority to interfere with the workings of his Office. However, I will forward your letter to the Prosecutor for his information.

Yours sincerely,

Theodor Meron
President

Mr Milan Mandić
President of Association of Missing Persons
of the Sarajevo-Romanija Region and
Member of Advisory Board to BiH
Missing Persons Institute
Lukavica-Cara Lazara br. 4
71123 Istočno Sarajevo
Bosnia & Herzegovina

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.
Tribunal International Chargé de Poursuivre les Personnes Présumées Responsables de Violations Graves du Droit International Humanitaire
Commises sur le Territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie depuis 1991.

Churchillplein 1, 2517 JW The Hague . P.O. Box 13888, 2501 EW The Hague . Netherlands
Churchillplein 1, 2517 JW La Haye . B.P. 13888, 2501 EW La Haye . Pays-Bas
Tel: +31 (0)70 512-5000 . Fax: +31 (0)70 512-5345 . Internet: http://www.un.org/icty

Chapter VI

APPENDIX VIII

One of many vandalized or destroyed Serbian Orthodox Christian cemetery and tombs or memory walls.

Chapter VI

APPENDIX IX

Long-Term Psychological Suffering and Intergenerational Transmission of PTSD Questioner.

Number of the questionnaire:

Name or initials or only number:

Date of birth and age:

Marital status:

Lived in Sarajevo from..... to.....

Questionnaire N°1

Exposure to potentially traumatic events (Criterion A) will be assessed using a format of the ‘’Life Events Checklist (LEC-5)’’ adapted to this original study. The presence of PTSD will be assessed using the ‘’PTSD Check List (PCL-5)’’. PCL-5 is composed of 20 items that correspond to the 20 criteria for PTSD outlined in DSM-5, and contains four subscales corresponding to the following four symptom clusters :

* **Criterion B** : Intrusion Symptoms and Re-Experiencing (Items 1-5) :

→ Recurrent or involuntary distressing dreams, memories, thoughts, or feelings related to the traumatic event(s).

* **Criterion C** : Persistent Avoidance (Items 6-7) :

→ Avoidance or efforts to avoid internal or external reminders of the traumatic event(s).

* **Criterion D** : Negative Alterations in Cognition and Mood (Items 8-14) :

→ Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs about oneself, the world, others, negative mood states, inability to experience positive emotions

*** Criterion E** : Increased Arousal and Reactivity (Items 15-20) : → Marked increase in arousal or reactivity such as irritability, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, sleep or concentration problems, exaggerated startle response.

A. Life Events Checklist (LEC) / Part 1

I. Criterion A / Stressor : listed below are a number of stressful events (exposure or threat of death, serious injury, sexual violence). For each event, circle one or more of the letters (A, B, C, D) under the event to indicate the following ways :

(A) The event happened to you personally, you directly experienced the event.
(B) You witnessed the event happen to someone else.
(C) You learned about the event happening to a close family member or close friend.
(D) You had repeated indirect exposure to distressing details of the event(s). This could occur during family discussions or in the course of professional duties (historical research, body exhumation/identification, criminal investigations…).
Be sure to consider the period from 1991 to 1995 in Sarajevo as you go through the list of events.

Events :

1. Combat or exposure to a war-zone (in the military or as a civilian):
→ **A** – B – C – D

2. Physical assault (for example, being attacked, hit, slapped, kicked, beaten up):
→ A – B – C – D

3. Assault with a weapon (for example, being shot, stabbed, threatened with a knife, gun, bomb):
→ A – B – C – D

4. Sexual assault (rape, attempted rape, made to perform any type of sexual act through force or threat of harm):
→ A – B – C – D

5. Other unwanted or uncomfortable sexual experience:
→ A – B – C – D

6. Captivity (for example, being kidnapped, abducted, held hostage, prisoner of war):
→ A – B – C – D

7. Life-threatening illness or injury:
→ A – B – C – D

8. Severe human suffering:
→ A – B – C – D

9. Sudden violent death (for example, homicide, suicide):
→ A – B – C – D

10. Any other very stressful event or experience:
→ A – B – C – D

B. Life Events Checklist / Part 2

1. If you checked anything for events 1 to 10 in Part 1, briefly identify the event you were thinking of:

2. If you have experienced more than one of the events in Part 1, think about the event you consider the worst event, which for this questionnaire means the event that currently bothers you the most. If you have experienced only one of the events in Part 1, use that one as the worst event. Please answer the following questions about the worst event (check all options that apply): Briefly describe the worst event (for example, what happened, who was involved, etc.).

3. When did it happen?.....(please estimate if you are not sure)
How did you experience it (circle)?
A. It happened to me directly
B. I witnessed it
C. I learned about it happening to a close family member or close friend
D. I was repeatedly exposed to distressing details about it.
E. Other, please describe:

4. Was someone's life in danger (circle)?
X. Yes, my life
X. Yes, someone else's life
X. No

5. Was someone seriously injured or killed (circle)?
X. Yes, I was seriously injured
X. Yes, someone else was seriously injured or killed
X. No

6. Did it involve sexual violence (circle)?
X. Yes
X. No

7. If the event involved the death of a close family member or close friend, was it due to some kind of violence (circle)?
X. Yes
X. No

8. How many times altogether have you experienced a similar event as stressful or nearly as stressful as the worst event (circle)?
X. Just once
X. More than once (please specify or estimate the total of times you have had this experience: ……)

C. PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5)

The answers to the 20 items, from Criterion B to Criterion E, have a score from 0 to 4 (circle), any item with a score of 2 or more is considered present:
* 0 : Absent
* 1 : Mild / subthreshold
* **2** : Moderate / **threshold**
* 3 : Severe / markedly elevated
* 4 : Extreme / incapacitating

I. Criterion B (item 1 to item 5): re-experiencing symptoms. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one or more of the following ways:

Item 1. Frequent upsetting thoughts or memories about a traumatic event. Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive memories. Children older than six may express this symptom through repetitive play in which aspects of the trauma are expressed.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 2. Having recurrent nightmares. Traumatic nightmares or upsetting dreams with content related to the event. Children may have frightening dreams without content related to the trauma.
* Absent : 0

* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 3. Feeling as though the event were happening again, sometimes called a flashback. Dissociative reactions, such as flashbacks, in which it feels like the experience is happening again. Children may re-enact the events in play.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 4. Strong feelings of distress when reminded of the event. Intense or prolonged distress after exposure to traumatic reminders.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 5. Marked physiological reactivity, such as increased heart rate, after exposure to traumatic reminders. Re-experiencing : Being physically responsive, such as increased heart rate or sweating, when reminded of the event.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

II. Criterion C (item 6 and item 7): avoidance. Persistent effortful avoidance of distressing trauma-related reminders after the event as evidenced by one or both of the following:

Item 6. Avoidance of trauma-related thoughts or feelings.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 7. Avoidance of trauma-related external reminders, such as people, places, conversations, activities, objects, or situations.

* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

III. Criterion D (item 8 to item 14): negative alterations in mood. Negative alterations in cognition and mood that began or worsened after the traumatic event as evidenced by two or more of the following:

Item 8. Inability to recall key features of the traumatic event. This is usually dissociative amnesia, not due to head injury, alcohol, or drugs.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 9. Persistent, and often distorted negative beliefs and expectations about oneself or the world, such as "I am bad," or "The world is completely dangerous."
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 10. Persistent distorted blame of self or others for causing the traumatic event or for the resulting consequences.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 11. Persistent negative emotions, including fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 12. Markedly diminished interest in activities that used to be enjoyable.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1

* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 13. Feeling alienated, detached or estranged from others.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 14. Persistent inability to experience positive emotions, such as happiness, love, and joy.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

IV. Criterion E (item 15 to item 20) : alterations in arousal/reactivity. Trauma-related alterations in arousal and reactivity that began or worsened after the traumatic event, including two or more of the following :

Item 15. Irritable or aggressive behavior.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 16. Self-destructive or reckless behavior.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 17. Feeling constantly “on guard” or like danger is lurking around every corner (hypervigilance).
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 18. Exaggerated startle response.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 19. Problems in concentration.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

Item 20. Sleep disturbance.
* Absent : 0
* Mild / subthreshold : 1
* Moderate / threshold : 2
* Severe / markedly elevated : 3
* Extreme / incapacitating : 4

V. Criterion F : duration. Persistence of symptoms in Criteria B, C, D, and E for more than one month.

VI. Criterion G : functional significance. Significant symptom-related distress or impairment of different areas of life, such as social or occupational.

VI. Criterion H : exclusion. The disturbance is not due to medication, substance use, or other illness.

Questionnaire N° 2

The impact of war-related trauma on Serbian families over several generations, will be assessed using an original questionnaire with establishment of a family impact score of war trauma. Yes = 1, No = 0.

Q1. Was a member of your family dead, seriously injured or missing during the War in Sarajevo (circle)?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q2. Was a member of your family dead, seriously injured or missing during the Second World War (WW2) or during the Bosnian war (91/95 out of Sarajevo)?

* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q3. Do you often come with your family to talk about the war or listen to patriotic songs or music?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q4. Do you often look at war-related pictures, watch war-related TV documentaries, read war-related books or articles?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q5. Do you have in your house, at the sight of all, any war-related items (photograph, flag, military cap, weapon…)?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q6. Do you commemorate with your family the anniversary dates of the war and the anniversaries of your deaths in the war?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q7. Did you choose for your children or grandchildren the first name of someone in your family who died in war or the first name of a war hero?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q8. Have you been hit or betrayed by a non Serb friend or neighbor you knew well ?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q9. Did you need the protection of an influential non Serb neighbor or friend ?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q10. Do you often use derogatory terms to describe a community considered hostile (for example Oustachi for Croatian)?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q11. Do you ever feel hatred or a desire for revenge against your unpunished persecutors?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q12. Have you lost any contact with members of the Croatian or Muslim community?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q13. Do you consider that the horrors of war that you have experienced or that your family has suffered are unknown or underestimated in Europe and in the world ?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q14. Do you suffer from having member(s) of your family who is still buried in Sarajevo?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q15. Do you ever go to Sarajevo to pray at the place where a family member or close friend is buried (or disappeared)?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q16. Do you pray regularly for your loved ones dead or wounded in the war?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q17. If a member of your family who died in Sarajevo does not have a grave (missing or buried in a mass grave), have you dedicated a place of prayer or meditation in your house?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q18. When talking about Jasenovac camp, do you experience intense emotion?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q19. Do you experience or not Republika Srpska as the Safe Haven for the Serbs west of the Drina river after the experience of genocide on Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia and after the horrors of the 1990s conflict ?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q20. Did you consider leaving Republika Srpska, going abroad?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q21. Are you worried about your children's future (fear of a new war)?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q22. Do you take medical treatment to ease the war-related sufferings?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q23. Do you have any gestures, attitudes or rituals to quell your fears or anxious symptoms related to war?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q24. If you never talk about war, is it for fear of reliving moments too painful for you, to try to forget?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q25. Are there places where you never come back because they revive traumatic memories?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q26. If you try to suppress the memory, is it to protect your family and not to transmit fear and misfortune?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned

Q27. When you talk about the war, is it not to forget, to keep alive the memory?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned by the question

Q28. When you talk about the war, is it to free you from a weight too heavy to bear alone?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned

Q29. Do you systematically attend the commemoration events?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned

Q30. Is there an obstacle to the celebration of your Saint-Patron?
* Yes
* No
* Not concerned

Do you have anything to say or develop that you could not express through this questionnaire ?

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Chapter VI
APPENDIX X

Collection of the personal statements and record of witness statements related to Suffering of Serbs in Sarajevo. Statements were selected by Patrick Barriot member of the Commission.

Record of witness statement - Borislav Šušić 1241
Record of witness statement - Goran Stojakov.....1265
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KI Number: [illegible]

RECORD OF WITNESS STATEMENT

Dated 5 November 1995 before investigative judge of the Lower court in Ilidža in the criminal proceedings against unknown persons due to criminal offence from Article [no entry] of KZ[1].

Bratislav Čukić - judge

Witness
Borislav Šušić

Recording clerk
Aleksandra Cvetković

Persons present at witness examination:

public prosecutor
[no entry]

defendant
[no entry]

defence attorney
[no entry]

Examination began at 10 AM

The witness was warned that he/she is obliged to speak the truth and that he/she must not keep anything secret, was warned of the consequences of giving false testimony, as well as the fact that he/she is not obliged to answer specific questions if it is probable that he/she would thus expose himself/herself or a close relative to severe shame, considerable material damage, or to criminal prosecution (article 229 of ZKP[2]), thus the witness gives following answers to general questions:

1) Name and surname Borislav Šušić
2) Father's name Radmilo
3) Occupation bachelor of laws
4) Temporary place of residence temporary the 237 Gladno Polje, Hadžići
5) Place of birth Luke, Hadžići
6) Year of birth 8 March 1959
7) Relationship to the defendant and the aggrieved party [no entry]

Next, the witness states the following regarding the case itself:

[signature: Šušić B.]

[1] Translator's note: Criminal Code

[2] t/n: Criminal Procedure Code

Upon graduating from the Faculty of Law, I started working at the State Security Service in the SUP of BiH[3] in 1982. I was residing with my parents in Sarajevo, in the Brankova Street; now I'm residing in the 21/4 Hiseta Street. I married Ljiljana, maiden name Andrić and we have a minor child together.

In the period between 1985 and 1987, I was assigned as a commander of the police station in Hadžići; in 1987 I was assigned as a secretary of SUP in Hadžići, and I had performed this function until 1st June 1991. After that, I was transferred to the Police Administration of the then Republic Ministry of Interior of BiH in Sarajevo. At the beginning of May 1992, Jusuf Pušina – the then Assistant Minister of Police, called me and without any explanation took my official ID and my weapon. After that, I took sick leave and, on 15th June 1992, I was issued a rescript on my transfer to the administration department in the Police Administration and my task was tracking dispatches in the field of public order, so I did not perform any operational tasks from that moment. Regarding the official documents, I was issued an accreditation card which I kept on my lapel all the time as a public ID document, in the MUP[4] as well as outside of it.

As I have already mentioned, I was excluded from all the operational tasks in the police. Privately, I could not move freely through the city anymore, as I could have done before, due to the situation in Sarajevo during that period.

There were few Serbs left in the MUP. Certain members of MUP who were extreme Muslims were mounting pressure in different ways to make all the unknown persons leave the police and to have only Muslims, the SDA[5] members, in the MUP. Persons who stood out in these actions were Enver Halvadžija, the Secretary of the National Defence in Novi Grad; Avdo Habib, the Assistant Minister of Police; Malik Krivić, Police Commander in the Novi Grad Station and Mehmed Kamenica from Goražde, the inspector. By the way, police was generally in some kind of disorganization and in a mess all the way until the middle June 1992, when they started organizing themselves more seriously. Ministry of interior was formed, led by Jusuf "Juka" Pušina, the Minister.

[signature: illegible]

[3] t/n: Secretariat of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina

[4] t/n: Ministry of interior

[5] t/n: Party of Democratic Action

- 3 –

Jozo Jozić was appointed Undersecretary of the National Defence. He emigrated in 1993 as an intelligence officer of the Croatian Intelligence Service (SIS), and he was replaced by his previous deputy, Nedžad Ugljanin – the extremist born in Mostar. A group of snipers belonging to the formation of the State Security Service was formed under his direct command. Persons from the group whom I know are Dragan and Boris Šošić, Croats and close relatives. Ugljanin personally came and participated in some of their actions. In September or October 1992, I was able to, circumstantially, see Dragan Šošić returning from one of the actions and writing a report on it. Among other things, this is what he wrote: "I was on a watch on top of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and the "Elektroprivreda". I fired two shots. One of them was successful as I shot a woman in front of the MUP School in Vrace. She was washing the pans, facing away from me". Ostoja Janković conformed that this murder happened as described by Dragan Šošić. Janković was the head of SDB in Sarajevo before the war, and he was in the reserve police at the time when he talked to me about this. He made a comment on this case in my presence and said: "Fuck this State Security which kills women from the back". Janković emigrated in 1993 and is currently in Austria. I am not familiar with where the Šošić brothers are.

Members of the State Security participated in all the searches of Serbian apartments together with the military organs of the security. They were looking for the alleged "fifth column" and the "snipers". After they would return from these actions, I could hear them say codes like "Fly, fly" – this code meant that they threw a Serb from a high-riser. Cases like this frequently happened in Alipašino Polje and in Novi Grad, but I am not familiar with any concrete cases.

As far as I know, the State Security Service was behind the launching of Juka Prazina in Sarajevo. They were fully supported by the Party of Democratic Action, i.e. by Alija Izetbegović, who promoted him to the General and Commandant of all the special units in Sarajevo. This was publicly announced on TV and other media.

[signature: illegible]

Assistant Minister of Interior Affairs for the police tasks – the uniformed part of the police – was Ismet Dahić, previous commander of the Novi Grad Police Station. He was removed from this position and 1993 and replaced by Omer Stambolić from Hrasnica, a former Head of the Police Station in Stup, where he had robbed a huge fortune in the warehouses of the business capacities. His assistants were Ivan Ilić – a Croat, and Dragan Vikić – a Croat and a commandant of the special police unit.

With his unit, Dragan Vikić participated in all the combat operations and MUP's actions. They carried out an attack on Serbian civilians in Pofalići and Velešići, aiming to drive out Serbs from these areas. They carried out the attack together with the 102nd Brigade of the so called Army of BiH, i.e. with the Velešići and Pofalići's units of the 101st Brigade led by Safet Zajko from Pofalići and Enver Šehović, also from Pofalići. I heard that between 250 and 300 Serbs were murdered. They were civilians, mostly elderly people, women and children. No Serbian soldiers were captured, there were no records of captured soldiers who went on trial, and it had not been officially stated that such soldiers existed.

Bodies of these victims were buried in the city's disposal site – a junkyard in Buća Potok, above the "Zrak" facility. The bodies were actually buried with an excavator. I had a chance to personally see this disposal site. It is a chasm around 100 meters deep. Every day, garbage is brought there from Sarajevo and tossed down with excavators. Ramiz Ademović told me in the Central Prison (I will discuss below about my time in the Central Prison and other prisons) all about tossing down bodies from Pofalići and Velešići in this disposal site. Ramiz was a driver in the "Šipad Standard" Company in Stup. He now works as a driver in the city bakery and he was sentenced for some thieveries. According to him, he was a direct participant in the action in Pofalići. Allegedly, he stood out as a great soldier. Regarding the previous matters, he said the following: "Corpses and graves should not be looked for in Pofalići and Velešići, they should be looked for in the junkyard in Buća Potok".

[signature: Šušić B.]

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The majority of Serbian civilians captured in the action in Pofalići and Velešići were imprisoned on the property of the "Rad" RO[6] in the settlement of Buća Potok and they were murdered there. Benjamin Škulj – Benjo and Mirsad Džip, pre-war criminals who served their time in jail for murdering Boro Krajišnik, his sister Borka and their mother with Samir Petrović alias "Petra" as an accomplice, told me about this. In prison, they openly spoke about murdering a married couple Šiljević together with Nedžad Serdarović alias "Sisica". They said that they slaughtered the husband – Risto, and strangled the wife - Kosa. They also said that they murdered an older man whose last name was Nikolić and who owned a video club in Buljakov Potok. They belonged to a unit called "Strela" led by Smajo Šikalo, a famous karate man and a criminal from Buljakov Potok. They participated in action carried out on Pofalići, Velešići and many others. Their crimes were proven but, thanks to the investigative judge Muhidin Kapo, all the evidences was ruined and they were released.

As far as I know, actions on Pofalići and Velešići were carried out by units of Dragan Vikić and Juka Prazina, as well as by the aforementioned 102nd Brigade of the Velešići and Pofalići's unit.

Regarding the attack carried out on the line of military ambulance vehicles of the former JNA[7] on 2nd May 1992, the only thing that I am familiar with is the following: charged power lines for trolleys and trolleybuses that were thrown on this line and killed most people in the line, were dragged by a yellow "FAP"[8] and that, soon after, Juka Prazina's group of people came there and murdered people in the line. Captured persons from this line were tortured mostly by Abdulah alias "Dule"; I do not know his last name, but I know that he was a former chauffeur for the "Bristol" hotel. He kept prisoners in a basement of the "FIS" sports hall opposite the MUP and in the "Đuro Đaković" cinema. Abdulah is now considered to be an honourable citizen of Sarajevo; he owns the "Zlatni Ljiljan"[9] café in the business premises of the "Sarajka" department store. He has become a wealthy man.

On 28th May 1992, sometime after 9 AM, I was walking down the Vase Miskina Street from the direction of the Eternal Flame towards Baš Čaršija. In front of the photo optics, the "JAY" and the

[signature: Šušić B.]

[6] t/n: labour organization

[7] t/n: Yugosalv People's Army

[8] t/n: a truck produced by an Automotive Manifacturer from Priboj, Serbia

[9] t/n: "Golden Lily"

fountain pen repair shop; and also on the opposite side of the street – on the left, in front of the post office, I saw TV cameras set on the camera stands. The street was full of passers-by. About 20 m away from me, there was a big number of people queueing in front of the "UPI-Klas" bakery waiting to buy some bread. At that moment, Haris Avdić called my name. He owned the "Hacijenda" Pizza place and café on the stands of the "Željezničar" football club. He was Juka Prazina's SWAT member at the time. He hurriedly asked me: "Where are you going and what are you doing here"? I replied that I was heading to the market to buy some things, and he replied: "Go quickly; we are doing some work here". At that moment, I noticed a red "Jetta" arrive with tires screeching and Adnan Solaković, commandant of one of Juka Prazina's units, got out of the car. Solaković and Avdić shook hands and left to the "Bosna Sport" basement, which was in the immediate vicinity.

I was rushing past the aforementioned queue of people waiting for bread and took a turn behind the "Markale" marketplace towards the Maršala Tita Street. When I was around 30 – 40 meters away from the queue, I first heard two shots from the direction of the Faculty of Economics. Right after that, I heard a strong explosion in the Vase Miskina Street. I mechanically started running down the Maršala Tita Street, ran past the marketplace's wall that is placed alongside the street and, from the other side of the market, I glanced at the Vase Miskina Street, towards the Maršala Tita Street. I saw a big number of people and bodies lying on the ground, I saw broken shop windows, distraught people running, screaming and shouting, I saw smoke and dust. I did not linger, but ran towards the MUP instead. It was about 300 m away from the place I was at and it took me 5 minutes maximum to get there. In the dispatching room, which was next to the building's entrance, I saw Mehmed Hadžimešić – the duty officer. He immediately asked me: "Do you know what has happened?" and immediately added: "The massacre in the Vase Miskina Street". Our team led by Emir Kreho (a homicide police inspector of the Public Services Centre in Sarajevo) went to the crime scene. I was surprised by Hadžimešić's words and asked when the team left to the scene, and he responded that they had left five minutes ago.

[signature: illegible]

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This made and confused and I thought, without making any comments, that the only way for the team to already be at the crime scene was if they left before the explosion. I want to mention that, at that time, I was unassigned and had no decision on my assignment to any position – which I have previously mentioned – so I occasionally went to MUP, just like all the other people who were in the same position at that time.

Five minutes later, Hadžimešić turned on the TV that was in the room, and the scenes of massacre in the Vase Miskina Street had already been televised. Based on the scenes on TV, I concluded that they were shot from the camera that I had previously seen set in front of the post office. I stayed at the MUP and, 20 – 30 minutes later came Mirza Jamaković, the head of anti-sabotage department and a famous expert in pyrotechnics. He did not make any comments and he did not show any signs of anxiety. Soon, he left and he did not show up at MUP for days.

That same evening, I watched a TV Sarajevo's report from the crime scene. Among other things, they showed what was left of the grenade's tail that allegedly had exploded in the Vase Miskina Street. The grenade on TV was large calibre and contained a lot of wide wings on the tail. However, few days later I was in the dispatch room and I saw photographs from the crime scene with the rest of grenade's tail. It was smaller calibre and had thicker wings. What I saw there made me conclude that the shots on TV were doctored.

Sometime later, while I was imprisoned in the "Viktor Bubanj" camp – the period that I will discuss in more detail below - in a number of cells on the mezzanine, there were detainees from Ramiz Dolalić alias "Ćelo 2" and Mušan Topalović alias "Caco"'s group. They often called each other out loud and protested for being arrested, and all the other detainees on the mezzanine could hear that, including me. While they were yelling, I heard Haris Kreko from Topalović's group shouting:

[signature: Šušić B.]

"Mother fuckers, where are Ganić and Mahmutčehaić now? When we had to, we killed our own people, too. Where are they now to help us? Now we are no more good to them so they locked us up…" and similar things. Haris Kreka was in a cell with Boris Spajić, Vojo Spajić's son, who was a professor of civil law at the Faculty of Law in Sarajevo. After some time, when I was transferred to the Central Prison together with Boris Spajić, I asked him about Haris Kreko. He told me that Mušan Topalović – Caco's group, of which he was a member, was ordered to bombard the Vase Miskina Street, and that snipers fired two shots from the Faculty of Economics building as a signal for the start of bombarding. He also told me that a shell was fired from a spot above the Kazani, on the left side of the Miljacka River.

Boris Spajić is currently in Sarajevo and plans to escape and head to the Czech Republic to meet his son from the first marriage. He was sentenced to four years in prison for illegally transporting Serbs from Sarajevo to the territory of the Republic of Srpska. The sentence was abolished in February 1995.

There was an armed group operating in each of Sarajevo's neighbourhoods, usually consisting of famous criminals. This situation had lasted until the middle of September 1992. The official police did not perform their duties during that period and was completely inferior to these groups. The only active group was the special police unit. They were active in combat operations together with those groups and some units of the so called Army of BiH, led by Sefer Halilović at that time. This special police unit was led by Dragan Vikić and his deputy, Kemal Ademović, participated with him in all the actions. Ademović was closely connected to the highest management of the Party of Democratic Action and he was in a direct contact with Alija Izetbegović.

During my stay in Sarajevo as I was moving around the city and communicating with my co-workers at the MUP, I found out that the central part of the municipality of Stari Grad was held by Sakib Puškar alias "Puška", who was a close friend of Haris Silajdžić, Jusuf Pušina and Ismet Dahić, and who was famous for being a pre-war criminal. His headquarters was in the Centre for learning foreign

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languages, in the Vase Miskina Street. He had a prison in the basement of that building. He is currently in Sarajevo and he is a member of the so called Army of BiH as a colonel.

Mušan Topalović alias "Caco" held left side of Miljacka, in the municipality of Stari Grad, all the way to Grbavica and the Jewish Cemetery. He was a former criminal and musician in taverns. Avdo Hebib killed him on 28th October 1993 to revenge his son who had been killed by Caco. Topalović's headquarters was in the Primary School facilities, in Bistrik. There was also a prison in thuis school. Captured Serbs were brought there by buses. They caught Serbs all over the city and brought them to this prison, which was also a huge torture place. A place called "Kazani" was also under his patronage. I heard that 500 murdered Serbs were thrown into this place. The corpses were thrown into the ditches – sink-holes around 300 meters deep, and then destroyed with a lime. Alen Hatić, Topalović's biggest supporter, used to drop off the lime in his "TAMIĆ"[10]. I was present at times when Hatić openly spoke about this to other prisoners in the Central Prison. According to him, the majority of murders in "Kazani" were committed by Sejo alias "[illegible]". I am not familiar with his real name and last name. He was also in the Central Prison and I heard him boasting about those murders.

I want to mention that criminal proceedings were brought against members of this group – the perpetrators of crimes in "Kazani" after Topalović was murdered, and they were detained in the "Viktor Bubanj" camp. During the conduction of criminal proceedings, investigative bodies did everything in their power to present the perpetrators as persons of diminished responsibility. As a result, they were all ordered protection measures of treatment at the neuropsychiatry department at the Koševo hospital. During the proceeding, 17 bodies of their victims in Kazani were found and exhumed. Fifteen of them were identified as Serbs from Stari Grad, and two remained unidentified.

Ramiz Delalić alias "Ćelo 2" held the right side of Miljacka in the municipalities of Stari Grad and Centar under his control. His command was in the kindergarten in Stari Grad above the Orthodox Church. A prison and a torture place were in the basement of the building. Delalić personally organized the murder of Nikola Gadović

[signature: Šušić B.]

[10] t/n: a truck priduced by a Yugoslavian, later Slovenian commercial vehicle manufacturer

in front of this orthodox church, at the beginning of March 1992 during a wll-known wedding celebration. However, he was never held accountable for this murder. He now owns a café in the Štrosmajer Street next to the cathedral.

Juka Prazina directly held the municipality of Centar, all the way to Ilidža, under his control. He was also the main person in the whole city. His command was in the kindergarten in the Sutjeska Street. He had prisons in several places. One of his main headquarters was in the settlement of Alipašino Polje – B phase. It was fenced with wire, ditches and machine-gun nests, so no uninvited persons could approach it. There, he also had a prison for Serbs under direct control of Juka's deputy and closest associate – Samir Kahvedžić alias "Kruško". Juka Prazina also had headquarters in the "Borsalino" café; in the basements of apartment buildings in the Španskih Boraca Street; in the heat plant in the B phase; and in the "Andrija Rašo" and "21. Maj" primary schools. One of his closest associates, Edhem Omerović – Edo, held the settlements of Otoka and Čengić Vila under his control. He had prisons in the Socijalističke Revolucije Street; in the basement of the Commercial Bank; in the kindergarten in the Palmira Toljatija Street; in the former "Tvin" furniture shop in the Džemala Bijedića Street; in the "Slobodan Vuković" Primary School in the Čengić Vila; in the business premises of DP[11] "Energopetrol", opposite the "Slobodan Vuković" Primary School. Omerović is currently in Sarajevo and owns a café in premises of a former hairdressing salon "Valera" that had been owned by his mother before the war, in the Božidara Adžije Street.

One of the most notorious prisons was in the "Vladimir Nazor" school for retarded children in the Ivana Krndelja Street. Only few people made it out alive from there. It was established and controlled in the beginning by Edin Bahtić alias "Fićo", a former football player in the FC "Željezničar". He emigrated at the end of 1992 or the beginning of 1993 and lives abroad now. After him, the prison was held by Rusmir Čakalović alias "Rus", a Muslim residing in the Sremska Street with his wife Gordana, maiden name Pandurević. There were a lot rumours in Sarajevo about the two of them directly participating in the abuse and murders of prisoners. Rusmir was sentenced for illegal transport of Serbs from Sarajevo and he is

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[11] t/n: public enterprise

currently serving his sentence, while Gordana is in Sarajevo.

Enver Zornić, Izet Tinja, Amir Hodžić, Mirsad Hašani – an Albanian and Enver Džanko controlled one part of the settlement of Hrasno. They had their own armed unit that got completely out of hand. I am not familiar with the exact location of their command, but I assume it was in the premises of a student service, up the Ivana Krndelja Street, where their prison was located. They murdered and robbed a lot of Serbs, as well as companies "Jugokomerc", "Iskra" and "INA". They were sentenced in Sarajevo at the end of August in 1993 to imprisonment from 5 to 14 years. Among others, they murdered judge Zorica Gogalo's husband who was a Croat so, allegedly, Franjo Tuđman was personally interested in the criminal proceeding held against these persons.

Bejadin Abdulovski alias "Dino", a former weightlifter in the SD[12] "Željezničar", had control over the other part of the settlement of Hrasno – from the Pere Kosorića Square to the FC "Željezničar" stadium and facilities of the RO "Strojorad". His command and prison were located in the premises of the "Ivan Goran Kovačić" Primary School, a place where many Serbs died. Abdulovski is still in Sarajevo and lives at the Pere Kosorića Square.

Brothers Džilda and Izo Begić and Fahrija Kurtaj alias Fahro controlled the Koševsko Brdo. The Koševo stadium and a sports hall "Zetra" with its underground business facilities are located in this area. The stadium and the sports hall were locations of prisons in which interrogations and murders of many Serbs were conducted. Their bodies were thrown into Miljacka and left floating there for days. However, I am not familiar with the names of any victims. Besides brothers Begić and Kurtaj, Jusuf Prazina and Zoran Čegar, one of Dragan Vikić's assistants also had prisons there. One of the persons who were often seen in these premises was Senad Granulo, a member of Dragan Vikić's Special Forces. His wife Gordana works in the State Security Administration and she was closely connected to Asim Dautbašić, Nedžad Ugljanin's assistant and one of the leading persons in the State Security. Izo Begić, Kurtaj and Granulo are currently in Sarajevo, and Zoran Čegar is in Zagreb as a military attaché from BiH. Asim Dautbašić is currently in the BiH embassy in Germany as a counsellor.

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[12] t/n: sports society

There are family tombs of old Sarajevo families at the old "Lav" and the "Sveti Josip" Catholic cemeteries in the Stjepana Tomića Street. These tombs were abandoned 20 years ago. Many corpses of murdered Serbs whose identity has remained unknown were thrown into these tombs. Their corpses were secretly thrown into these cemeteries, at night. This cemetery is located right next to the "Koševo" stadium and the "Zetra" sports hall.

Boris Krstičević alias "Čile", a Croat from Sarajevo, who was a pre-war thief and an idler, had his own armed group that controlled a part of the city from the Faculty of Civil Engineering to the Maršala Tita Street, a neighbourhood that closes the Kralja Tomislava Street and the Đure Đakovića Street. His headquarters was located in the premises of the "Naš Dom" department store, in the Sutjeska Street. The department store's basement was a prison. This group was highly extreme and they were preparing an assassination of Radovan Karadžić – something that Krstičević used to boast about publicly. He is working in the State Security Administration now and currently is in BiH consulate in Frankfurt.

Zlatko Lagumdžija (not a famous public figure), a pre-war criminal from Sarajevo, had his own armed unit which controlled the Kranjčićeva Street. There are a few apartment buildings called "Karingtonke" and a part of the Marijin Dvor neighbourhood all the way down to the railway station in this street. His headquarters was located in the business premises of the "Karingtonka" building, in which garages were turned into a prison. The "RS" café was opposite this building, but I do not know if there was a prison in that café. Lagumdžija is currently in Sarajevo.

The settlement of Pavle Goranin (Švrakino Selo) was controlled by criminals. I am only familiar with their nicknames: "Kemica", "Kiklop", "Sejo Bubuleja" (I heard that he slaughtered many Serbs and that his specialty was slaughtering from behind), Davor Matić alias "Žmiro" and "Muco", who was later killed in a violent confrontation of criminals. Their headquarters was in the "Pavle Goranin" Primary School, but they occasionally moved it to different apartments. The school premises were also a prison for Serbs. One of the members of this group was Fahrudin Zahiragić alias "Čara", who is sentenced for a theft and is in the Zenica Correctional Facility.

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"Sejo Bubuleja" is currently in Sarajevo, and I am not familiar with places of residence of others.

Besides the aforementioned persons, in Čengić Vila, Otoka and Pavla Goranina was also a battalion under the command of Borislav Kuno – Latić alias "Riki", a famous international criminal who was Juka Prazina's direct subordinate. His unit conducted numerous crimes, and he was killed by one of his bodyguards.

Since the beginning of war, the Dobrinja housing project was under control of Ismet Hadžić, Alija Izetbegović's personal friend and a religious fanatic. People who were coming to the settlement were the so called Mujahedeen, religious officials – soldiers on the path of Islam whose sanctity is dying for the Islamic idea. Many of them are foreigners from Palestine, Syria and other Islamic countries; and most of them are from Iran. Dobrinja was completely closed and no one could get in or out of it. The first cleansing of Serbs happened there. I am familiar with the fact that a prison for Serbs exclusively was formed in the "Sunce" restaurant; more precisely in the bombing shelter in this building. No one was allowed to visit the prison – not even the representatives of international charity organizations, police or military organs. Hadžić is directly connected to Alija Izetbegović, who visits him in Dobrinja once a week in order to hold a religious service. The headquarters of foreign Islamic organizations are also located in Dobrinja.

The settlements of Buljakov Potok, Buća Potok, Briješće, Sokolje and the whole "21 Maj" Street at that time were under control of Smajo Šikalo alias "Smajke" and his group with the most modern weapons and the best organized logistics. Their headquarters was in the Railway Industrial High School (ŽIŠ) in the Živka Jošila Street. There is an infamous prison for Serbs that still exists there. People who were captured in this prison, among others, were: Sretko Damjanović, Borislav Herak and Nada Tomić. They were interrogated and tortured there, especially Sretko Damjanović. This group looted many Serbian homes and commercial properties. The most infamous persons best known for murders and robberies were Benjamin Škulj alias "Beno" who immigrated to Austria, Mirsad Džip, Samir Petrović alias "Petra", Nedžad Serdarević alias "Sisica", Edo

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Kurtović alias "Grbo" and Mirsad Ćato. They are all residing in Sarajevo now.

It is widely known that there were and still are brothels in Sarajevo in which young Serbian women were brought. The brothels are in the following hotels: "Beograd", "Zagreb" and one was in the "Evropa" – until it was burnt down. The brothels are also in the "Monik" and "Bellvedere" boarding houses, as well as in the all aforementioned headquarters of the paramilitary units. Detained Serbian women were raped in the Central Prison, on the fifth floor, in the stockroom number five, right from the stairway. I heard that one of them was B M , but I am not familiar with her current place of residence. People who told me about the rapes in the Central Prison and who could testify of that are Darko Kovač, Zdravko Škobo from Ustikolina near Srbinje and Slobodan Pavlović from Sarajevo. They are still serving their sentences, and I am sure they will cross to the territory of the Republic of Srpska as soon as they are released. The so called female part of the Central Prison for convicts is on the third floor in room number three, but I am not familiar with what was happening in that room.

There are several brigades in Sarajevo, in the frame of the first corpus of the so called Army of BiH. There are military prisons in the headquarters of all brigades. The initial investigations and interrogations of arrested Serbs are conducted there by military police and military units of these brigades. All Serbs went through heavy beatings in these prisons during the interrogations. There were cases of deaths but they were not documented and the actual number of the deaths is unknown. In this regard, the most famous is the 101st Brigade who had a prison in the basement of the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, and the 102nd Brigade who had a prison in Hrasno, in the "RMK" Factory of wire and in the premises of the ŽIŠ (Railway Industrial High School).

On 20th June 1993 around 5 AM, I left my apartment in my tracksuit and my slippers, to fil the canisters with water behind the "Vladimir Perić" Primary School. As I was returning, three uniformed men whom I did not know stopped me. One of them took his pistol out and put it to my stomach, while the other put a sack on my head and tightly tied a rope around my neck. At the same time,

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they handcuffed me. I was put on the backseat of a car, tied up, and the car headed at full speed and with tires screeching in a direction unknown to me. This happened in front of the building I was living in.

During the car ride, they set on my back and hit me. After some time of a ride at high speed, we stopped. They took me off the car and pushed me down the stairs to the basement of a building. I was still tied up, with a sack on my head and handcuffed. They set me up in a chair. About half an hour later, I noticed a man entering the room from the left. I could see through the sack that he was carrying a lit candle. Immediately after that, he started beating me without any questions asked. The punches made me fall off the chair and then I would get back on again. I was out of breath, and blood coming from my mouth and nose was chocking me. As far as I could see, there were three persons that beat me non-stop in this room. While they were beating me, they yelled at me: "Speak!", but they did not ask any specific questions. After some time, they asked me about [illegible] data. When I answered, they continued to beat me. They addressed each other with "Marko", "Pero" and other Serbian names. They asked me if I knew that I was in the premises of the "Strojorad", on the Serbian territory. One of them accused me of being the main spy in Sarajevo, so he asked me to tell everything about the organization of a military and civil intelligence service, and so on. Among other things, they told me that they had arrested my brother, who allegedly confessed everything. I cannot recall how much time passed until, by my estimation, the men who had previously come in with a lit candle took the handcuffs off my hand and asked me to explain to him the pyramid of military intelligence service in Sarajevo, the pyramid and the structure of the State Security Administration and so on. Based on the terminology this man used, I concluded that he belongs to the structure of military security organs. I also concluded that the questions were provocative and that they wanted to let me know I was imprisoned on the Serbian territory. After some time, they told me they were not "Chetniks"[13] and that I should feel free to tell them everything I knew. However, they were not content with my answers, so they continued hitting me with various objects, after they had previously handcuffed me again. I used to faint, and

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[13] t/n: a derogatory nickname for Serbs, originates from Serbian guerrilla forces in WWII

they would drench me with water, drag me across the floor and kept abusing me while threating to kill me.

I do not remember how long I had been in the basement when they dragged me out of it, but I did notice it was night time. They put me in a car and drove me for about half an hour, with occasional hard breaking. During the ride, they were deciding upon the ways of killing me among themselves. About half an hour later, they took me out of the car and faced me against the wall- that was the first time they took the sack off of my head. I noticed that I was standing next to the closed tunnel above the settlement of Ciglane. They told me that I was taken to the shooting, and they decided among themselves that they would first shoot me in my legs, and then in my spine – so I could suffer for a longer time. At one moment, I felt a heating sensation in my back and fainted; but I did not hear a shot being fired.

I woke up at the hospital in Koševo, in trauma wing. I was treated by doctor Vuković and doctor Malinović (she works at the military hospital in Milići now). I was diagnosed with three broken ribs on the left side and four on the right side; a broken ribcage, a cracked sternum, my left kidney moved for about 6 cm, my right arm fractured in two places and other injuries all over my body. The injuries were diagnosed after the scan and reported in my discharge summary which is supposed to be in the documentation in the Central Prison in Sarajevo.

I spent 12 days in the intensive care unit being infused, and during that time two police officers from the MUP were watching in front of my door.

During my stay at the hospital, I was recalling everything that had happened to me and I concluded that one of the persons who arrested and beat me was Enes Radžo, the inspector of State Security of the Security Unit Protecting Specific Persons and Facilities. At the time, he personally secured Miodrag Simović, the then Deputy Prime Minister of the so called BiH until March 1993. The person who interrogated me and mentally abused me the most was Fikret Muslimović, a pre-war Colonel Security of the JNA in Sarajevo military area. Before the war, he was the head of JNA Security in

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the military area of Sarajevo, and I had personally known and contacted him since 1985.

After 12 days at the hospital in Koševo, Boriša Delić – a Muslim and Boris Tankosić – a Croat, both retired workers at State Security Service came to pick me up. They greeted me and asked who did this to me. They allegedly picked me up to take me home and they helped me to get to the car. During the ride, they told me that they would take me to the MUP since Minister Alispahić and State Security Under-secretary, Jozo Jozić, allegedly wanted to talk to me.

However, they brought me to the Central Prison and escorted me to a room on the third floor. They asked me to confess everything without saying what I was supposed to confess. They also gave me a sheet of paper to write my statement on, urging me to cooperate. About one hour later, they gave me an order for pre-trial detention which said I was suspected of divulging official secrets pursuant to Article 127 of KZ. In the evening, they came intoxicated and started asking me about my whereabouts while I was in service, about my friendships in my private life and so on. In the meantime, they withdrew the aforementioned order for pre-trial detention and gave me another decision that stated I that I was suspected of espionage pursuant to Article 128 took over from KZ of the SFRJ[14]. During the interrogation, prison guards entered the room and beat me, abused me, cursed me and did many other things in their presence. It lasted for a whole night and, before dawn, they escorted me to a cell on the fourth floor. After a short period of time they continued interrogating me, and I was beaten and abused again. After two days of the consecutive interrogation in the aforementioned way, they decided to type a statement which I signed.

I stayed for three more days in the Central Prison. Then, they transported me to the former JNA "Viktor Bubanj" barracks that was renamed to the "Ramiz Salčin" barracks. I was escorted to the cell number 11 on the mezzanine. Military prisons had been located here from before. I spent ten days in this cell and I was beaten the

[signature: Šušić B.]

[14] t/n: the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia

whole time by military police officers; i.e. I was beaten during the interrogations in the other room. Vuko Bogdanović from Ilidža was also in this cell. He had also been previously beaten and he helped me recover after the beatings during the interrogations. He is in Ilidža now, and he got out in October 1994.

The aforementioned Boriša Delić and Boris Tankosić visited the prison every day and participated in the interrogations. Besides them, a person who also attended the interrogations was a military prosecutor Ljubomir Lukić – a Serb who had been an attorney in Sarajevo before the war. He emigrated in 1994 and currently resides in France.

One day, while patrolling the prison, Himzo Dolan – the prison warden who used to be a Warrant Officer in the JNA and Senad Kreho – the President of the Military Court who was a judge and a prosecutor in the Lower Court, i.e. in the Prosecutor's Office II in Sarajevo came into my cell. They got interested about my case and I told them that I had been imprisoned without a decision issued. That same night, the military police officer Ramiz, who was the officer of the guard back then, came in. He used to work as a guard in the Foča Correctional Facility. He handed me an order for pre-trial detention which was retroactively dated ten days before, and which stated that I was suspected of espionage.

The next day, I was sent to cell number one on the mezzanine and I stayed there until 15th September 1993 when I was put in cell number seven. The guards kept beating me every day, mostly during night. There were 12 cells in this part of the mezzanine in total. They had bars instead of walls on the side next to the corridor. There were five more cells on the other side of the corridor. They were out of my sight and Muslims – members of the so called Army of BiH were imprisoned in those cells. They put covers on the bars of cell number one, so I could not see people passing through the corridor. Still, I could hear voices and cries of other prisoners.

During the investigation, I was interrogated by the investigative judge Vladimir Školjarić. I had known him from the time I studied at the Faculty of law. His office was on the

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Barracks' second floor. People present at the examination, besides the aforementioned prosecutor Ljubomir Lukić and an ex officio lawyer, Namil Silajdžić from Sarajevo. They persistently insisted that I had connections with Sead Rekić, a former Major in the JNA who was accused of five criminal offences and who was in prison at that time. I did not know him, but they claimed to have found Rekić's sniper at my place – which was not true. I denied these and other false accusations, but I had to sign a statement that had already been typed by Špoljarić. I was beaten by one of the guards, in their presence.

Around seven days later, I was called to attend the trial of Mario Vignjević, my former co-worker, a Serb. The judge was Fahrudin Teftedarija. He was suspected of illegal organizing an escape from Sarajevo. The prosecutor Lukić insisted that I witness against Vignjević, which I could not accept since I was not familiar with anything from his case. This was the reason why they beat me heavily after they had brought me back to my cell.

When I was transferred from cell number one to cell number seven, Borislav Herak was in cell number seven. Other prisoners had previously told me, during the rare walks we were allowed to have, that he is the main provocateur and that I should avoid him. He acted insane and every day went to the Court President, Senad Kreho's office. He brought cigarettes: Marlboro, Winston and others from there. He tried to provoke me in different ways. He was sentenced to death under charges of a rape, genocide and other most serious offences. Although insane, he was used in detention by investigative organs as a provocateur and a delator. He was not beaten. He had lived in Pofalići prior to the war. He was an idler and a marginal figure with a mentally incompetent behaviour. He walked around cemeteries a lot in order to drink alcohol during funerals.

Based on Herak's problematic and false testimony, Damjanović Sretko from Vogošća was sentenced to death and Nada Tomić, also from Vogošća, was sentences to three years in prison and is now living in Vogošća. Some of Herak's letters testify of his personality. I managed to take one of them out and it is in my possession now. Seven days later, Herak was taken to the Central Prison and they occasionally brought other people to my cell.

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On 30th October 1993, I was taken to the trial in front of the Judge Davor Jukić. Among other judges in the Criminal Council, I recognized Judge Muhidin Kapo. I had previously personally seen him and other guards in cell number six, beating Dragan Zelić from Ključ. He was arrested on the line of contact. Senka Nožica, an attorney from Sarajevo, was appointed as an ex officio counsel. I was sentenced to 13 years in prison. The prosecutor, Lukić, was not content and demanded a higher punishment.

After the verdict was handed down, I was brought back to my cell and got severely beaten by guards that night. The guards who beat me the most were Esad Kuruglija; his brother Ado; Muftić whose first name I do not know; and Sakib, the officer of the guard. They were all guards in the Foča Correctional Facility prior to the war.

Besides them, persons who stood out in abuse and physical torture of prisoners in the "Viktor Bubaj" barracks were, as far as I could notice: Babić whose name I do not know, around 19 years old, blond, resided in Pale before the war; Baltić alias "Balta", around 25 years old, from Sarajevo; Rifet alias "Role", around 26 years old, from Sarajevo; Kemo Dautović from Sarajevo; Suljević whose first name I do not know, he worked in the "Knjaz Miloš" mineral water warehouse before the war; Ramiz, the officer of guard from Foča, and others whose names I cannot recall at this moment. In most cases, the prison warden, Himzo Dolan, was present during the tortures and abuse of prisoners.

Serbian soldiers on the battle lines were captured in the basement of the prison. I was not in the basement, but I could hear screams and cries of prisoners down there. Novo Tadić could testify of what was happening in those cells. He survived tremendous tortures and lives in Vogošća now. Military police of the 101st Brigade of the so called Army of BiH were in charge of the prisoners in the basement. Commandant of this group at that time was Nedžad Ajnadžić, who was an active military personnel before the war, and now he is Commandant of the First Corps of the so called Army of BiH.

During my imprisonment in the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, none of the prisoners died under torture. At that time, as far as I

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remember, imprisoned persons were: Nikola Andrić who is in Grbavica now, sentenced to six years in prison, got beaten a lot; Mladen Lubura who was sentenced to five years in prison and exchanged on 15th October 1995 and lives in Ilidža now; Nenad Gvozdenović who was released in an exchange in May of 1994 and lives in Belgrade now; Davor Janjić who was sentenced to one and a half year in prison, he was released in May of 1994 and lives in Belgrade now; Goran Ždralo who was sentenced to three years in prison, he was released in April of 1995 and lives in Ilidža – Doglodi now; Borislav Herak who was sentenced to death and whom I had previously mentioned, he is in the Central Prison now; Sretko Damjanović who was sentenced to death, he is in the Central Prison now; Vuko Bogdanović who was sentenced to two years in prison for an attempt of escape from Sarajevo, he had been captured in prison in Hrasnica with his wife, who was also imprisoned in Hrasnica, they are in Ilidža now; Duško Petrović from Hrasnica, a former FAMOS football player, he is somewhere in Serbia now and he is familiar with everything that happened in prisons in Hrasnica; Božo Džorem, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses cult, after he was released from prison he was allegedly killed by a grenade together with his wife and child; Novo Tadić who was imprisoned as a soldier of the RS[15] and heavily abused, he is in Vogošća now; Đoko Đokić, around 65 years old, a lunatic who was sentenced for being a sniper and for a rape, he is still in the Central Prison; Zdravko Kekić, a former secretary in the Reljevo MZ[16] in Ilidža, he had a house in Buljakov potok, in June 1992 he was sentenced to one and a half year in prison for possession of a rifle and at the end of 1993 he was sentenced again to five years in prison for the alleged organizing of Serbs, he allegedly lives in Trnovo and he knows much about the sufferings of Serbs in Sarajevo, he was exchanged on 15th October 1995; Petar Mušić – Pero who was sentenced to five years in prison for not reporting the attempt of escape from Sarajevo done by Milenko Radanović – a worker on a gas station, he had a big house in Pofalići and now lives in Zrenjanin – his wife's place of birth, together with their child; Milenko Radanović who was sentenced to 15 years in prison, but his sentence was commuted to a sentence of five years, he is probably in Novi Sad now with his family; Rajko Čvoro, born in 1928, a former worker on a gas station, he was sentenced to five years in prison and lives in Pale now; and Dragan Zelić from Ključ, sentenced to eight years in prison as a member of the Army of RS, he was eerily abused and transferred to the Central Prison where he was murdered on 17th November 1993.

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[15] t/n: the Republic of Srpska

[16] t/n: local community

Since April 1995, the prison in the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, i.e. the "Ramiz Salčin" has been integrated into the civil central prison under the unique management of the Central Prison. The management and the guards of the prison have been assigned different posts in the barracks, or they have remained in the same positions – but under the management of the Central Prison.

I was transferred to the Central Prison on 1st November 1993. I had spent the first three days on the fifth floor, and then I was moved to the third floor. I was not abused in this prison, unlike the previous prison I had been to. The guards and other prison staff mostly maintained a professional relationship towards the prisoners. People who were beaten were usually individuals who allegedly violated house rules and disturbed peace. A person who stood out in the beatings was Hilmo alias "Kralj" – before the war, he was a guard in Foča, and now he is the officer of the guard in the "Ramiz Salčin" prison. By the way, he used to welcome the prisoners transferred from the barracks' prison and beat them up. As far as I could notice, there were around 30 convicted Serbs and 50 convicted Muslims. The number varied, and there were people with minor offence charges. The prisoners who committed minor offences and those with minor offence charges were taken to do different kinds of labour in the city.

The worst part was mental abuse and terror conducted in various ways, and it was something I could barely stand. During that time, individual persons were taken to the isolation in cell number five on the third floor. They were subjected to a special treatment there and suffered severe tortures.

On 13th November 1993, the guards called for: Milan Kolak, convicted for murder before the war and a famous prison delator; Mirsad Nimani, an Albanian from Sarajevo, convicted for a murder before the war, also a delator; Haris Ovčina, a multiple convict, junkie and a felon; Đoka Đokić and Dragan Zelić. They took them to the isolation cell – cell number five, without stating reasons for that.

On 17th November 1993, we were informed that Dragan Zelić hanged himself in that cell. However, when he was released from the cell, Haris Ovčina told us, in front of other prisoners, that a

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person who strangled and hanged Zelić was Mirsad Nimani. Zelić had previously been knocked out by "leponex" pills.

At that time, the head of the educational service was Ahmed Elezović from Bihać who was an extreme nationalist and kept a direct contact with delators such as Nimani, Ovčina and Kolak. A few days after Zelić's hanging, Elezović disappeared from the Central Prison. The prison warden was Meho Sobo, a pre-war judge in Foča and an extreme nationalist. He was replaced on 15th September 1994 by Esad Osmanbegović from Sarajevo, who was a former inspector of the Ministry of Justice. Ten days later, Ahmo Elezević returned to his old work place; i.e. he returned before Osmanbegović became a warden.

On 24th February 1995, Dragan Zelić's scenario repeated. This time, Jovo Ninković from the settlement of Pionirska Dolina, around 60 years old, was set aside together with the afore mentioned persons. He was transferred to cell number five, which became an infirmary in the meantime. Jovo Ninković died in this room. He was most likely poisoned.

The aforementioned Herak and Damjanović had stayed in the Central Prison, in the cell reserved for the death penalty prisoners – the so called "death cell", in the separate rooms.

I was released from the Central Prison in an exchange on 26th September 1995, together with Novo Tadić, Dragan Ristović, Alaksa Slavnić and his son Milorad.

Even today, I suffer consequences of torture and abuse I was subjected to in the "Viktor Bubanj" prison and barracks. I have most problems with kidneys. I have kidney issues and I had been urinating blood continuously for about a year and a half. I have difficulty breathing and it is hard for me to move around. The movements in my right hand are limited in the area of my right fist. My wife and my child managed to exit on 20th February 1995 with her documents modified to her maiden name.

I want to mention that, according to my findings, the Security Services Centre in Sarajevo has a list of 4.200 Serbs who are

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forbidden to leave Sarajevo. My wife was on this list, too, but she managed to leave with the documents with her maiden name on them.

Around 20 more Serbs were left in the Central Prison in Sarajevo. They were sentenced to different prison sentences. Three of them were sentenced before the war, for a murder. Except for the aforementioned persons, people who are still in prison are: Savo Ivanović, around 69 years old, convicted to 15 years prison, he has been imprisoned since 1992 and have experienced severe tortures; Čedo Savanović from Kikinda, he was sentenced to five years in prison as a member of the Army of RS, he experienced severe tortures and managed to avoid his eyes being ripped out and other things; Mirko Božić from Velešići, he was sentenced to five years in prison; the aforementioned Đoko Đokić; Milenko Mijatović from Rajlovac, he was sentenced to seven years in prison; Borislav Mitrović who was sentenced in June 1992, he was a former State Security Administration employee; Miroljub Torbica, a former MUP employee who was sentenced to five years in prison, he is in a serious health condition and he is disabled; the triplets Miloš, Nenad and Aleksandar Bokan form Sarajevo, born in 1976, they were sentenced to one and a half year in prison for the attempt of illegal crossing; Ilija Jovetić from Sarajevo who was sentenced to two years for rejecting the mobilisation; Predrag Novaković who was sentenced to two years in prison for an illegal attempt of escape; Predrag Vekić from Sarajevo who was sentenced to two years in prison for the attempt of escape from Sarajevo; Stevo Kostić from Sarajevo who was sentenced to a year and a half in prison for the attempt of crossing to the Republic of Srpska; Branislav Lazić from Sarajevo who was sentenced for an illegal attempt of crossing to the territory of the Republic of Srpska; Branko Arsovski who was sentenced to four months in prison for rejecting to work in the Civil Protection; and Slobodan Jovičić who was sentenced to four months in prison for rejecting to work in the Civil Protection.

This is all I had to say on the previous matters, the record was loudly dictated to me and everything I stated was entered in it; I do not wish to read it, I accept it as my own and as such I sign it.

Examination ended at 11:55 PM.

[signature: Šušić B.]

RECORDNING CLERK

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JUDGE

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E X P L A N A T I O N

Information on the enemy force in Dobrinja area .

GORAN (Petar) STOJAKOV, born on 23.09.1958 in Vinkovci, with residence in Dobrinja, Grada Bakua street, No. 9/8

- this was written about, our note on the application of the method of work from 02.10.1992 (fled from Dobrinja)

Through further investigative actions, Stojakov stated information and details on the position of enemy forces, weapons, and morale of Muslim fighters. Among other things, the following observations were interesting for our assessments:

The shelter at the Heroja socijalističke borbe Square is secured with trenches at the entrance.

In the shelter - along the length of the skylight - the battalion is lined up and inspected by companies, each company for 15 minutes, and this lining up lasts from 07:15 until 08:15 hours.

The critical point of the Muslim position is the barricade consisting of several cars and sandbags towards Dobrinja IV.

The only way for ammunition and personnel to arrive is through the basements of the building with even numbers in AFŽ Street. The entrance is at number 10, the first balcony on the ground floor. You take the wooden stairs to climb the balcony from the passageway, go through the living room, hallway, and enter the basement.

The easiest way is to close the exit to the barricade at No. 2, where the exit is below the balcony. The balcony on the 2nd floor has been hit, which means that it is in our field of view and that it can be kept under fire.

When there was an attack on Dobrinja IV, Partizanske Olimpijade Street was kept under fire from our side, which caused a communication problem between buildings with even and odd numbers (I and II buildings towards our line.)

If the barricade is kept under fire, the entire first line is cut off.

There are no guards on the sides of the buildings - the roofs are connected, so if

any side is breached - then it is possible to control the whole front line.

Only the first fighting line is fortified (trenches). There are no mines laid down (to Stojanov's knowledge), which could be seen from their attack movements in all directions.

The only minefield is beneath the hedgehogs - anti-tank and anti-infantry mines are laid down at the reserve defense line, which cuts the Lukavica road at the line in V. Maglajića street - halfway between the heating plant and the intersection towards Dobrinja IV.

From V. Maglajića street to the Lukavica road, a trench was dug that reaches the hedgehogs laid down - and from the road to Sakić's stables.

In V. Maglajića street, four trenches were dug in two lines, this is a reserve position for the osa[17].

The position in V. Maglajića street is held by a department from the 1st company of the 1st battalion - former military police officers, stripped of their authority. Mile DAMJANIĆ is among them - he was at the Vukovar battlefront, and he is the fiercest. The main looters are in this group. That is a crew of 10 people, all mostly drunk - in front of the other entrance, at number 4, they set two guards overnight.

In this area in V. Maglajića street, there are no more guards, except in the shelter.

There is a headquarters in one part of the shelter where another guard is located. The guards are armed with hunting rifles - shotguns.

The civilian police are located in the café "Baltazar," in front of which there is usually a POV parked.

- Military police are in "Borovo." Their commander is SENAD MEHINOVIĆ, and his deputy is (illegible) (he is the one according to whom the Sebrs should be slaughtered).

- The headquarters of the brigade is in "Gavrilović" and the pharmacy.

- The information center is between the game club and (illegible) market.

The prison is in the store "Sunce" behind Privredna bank. The main person there is SEFKO Muslić, from Foča.

Armored personnel carrier is located across "Borovo" near the bar "Bristol" where the UNPROFOR often are. The civilians are not allowed to contact UNPROFOR.

On 10/09, it was fired from the DShK at the UNPROFOR convoy that moved along the road towards Vraca.

[17] T/N - RPG launcher

A certain Muslim soldier OMERICA said that a Serb woman was captured under charges that she was a sniper - they wounded her in the leg and then put a timed bomb on the back and directed her towards Nedarići when the bomb activated (this was done by two Muslim brothers from Ilidža).

Juka Prazina sold them (illegible) grenades for 100 German marks apiece. In order to get to the ammunition, they have to bribe the warehouse clerks with food and other things, for which they specifically mentioned Vikićs, and in order to get the basic fighting equipment.

A police officer from Stari Grad came with his unit on 01 and 02/09 during the attack on Dobrinja - IV. His name is JASMIN (illegible). He commented on the deaths of the Muslim soldiers during the attack. He has a very bad opinion about the Muslim authorities, which the following comment proves in its own way:

"It is a known fact that the Chetniks never reached Stari Grad, and yet it has been looted. All the goods and money went through the hands of a certain (illegible), former President of the municipality, and now a commander. He is said to be "worth" about three million marks."

The police officer JASMIN said that he was working on arresting soldiers and civilians, smugglers and fifth column members in the presence of his unit in Dobrinja. He also had an explanation of why the City hall was burned. He said that it was fired on because there was a multi-barrel rocket launcher nearby, and when the MBRL was hit, the City hall caught fire in the explosion.

Together with this, STOJANOV also noticed and observed the information that he received by listening to the comments of the Muslim soldiers, such as:

- In the tunnel beneath the neighborhood Ciglane there are three tanks, one of which is a T-84, and which occasionally go out of the tunnel and fire towards Poljine.

- Tripod howitzers are at the position in Velešići - there is a battery of howitzers, unknown number.

- From Dobrinja II towards the neighborhood Nedarići, where the trolleybus operates - Olimpijska street - there is a tunnel beneath the road which exits at the line towards the neighborhood where a mosque is located.

- When they come down from Mojmilo, where the forest was cut down near the transmission line pole, there is around 50 meters of clear space that they can use to come directly down to the electrical substation in Dobrinja II (that is one passageway - below it, there is a bunker that was fired at).

The other passageway is on the line Keli - Žarka Zgonjanina street.

The last house from Keli towards the hill, their guards occasionally come down there (the house is not damaged).

The Muslim soldiers that went to Igman said that they went along the airport runway. From Dobrinja I, they go directly to the airport, when they reach the runway, they move along it, go around it and go across to Butmir (that is the position between the Kasindoslka street and the runway).

Talking to the soldiers, Mirsad KARIĆ said that an "Olovo Muslim Brigade" is being formed in Sarajevo, that it will have around 2,000 men and that it should be secretly transferred from Sarajevo to Olovo.

The same Karić said about himself that he had been at the old airport, before the war, for training for six months.

The commander of the unit in the private neighborhood across Dobrinja II, near the mosque, is IBRO CAR (towards Nedarići).

Location: Lukavica Statement taken by: Captain of the 1st class

Date: 6th October,1992. Desimir Šarenac

[handwritten numbers: 178/96-2] [handwritten numbers: 52]

No. KI Kri. 21/96

WITNESS EXAMINATION RECORD

dated 4th March 1996 before Investigative judge of the Municipal court in Kikinda in the criminal proceedings against unknown perpetrator due to criminal offence from Article 142 of KZ[1] .

Investigative - Judge

Radivoje Spasić Witness,

Recording clerk, VOJISLAV ČANGALOVIĆ

Olgica Miladinov

Persons present at witness xamination:

public prosecutor

[no entry]

defendant

[no entry]

defence attorney

[no entry]

Examination began at 11 AM

The witness was warned that he/she is obliged to speak the truth and that he/she must not keep anything secret, was warned of the consequences of giving false testimony, as well as the fact that he/she is not obliged to answer specific questions if it is probable that he/she would thus expose himself/herself or a close relative to severe shame, considerable material damage, or to criminal prosecution (article 229 of ZKP[2]), thus the witness gives following answers to general questions:

1) Name and surname VOJISLLAV[3] [sic] ČANGALOVIĆ

2) Father's name Manojlo

3) Occupation physician - dentist

4) Temporary place of residence Nakovo, the 49 Ml. Stojanović Street

5) Place of birth Sarajevo

6) Year of birth 1940

7) Relationship to the defendant [no entry]

[1] Translator's note: Criminal Code

[2] t/n: Criminal Procedure Code

[3] t/n: correct name is VOJISLAV

Next, the witness states the following regarding the case itself:

The witness was warned that he is obliged to speak the truth and that he must not keep anything secret, and warned of the consequences of giving false testimony, he states:

I resided in Sarajevo, the 29 Gornji Velešići Street. I was arrested by Muslims on 25th November 1992 at my home. Twelve more Serbs who lived nearby were arrested. These are: Todor Ristović, Dragan Ristović, Trifko Božić, Mirko Božić, Željko Kljajić, Drago Šoja, Ostoja Šoja, Jovo Kretija, Živko Kretija, a man whose last name was Krunić, Milorad Šekara. We were arrested by soldiers of some motorised Sandžak brigade whose headquarters was in Pofalići. We were taken to facilities of former the "Vranice"construction company. My son-in-law, Mladen Glogovac, was arrested with me. A "Golf" vehicle took us to the "Vranice". We were placed in a basement where I met my neighbour, Trifko Božić. He was arrested one day before me. He was in bruises and beaten. He complained that he was cold so I covered him with a dirty blanket I found there. He told me that if my son-in-law, Glogovac, gets free, he should go to his family and tell them to hide his daughter Nataša. Muslims probably blackmailed him and threatened to harm his daughter. I have to describe how everything happened. Namely, before the secession of BiH[4] I had seen Muslims arming and carrying weapons. Those persons weren't uniformed, but they were civilians. In the beginning of March in 1992, Trifko and Mirko Božić were walking down the street, Muslims asked who was walking, they replied it's Trifko and Mirko, and Muslims reacted by cursing their Chetnik[5] mother and shot in their direction. Since that, we felt threatened. We went to the Community Centre to report this. They told us there that there is a possibility for the Crisis Management Committee to expand to Serbs too, because Serbian citizens were threatened as well. It was their deception because they did nothing after that. Regarding the expansion of the Crisis Management Committee, I attended one of the meetings held in Željko Kljajić's garage. I didn't participate in the discussion, I was late for the meeting, and it isn't true that I organized it. They talked about expending the Crisis Committee in the the Velešić Community Centre. They also talked about arming of Muslims, and our need to protect our bear lives. Muslims got the weapons in the Community Centre, too.

Later, Serbs offered me a rifle, which I didn't accept, but rather gave it to Ostoja Šoja. That same rifle was found in his possession later.

I spent only 2, 3 hours in basement of the "Vranice", and it was night when they took me to the hearing in another room. There was a burning candle in the room and, as soon as I got in, someone hit me on my left shoulder so hard, that I immediately fell down. Muslims were laughing. The investigator asked me to sit on a chair with a chair

[4] t/n: Bosnia and Herzegovina

[5] t/n: a derogatory nickname for Serbs, origin comes from Serbian guerilla forces in WWII

back facing him and my hands leaned on the chair back. He asked me to look at him. He questioned me about weapons, ham radio device, where I kept cannon and so on. To me, it seemed stupid, ridiculous. There were "executioners" on both sides, they kicked with legs and hit with bats my back, neck, forearms, upper

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legs. For example, when he asked me where my cannon was, I was surprised, i.e. I denied it, and those executioners kicked me. Then they knocked me on the ground and kicked me. I don't know the investigator, nor the other present Muslims. They beat me so hard that I was all in bruises. I didn't lose consciousness. I spent about two hours in this room. They asked me if I was a member of Serb Democratic Party, and I denied it even though it was a legal party. Then they took me to a bigger room and when they opened the door, one of people who took me there hit me with something in my neck so hard that I flew towards the other wall and hit the opposite wall with my head. I was probably kicked with the leg, bit I am not sure. There, I found Drago Šoja and Jovo Kretija. They were both beaten. I was there for 15-20 minutes, and then they took me out and let me go home. I was thinking about the reason why they let me go so I thought they probably let me to die of injuries sustained. I walked for about 50 m and when I came to an overpass, I fell down due to the inanition. I thought I should get away from there as quickly as I can, so I walked for another 50 m, to a "Renault 4" vehicle, that is to an intersection where I couldn't orientate even though I have been there many times. Leaning on the "Maršal Tito" barracks' fence, I got to a post office and a "Renault 4" vehicle that was burnt. I waited there until morning. I was vomiting in that vehicle, feeling very thirsty. In the morning, I wanted to get out of it, but I couldn't. I asked passengers to help me, I stopped the vehicles, but nobody helped me. By this vehicle, there was a stand with an awning for selling goods and, while leaning on that stand, I managed to get out of the vehicle, but then I lost consciousness. I remember someone pulling my collar and saying: "He's alive". Then, I someone got on a bus since I wanted to go my friend's place, but I couldn't get off on the bus stop, so I drove on the bus till the end of the route. The driver told me they were going to go back. I remember getting off the bus and lying on a bench in a park near the bus. I was taken by a vehicle to my friend's place in the 1 Blagoje Perović Street. However, there were guards in the entrance to the building. There, they arrested me again and took me to the police station in Pofalići again. Actually, they took me to the regular police station in that place. From here, I was taken to the ambulance, and then I was taken to the Faculty of Medicine Hospital in Sarajevo, where doctors diagnosed seven rib fractures on the left side, acute kidney injury, contusions on my arms, legs and body,

blood pressure 60/40. They put a chest tube on the left side of my thorax. When they took me to a hospital room, other patients protested by saying that a chetnik shouldn't be with them, so they moved me to another room. I was alone in that room, and there was also a guard with an assault rifle. I was investigated by Ismail Biber there. He was probably a member of the military police. That investigator came every Monday and he didn't beat me. One of the guards beat me during his colleague's visit to me. He entered the room and asked me where my ribs were broken, and then he hit me with his fist a few times on my chest. I started yelling and a head nurse came. This same guard and his colleague stayed in the room when the nurse asked me if they were beating me and, because of the fear that I would be beaten again, I said they didn't. However, she said that

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they did beat me and called the doctor. After this, that guard was removed and he didn't guard me anymore. I was guarded by a man named Toni, who was fair. I don't know the names of the doctor and the nurse. I spent a little bit more than a month in the hospital, and on 6th January 1993, Biber came to the hospital and they took me to the Sarajevo Central Prison. They couldn't find one of my shoes at the hospital, so I left with one shoe, and I only had a slipper with no socks on my left foot. It was very cold, -17°C. In the central Prison, I spent a night in room No. 80 on the fifth floor. There was no glass on the windows, but metal shutters instead. It was very cold in that room. On the third day, they took me back to the hospital. I stayed about ten more days at the hospital, end from there I was taken to the second internal. On 27th, actually on 26th or 27th January, the warden form the former "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, Dolan Ramiz, came and I was taken to prison in the barracks. I was questioned there by a judge Fuad Teftedarija. He was really fair. Then, I was transferred to the cell No. 1, where later one more person came, and then I was sent to other cells. The cells' dimensions were 4x1.65 m, and sometimes they put even 12 people there. I was charged for armed insurrection and weapons. I wasn't beaten in that prison. I know they beat other prisoners. I don't know the names of investigators or prison guards who beat other prisoners.

The food was really poor in that prison. We were given half a piece of bread and half bitter tea, and a little bit of stew for dinner. We didn't have lunch. I was judged by Judge Davor Jukić and I was sentenced to 4 years in prison. I was there from May 1994 and I was exchanged on 6th October 1994. I was in the Central Prison from May until the exchange. Regarding Trifko Božić, he was arrested together with me, beaten in the facilities of the "Vranice" company and therefore died the next day.

He was buried at the old Orthodox cemetery in Koševo. I want to point out that conditions in the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks have become more bearable since the time when the delegation of the International Red Cross Committee visited the prison in March 1993. I know that, I think at the end of 1993 or the beginning of 1994, a butcher form Novo Sarajevo, Nešković, was murdered on the fifth floor. Investigated prisoners were on that floor. At that time, I was cleaning that floor and when I came in the room where he was lying on the ground, a guard removed me from there. I heard his name from other prisoners. I didn't learn who killed him, nor his name. We were called various names in the Central Prison. In cases of visits from journalists or Arab countries representatives, they would introduce us as prisoners, and in cases of visits from humanitarian organizations representatives, they introduced us as prisoners, convicts or conspirators. Before exchanges in the central Prisons, Muslim authorities would bring one Muslim criminal into each room, and that person would spy on us; when humanitarian organizations representatives visited, they would say that there are Serbs, Muslims and Croats among the prisoners, and that they all live under same conditions. One of these criminals was Radža Maher, who was convicted for the murder of two Muslim soldiers.

[signature: illegible]

- 5 -

He himself told us that, as a member of Muslim police, provided there are no others and witnesses, threw people form second and higher floors out of windows. These criminals told us which Serbs they murdered while digging the trenches. I heard there is a rocky place called "Kazan" on Trebelić[6] [sic], and that many Serbs were murdered there. Actually, it is some kind of a chasm. One woman from Sarajevo whose name I don't want to mention told me that one Albanian told her she should take off her black mourning clothes since snipers shoot women in mourning clothes in Sarajevo, presuming they are Serbs, and then they make it look like it was Serbs who shot. Actually, it was done by Muslim snipers.

This is all I had to say.

I forgot to say that, in Velešići, before my arrest, Muslims murdered Ristovićs, a family of five, in their home. They murdered Krsto Buha and burnt him in his home.

This is all I had to say.

Warned witness states that he does not wish to read the record since he heard it as it was loudly dictated, he accepts it as his own and as such signs it with no comments.

Ended at 12:40 noon.

[6] t/n: correct name of the settlement is Trebević

Investigative Judge,	[stamp: Republic of Serbia	Witness,
[signature: illegible]	Autonomous Province of	[signature:
Recording clerk:	Vojvodina	illegible]
[signature: O Miladinov]	Kikinda]	

1st SARAJEVO MOTORISED BRIGADE

INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED

Date: 16/02/1994

OFFICIAL NOTE

Info regarding defector's knowledge on the situation in the town, crimes against the Serbs and some smuggling channels.

MIODRAG PETROVIĆ, a Serb; father's name PERO; mother's name MILENA, maiden name Blanuša; born in Sarajevo on 08/10/1956; Address: 3 VI Proleterske Brigade 3 street, Novo Sarajevo; BSc of Civil Engineering by occupation; employed in the "Hercegovina" Construction Company as a construction manager; married to Dobrila, maiden name RISTANOVIĆ; no children; His parents live at Grbavica, in the 4a Zagrebačka street; his sister Mirjana lives in Belgrade, served Army in 1983, in Sinj, 117o1 engineering unit, limited capability for the Army service due to bad sight and multiple shoulder dislocation; he plans to join the Army of RS, if possible in Grbavica.

Miodrag Petrović crossed over to Grbavica on 14/02/1994 at about 05.30 AM starting from the Pere Kosorića Square, over the M. Đuraškovića street and the "Strojorad" company, together with four other persons. His acquaintance from the digging duty named ACO, enabled a contact with a person who organized the crossing for 2000 DM per person. Since his wife also got out of the town together with him, they did not have enough money and had to sell all valuables from their flat.

The motive for the defection is impossibility of further life amongst the Muslims, his wish to repatriate with the family that lives on the Serbian side and his wish to live again as a free man.

At the beginning of the war the defector was appointed as a trustee in charge of distribution of the humanitarian aid in his local community and as a housing association chairman in the skyscraper he lived in. On 17/05/1992 the Order for the general mobilization was issued in the Muslim part of Sarajevo and he joined the Civil Protection Unit. In October that year he was issued the Decision on the limited capability for the Army service from the Military Doctors' Board, based on the ophthalmology findings, which was a precondition for getting the approval to be engaged in work service. Thanks to his friend STJEPAN TRLIN, a Croat, he got the work duty in the "Hercegovina" Construction Company he was already employed in. Since the end of June 1993 the Municipality occasionally engaged all employees of the company for digging. He was digging a dugout at *Mijatovića kosa* in November 1993, near the fallen electric power pole. The dugout is situated near the house with several balconies, probably planned to be used as an Outpost HQ. A trench from there leads to the bunkers, covered by round logs and soil. He found out that the guard shifts were changed at nights, every 24 hours and that there were about 15 soldiers, and that the said part of the front line was considered unsecure due to proximity of our positions. He heard there from a Muslim, who was demobilized and transferred to the labour unit, that they had been digging a tunnel in the Milinkladska street for three months and reached the school (probably Police Academy). He worked on transportation of sleepers in the area of the Ugorsko-Šaban's house in January 1994. The sleepers were taken from the side track of the new railway station and transported with trucks to the Barice settlement and from there taken to a small hill, where the engineers took it over.

The access to the place, where the engineers installed the sleepers was not allowed, so he does not know the data regarding the location and disposal of the bunkers and firing positions and number of soldiers.

Lots of people got killed or wounded while digging and he gives an example when two men got wounded by a shell during digging toward Vogošća. They were allowed to take the casualties from there, but others were not allowed to find shelter in the trenches at gunpoint.

According to a statement of a Croat soldier, in January 1994 on the occasion of the attack to the Hrasno hill, a squad of 17 people, amongst which 2 Muslims, were ordered to take over a slope. They refused the order and were taken to the "Viktor Bubanj" prison to be interrogated there and after that transferred to the labour unit. It was later discovered that they had been sent directly to a mine field to demine it with their own bodies.

At the New Year the Muslims planned to occupy Grbavica at any cost before the negotiations in Geneva start, in order to refute the argument of dividing Sarajevo. After failing to do it, they tried to provoke the anger of the World Community against the Serbs, staging well known incidents.

Just before getting out, the defector heard that the Muslim Army leaders planned to deploy significant forces out of Sarajevo. They would be replaced by the police forces, and the police forces would be filled with the persons of limited ability and older individuals.

In some parts of the town the Serbs are not allowed to sell their personal belongings, especially in Alipašino Polje and Stari Grad, in which one could see the graffiti saying: "Do not buy from the Serbs, it will be ours anyway".

A list with the names of SDS members and a list of the ones, who were issued the weapons, were found in the flat of PREDRAG TANASIJEVIĆ, who left the town at the beginning of the war. Tanasijević worked in the Municipality Centre as a representative of the SDS in the Cadastral Office in charge of geodetic and communal affairs.

At the beginning of the war, before the Muslims entered the "Zrak" factory, JOZO PERIĆ hid some very expensive and valuable instruments and destroyed some of them. He told Petrović that in confidence, noting that he had some very important information, since he was still in charge of security in the "Zrak" factory. Perić is married to Danica, a Serb, who lives in the 115 Lenjinova street, in Grbavica with two their children, and he wants to cross over to our side.

The defector learned that the Muslims had brought to the town through the tunnel beneath the airport runway certain amounts of nitro-glycerine rifles to be used as the anti-tank weapons, which are now stored in the "Maršal Tito" barracks. The "Stinger" and "Strela" rocket-launchers were brought in by the same channel. All the weapons are new, folded in cellophane and stored in oil. He heard this from the acquaintance MIRSAD HAJRULANOVIĆ[1], who works in the mentioned storage.

Petrović says that the "Patriotic League" for Grbavica was established even in September 1991 with the so called left and right wing. They had a test mobilization

[1] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: surname illegible, looks like Hajrulanović

in the "Vaso Pelagić" Community cultural centre with special attention to practicing and organizing medical service. He was told that by FIKRET DIZDAREVIĆ, who was a member of the "Patriotic League" since its foundation. He lived in Grbavica before the war and his father was killed there by a Muslim sniper. He heard from the soldiers of the former Caco's brigade that 7 soldiers of that brigade got killed and 44 wounded during the massacre at the "MARKALE" market place.

Most crimes against the Serbs were committed at the beginning of the war in the "risky" parts of the town. The defector underlines the crimes, committed by NUSRET ŠIŠIĆ "DEDO", who boasted to had killed 400 Chetniks in Alipašino Polje. He also considered as "Chetniks" the pregnant women whose husbands escaped to the Serb side. He would just push many Serbs through the windows of the flat where he found them.

There were situations in the "Markale" market place, which was called "Chetniks' market", because it had never been shelled, that Caco's men would capture some Serb, took him to a nearest courtyard and killed him.

Some acquaintance heard from a lawyer named BLAGOJA BRATIĆ, who worked in the "Viktor Bubanj" prison that he was present when one Caco's sniper was making a statement, who gave an example that Caco used to come to the the "Viktor Bubanj" prison and would take about 40 Serbs for digging. He would take them somewhere in the foot of the mountain of Trebević and killed half of them with a sledgehammer, specially made of a missile wing and brought back the other half, explaining that the truck turned over and that they were killed by the Chetniks.

At the end of January a boy and a girl, both 17 years old, were killed in a flat in the Braće Ribara street. The boy was killed with a shot to the back of his head and the girl was slaughtered and after that they turned on the gas in the flat and locked it. The surname of the young man was MU-*illegible*-ČIĆ, and his father, who was supposed to go to Zenica as a lecturer at a military school, tried to commit suicide. The girl's surname was VUK and was a cousin of the said young man. Her father was an official in the Muslim MoI. There were 4300 DM stolen from the flat and the police did not allow TV crews to film anything in the flat.

Just before the "Markale" event, he was supposed to be exchanged with his wife and another friend of his at the Jewish cemetery. He found out that the exchange channel existed for a year, with other two, which were recently broken. The price of the crossing over was dictated by the both sides with the possibility of combining the way of exchange. According to the first variant, they were supposed to be exchanged for an older couple and a young man aged 21, who was engaged in digging at our positions for a longer period of time and was familiar with all our firing positions. According to the second variant, Petrović or his friend were supposed to cross over

first and bring back to the Muslim side a heavy machine gun, and then all of them to cross over to the Serb side and to give 3900 DM to a man, waiting for them on the other side. The name of a man, who organized the connection, was named HAR-illegible (he does not know the surname) asked for 300 DM apiece, but they were not supposed to speak about it at the location of the exchange. The massacre at the „Markale "market happened on the day of the supposed exchange and the crossing failed.

The defector has heard that the trade in weapons was being done in Stup. The contact at the place of smuggling is established with a sound of whistle. The smugglers on the Serbian side demand from the Muslim side not to take any ethnic Serb soldier with them at all to avoid possible identification. The organizer of smuggling on the Muslim side is ESAD PALDUM, the commanding officer of the 1st Motorized brigade.

He also heard from a Muslim, who lived in Čengić Vila and who is by origin from Stari grad, that the soldiers of the former JNA had been selling a box of ammunition for 400 DM apiece at the positions above Bistrik.

As for the specialised production facilities, he knows about "Uniklima", "ZRAK", "Vaso Miskin Crni", RTV building basement. The shells cartridges are produced in "ŽICA", just machining, and they are charged in the technical school. He heard it from a Croat, an engineer, who worked there.

The Muslims try to hide number of their casualties, but it leaked from their sources that they had lost at the time of the New Year about 70 soldiers at the position, which was held earlier by the HVO. They had a lot of casualties at Vrbanja and Hrasno hill in January.

According to him, UNPROFOR smuggled in petrol and other gods of interest, and there is a rumour that they take out the Serbs for the sum of 1000 DM.

PROPOSAL OF MEASURES: The individual is to be deployed to a unit, taking into consideration his health capabilities. If possible, we should meet his wishes to deploy him in Grbavica, where his parents live.

SECURITY OFFICER

Đorđe Kovač

No. KPU -78/97

RECORD OF WITNESS HEARING

Taken on 26 June 1997 before the Investigating Judge of the Basic Court [redacted] in the criminal case against N.N. on the count of felony based on the Article 143 of the Criminal Code.

INVESTIGATING JUDGE	WITNESS	NOTARY
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

Witness hearing also attended by Public Prosecutor:

_____

Defendant

_____

Defense Attorney

_____

Commenced at 9:00 o'clock

The witness has been cautioned that he is obliged to speak truthfully and not omit any information, he has been cautioned to the consequences of giving a false statement, and informed that he may choose to not answer certain questions if answering would likely expose himself or his immediate relatives to extreme humiliation, considerable financial damage or criminal prosecution (Article 229 of the Criminal Procedure Code). The witness provided the following answers to general questions:

1) Name and Surname: [redacted]

2) Father's Name: [redacted]

3) Occupation: [redacted]

4) Residence: [redacted]

5) Place of Birth: [redacted]

6) Date of Birth: [redacted]

7) Relationship to the defendant and the claimant: non-familial

On the case itself, the witness stated the following:

Prior to this war, I resided in Sarajevo, [redacted] Before the war broke out, the population of Sarajevo was Serb, Muslim and Croat, and the relations between those nationalities were good. We were friends, participated in family celebrations, and there were plenty of marriages between Serb men and Muslim women and vice versa.

This status was maintained until early 1991, when the referendum on the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held. I do not know the precise results of the referencum, but I do know for a fact that the Muslim population had started forming a Muslim army and police in their communities, and arming themselves. Serbs were fired from their jobs, and particularly from leadership positions. Muslims threatened Serb residents on a daily basis, claiming that all the Serbs from Sarajevo will be exiled and killed. The situation was becoming worse by the day, and in early 1992, the Muslim police began forcing entry into Serb homes and searching them. They started referring to all Serbs as Chetniks and threatened to arrest them and remove them from Sarajevo.

In april 1992, the Muslim police and the newly formed military units were setting up checkpoints in Sarajevo and at crossroads, preventing the Serb population from moving freely. The entire neighborhood of Dobrinja was cut off from Sarajevo with checkpoints, making it impossible to enter or exit the neighborhood. The movement of the Serb population was limited, seeing as all Serb men and women were being ID'd and told to stay close to their homes. Every excursion was risky, as the Muslim police requested a show of ID, providing a reason for leaving your home, and your destination. The Muslim police likely organized phone taps, and frequently made threats over the phone late at night, such as "What are you waiting for? Why aren't you leaving Sarajevo? Sarajevo is a Muslim city." The situation was bearable until the end of the month, because Sarajevo at that time still had JNA units,

whose protection the Serb population relied on. After the Yugoslav Army units left, Sarajevo, that is, the Serb population of Sarajevo, was left completely defenseless. Before the military units left, the Muslim Army would attack them in their barracks. Particularly drastic attacks occurred in the Dobrovoljačka Street, and on Skenderija after that. Those attacks by the Muslim army were broadcast on Sarajevo television, and the Muslims enthusiastically and happily supported the massacres of the military. Measures implemented by the Muslim army and police brought fear to the Serb population, later followed by numerous arrests of civilians, where they were led off in unknown directions. At that time, Sarajevo had various Muslim military groups led by Juka Prazina, Caco, Ćelo, and others. They took Serbs to camps, and they also had their own private prisons where Serbs were horrendously tortured and killed. Juka Prazina, specifically, had his own staging center in the Kralja Tomislava Street. Rumors had it that Serbs were hung by their feet, beaten, and died from the beatings at that center. Juka's men hung some of the detainees on electricity poles, and similar.

I myself was detained on 19 June 1992 in my apartment and taken to the Otoka neighborhood, where I was held in the basement of a high-rise. I was arrested by the Muslim police, and after my detention, as I was being taken into the high-rise basement, Muslim policemen were stationed on either side, who cursed out my Serb Chetnik mother and then beat me mercilessly. They struck me with the butts of their weapons, their booted feet, clubs, 50-60 cm long pieces of metal pipe, nd 60-80 cm long and 3 cm thick pieces of electricity cable. After the beating, I was thrown into a dark room that already had multiple people in it, but apart from feeling their presence, I was unable to see anybody. After a certain while, I was removed from that room and taken into another, with 5-6 Muslim police officers who began to interrogate me. They asked me for the whereabouts of my son, and requested his phone number after I told them that he was in [redacted], I gave them the number, and then they ordered me to go to a different room, call my son on the phone and ask him questions formulated by them. When I got to that room, a Muslim police officer sat on my shoulders, holding a knife in his hand, which he put to my throat, and I asked my son questions formulated by him after he established a connection. The police officer's questions were: whether my son was a Chetnik, where he was, is there a military unit there, the composition of the military unit, and similar. After this, I was horrendously beaten and then returned to the basement room. I was taken out again the next day and ordered to sit down, one of the police officers present at the scene drew his gun, threatening to kill me, and then pointed the gun at me and fired a bullet above my head. I was mercilessly struck with hands and feet, and then returned to the same room. Every day following that moment, Muslim police officers entered the room and ordered me to face the wall with my arms up and my hands on the wall, and then they struck me on my back with their feet, clubs and various wooden objects

until I collapsed to the ground. They ordered us to hit each other in that room, with our fists, feet and heads. The Muslim soldiers used flashlights during the beatings, so that was the first time that I was able to see that there were other people in the room. If we failed to hit each other hard enough, the police officers would then beat us until we passed out and then leave the room. This went on for 8 days, and each day, myself and the others in that room were beaten several times, particularly during the night. In all that time, we were only given two loaves of bread and a glass of water each. The room was horrendously humid, as water was dripping from the ceiling.

After being in that room, I was taken to the Viktor Bubanj Barracks and detained there. Prior to being taken to the Viktor Bubanj Barracks, the Muslim police officers took me out to a different room, where I saw upon entering that there were many weapons, automatic rifles, regular rifles, handguns, grenades, and next to the weapons, *šubara* hats with Chetnik insignia. I saw them filming all of this, and then they asked me who I was and where I lived. They demanded that I say when I was arrested, how I was treated, and send a message to the Serb population cautioning them to respect the Muslim authorities. Only after giving that statement, I was taken to the Viktor Bubanj Barracks. On my arrival at the Viktor Bubanj Barracks, a group of Muslims and soldiers waited for me at the gate, saying that they wanted to see the Chetnik voivode whom they had allegedly seen on television, and then I was taken to a cell and locked up there. I was held in the cell no. 6, and during my stay in that cell, I saw detained Serbs in other cells who looked terrible as they passed by my cell. They were bruised, bloodied and swollen, and walked with extreme difficulty. In the cell, I encountered Momo Vuković, a handball coach from Sarajevo, and another whose last name was Koprivnica. Momo Vuković and this Koprivnica man were horrendously beaten, so they just laid there, unable to stand up.

I was taken out of the cell no. 6 numerous times for hearings in a different room, and they asked me every single time whether I was a member of the SDS, whether my son was a member of the SDS, and other things. After all those hearings, I was taken before the Military Court on 7 September 1992, where I was sentenced to a prison term in the duration of 18 months for felony unlawful possession of a firearm, despite the fact that I did not own a firearm at all. The judgment came into force on 30 September 1992, and I was taken to the Central Prison in Sarajevo to serve out my term.

Due to the beatings I suffered during my stay at the prison in the high-rise and my extremely poor diet, I became ill and was taken to the Koševo Hospital for a certain length of time, I was treated for a month, and after my treatment, the UNPROFOR took me to the free territory in Lukavica.

During my treatment at the Koševo Hospital, I was mistreated and threatened by the hospital staff multiple times. The staff mistreated me by saying that I am getting medical treatment and enjoying my comfort while other Muslims were being killed by Chetnik mistreatment, and similar.

During my stay at the prison in the Viktor Bubanj Barracks, the following persons died of the relentless beatings they suffered:

1. Neđo Odžaković from Sarajevo, I do not know any other information on him.
2. Trivo Guslov from Sarajevo
3. Petar Kuzmanović from Sarajevo.
4. A Nikšić and a Ćaranić from Sarajevo, but I really do not know any other information about these persons.

I had personally seen Nikšić and Ćaranić at the Viktor Bubanj Barracks, being taken outside by police officer Kemo Dolovac, who doused them in cold water from a pressurized hose, and those two men died after that. I have listed the names I was able to find out, but I had personally witnessed many of the detained Serbs succumb to their injuries during my stay at the Viktor Bubanj Barracks. Bodies of the deceased were being taken out every day, wrapped in blankets, especially during the night. One night during my stay at the Viktor Bubanj Barracks, I clearly remember Slaviša Ćorović, a national team athlete in karate, being taken into the room, and immediately upon his arrival, he was taken to a hallway and screams and yells could be heard from that direction. After about a half hour, Slaviša was returned to the cell completely unconscious, beaten, bruised, bloodied and swollen all over. He was dragged into the cell by Muslim police officers, and he only regained consciousness after a length of time, asking where he was and what had happened to him. Slaviša was held at the Viktor Bubanj Barracks for 15 days, and he was taken away after that. To this day, I sincerely do not know what happened to Slaviša.

After my evacuation to the free territory, I learned from [redacted] that her husband Jovica Jugović had been killed by the Muslim police, that Andrija Mumović from the same apartment building was also killed, and that their remains were thrown into the Miljacka. [redacted] now resides in the [redacted]

That is all that I have to state at this time.

[no entry]
Name of the organ

[no entry]

Headquarters of the organ

Number of the Subject [no entry]

Date of origin: [no entry]

Secrecy type	Security Classification Level		
STATE SECRET			
MILITARY SECRET	Highly Conf.	Confidential	Internal
OFFICIAL SECRET	Highly Conf.	Confidential	Internal

Retention Period	
Year(s)	
Permanently	

Subject: [handwritten note: Vuković Marko – a surgeon]

[handwritten note: significant statement]

[no entry]

Total Number of	
Documents	Pages

[handwritten numbers: 91] KI Number: [handwritten note: KRI 20/96]
[handwritten numbers: 514] [handwritten numbers: 209]

RECORD OF WITNESS STATEMENT

dated 11th March 1996 before Investigative judge of the Lower court in Trebinje in the criminal proceedings against [no entry] due to criminal offence from Article [no entry] of KZ[1].

Bojan Stević - judge

[no entry]

Recording Clerk

Aleksandra Cvetković

Witness

Marko Vuković

People present at examination:

public prosecutor
[no entry]

defendant
[no entry]

defence attorney
[no entry]

Examination started at 2:45 PM.

The witness was warned that he/she is obliged to speak the truth and that he/she must not keep anything secret, was warned of the consequences of giving false testimony, as well as the fact that he/she is not obliged to answer specific questions if it is probable that he/she would thus expose himself/herself or a close relative to severe shame, considerable material damage, or to criminal prosecution (article 229 of ZKP[2]), thus the witness gives following answers to general questions:

1) Name and surname Marko Vuković

[1] Translator's note: abbreviation for the Criminal Code

[2] t/n: abbreviation for the Criminal Procedure Code

2) Father's name Vlado

3) Occupation a doctor – a surgeon and an orthopaedic

4) Temporary place of residence temporary Trebinje, phone

5) Place of birth Dragojevići, Foča

6) Year of birth 8th May 1936

7) Relationship to the defendant and aggrieved party [no entry]

Next, the witness states the following regarding the case itself:

– 2 –

I graduated from the Sarajevo Faculty of Medicine and started working as a doctor in Foča. I started working in Sarajevo in 1982 as a Sergical Clinic Deputy Direcor; in 1984, I was elected assistant professor at the Sarajevo Faculty of Medicine. I had been having those jobs until the beginning of war in the former BiH[3], and I was also recruited as a surgeon at the Trauma Clinic. My function in the business board allowed me to keep in touch with most of the doctors since all organisational – personnel tasks in surgical clinics went through me.

After a multiparty system was introduced, the Sarajevo parties made deals on the crucial executive positions. In my business board, a Croat was the president, and there were also one Serb (me) and one Muslim. No changes were made in this Board. However, as the war broke out, most of the Serbs in executive positions were rapidly replaced. The three of them who stayed in their positions got Muslim deputies. Those deputies basically started performing all the functions, leaving Serbs side-lined. By the way, horrible hatred against Serbs by Muslims and Croats in the leading positions of the HDZ[4] party was omnipresent at the beginning of war. Still, Croatian citizens had correct relationship with Serbian citizens – probably because they both were in a similar position when it comes to Muslims' attitude towards both of them.

Shortly before the war, when barricades were set up throughout the city, many Serbs were searched in the streets by members of the so called "Patriotic League"; their vehicles and other valuables were taken away from them on the streets. For example, my brother Simo Vuković had his "Golf" taken away from his yard.

Attitude of members of the "Patriotic League" towards members of the JNA[5] was especially interesting and surprisingly harsh. A large number of officers of the former JNA took off their uniforms and left their soldiers unprotected like wild animals exposed to haunters, and anyone could do whatever they wanted to them. Members of the "Patriotic League" and many Muslim citizens shot those soldiers with any weapons they had, they abused and murdered them. The only way for them to save themselves was to change into civil clothes. However, unfortunately, some of them did not have any civil clothes. Many soldiers tried to save themselves by running away to hospitals. Unfortunately, members of the "Patriotic League", i.e. the "Green Berets" quickly posted guards in all hospitals. They were catching those soldiers at the gates and taking them in unknown directions. We never saw those people again. Some of the soldiers

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[3] t/n: abbreviation for Bosnia and Herzegovina

[4] t/n: abbreviation for the Croatian Democratic Union

[5] t/n: abbreviation for the Yugoslav People's Army

resorted to self-mutilation, or they tried to escape to hospitals as injured persons. Members of the "Patriotic league" had the same treatment for both healthy and injured persons. Unfortunately, the "Patriotic League" formed some kind of a hospital in the Second Ward of the Urology Clinic during the first days of war. Severely injured Serbs were taken to this hospital. Serbian personnel were denied access to this hospital. I am personally familiar with the case of the former Head of the JNA Army Home in Sarajevo. 24 hours after a difficult operation, he was allegedly taken to the aforementioned ward. I have never seen him again after that. He had a Macedonian last name. They took him from the intensive care unit of the Trauma Clinic. I performed an operation on him one day. Immediately, a guard with automatic weapon was deployed next to him. The guard was an X-ray technician at the Institute of Radiology. I cannot recall his name and last name. The next day, the former JNA Head was taken away from the Clinic and I have never seen him again. I believe that, for a certain period of time, patients in this ward were controlled by Dr Faris Gavrankapetanović, a doctor in the ward that was led by me for a long period of time. I am not familiar with his treatment of the patients. I only know that one retired police officer known as "Mujica" secured the ward. He was known for his cruelty.

At that time, all media – especially the Television and the Radio of Sarajevo, promoted persecution of members of the JNA. The JNA members were accused of all sorts of things. They were showing Mufid Memija, a TV Sarajevo journalist with an automatic rifle in his hands, all night long on the TV. Hadžifejzović, the newsreader, was literally calling for culling. I am also familiar with the fact that Mr. Alija Izetbegović and Ms. Turković, who was later appointed ambassador in Zagreb, visited the slopes of the Trebević Mountain in summer of 1992. Numerous Serbs were murdered and ditched in the caves on these slopes. The person who stood out in doing this to Serbs was Mušan Topalović alias "Caco", a commander of the special militia and members of his group. After forcing Serbs to dig tranches, they shot at and murdered many of them. Some of the Serbs got killed on the first lines during armed conflicts. During the aforementioned visit, in front of the TV cameras or Radio – I am not sure, Alija told Mušan Topalović that he should listen to the Command and praised him for the work well done. Ms. Turković praised him even more. By the way, there was a practice at that time that each street, i.e. each neighbourhood in Sarajevo had its own armed

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Muslim group. Those groups called themselves different names. Mostly at night, those groups took away prominent Serbs. Their excuse was that they were taking them in for informative conversations. However, they murdered those Serbs. Dr Milutin Najdanović was murdered in this manner. He was a professor at the Clinic for Chest Surgery who got retired just before the war broke out. In the presence of his wife, daughter and grandchildren, he was taken away from his apartment and murdered nearby. He was stabbed with a knife nine times and shot in his mouth. He had lived in the settlement of Koševo, between the Sarajevo stadium and the hospital. There was a rumour that his murder was committed by a group led by a person nicknamed "Srna". The same group is responsible for the murder of Branko Milanović on the Vrbanja Bridge. Starović, an engineer, was murdered in a similar way. He had been a CEO at the "Traser" Sarajevo Company before the war. People who were murdered the most were the ones who were left alone in their apartments, including women. After the murders, the apartments would be occupied. A lot of Serbs were murdered in front of their apartments or in the stairways. The explanation was always the same: it was done by Serbian snipers. Dr Gojko Šurbart, a retired cardiologist, was murdered in the same way.

I would like to mention extremely brutal conduct of a person last named Topić, alias "Topa". He owned a café in the Alipašino Polje. Afterwards, he was appointed a military attaché somewhere in Germany. He and his two companions entered the operating room while I was operating on a soldier who suffered minor injuries. They lifted the soldier off the table, pushed me away and immediately started beating the wounded soldier in front of the operating room. They took him to a destination unknown to me. They did not beat medical personnel on that occasion. I am sure I could recognize Topić when I see him.

I would also like to specifically mention the events that took place in the Vase Miskina Street at the end of May 1992. I found out the majority of information on this event while I was in prison, and from Fahrija Karkin, a lawyer who shared a prison cell with me for three months. He was arrested for his criminal activities. By the way, he was initially Sefer Halilović's deputy. Halilović was the commandant of the "Patriotic League", while Karkin was in charge of civil matters. During his stay in prison, he talked with other people in the room. I could not sleep at the time, so I heard that the day before the event that took place in the Vase Miskina Street, members of the "Patriotic League" visited Muslim apartments near the aforementioned street and told the residents

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– 5 –

not to leave their apartments and not to go out in the city. At that moment, it became clear to me why so many Serbs got murdered and wounded while queuing for bread in part of the city with very few Serbs. I have to say that some of them were wounded with firearms, so I suppose that they were shot from a small distance at the same time when mine explosion happened in the same street. It is assumed that they were being shot at from the "JAT" skyscrapers located in the immediate vicinity. The truth is that only a minute after the explosion, two OB vans arrived in the Vase Miskina Street, although the TV station was at least 8 kilometres away from the place where the explosion happened. In my opinion, Kerkin was well acquainted with the preparations for the massacre which was, in my opinion, done by the Muslims. Similar thing happened in front of the City Hall when two persons were murdered. The ambulance vehicle arrived only 20 seconds after the event, although the ambulance is located two to three kilometres away from the place where the event took place. Everyone at the hospital believed that everything was framed.

Events that took place in and around the Sarajevo Maternity Hospital and the Ilidža Rehabilitation Institute are especially interesting. Primarius Dr. Marina Maglajić, a gynaecologist and a member of the business board of the SOUR[6], told me the day before that members of the "Patriotic League" entered the Maternity Hospital at around 10 AM. They were brought in by Dr Lutvo Hodžić, a paediatrician. That entire day and until the afternoon the following day, they were shooting on Serbian positions from the maternity Hospital. I want to point out to the fact that the Maternity Hospital is located on a hill ascending above Sarajevo and the area towards Vogošća. It was only the next day at around 4 PM when Serbs attacked the Maternity Hospital, when the hospital had long been abandoned. I also want to point out to the fact that no infants, no new mothers and no medical staff were injured – meaning that they had previously been evacuated for those purposes.

A more drastic case took place at the Ilidža Rehabilitation Institute. The day before – I cannot recall the exact date – members of the "Patriotic League", i.e. the "Green Berets" from the settlement of Hrasnica brought weapons on the third floor of the Institute. Some of the members changed into patients' clothes, while another group arrived in white coats the next day. Shooting from the third floor, they murdered around 20 Serbs in the park. Later, while defending themselves, Serbs set the third floor on fire, but there were no injured patients. The patients were sent down to the first and the ground floor.

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[6] t/n: abbreviation for the Composite Organisation of Associated Labour (COAL)

I would like to mention a statement given by Dževad Softić, a professor of gynaecology. In my office at the Clinic, he said the following: "Four women with a referral came to my office for a pregnancy termination. When I asked them how many men raped them and where it happened, each one of them told me that they had not been raped, but they were instructed to say so in exchange for certain privileges". I also want to point out to the fact that all of the women were Muslim, as well as the doctor.

I have witnessed grenades falling on property of the "Koševo" hospital on several occasions. The grenades hit the Trauma Clinic in my immediate vicinity twice. However, it was always preceded by a series of shootings performed by the Muslim military below the Trauma Clinic, where some kind of their school was located. Later, we would always take cover as soon as they started shooting from that school on Serbian positions. The Clinic was approximately 15 metres away from the Faculty of Civil Engineering, where this school was located.

Just when the war broke out, I met Omer Sefić at the hospital's property. He was a Muslim lawyer whom I had operated before the war, and he invited me for a coffee at his place. He led me to the administration building of the Clinic Centre. I had an office in the building as well, as I was a member of the business board. It was a low building with the ground floor and the first floor. It had a large atrium shaped as a Cyrillic letter "P". Muslims had set up high bars at the entrance. The bars had not been there before the war. I saw around 50 people detained in the atrium; they were standing or walking around the room. Sefić confirmed to me that it was a prison. Those were mostly older people – I had not seen any younger men among the prisoners. In my estimation, there were around 120 and 150 arrested people there. I went to see Sefić several times (three to four times) because he had a special phone line and because he was very correct to me. In August or September 1992, the prison was emptied. I do not know where all those people were taken to, but the rumour had it that they were murdered in front of the "Zetra" sports centre.

Furthermore, the "Patriotic League" had another Command in the basement and on the ground floor of the Faculty of Dentistry and the Clinic, and in the most of schools and kindergartens I know near the "Koševo" hospital. Juka Prazina was the Commandant of the Headquarters at the Clinic of Dentistry. I do not know who was the commandant of the headquarters in other aforementioned locations.

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I had known Juka Prazina since before the war because he had a surgery and stayed in the hospital in my ward in February 1992, so I saw him in person in the aforementioned headquarters. In the beginning of war, Juka Prazina was constantly in the BiH Presidency building. He had an office there and everybody called him "general". He was always sitting in the first rows in all meetings.

I would especially want to point out to the behaviour of Josip Pejaković, the actor. He became a commander of a company responsible for protection of monuments of culture. The company was armed. He owned several purebred dogs and took them with him everywhere. There were serious stories in different places that he had been pitting them against imprisoned Serbs in the "Viktor Bubanj" prison.

I would also like to mention the conduct of a number of Muslim doctors towards injured Serbs, especially towards members of the former JNA. Many of those people had died due to deprivation of medical assistance; especially because of the failure to perform blood transfusion or due to endless postponing of surgeries. Doctors who stood out in such practice were: Dr Esad Ćibo, an orthopaedist; Dr Naim Kadić, a neurosurgeon who is currently their ambassador in Kuwait; Dr Ljubović, a neurosurgeon (I do not know her name); Dr Ešref Bešlić from the Clinic of Abdominal Surgery; Dr Esad Drino, also from the Clinic of Abdominal Surgery; Dr Bilal Berzad, an anaesthesiologist who had been Head of the Anaesthesia Centre before the war; Dr Kemal Drnda, a cardiothoracic surgeon; Dr Muhamed Gavrankapetanović, a neurologist; Dr Fariz Gavrankapetanović, a trauma surgeon; Dr Amira Dulić, an anaesthesiologist; Dr Fakica Bušić, an otolaryngologist. I also need to point out to the fact that there were Muslim doctors who provided adequate medical assistance to Serbs and who helped Serbs on various occasions. For these reasons, other Muslims threatened these doctors. Those doctors are Dr Ismet Cerić, a psychiatrist, Dr Mina Bunar – Kapetanović, a psychiatrist, Dr Ismet Ćeranić, a neurosurgeon and others. By the way, it was extremely difficult for Serbs to meet their needs when it comes health care. They were not given any medications, they were never allowed transport in an ambulance, they were rarely admitted to hospitals.

In the summer of 1993, Dr Dragan Kalenić, minister of health, sent me a letter through one woman from Switzerland. In this letter, he asked me to check the percentage of Serbs admitted to hospitals in Sarajevo. Since I was not able to always differentiate Serbian from Croatian names, I put them in the same group. Of all people admitted to hospitals, there were 10.2% Serbs and Croats. At that time, it was claimed that there are 38% of Serbs and Croats.

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By the way, all the time during the war, Serbs were only allowed to seek help from just few Serbian doctors and even fewer Muslims.

What I especially want to point out to are the events which took place in the Dobrovoljačka Street on 3rd and 4th May 1992. I will talk about these events to the extent of how I know them. That day, I was the head of a team in Trauma Clinic. A lot of severely wounded members of the JNA were brought in to the hospital after the attack on the column in the Dobrovoljačka Street. Most of them were officers. I personally operated on them. One of them was a general Enes Tas. According to what I was able to hear, the attack was organised and ordered by Ejub Ganić, and executed by a person last named Abadžić – an economist and owner of a store in Baščaršija. Members of the "Patriotic League" and the "Green Berets" were stopping certain vehicles, opening the doors and shooting officers and soldiers directly in the heads. Dr Radulović was murdered in that way; he was Chief of Medical Corps Military District and a colonel by rank. The ones who managed to jump out of the vehicles were murdered in the streets because the attackers were placed on both sides of the street. The ones who arrived at the hospital received the aforementioned treatment and they were transferred to a special ward of the Clinic of Urology. I want to specify the treatment: members of the "Patriotic League" entered all hospital wards without knowledge and consent of doctors and took away certain wounded persons on their own authority, disregarding their health condition. Those persons were most likely taken to the ward in the Clinic of Urology – so we were told. We have never seen those persons on check-ups again, nor were we able to make any kind of contact again. So, their fate was mostly unknown to us. I would also like to say that general Enes Taso, one major and four soldiers escaped their fate because they had been directly exchanged before members of the "Patriotic League" arrived.

The way in which members of the "Patriotic League" treated medical personnel of Serbian nationality was aggressive. One tall, blonde and uniformed young man wanted to murder me at the Clinic twice. I was saved by Spomenka Matić, a Croatian woman and a nurse who got me into an elevator on the ground floor and took me to the elevator tower on the roof. I spent two hours on the roof. In the meantime, the Clinic security removed the attacker from the building. The security apologized to me. However, three months later, I was informed that the same person came looking for me. Fortunately, I had not been working the day when he arrived.

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Serbian doctors were constantly accused of performing too many amputations on Muslims, allegedly to disable them. This was a direct hazard for their lives. They continuously kept addressing the nurses as "Chetnikushe"[7]. A Muslim police officer pointed automatic rifle into the stomach of Dr Slavoljub Vrčević at the Trauma Clinic. The police officer kept the rifle pointed to the doctor's stomach for 15 minutes, demanding that he gets his brother out of prison. Medical staff of Serbian nationality was endangered in other clinics as well. That is why they were finding different ways to escape; they were gradually leaving. Dr Milica Marković, a neuropsychiatrist, was murdered with a shot directly in the head. Her husband, a pharmacist, was severely wounded by a Muslim soldier who had previously taken 4,000 marks from them in order to safely get them to the Serbian side. Then, he shot them in the backs. She was killed on the spot.

On 3rd January 1994 at 2 AM, I was arrested by a patrol consisting of five police officers. When they entered my apartment, two of them kept the weapons pointed to me, one of them flashed light in my face, and two of them were searching my apartment. They ordered me to quickly get dressed, not allowing me to take my gloves, scarf or a cap. They took me to the Dolac Malta police station. I had spent two days and two nights there before they took me to the Central Prison on the third night. They did not physically abuse me, but they did insult and threaten me seriously. I spent five nights in a solitary confinement, with no blankets, no day or artificial light, wearing only a coat. Then, I spent 15 days in a cell which I shared with a man last named Damjanović who was sentenced to death. Later I was moved to a bigger room since, besides other people, there was also the aforementioned lawyer Fahrija Karkin with me. Doctors received a more beneficial treatment in prison. There were four more doctors in prison besides me: Dr Dejan Kafka, Dr Igor Sabljak, Dr Nemanja Veljkov and Dr Ranko Medan.

We were located in the military part of prison on the 5th floor. There, the head was Šefko Mulić from Foča. Before the war, he had been retired from the Foča Penitentiary. One person whom he treated extremely brutally was Veljko Filipović. Filipović was around 60 years old, with poor health. Mulić did not allow him to see a doctor, not even after Filipović had diarrhoea 12 times in one night. By the way, he was sleeping on the top bunk.

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[7] t/n: a derrogative nickname for Serbs originating from Serbian guerrilla forces in the WW2

Veljko Filipović survived thanks to the medicines brought to me by one doctor. This doctor wrapped the medicines in toilet paper since we were not allowed to have any medicines.

The charges had been changed three times in my case and in cases of other doctors. Initially, we were indicted on charges of genocide and faced death penalty. Then, the indictment was modified to military desertion and avoidance of duty tasks. Finally, the indictment was boiled down to avoidance of duty tasks. We were not allowed to have witnesses testify. During the trial, the judge dictated for the record that witness statements have been read, although those statements had never been read nor presented to us. None of the doctors know if witnesses had been heard and, if they have, what they testified. I was the first defendant among the group of five doctors – defendants. The sentences were handed down in only 12 minutes and decisions on extension of detention were written. This made us realise that everything was written in advance and that the trial was only a matter of formality. All our complaints and appeals had been automatically denied. The medical documentation we submitted was merely mentioned, and medical reports had not been read. I was sentenced to 20 months in prison.

I was released from prison on 16th June 1994 in an exchange.

As I have already mentioned, I spent all this time in the Central Prison. However, I heard that many Serbs imprisoned in the "Viktor Bubanj" prison were subjected to tortures and even murdered. I know that Stevo Zarić, a civil engineer from Bratunac and Puhalo, a lawyer and a former JNA officer were murdered in this prison.

In the Central Prison, I shared my room with Sretko Damjanović for 15 days. He was sentenced to death. He told me that he was completely innocent, that he had not raped anyone and that he had not murdered anyone. Namely, Muslims claimed that he had committed murders in the area which was constantly under Muslims' control. He also said that none of alleged victims had ever been identified or exhumed. Also, he had never faced any allegedly raped women. Those women were all living in part of the city controlled by Muslims. He showed me indictments and appeals, so I also saw his lawyer's appeal

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addressed to the Hague Tribunal. The appeal was written on 23 pages. Damjanović complained to me about that. Since he was in a solitary confinement, it was very difficult for him not having a watch. That is why I gave him my watch and my scarf.

While I was in Sarajevo, I had been following Muslim media. They often mentioned Grand Mufti Efendija Cerić who used to visit military units and who used to say that this was Jihad (the holy war). We (Serbs) knew what this meant and it caused huge fear among Serbian citizens.

I am willing to testify about the aforementioned matters before a competent court.

This is all I had to say on the previous matters. The record was loudly dictated to me and everything I stated was entered in it. Thus, I accept it as my own and, as such, I sign it.

Witness examination ended at 6 PM.

RECORDING CLERK JUDGE

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THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
PUBLIC SECURITY CENTRE OF I.[1] SARAJEVO
Rogatica Police Station

Number: 13-4/02-83/04
Dated 27th April 2004

RECORD
Of witness statement

Dated 27th April 2004 in the OKP PS[2] Rogatica regarding the findings on the murder of a SJB[3] Novo Sarajevo's police officer Pero Petrović which took place on 4th April 1992.

ATTENDANTS:
1. OSL[4] : Danko Milović
2. WITNESS: Mitar Šiljegović
2. Recording clerk: Milenka Vuković

Witness examination started at 11:30 AM.

In terms of Article 150, Paragraph 2 of ZKP RS[5], the witness is cautioned that he must tell the truth and not withhold anything, and that giving false testimony is a KD[6].

The witness gives the following personal information:

- Name and last name: Mitar Šiljegović
- Father's name: Marko
- Mother's name: Bosiljka, maiden name Savić
- Day, month and year of birth: 8th November 1954, Sarajevo, the municipality of Centar
- Place of residence: [redacted]

[1] Translator's note: Istočno Sarajevo
[2] t/n: Crime Police Department of Police Station
[3] t/n: Public Security Station
[4] t/n: authorised official
[5] t/n: Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Srpska
[6] t/n: criminal offence

- Occupation: a purse – sewer

- Marital status: married, father of two children

- Nationality: RS - BiH[7]

- JMB[8]: [redacted]

[signature: Šiljegović Mitar]

In terms of Article 8 of the ZKP RS, the witness is informed about the equal usage of alphabets: Cyrillic and Latin; and about the official languages: Serbian, Croatian and Bosniac.

Which alphabet do you wish the record to be kept in? Cyrillic.

Do you understand Serbian language, the language this of this proceeding? Yes.

Do you need an interpreter? No.

In terms of Articles 146 and 147 of the ZKP RS, the witness is informed that, since he is a lineal relative of the defendant, he has the status of a privileged person and may not be forced or may refuse to answer the questions of an OSL or that he can waive the privilege to answer the questions.

The witness has been introduced to the provisions of Article 148, Paragraph 1 of the ZKP RS that he shall have the right to refuse to answer certain questions which answered truthfully would result in in him being prosecuted.

The witness has stated that he shall answer the questions to an authorised official.

Are there any other reasons for you not to testify? No.

Witness signature: [signature: Šiljegović Mitar]

[7] t/n: the Republic of Srpska – Bosnia and Herzegovina

[8] t/n: Unique master citizen number

The witness is summoned to reveal everything he knows about the case.

S T A T E M E N T

In the beginning of early war conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, I had stayed in my apartment in Sarajevo, in the 93 27th July Street, the settlement of Obala. In the period from April to June, uniformed persons came to my apartment and conducted searches of my apartment and other rooms. On those occasions, they asked me to give them small arms and long firearms, as well as my membership card. They also asked if I was a member of a political party, if I belonged to the Radical Party or the SDS[9].

[signature: Šiljegović Mitar]

I do not know exactly how many times they came to my apartment in the aforementioned period from April to June – when I was arrested. On 13th June 1992, three uniformed persons with rifles in their hands came to my apartment in Sarajevo. One of them hit my head with a rifle butt, then they handcuffed me, put me into a car that was parked in front of the building and then dragged me to the Central Prison in Sarajevo. In the Central Prison, unformed police officers wearing blue police uniforms interrogated me, abused and beat me in order to make me confess I own small and long firearms and that I belong to one of the Serbian political parties. I spent 48 hours in a solitary confinement in the Central Prison. Then, the aforementioned police officers would take me out of the confinement for a hearing, and after the hearing they would put me back in the cell. Every time they took me out and back into the confinement, I was beaten and mentally abused. I remember it was on 15th June 1992 in the evening when police officers took me out of my confinement to the hall. I saw 11 men and an unknown woman. From the fourth floor, we went through the lines of police officers, guards and military officers who beat us in our way down the stairs and in front of the entrance to a building. There were vans without seats there and they put us in them as if we were just bags of potatoes. During this event, they were all saying to us that we were going to the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks. These guards and police officers also cursed our **Chetnik[10] mother** and told us: "You will all end up in the Viktor Bubanj". When we entered the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, we were welcomed by the military – territorial defence members. The first twelve of us who

[9] t/n: Serb Democratic Party

[10] t/n: a derogatory nickname for Serbs, origin comes from Serbian guerilla forces in WWII

came from the Central Prison were beaten, and then we were escorted to our cells. I was placed in the cell No. 9. There had already been 12 Serbian people in the cell, and I want to mention that the cell's dimensions were 2,60 x 1,65. I met Lukendić, Nešković and Obradović in this cell. I cannot recall their names, and I cannot recall the other persons from the cell. I was taken out of this cell every day to be heard by a judge Kapo, who was born in Rogatica. They wanted to force me to confess that I owned a radio station and weapons and that I was informing the Serbian side on where they should shoot the grenades.

On 29th June 1992 they released me from the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks on the ground that I should check in to the first command of the territorial defence.

On 30th June 1992, uniformed persons came to my door again. They were wearing camouflage uniforms and they told me to check in the Territorial Defence Headquarters, which was located in the SJB Novo Sarajevo, in the Dolac Malta.

[signature: Šiljegović Mitar]

I checked into the aforementioned Headquarters. There was **the Forth Battalion of the 101 mountain Brigade there; the brigade's commandant was Nedžad Ajnadžić and the Battalion's commandant was Enis Srna.** I was incapable of military service and I had not performed it – I do not have my left lung. In the aforementioned command, they put me into a manual labour platoon. The commander of this platoon was Kasimović, I cannot recall his name. In this platoon, I was digging trenches on the Hrasnop Brdo, around the Željo stadium and on the 8th April Square (the square of the heroes). There were around 30 people in the manual labour platoon and they did the aforementioned tasks. Since I had to constantly check in to the commanders who were in the Headquarters located in the SJB Novo Sarajevo, I listened to numerous stories oriented against Serbs and that is how I got some findings from the **story of soldiers in the IV and 101 Mountain Brigade on the murder of a police officer, Pero Petrović, who was murdered on 4th April 1992 near SJB Novo Sarajevo.** A soldier in a camouflage uniform with a nickname "Džimi", who used to sell goods on a stand in the Hrasno market boasted around other soldiers that he was the one to kill the first police officer, the first victim of war – **Pero Petrović.** I want to mention that, in the aforementioned Headquarters, I found out that Sejad Piskić was

a sniper in Grbavica and that he boasted about murdering two minor children from the "Loris" building. He also murdered other Serbian civilians, cut their ears off and lined them up the chain he used to keep around his neck. I also want to mention that, while I was cleaning the ruins in the Viktor Bubanj barracks as part of my mandatory work, I saw Murat Šabanović and his unit in the barracks. He was abusing the prisoners in the same way we were abused in the manual labour platoon.

In 1995, I collected all the paperwork I had had on my incapacity for military service and the then MUP[11] in Sarajevo allowed me to leave Sarajevo together with my family.

The witness is informed after the hearing that he has the right to read the record and make any commentaries on the record.

Do you want the record to be read to you? No. [signature: Šiljegović Mitar]

Do you have any commentaries on the record? No. [signature: Šiljegović Mitar]

Will you sign the record? Yes [signature: Šiljegović Mitar]

Witness examination ended at 1:00 PM.

WITNESS	**RECORDING CLERK:**	**AUTHORISED OFFICIAL**:
Mitar Šiljegović	Milenka Vuković	Danko Milović
[signature: Šiljegović Mitar]	[signature: illegible]	[signature: illegible]

[11] t/n: Ministry of Interior

Personal Statement No. 71/00393 Strahinja Živak[1]

I was born on the 19th of August 1932 in the village of Brđani near Konjic. My mother's name was Bosiljka; maiden name Zelenović and my father was Đorđe. In 1956 I married Malina, maiden name Šaran. We spent 36 years together and got sons Slobodan, born in 1957 and Velimir, born in 1961. My family has libed in this area for centuries. I experienced World War 2 when I was nine. I witnessed Serbs' suffering, even casualties of my own family/my uncles Uroš and Anđelko were killed by the Muslims and Croats on the river Laša, by hitting their heads with a sledgehammer and after that the river carried them away. It happened in the spring 1941. Next spring, on the 19th of May 1942 I lost my father. The Muslims killed him before my own eyes, butchering him with knives.

My mother Bosiljka became a widow at the age of 28 and with 5 children: I, Anđa, Sofija, Zdravko and Đorđe, who was born 3 days after my father's death and that is why he was named after the father. My brother Zdravko died from typhus in 1943 and 4 of us survived and live today in 3 states: the Republic of Srpska, Montenegro and Serbia. I am glad that even during this war we all stayed in our countries with Serbian people and no one ever thought about escaping to foreign countries. My childhood and youth were very hard. I could not attend the school regularly and I got employed at the age of 16 as the oldest child in the family to help the rest of my family.

Along with work, I had to go to school and I completed primary school, secondary school, College of telecommunications and then Faculty of Traffic, with a major in mail and telecommunications.

It was a big effort all together. I obtained important positions within the mail and telecommunications system and in 1989 I got retired as the Head of Inspection Department of the PTT Sarajevo.

I returned to my home village Brđani, to my farm, to live there for the rest of my life, finding that I earned it, worn out through the work and politics.

On 17th of April 1992, this was ominous day for my further destiny and start of Golgotha that I had to survive. My cousin Božo wounded me accidently while cleaning a hunting weapon, wounding my both legs and breaking a bone in my right leg. I was transported urgently from the village of Brđani to the town of Konjic. After receiving first aid, I was transported to Sarajevo traumatology clinic. They examined the gunshot wounds on my legs and I stayed there for treatment. The war already begun and the members of the „Green Berets" entered the hospital rooms with intention to guard it, as

[1] Bojić, D. (Ed.) (1996). Stradanje Srba u Sarajevu: knjiga dokumenata [Suffering of the Serbs in Sarajevo: document book]. Second amended and expanded edition. Belgrade: Komeserijat za izbeglice SR Srbije, pages from 150 to 161.

well as to monitor the patients. I noticed that they had different approach while treating my injuries. After the doctor's morning rounds and prescribing therapy in the patient records that we had on our hospital beds, I did not receive the prescribed therapy, dressing and medicaments. I asked the nurses to give it to me, in fact I asked them why they skipped me when dressing the wounds, and I did not get the answer. One of the nurses, a Muslim, asked me about my nationality, because my surname was not quite clear to her. I answered: "Does it matter?" and I told her that I was an Orthodox Serb. I noticed that all middle medical staff were Muslims. Taking into consideration my serious wounds and pain and lying amongst only Muslim patients and wounded individuals, listening them talking that all Serbs had to be killed and expelled, I had courage to address doctors Vuković and Vranić, the Serbs, who were the heads of traumatology department, the director and deputy, as well as professors at the Faculty of Medicine.

I asked them to have my wounds dressed and to give me my prescribed therapy. They intervened and in that case I was dressed and got the cure. The truth is that it was not enough for successful healing of the wounds, because they were coming to morning rounds every 3 to 4 days, and I was practically without any therapy in the meantime. **The Muslim doctors Dizdar and Kulenović dresses the Muslim patients and wounded persons, besides the nurses doing it. I asked them in person to dress me too that day, but they did not do it, telling that it was duty of the nursing staff and that they did it voluntarily to their wounded and sick individuals.** I asked myself then, although I was not a medical expert, whether the Hippocratic Oath was forgotten by the Muslim medical staff in Koševo Hospital. I answered myself that it was forgotten. I as a Serb, civilian wounded person – a patient, was receiving different treatment only because being of Orthodox Christian religion and Serbian nation.

After such a treatment the wounds got infected and doctor Dizdar (Muslim) transferred me to another, so called septic department. Even there I was not treated same way as their sick and wounded. On 29th of May 1992, in order to empty space for their patients and wounded, they transferred me with the infected wounds, on crutches to another department (building next to the Traumatology) of Internal Medicine. I had to go every third day to my "basic" hospital for dressing and examination.

Sometimes, I would be dressed and examined and mostly would not, depending on who of the doctors and other staff was on duty. One day, when I was visiting other department, they brought to my room an operated patient, escorted by the Muslim police. Others pointed at the patient, telling he was a „Chetnik", and his name was **Pjevac Pero**. After coming from dressing from the Internal Medicine clinic, I visited the patients in the room, I used to be with, but Pero was not there anymore. I asked the patients and nurses if they knew where Pero was and they answered they did not know. Pero was taken from the hospital bed, killed and buried at the "Lav" cemetery, which

is next to the hospital. I found it out listening to the conversation of the police officers, who were securing Internal Medicine clinic. Sitting on the bench in front of hospital I heard the conversation: He will have same destiny as Pjevac Pero, eaten already by worms in "Lav". **I also heard in my room their wounded patients Nasim Ugljanin and Sejo Bea talking that the Serb wounded and sick patients had been killed in the morgue and taken to the "Lav" cemetery.** I was very sad hearing that, as well as the stories and a new song about killing Serbs and bars of dead bodies in the river of Miljacka, which they gladly listened on the radio.

I was constantly questioned by the police officers and doctors about the way I got wounded, where I lived, what I did and other details. I had a feeling that something bad was going to happen; no matter that I was immobile and sick. Then they started making lists of Serb nationality patients, putting their names on the doors of their rooms. On the 4th of July 1992, after 80 days of hospitalization, three armed police officers entered my room asking: "Who is Živak?" I was lying and sat on the bed and introduced myself. They dragged me roughly from the bed and told me to go with them. I asked them: Why are you taking me and do you have an order to take me away. I am a sick man, immobile and cannot go anywhere. I was hit a few times with button. I tried to take crutches and hygiene kit and some medications, which had been brought to me by a cousin. They did not allow me to take anything, even the crunches, telling me I would not need it and I would not walk too far. Seeing that I could not get out without crunches, they gave them to me and got me out of the hospital. A black car waited for me. They pushed me into the car, tossed the crunches back and handcuffed me. They started beating me with buttons and slapped me cursing my Serb family and a mother. The car drove off and the driver saved me from further battery, because I disturbed him driving with avoiding their punches. They told driver to drive to the "Lav" cemetery. "We are going to kill him there". That moment reminded me on the killing of Pero Pjevac. Since the car passed the cemetery, the police officers said to take me to the river of Miljacka where they had killed other Serbs. „It is cheaper not to dig the grave for every garbage" Cell 78 is better than "Lav" and Miljacka. They took me into a prison, a large room, and there were about ten police officers, armed with Hecklers, pistols and daggers.

A man in plain clothes, with short beard, was sitting at the table and they called him "investigator". Bringing me into the room, they introduced me: "That is the Chetnik , member of SDS from Konjic" Another man in uniform, whom they called the warden, entered the room. He spoke to me: You have chance to stay alive or to be shot. It depends on you and if you tell us the truth". I said I was not afraid of the truth and that I did not commit any crime and that I was a wounded civilian, a sick person, which had nothing to do with the war that broke out. They searched me to the skin, although I had only the upper part of pyjamas, short pants and a sock on my left foot. The other leg was all in plaster cast all the way to the foot, with a hole in the place of the wound and a cover, also made of plaster, on it.

They found nothing, except a small piece of paper with a few telephone numbers of my friends in Sarajevo, who I tried to contact and inform that I was in the hospital, in a pocket of pyjamas. Unfortunately, there was also my press card of the "Večernje Novosti" newspapers from Belgrade. I used to be their correspondent from Konjic and later from Sarajevo. They beat me again with the buttons. "So, he was a Serbian journalist, you can see whom we have here." The "investigator" ordered them to stop beating me: "You see that he is sick" He allowed me to sit down and gave me a paper to write the statement. Although depressed, I wrote a few sentences: I am guilty of nothing. It is strange that you arrest me as a civilian wounded person and a patient without any evidence of crime. Even if there is evidence, according to international convention I should have been first cured and then arrested and possibly convicted. Do not have any fear I would escape because I am in your hands and I do not think about escape because I am not guilty. My only guilt can be because I am a Serb during this war and that I belonged to the Serbian Democratic Party, which was legal, as well as two other national parties (the Croatian Democratic Party and the Democratic Action Party)". I did not sign the statement. The investigator looked at the statement and noticed it was written in Cyrillic. He asked me if I knew other alphabet – I told him that I did, but that I usually use the Cyrillic. He did not like it and I felt a button strike on my back and head. The investigator stopped the battery.

During my "treatment" (for about two hours), we could hear the shots in the prison compound. I had a feeling these shots were ending someone's life. According to stories of their patients, and later the convicts we served sentence with, many Serbs brutally lost their life there

I was taken to cell 78 at about midnight on that particular day I was arrested. I found a prisoner in the cell 78, I think his name was Stanojević, a retired Yugoslav National Army (JNA) Sergeant Major. Next morning, in the daylight I noticed his head was blue and swollen and a part of his forehead was covered with dried blood. I asked him about the reason he was arrested and about that on his forehead. He answered he was accused of possessing a sniper, although they did not find it when searching his flat. He wiped his forehead and it started bleeding again. You could see, and he told me that too, a carved sign of cross. He stayed with me a night and a day and was taken at about 10 p.m. by their police next evening. I think he was murdered, because I did not see him in the "Viktor Bubanj" and he was not sentenced, e.g. he was not sent to serve his sentence in the Central Prison.

I stayed in the cell no. 78 for 4 days, alone. During all that time the police officers barged in yelling: "You are the Chetnik, collaborator of Karadžić", coursing my mother and family, slapping me and striking me with button. I wanted their investigator to see me. He came and asked me what I wanted.

I asked for water and my wounds re-dressed. They gave me some water; I could not eat anything of the food they brought to me twice a day. The truth is that the food was poor and of bite-sized. They did not dress my wounds; I got the answer that it was a prison, and not the hospital. After four days they took me with another 25 prisoners to "Viktor Bubanj". "Viktor Bubanj" – torture location for the Serb men and women.

The "Viktor Bubanj" prison is a former JNA military prison, named now "Ramiz Salčin". In this prison were on average 200 men and about 35 women. According to my estimation there were about 5000 Serbian men and women who went through this prison for the period of the 7 months I was there under investigation. There were 17 cells with the imprisoned Serbs.

The surface of the cell was 6 m^2 and there was only one bed at the time of JNA. In that area, where only one bed used to be, the Serbs were thrown one on top of the other on the concrete. On average there were about 12 of us in there. Only furniture that we had in there was a small piece of mat (0,70 m^2) and a blanket. There was no heating, we were lice-infected, no hygiene, we did not wash our face for a month. They gave us water once a day, a litre per prisoner, which we used for drinking. As for the lice-infection, they gave us a powder that was inefficient. It only made us cough and sneeze.

I put lice, covered by the powder into a matchbox and they lived even after 7 days. I have shown it to the prison warden **Himzo Dolan**

He verbally attacked me: "You mortal being, what came to your mind?"

There were many sleepless nights also because of lice we removed and killed. Every day were fighting for the light to kill the lice in order to sleep a few hours next night.

I remember Dragan Boljugija found and killed 500 lice on his white shirt, which his girlfriend brought to him previous day. He said: "I will not do it any more, there are some small ones left", because we also waited our turn for the same "action"

The food was bite-size. At about 10 a.m. we got a cup of bitter tea and 60 grams of bread and about 4 p.m. – 60 grams of bread and a plate of some cooked meal, usually some watery soup with some rice and a few pieces of macaroni. Due to such conditions, the prisoners lost their weight rapidly with constant physical and mental mistreatment.

The nights were very hard. You could hear sobbing from the cells by the prisoners that were taken out of their cells upon some order into offices of duty police officers to be beaten there and then returned half- dead to the cells. We threw water to wake them up, rendered "first aid" moving to make them stretch their blue and swollen body. The police officers usually beat with buttons, cables, bars, automatic rifle stocks, fists and feet. They usually kicked me into genitals, since I used crunches. I tried to protect myself with putting some army blouse and trousers and by putting old shirts between the

legs to cushion their kicks. There were many urinating blood for days, like me. Every morning, before officials arriving, they took out some healthier and younger prisoners to clean the blood of the prisoners in the corridor. There was a period when a stomach infection with diarrhoea occurred. They resolved it with giving us some buckets in the cells to defecate there in order not to disturb their police officers during the night to take us out to toilet. Every need for toilet during the night caused yelling and battery. We were forced to do it in the cells and to take it out in the morning and to pour it into the toilet secretly. We asked to be allowed to get out twice a day and at about 8 p.m. in the evening. The biggest criminals amongst them (although no one was a good one) were as I remember: **Kemo Dautović, Fahro Alić,** some **Mrđa, Himzo Dolan –** prison warden**.**

Himzo Dolan took us out without our shirts off to the prison compound at about 8 p.m. on the 27th of January 1993 at the temperature of minus 20 degrees centigrade. He kept us there about 2 hours to get some clean air, and the reason was a song named "Odakle si sele[2]" that some police officers allegedly heard during the night. He stressed he would conduct a special investigation the following days and we will speak about it and that he was an experienced police officer and a former JNA security officer. He kept his word and the following days were the days of torture regarding that song. These were only motives for torture and quiet kills. Majority of the prisoners were intellectuals and young people, but there were some old men and women of age of eighty, as well as the pregnant women. I remember a whole family taken to prison, father and mother with two daughters, only because the husband allegedly was a retired JNA colonel.

The prisoners were living skeletons after the mass diarrhea epidemic. We found that they put some nitrogen into our food, a nitrogen compound that destroys blood and protein. There were many intellectuals in the prison: biologists, chemists, doctors, economists, lawyers, engineers and university professors.

There were Borislav Herak and Damjanović, charged with war crimes, in the cell. They were tried as war criminals and death penalty imposed.

It was strange that the prison authorities treated those two in different way. Damjanović was tortured, beaten up, even **Ismet Bajramović aka Ćelo** shot from pistol next to his head. Borislav Herak got the cigarettes from the officials, extra food. The Red Cross clothes for the prisoners were specially separated for him. He was more protected and taken care of than their – the Muslim prisoners, who were under investigation. Both of them were sentenced to death and that is why I do not understand such different treatment during the investigation and the indictment and the verdict were the same for both of them. Serving my sentence in the Central prison I also heard from the prisoners that he, although convicted as a war criminal, was protected by the prison

[2] TRANSLATORS NOTE: Sister, where are you from

authorities and police in comparison to Damjanović, who pleaded not guilty for all the acts he was charged with. Even nowadays I do not understand why they treated Herak, let's say, favourably.

CELLS OF DEATH

Nobody knows how many people were killed in the Muslim investigation prison of the „Viktor Bubanj" barracks. Going through my memories, the people were dying of battery, hunger, cold, snipers when being taken to forced labour... I will list some of the names of died, murdered and missing people. I have to take a deep breath when listing those names: **Uroš Rakanović, Zoran Odžaković, Mato Ćeranić, Petar Kuzmanović, Radoje Marinković, Slobodan Matović, Savka Damjanović, Mihajlo Radočić, Nedeljko Živković, Stevo Drakulić, Pero Pikulić, Vojko Radović, Vojin Vukadin, Stanko Turanjanin, Novica Ničević, Aleksandar Matić, Šiljegović, -Stevo Mišević, Čajević, C**ollonel **Bracanović** ...When someone dies they put him in a blanket and throw into the corridor. I heard they were throwing them into the garbage containers. Our prisoners brought 4 dead bodies, which were not identified, from the fifth floor of the Military prison. **Ostoja Šoja** was killed by a sniper during the forced labour on the 19th of December 1993. The Serb prisoners were the target of the Muslim snipers when being on forced labour in the town.

INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL

After being taken to the Investigative prison, I was interrogated ten days later by two investigators from the Public Security Centre, as they introduced themselves. They conducted the interrogation following some notes that they had, with questions: why I was member of SDS, how did I cooperate with the JNA, why did we organized and armed Serbian people etc. I answered that I was a member of SDS, which was a legal party as well as other two national parties SDA and HDZ and that I did not feel guilty and had nothing to do with the war that broke out. "You put me, sick and wounded, into prison with no evidence" Two days later they gave me a printed record, which I read and refused to sign, because the essence of statement was not there. The police officer then beat me in the cell. Two days later I was taken to the interrogation again. The interrogation was properly conducted with clear dictating. I got warned to tell the truth and a list of 40 people was presented to me, by that judge, who read those names starting from Dr. Kardžić, Krajišnik… warning me that those were war criminals. He asked me if I knew them and whether I was related to them and I negated it. My statement was

based on the statement I previously made before the Security Service Centre inspectors. Therefore, I only admitted I was a member of SDS, which was a normal thing within the new political pluralism.

I belonged to the political party of my people. I contested everything else: There was no need to cooperate with the former JNA, since it was the joined Army of the so called BiH. **All that they tried to impute, happened in 1991, at the time when Bosnia and Herzegovina was not recognized, e.g. it was a part of the former Yugoslavia.**

Next day the interrogation was conducted by a person named **Ignjac**. He was very arrogant and did not allow me to sit down, although I used crutches. The interrogation was conducted same way as the previous one, insisting on same things and forcing me to admit what they wanted me to. The police officer **Kemo Dautović** struck me with a button a few times in front of the judge, who introduced himself to conduct the interrogation in the role of the public prosecutor. I signed the record. New interrogation was at night at 10 p.m. At the same interrogation same questions with my same answers. I received the Decision on Custody, pursuant to Articles 119, 136/2 and 139, under the threat of death penalty, because those are criminal acts of subversion of the BiH State.

The decisions were arriving every month and I gave them to the prisoners to smoke them, because they did not have cigarette paper. Others criticized me for not keeping them. I knew I would get the other ones. I received the Indictment and Date of Summons scheduled for 25th of December 1992. The Indictment was very severe; "threat of death penalty".

The trial did not take place, the new Court hearing is summoned for 13th of January 1993. I appeared at the trial with 42 kg of weight with crutches. I felt a small comfort seeing there the Trial Chamber, let them sentence me to death finally. The Chairman of the Chamber was the Judge **Fahrudin Teftedarija**. The trial lasted for 15 minutes. The Indictment was read and I was asked to say what I had to say. I stated as follows: I remain with my Statement, I made during the interrogation. I am a civilian, wounded and sick person, arrested in Traumatology of the Sarajevo Hospital. It is exodus to put me on the trial. I am not a war criminal; you do not have evidence that I am guilty as charged. I only belonged to the legal political party of my people.

You only have my statement, which was partly forced with physical torture.

Judge Teftedarija was furious regarding my statement. The public defender disputed the Indictment as I did, he pointed out that I should be not tried but treated. Nothing helped – 15 years of imprisonment. The mitigating circumstances were – and older and sick person, a big comfort. I lodged an appeal. The Supreme Court confirmed the Verdict, denying all facts I presented as my defence.

A medical worker - veterinary technician told me I should ask for transfer into Central Prison before the Final Judgment was issued. He was the one, who was very aware my health condition, giving me "good services". He removed the cast from my leg with the pliers, hammer and fruit scissors. Two of their criminals held me during this "operation" and I was holding myself to a seedling in the prison compound.

After the effort that lasted for two hours, the cast was off, the leg got black and the muscles got atrophied. He would have not removed the cast even then, had I not showed him the wound, which got infected – became wormy, because I did not get any medication, nor I was dressed.

I bandaged the wounds with some old shirts – rags, putting the coltsfoot and strawberry leaf that I picked in the compound during the walk. Whenever I asked his services, medical help from him, he responded: "This is not hospital, this is a prison and you know what you did".

I was transferred to the Central Prison on the 6th of February 1992 and I felt some relief. I lied in the bed after 250 days, lice disappeared, I had three meals a day or some kind of it, and more professional attitude of the prison staff to the prisoners.

The International Red Cross recorded us in March 1993 and I sent the first message to my family. The International Red Cross doctors examined me and recommended the prescribed therapy (remedies, laboratory, ECG and others) to the Prison Health Service and the Management. They told me they would ask for my unconditional acquittal from so called BiH Judiciary.

During the next visit of the International Red Cross I saw they requested it in writing. The Muslim authorities ignored it and nothing happened out of it. They gave me some remedies, referred me to do have ECG done outside the prison, in the MoI Clinic. I was surprised when they handcuffed me, and I still used a crutch. Somehow I came there limping and carrying a crutch with the handcuffs. The citizens and the patients were looking at me surprisingly; a tied disabled person, the crutch hangs on the handcuffs. The sergeant did not have the keys to take the handcuffs off, because the keys were at the commander **Hilmija**, who ordered my handcuffing. They succeeded somehow to do ECG. Although handcuffed I did not allow them to do laboratory findings, because I heard from the others, who gave blood samples, that they take a whole bottle for the transfusion for their Army. I did not have enough blood for such findings.

It was not easy to serve sentence together with Muslim prisoners, the criminals. They constantly provoked, and beat some of us like Đ.Đ. M.L. Dragan Zelić ond others. Dragan Zelić (21) was isolated from others and murdered mysteriously one morning. Allegedly, he committed suicide. He was really little bit mentally disturbed due to mistreatment and battery in "Viktor Bubanj".

The first message that I received from my brother Đorđe from Smederevo on the 6th of July 1993 was very sad for me. I learned that the Muslims killed my two sons, Slobodan and Velimir and my mother died of sorrow because of that information, my imprisonment, as well as because of looting of our family house in the village of Brđani, where she stayed with my wife Malina.

The prison authorities were aware of the fact and it made my situation even harder. They were provoking me all the time regarding my verdict, assuming that my sons were in Army of the Republic of Srpska.

They did not want to assume anything else, because they found justification for all that was Serb, the murders, ethnic cleansing and others.

There were weird trials and investigation procedures in so called Republic of BiH such as:

I.S. (62 years old) sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment for alleged missile guidance. He has a mirror in the flat.

Đ.Đ. (62 years old) crossed the line with a water bottle in Vogošća; he was arrested and sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment for being an enemy soldier, He was accused to be a sniper shooter. The man had medical proof that his eyes were operated and that he was treated in the mental institution Jagomir. It meant nothing to them.

P.S. (36 years old), an architect from Sarajevo was sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment for illegal possession of weapons. Searching his premises they found a few name tags of the prison police officers, what they usually wore in the lapel as official accreditation. It was the base to convict him and give him a new ten years sentence for "espionage". It is characteristic to mention that the prisoners were tortured, besides, so called ordinary beating up, which caused hematoma, swellings.

B.V. One eye was poked out with knife.

Č.S. His hands were burned with red-hot iron. Both of them were sentenced to 3.5 years. Some of them had fingernails ripped out.

V.Č. Broken five ribs

B.Š. Broken clavicle and so on.

Serb women from the cells 17, 18, 19 were taken by the police officers at about 10 p.m. to "wash the dishes". The police officers got drunk and abused them violently.

Ismet Bajramoviće Ćelo shot from the Magnum pistol next to heads of prisoners, scaring them.

EXCHANGE

Our hope and comfort was in the exchange of the prisoners. That was going very slowly. The prison authorities were usually exchanging the sentenced people with small sentences or if they already did their time. I was under big embargo and they did not let me to be exchanged although I was constantly requested by the Serb side and the international Red Cross insisted on my exchange and unconditional release, as a sick and wounded civilian.

That day came, November 9, 1994, when I was exchanged for two Muslim prisoners, doctors. It was the happiest day in my life, which I will celebrate regardless to my family tragedy and personal misfortune that I have survived – 30 months of torture in Muslim prisons. I came to my people, my state. What can I say when I am the tragedian of all wars.

In the last 100 years, only by natural cause died one uncle (Vaso) and the other 11 men aged from 25 to 40, got killed by Muslims and Croats.

SERB REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
State Documenting Center for Research
of War Crimes against the Serb People

Code: 0147
File: A1

WITNESS STATEMENT

Witness Srđa (Ivan) Bulatović from Sarajevo, born 6 August 1958 in Sarajevo, gave the following statement to the State Documenting Center for Research of War Crimes against the Serb People on 28 November 1992 on the matter of (1) the time, location, circumstances and scope of the crimes and violence perpetrated; (2) persons upon whom the crimes and acts of violence were inflicted; (3) persons who participated in perpetrating the crimes and violence; (4) potential witnesses and documentation of the crime.

As early as March 1992, in the entire Sarajevo area, and above all the municipality of Stari Grad, the impending war could be felt in the atmosphere. Then still unarmed groups of young Muslims, especially taxi cab drivers, were following all distinguished Serbs around the town, following their every step, from the restaurants where they typically used to meet, all the way to public gatherings – and they were documenting it. Groups of 15-year-old Muslims were already strolling around City Hall, with green berets on their heads and no longer bothering to hide their weapons. At night, they would pull cars over on hillsides in the city and carry out their own private inspections.

Sarajevo had already become nickname town, where very few people in those groups were known by their real names. Ata, Seljo, Seki, Feko, Juso, Haris Lukovac – a group of 13 Muslims who had sworn to protect Izetbegović for life – they were running around the Urology Clinic unimpeded, where I was employed as a physician – specialist in urology.

The inevitable happened in early April. The hegemonizing at the Clinic could be felt immediately, people no longer worked together like they used to and everyone stuck with their own flock. I personally felt protected in the presence of Dr. Guzina and Dr. Babić, renowned specialists, well-known Serbs from the Urology Clinic. Babić resigned from his position shortly after and went to Pale, and Guzina, even though he was the Chief of the Clinic, did not show up to work until 10 April. He sat at home, in his apartment, wondering whether he should run or stay. When he showed up to work, he was visibly agitated, but he did not speak much… None of our officials gave us clear instructions as to whether we should run or stay.

By 10 April, the Green Berets had occupied the entire Koševo hospital complex. A man called Mema, half-idiot, psychopath, was in charge of the Urology Clinic. He gave

himself the authority to inspect anyone at will, whenever he wanted, however he wanted, and even to run a commentary on the appearance and the characteristics of people to whom he could not hold a candle. I was personally told that I would be killed because of my surname, even though many of those uninvited men had known me from earlier, whether as a doctor or because I had grown up right next to them in the immediate vicinity. Up to 29 April, I went to see my friends at Poljine at will, under the guise of changing the tires on my car or something similar. Our guards at our barricades were extremely trivial at that time, and it all seemed very disorganized. The infamous searches/robberies of apartments started around that time, under the guise of searching for sniper perches. Mass arrests of Serbs started simultaneously, their valuables were confiscated, even entire apartments, for the purposes of accomodating some of their fighters arriving from Sandžak and Kosovo as jihad volunteers. Rapes of Serb women and brutal murders became everyday occurrences. Delinquents reigned supreme, such as Jasko – the most prominent criminal in Koševo, he lived at 48/1 H. Brkića Street; then Hamo Poplata, who arrested hundreds of our innocent pople, and Ibro Poplata, owner of the "Fazan" restaurant – rape specialist. The infamous Sarajevo criminal Đale, along with the aforementioned Poplatas, slaughtered Jovan Milušić, known as Maks, who used to be their neighbor. It is characteristic of Sarajevo that many Muslims led their Serb neighbors to their graces. Basically, they killed their own neighbors just because they were Serbs, or filed false charges and reported made up crimes.

The infamous "Juka Crew" set up a "police station" in the "Nemanja Vlatković" Home for Deaf and Mute Children, and appointed Trta, formerly a waiter at the "Dandi" pizza parlor, as its commander; and another at the Bilijar Club, and at the "Kestenov Hlad" café, located in the home of Dr. Vojka Marković. Gatherings of people from Sandžak and the presence of various types of weapons were spotted at those locatons even before the war. One of the "regular" patrons at these places was Jasmin Nišić, so-called Pišonja, who was known as a Muslim who had joined the Croatian Army in their clashes against the Serbs. They also had a Serb in their ranks – Aco Knežević.

All routes leading out of the city were blocked in May. Telephone lines were also cut. That half-idiot, Mema, was still running around the Clinic. He was later wounded, a gunshot wound directly through the eye. They brought to the clinic the Muslims who were wounded in that crime at Skenderlija. They brought the wounded Colonel Katalina and the also wounded Lieutenant-Colonel Božinovski. They put them all together on the second floor, which was turned into a jail. One of the soldiers, Vitković, from Ilijaš, wounded in the stomach – died after surgery. One of the staff let him drink water, on purpose, certainly, which I presume turned out to be a fatal but deliberate mistake.

In these cases, myself and Professor Šošić acted in accordance with the principles of medical ethics, but we tried to have a Muslim assisting us at all times, so that they

could not accuse us of anything. The hardest cases were always left exclusively to Dr. Guzina. They dragged in a lot of wounded people of all nationalities, and I spent four whole months mostly at the Clinic, I literally lived there.

A heavily wounded Muslim soldier was brought in one day, he had an open injury to the lumbar spine, a severely damaged kidney and left lung. His shrapnel injuries were extremely severe and required emergency medical care. Dr. Guzina and myself immediately diagnosed a severe spinal injury which would have permanent consequences. We did the only thing we could to save his life, but Dr. Hiroš, Dr. Šabanović, and Dr. Bešlić accused us of taking the wrong surgical approach. Fortunately for us, Dr. Aganović assisted us in the surgery. Considering the dire condition that the injured was in when he was admitted – he could have easily succumbed, and then any old fool could have shown up, accused the Serb doctor, and even shot you directly in the head, any time they pleased. For example, the very next day, that unfortunate man's commander, the infamous criminal Ramiz Delalić – Ćelo, spit at and slapped Professor Faruk Konjhodžić, who had already taken over the wounded man's continued care, considering his neurosurgical injury to the spine. Only at that point Dr. Guzina and I realized what would have happened to us if the wounded Muslim man had died at our operating table, which could have easily happened, considering the nature of the aforementioned injuries.

I had known Juka Prazina before the war, we were next door neighbors for a while. He held that acquaintance in high regard. It appeared as though I enjoyed certain privileges with him. thanks to those circumstances, I was able to save many of our people through Juka. I also saved Dr. Guzina, when he was detained at the private jail at Deda Šišić's in the "Zagreb" hotel. At that time, nobody knew whether Dr. Trifko Guzina was even alive, let alone where he was. I used my acquaintance with Jusuf Prazina, who personally located Dr. Guzina, and later, along with Dr. Junuzović, and with the help of Ismet Bajramović – Ćelo, took him out of the jail and saved him from a guaranteed execution.

However, without a doubt, Juka's crew executed Serbs en masse, respectable citizens, accusing them of owning weapons, calling in tips, allegedly collaborating with the Chetniks. All of the known mass graves for Serbs, as they were known in Sarajevo, are at their conscience: near the Railway Terminal, in front of the ŽTP hotel in Velešići, between the old cemetery and the Zetra hall, inside the Zetra hall, between the Lav cemetery and the student clinic, at Alipašino Polje, near the Television building…

It is no longer any secret at all that Sarajevo is a mass grave for Serbs. Many of the slaughtered Serbs were doused in gasoline and set on fire, so that they could not be identified.

There is this Serb in Sarajevo, Ratko Mitrović, who has an apartment at 36/2 Kralja Tomislava Street, who worked at the medical examiner's office and has seen many of

our mutilated corpses. Among others, he saw eight members of the Ristović family from Velešić, as a vivid image of the Muslim gangs' brutal mistreatment of unprotected Serbs.

Ratko Mitrović also identified the remains of Professor Doctor Milutin Najdanović, who was the victim of a crime incomprehensible to the civilized man.

I am aware of a case when that Serb at the medical examiner's office received a living man called Čedo and was told to document him as deceased, and when he refused to do so, the Muslim bandits took that poor Čedo outside and returned him to the medical examiner's office about 10 minutes later, saying "Well, you can document him now." Ratko Mitrović should be carefully taken out…

I myself have witnessed the condition in which many of our beaten and mistreated people were brought to the clinic. Rapes of unfortunate Serb women became a fact that very few people cared about in the demented Sarajevo of those days. brothels where Serb women were used as a reward for Muslim soldiers' basest urges were well known. Their various gangs would accept payment in foreign currency from Serbs in exchange for help in getting out of the city, and then take both the money and their lives from many of them, and the trusting unfortunate Serbs would be declared as missing or killed while trying to escape. Kemo Ćelo, once well-known around the town, and now an investigator at their Military Prison – publicly stated that he kills with a shotgun every single Serb that he perceives as emanating the most minuscule amount of Serb pride.

Every single Muslim newspaper, being printed exclusively for propaganda purposes, same as their radio and television – can easily be described as accomplices in all of their crimes, seeing as they praised every form of evil aimed at Serbs, all Serbs, regardless of location, with a staggering amount of spiritual indifference. Their hatred overpowers all of their other capabilities. I was particularly dumbstruck by this in my former Muslim friends, whom I had considered to be of solid intellect. Overnight, they had sunk deep into the spirit of the street mob, which will eventually choke itself in its pathological hatred of Serbs. Someone who had been my peer at the Clinic suddenly has the same opinions as the fanatics of the lowest kind, and, most unfathomable of all, uses the same terminology. That is what the Serb intellectuals in Sarajevo fear more than death...

[handwritten signature.]

0531-6783

1. SARAJEVO BRIGADE COMMAND
SECURITY ORGAN
On August 13, 1993

OFFICIAL NOTE

Defector: Strekozov Boris STREKOZOV BORIS, father VIKTOR (RUSSIAN) and mother LAMA[1], born ŠOP (Croat), born on November 25, 1955 in Sarajevo, the municipality of Center, with a permanent place of residence in Kralja Tomislava No.34, Municipality Center Sarajevo, married, wife Mirela, maiden name Tadić, with two children (son Andrej 10 and daughter Tea 5), family moved to Australia on May 18, 1992 and are currently in Brisbane, is a vascular surgeon, before the war was the director of the Institute for vascular surgery and transplantation (Father Viktor died during the war, and the mother remained in Sarajevo in the Dž. Bjedića Street No. 58).

At the beginning of the war, without any explanation, the Crisis Staff removed him from the position of Director of the Institute for Vascular Surgery and Transplantation, although he was the only vascular surgeon in the clinic and in the city. Fearing the abuse by one of the numerous armed bandit-paramilitary formations, Strekozov moved to the premises of the Institute. However, he did not avoid embarrassment or harassment at the clinic either. Namely, at the very beginning of the war in May 1992, Adnan Dizdar, a medical specialist, was surrounded by armed Muslims (Green Berets) and made the lists for the liquidation and expulsion of non-Muslim personnel. In this action, he was unlimitedly supported by the director of the Clinical Center, Dr. Naim Kadic and his puppets on a string, an orthopedist ĆIBO SAFET and the pre-war criminal and the newly appointed head of security KINEZ[2] (identity unknown). Even the honest and conscientious doctors, who did not agree with the new democracy and personnel policy of the SDA leaders, were not immune to persecution and purges. Consequently, Dr. ŠESTAN MUHAMED, an anesthesia specialist, was arrested in May 1992, for having delivered the salary to the mother of SIMIĆ DAMJAN. According to the source, and because of the catastrophic personnel policy, the former Sarajevo Clinical Center remained Center only by name, and in reality it was ruined and is currently at the level of the Regional Health Center. The allegations are supported by the fact that many departments have practically stopped working:

[1] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: name illegible, seems like Lama

[2] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: nickname meaning Chinese

0531-6784

- Plastic surgery, does not exist anymore, and there is no a single specialist doctor;

- Traumatology was decimated, only Dr. Torbica and Dr. Vuković remained (and they are also planning to escape);

- The thoracic department is about to be closed (Dr. Kalinić and Dr. Ždrale left), only Dr. Guska remained.

- The conflict between Muslim and Croat personnel escalated at the orthopedic department, where the latter got the shorter end of the stick and are mostly preparing for the escape from Sarajevo.

The only people benefiting from this situation are the Muslim personnel of the "second category" of expertise (the source for example mentions Dr. EDO OMERAGIĆ, an internist who was awarded with the largest acknowledgment of the so-called Army of BiH the "Zlatni Ljiljan[3]" for the alleged achievements and the six months involvement in the Muslim Armed Forces (OS[4]).

The source states that the clinical center cannot meet the needs of the Muslim part of Sarajevo at all, and that adequate medical assistance can hardly be provided to the population and injured Muslim fighters.

- The levels of supply of the clinic with the necessary medicines, medical materials, fuel and food is bad, but not to the extent that the Muslim media reported it.

PROPOSAL OF MEASURES

- The abovementioned is to be enabled with the appointment to some of the existing medical institutions in the territory of the RS, because he is a highly specialized expert and a specialist in vascular surgery.

AUTHORIZED OFFICER IN THE SO[5]
2nd lieutenant Vujičić Radoslav

[3] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Golden lily

[4] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: OS – Oružane snage – Armed forces

[5] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: SECURITY ORGAN

SERB REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

State documentation center for the research of war crimes against Serbs

WITNESS STATEMENT

Witness Dr. Trifko (Đuro) Guzina from Sarajevo, born on 24.04.1934 in Fojnica village, Gacko, gave a statement to the State documentation center for the research of war crimes against Serbs on 12.11.1992 about (1) time, place, and circumstances and the scope of the crime and violence; (2) victims of the crime and violence; (3) perpetrators of the crime and violence; (4) potential witnesses and documentation about the crime.

I worked as a specialist physician, a urologist. From 1985 I was the director of the Urology clinic at the Koševo hospital in Sarajevo. When the war started, I was a member of the Politics council of SDS, members of which also were Nikola Koljević, Slavko Leovac, Biljana Plavšić, Aleksa Buha, Sava Čeklić, Milutin Najdanović, etc. Just prior to the start of the war, at the Clinic, I felt that something was happening as my Muslim colleagues started behaving differently. Still, I could not even imagine that it was then when my suffering would start. I will tell you all about it, as much as I can, in this mental and physical condition.

First troubles began several days after the war broke out when Kerim Lučarski, chief of the military police, came to my workrooms. He came with his guards, behaved very rudely, and allegedly, his aim was to guard the machines for breaking stones in kidneys and gallbladders. The chief guard was a certain Memo. This all happened in agreement with dr. Mustafa Hiroš. Immediately they took over the storage unit with drug and other material supplies. At the same time, they spread the propaganda that, supposedly, Serbs, known to them, had already brought all the medicines and medical material to Pale from the Clinic, which was pure fiction. They searched all Serb nurses every day. They found ten or so pills of some children's medicine on Božica Lalović, and I barely managed to save her from getting arrested. Memo, their chief guard, who was particularly arrogant and prone to drinking, once, drunk, tried to crash the monument to Blagoje Kovačević, the founder of the Surgery clinic, by tying it to his car. I managed to intervene and stop this incident.

Immediately afterward, they emptied the upper floor and brought our soldiers there who were wounded in the Skenderija massacre. Among them was Lieutenant colonel Božinovski. His wife's name was Ljubica; I know that she worked at the military hospital. They accused him of shooing one of the attackers at the YPA barracks in the mouth. Arrogantly, as if I was a prisoner, they pushed me into the room to check

on the wounded "chetnik" while they spat on and maltreated him. I gave my professional opinion, purely from the medical perspective, as I did with all my patients.

Their police hid the guard Memo. They did this to hide an extraordinarily indecent and arrogant man who proclaimed himself to be a soldier pinning some ranks and medals onto himself, that he found and confiscated in one of his many raids on military apartments.

On one such apartment raid, he found nurse Mira Milutinović. He maltreated her and asked her whether she knew where the apartments of Dr. Babić and Dr. Guzina were. Shortly afterward, they searched my apartment three or four times. I legally owned a military carabine, which I had already given to some Čamo from the Territorial Defense. After the search, four police officers from HOS, one of whom presented himself as Čalo and other as Dodig, brought me somewhere towards hotel Zagreb, following orders of their commander Srna from the Bureau for investigation of war crimes. They brought me to the fourth or fifth floor, into an unknown room, where I waited for two hours casually talking to one of the officers. Then, they blindfolded me and brought me by car to an unknown location.

They brought me into some hallways and then into a toilet where I had to sit on the toilet seat. They handcuffed me there. I sat there for another hour, and then they brought me, with a blindfold on, to some other rooms. When they took the blindfold off me, I was in a room where I could see a connections device, a bar, and a movie camera. They tried to talk to certain Lalović there, trying to exchange me for 28 Muslims from Vogošća. He gave me the phone and told me to say: "It's Trifko Guzina speaking." I was forced to admit that I was a chetnik and a murderer, which I did not want to admit. I told them that I was a physician who swore to treat all people disregarding their nationality or anything else. The connection broke then, after which they blindfolded me again and brought me somewhere near some steamer and brought me, with a blindfold on, to a private apartment on the sixth floor. Their commander Srna came there, middle Hight, brown hair, round face - with no other distinguishing features. He took some list and told me: "You were a member of the Politics council of SDS." She showed me a document from our meeting, which I had signed. He asked me what the Politics council was. I told him that it was a Council for inter-party cooperation. He interrogated me then about what I knew about each of the Council members individually. I told him that I had operated on some of them or their family members personally and that that was how I had met them. This happened around 1 a.m. on a June night. Srna then left. In the meantime, my wife went to see Juro Pelivan, as he, too, was a patient of mine. That Croatian connection prevented me from getting killed earlier. As Pelivan intervened, they brought me again to their Bureau, where I was forced to give a statement for the Television in which I condemned the

genocide over the Muslims. I said that I condemned all ill-intentioned actions over all people alike. From there, they blindfolded me, brought and surrendered me to the local police, that is, some sort of a night's watch, which brought me home.

They left me alone for two or three days, and then they brought me somewhere again around 4 p.m. They lied to me that we were going to the Presidency. I was arrested by an officer on whose accreditation I only saw number 003.

The day before that arrest, Pejanović invited me to their Presidency and ordered me to join Kosovac in the Serb Democratic Forum. Pejanović, Braco Kosovac, Boro Bjelovac, Uglješa Uzelac, Vito Žepinić and a majority of former leaders waited for me there, all of whom were Serbs. Pejanović ordered that I had to be included in the Council, as that was a condition for them to keep me alive. They recorded my presence there, and even then, I said that I had operated on more than 25 thousand people and that I was only following medical ethics.

The same police officer, with the numbers 003, told me cynically when we arrested me: "Did you have the forum - you did!" He brought me to the Bureau again, not the Presidency. The first time I was there, I was told that I was a prisoner of war and that that was my only status. In fact, they actually really wanted to exchange me for a man important to them who was imprisoned in Vogošća. Svetozar Stanić offered 28 Muslims for me, and they asked to 58. I got that information through Juro Pelivan.

Dedo was there at the Bureau, an Ustasha who escaped Bleiburg in 1945, where he was tried as a war criminal. Juka Prazina included him into his staff, but he pushed him out because he had perpetrated mass killings of Serbs from Alipašino Polje and other parts of the city. Dedo joined the Bureau as an associate. Dr. Srđan Bulatović can provide more details about this. Dr. Junuzović also said that, while with Juka, Dedo killed all Serbs that he could and that that was the reason they had split up. I told Dedo that I knew Dr. Junuzović. He then asked me if I knew Dr. Nemanja Veljkov, a liver specialist. I told him that I had heard of him, but I did not know him in person.

In the meantime, it was known that Srna had convicted me to death.

From there, blindfolded, they brought me through some corridors to a large salon and said: "Allah emanet, we will kill you, Chetnik, just chose whether with bullet or knife." They brought a German shepherd and yelled: "Rex, go smell the Chetnik too." I had to sit up straight on a bench there, head up, blindfolded, not moving at all. Many guards went by and talked to me very rudely. Then they brought two persons. They were brought in by a guard with a Montenegrin accent. I want to note that all the guards said that they were Serbs, but I could distinguish them through their accents. Very quickly, I recognized the voices of the two persons. Those were Slavko Leovac and his wife. They told me that they brought in the President of the Politics council

of SDS. They put some hood over Slavko's wife's head, which made her suffocate all the time, and Slavko, a chronic heart patient, begged them to give him his medicines. This lasted the whole night. They touched our necks with their hands. They said: "A nice neck to slaughter." They played Ustasha songs extremely loudly, especially in the morning. Slavko and I could not understand a single word because the guards were always around us, maltreating us in various ways. They told us in the morning: "Go on, get up, we're going to finish you now." They brought us into a basement room. They took our blindfolds off and gave us breakfast. At around 8 a.m., Srna came and ordered to put us into a dark closet, where we sat on three chairs. I heard the guards there saying how they would be free that night as they would kill us in the evening. I also heard that in the adjacent rooms, there were other prisoners, men and women, and even one pregnant woman. That evening a man in a completely black uniform with a patch over his eye came and said: "Guzina, get out, you're going to see the commander."

"Oslobođenje" has already reported on my entering the Forum, but Srna still demanded my execution.

Slavko Leovac stayed there. I was later told that Pejanović helped him and his wife get out of the biggest Serb cemetery with a UNPROFOR vehicle.

I saw that we were moving towards hotel Zagreb, and the one that drove me there talked about how he was fighting in Mitnica near Vukovar. He brought me to an office in which commander Srna waited for me, together with my colleague Dr. Junuzović, who intervened, asking for me to be transferred to the military prison. I signed documents saying that they had not beaten me. I was then brought to "Barutana" to Ismet Bajramović - Ćelo. I was told there that I would be formally heard. My wife did not know where I was. She learned this by accident from two Gypsies, and immediately contacted Dr. Junuzović, who talked the men in the military prison into hearing me proform. He also told them to give me a paper saying that I was questioned and that there was no need for any further hearings. They notified my wife about this and then brought me home.

The police force of the Bureau for investigation of war crimes was organized at that time, wanting to attack the Presidency and the Military prison. This was stopped by Ćelo and about 5 or 6 thousand of his police officers - they blocked the whole city.

When I was to be delivered to the Military prison, Srna told me: "I'll come back for you." He even threatened Dr. Junuzović, saying that he was personally responsible for releasing the biggest Serb Chetnik, to which Junuzović responded that he protected me at the cost of his own head.

That night, when I came home, two of their rival police forces collided. The city was blocked. Nobody bothered me anymore, but I was ordered by Stjepan Kljujić to go to work regularly. I was to be tried later.

At work, one of their police officers came to me and said: "You must stick to the Forum, otherwise you're dead."

While I was away, the staff of my Clinic changed. Instead of me, the director was now Dr. Hiroš. Some new people came, as well. Their chief ideologist was Dr. Konjhodžić and executor Safet Ćibo.

I went to work for about 15 days, and I was only there physically. I went to work on foot from Gorica, sneaking between the buildings and running away from rifle fire, while others were brought in by armored vehicles. Some of them even lived and ate at the Clinic, after they had sent their families to Croatia or elsewhere abroad.

One of ours, Dr. Srđan Bulatović, was also allowed to live at the Clinic. He was taking care of Juka Prazina, so Juka helped him however he could. He was simply in love with Dr. Bulatović. I think that he even gave him a weapon.

Bulatović is the key figure in terms of shedding light on the genocide and many other crimes perpetrated against helpless Serbs. He even told me once that he would spit on himself because he is so helpless, yet has an opportunity to look at thousands of Serb bodies in the Koševo stream, Pionirska valley, around the stadium and the Koševo hill. He also knows that all the people buried at the "Lav" cemetery, market with N.N. are actually innocently killed Serbs. Dr. Bulatović probably has something to say about how the innocent were killed somewhere near the Television at the time when the Miljacka rose and was full of bodies.

I myself heard from the people who lived near Koševo how they complained about the smell of decaying human bodies suffocating them. I also heard a story about crime over Dr. Najdanović: Juka Prazina tied him up, placed a picture of Tito beneath him, and forced him to say: "Juka, you are Tito!" Dr. Milutin Najdanović was found somewhere with multiple stab wounds and shot with a bullet to the head. Dr. Bulatović might know more about this as well.

When I got out of prison, "Večernje novine" published an article about the killings of Muslims in Vogošća ordered by Joja Tintor. The same article said that I, Dr. Trifko Guzina, was the creator of the idea, and Tintor's spiritual leader. In their Press center, that article was distributed to all of their and foreign press. I denied these claims because otherwise, I would be dead, however, they did not want to publish this.

That was the time when Sefer Halilović took everything into his own hands. Once again, I was brought in for a hearing, this time to the police station, where they

interrogated me about everything for three to found hours. They had already arrested Srna and Dedo, and they asked me to testify against them in an emergency procedure. They told me that they planned to shoot me together with Dr. Nemanja, and they released me.

Four days later, in the evening - there is the Military police again, and once again, they took me to "Barutnica." There I found Dževad Topić, arrested, an assistant to Ismet Ćelo, as well as all the other main executors from their police. When I came there, they told the arrested police officers: "Here is Dr. such and such, the best urologist - who will give a statement that Srna wanted to shoot him."

Again, new statements, new hearings, everything new - because their Military police now wanted me to sign the document saying that they saved me from being shot by the Bureau police. At the time, their police forces collided all the time, trying to blame each other for the cruelty over the Serbs and many other crimes.

When they got a statement from me that they wanted, they let me go home again. However, this time, they told me that I had to leave by myself, on foot, but to be very careful because: "The police force that arrested you are everywhere," as they said. Even earlier, I noticed that I was being watched and that they followed my every move.

When they let me go alone to the streets, I did not have any of my identification documents. It was very dark outside, which helped me reach my apartment alive somehow. Midnight was near.

I learned around then that a convoy was preparing to leave Sarajevo. A requirement for leaving was having a confirmation of poor health. A panel of doctors gathered immediately, just for my case, and I got that life-saving document. I used it to leave Sarajevo, i.e., flee from it in convoy as an ill person. Until 11.11.1992, I lived in Antona Mavraka Street No. 6.

I wish to say that, after everything that happened to me, I am mentally exhausted, and I cannot remember everything or talk about everything in a coherent manner, which is why I promise to, should I remember anything important, subsequently adjust my statement.

No. KRI 66/94

Witness Hearing Record

Made on 03/11/1995 with the Investigative Judge of the _Basic_ Court in Ilidža in the criminal procedure against N.N. because of the crime described by Article _____ of the Criminal Law.

_____Bratislav Čukić_____ - judge W i t n e s s _____ Ratko Mirković____

Court reporter

__Aleksandra Cvetković__

Witness hearing attended by:

Public prosecutor

_____

Defendant

_____

Barrister

_____

Started at ____08:30____ hours

The witness is warned that he is obliged to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. He is warned about the consequences of giving false testimony, and that he is not obliged to respond to specific questions if it is likely that such responses would expose himself or his loved one a relative to grave shame, substantial material harm or prosecution (Article 229 CPA). To general questions, the witness responds as follows:

1) First and last name_____Ratko Mirković_____

2) Father's name _____Cvjetko_____

3) Occupation _____professional driver_____

4) Place of residence _temporary Grbavica, Nikole Gardovića St, No.58/8____

5) Place of birth _____Sarajevo_____

6) Year of birth _____31/05/1949_____

7) Relationship with the defendant and the victim _____

After this, the witness says the following about the subject:

I was born in Sarajevo, where I lived in the Kralja Tomislava St, No.36/II. I was employed as a driver in the Public Enterprise "Pokop" - Sarajevo. I am not married.

During the war events on 04/04/1992, I was at my workplace. I was a hearse driver for the Public Utility Enterprise "Pokop" - Sarajevo. From 04/04/1992 until 02/05/1992, I was the only driver in the company, and I transported the dead to Nevesinje, Gacko, Trebinje, Kalinovik, Trnovo and other places. From 02 until 06/05/1992, Sarajevo was completely paralyzed due to war events.

On 05/05/1992, there was a call, broadcasted over the Muslim radio, by the "Pokop" director Šipčić, that all employees should report to duty, which most of us have done. Then, Šipčić told me to go to the morgue, to try to take the body of a Serb soldier and to try to transport it to Vraca. I was unable to do this due to the chaos present in the morgue. As I was returning from the morgue, behind the stadium Koševo, in the Đure Đakovića St, I noticed five-six bodies of the murdered soldiers of YPA in a trench, i.e., the water canal, on the right side of the road. I could not stop, so I notified Šipčić about this. The same day, I went with Šipčić to Lukavica, with the intention of leaving Sarajevo illegally, that is to notify the YPA authorities about the killing of the soldiers. Upon our return to Sarajevo, after I had left Šipčić in front of his apartment, I was stopped and arrested in front of the "Skenderija" building by a group of people, most of whom were in uniforms. One of them was the bodyguard of the former official Hasan Čengić, but I do not remember his name. I was taken to a nearby bar, the name of which I believe to be "Skenderija," which was their headquarters. In the HQ, I saw a large number of unfamiliar people, who had walkie-talkies and snipers. They handcuffed me and started asking me where I was, all the while beating me. The interrogation was led by the aforementioned Čengić's bodyguard. In the meantime, they went to my apartment, raided it and looted some things, as well as 300 German Marks. Around 18:00, they took me to the "Marin Dvor" police station where their prison was located. I was in this prison for two days and two nights. During this time, they interrogated me, and, as previously, they accused me of being a Chetnik and a sniper. I was also beaten.

On the third day, I was transported to the "Karingtonka" neighborhood in Sutjeska St, No.4 or 6, in the basement of a facing brick building, which also served as a refuge. In this basement, I found 20 to 25 other captured Serbs, of which I knew none. I saw that they were also beaten, especially one who was covered in blood. I was here for two days and two nights as well. During this time, people in uniforms kept coming to the basement and continued to beat and terrorize us. Opposite of this building there is the "RS" (Radio Sarajevo) bar, which was later also turned to a prison. I heard that, in that prison, the Serbs were dreadfully tortured.

On the fifth day, they put me in a car, and, judging by their gestures, I concluded that they planned to kill me. However, during the ride, they talked with someone via walkie-talkies, after which they brought me to the police station at "Marin Dvor," and then disappeared, having told the officers on duty to keep an eye on me. Thanks to the fact that the offices on duty recognized me, they willingly took me to the Central prison by car, in order to protect me from the aforementioned people. Even to this day, I do not know to which formations the people who arrested and terrorized me have belonged.

In the Central prison, I was also interrogated, but I was not physically abused. On the evening of the same day, I was released from the prison, and I returned home.

Following my release from the prison, I had a working obligation in the PE "Pokop." From 13/05 to 05/06/1992, I worked as a gravedigger at the "Lav" cemetery. During that time, I witnessed about 20 funerals of killed Serbs. They were mostly killed during nights and left at the cemetery, where we found them the following day. I specifically remember one case when, one morning at the cemetery, we found three murdered people, one of whom was a man over 60 years old. On the head, he had a Montenegrin hat, he was disabled, and next to him there was a crutch. The murdered woman was about his age, and I assume she was his wife. Next to them, there was the corpse of a woman, about 40 years old. Her head was deformed due to torture and completely covered in blood. Just as all the other corpses found at the cemetery, they had no personal document with them. These corpses found at the cemetery were buried in a common grave at the "Lav" cemetery without any markings. There are two such common graves. In one of them, there was around 50, and in the other, about 60 murdered Serbs.

Between 05/06 and 30/12/1992, I worked in the morgue of the "Koševo" hospital, which was in those days acquired by the PE "Pokop." The Head of the morgue was Alija Hodžić, a semi-literate person and an extreme nationalist.

While I worked in the morgue, among other things, I remember when and SDS MP of the Parliament of B&H was brought. His last name was Najdanović, or something similar. He was in the morgue for about ten days, in a separate room. I had an opportunity to see his corpse. I saw that it was heavily beaten with six or seven bloody bruises. The foreign press was interesting in this case, but they were denied access to the morgue. He was buried ten or eleven days later, with the permission of the government and in attendance of the family.

On one occasion, a very beautiful woman, about 30 or 35 years old, was brought in, around 23:00 or 24:00 hours. Juka Prazina's people captured the woman when she tried to escaped Sarajevo, they tortured and finally murdered her. She was found without personal documents and was buried in one of the aforementioned common graves at the "Lav" cemetery.

A younger Serbs, about 25 or 30 years old, was also buried in the common grave at the "Lav" cemetery. He was captured around "Dariva." On his body, there were between 15 and 20 knife stabs, and I saw that some of the wounds were inflicted by an incandescent object, because burn marks could be seen around them.

On one occasion, a man, between 40 and 50 years old, was brought in from the "Viktor Bubanj" prison. He was beaten, but was still alive. They wanted to leave him in the morgue, but I refused to take him in even though they insisted, saying that they brought him following the command of the "Koševo" hospital's chief of security. He was known by his nickname "Kinez" and I know that he was an extremist. Because I, nevertheless, did not let this person be left in the morgue, he was returned to "Viktor Bubanj" prison, and the same night, around 24:00, he was brought in again, dead, and the guards who brought him told me: "There you have him now, he is dead." Later, I found that this man, killed in "Viktor Bubanj" prison was named Mato or Marko Ćeranić, and, before the war, he worked in "Hidrogradnja." I do not know where or how he was buried.

I do not remember the exact date when, as I came to work, I saw the bodies of the murdered family Ristović in the morgue. Members of the "green berets" came to the morgue the whole day kicking the bodies of the deceased, swearing their Chetnik mother at them. Foreign press also came, interested in this case, but they were left with no information, as directed by the aforementioned "Kinez." I, however, managed to steal a moment and let one press reporter make several photos, and I also told him the names of the deceased. Two days after the murder, via Muslim TV, there was an apology for this crime to family Ristović. The murdered family was buried with regular customs.

About one month after this event, the younger son of the Head of morgue Alija Hodžić, whose name I do not know, was arrested, because he participated in the murder of the family Ristović. I do not know how long he was in prison, but I do know that, later, he was transferred to the neuropsychiatric clinic from where he was released as, apparently, he was mentally unstable.

Related to these cases, on one occasion, pathologist Dr. Ilijas, a Muslim, told me in confidence that he was forced to state in the medical records of the aforementioned Serbs that they had died of a heart attack. They particularly insisted on this in the case of the MP Najdanović. He told me that he did not want to accept this, which is why he was removed from the duty of the Head of the Pathology Department and the Faculty of Medicine.

From 30/12/1992 until the end of February 1993, I worked as a gravedigger at the "Stadion" cemetery, after which I became the night watchman at the Directorate of the PUE "Pokop." After this, I was transferred again to be a gravedigger at the "St. Marko and St. Josif" cemetery. During this time, I was not able to spot the Muslim crimes over Serbs as well as I could while I worked in the morgue. However, as I was in contact with many Serbs, I heard that they complained about brothers Hamid and Uzeir Balović. They

terrorized the Serbs, looted their property and killed them at night in Velešić and below the hill Hum. The two of them worked at the PUE "Pokop," but I personally did not notice special extremism on them at the workplace.

My former neighbor, Ivan Bulatović, a retiree and the former director of the business board of "Jugokomerc," a distinguished expert, told me once in confidence, that he had overheard a Muslim who was at the bar "Hamam bar," when Mušan Topalović, aka "Caco," brought in a sack from which he dumped decapitated human heads, claiming that those were all Serb heads. Bulatović's sister-in-law Gara and her newlywed husband Milan, whose last name I do not know, were found dead in February or March 1994 in their apartment which was looted. When Bulatović tried to learn more about the circumstances of their death through the MoI, his friend in the MoI advised him to stop asking questions about that case.

I want to note that the director of "Pokop," Vlado Raguž, a Croat and the vice-president of HDZ in Sarajevo, has always had a decent attitude towards me. Once, Raguž said in my presence, as well as the presence of Miro Lasić, an HDZ official in B&H and Ivan Marić, also a Croat, that Mušan Topalović - Caco had killed more than 2,000 Serbs in Sarajevo. We had this conversation immediately before the assassination of Topalović, when the Muslims dug out around 30 corpses of people murdered by Topalović and his men and buried them in a common grave located between Zetra and the "Stadion" cemetery. Ivan Marić, together with other workers of "Pokop" attended this mass funeral. That same day, I participated in the digging of a special grave at the Catholic cemetery "Sveti Marko," in which the beheaded body of Ljubiša Frankić, a Croat from Sarajevo, was buried. The funeral was attended by his wife and two children. She said on that occasion that her husband was murdered by Mušan Topalović - Caco in his HQ, having been crucified before the murder. Her statement was corroborated by the director Vlado Raguž, who was also present.

I was also present at the funeral of Ostoja Šoja from Velešić, who was killed in "Viktor Bubanj" prison, supposedly by a sniper. Together with him was his brother Drago, who was later traded out of the prison. I also remember the funeral of one road hauler from Velešić, whose name I do not remember. He had a house next to the gas station in Velešić, in which he was killed by the Muslims. His corpse was later traded and buried at the "Sveti Marko" cemetery. A certain person named Šekara, from Velešić, who now lives at Grbavica probably knows more about this case.

In Sarajevo, there was an open secret that in the Student dorm "Mladen Stojanović," at the junction of the streets Radićeva, JNA and Mis-Irbina, there was a brothel, which was supposedly operated by the members of the Army of the RB&H. They supposedly forcefully brought Serb women to this brother where they brutalized them. I do not have any more details on this brothel.

A witness to these events, as well as to the events that happened outside my presence, could be Ivan Marić, a stonecutter in "Pokop" who now lives in Sarajevo. He has two brothers whose names I do not now. One brother is an air force officer in the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, and the other is a Sergeant in the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, also stationed in Belgrade. As much as I recall, the air force officer's name was Marijo.

That is all I had to say. The record was dictated loudly and everything I said is clearly written down. I do want to read it, I acknowledge it as my own and I sign it as such.

Ratko Mirković

(signed)

The hearing completed at 11:00 hours

COURT REPORTER

(signed)

JUDGE

(signed)

03732088

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE

ILIDŽA WAR DEPARTMENT

NO.: 245/93-58

Dated: 15 February 1993

Operative: A 10

OFFICIAL NOTE

On 15 February 1993 on the premises of the National Security Service, Ilidža War Department, an informative interview was conducted with Dr. Vladimir Šimunović, born to father Josip and mother Vilma, née Čapelj, on 27 June 1948 in Sarajevo, Centar Municipality, Croat by nationality, resides in Sarajevo, 80 Marshall Tito Street, ID no. 1847/86 issued by SUP Stari Grad, personal citizen number 2706948170008, married, father of one, excused from military service due to poor hearing and eyesight, medical doctor by occupation, surgeon and neurosurgeon, employed at the University Medical Center trauma clinic in Sarajevo, on the circumstances of his stay in Sarajevo from the beginning of the war until this day.

The interview revealed that the aforementioned had left Sarajevo through the Croat Catholic Association "Napredak", with the direct intervention of Monsignor Vinko Puljić. Dr. Vladimir Šimunović declared that the Muslim side had around 20,000 dead soldiers in the city and around 120,000 wounded. Further, he said that during the clearing of Otes, there were around 150 wounded members of BIH Armed Forces in only one day. Related to that, we have received an information that around 150 wounded combatants from Azići were taken to the Koševo Hospital over the previous three days. The work of the medical personnel in the city hospital is being heavily monitored, and doctors are often threatened with firearms to save certain patients that were brought in half-dead. Doctors of the Serb nationality, and lately Croats too, are in a particularly difficult position.

We have also received the information that the Military Police with around 200 men, commanded by Almir Husić, who goes by the nickname of Prof. Kinez, has been working out of the old washroom and restaurant above the Otorhinolaryngology building in the Koševo Hospital complex. Further, there is some sort of an artillery

weapon beneath the Faculty of Construction that is being deployed with some frequency, and two armored vehicles have been seen in the tunnel in Ciglane.

Further in the interview, Vladimir Šimunović stated that the "massacre" in the Vase Miškina Street is actually a classic setup. The rift in the city between the native Muslims and the Muslims from Sandžak is growing increasingly deep, specifically, the native Muslims see themselves as overlooked, both on the political and the military scene, since the Ganić-Halilović group has been controlling everything. The Muslim side was short on ammunition and grenades for a long time, and had even completely run out at certain positions, but there have been deliveries of the aforementioned materiel recently, and some is probably being manufactured within the city as well.

Some of the Muslim doctors who are too extremist in their views include: Dr. Faruk Kulenović, Dr. Mufid Lazović, Dr. Faris Gavrankapetanović, Dr. Goran Džinić, who humiliate Serbs in every imaginable way, and would be willing to swap their medical scrubs for military uniforms in the name of Alija Izetbegović's ideals.

Further, we were told that the Military Police had fully blocked the city center two days earlier, in order to round up deserters and hand out the stolen goods.

At the end of the interview, Dr. Vladimir Šimunović stated that the Serb side had no adequate representatives, nor any organization stationed within the city that would deal with getting Serbs out of Sarajevo and improving the truly unbearable living conditions.

S T A T E M E N T

Prior to the war break out I had been living with [redacted] Street, in the settlement of [redacted], the municipality of Novi Grad, Sarajevo. I owned [redacted] in Ilidža. When the war broke out, I went to my brother's place in the [redacted]; he had already left Sarajevo and gone to [redacted]. I was alone in his apartment. During that time, my son [redacted]. In May of 1992, while I was in my brother [redacted] apartment, a young man in civil clothes whom I hadn't known came to me and said: "You are going to an interrogation with me". I went with him to the building he took me to. It was a building that, I think, now belongs to the Electric Company. Upon our arrival, the young man took me to a basement and there were many people already, both men and women. I have never seen the young man after that.

The person in charghe in that prison was a person that I had never seen before, the only things I knew about him were that his name was "Senad", that he lived in the village of Švrakino Selo, that he was around 30 years old at that time and that he was blonde – brownish. The basement we were in was about 20 square meters big and there were at least 30 people in there. Every day, some people were taken from there and others were coming, so it was always full. There were more imprisoned men than women in the basement. Men were taken to the upper floor and beaten mercilessly. They were given shirts, the kind of shirts they wear in psychiatric hospitals. They would tie up their arms and legs, and torture them to exhaustion whenever they could. On one occasion, Senad came to the basement alone, and he beat a person whose last name was Drašković, I cannot recall his name; before mine and everyone else's eyes he beat him, kicked him with legs and wooden bats. Drašković died as a result of injuries from intense beatings. Then, two unknown civilians came and carried him to the unknown destination. Every time Senad tortured and beat someone, he

[signature: [redacted]]

would force me to wash his legs and the bloody floor. On these occasions, he kicked me with legs and cursed my chetnik[1] mother. When they would return from a battlefield, they were like crazed animals. On these occasions, they regularly came down to the basement in groups and took out imprisoned men in order to beat them, and they

[1] t/n: a derogatory nickname for Serbs, origin comes from Serbian guerilla forces in WWII

physically abused some of the men in the basement. After we spent several days in the basement, they sent us to the upper floor in a room bigger than the previous one, although this room looked like a basement, too. I remember they once brought in 17 people with last name [redacted] I know that [redacted] were physically abused, while their women and daughters were raped. I am neither familiar with their location now, nor with their identity.

Food in the basement was very poor. We were given a slice of bread with ajvar[2]. We had enough water. During the time spent there, no one had a shower, i.e. we smelt like a stinky skunk. We had never received medical assistance.

Juka Prazina came every Thursday and took us outside. He used to line us up and point his finger to the prisoners, saying to his soldiers: "You take this one to "Ćelo", this one stays". After that, they drove people off in small army trucks, and the rest of us returned to the basement.

All the women in the prison I was in were raped every day by soldiers of AR-BiH[3] who came back from battlefields, as well as by "Senad", the commandant of the prison. Except for Senad, one more person with the same name came in; this person tortured men and raped women in an extremely atrocious and humiliating way. That other Senad was dark and tall. I am familiar with the fact that a person named Jasmin, a taxi driver who drove Mercedes, sexually abused women the most. Of all the raped women, I only knew [redacted] (died) and [redacted] whose current location I do not know. I do not know other women of various ages, but I definitely know that they were all raped, regardless of their age. The oldest woman, [redacted], was about 70 years old, and the youngest girls were about 20 years old. At any time, day or night, women were taken away and sexually abused. They took them to the apartments in the same building and sexually and violently abused them. Women were anally raped, too, and they also demanded oral sex from them.

I was among the raped women. They raped and abused me every day in the worst ways possible, as I have already described and as they abused all the women. Of all the persons who raped me, I only know "Kruško", Senad, and Jasmin the taxi driver, whom I have already mentioned. During the rapes, sometimes, a group of 5 to 6 soldiers sexually abused one woman. It happened to me, as well. We, women, were not allowed to talk about the rapes we have suffered, and neither were men who were captured with us, because there was always a guard standing at the door and he would not allow us to say a single word to each other.

[2] t/n: a pepper-based condiment

[3] t/n: the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

There was a certain "Zvonko" in the prison, I did not know his last name back then, and his duty was to list names of prisoners of Serbian nationality. He was middle height with a very ugly face filled with acnes.

One day, they took about 25 or 30 of us outside, and escorted us to the border line, tied our hands up and set us as a living shield. At that moment, Senad talked to me and said: "What is

[signature: [redacted]]

wrong, if I screwed you last night, it does not mean that I would not bring you here and kill you". Grenade shells were exploding around us. We spent a few hours there. Luckily, not one of us was hurt. Because nobody was killed or wounded, they got so mad that they beat us like crazed beasts all the way back to the basement.

On one occasion, they brought a man into the basement; he had previously been imprisoned in Dobrinja, in the Commercial Bank basement. He looked horrible. He could not stand on his legs. He had injuries all over his head, arms, and legs – in short – all over his body. He told me his wife's name is Gina and that they would kill him. I think his last name was Draško. Despite his extremely poor condition, nobody offered him medical assistance. After three days in the basement, two civilians came for this man and took him in the unknown direction. I have never heard about him after that. Later, when I went to Pale, one of his sisters came to me and asked me about him. I told her everything I knew. On that occasion, that woman told me that she was carrying a bag full of money for her brother; she wanted to give the bag to Juka Prazina, but Juka told her he knew nothing about him.

I forgot to mention that the prison I was in, with all other imprisoned civilians of Serbian nationality, was a prison of a unit commanded by a person nicknamed "Kruško". I spent several months in this prison. On one Thursday, Juka Prazina came. As usual, he pointed fingers at us, so he pointed at me, too and said: "To Ćelo". That same day, [redacted], other three women, other three men and I were taken by a truck to the SUP[4], which was located near the FIS in the Mis Irba Street, the municipality of Centar. When we got off the truck, a group of soldiers shouted: "Here come chetniks, they have come again". That same group of soldiers told us to put our hands on the wall and not to look in their direction. We stood like that for about 30 minutes, and then they walked us into a building, where they searched us and took our names and last names. On that occasion, a man at the reception desk, wearing police or some other uniform – I cannot remember, said: "Here is another [redacted]".

[4] t/n: Secretariat of Interior

From there, they took us back to the truck and drove us to the "Viktor Bubanj". One person in a military uniform met us there. They put us in different rooms. I was escorted to a room; there were around 10 women of different age. During the time spent there, I was interrogated by several investigators. One of them had a nickname "Brzi". They asked me if I had any brothers or sisters, if I was a member of SDS[5] , if I had any weapons and so on. I told them that I have got only two sisters, and I could not mention my brother because I was too scared, regarding what I had experienced so far. I was questioned about the same things day after day. On the approximately fifth day, a middle height, young man in a military uniform came to my cell and asked: "Who is [redacted]?". When I said it was me, he introduced himself as "Besim", a warden of the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks. Then, he took me to an office, where he took my statement on the conditions of my deprivation of liberty and conditions and abuse in Juka Prazina's prison. I told him everything the way it had happened. Three more soldiers were there on this occasion. The interrogation was conducted on the floor above the prison. The prison was located on the ground floor, and consisted of a hall with cells on both sides. I did not have a chance to see who else was imprisoned here. I was imprisoned in a cell on the right side of the hall, somewhere at the middle of the hall. Because of the mental state I was in due to the torture I have been through in Juka Prazina's prison, I was not able to find out

[signature: [redacted]]

which other women were in the prison, the women who I shared my cell with as well.

The conditions of life and staying there were the hardest. We were not given the right to adequate nutrition, hygiene maintenance, we did not have the right to take walks, we were not allowed to receive post and packages, the guards were constantly addressing us with insulting words and curses based on our nationality, cursing our chetnik mothers and threatening to repeat the abuse and torture we had previously gone through. I never had a hearing in front of the prosecutor or a judge, nobody ever told me on what grounds I was kept in this prison or for what purpose. No one ever explained to me the nature of the institution I was in....

[5] t/n: Serb Democratic Party

Personal statement 1992/1, [redacted].

(Statement given voluntarily by [redacted]. on 6 November 1992 at the [redacted])

I am [redacted]., born in [redacted] in [redacted] [redacted] Municipality. I was captured on 26 May 1992 in the woods not far from my home. Two other girls were with me, refugees from Visoko, [redacted] and [redacted]. The three of us were captured by a dozen men wearing camouflage uniforms and hats with the "lily" insignia. They put us on a truck and drove off in a direction unknown to me.

We were taken to the Breza camp. They locked us in a basement with small windows, which was dirty, wet and cold. We were immediately raped, gang raped and beaten. I was there for two days. after that, I was taken into a different building and different room. There were five women and girls already there: two [redacted], [redacted]I stayed in that room until the end, i.e. until we were freed on 15 August 1992. We were held in that same room almost the entire time, except when they would take us out so we could watch prisoners being beaten, tortured and killed.

The prisoners were tortured by slaughtering, cutting off body parts one at a time, drowned in a pool that looked like a swimming pool, I do not know what was in it other than water.

The prisoners were forced to work extremely hard, and we were only taken out of that room when they wanted us to watch the murders and the torture, clean, or work in the garden. I did not know any of the prisoners, they were from Breza, Visoko and Vareš.

We were constantly, incessantly beaten and raped, they took turns, and some days up to 20 men would take their turns on me. When we would pass out, they dumped water on us.

We did not bathe. There was a bathroom, but we were not permitted to bathe. We had one water faucet where we were only allowed to wash our faces a bit, and maybe wash ourselves if we managed to pour some water quickly.

We were tortured by being forced to watch them torture other prisoners. On one occasion, they forced a father to rape his own daughter, who was around 17 years old. They were beaten, but both him and the daughter were resisting those requests. When they held a knife to his throat and wanted to slaughter him, his daughter screamed and begged him to do it so they don't kill him. He did it, but I do not know whether they killed him later, since anybody who made it out of that prison was half-dead.

They fed us with pieces of moldy bread or pasta, probably scraps. There was also some sort of stew, that was more like pig food.

The girls and women in that cell never talked between us because we were never alone, one of them was always present when we worked and when we were in that room. They kept mentioning the name Kula, maybe some sort of a nickname. They kept wondering whether he would be pleased or not, with how much and how they beat us, and how much and how they raped us. They laughed while talking about that. Later, when I returned home, I heard that Kula was the warden of the prison and that he was from Semizovci. I have never seen this Kula.

When I was released, so were the five girls who were held in the same room as me. Two of the girls committed suicide immediately after returning to the village, and the others went somewhere with their parents. We were released because we had become pregnant, which was the goal in the first place.

I am terrified of closed spaces and I cannot wait to return home.

No. KRI 66/94

Witness Hearing Record

Made on 15/06/1997 with the Investigative Judge of the Basic Court in Sokolac in the criminal procedure against N.N. because of the crime described by Article 142 of the Criminal Law.

Investigative - judge	W i t n e s s
Đorđa Samojko	Novica Buha

Court reporter

Dejana Čvoro

Witness hearing attended by:

Public prosecutor

_____

Defendant

_____

Barrister

_____

Started at 13:00 hours

The witness is warned that he is obliged to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He is warned about the consequences of giving false testimony, and that he is not obliged to respond to specific questions if it is likely that such responses would expose himself or his loved one a relative to grave shame, substantial material harm or prosecution (Article 229 CPA). To general questions, the witness responds as follows:

1) First and last name Novica Buha
2) Father's name Krsto
3) Occupation machinist
4) Place of residence temporary Hotel "Jahorina," Pale, phone [redacted]
5) Place of birth Gornji Velešići No. 126-B, municipality Novo Sarajevo
6) Year of birth 14/01/1955
7) Relationship with the defendant and the victim

After this, the witness says the following about the subject:

I was born in Gornji Velešići, municipality Novo Sarajevo, with residence there in my family home. I am married to Jovanka, maiden name Kovačević, a with her, I have two children. I war an employee of Unis-Pretis Sarajevo.

Since 1980, I was a reservist in the police station Novo Sarajevo, and I was stationed in the reserve police station in Gornji Velešići. The HQ of this reserve police station was in the building of the Local Community in Velešići, Lovćenska 137-A street. Lately, Nurija Zahiragić has been the commander of this police station, and I was his deputy. This station consisted of 65 total reserve members, out of which only 8 were Serbs.

In Gornji Velešići, around 6-8% of the population were Serbs, the rest were Muslims and a very small number of Croats. Until the 60's, this area was populated by Serbs, and since the 60's, there has been a massive influx of Muslims coming from Sanjak, Višegrad, Rogarica and Goražde.

My parents lived in their family home in Gornji Velešići on the west side of a hill called Hum. Their house was around 300m away from a TV repeater. My sister Dušanka, unmarried and an economist, lived with them. The house that I built in 1972 was on the opposite side of the hill, on the north-east side of the repeater, and around 400m away from my parents' home. Just next to my house, there was my younger brother's house, who had also built his family home and had lived there with his family.

In November 1991, I was drafted into the reserve police, and I was placed in Gornji Velešići. One of the main tasks was to protect the TV repeater and other objects on Hum hill. I did not go to my workplace in the company anymore, but I still received my salary from the company. During this time, I personally witnessed Muslims arming themselves illegally in Gornji Velešići, especially since March 1992. I also saw that Rašid Džebo armed himself with an automatic rifle that he had supposedly received from this party, SDA. In the beginning of April 1992, I saw many Muslims with weapons securing their mosque in Gornji Velešići and on their holiday, Eid al-Fitr, that they celebrated those days, their fired from their weapons in celebration, which is how I concluded that they were massively armed.

On 01.05.1992, a group of around 10 armed men, whom I did not know, came to my house. As they had previously surrounded my house, at their request I had to surrender the weapon that I was handed out, an automatic rifle. The same thing happened to other Serb members of this reserve police unit.

On 16.05.1992, during the early morning hours, the Muslims executed an armed assault on the Serbs in Gornji Pofalići. I spent that morning in my house, which I did not leave the whole day, as I could hear the detonations from Gornji Pofalići that whole time. The next morning, my stepmother Ljubica came to my house and told me that my parents' house had been burned down, and that my father Krsto was missing. Immediately, I went

with my stepmother and my neighbor Rešid Džebo to my parents' house, and I saw that it was burned down to bare walls. I assumed that my father was hiding in the basement and that he died there, so I searched for him, but I did not find him. I returned to my house. In the afternoon, my brother Jovica went with Rešid Džebo, Mensur Trnko and Savo Marić to search for my father. They found the remains of my father who had burned to death in the fire wreckage, on the front porch. They found the burned bones which they placed in a wooden casket and brought to Janko's house.

I want to note that my stepmother told me that the Muslims had raided my house as well on 16.05.1992, that she was scared and ran towards the barn. She hid there, and heard a gunshot in front of the house. She then ran away to a neighbor, Gojko Nikolić, where she stayed the night. She thinks that that was the gunshot that killed my father at his front porch. Later, when I went again to my parents' house, I found two automatic rifle shells, 7.62 cal. made by Igman from Konjic.

I buried the remains of my father at the Poljine cemetery in Sarajevo on 19.05.1992. I left Gornji Velešići that same day I never returned again. After the Dayton Agreement, I moved his remains to the Repca cemetery near Pale.

I do not know who participated in my father's killing, but I later heard that among them there probably was Murat Šabić from Kobilja Glava neighborhood in Sarajevo, who was, before the war, an employee of "Tas."

I assume that Samir Mahir from Gornji Velešići could know who killed my father, as he was present when some Muslims had terrorized my father during the assault on Gornji Pofalići.

I disclose the following information about my brother:

JANKO BUHA, son of father Krsto and mother Staka, maiden Čangalović, born on 10.08.1946 in Sarajevo, a professional driver, worked in the MoI school in Vraca, Sarajevo, married to Lena, maiden Radosavčević, father of two children with permanent residence in Gornji Velešići 126-B.

I tried to find out what happened to him through the international committee of ZK and other relevant institutions, but to no avail.

My sister Radojka lived in the neighborhood Dobrinja II. She was married to Dušan Petrović who was arrested in his apartment by the Muslim police on 24.06.1992. He was incarcerated in private prison "Sunce," then transferred to the prison in "Poljooprema" in Dobrinja, from where he has been missing. Milan Kravić, who was incarcerated in the same prisons could have more information about him. Before the Dayton Agreement, Milan Kravić lived in Vogošća, and I do not know where he lives now. Also, Ilija Kukobrat, who now lives in Vojvodina, phone 025/711-219 and Koviljko Trifunović, now in Novi Sad, phone 021/390-413, could know more.

I disclose the following information about my brother-in-law:

DUŠAN PETROVIĆ, son of father Dimitrije and mother Savka, maiden Borković, born on 04.09.1959 in Gradiška - village Turijak, professional carpenter, worked in Famos from Hrasnica, married to Radojka, maiden Buha, father of two children, had permanent residence in Danka Mitrova 3 street, in Dobrinja II, Sarajevo.

As far as I know, Risto Ristović with his wife, Boro Ristović with his wife Joka and daughter Dušanka, Natalija Božić and her son Predrag with his wife and child are the only Serbs now living in Gornji Velešići.

I want to note that Natalija's husband, Trifko Božić, was arrested in November 1992. He was severely beaten in prisons, and he died on his way from injuries he got while in prison.

I demand that a criminal procedure be conducted against the perpetrators of crimes mentioned above and that they are sentenced accordingly.

That is all I had to say. The record was dictated loudly, and everything I said is clearly written down. I do want to read it, I acknowledge it as my own and I sign it as such.

The hearing completed at 14:30 hours

COURT REPORTER	JUDGE
(signed)	(signed)

[handwritten] 478/96-24 *[handwritten] 74*

Number KRI 37/96 [handwritten]

WITNESS EXAMINATION RECORD

compiled on 23/07/1996 in the presence of the investigative judge of the Lower court in Višegrad in the criminal proceedings against the_____because of criminal offence according to Article _____of the CC.

Milanka Tanasković - judge

Witness

Nedjeljko Pikulić

Record keeper

Aleksandra Cvetković

Also present during the witness examination:

public prosecutor

……

defendant

.....……

defence lawyer

……..

Beginning at 17:00 hours

The witness is cautioned that he is obliged to speak the truth and not to withhold anything. He is warned of the consequences of giving false testimony, as well as that he is not obliged to answer certain questions, if he is likely to expose himself or his close relative to the grave dishonour, substantial material damage or criminal prosecution (Article 299 of the CPC), therefore the witness gives answers to the general questions:

1) Name and surname Nedjeljko Pikulić
2) Father's name Radoslav
3) Occupation Highly skilled driver
4) Residence temporarily Višegrad, 36 Dušće street, phone [redacted]
5) POB Sarajevo - Pofalići
6) DOB 05/09/1948
7) Relation with the defendant and injured party

After this the witness states the following regarding the case: [*signed Nedjeljko Pikulić*]

I was born in the Pikulić family, who has lived there for ages, in Pofalići near Sarajevo. I lived in a family home, and I personally built two houses on the property that I inherited from my grandfather and my father, and in one of them I had business premises of 64 m2, a garage and other ancillary facilities. I am married to Nevenka Koprivica from Sarajevo and I have two children with her. My mother, sister, brother with his family lived in the household with me, and my father died in 1987. We were one of the most respected Serb families in Pofalići and as such widely known in Sarajevo itself.

My house and other family-owned buildings were located at the 165 Humska Street. There were few Muslim people whose families have lived there for generations in Pofalići, and with the urbanisation of the town in the 1970s began the rapid migration of the Muslims from eastern Bosnia, Herzegovina and other parts. A good number of them settled in my immediate neighbourhood, but I never had any misunderstandings with them. On the contrary, we had good neighbourly relations.

With the foundation of the political parties in former BiH in the settlement of Pofalići, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was first formed, then the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and finally the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). I was the first president of the SDS local committee for Pofalići, that is, the local committee of Gornji Pofalići. I was replaced in this role mid-1991 by Vasilije Gagović, from Gornji Pofalići.

Immediately after its formation, members and activists of the SDA displayed aggressiveness, which was growing. I have personally observed that some Muslims from Gornji Pofalići, including my neighbours, started arming themselves. One of the people who actively worked on arming Muslims in Gornji Pofalići was Ramiz Karadža, residing at 186A Humska Street, who was getting the weapons through the commander of a reserve unit of the militia unit that covered the area of Gornji Pofalići, whose commander was Ejub, as much as I remember his last name was Terzo, from Trnovo. For example, I personally saw Ramiz Karadža. When he was coming from Sarajevo and going to his home he carried an automatic rifle with him, and he was returning without it, which I saw several times. When he entered my catering business premises, I pointed that fact out to him, but he falsely swore on his son that he did not carry weapons with him.

Before the start of the war in former BiH, Muslims also distributed these weapons in public, which almost all Serbs in Gornji Pofalići could see.

This resulted in that the Serbs also started acquiring weapons in various ways at the beginning of the war. I legally had a licensed pistol and a "bokerica[1]" hunting rifle, which was also known in my neighbourhood.

For several months before the war began, almost every night, from the Muslim part of Gornji Pofalići, from the settlement of Jezero, Semizovina, "Ruđer Bošković", Velešići and others, the Muslims fired almost every night from the firearms, and this was especially frequent before the beginning of the war and we, the Serbs, were disturbed by it, because we did not dare to react since the Muslims were in the majority and held all prerogatives in power.

On March 1, 1992, a plebiscite on independent and sovereign BiH was organised in BiH by the SDA. On that occasion, the bursts were fired at my house, as well as at most Serb houses in Gornji Pofalići, from the direction of Muslim houses and settlements. My house was hit with three bullets, but no one was hurt. I intervened with the police at Novo Sarajevo Station, but there was no response. The aforementioned Ejub Terzo asked me who was shooting, and I, since I did not know how to answer because it was night, I replied that the one to whom he had distributed the weapon had fired, which caused a quarrel among us. It happened in front of the Local community centre in Gornji Pofalići.

That day, Nikola Gardović was killed in Sarajevo at his son's wedding and the barricades were raised throughout the town and suburbs. The situation has become much worse. The Serbs in Gornji Pofalići have therefore organised on-duty guards near their houses for self-defence and protection of their homes. A Serb territorial defence was organised in Gornji Pofalići, headed by Milorad Elez. A Crisis Staff was also organised and was chaired by Dragan Šojić.

I do not remember the exact date, in April 1992, my *kum*[2] Vlado Ignjatović was arrested on the street, and upon being brought to the Novo Sarajevo police station, he was also beaten by, among others, Ejub Terzo. On that occasion, I went to the police station to intervene and in the presence of Vlado Ignjatović and the assistant commander of the police station Arso Škipina, Ejub Terzo stated: "I will destroy the Pikulić tribe", on which I was later informed by Škipina and Ignjatović. From that day, I no longer descended from Gornji Pofalići to Sarajevo, but mostly stayed at home to protect my family. Arso Škipina is now in Pale, and Vlado Ignjatović was killed during the war.

[1] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: a double barrel shotgun with the barrels one on top of another

[2] TN: KUM left in original, it can be translated in many ways depending on the relationship of two person, kum can be the best man, a witness at the wedding, a godfather to a child, not obvious here what kind of kum he was

As far as I can remember, in early May 1992, in Gornji Pofalići, in front of their houses, the Muslims killed Mladen Bratić, whose funeral I attended, as well as Rajko Savić. It has not been determined who the killer and the motive was.

Already in April and early May 1992, the arrests of a number of Serbs began in Gornji Pofalići, and I know of the following cases:

Radenko Sladoja, father's name Peko, his car was shot at near the Muslim houses of the Muslims by surname Sabljica and Kapo as he was driving towards his house, after which he was arrested and taken to one of the Muslim houses. He was released by the intervention of the Serb neighbours. He is now in Germany.

Miloš Mijović was arrested in his home and severely tortured and abused in prisons. He is now in Pale.

Blažo Šarović, arrested at his home, tortured and abused in prisons, is now in Bijeljina.

Srbislav Dragutinovic arrested at his home, tortured and abused in prisons, is now in Pale and is staying at the Miladin Bunijevac weekend cottage near the "Šator" Hotel.

Miladin Bunijevac, professor, I do not know where he is now. He was also tortured and abused in prisons.

Dimšo Vasić, also arrested and abused in prisons, I do not know where he is now.

Rade Vučićević was also tortured in prison and sentenced to 12 years in prison and is now in Rogatica.

Sreto Čangalović, arrested at his home and tortured in prison, is now in Tilava near Sarajevo.

On the night of May 15, 1992, the houses of Peko Sladoja and Miloš Mijović were set on fire, which caused great agitation among the Serbs in Gornji Pofalići, and the following morning, around 5 a.m. the Muslims carried out a sudden armed attack with great force from Buća Potok, Kobilja Glava, Gornji Velešići, Ruđer Bošković Street, Donji Pofalići and part of Petar Mećava Street, on the Serb part of the village of Gornji Pofalići, with previous use of mortars. At that moment, I was in my house with my family and mother.

The fiercest attack, in my estimation, was directed at my house, which is located in the central location in Gornji Pofalići, that is, at the highest level. Panic ensued among the Serb population, who in large numbers sought rescue at the only exit from Gornji Pofalići, that is, towards Žuč Hill, through the forest above my house.

In the immediate vicinity of my house, shelling and firearms killed Sreto Madžarević, his wife Dušanka, Ranko Šojić, Radovan Buha, Zoran, whose names I

cannot remember at the moment, and I saw that there were other people killed whose identity is unknown. I personally saw their corpses and I could show exactly where they were.

Boriša Šojić was severely wounded, a Muslim Galib Sinotić took him by his car to the hospital, which is where Boriša Šojić disappears, and, as I have heard, the Muslims have killed Galib Sinotić because of this; Miro Rogan, after severe wounding, no trace of him too.

In the morning, my family, along with the rest of the Serb population, made their way to the Žuč Hill, and I stayed with my other neighbours to defend the Serb part of Gornji Pofalići.

In the night hours, along with the other defenders, we made our way to the Žuč Hill. While pulling out of Gornji Pofalići in the woods, I saw the killed Soka Škobo, who was hit in the back of the head, and the wife of Nedeljko Vasković, whose name I do not remember. We brought a corpse of Soka Škobo with us to the Žuč Hill and Vasković's corpse remained in the forest.

After the Muslim attacks on Gornji Pofalići, they arrested a number of civilians and carried out various acts of violence. A number of people have disappeared and nothing is known about them to this day, and the following people are known to me: my uncle Vojo Pikulić over 60 years old and his wife Marica, Pero Pikulić was last seen in the Viktor Bubanj camp, where every trace of him was lost, Dušan Kosić, Stana Čangalović, Stevo Vesković and his wife Stana, Radović, whose names I cannot recall at the moment, they were all retired.

One of my homes was among the first in Gornji Pofalići to be set on fire and burned. The second house and other buildings were looted and destroyed. In addition to residential and other facilities, I had 6000 m^2 of meadows and 7000 m^2 of forest. I would not be able to assess the value of this property now, and I would submit a claim for damages if the conditions were created.

For now, I am not ready to testify before the court, given that Muslims have declared me a war criminal without grounds.

That's all I had to say about the abovementioned. I approve the records and as such I sign it.

Ended at 7:30 p.m.

RECORD KEEPER — JUDGE

[*signature illegible*] — [*signature illegible*]

No. KRI 66/94

Witness Hearing Record

Made on 08/11/1995 with the Investigative Judge of the Basic Court in Ilidža in the criminal procedure against N.N. because of the crime described in Article _____ of the Criminal Law.

Bratislav Čukić - judge

_____

Court reporter

Aleksandra Cvetković

W i t n e s s

Dragan Ristović

Witness hearing attended by:

Public prosecutor

_____

Defendant

_____

Barrister

_____

Started at 08:30 hours

The witness is warned that he is obliged to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. He is warned about the consequences of giving false testimony, and that he is not obliged to respond to specific questions if it is likely that such responses would expose himself or his loved one a relative to grave shame, substantial material harm or prosecution (Article 229 CPA). To general questions, the witness responds as follows:

1) First and last name Dragan Ristović
2) Father's name Boro
3) Occupation worker
4) Place of residence temporary Vogošća, Zagorke Radić St, No.34, 071/434-012
5) Place of birth Sarajevo
6) Year of birth 30/06/1970
7) Relationship with the defendant and the victim _____

After this, the witness says the following about the subject:

I was born in Velešići, a suburban neighborhood of the municipality Novo Sarajevo. I was studying to be a mechanic, but I never finished my studies. I lived together with my parents in our family home.

My family, Ristović, is one of the indigenous families in Velešići, and there were 18 of our houses. Also, as far as I can remember, according to the last census before the start of the war in former B&H, in Velešići there were around 900 Serbs and more than 10.000 Muslims, who came to this area illegally, over the last 10 years or so, and migrated mostly from East Bosnia and Sanjak.

The neighboring settlement to Velešići is Kobilja Glava, which has almost exclusively Muslim population who came there over the last 10 years or so, but there is also a small number of indigenous Muslims there. After he ran from Velešići at the start of the war, Murat Šabanović came to Kobilja Glava where his sister lived. When he came there, he formed an armed unit called "The Podrinje Brigade" which mostly included Muslims from Kobilja Glava.

Murat Šabanović, together with his unit, participated in the assault and burning of Serb houses in the settlement Pofalići in June 1992, on which occasion, as I heard, there was a large number of civilian casualties. Following this attack, he and his HQ came to Velešići, and formed a base in some of the abandoned Ristović houses, after the people who lived in these houses fled at the start of the war or immediately after the attack in Pofalići. Shortly after the events in Pofalići, Murat Šabanović started raiding individual Serb houses in Velešići with his unit, as well as terrorizing the Serbs who lived there.

I know that, when they raided the house of Krsto Buha, they killed him, looted and set his house on fine. Krsto Buha burned inside the house.

As far as I remember, on July 09 or 10, 1992, a group of four armed Muslims, for whom I assume were members of the Murat Šabanović's unit, stormed the house of Obren Ristović, on which occasion they killed:

1. **Obren Ristović**, owned of the house, around 38 years old
2. **Pero Ristović**, Obren's brother, around 40 years old
3. **Bosiljka Ristović**, Obren's sister, 33 years old
4. **Radosava Ristović**, Obren's mother, around 60 years old
5. **Danilo Ristović**, Obren's cousin, 13 and a half years old
6. **Mila Ristović**, Obren's aunt, around 50 years old.

Dušan Ristović was wounded in this attack.

They were all caught during lunchtime, when the following people stormed the house and killed them with automatic and hunting rifles:

1. MIRSAD HODŽIĆ, born in 1971, from Kobilja Glava, together with whom were 3 other Muslims whose names I do not know.

Immediately after the killings, they fled. Other than Dušan Ristović, Stojanka Mastilo was also there at the scene. She was born in 1962 in the village Jabuka near Foča and lived in Vojkovići - Sarajevo. She was inside the house because she visited her friend Bosiljka Ristović. Dušan Ristović now lives in Grbavica, Lenjinova St No.9, and Stojanka Mastilo now lives in Novi Sad where her sister lives, and whose name I do not know. It is possible that she has married and changed her last name.

The perpetrators of this crime were caught by the police. On the trial, they were declared legally insane, sentenced to five years in prison each and forwarded for treatment to the neuropsychiatric clinic in Sarajevo, from where they were soon released and are now free in Sarajevo.

The Serbs in velešići were raided on 24.12.1992, when, supposedly, the raiders search for weapons. On that occasion, the raiders killed Željko Kljajić, Ostoja Šoja, Drago Šoja, Vojislav Čangalović, Todor Ristović, Konstantin Božić, Živko Kretija, Jovo Kretija, Mišo Šekira, Momčilo Kovačević, Ranko Krunić and Trifko Božić. They were transferred to the premises of the construction company "Vranica" in Pofalići, which served as HQ for some Muslim unit. They were tortured and physically brutalized there, and Trifko Božić succumbed to the wounds, a driver from Velešići, 48 years old. The others were taken to the prison in the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks.

After this event, the Muslims started forcefully detaining the Serbs in order to exchange them, as well as to mobilize them into the Muslim army. I would like to point out that the detainments for exchanges were privately conducted, and the exchanges were paid for. Because of this, I was hiding and avoiding contacts with Muslims, as I tried to cross to the territory of the Republic of Srpska, but the Muslim military police found and arrested me of 05.12.1992. They brought me to prison in the former YPA barracks "Viktor Bubanj" in Sarajevo, and told me that they would conduct an informative interview with me. They brought me to the cell number 11. In this cell, I found Zoran Plavšić, Boško Gogić, Dragutin Mihajlović, Radomir Veljković, and Zdravko Vukajlović, who were also arrested. Mihajlović and Veljković were born in Kruševac, and lived and worked in Sarajevo as teachers. They were both retired, and Veljković was a distinguished professor of quantum physics. The others were from Sarajevo. They were all beaten and their strength was leaving them, and Boško Gogić was in the worst condition.

Immediately after they brought me to this prison, I was interrogated by the military police which was part of the 101st Brigade, and the premises of which were located in the prison building. They interrogated me for 15 days, and the whole time I was beaten and tortured. Usually, four to five police officers participated in these beatings, and they used batons and other objects, they kicked me with their boots, hit me with rifle butts, thick electric cables and other objects when they encircled me and kicked me between each other, etc. On this occasion, they broke four of my ribs on the left side of my ribcage. I specifically remember one day when they interrogated me using the "hot-cold" system, which means that they would first beat me hard, and then they would sit me down on a chair and start a "normal" conversation, offering me a cigarette, and if they were not satisfied with my answers, they would continue beating me. Then, when I took a lit cigarette, one of the officers cursed my Chetnik mother, lifted me from the chair, pushed me against a locker, shoved a gun barrel in my mouth after he had first cocked the gun, severely wounding my palate and other parts of my mouth. He also hit my head with the gun handle.

I do not know the names of these officers, because they never called each other by names while they were around me.

After I was interrogated by the military police officers, an investigation started against me, and I was then interrogated by the investigative judge, whose office was upstairs in the prison. During the investigation, I was not beaten or terrorized.

While I was in the "Viktor Bubanj" prison, I heard from other inmates that 12 Serbs had died before I came there. They died of hunger and beatings, but I cannot remember their names. While I was there, in the cell number 9, a name whose last name was Odžaković died of hunger. As far as I can remember, his first name was Neđo, I do not know where he was from.

I know that, while I was serving my sentence in the Central prison on the fifth floor, Joca Nešković died, a butcher who worked in Blagoja Parovića St in Sarajevo, and the official medical findings stated that he had died as a cardiac patient. Dragan Zelić and Jovo Ninković also died while they were serving their sentence on the third floor. Dragan Zelić was found hanging in the toilet while he was in a solitary confinement unit, and Jovo Ninković died officially as a cardiac patient. All these cases happened under strange circumstances, and among the inmates, there was a conviction that they had been killed.

I was released from the Central prison by exchange on 26.09.1995. My parents are still in Velešići, they filed a claim to leave Sarajevo, but their request was denied.

While I was in the cell number 2 in the Central prison, my cellmates were, for a while, the former members of the armed forces of Mušan Topalović aka "Caco"

and his deputy Ramiz Delalić aka "Ćelo 2." Those were Alen Hatić and Emir Kapetanović. In the living room area, I also talked with Samir Kapetanović and Haris Kulenović. Hatić was imprisoned because of thievery, Emir, and Samir because of an armed robbery and murder of some children, and Haris was their accomplice. I talked several times with Hatić and Emir Kapetanović, who told me, among other things, that they had participated in numerous actions of the aforementioned units, in which they captured many Serbs in Sarajevo, brought them to dig trenches, etc., and, according to them, many Serbs were killed. Their bodies were brought to a place called Kazani[1], above the settlement Bistrik in the Stari Grad municipality. They were thrown in these cauldrons in layers, and, as they explained, they would first throw 30 or 40 bodies, then they would pour quicklime over them, then another layer of bodies, then again quicklime, and over the quicklime a layer of dirt, and so on, and according to them, there was about 10 of such layers. They did not say who did the killing, and they never said they had done it. According to them, Samir Kapetanović and Haris Kulenović had also participated in these actions.

They also talked about the massacre of the citizens in the bread line in Vase Miskina St. They said that no grenade was thrown at the line, rather a strong explosive was planted in an ice-cream chest in front of the store, but they did not say who planted this explosive. Another massacre, the one that happened at the "Markale" market was a consequence of, as they said, a grenade was thrown from one of the nearby buildings, organized by the Muslims. About the last massacre, the one at the "Markale" market, which happened in spring 1995, they said that that, on that occasion, a grenade was launched from Kazani, also organized by the Muslims.

Alen Hatić was released and is now free in Sarajevo, and Haris Kulenović and Emir and Samir Kapetanović were transferred to the Zenica prison to serve their sentences.

That is all I had to say. The record was dictated loudly and everything I said is clearly written down. I do want to read it, I acknowledge it as my own and I sign it as such.

Dragan Ristović

(signed)

The hearing completed at 14:00 hours

COURT REPORTER

(signed)

JUDGE

(signed)

[1] T/N - The name of the place, Kazani, has the meaning of cauldrons.

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
POLICE ADMINISTRATION EAST SARAJEVO
POLICE STATION HAN PIJESAK
-criminal police department-

Number: 13-02/3-EPL-53/05
Day: 21.03.2005

R E C O R D
ON THE ACQUISITION OF STATEMENT FROM A PERSON

Made on 21.03.2005 in the premises of the police station Han Pijesak, relating to the acquisition of statement from Rada Dragičević, about the war crime perpetrated to the cilivans by soldiers of the Army of B&H on 28.12.1992, in Donja Bioča, Ilijaš municipality.

Started at 11:10 o'clock.

Present:

1. Authorized official: Milan Marković
2. Authorized official: Čedo Janjuš
3. Citizen: Rada Dragičević,

In regards to Article 8 of the CPA of the RS, the citizen is advised that they have a right to their language, right to interpretation, and right to an alphabet.

Do you understand the language we use to speak? YES

Do you need an interpreter? NO

Which alphabet do you want this record written in? Cyrillic

Afterward, the citizen is advised in regards to Article 219, Paragraph 2 of the CPA of the RS that they do not have to make any statements or answer any question that the authorized official asks other than personal information. After being informed in what capacity they were summoned, they are advised about their rights as a witness from Article 150, i.e., Articles 6 and 142 of the CPA of the RS.

Did you understand your rights? YES

Do you need a lawyer? NO

Will you answer the questions even though you are aware that you do not have to? YES

After this, the person from whom the statement is collected states the following information:

our first and last name: Rada Dragičević
Father's name: Dranko Draškić
Mother's name: Milojka
Your mother's maiden name: Mirković
Your date of birth: 07.12.1961
Place of birth: Ćatići, Visoko municipality
Where do you live: Vlasenica, Svetosavska BB
What is your vocation: caterer
Are you employed and where: Yes, "Omora-promet" LLC, Han Pijesak
Are you married? No
Do you have children? Yes, one
What is your nationality? Serbian
What is your citizenship? Republic of Srpska - Bosnia and Herzegovina
UMCN[1]: [redacted]
Personal ID number: [redacted]
Contact number: [redacted]

Rada Dragičević, an employee of "Omara-Promet" LLC, came to the premises of police station Han Pijesak on her own initiative on 21.03.2005 at 11 o'clock. She gave a written statement regarding a War crime perpetrated to the members of her family in Donja Bioča, Ilijaš municipality, on 28.12.1992 at around 05:30 o'clock by three unknown soldiers of the Army of B&H, on which occasion they raped and then killed her daughter Mirjana (10 years old), mortally wounded her aunt Lenka Skočo (54 years old), and severely wounded her mother Milojka (52 years old), as well as herself, on which she gives the following:

S T A T E M E N T

In 1984, I divorced from my then-husband Nenad Dragičević, whose last name I kept because of our children, and that year I moved from his apartment in Ilijaš to my parents Branko and Milojka Draškić's family home in Donja Bioča, Ilijaš municipality, together with our two children, son Janko and daughter Mirjana. Until the outbreak of war in the former B&H, I worked as a waitress in the restaurant "Olimpik" in Ilijaš, which is how I earned money to raise and educate my children.

[1] T/N - Unique Master Citizen Number

On 28.12.1992, around 05:30 in the morning, my mother Milojka woke me up and told me that something strange was happening in the village and that heavy gunshots can be heard due to which the people were supposedly fleeing towards Ilijaš. I got up then and went to the front porch in my pajamas where my mother and my aunt Lenka Skočo stood, who fleed from the village Gornja Bioča and settled in a weekend cottage near our house and spent that night at our place. My mother told me then to wake my children up and that we should also flee towards Ilijaš, after which I immediately returned to the room, woke my children up, put some clothes on them and told them that we had to flee towards Ilijaš because the Muslims fro Visoko municipality had attacked our village. While I was clothing my children, I heard a burst shooting immediately in front of our house's door, after which I ran in front of the house and saw three unknown men with automatic rifles in their hands standing next to my mother and aunt. They wore green camouflage uniforms with some ribbons on one of their sleeves, with bandanas around their heads and backpacks on their backs. Two of them had very dark skin, and then I realized that those were the mujahideen. I had heard that they were fighting for the Army of B&H. The third one had light skin, and I assume he was from our area. The two talked among themselves on some unintelligible language, and the third one, who was about 25 years old, kept quiet the entire time. Then I heard my mother saying: "Rada, keep the children safe," and I saw blood coming down her leg-thigh, and my aunt shouted all the time, and I saw her blood coming from around her hip. Afraid, I returned immediately to the front porch and told my children who started running towards me from the kitchen to run, which Janko did and ran to his room, and Mirjana cried and grabbed to with her arms. At that moment, the soldiers came towards us. Two of them grabbed me by my arms, and the third one grabbed my daughter and pushed her into the kitchen. A mujahideen and the soldier from our area held me, and the other mujahideen pulled a sweatsuit with her underwear from my daughter, who screamed. He then pulled his own pants with his underwear down to his knees and pushed her to the floor, spread her legs, and raped her. My daughter screamed and scrambled, and then the brute hit her several times to the face. Blood started pouring from her nose, after which she stopped crying because she passed out. When the first mujahideen finished raping her and dressed up, he came up to me to hold me, and the other mujahideen picked up my passed out daughter, put her on the couch and raped her too. After the other mujahideen raped my daughter and dressed up, the soldier from our area went towards my daughter. I broke away and started running towards her, and at that moment, the first brute-mujahideen fired from the automatic rifle and shot me in the stomach and leg, which caused me to fall to the floor next to the couch. While I was lying on the floor, I saw the third brute came near and raped my passed out daughter on the couch, who was bloody all over her face and between her legs. When he finished raping her, the first brute came to the couch and fired a single shot to my daughter's head. During this time, while the three soldiers were with us in the kitchen, about half an hour,

there was heavy gunfire and noise coming from the vehicle engines in the village, which is why the three criminals ran out of the house and fled. After this, I crawled across the floor, came to the front porch, and saw my mother and aunt lying in the same place, and I know I told my mother that the Ustashe killed my Mirjana. After a short while, Army of the Republic of Srpska came to our house with a tank, put my aunt and me on the tank, and brought us to an ambulance had already come to the village from Ilijaš. They brought us then to Ilijaš and provided us with first aid, after which they brought us by ambulance to the hospital "Žica" in Blažuj. After a short intervention here, they urgently brought me to the military hospital in Pale, where I underwent surgery, and then on 29.12.1992, the transferred me to Belgrade by helicopter, placed me in the Emergency room, where I was kept for six months. While I was in hospital in Belgrade, I found out that my daughter Mirjana was buried at the graveyard near the church in Ilijaš, and that my aunt Lenka died in the hospital in Blažuj the next day after she was wounded. My mother, Milojka, was cared for in the hospital in Ilijaš. I also found out then that my son Janko was hiding in the bedroom hidden in the sheets while this war crime was happening.

I note that I have told about this crime perpetrated by the members of the Army of B&H several times to organizations such as the Association of Prisoners of the Republic of Srpska and other organizations that investigate the crimes perpetrated on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nobody ever called me to the country institutions so that I could give a detailed statement in regards to this crime, in order for the perpetrators to be found and for them to answer to the competent court.

I also note that I remember in vivid detail all the events that happened in front of and inside our family home, and that remember the faces of the brutes whom I could recognize.

There is nothing else I can say about the above.

The citizen is advised in regards to Article 65 of the CPA of the RS that they have the right to read the record or demand another person to read it to them. YES

Do you want to read the record, or would you rather have it read to you? YES
The acquisition of the statement stopped at 12:35 for the reading of the record.

Do you have any objections to the record? NO

Do you have anything else to say? NO

Will you sign the record? YES

The acquisition of the statement finished at 12:40 o'clock.

Reporter	**Citizen**	**Authorized official**
Nedo Janjuš	Rada Dragičević	Milan Marković
(signed)	(signed)	(signed)

[handwritten numbers: 178/98-2] Number KRI 723/98

RECORD OF WITNESS STATEMENT

dated 20th May 1998 in front of Investigative judge of the District court in Belgrade in criminal proceedings against unknown persons due to criminal offence from Article 144 KZJ[1] of KZ[2].

Investigative - judge
Ilija Simić

Witness
Pero Jeremić

Recording clerk
Olivera Krnjić

Persons present at witness examination:

public prosecutor
[no entry]

defendant
[no entry]

defence attorney
[no entry]

Examination started at [no entry]

The witness was warned that he/she is obliged to speak the truth and that he/she must not keep anything secret, was warned of the consequences of giving false testimony, as well as the fact that he/she is not obliged to answer specific questions if it is probable that he/she would thus expose himself/herself or a close relative to severe shame, considerable material damage, or to criminal prosecution (Article 229 of ZKP), thus the witness gives following answers to general questions:

1) Name and surname Pero Jeremić

2) Father's name Vaso

3) Occupation pensioner

[1] Translator's note: Criminal Code of the Federative Repubublic of Yugoslavia

[2] t/n: Criminal Code

4) Temporary place of residence in Borča, the 21 Bratstva Jedinstva Street, phone: 3328-190

5) Place of birth the village of Mekoća, municipality of Kalovik[3] [sic], Republic of Srpska

6) Year of birth 1st September 1927

7) Relationship to the defendant and the aggrieved party _____

Next, the witness states the following regarding the case itself:

[signature: Pero Jeremić]

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The witness was warned that he is obliged to speak the truth and gives the following answers on the court's questions:

I had lived in a big house near the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks with my family. The house had 8 apartments, and there were four of us, brothers. We were the owners. I owned two apartments and two garages. I lived with my wife, Stana Jeremić, in one apartment; she managed to escape and come to Belgrade on 15th May 1992. My son, Mladen Jeremić, lived in another apartment; he had also left to Moscow on a business trip in April. When the war broke out, most of the tenants in the house, i.e. most of my relatives left, so only I, my brother Milorad, his wife Bosa and my relative Anđa stayed there.

From 6th May and onwards, on several occasions, members of territorial defence came to my house searching for weapons; however, they did not find anything. I remember them coming on 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 25th May and also before that. On 26th May, sometime around 1 PM, a group of armed people in uniforms came. They were "Green berets". Their superior was a Muslim with last name Rajković. I do not know his name, but I know that his mother was Fatima. There were around 10 – 12 people. They did a raid of the whole house and carried weapon detectors. By the way, my son's trade company "SINKOM" was in the basement. There was a cash register, computers and other things in the company's facilities. These people asked me to give them the key of the cash register, which I did. I know they took 500 DEM and

[3] t/n: the correct name is Kalinovik

some documents. While the raid was taking place in the house, a shot was heard. After that, around 150 people gathered at very short notice and accused me of shooting. I answered them that I did not shoot since I did not have a weapon. Then, they found a machine gun in a bush by the house and told that I hid it there. I replied that it was a lie and that it was not mine. After, a man came and took me to the garage and started beating me; I do not know his name, but I do know that he was tall and blonde. He hit me in the head with a baton, so soon I was covered in blood. Later they handcuffed me to a fence in front of the house and I was there for two or three hours. Then they put me in a Mercedes and drove me to the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks. They took away everything I had with me – keys, documents and so on. They only left me 200 DEM that this man found while searching and he said: "I will not take the money from you". I spent around two hours in a solitary confinement in the "Viktor Bubanj". When they took me from my home I was in my slippers, trousers and shirt; I did not wear any more clothes. On the same day, on 26th May 1992 around 6 PM, they drove me to the Central Prison, and a person named Ismet Bajramović alias "Ćelo" was waiting for us there. They addressed him with "colonel".

In the Central Prison, I was put in a solitary confinement on the 3rd floor. Steva Borovina was put there later. Before the war, he was a director of the "OSIGURANJE" and, as far as I know, he is in Belgrade now and also works in the "DUNAV"[4]. After some time, they put us both in room 176 – 178, and there were more people there.

[signature: Pero Jeremić]

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3 – 4 days later, I was called in for a hearing in a hall. There were three men in there – two seemed familiar to me but I do not know their names; they had worked in the "FAMOS" Company. I had been the company's director of OUR[5] before I retired. They wanted me to confess that the weapon they had found was mine; I denied it and then they said they would draw up the record and bring it to me to sign it. They brought the record twice for me to sign it; I denied since it did not contain what I had said. At the end, they agreed to draw up the record based on what I had actually said. They did not record it and fill out my personal information card until 17th or 18th June. On 20th June, they put me into a solitary confinement again, and on 22nd June they

[4] t/n: both Osiguranje and Dunav are insurance companies

[5] t/n: associated labour organization

took me out and put me into a truck together with about 100 more people and drove us to the "VIKTOR BUBANJ" camp. By the way, while I was in the Central Prison, I was not physically abused, rather just mentally, and the food was very poor. A man whose last name was "HERCEG" hit me once with his leg. I also remember some of the guards in the Central Prison: Fudo (FRENKI), Meliha – a woman, Mirela, Daut.

All these people were transferred to the Viktor Bubanj with me. I was put in a room with dimensions 6 – 7 m² together with 12 – 13 more people. We were given around 70 – 60 g of bread a day and a soup that was actually just plain water, and tea that also contained nothing but water. From the time I got into prison until the exchange, I lost 24 kilograms. By the way, the camp commandant was a man called "BESIM". I do not know his last name, but I heard he is from Foča. I had a hearing again in July. I was heard by the three men that had interrogated me in the Central Prison. I learned that one of them was Fadil Jahić. On this occasion, they stated that, on 22nd June, they allegedly found a Shpagin machine pistol, a Scorpion and a machine gun. I told them that was not true but, after the abuse, some other people brought a statement for me to sign. I told them that I cannot see without my glasses so they could write there whatever they wanted. They said that it did not matter and one of them hit me and said that I would sign it, so I did. After that, a big man who was allegedly form the security came. I do not know his name, but he also interrogated me regarding the weapons and he asked me where my son was and if I had his phone number for them to call him. I told him that I did not know where my brothers and relatives were since they had all gone. Then this man told me that I had signed a statement which claimed that they found the weapons at my house. I told him what really happened. Then he took me out of the camp to the terrace and showed me my house. My house was the only untouched while the other Serbian houses were burnt down. He told me that their headquarters was in my house. I answered that it was a better solution than burning it down. Then they brought me back into the room. After some time, I was put in a bigger room since I had some health issues. When I asked for a doctor's assistance, I was examined by a man who I think was not a doctor, but just a trainee. Then I was summoned, but the trial that was supposed to be in the Municipality Court in Sarajevo was postponed. Then they moved the location of the trial to the "Viktor Bubanj" camp and the date was supposed to be 11th September 1992. I was summoned on 8th September 1992 and when I told them that my trial date was 11th, they said it did not matter. Nihad Šeremet was the judge. There were also a public prosecutor, a recording clerk (female) and one more man.

[signature: Pero Jeremić]

B15396

- 4 –

The judge told them all to leave the room and, when I was left alone there with him, he told me that the trial's outcome was not important since I was about to be exchanged at 11 AM that day. I told him that I wish to say everything that happened, and everything that followed was kind of a mock trial. I was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months in prison. I was not given a verdict; but I enclose all the other documents I have. After I left the courtroom, I saw a man in the hall. I suppose he was Juka's deputy. He asked me how long I was sentenced for and I answered him. He told me "You are going to be exchanged today". I was not given any certificate or any other documents that would prove I had been in prison. After I went to get my stuff – actually, I did not have anything – they put me in a car and I headed to the exchange. That is when one man threatened to kill me and the others and throw our bodies into the Miljeca[6] River. However, the other one told me "Do not worry, you are about to be exchanged". And so I was exchanged at the "Bristol" bridge and crossed to the Serbian territory. After some time, I went to Belgrade. By the way, I remember that, when I left the prison, people who stayed in the room I was in were: Miloš Jokić – I heard that he was killed after the release; Strahinja Živak – he was born in Konjic and he was wounded and sentenced to 15 years in prison for an offence unknown to me, allegedly it was for arming the army. This Živak guy was released from prison in 1994 in an exchange. Other people who were with me in prison were Todor Todorović; Pandurović whose name I do not know; Nastić whose name I do not know; Mile Rodić – I heard he is in Canada and once I quarrelled[7] with him since he was a snitch; Ranko Skoko; Tuholj Ćorović and so on.

By the way, during my time in prison, I did not witness other prisoners being liquidated or even abused. I do not know any other names besides those I have already mentioned.

Regarding the property which I had left in Sarajevo – the aforementioned house, i.e. my two apartments are about 85 m² big. The four of us also had 100 m² totals of two garages. I had also left two cars – "JUGO" and "STOJADIN".

I am willing to testify on the abovementioned matters before a domestic or an international court. That is all I had to say on the previous matters. The record was loudly dictated, I do not wish to read it, and I sign it without any commentaries.

[6] t/n: the actual name of the river is Miljacka

[7] t/n: unknown word, most likely the correct word is quarrel or argue

Recording clerk [signature: Pero Jeremić] INVESTIGATIVE JUDGE

[signature: illegible] [signature: illegible]

ILIJA SIMIĆ

B15397

LOWER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE II IN SARAJEVO[1]
KT. No. 276/92
Sarajevo, 23rd July 1992
RB/OM

LOWER COURT II
IN SARAJEVO

Pursuant to Article 45, Paragraph 2, Item 3 and Article 241, Paragraph 2 of ZKP[2], I hereby submit

MOTION FOR INDICTMENT

Against: Pero Jeremić, son of Vaso (father) and Jovanka, maiden name Govedarica (mother), born on 1st Sep 1927 in Mekoća, the municipality of Kalinovik, a pensioner (former emloyee of the FAMOS / director of OOUR[3] of a housing unit, residing in Sarajevo – the 54-A Prnjavorska Street, currently in the Military Prison,

For: On 26th May and 22nd July 1992, in Sarajevo, in

The 54-a Prnjavorska Street, acquiring and holding in possession: 1 machine gun M-53 cal. 7.9 mm, 1 machine gun "CZ" cal. 7.62mm serial No. 61738, 1 Shpagin machine pistol "Dobošar" cal. 7.62 mm serial No. 651, 1 "Scorpion" pistol cal. 7.65 mm serial No. 10722, 30 bullets cal. 7.29 mm and 330 bullets cal. 7.62 mm, therefore committing a criminal offence of illegal possession of firearms or explosives from Article 213, Paragraph 1 of KZ RBiH[4]

[1] Attached documents with a statement by Jeremic Pero, verdicts from the Muslim part of Sarajevo.
[2] t/n: Criminal Procedure Code
[3] t/n: basic associated labour organization
[4] t/n: Criminal Code of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

I therefore
PROPOSE
1. A hearing to be scheduled and held before
the court in accordance with actual and local jurisdictions and people called:

Lower public prosecutor II Sarajevo,

Defendant
Pero Jeremić? The 54-a Prnjavorska Street – Sarajevo,
2. To examine the certificates of the
temporary forfeiture of the objects at the hearing.
3. To order a pre-trial detention of the
defendant Pero Jeremić in terms of Article 433, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of ZKP
4. After the hearing and evidence presented,
to find guilty and convict the defendant in accordance with the law.
I hereby CONFIRM that this copy
is authentic to the original
Nihad Šeremet

DEPUTY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
[signature: illegible] B15398 Branimir Rončević
LOWER COURT II SARAJEVO

KV NUMBER – 143/92
Sarajevo, 28 July 1992

Lower Court II Sarajevo sitting in the Trial Chamber consisting of Davorin Jukić as the Presiding Judge and judges Senad Kreho and Nenad Šeleda as members of the Chamber, with participation of recording clerk Slađana Baričanin, in the criminal proceeding against Pero Jeremić, for a criminal offence in violation of Article 213, Paragraph 1 of KZ RBiH, deciding on pre-trial detention against the defendant, and following the issuing of a motion to indict of CJB[5] II Sarajevo, KT – 276/92 dated 23rd July 1992 in the Chamber meeting held on 28th July 1992 and pursuant to Article 433, Paragraph 1, Point 1 of ZKP, issued

D E C I S I O N

On the defendant Pero Jeremić, son of Vaso (father) and Jovanka, maiden name Govedarica (mother), born on 1st September 1927 in Mekoća, the municipality of Kalinovik, a pensioner (former employee of the FAMOS), director of OOUR a housing

[5] t/n: Public Security Centre

unit, residing in Sarajevo in the 54-a Prnjavorska Street.

DETENTION ORDER

Shall be calculated from date and time of deprivation of liberty and placement to custody in the District Prison in Sarajevo and detention may last no longer than two months or until the next court's decision.

Appeal against the decision does not have suspensory effect.

R A T I O N A L E

CJB II Sarajevo with a motion to induct KT-276/92 dated 23rd July 1991 filed charges before this court against Pero Jeremić, for a criminal offence of illegal possession of firearms or explosives referred to in Article 213, Paragraph 1 of the KZ RBiH.

Following the issuing of a motion to indict the Trial Chamber has, pursuant to Article 433, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of ZKP, examined whether there are conditions for detention against the defendant and decided as in the wording of the Decision since there is a justified concern that, while released, the defendant might hide, and there are other circumstances which obviously indicate the danger of defendant escaping since there is war in the country and the defendant might flee to the territory not controlled by the legal organs of RBiH.

RECORDING CLERK	PRESIDING JUDGE
SLAĐANA BARIČANIN	Davorin Jukić

LEGAL REMEDY: Appeal against this decision may be made to the Higher Court in Sarajevo through this Court, within 3 days from the receipt of the decision.

[handwritten note: I was deprived of liberty, beaten and robbed On 26th May 1992 and I was released from prison in an exchange on 8th September 1992. Detention order has been issued two months after my imprisonment.]

B15399

LOWER – HIGHER COURT IN II Sarajevo K: 226/92

NOTICE
TO THE DEFENDANT TO THE MAIN HEARING

Pero Jeremić from [no entry]
Street [no entry] Street No. [no entry]
is called as a defendant to the main hearing on Friday, 7th August 1992
at 11 AM to this court [illegible]number 23 for a criminal offence
[no entry] in violation of Article 213, Paragraph 1 of KZ
[no entry] 19[no entry].

Presiding judge – Judge
NIHAD ŠEREMET
[signature: illegible]

[no entry]
certified copy - authorised court official
[stamp: The Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Lower Court II Sarajevo]

The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina K:[handwritten numbers: II – 2/92]
[handwritten note: District Military] COURT in [Sarajevo] (file reference)

Summons to appear

[handwritten note: PERO JEREMIĆ]
(name and last name of the defendant)

[no entry]
(street and street number, organizations etc.)

[handwritten note: District Military Prison]
(place)

You are hereby ordered to appear in this court as the DEFENDANT on 11th September 1992 [no entry] (day) (date) 19 [no entry] at [handwritten note: 11 AM], in a room No [handwritten numbers: 202] floor [2] for [no entry]

Your failure to appear without a justifiable reason will result in your APPREHENSION. You are INFORMED that the defendant, during the course of the criminal proceeding may have a defence attorney (attorney), and that the defence attorney may attend the hearing of the defendant.

In [handwritten note: Sarajevo] on [handwritten note 3rd September] 19[handwritten numbers: 92].

Investigative judge,
Presiding judge,
Judge,

[handwritten note:
ŠEREMET NIHAD
[signature: Š Nihad]

B15401

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
PUBLIC SECURITY CENTER
EAST SARAJEVO

No.:13-02/4-87/05
Date: 28 April 2005

R E C O R D
of witness hearing

Taken on 28 April 2005 at the premises of the East Sarajevo Public Security Center, Department of Criminal Police, on the basis of the Article 219 of the Republic of Srpska Criminal Procedure Code, on the circumstances of felonies detailed in the Chapter XVII of the BIH Criminal Code (Crimes Against Humanity and Values Protected by International Law) committed during the previous war by members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serb civilians and members of the former JNA and the VRS captured by RBIH military or civilian authorities.

In Attendance:
Witness: Marko Mikerević
Authorized officials: Duško Obradović
Notary: Dragica Lalović.
Nickname: --
Father's Name: Spasoja
Mother's Name: Petra
Mother's Maiden Name: Simić
Date of Birth: 16 September 1931
Residence:
Occupation: Retired
Employment: Retired
Marital status: Married
Children: None
Nationality: Serb
Citizenship: BIH
Personal identification number: [redacted]
Identity confirmed based on the personal identification document no. [redacted] issued in Doboj.

[handwritten signature]
Witness Signature

On the basis of Article 8 to the Republic of Srpska Criminal Procedure Code, the witness is advised of his right to speak in his own language and his right to an interpreter.

Do you understand the language in which the interview is being conducted: Yes.

Do you require an interpreter? No.

[handwritten signature]
Witness Signature

The witness is likewise advised and warned that, according to the Article 150 to the Republic of Srpska Criminal Procedure Code, he is obligated to answer the questions posed to him by the authorized official, with the exception of the questions which may expose himself to criminal prosecution under the Article 148, Item 1.

[handwritten signature]
Witness Signature

Do you have any familial relation to the defendant? NO.

Is there a different reason why you should not testify? NO.

Will you answer the questions posed to you? YES.

[handwritten signature]
Witness Signature

S T A T E M E N T

Between 1954 and 1988, I was employed at "Pretis" in Vogošća, when I retired from the workforce due to work-related disability. I was involved in social and political activities the entire time in Sarajevo. When the war broke out, I was filling a social position as the President of the MZ "Ivan Krndelj" Council. In April 1992, the activities of the MZ and its executive organs switched to work under wartime conditions, according to the existing war plans made during peacetime. A war council was formed at that time, of which I was a member. My duties within that council related to working with homeowners' associations and apartment building trustees. The organization of the activities had to do with preparing basement facilities for the purposes of hiding from the combat operations, fire protection in apartment buildings, and organizing volunteer guard schedules in stairwells. Later, we also dealt with organizing the distribution of humanitarian aid based on the previously compiled lists of citizens.

My work at the MZ "Ivan Krndelj" continued until 18 February 1993, when I noticed that the humanitarian aid which had arrived was being distributed unevenly at the expense of the Serbs, and filed a complaint with Ante Nenadić, Deputy President of the War Staff at MZ "Ivan Krndelj". After that, a memo arrived from the SO Novo Sarajevo War Staff, presided by Kasim Demirović, that I could no longer be a member of the Municipal Staff. Considering that I had been a lay judge with the II Basic Court in Sarajevo for 25 years before the war, I managed to get myself hired as a lay judge, through my personal relationship with the President of the Court Senad Kreho, who had been a criminal judge at the II Basic Court in Sarajevo prior to the war. My employment as the lay judge at the aforementioned District Military Court continued through the end of 1994. After that, I was unemployed and lived in my apartment. My employment was treated as Work Service, and I was at the Court every day except Sundays. By the way, all judges from the criminal department of the II Basic Court in Sarajevo were reassigned as Sarajevo District Military Court judges, and those were: Senad Kreho as President of the Court, Davor Jukić – Deputy President, Muhidin Kapo – judge, Amir Jaganjac – judge, Salem Miso – judge, Muhamed Podrug – judge, Sadeta Škaljić – judge, Šaban Maksumić – judge, Fahridin Teftedarija – judge, Zlatan Terzić – judge, Suljo Babić – judge, Nihad Šeremet – judge, Nenad Šeleda – judge, Vlado Špoljarić – judge, and the military prosecutor was Mustafa Bisić, with deputies: Ljubomir Lukić, Branko Šljivar, Hikmet Armautović, Meho Sobo, Drago Fazlagić. Mustafa Bisić was temporarily succeeded by mirsad Strika, and Kreho was replaced by Idriz Kamenica. Senad Kreho and Mustafa Bisić were removed from their positions in the fall of 1993 because of accepting bribes and the whole affair surrounding the "Jugokomerc"-owned stock found in Senad Kreho's apartment. I must add that the prosecutor Mustafa Bisić was removed at the same time as Senad Kreho, on the same grounds, since the same stock was also found at his home. During the trial of Zornić from Hrasno Brdo for killing Serbs in Hrasno Brdo, I must note that it would have never been discovered that Serbs had been burned had Josip Gogalo not been killed. Gavro Ćeranić had a home on Varaždinska Street, where the remains of Josip Gogalo were found with gunshot wounds as the cause of death and burns on 60% of his body. Josip Gogalo had previously been arrested at the apartment of author Jovan Popović. When Ahmet Fazlagić, a judge at the Sarajevo Basic Court and Josip Gogalo's godfather, noticed that his godson was missing, he went to Stjepan Ključić and asked that he be found. After that, Izetbegović issued an order to find Gogalo, dead or alive, within 24 hours. When the group from Hrasno Brdo, Zornić and others, went on trial, in addition to Josip Gogalo, the remains of Sreten Ninković from Bihaćka Street were also found, as well as Jovan Popović, and Jagoda Janković, who had been burned completely. This was determined by forensic experts Žujo Hamza and Ilijas Dobrača. I believed their findings because they had previously provided their expertise on other cases in a professional manner and consistently with their medical ethics.

I am familiar with a case when the UNPROFOR asked the Muslims to loan them a new VW Golf in exchange for the UNPROFOR delivering 50,000 rounds of various ammunitions from Kiseljak to the Muslims. In that occasion, Enver Zornić and Izet Tinjak arrived at the home of Sreten Ninković in Bihaćka Street, who owned a new VW Golf, they confiscated his vehicle, and the next day, i.e. the same night after midnight, took him to Hrasno Brdo, and the same Sreten Ninković was later found dead at the home of Gavro Ćeranić at 34 Varaždinska Street, along with Jagoda Janković, Jovan Popovac and Josip Gogalo.

Regarding the trials of certain Muslim criminal groups, I can say that those persons had been indicted on regular or aggravated murder and robbery charges, like the Zornić case, and were sentenced to prison terms in the duration between one and 15 years, which is the length of Izet Tinjak's sentence. I had personally heard that.

As an example of gross infringement of human and civil rights of Serbs in Sarajevo, I can cite the case of Mirko Krstović from 4 Ivan Krndelj Street, whom I am personally acquainted with, who had spent over a year imprisoned at various locations in the Sarajevo area and in the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, without ever having been on trial for anything.

All of the judges used to sleep at the top floor of the Court building, which also housed a military detention facility that could hold about 30 people. That was the case in peacetime, and in wartime, up to 500 people would be detained there. All of the detainees were listed in plain notebooks, which I had personally witnessed, because I was able to see an entry-notebook from the period prior to the formation of the Military Court on one occasion after I became a lay judge, and I saw a married couple, Rade Popovac and wife Nevenka, listed as detainees no. 4,517 and 4,518. I had seen those notebooks at the trial of lawyer Fahrija Karkin, who had, according to his charges, singlehandedly exchanged 31 Serbs previously brought to these "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, including Momčilo Okuka, who worked for the City Traffic, and Pero Jeremić. The money he got from exchanging the Serbs was deposited to SDS party accounts, since each of the Serbs practically had their own price on the exchange. I learned this during the trial of Rusmir Čakarević, aka Rus, who had embezzled the sum of 1,000 Deutsche Marks in this occasion. When the District Military Court was formed in September, a notary office was established, so there were records and all of the documentation required in military court proceedings. His sister Ramiza, who lived in Hrasno Brdo, stated in that occasion that his brother was on trial for 1,000 Deutsche Marks, and they requested 3,000 Deutsche Marks for his release. His defense attorney was Gavrilo Gunjak.

Concerning the trials in which I participated as a lay judge, I noticed that Serbs were often charged with fabricated felonies such as giving various signals, that evidence of firearm possession was often faked by putting Military Police officers who participated in the search and arrest of these persons on the stand as witnesses. When the trial ended and

the debate and voting on the judgment began, the matter of the person's guilt or innocence was never brought up, and they were presumed guilty. The only question on the table was the length of the sentence, and it was decided in the manner that the judge would present his proposal and then ask for the lay judges' opinion. I had never noticed in any records from the proceedings that the defendant had been advised of his right to an attorney, or invited to the trial. Likewise, the charges were never read at the trials. Šaban Masumić, Fahrudin Teftedarija and Hikmet Arnautović personally bragged to me that they "ironed the Chetniks in the cells at night".

The first time I crossed over to Srpsko Sarajevo after the war was on Grbavica on 19 February 1996, and I went to Slava Đurđević who lived at 55 General Dragoljub-Draža Mihajlović Street. Immediately after that, I went to the Public Security Station, where I turned myself in and handed over the list of Muslims who had perpetrated crimes against Serbs in the Muslim part of Sarajevo, and the evidence – a page from the newspaper listing the names of Serbs who had been declared war criminals by the Muslims. According to the deal I made at the Grbavica Public Security Station, I returned to the Muslim part of Sarajevo the same day, and return to Grbavica on 22 February 1996, i.e. leave the Muslim Sarajevo for good and cross over to the Republic of Srpska permanently. It was also agreed that upon my return, I would provide information to the organs of the Republic of Srpska on the crimes against Serbs perpetrated by the Muslims, which I have done as agreed. We spent a day working in the Grbavica Security Station, and two days on Pale.

The Serbs were tried for the same felonies much more strictly than the Muslims were, and they were often charged with nonexistent felonies. There were all sorts of machinations and infractions against the law with the purpose of giving Serbs the strictest possible sentences. Serbs were convicted on false charges. For example, Goran Ždrale was accused of slaughtering and killing Muslims in Ahatovići, which was never proven, but he was sentenced to three years in prison anyway. Milorad Šešelj was accused of not wanting to shoot his own people during the fall of Otes, for which he was sentenced to a year in prison, while none of the Muslims and Croats who had fled the front line in that occasion were ever charged.

When I was named to the position of lay judge in the aforementioned court on 18 February 1993, the prison warden had been Besim Muderizović, who was removed shortly after and replaced by Himzo Dolan. I had no contact with Besim Muderizović, as he left the position shortly. Himzo Dolan stated in a conversation with the lay judges (in the hallway) that if it were up to him, he would kill all of the Chetniks, and so I reached the conclusion that his treatment of Serbs was hardly fair.

During my term as a lay judge in the aforementioned court, I had seen on multiple occasions Bakir Alispahić come to the Court and mee with the President, and in that occasion, also get in touch with the prison warden Himzo Dolan. I read in the press –

the "Slobodna Bosna" Magazine (1994), Muslim publication where Besim Muderizović stated that Bakir Alispahić came by and requested that they give him a few Serbs from the prison so he can exchange them for his family from Ahatovići. Bakir Alispahić exchanged the arrested and detained Serbs for his family from Ahatovići. Who gave him those Serbs from the prison, I do not know. Serbs were transported from the "Viktor Bubanj" Military Detention to the Central Prison at night. As far as I am familiar with the removal of Serbs from the military detention, they were taken away in agreement with Bakir Alispahić, Besim Muderizović, Slavko Herceg, Mehmed Kurtaj and Ismet Bajramović.

The crimes perpetrated against Serbs in the location of Boguševac – so-called "Kazani" included slaughtering and stabbing with an 80 cm-long saber, and the crimes were commited by: Samir Seferović, 10th Muslim Mountain Brigade 3rd Battalion Commander, Omer Tedžo, sniper unit commander, Esad Tucaković, Zijo Kubat, Refik Čolak, Mavludin Selah, Asif Alibašić, Esad Kadić, Armin Hodžić, Senad Haračić, Esad Raonić, Samir Ljubović, Samir Žiga, Senad Hasić, Ramo Abdul, Fahrudin Rondić, Džemo Topalović, Emir Topalović and Senad Tadić, and Suad Omanović killed with a hammer in the immediate vicinity of Kozja Ćuprija.

The victims on Boguševac at the locality known as "Kazani" included: Radosav Komljenac and wife Marina, Sergej Lavriv and wife Ana, and Milena Drašković, all civilians from Sarajevo, then Božidar Šljivić, Ergin Nikolić, Duško Jovanović and Zoran Vučurević. The latter four were members of the 10th Muslim Mountain Brigade 3rd Battalion. Ergon Nikolić and Duško Jovanović were stabbed by Mušan Topalović, aka "Caco", with the aforementioned saber.

I learned the information about the aforementioned crimes at Boguševac from the court proceedings before the Great Council of the ARBIH District Military Court in the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks in mid-1994, following the murder of Mušan Topalović aka "Caco." The Great Council consisted of the following judges: Council President, judge Muhamed Podrug, second judge Sadeta Škaljić, and lay judges myself – Marko Mikerević, Galib Smajić and Duran Kereš.

Charges were filed against 18 persons in that occasion. I do not recall all of their names and surnames. I know that some were sentenced to prison terms in the duration of six years, some were freed, and two were sent to a psychiatric hospital for detention and treatment. In addition to the victims that I said were listed by first and last name during the proceedings, court medicine experts Ilijas Dobrača and Žijo Hamza answered a question from the attorney, saying that there were many more sets of remains at the locality of Boguševac, but they were unidentifiable because they had been burned or were decomposing.

I forgot to mention that Đurđa Škorić, a Croat woman from Tutin, was also charged with the 18 defendants. She worked as a cook in the ARBIH 10th Mountain Brigade. She

was accused of murdering Božidar Šljivić, whose home and possessions she usurped and moved into the same. However, judge Muhamed Podrug dismissed Đurđa Škorić's charges at the suggestion of public prosecuting attorney Ljubomir Lukić, so she only testified as a witness.

In Švrakino sSelo, the following Serbs were arrested and taken to the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks by: Selmo Ismo aka "Peza", Vahid Selmanović aka "Ćelo" and Avdo Širbegović aka "Car". Selmo Ismo took Milomir Todorović away in early June 1992, and disappeared without a trace. I learned this information from Gordana Todorović, Milomir Todorović's wife, who still resides in Hrasno with her two young children, 53-A/IV Braće Ribara Streed, and Milomir Todorović's mother, remarried Dušanka Kovačević and stepfather Milovan Kovačević, who still reside in Sarajevo, 27 Hamdije Kreševljakovića Street (Švrakino Selo).

On 4 May 1992, I received a call from my cousin Dušan Đukić, who lived at 112 Prvomajska Street, asking me to come to see him, which I did the same day. He told me that he had seen nine JNA soldiers, restrained, being brought into the police station in Švrakino Selo. We wanted to intervene with Jozo Anđić, an officer from the station, to have them released, and we attempted to do so. When we went to see Jozo Anđić, he said "Under no circumstances will they be released". Those soldiers were armored carrier personnel who transported food and were captured in Nedžarići, which my cousin and I concluded because it was broadcast in the media. When I was passing by the Pavle Goranin School on 5 May 1992, which is in the immediate vicinity of the police station, I noticed a large pit being dug with an excavator right there near the school, which was refilled and leveled three days later. I presume that the aforementioned nine captured JNA soldiers were killed and buried there. My next visit to Švrakino Selo was the next day (5 May 1992) at the behest of my sister-in-law Jovanka Đukić, the wife of the aforementioned Dušan Đukić, who asked me to come to see her immediately, which I did. When I arrived, she told me that Robert Sejmenović (Robert Sejdinović) aka Žan, her next-door neighbor, killed her husband Dušan Đukić in the stairwell of their apartment building. Dušan Đukić was killed with a knife, with two stab wounds to the back, to which effect I have a medical report.

The next day (5 May of the same year), the clothing of the murdered soldiers was in pieces (ripped up) and strewn around the Public Security Station yard. I have personally seen that clothing in that condition on 5 May 1992. Fadil Plivac, aka "Baj-Baj", who was named as one of the participants in the execution of the aforementioned soldiers, came to Švrakino Selo from the Foča Penitentiary, where he was serving a prison sentence for multiple counts of vandalism and theft. After the aforementioned prison (Foča Penitentiary) was shut down, I do not remember the date, but I know that the aforementioned Fadil Plivac aka "Baj-Baj" joined the Muslim units in the Švrakino Selo neighborhood in April 1992, immediately after the war started.

I later learned that in addition to Fadil Plivac aka "Baj-Baj", Rudo Sloboda, Džemo Lagumdžija, Jusuf Lagumdžija and Osman Čustović also participated in this murder. The aforementioned group managed a private prison in the "Pavle Goranin" elementary school in Švrakino Selo where the aforementioned soldiers were executed. My sister-in-law Jovanka Đukić can also testify to this information, as she lived in an apartment directly across the street, so she was able to see.

The private prison "Stela" was located at Alipašino Polje and managed by Senad Dženanović aka "Glavoguz" and Edin Gadžo aka "Kljuna", and their deputies were Miralem Ganić, Sabahudin Tabaković, Dženan Abazović, Osman Lerić and Duran Kereš. During the trial of these persons at the aforementioned District Military Court, the charges, among other things, said that Senad Džananović would cut Serbs on the neck with his knife at this prison, and then collect the blood in a plastic cup and drink it. Senad Džananović was also accused of killing Serbs in Dobrinja. I know that the judge Muhidin Kapo and Dr. Hamza Žujo were appointed to exhume the victims in Dobrinja, process the crime scene and file a report with the President of the Court Council Amir Jaganjac. I know that the judge Muhidin Kapo filed a report which said that the site where the remains were buried was unapproachable due to combat operations, so there was no exhumation or crime scene processing. I later learned from the lay judge Duran Kereš that Senad Džananović had been sentenced for the aforementioned crimes to a prison term in duration of one year, while Edin Gadžo was sentenced to three months. Witness Dragan Stanojević can confirm the torture of Serbs at the "Stela" prison, who was detained, tortured and abused at that facility. After his release from prison, Stanojević turned all of his possessions and his apartment over to some Muslim Ministry of Interior members in exchange for being taken out of the city and into the Serb territory. He now resides in the village of Grapska, Doboj Municipality. Edin Gadžo was charged, among other things, with forcing Serbs to serve as a human shield at Dobrinja and the "Mojmilo" reservoir, as well as taking the remains to the landfill to be burned. It is known that the Serbs who had been killed in the city were taken to the landfill to be burned in order to avoid having mass graves in and around the city.

Sometime in 1994, I do not recall the precise date, the persons Emir Kapetanović, Samir Kapetanović and Haris Kulenović were tried for the murder of Radomir Vuk's daughter and his sister's son, who were Croats. The murders were committed in Radomir Vuk's apartment during the robbery of around 4,000 Deutsche Marks. In order to minimize their responsibility, the defendants cited to the court the fact that they had killed a lot of Chetniks in the areas of Pionir valley, Koševo hill and Breka, to which effect they brought witnesses Džafer Omerović and Atif Dževlan. I have provided the information on the length of the prison term of these persons in order to compare the harsh sentences for the murders of Muslims or Croats, while the mass murders of Serbs entailed prison terms in the maximum duration of six years.

Malik Dizdar killed a family at 18/III Ahmet Fetahagić Street during a robbery. In that occasion, he killed Rade Šuljić, as well as his wife and child, whose names I do not recall. He later moved into their apartment. At the trial of Malik Dizdar before the Great Council presided by Samir Jaganjac, his innocence "was proven" and the charges were dismissed. I was a lay judge in this trial.

In the area of Bentbaša, the arrests and removals of Serbs from their homes and apartments were carried out by: Dženan Abazović, Samir Bešić, Rasim Krilić, Rašid Sobo and Meša Selimović. These persons were tried for the crimes at Boguševac at the locality of "Kazani".

Crimes against the families of Krajišnik and Šiljević and Branko Nikolić were perpetrated by: Samir Bulić, Mirsad Điš, Benjamin Škulj, Bekir Ćato and Nedžad Serdarević. They killed Boro, Borka and Jagoda Krajišnik, Branko Nikolić and Risto and Kosa Šiljević. They were all murdered in their homes. According to the court medical expert, Branko Nikolić had been strangled, and found with female underwear in his mouth. The court proceedings were presided by judge Šaban Maksumić, and I was present as a lay judge.

Ramiz Sukić, Kenan Ahmetagić, Husein Žiga, Zoran Čegar, Eldar Spahić from Rogatica, Rasim Kurtović, Hajrudin Drljević and Meho Turčilo operated in the entire city area, where they arrested Serbs and took them to the Central Prison. Zvonimir Božić from Sokolac had spent a certain time as a detainee in the Central Prison, who has since made it out of the Muslim part of Sarajevo and I believe now resides with his sister Zdenka in Sokolac. He can testify to the treatment of Serbs at the Central Prison. He told me that Serbs were horrendously tortured and mistreated at this prison.

Hasib Bačević killed Branko Đurišić at 31 Benbaša, robbed him and usurped his home. The court proceedings over this murder were presided by judge Šaban Maksumić. I do not know how the trial ended, since the process was cut short and the defendant taken to the hospital for treatment.

Ahmet Ahmetagić, police officer at the District Military Court in the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks in Sarajevo and his daughter Samija mistreated Serbs in Švrakino Selo. Jovanka Đukić, the wife of my cousin Dušan Đukić who was murdered on 5 May 1992, as stated, can testify to that effect. To my knowledge, my sister-in-law Jovanka Đukić now lives in the Doboj area.

Edin Omerović aka Edo owned and managed a private prison in a kindergarten on Otoka. The Serbs fom that prison were killed on sites from Otoka to the streetcar garage next to the waterfall near the Novi Grad Municipality on the left bank of the Miljacka. There were many sets of remains at that locality in summer 1992, and considering its proximity to Edo Omerović's prison, it can be concluded that those were the remains of Serbs murdered there.

The murders of Serbs on Otoka were carried out at night. Vojin Boljanović, who left Muslim Sarajevo and went to Bileća to his brother with his wife and daughter, can testify to that effect. Serbs killed at this locality, as well as many others, were taken to the city landfill and burned.

Zlatan Babić, son of Mustafa, took Boško Đukanović and Višnja Stojanović from the "Ivan Goran Kovačić" Elementary School in summer 1992, and their fates remain unknown to this day. Zvonimir Božić can testify to this effect. He left the Muslim Sarajevo and went to Sokolac to his sister Zdenka.

Izet Pejdah and Vladimir Mandić aka "Brino" mistreated Serbs in the area of MZ "Ivan Goran Kovačić".

Near the old gas factory at Čengić Vila, there was a private prison managed by Galib Smajić. Among others, detainees included: Ognjen Čajević, Radomir Bjelica and Boško Knežević, whose fates remain unknown. As I knew Galib Smajić, I had once asked him what happened to the aforementioned Serbs, to which he answered that Ognjen Čajević had been killed, and he did not know anything about Radomir Bjelica or Boško Knežević. Friends of the aforementioned Serbs came to me and asked me to find out whether they were alive. Those were: Vladok Mikadinović, Mirko Miletić and Marko Stanić, who inquired for those listed above, as well as whether a Dimitrije Vuković aka "Vili" was in prison.

There was a private prison at the ŽIŠ School in Buća Potok, managed by Mašo Kurtović. As I was able to learn from conversations with Serb nationals, this prison also had a lot of detained Serbs.

During my recent trip to Grbavica, I met with Pantelija Miholjčić, who now works at the Grbavica Water Company. In that occasion, he told me that there had been a private prison in Dobrinja, in the "Baltazar" café. The "Vikićevci", the so-called "Green Berets", the "Veterans League", etc., operated in this area.

As far as the identification and burial of 38 Serbs who were killed on Žuča, I learned from Predrag Nišević, who was renting a home in Pofalići and whose mother lived in an apartment building at 4 Ivana Krndelja Street, that the Muslims forced the Serbs to bury the dead, and that the 38 murdered Serbs were to be identified by Zoran Trišić and Dragan Rađenović, who filed a report with the Muslim authorities to that effect. I read about this case in a Muslim newspaper that I took to Major Škrbo in Grbavica.

The organizers and perpetrators of the Crimes against Serbs in the area of Pofalići and Žuča were: Kerim Lučarević, Muamer Lučarević, Jure Ljolje, Milenko Fejzić, Vahid Zajko, Mehmed Mujanović and Mustafa Selamonović, for which they were charged before the Muslim military court. In addition to killing Serbs in these neighborhoods, they were charged with delaying the court proceedings in order to gather evidence.

Jozo Marković aka "Mare" stole Serb cattle from Žuč and slaughtered it in the vicinity of the "Ivan Goran Kovačić" Elementary School, and then he dried the meat in the basement of a building at 10 Braće Ribara Street and sold it out of there. Jozo Marković crossed over to Serb territory at Grbavica in 1994, and his wife Dženita and their child followed him. At a later time, Jozo, as a VRS member, got in touch with Muslim soldiers at "Strojorad", where citizens from both sides were being exchanged for stamps. During one of those encounters, the Muslims arrested Jozo Marković and took him to the "Viktor Bubanj" prison, where he was sentenced to five years. The Serb side requested that Jozo Marković be exchanged, however, I know that they were told that there was no Jozo Marković in their military prison. In January of this year, captured Serbs were exchanged for captured Muslims, but Jozo stated that he did not wish to go to the Serb territory in that occasion.

In early June 1992, I was staying with my sister-in-law Jovanka Đukić at 112 Prvomajska Street. On my way back from there, I met with an acquaintance of mine, Vladimir Sladić, on the street between the Radio-Television building and the Novi Grad Municipality, and had a chat with him. in that moment, a group of workers were carrying TO uniforms from the municipality building, and storing them in bins in front of the Municipality building. This event was filmed by a journalist holding a camera and a microphone. In that occasion, he was escorted by two persons in civilian clothing, armed with automatic rifles, who demanded that passers-by show ID. In that moment, Savo Simović from Podgrab passed by and was also ID'd by them. The journalist wanted to ask him a question, however, Savo waved him off and went on his way. The armed persons immediately told him to come with them and took him in the direction of the bridge over Miljacka connecting the 6th Proletarian Brigade Street and the old Ilidža Street on the other side. The journalist with the camera followed them. I then asked my acquaintance Vladimir Sladić for the journalist's name, to which he answered that it was Hidajet Delić. Three days later, I was visiting my sister-in-law Jovanka Đukić again at the same address to bring her bread, as bread was difficult to come by then. I found Savo Simović's sister Milena Simović at Jovanka's, who also lived at 94 Prvomajska Street. Milena was in tears and complained to me that her brother Savo was missing. When I was returning from my sister-in-law's apartment the same day, I went to the bridge between the PTT Engineering Building and the Radio-Television Building. On the right side of the bridge I saw 15-20 human corpses strewn across the meadow. These corpses were 2-3 meters away from the bed of the Miljacka, and I was looking at them from 5-6 meters away. I was horrified by seeing so many corpses, and scared of being noticed there, so I immediately went home, and was not able to notice anything in detail or recognize any of the corpses.

On one occasion in fall 1993, my neighbor Robert Kurtušić, son of Luka, who lives in the same apartment building as I do (6/10 Ive Krnjaševića Street), police officer by

trade, was a member of Vikić's unit, he told me one evening in my apartment over a cup of coffee that around 7,000 Serbs had been killed in Sarajevo by that point (fall 1993). He gave me this figure, according to him, based on the data that the Muslim police of Sarajevo had at their disposal.

In late 1994 in the so-called ARBIH District Military Court at the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks, attorney Fahrija Karkin was sentenced to five years in prison on the charges that he had singlehandedly exchanged 31 Serbs, including Pero Jeremić – exchanged at Grdonj, and Momčilo Okuka – exchanged at Drveni Most near Bristol in 1992. Karakin was convicted by a Council composed of: Presiding Judge Muhamed Podrug, second judge, if I recall, Davor Jukić, and lay judges myself (Marko Mikerević), Osman Lerić and Ismet Mameledžija. On that occasion, Karkin stated during the court proceedings that in Sarajevo in 1992, he could arrest any Serb he wanted and do with him whatever he wanted. On that occasion, he also stated that Alija Izetbegović, the President of the Presidency of the so-called Bosnia and Herzegovina requested from him (Karkin), in writing, to arrest as many Serbs as necessary to exchange a Haris Jasenković from the prison in Foča, allegedly a relation of Alija's wife. Before the Great Council of the District Court, attorney Fahrija Karkin showed the judge a document where Alija requested that the Serbs be arrested, signed by Alija Izetbegović.

The Court dismissed this argument of Karkin's, that is, the show of document signed by Alija Izetbegović requesting that the attorney Karkin arrest as many Serbs as needed for the aforementioned purposes, since accepting this argument would require that the President of the Presidency of the so-called Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović appear before the court as a witness. I forgot to mention that this remark of Karkin's was entered into the minutes, and the document signed by Alija Izetbegović was attached to Karkin's record.

On one occasion, Kushner and Bianca Jagger visited the prison, where they were able to see the prisoners, and as she was exiting the prison, Ms. Bianca Jagger was crying and tearfully said that she could not believe what the Serbs were doing to the Muslims, which is proof that the entire international public was being deceived, as the prisoners in those prisons were mostly presented as Muslim.

I wrote a book on all of my observations on the suffering of Serbs in Sarajevo during the previous war, titled "The Sarajevo Death Cauldrons". I stand by everything I wrote, and am prepared to testify to that effect before any court that should require it. I would also like to attach certain documents that I was able to gather, all for the purpose of proving the real truth and the true war crimes committed against the Serb people in Sarajevo. The documents are ones I used while writing my book, and which I titled "Sarajevan Bloody Fairytale", and personally signed each page.

According to Article 65 of the Republic of Srpska Criminal Procedure Code, the witness is advised that he has the right to read the records after the hearing, or have the same read to him, and lodge a complaint to the contents of the same.

Do you wish to read the records or have them read to you? NO.
Do you have any objections to the contents of the records? I do not.
Will you sign the records? I will.

_____

Witness Signature

Witness hearing concluded the same day at 17:50 o'clock.

STATEMENT BY	NOTARY	STATEMENT TAKEN BY
Marko Mikerević	**Dragica Lalović**	**Duško Obradović**

20/17-35-2
12/02/94

1st SARAJEVO MOTORISED BRIGADE
SECURITY DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED
Date: 06/02/1994

illegible signatures and notes

OFFICIAL NOTE

Info regarding defector's knowledge on the situation in the town, mistreating of Serbs and crimes committed by the enemy

SLOBODAN BOKUN, son of PAVLE and RADOJKA; Serb; born on 17/02/1952 in Sarajevo, economist by occupation; employed in the PTT ERC in Dolac Malta former-address: 1/17 Petra Dokića street, married to Biljana, maiden name KARAĆ; father of two daughters: VANJA, born in 1981, and ANDREA, born in 1985, both live in Belgrade since April 1992, rest of the family (mother and brother) live in Trebinje, nobody of the family remained in the town, served JNA in 1979, in Kruševac, artillery, maljutka (*antitank guided missile*)9K11.

BOKUN SLOBODAN crossed the borderline to Grbavica at about 5 a.m. on the 04/02/1994 coming from the direction of the Pere Kosorića Square, across the Milutin Đuraškovića street and "Strojorad" factory. He paid 2000 DM for the crossing, and the mediator of the run was his neighbour named SEJO (he does not know his last name), a taxi driver who linked him to the organizer of the escape. The night before the escape to our side he spent in the flat in the street of Ivana Krndelja, on which door there was a plate with the surname MARJANOVIĆ. He had to be dressed in black, and in case of control he had to say that he was in the work unit.

The motive for the escape is his desire to get together with his family, to be with his people and to get out of the city of hell.

His desire is to get back with his family and to join the VRS, preferably in Trebinje, where his brother and many close relatives already are.

During his stay in the town Bokun was not conscripted to the military service. He was under compulsory labour in the PTT ERC at Dolac Malta, where he worked earlier, until March 13, 1993. After that, he was mostly hiding in the flat until the time of escape.

On August 2, 1992 Bokun was taken out of his flat by four Muslim army soldiers on the charges of sending light signals to the Chetniks. Among those who took him to their headquarters situated in the Napoli pizzeria, street of Petra Dokića, were TOKAČA (he does not know first name), brother of the Muslim MoI official Mirsad Tokača and HOTA, a blond, tall guy, about 28 years old. He was beaten there, but he did not agree to sign the testimony to confess his alleged guilt, and he was then taken to the prison at the Viktor Bubanj barracks. Fortunately for him, he found there EMIR SALKOVIĆ, a native of Trebinje, who worked as a guard in that prison and was acquainted with the Bokun's brother Zdravko. Salković hides him away from the thugs KEMO and PUKOVNIK, and he helped Bokun to get in touch (by telephone) with his acquaintances, who had some connections in the town, and eight days later he was released due to lack of evidence. He was helped by his Manager, ARNAUTOVIĆ ENES and a neighbour HADŽALIĆ MAJDA, who was a friend of Edin Bahtić-Fićo and a ballerina GORDANA MAGAŠ, for whom he knew she had lot of connections. During the time he spent in "Viktor Bubanj", he witnessed the everyday torture of prisoners and amongst them they tortured most a guy named SINIŠA (he does not know the last name) young, tall man, for whom he heard that he was a member of the national karate team. He and others were mostly beaten up by KEMO and PUKOVNIK, two short, fat men, who mostly committed the atrocities while being drunk.

From his first stay in the "Viktor Bubanj" I highlight one very interesting event:

The French Minister of Health BERNARD KOUCHNER, an allegedly big human rights activist, visited the prison. Bokun was warned by Salković not to say to him a single word.

Kouchner went from cell to cell and "had a chat" with prisoners, and one of the prisoners, who knew French, complained about treatment and conditions in prison. That same night, this guy was terribly beaten, so he barely survived. It is certain that the conversation between him and Kouchner was not a secret for the Muslims.

Then, in a cell of dimensions 3.5 x 1.6 m there were 14 prisoners, and the food was below any level. The prisoners received two meals a day and one loaf of bread was shared among twelve people, and a cup of tasteless liquid that was called tea in the morning, and soup in the afternoon.

In February 93 he was brought in again. Two Serbs employed in the PTT, Šarenac Rade and Avram Momo left the town, and immediately the post office in the street of Miloša Obilića was shelled. Bokun got also accused of preparing a diversion in the post office and was interrogated by a person named MEŠIĆ (he does not know the name) and "DULE", which he found out later to be a Muslim. They threatened him, told lies about his wife and so on. It is interesting that they also mentioned one detail from the conversations that Bokun, the aforementioned Avram and the actor of the National Theater MILENKO VIDOVIĆ had in the apartment of Avram at the Danilo Đokić Street. On that occasion, they toasted to the Republic of Srpska during an informal conversation, watching TV, more jokingly, as says Bokun. During the interrogation in the MOI premises, in the building of the GP "Bosna" in the street of Omera Maslića, , among other things, Mešić also charged Bokun with this toasting. Given that neither Avram nor Bokun were talking about it, it is logical that Muslims could only be informed about it all by VIDOVIĆ. Bokun was once again taken to "Viktor Bubanj", where he found much better conditions. He had problem with only one guard, a Serb MILAN ĐINĐIĆ, who cursed his Chetnik family and harassed him and other Serbs in the prison, but everything was a game compared to his first stay there. In the prison he saw Herak, who was constantly visited by some delegations and journalists, and his cell was also visited by journalists with almost always the same question about how many Muslim women we had raped. In the end, Bokun was charged for avoiding military service, but the judge KAPO, who he knew from before, advised him to call the Novi Grad Municipal Secretariat of Defence as a witness, which he did. Since it was confirmed that he was not summoned for conscription and that he had a work obligation, he was acquitted and on the 13/03/1993 he got out of the prison. However, according to the Mešić's and Dule's orders, he was not allowed to enter the Post Office facilities at Dolac-Malta, where he worked, so he lost his job.

In September 1993 he was summoned to report to the Novi Grad police station. There he talked to HODŽA (he does not know the real name), a tall, bald inspector, who openly asked him if he wanted to leave Sarajevo. After a brief reflection, Bokun replied that he would, because he thought there was a kind of exchange in question. However, they told him that they would arrange everything for him to leave Sarajevo with a convoy, but in return to send them the information they asked for. Bokun allegedly responded that he always hated snitches in his life and did not agree with it. They let him go home and told him to let them know if he changed his mind. They did not call him anymore.

Most likely, after being reported by someone from the neighbourhood he received a call for military service on 05/01/1994. He copied all the symptoms of pain in the thyroid gland from a female neighbour, who was really ill, because it cannot be proven by examination or x -ray. On this basis, he complained that he was not fit for the military service due to thyroid gland disease and received a referral for examinations, so he was not conscripted to the Muslim army before the escape.

From one of the neighbours who had recently been mobilized he learned an interesting piece of information. The guy got drunk and got into a fight in the bar and was taken to their military detention in the building where the "Vladimir Nazor" school for *retarded* children was, which is next to the river Miljacka below the skyscraper in the Petar Dokić street. In the basement of the school, he saw fifty Serbs who were detained there, all in short sleeve shirts and undershirts, which meant that they were detained in the summer. These people are in a very bad condition, and it is very cold and with extremely inadequate conditions in the basement.

In the last fifteen days, a large number of people from Sokolje have been settled in the Bokun's neighbourhood. They say that about 130 families have been exiled from this settlement, which tells that the Muslims are preparing something. An elderly woman from Sokolje told him that she knew they would move them as soon as she saw the PAMs, cannons and other weapons[1] were buried above and around their houses.

There is no knowledge of any other plan of the Muslims.

Being interested in the possibility of escaping to the Serbian territory, he heard that there were Serbs among the UNPROFOR's French legions, that certain ILIJA is taking the Serbs from the town for 1000 DM. He did not find who was money to be given to and how to get into contact with Ilija, but when all is arranged he apparently comes to the home address and, with a small armoured vehicle nicknamed "frog" in Sarajevo, he transports to our side. I do not know if it is the same man in question, but in an informative interview with the defector STOJADINOVIĆ BORIS in December 1993, a legionnaire

KADIĆ ILIJA, allegedly from Slavonia, who on behalf of UNPROFOR, purchased the wooden boards in the private company "Geerp" of Došenović Gojko, where the unit of Josip Pejaković (Institute for the Protection of Cultural Property) is located.

There is no information on the activities of UNPROPOR, apart from the stories on smuggling, there is also no knowledge of the Serbs who, potentially, are on our side but working for Muslims. He was unfamiliar with the position of the army, and regarding the designated industry and the facilities, he heard that the grenades were made in "Vaso Miskin".

He knows of the murder of RAJKO ŠEKEROVIĆ who was a subtenant in Pofalići. The unfortunate ŠEKEROVIĆ tried to visit his flat and take necessary things from it, but the Muslims arrested him in Pofalić and took him to "Viktor Bubanj". There he was beaten up in such a way that he was found dead in the morning in the cell.

He also learned that the Serbs from the work unit are being executed. Almost every time they take them somewhere to work, some of them do not return, and the explanation is that they were killed by Serb snipers. It happens that such an explanation is given even

[1] TN: tools in original, probably a mistake since people often mix these words in local language

when they work in completely safe zones, where not even theoretically cannot be reached from Grbavica or some other place under our control. ŠOJA was executed in the same way (he does not know the name) who was caught as a VRS fighter and sentenced to 8.5 years, and it was in the cell with Bokun for a while.

With him, the members of the so-called "Chetnik group" from Velešić were. This is how they called them in the "Oslobođenje" newspapers, a group of six or seven Serbs from Velešić who were the SDS members and assigned with weapons. They were betrayed by a neighbour, whose name Bokun unfortunately does not know apart from that his family name is starting with K and that he is from Faletić. He has also given out the exact places where they had buried the weapons, so that the Muslims searched at the exact place and found evidence. From that group, with Bokun in jail were ČANGALOVIĆ (he does not know the name), dentist prosthodontist, was sentenced to longer imprisonment and DRAGAN SIMIĆ. NENAD GVOZDENOVIĆ was sentenced to 4 years, due to escaping attempt, and MLAĐEN TOMIĆ from Hrasno-hill was in prison when he was released, and he had not been tried either accused.

PROPOSED MEASURE: To deploy him to the unit according to the needs.

SECURITY OFFICER:

Uljarević Radovan

HE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA [handwritten number: 37]

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

CRIME INVESTIGATION POLICE DEPARTMENT

B I J E LJ I N A

Number: [handwritten numbers: 15-02-31/96]

Date: 5th February 1996

On 5th February 1995, JOVIČIĆ SLAVKO, son of Jovo (father) and Borka, maiden name Andrić (mother), born on 10th May 1953 in the village of Doljani, SO[1] Hadžići, a lawyer by occupation, a Serb, citizen of the Republic of Srpska, married, father of three children, previously employed at the MUP[2] of the former BiH[3] - V Department of DB[4], previously resided in the village of Doljhani[5] [sic] number 24, with no criminal record, came to the SJB[6] Hadžići and gave the following

S T A T E M E N T

I had been working in MUP in Sarajevo until 19th April 1992. I was staying at home in the village of Doljani since 19th April 1992 due to the disruption of traffic. In that period, the Muslim police had already been controlling Pazarić. They were commanded by NAIL HUJIĆ, around 45 years old, born in Pazarić. They were patrolling, keeping the watch at the checkpoints and going through the villages. At that time, Hujić's deputy was MIRSAD ŠABIĆ from the village of Dragovići, around 37 years old. The police was arming Muslim people. The weapons were brought in through Kreševo. According to my findings, the most active persons in the arming were a man named LIHOVAC alias "Gera" and his cousin LIHOVAC alias "Điđa". As far as I could find out, Muslims organized around 700 Muslims in the reserves of the so called SJB Hadžići with headquarters in Pazarić. All active Muslim police officers who resided or were born in this area immediately joined this SJB. The ones I know are Osman Šunj, a former police officer in OBL[7]; Avdo Mujan, a former

[1] Translator's note: Municipal Council
[2] t/n: Ministry of Interior
[3] t/n: Bosnia and Herzegovina
[4] t/n: State Security
[5] t/n: the correct name of the village is Doljani
[6] t/n: Public Security Station
[7] t/n: Security of Persons and Property

traffic police officer at the Road Traffic Safety Police Department I Sarajevo; Fikret Kovačević, son of Šaban (father), a former police officer at SJB Hadžići; Azem Turčinović, a former police officer at SJB Hadžići. The most extreme police officers were Muhamed Turčinović alias "Zeko", born in 1953 in the village of Dragovići, son of Muhamed (father), a former Head of the II Department of DB of MUP of BiH; and Enver Dupovac, born in 1951 or 1952 in the village of Dupovci, SO Hadžići, a former Inspector General for military tasks in the former MUP BiH. According to my findings, the two of them were organizers of the establishment of the so called SJB Hadžići, as well as of the "Silos" camp in Tarčin and the "Krupa" camp in Zovik – Pazarić. These two persons organized and conducted the first hearings. Besides them, the following persons conducted the hearings: NEZIR FIŠO, around 35 years old, born in the village of Trzanj – Tarčin, a former inspector at the V Administration of DB of the former MUP BiH; Milan Božić, around 35 years old, a former crime scene technician at the CSB[8] Sarajevo; MENSUR ČOVIĆ, around 35 years old, previously employed at the Secretariat for NO SO[9] Hadžići; SALKO GOSTO, around 35 years old, previously employed at the SJB Hadžići as an inspector, born in Tarčin; RIFAT ČULJEVIĆ, around 32 years old, employed at the SJB Hadžići. These persons conducted all the interrogations and decided on who was going to be sent to the camp, and who was going to go back home. During the interrogations, we were physically abused in the following way: we were hit with fists, kicked with legs, rifle butts, cables and batons filled with sand. During my interrogation, unknown reserve police officers beat me, as ordered by Muhamed Turčinović. I had already known him since we went to primary school together. All the tasks regarding the apprehension and imprisonment of Serbs in the "Silos" camp were finalized by Refik Tufo, a retired police officer who was a commander of the Police Station Department of the so called SJB Hadžići, with headquarters in Tarčin. Since he was an old police officer who was not familiar with all the methods of the operational service, he was using the most brutal force in order to extort confessions. During April and May in 1992, Muslim police were patrolling through the village and imposing pressure on Serbs in order to intimidate them. Serb's freedom of movement was restricted, so we did not receive truthful information on what was happening in other parts of the municipality.

[handwritten note: Tufo Refik

[signature in Cyrillic: Slavko Jovičić]

[8] t/n: Security Services Centre

[9] t/n: National Defence of the Municipal Council

[beginning of the 2nd page of original text]

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We were also not able to predict what Muslim side was preparing. Contact with other Serbs in the village was minimised since Muslim police officers were constantly present, preventing us to exchange information.

On 25th May 1992, my house was surrounded by Muslim police unit. There were about 50 people armed with automatic weapons. They called on me to surrender, which I did, since I did not have any intentions to fight my own private war, nor was I able to offer any resistance – like all the other people in the village as well. I did not carry any weapons with me except for my service weapon with all the certificates for it. Muslim police officers took this weapon while searching my house, but did not give me any kind of written confirmation of this. On that occasion, they also took a "Motorola" handheld radio owned by the former MUP BiH. Osman Šunj commanded the apprehension. Mensur Čović took my statement at the SJB. I said in the statement that, because of the nature of my work, I travelled across the former BiH and noticed many people arming themselves. They released me that day and promised not to apprehend me ever again.

On 26th May 1992 at 2:30 PM, Muslim police officers came to my house again. They took me to the "Silos" camp in Tarčin, without giving me any explanation of the reasons for my arrest.

At the camp, I was greeted by ŠERIF MEŠANOVIĆ, a former guard at the Central Prison in Sarajevo and a deputy camp warden in the "Silos" camp at that time. During the search, he took my documents and my transistor without giving me any written certificate. I was placed in the cell No. 7. Nebojša Stajić, Nikola Andrić, Kosta Lojanica and a man around 55 years old, whose name was Obren Šinik, I think, were already in the cell. The dimensions of the cell were 9x4.5m, and it had previously been used for storing crops. There was only concrete floor in the cell, and we were not given any blankets or anything else that we could use for laying down, so we were forced to lay down on a wet concrete. There were no conditions whatsoever for performing physiological needs. We had only one meal a day which consisted of 50g of bread and five spoons of warm water that Muslims called "soup". The meals were made of waste from food and later I learned that the guards urinated in our food. They forced us to eat this meal in 1 minute. I did not know the guards who did these tasks in the "Silos". On 2nd June 1992, the guards sent me out to pour a bottle of water for prisoners in my cell. On that occasion, a young man awaited for me. He was around 30 years old, over 185 cm tall, [illegible] built, with short brown hair and dressed in

a camouflaged uniform. He started hitting me in my face. He hit me with so much force that I fell on the ground, and he continued kicking me with his legs. IBRAHIM MAKSUMIĆ alias "Škola" was with him. He was born in 1946 and he worked at the former SO hadžići. He did not even try to stop his young man from abusing me. From 1st June until 4th June 1992, we were not given any food.

[handwritten note: no food was delivere to cell No. 7 from 1st June 6th June '92.

On 4th June 1992 around 9 AM, Bećir Hujić, the camp warden came. He was around 35 years old, born in the village of Ljubovčići – Pazarić, a former guard in the Central Prison Sarajevo. He told us that the HOS unit was about to arrive and that we should hand over all our valuables (gold, watches and so on) to him since there was danger that the HOS[10] would rob us. Enver Dupovac was brought into this group at around 11 AM. Around 30 men and one woman wearing camouflaged uniforms raided the cell I was in. They had various markings (checkerboards, HOS, a half-moon). Among them was a foreigner, a German. I knew five well-known Muslims in this group by sight; they were from Sandžak and they were prone to criminal offences before the war. One of them recognized me as we had contact in the former MUP of BiH, when they attempted to forcefully free Jusuf Prazina. They took Lazar Krstić and I out of the cell and physical abuse started immediately. They beat us with everything they could (rifle butts, batons, battens, legs and so on). They forced us to fight with each other, i.e. they forced us to knock our heads. A person who stood out from the group by his brutality was Tiro alias "Tiki", son of Bajro (father), around 30 years old, from the village of Osjenik, OS Hadžići; and a person named Miralem alias "Minerali", around 32 years old, born in Sarajevo and residing in the village of Raštalica. I passed out soon after the first punches, so I do not know how long the abuse lasted for and how they beat us. Everything was followed by verbal insults, spitting and other kinds of humiliation.

[signature in Cyrillic: Slavko Jovičić]

[beginning of the 3rd page of original text]

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When I regained my consciousness, Miroslav Samouković was laying on top of me, all covered in blood and unconscious. All my clothes were cut with sharp objects and I was covered in blood but, as I passed out soon, I do not know who did this to me. I could not get up off the concrete floor for more than fifteen days. Serbs from my cell provided me with help I needed. It often happened that we did not get any food

[10] t/n: Croatian Defence Forces

for 48 hours. There were 37 Serbs in the cell number 7 in middle June of 1992. They were all in a very poor condition due to lack of food and everyday physical abuse. We did not have any conditions for managing our personal hygiene. There were people who could not perform their physiological needs for 45 days. I did not have a bowel movement until 35th day upon my imprisonment. People were losing weight rapidly. In two months in the camp, I lost 43 kg. I weighed only 34 kg on 8th [illegible] 1992 when I was diagnosed with pneumonia. [illegible] Obren Kapetina, 63, died from hunger on 8th November 1992. He was born in the village of Deovići – Pazarić. I found out afterwards that Petko Krstić, around 30 years old from Tarčin (died on 14th October 1992) died of hunger and constant abuse; and that Bogdan Vujević, over 60 years old, from the village of Doljani – Pazarić, died from the consequences of abuse. According to my findings, he was the first victim that died in the "Silos" camp. During November 1992, an old man called Vaso Sarenac died in the camp. He was around 85 years old and completely senile even before the war. Muslim police brought him to the camp under accusations that he was a sniper. Around 380 Serbs were imprisoned in the camp during the periods with most prisoners.

On 14th August 1992, the camp warden Bećir Hujić made us enlist in the TO BiH[11]. He promised us the freedom and better status for our families. Of course, none of the imprisoned Serbs ever joined those paramilitary formations.

On 26th November 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross led by a Swiss, Marc de Perrot, comes to the camp for the first time. The members of the Committee were appalled by the state we were in and the conditions in the camp. On 10th December 1992, they brought us two blankets for each prisoner; it was the first time we could lay down on a blanket or cover with it. Muslims cut our hair very rarely. When they let us out to bring some water, they would show us to the citizens and say that we were all Chetniks[12] with long hair and beard.

All the prisoners in the camp were civilians brought from their homes, except for 11 reservists of the former JNA[13] who were brought in from the "Krupa" military warehouse. Later, Muslims turned the warehouse into the camp for Serbs. On 29th December 1992, Muslims transferred 137 Serbs to the "Krupa" camp under the guise of working on the first battle lines. The group consisted of well-educated Serbs and situated householders. Muslims' Government intention was to get us all killed while working on their lines on Igman. Besides this reason, they also wanted to hide us from MKCK[14].

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11 t/n: Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina

12 t/n: a derogatory nickname for Serbs, it originates from Serbian guerrilla forces in WWII

13 t/n: Yugoslav People's Army

14 t/n: the International Committee of the Red Cross

In January, the first group of prisoners has been sent to forced labour in Hrasnica. The organizer was VAHID ALAĐUZ, a former deputy commander in SM[15] Hadžići. The group spent around 65 days in Hrasnica. In the middle of April, the second group of around 30 Serbs, including me, went to Hrasnica. We were placed in a newly-built building's basement in Hrasnica. We did not have any blankets or beds in this camp, either. We were forced to a 22-hour labour every day, with only two very poor meals a day. We had almost no opportunity at all to rest or sleep. There were also around 30 Serbs from Hrasnica and Sokolović Kolonija in this prison. There were 9 women and one minor. According to my findings, around 20 Serbs had already been murdered in this camp. The murders happened in the Primary School in Hrasnica, private garages and the FC "Famos" stadium. No one could get in or out of Hrasnica. They were completely isolated.

On 22nd April 1993, three Serbs escaped while digging the trenches. Then, all hell broke loose for us. They used any objects

[signature in Cyrillic: Slavko Jovičić]

[beginning of the 4th page of original text]

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they could find to beat us up. Anyone living in Hrasnica was allowed to beat us. The fact that the escaped prisoners escaped from two different ends of the working site at almost the same time, indicated to Muslims that it was an organized escape. As a former DB employee, I was accused of organizing the escape. Even though I confessed nothing, Muslims subjected me to several days of torture. They broke four of my ribs and relocated my right kidney from its position. They stripped me naked, poured water over me and kept me outside, on the frost, for several hours during night. I lost consciousness several times. The inspector on my case and main person in the prison in Hrasnica was Mustafa Gegaj alias "Mujo". He was around 24 years old, well-developed, over 185 cm tall, with short, dark hair and high sideburns on his forehead and an earring in his left ear. Gegaj was the most monstrous man I had ever met during my time in the camps. According to my findings, he was the creator of all the evil that happened in Hrasnica. He beat the prisoners often and threatened to slaughter them. He offered me to cooperate with their MUP and proposed to give me 100.000 DM to cross to the Serbian territory and murder Radovan Karadžić or Momčilo Krajišnik. During the assassination, my family were supposed to be hostages of Gegaj. If my assassination attempt had succeeded, they would have transferred me and my family to some of the Arabic countries. Besides Gegaj, I was also interrogated and abused by ZIJAD GAGIĆ alias "Zijo", a former employee in the Road Traffic

[15] t/n: Police Station

Safety Police Department Sarajevo who was assigned the Head Security Organ of 109th Mountain Brigade of the so called Army of BiH with headquarters in Tarčin; and a certain "HOTA", around 40 years old, who was assigned one of the Heads of 14th Division of the so called Army of BiH in November of 1995.

During my interrogations or any other contacts with Muslims, I was forced to use Turkisms or Arbic words. If I did not do that, I was punished.

During operational work in Hrasnica, Gegaj had help from ZAIM LALIČIĆ, a guard in prison in Hrasnica, who stood out in physical abuse of Serbs. This Laličić guy used to come to beat me at Gegaj's invitation. Later I found out that a guard named FUDO murdered three imprisoned Serbs: Milan Krstić (he shot him with a pistol in the forehead from 10 cm distance); and Slaviša Kapetina and Ranko Varagić were murdered from 2-3 m distance with a burst fired from an automatic rifle. The guard has never given a statement regarding this, nor has anyone ever tried to call him to account for the murders.

With assistance of the prison warden ZIJAD GAGIĆ alias "Zijo", Gegaj did not let me out of my cell until 1st August 1993. I was also deprived of any contact with other prisoners. Everyday abuse continued during this course of time. Since Gegaj suspected that prisoners might escape again, he did not allow me to linger in forced labour and locked me in until 25th August 1993. I was working from 25th August 1993 until 30th October 1993, and that was the end of my stay in Hrasnica.

Later I found out that Vojo Šuvajlo got killed as a living shield on the first line in middle June 1993. He was 26 years old, and he was from Tarčin. I also found out that Slobodan Krstić died in a similar way, in middle July. On 28th July 1993, prisoners in Hrasnica: Slobodan Nikolić - around 30 years old and Momo Kovačević - over 50 years old, got killed by a grenade. During my stay [illegible] the last victim was Goran Andrić, around 35 years old. He was killed by a grenade on 17th September 1993. I remember that day because my last beating in Hrasnica was on that day.

On 30th October 1993, my group and I were transferred back to the "Silos" camp. At that time, there was less abuse in the camp. The first official delegation of the so called Army of BiH led by Nedžad Ajnadžić, a captain in the former JNA and the Head Security Organ of the 1st Corps of the so called Army of BiH at that time, came to the Silos on 25th January 1994. He was escorted by several officers and the Commandant of the 109th Brigade of the so called Army of BiH, NEZIR KAZIĆ – a construction technician in the Military Post Office in Žunovnica. On that occasion, Ajnadžić personally threatened me that I shall never leave the camp, while he told the others they would be released after all missing Muslims from the territory of SO Hadžići were found. My cousin Mirko Mandić visited me that day. His parents are Gojko (father) and Marija (mother); he was born in 1959 in the village of Doljani.

He was a member of the so called Army of BiH and I believe he was the II Company Commander of a local battalion.

[signature in Cyrillic: Slavko Jovičić]

[beginning of the 5th page of original text]

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I also want to mention something I have forgotten to state earlier in my statement. Milan Hodžić, who used to work as an inspector in the Muslim police, in June of 1992 showed me a certificate of my death in battlefront in Bijeljina, issued by the Muslim police.

During 1994, all prisoners in the Silos faced the heaviest physical labour. I was forced to unload heavy sacks that weighed 50 kg, even though I weighed less than that and was in a very poor physical condition. By way of illustration, on one occasion, ten of us had to unload 215 tons of flour in two hours.

On a number of occasions in 1994 and 1995, I had a chance to personally see Alija Izetbegović and his escort on the Tarčin heliport, around 30 m away from the "Silos" camp. In November of 1994, we had to build a command of the 14th Devision of the so called Army of BiH. It was a two-storey building, and the material was obtained by looting Serbian villages that were under Muslims' control. We had to build this building at very short notice, so the work was done non-stop, during both day and night. The building was only about 20 m away from the "Silos" camp. The aforementioned heliport was also built by us, prisoners. We were working regardless of weather conditions and with no machines or any other kind of assistance. A person named Munib was the one who forced us to labour the most. Prior to the war, he was employed at the Housing Fund of the former JNA in Sarajevo.

General Vahid Karavelić visited us on several occasions. He was always pushing the camp authorities to get the work done faster. Even today there are plates on these building, stating that the construction was financed by the Army of BiH. All the time during our stay, flags of SDA[16] and military formations that had headquarters there were fluttering above the command. I can state quite categorically that all delegations in BiH, both official and nonofficial, were familiar with what was going on in the "Silos" camp. To prove this, I want to say that, at the beginning of 1995, two associates of A. Izetbegović visited us in the camp. Their names are Fadil Pekić and Akir Šišić, and they were brought there by Nezir Fišo.

[16] t/n: Party of Democratic Action

I know that Muslim police officers used imprisoned Serbs as living mines during the conflict in the settlement of Nedžarići, in June 1995. Namely, they were forcing Serbs to carry dynamite to our trenches, and then the Muslims would activate the dynamite by remote controllers. Dane Čičić got killed in that way when he was hit by a launcher. They would tie up the Serbs using cables and force them to go towards our trenches.

I know that, on 1st April 1993, Muslim authorities sentenced 17 prisoners to imprisonment sentences from 18 months up to 3 years. The judge was Mladen Veseljak from Zenica. The indictment was for possession of weapons and membership in the SDS[17]. In November of 1994, Muslim authorities realised that we would manage to endure the sentences, so they organized a new trial. This time, we were accused of committing criminal offences pursuant to Article 124, Paragraphs 1 and 2 and in connection to Article 139 taken over from KZ SFRJ[18] and in connection to Articles 159 and 191 of KZ BiH[19]. Investigative judges were Davor Jukić and Muhidin Kapo. We have never been sentenced and yet, we have a prisoner status.

Dayton Peace Accords ensured our release, although Muslim side was still trying to find any possible way to avoid our extradition.

During the last two months in the camp, they were pressuring us to stay on the territory of the Federation. They even offered us jobs, all this to try to cover up everything that happened in the "Silos" camp.

I was released on 19th January 1996, after 1334 days of imprisonment.

The statement was loudly dictated; I accept it as my own and confirm it by signing it.

WITNESS:	STATEMENT TAKEN BY:
[signature in Cyrillic: Slavko Jovičić]	[signature: illegible]

[17] t/n: Serb Democratic Party

[18] t/n: Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

[19] t/n: Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina

After being informed on his rights the citizen gives to the authorised officer the following:

STATEMENT

I was called up to serve a regular military service and on April 11, 1994, I went to the VRS and the barracks which was located in an elementary school in Dušanovo, now Kasaba, Milići municipality. I served in the Military Regiment of VP[1] 7590 where I was a military police officer. On August 3, 1994, my unit was sent off and deployed to a fire line in the Nišićka Visoravan, near the village of Brgule. We were placed on this line solely with the task of preserving the existing positions, and in no way to carry out the attacks and actions on the positions of the FBiH army. We were deployed to this line of fire to assist the existing army, which could not resist the daily attacks of the FBiH army, and in my view, since we were new soldiers, we were not even trained to perform such tasks in the army. On August 5, 1994, at about 3.30 a.m., early fierce attacks by the FBiH Army from all available means into our positions began. This attack lasted all day so our line was broken in several places. At about 3 p.m. the same day, I noticed that I was left alone in the surroundings of the FBiH army, so I began to retreat to the villages of Mali Jasen and Okruglice which were controlled by the VRS. At about 4.15 p.m., the Muslim forces noticed me and started shooting at me from the infantry and artillery weapons, 60 mm mortars, and while the shells were falling around me, fired bullets caused the branches falling off the trees, I managed to hide in one ditch between the stump of coniferous tree and a stone covered with ferns, where, in my opinion, I laid for a long time, because I got numb and while lying down I saw when the members of the Muslim forces who had the "Black Swans" insignia on their overalls were passing by me. When all kinds of weapons ceased firing around me, and I could hear the fire not so far away from me, I began to retreat crawling to a safe place. In that retreat, I was spotted by two Muslim soldiers who had fallen behind in action and immediately started firing in my direction with a burst of fire and launched the rifle grenades saying, "Stop Chetnik, motherfucker, you're done, Allahu Akbar, etc." In fear and during my escape, I took shelter and opened fire in their direction from the rifle, and then it got stuck. After that I started running with the intention of running away from them or getting as far away from them as possible to make my weapon operational again and save my life, and as I ran at one moment I felt some jerk in the body that knocked me to the ground, I tried to get up and continue further, I failed to do that and at that time I saw that I was bleeding in the groin of my right leg, which I did not feel already as if my leg was a foreign body. Immediately, I took off my belt and tied my leg to stop the bleeding, after which I managed to get up and bounce behind a tree on my left foot,

[1] TRANSLATOR's NOTE: military post

trying to see if my pursuers had seen me, whom I did not see, and I continued walking on my left foot, when I felt severe stomach cramps, which slowed me down, produced by a single rifle grenade shrapnel that hit me in the stomach. In all that commotion, fear, shock and a scene I cannot describe, I saw my salvation in retreating into one stream and at that moment I felt familiar with the territory and terrain I was going through and I was sure that I was moving in the right direction. I began to crawl, dragging myself across the ground, when I heard somewhere in the distance that a grenade was fired, which resembled a 155 mm howitzer by sound, and which subsequently exploded in my immediate vicinity. That detonation threw me 4-5 metres in the air. Five pieces of shrapnel hit my body. I fell to the ground after hitting one tree, I broke my left collarbone and lost consciousness after I hit the tree with my head. After a while I came to a conscious state, I felt intense pain throughout my body, my breathing made me anxious because I saw bubbly blood on my right shoulder, and my breathing was difficult. After realising that my lungs were hurt, I took my left hand, put my palm on that wound, and after that I began to breathe much easier, while I had very severe pains all the time, and at some point I felt some warmth in my stomach, with my right hand I unbuttoned overalls and I saw that I have a large wound in the abdomen. Then I thought that this was my end, my whole life flew before my eyes, which I had behind me, and while I was thinking about it I heard some approaching voices, and I began to drag myself on the ground, pushing my body with my left arm and leg. During that crawling, I felt a strong blow to my left knee, and when I looked, I saw that it was actually my lower leg, that is, my foot, that was cut off by the burst fired from the rifle. Only then could I no longer move from that place. After a short time two Muslim soldiers came to me, one of them kicked me in the head and broke my three teeth, I didn't get the time to spit my teeth out, he put a gun in my mouth, swearing my Chetnik mother, etc. while the other soldier was pulling his shoulder saying, "Don't shoot, fuck him, don't you see he's almost dead, let's save my nephew", while the other said he had to shoot, when he cocked the weapon he pulled a gun from my mouth, fired one bullet into my neck, and then one shot into my left ankle when he moved up from my helpless body. After all of that, they took me by the shoulders and dragged me to the village of Brgule, which I heard, because I couldn't see by that time already. The moment they said that they caught a Chetnik, there were severe beatings all over my body with broken bones, chest and head, so I fainted. I came to a conscious state in a vehicle, where I was already tied up, they poured water on me, slapped me and asked personal information, how many soldiers there were, equipment, etc., while I heard a female voice mentioning the Vareš hospital, they were stabbing my hands with something and after that I lost consciousness. When I regained consciousness I found out I was in an operating room of the Zenica Hospital. Immediately after the surgery, and that same night, they put me in a bed, along

with seven Muslim patients, one of them hit me with at the stitch area on my stomach three times with a crutch and they re-stitched me in the operating room three times. The man who beat me in that room told me that it was a period of mourning in Zenica for fifteen days already, because 140 Muslim soldiers were killed in that part of the line where I was arrested and that he would revenge that army on me. After that horrible night, in the morning hours a Doctor came in, introducing himself as a doctor ČAK[2], speaking Serbian language not so well, but I understood him that he had operated my left leg, abdomen and placed fixators, and that he would bring the representatives of the Red Cross who would register me for the exchange of the captured soldiers. That same day, an old lady came into the room, who approached my bed, to which I was bound, and spat in my face, and after that came the soldier who arrested me, the one who restrained the other from shooting at me and said, "It's good, you stayed alive, there is hope" and left the room. I didn't have any food or hygiene at that hospital. On that same day, two men came and put me on a stretcher, tied my hands and feet and transported me by a Land Rover to the Zenica Correctional facility. When they brought me into that building in an office where a man was sitting at the table, the questioning began, what nation I was, religion, etc., and when I answered that I was a Serb, of the Orthodox confession, that man brutally beat me up while I was tied and he ordered the two men to take me to a room, which was like a classroom, in which there were already seven old men over 50 years of age, of Serb ethnicity from the Laktaši area and they left me on the floor of that classroom. I had been in that room from 18/08 until 23/08/1994 and I was interrogated daily and beaten, without medical aid, bandages, without food, etc. And one day I was interrogated by a man I know only by the name Hussein, who drilled my left tibia bone with a hand drill asking me for some information which I really did not know and I do not know that even today. I figured out that they thought that I was a very important person in the VRS, because my unit offered to exchange captured soldiers on the same day when I was captured. Regarding these interrogations I will not describe pulling hair, ears, nose, causing pain by pulling the fixers from the leg, etc., because it would take a very long time, and I do not consider it important, because it was normal to be done during these hostilities, when you were captured by a Muslim army. When that Hussein drilled my leg from I lost consciousness due to the enormous pain and it was also the last night of my life at the Zenica Correctional facility. On August 23, 1994, two men put me on a stretcher and tied my hands and feet, loaded me into one TAM truck and transported me to the suburbs of Zenica, where other two men took me, put me in a Land Rover and drove to the Sarajevo airport. There was one person in charge of me at the airport, and throughout my entire stay in Sarajevo, they carried me down on a stretcher to an underground corridor, a tunnel, they put me on some carts, which were on rails or wheels, I don't know what exactly

[2] TN: could be CHUCK

as they blindfolded me and drove me about a kilometre and they could barely get me out of the tunnel because there was a narrow part and a sharp bend there. When they took me out of the tunnel, they put me in an ambulance and drove me to the Military Hospital where they did not want to admit me, because I was a Chetnik according to them, so we continued our journey to the Koševo Plastic surgery hospital and they put me on some floor of the hospital in the room number 312. From that room, I could see the Hum repeater through a window that had no glass on it. I was admitted to the hospital by the so-called Doctor, if it can be said that Faruk Kulenović was a doctor, who put me in that room and he asked me two questions when we remained alone in the room:

1. Chetniks, what do you eat, so that every one of you whom we catch is two meters high, and with a cynical smile like a hungry wolf in a lamb torus, he said, but we're shortening you.
2. What did you need this war for?

When I immediately replied that we did not kill their member of the wedding party but they killed ours, this doctor approached my bed while I was tied up and beat me with open and closed hands. The doctor, when he got tired of hitting my body, walked out of the room and after a short time walked into the room holding a metal hammer in his hand, saying through laughter that my leg fixers, which had four screws, were not well placed on my leg and with the hammer he began to repair the fixator and I lost consciousness from the unbearable pain. This doctor never came to my room again. I was in this hospital until September 8, 1994, in which I had no medical help or bandaging, nor food. I was tied to the bed so I was lying in my own faeces, urine and the fluid that I vomited. Every day I spent in this institution, I was interrogated and brutally beaten several times by some unknown services, while the hospital staff sent members of the killed soldiers[3] of the Muslim army who beat me and urinated over my wounds, beating me with open and closed fists etc. On September 8, 1994, in the afternoon, I was shot at by a sniper from Hum with three shots that hit the bed, and I was placed on that floor alone as a patient and an unprotected live target for the sniper. On that day, but now in the evening, some people dressed in black overalls stole me from my hospital room and carried me on a stretcher through the laundry and transported me to Hrasno, a hospital for mentally ill children by some vehicle, and they mentioned some ĆELO and JUKA. These people were asking for 6,000 German marks at that time to take me to the Serb positions and they provided me with the phone services so I could call someone on the Serb side who would bring the money. As no contact was made, those same people brought me back in the same vehicle and left me at the front door of the Koševo Hospital on that stretcher, and I was found there in front of the hospital by the man who was supposedly in charge

[3] TN: word **families** probably missed in typing:

of my care in Sarajevo so he put me back into the same room where I was before the stealing. Maybe two hours later, a man came into the room who told me I was worthless and that he had an order to immediately transfer me to the Viktor Bubanj Barracks in Sarajevo, which at that time was a concentration camp and torture site for the Serb people, and now it is a disgrace that the same place is a court that was equipped by the donations of the foreign factors in BiH. That night, on September 8, 1994, when they brought me to the Viktor Bubanj concentration camp, they brought me into the building, the third or the fifth door to the right, on a stretcher and shook me on concrete floor out of the stretcher. There was a metal hoop on the ceiling of that room, or a ring through which a chain with handcuffs was put through (some tying up item) that they put around my hands and lifted me into the air and hung me. After that, two by two men were coming into this room with code names like thirteen, eight, nine, twenty two, two, etc., who hit me and kicked me all over the body, competing which one of them had a stronger punch and when they got over it, they brought wooden sticks with which they beat me for hours, they took out my blood with the syringes and were writing a letter to my mother in the text: "Dear mother we will see each other in heaven", after that one of them took a knife and he wanted to take my right eye out and when he cut the arcade and when blood came to my lips, I lost consciousness out of fear, not pain, because I was already used to the very severe pain that was present all the time. On 10/09/199?[4] when they brought me out on a stretcher outside the entrance door of that prison camp and while they were arguing over whether I should be released or still detained in that camp, I heard some voices which resembled the crying of a child, and then I saw them taking out a whimpering old man who was over 70 years of age from one from the premises to the corridor, completely naked, poorly nourished, and two construction bricks were tied with a wire to his testicles and when one of the camp guards kicked him in the buttocks the wire did its thing, it tore off the old man's testicles, and the old man fell in the hallway and immediately died, while at that moment I vomited some fluid, which I do not know where it came from, because during my entire stay in this camp I had no food but only torture and interrogations. On that day, on September 10, 1994, I was transferred tied on a stretcher to the Sarajevo Central prison, brought into one room as they call it, a hearing room, and a secretary came in, and a little later, Judge Muhidin Kapo. An indictment has been filed against me and I have been remanded in custody for 30 days. While I was lying on a stretcher in that room, Capo was walking around the room, gritting his teeth, telling that woman what to write, swearing my Chetnik mother and he used other swear words of abusive content, and at one point he tells me, "If you hadn't been like that, I would have swept the hall with you now." When he finished typing the decision, he went to the door, unable to resist his criminal act and nationalism, which he displayed all the time, he came back to me and the

[4] TN: number illegible, it is most likely 1994

stretcher, took my right hand and stabbed a ballpoint pen into my hand, piercing it, and while I screamed in pain he laughed and said, "I left you with a memory for your whole life of me", in which he succeeded, because that scar is in a visible place and he really succeeded in his intention. After this, I was transferred to a cell with one deserter from the Muslim army, whose name I would not mention, he was half a Serb and half a Croat child from a mixed marriage, and who had been cleaning my excrement in that cell for ten days. During this stay I removed the threads from wounds myself that were in a severe stage of infection. Three days after the indictment, there was a trial at which I was convicted as a VRS terrorist, with a proposed sentence to imprisonment of ten years and six months, which was immediately unanimously adopted by a judge and jury. And then comes the day of September 20, 1994, and finally my exchange for Ramiz Šalko, who was captured in Foča. All the things that I said can be a lot more detailed, but it is better that it takes hours for this and not days and I am also not remembering everything, because I have nightmares which prevent me from sleeping anyway.

Pursuant to Article 65 of the CPC of the Republic of Srpska, after making a statement, you have the right to read the statement or to have it read to you.

Will you read the statement or will we read it to you? I have read it.

Do you have any objections to the record? NO.

Is there anything else you would like to say? NO.

Will you sign the records? YES.

The interview ended at 23:00[5]

RECORD TAKER:	**CITIZEN:**	**AUTHORISED OFFICER:**
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[*signature illegible*]	[*signature* [redacted]]	[*signature* [redacted]]

[5] TN: 11 p.m.

SARAJEVO DISTRICT MILITARY COURT[6]
Number: *[illegible]*-1272/94
Sarajevo, 10/09/1994

Investigative judge of the Sarajevo district military court Muhidin Kapo in the investigative case against the suspect [redacted] on the basis of reasonable grounds that he committed the act from Article 119, paragraph 1 of the taken SFRJ *[illegible]CC* and pursuant to Article 159, paragraph 1 and 2 of the taken *[illegible]CC* on the 10/09/1994 rendered the following:

DECISION

AGAINST:

[illegible [redacted], born on [redacted], in [redacted], resident of [redacted], RBiH citizen,

on the basis of reasonable doubt that he, as the RBiH citizen, for the time of the proclaimed war situation in the country, from the beginning of May 1994, participated in the armed conflict against the legal armed forces of the RBiH Army, and on the side of the enemy military para-formations – the so-called army of the Republic of Srpska, so that he, during the armed conflicts in the area of Vrhovi, Zvijezda mountain, closer location Nišić plateau, after being heavily wounded, was captured by the members of the RBiH Army on 05/06 of August, 1994,

therefore as a citizen of the RBiH, who during the war took part in the war against the RBiH,

he committed the crime according to Article *[illegible] taken from the SFRJ [illegible] CC.*

Statement of grounds

[6] TN: the entire decision is barely visible, most of the translation is guessed

Sarajevo district military court made a request to the investigative judge of this court for conducting an investigation against the suspect [redacted] because of reasonable doubts that he committed the mentioned crime, and whose actions were described in the operative part of this decision.

Making a decision on the merits of the request for the conduction of the investigation, the investigative judge, after examining the *[illegible]* and the evidence which are in it, established that there are enough elements which *[illegible]indicate* that the suspect committed the incriminated acts.

During the investigation *[illegible]* needed to conduct *[illegible]* investigative judge on his example *[illegible]*paragraph 1 *[illegible]* and made a decision as in the operative part *[illegible]*.

[illegible stamp: Sarajevo district military court, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina]
[illegible 2nd stamp: clerk for ...]

MILITARY POST
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BG 32

At the request of the Committee for the collection of data on perpetrated crimes against humanity of international law, the examination was conducted on the 27th of March 1998 at the Institute of Forensic medicine in Belgrade, of [redacted] where he now lives, whose identity was established on the basis of [redacted]

ANAMNESIS

Mechanic locksmith, married, one child. Captured as a soldier of the Republic of Srpska by Muslims on 05/08/1994 in the Nišić plateau. Captured after being wounded by automatic weapons and shrapnel (right knee and right hip, abdomen, lungs) then two Muslims came near him and one put a gun in his mouth, swearing his Chetnik mother, saying that he would kill him. Then he fired two bullets to his left lower leg, which was already injured and fired one bullet through his neck on the left side. They put him on the tent wing and dragged him to the village of Brgole. There were 10-12 of their older people who came near and started hitting him with the butts, feet, fists. He was hit once with a butt in the head, he did not lose consciousness then[7]. Then they put him in a car, tied his right arm and questioned him about the deployment of our army. Due to his general malaise, he could neither speak nor see. They gave him some injection into his vein and transported him in an unknown direction again, when he lost consciousness again. He started waking up and the first thing he saw were some spotlights (operating room at the Zenica hospital). He heard some voices and saw the doctor stitching his guts. Then he lost consciousness again. When he woke up again he heard the voice "Chetnik woke up". Then three doctors came in, one of whom was from Virginia (USA) and introduced himself to be a "doctor without borders". Then he found out he had been in a coma for 7 days and had not been waking up. On that day, they decided to disconnect him from the apparatus (allegedly he was clinically dead). He told him he had a strong body. He was transferred to an eight-bed room where Muslims lay. Out of the seven, four were able to move and they repeatedly hit him at the stitches across the abdomen at night, so his stitches got torn. It happened three times so they stitched it again. Because of the pain he wailed. He lay there for a while, but he does not know for how long exactly and then he was transferred to the Zenica Correctional facility. In prison, he was once taken to some room with bars, they put him on and tied to a table and tortured him like that, one Muslim turned on the drill 5 cm away from his forehead, another a chainsaw just above his genitals, and the third one nailed the nails with wires into the bones of the lower leg. Then he took a baton, spilled a bucket of water on the tiles, and brought that stick to the spilled liquid, and then he saw some

[7] TN: it is written that he DID NOT lose consciousness, but in the following sentences the word AGAIN implies this could be a typing mistake

bluish sparks (an electric baton), and he was naked during all that time. One approached him with a knife and said "well, now you will no longer be able to aim," and was about to take his eye out, then he fainted. He regained consciousness in his cell. The following day some foreigners came and he was transferred to Sarajevo. He was on a stretcher the whole time (he had an external leg fixer and a left hip dislocation). He was refused admission at the Sarajevo military hospital because he was a Chetnik, after which he was taken to the Koševo hospital, guarded by four guards. One was hitting him, the other was spitting at him, and the third one was defecating over his body. They tortured him with hunger by throwing the food that the nurse brought out of the window right away. The windows were broken, so it was cold even during August. At the hospital reception, Dr Faruk Kulenović told him that the fixators were not done well[8] in Zenica, so he had taken a hammer and hit the pins deeper into his bone while he was awake. From there, he was transferred to the Viktor Bubanj Barracks and then to Hrasno, a hospital for retarded children, which was turned into a private prison. He was returned to the Viktor Bubanj barracks again. This was his "longest night." There, his nails on his right leg were ripped out with pliers, they put cigarettes down on his tongue, punched him with some needles, made his wounds bleed again, pulled blood from his veins with syringes, and wrote names on the wall with blood, and threatened to circumcise him and they broke-kicked out three of his teeth, one was punching him in the ribs only on the left side. When they were already getting tired at about 2 a.m., they sent him one guy who was told he could do "whatever he wanted" with him. When he saw how he looked all in blood and almost quartered, he just stopped, looked at him and "didn't have the courage to approach him." When the morning came, the same people who were doing it came, wiped the blood, cleaned everything in the room, put him in the car and took him to the central prison in Sarajevo. They put him in a cell there on the 5th floor. There he was registered by the Red Cross. Then they took the legal route to accuse him. Judge/lawyer Muhidin Capo began shouting and making some records with the typist. He was accused of being a "member of the Republic of Srpska Army and belonging to an enemy military formation." During one moment if rage he stabbed the pen in his right fist. He was told he would do 10 years in prison, but he never got his judgement. He was exchanged on 21/09/1994 on the "Bratstvo jedinstvo" bridge in Sarajevo.

PERSONAL MEDICAL HISTORY

Before the war he was completely healthy. He had not been operated.

[8] TN: translated as in original, although different versions of this show up in different statements and notes

MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION

- From medical records: st. post vulnus sclopetar tibiae sin.,pseudoarthrosis, st. post osteomyelitidem cruris 1. sin.

- From the discharge list of the traumatology clinic in Sarajevo reg.no. .566: "... date of admission 23/08/1994 Dg: Vul.sclop. reg. glutei. Fractura explosiva cruris sin. gen. dex. pubis dex. Ruptura intestini tenui pp. vul. sclopetaria.

- From the discharge list of the surgical ward of the Town Hospital in Sarajevo of the Republic of Srpska: "... Admission date September 20, 1994: ... UNPROFOR transferred him from the Koševo Hospital. Dg: Vul.sclop. reg. glutei. Fractura explosiva cruris sin gen. dex pubis dex. Ruptura intestini tenui pp. vul. sclopetaria ... operated at the Zenica hospital on 05/08/1994 when LP[9] was made without stating what was done on the small intestine and an external fixator was fixed ... on the left lower leg ... discharged on September 20, 1994 ... out of family reasons wants to continue treatment in Milići or Zvornik.

- From the discharge list in Milići, reg.no. 90: "... was treated from 27/01/1995 until 31/01/1995 ... the patient was admitted … for partial removal of ... fixator ..."

- From the discharge list of the hospital in Banja Koviljača reg.no. 312: ".... he was treated from the 23rd of February until the 1st of May 1995: Dg: paresis n. peronei 1. dex.

- From the discharge list in Milići, reg.no. 518: "... was treated from the 1st of May 1995 until the 11th of May 1995 ... admitted ... because of pain, swelling, redness and purulent secretion from the left lower leg accompanied with fever .... external fixator removed, incision performed and removal of purulent drainage, high doses of AB[10] are included ... wants further treatment ... VMA[11] ... ".

CURRENT PROBLEMS

Main problems: constant pain in the right hip region, left lower leg, spine pain due to shorter left leg, suffocation attacks, stomach problems. He sleeps poorly, nightmares prevent him from sleeping. He sweats and cries in his sleep. He has problems in marriage because of this and "scares the child". He does not feel his right leg due to a nerve injury. Personal history: pefore the camp he was not treated neurologically or psychiatrically. Family history: negates elements of relevance to neurological and psychiatric heredity.

9 TN: most probably laboratory test

10 TN: unknown abbreviation, probably antibiotic

11 TN: military medical academy

An objective examination of [redacted] established the following

FINDINGS:

1. A man about 182 cm tall, well developed and well fed. Cylindrical neck ordinarily movable. Chest cylindrical, symmetrically respiratory movable. Abdomen in line with the chest, soft during palpation. Secondary sexual characteristics well expressed.

2. The teeth are mostly preserved. The 5th and 6th teeth in the lower jaw on the left are missing (allegedly knocked out by the impact - the roots of the teeth extracted in Belgrade at the dental ward) and the 6th on the upper right. The dental pits are flattened at the sites of missing teeth, and the mucous membranes of the gums and lips are diffusely pale pink. Preserved teeth are firm in their roots, moderately cared.

3. In the hairy part of the middle frontal area, there is a transversely located whitish scar, 14x2 mm in diameter, hairless.

4. In the middle of the back of the right fist there is a whitish scar, oval in appearance, 10x8 mm in diameter above the skin.

5. On the left side of the neck, at the height of a large head rotator, at its front edge there is a whitish scar, 10x8 mm in diameter, and on the posterior edge of the muscle at the base of the neck, a whitish scar with a diameter of 8x9 mm, both oval-shaped scars and at a distance of 25 mm.

6. At 2 cm to the left of the midline of the back, at the root of the cervical region, there is an oval, whitish scar, 15x12 mm in diameter.

7. At the front of the right shoulder there is a whitish scar, about 3x3 mm in diameter, at the same level as the skin, and a small hardened part is felt underneath (allegedly he pulled out a piece of shrapnel from that location).

8. In the central line of the abdomen, below the apex of the xiphoid extension up to area below the navel in the total length of 22 cm, there is an operative whitish scar, with numerous

transverse brisket suture scars; up to 15 mm wide. In the area of the left spina iliaca anterior a whitish scar, 8x1 cm in diameter, was removed at the location from which a part of the bone was removed for implantation (this was done at the Zemun hospital).

9. In the area of the inner side of the upper one fifth of the right thigh, irregular whitish scar, 55x35 mm in diameter, recessed below the level of the skin, shrivelled as a spider web.

10. On the outside of the right knee, a whitish scar, oval-shaped, recessed below the level of the skin, wrinkled, 15x10 mm in diameter, a shrapnel left behind in soft tissue.

11. Left lower leg is deformed, bent, in the lower half arched inward. At the front of the lower half there is a visible longitudinal irregular whitish scar, 110x10 mm in diameter with transverse brisket extensions (from surgery), and an oval whitish scars up to about 10x5 mm in diameter (from the fixator) above the scars on the front inside and in the ankle area. On the back of the left lower leg, at the border of the middle and lower thirds, horizontally and partly obliquely downwards and inside there is an irregular, whitish scar, 85x22 mm in diameter (from shrapnel and subsequent firing). In the area of the inner ankle of the left foot, an irregular whitish scar, 45x25 mm in diameter, below the level of the skin. Partial limitation of movement in the hock joint and sensitivity to pain present in the area of the scar from the entrance wound and at light palpation in the area of the inner ankle of the foot. Left foot shorter by about 2 cm.

12. Apart from what has been described, there are no other changes on the outside part of the body.

NEUROLOGICAL FINDINGS

Skull and cranial nerves: neurological findings normal. Neck, torso and extremities: hypotrophy of the left lower leg and foot, weakened flexion and extension of the foot. Sensitivity: hypoesthesia of the dorsal and plantar side of the foot. Spinal column: no peculiarities. Coordination tests: normal. Extrapyramidal signs: negative. Meningeal signs, disinhibitory phenomena and pathological reflexes: not obtained. Walking and standing: limp in the left leg. Speech, gnosis and praxix: intact. Sphincters: controls them without problems. Neurovegetative system: no signs of dysfunction.

PSYCHIATRIC FINDINGS

Overall impression: acts tense and subdepressive; verbal contact is easily established and maintained. Consciousness: preserved alertness, oriented, with elements of the disintegration phenomena. Observation: Sensory deception are negated and he does not imply that there are any. Responsiveness: hypertenacity aprosexia. Remembering and memorising: elements of dissociative amnesia for periods of traumatic experiences. Intelligence: average, general knowledge inventory consistent with education. Opinion: in form normal, in content with frequent, coercive and disturbing reminiscences of traumatic experiences in hostile captivity, of negative anticipation. Emotions: anxiety-subdepressive syndrome, reacts to every loud noise, episodes of emotional anaesthesia. Voluntary and instinctive dynamism: hypobulia, frequent nightmares whose contents relate to traumatic experiences in hostile captivity with sequential insomnia, a decline in libido, withdrawal and a decline in efficacy in a family, professional and broader social context. Critical of his actions, discerning of his state of health. Pragmatic along with preserved moral sentiment, reasoning and behaviour.

DIAGNOSIS: according to the criteria of ICD[12]-10, the subjects have paresis of the tibial and peronellar nerve and post-traumatic stress disorder F43.1[13].

X-RAY FINDINGS

On an X-ray of the left lower leg, done on 27/03/1998 a bone scar - callus is visible in the lower third of the left shinbone, where, through the bone callus, this part of the shinbone is completely fused with the fibulae in the length of about 15 cm. The longitudinal axis of the shinbone has been modified in terms of convexity the way forward.

On a pelvic X-ray done on 27/03/1998 (of poor quality) in the soft tissue of the right gluteal region, foreign bodies are seen up to the size of pepper grains, which have unclear boundaries and metallic transparency.

Based on the foregoing, one can give the following

OPINION:

I. The scar in the hairy part of the frontal head region described under item 3 of the findings was made at the location of the previous injury, based on the appearance of the scar and anamnestic data, most likely at the location of the tear caused by the blunt mechanical tool which was in a swinging motion, which includes a buttstock, a baton, and the like.

[12] TN: International Classification of Diseases

[13] TN: diagnosis code

II. The scar on the right hand, described under item 4 of the findings, was formed at the location of the previous injury and, based on the appearance of the scar and anamnestic data, most likely at the point of stabbing, possibly applied with a pencil point.

III. The scars on the left lateral side of the neck, described under item 5 of the findings, were formed at the locations of entry and exit wounds, inflicted by projectiles fired from hand-held firearms, and whose canal went through subcutaneous soft tissue only:

IV. The scars in the root of the neck, on the right shoulder, right thigh and left lower leg, described under items 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11, as well as the bone scars on the bones of the left lower leg, were formed in the locations of previous injuries, and based on the way the scars look, X-rays and information from medical records, most likely at the locations of injuries caused by the explosive fragmentation agent (shrapnel).

V. The scars on the abdomen and left thigh region described under item 8 of the findings occurred at the locations of surgery which, as indicated by the medical records, had to be done due to the injuries of the abdomen and abdominal organs caused by explosion

VI. As a result of severe physical injuries on the left lower leg, paresis of the tibial and peronellar nerves developed, as well as noticeable deformation of the left lower leg. As a result of the severe psychic trauma suffered in captivity, [redacted] developed a post-traumatic stress disorder. All this significantly diminishes his general life and work ability.

Attachments:

- Photos
- Medical documentation
- X-rays

Commission of Physicians

Professor Dr Dušan J. Dunjić

Forensic specialist

[signature illegible]

Professor Dr Branimir Aleksandrić

Forensic specialist

[signature illegible]

Asst. Dr Aleksandar Jovanović

Specialist in neuropsychiatry

[signature illegible]

71/94-3 [handwritten, illegible]

BG-32

Number Kri 18/98

...5.8.94...[handwritten illegible]

Sarajevo...13...23/8-9/9.. [handwritten illegible]

V.Bubanj

CZ - 21.9.9? [handwritten illegible]

Chapter VI

APPENDIX XI

Inteructive mup of camps/location of confinement/prisons/detention for Serbs.

http://incomfis-sarajevo.org/map/?fbclid=IwAR081RyNkEWHoNAlhKWnlY2nBXWg52XxNI1Dp1P7FtfEYa_KR9wjd3LvXgQ



BIOGRAPHIES OF THE COMMISSION MEMBERS

RAPHAEL ISRAELI

Raphael Israeli was born in Fes, Marocco, currently teaching Islamic, Chinese and Middle Eastern History at Hebrew University. Graduate of Hebrew University in History and Arabic Literature, PhD in Chinese and Islamic History from the University of California, Berkeley in 1974. Since 1974 Lecturer and then Professor of Islamic and Chinese History at Hebrew University, with sabbatical periods spent at York University in Toronto, the University of Pittsburg's Semester at Sea program, Harvard University, Boston University, Australian National University in Canberra, Melbourne University and Naruto University in Japan. Fellow of the Jerusalem Center since the 1970s. Author of over 50 research books and a dozen edited books, and some 100 scholarly articles in the fields of Islamic radicalism, Islamic terrorism, the Modern Middle East, Islam in China and Asia and Europe.

VIKTOR BEZRUCHENKO

Viktor Bezruchenko was born on 10 October 1953 in Moscow, Russia. He obtained his Bachelor's Degree at Military Institute in Moscow and was commissioned as Second Lieutenant in 1980. The span of his Army service is 14 years. Between 1987 and 1989 he had a tour of duty as a Military Observer with the United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization in Middle East, and between 1993 and 1994 he was Chief of Staff UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1994 he retired from the Army in the rank of Colonel. Between 1994 and 2002, he held a post of Civil Affairs Officer with United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and worked in Gornji Vakuf, Sarajevo, and Brčko, being longest serving UN officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between 2002 and 2019 he served as military analyst with the United Nations International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, and as United Nations security officer in Iraq, Sudan, New York, and Afghanistan. In 1993, he attended a course of UN peace-keeping operations at NATO School at Oberammergau. In 2007 he took a course of International Criminal Law at Leiden University, the Netherlands. Viktor Bezruchenko also holds Master's Degree in Political Science from Sarajevo University, BiH, and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Kiev, Ukraine. He is author of about 20 publications on international law and military history. He speaks Russian, English, French, Serbian, Croatian, Polish, and Ukrainian.

DARKO TANASKOVIĆ

Born on January 4, 1948, in Zagreb (Croatia). He graduated at the Faculty of Philology, Department of Oriental Studies, in 1970. In 1972, he obtained his Master's Degree at the same Department, with a Master's Dissertation The Autobiography of "Usama ibn Munqidh" (Linguistic Features), and a Ph.D. (1979), with a thesis Arabic Language in Contemporary Tunisia (Diglossia and Bilingualism). Darko Tanasković was teaching at the Faculty of Philology from 1971 to 2018, when he retired as Full Professor at the Department of Oriental Studies. Prof. Tanasković published over 800 papers and research work reports including the following books: Arabic Poetry (1977), The Sufism (with Ivan Šop, 1981, 2011), Arabic Language in Contemporary Tunisia (1982), The Contrastive Analysis of the Serbo-Croat and Arabic Languages (1982), In dialogue with Islam (1992), At the East of the West (together with M. Jevtić, 2000), The Islam and Us (2000), The South-East of Serbia – the Continuation of the Crisis and the Probable Outcome (together with a group of authors, 2001), Arabic Grammar (with A.Mitrović, 2005), Islam: Dogma and Life (2008), The Autonomy of Reason (with M. Jevtić, 2009), Neo-Ottomanism (2010), The Pigeon that hasn't become the Bird (2012),The Signs of Time (2014), From One Day to Another (2015), From Neo-Ottomanism to Erdoganism (2016). Many Tanasković's works have been translated and published in various languages. Darko Tanasković was a visiting professor at the University of Sarajevo, Skopje, Algiers, at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris, at the University of

Sofia and at the University "La Sapienza" in Rome. In 1995 was nominated a member of the Academy of European Sciences and Arts (Academia Scientiarum Et Artium Europea) in Salzburg. Since 2000 he has been a corresponding member of the Society of Turkish Language (Türk Dil Kurumu) in Ankara. Darko Tanasković was teaching at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology (Belgrade), the Academy for Diplomacy and Security (Belgrade) and the Faculty of Political Sciences (Banja Luka). He was the president of the Council of the Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the member of the Foreign Policy Council of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is a member of the Association of Translators of Serbia, Association of Writers of Serbia and of the Serbian PEN. From 1995 to 1999 he was accredited Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Turkey and (1998-1999) Azerbaijan. In 2001 Darko Tanasković was appointed to the Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. From 2002 to 2008 he was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia to the Holy See and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta. From 2015 to 2018 he served as Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of the Republic of Serbia to UNESCO.

LAURENCE FRENCH

B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in sociology (social disorganization/social psychology) from the University of New Hampshire, a Ph.D. in cultural psychology (educational psychology and measurement) from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and a M.A. in school psychology from Western New Mexico University. Pursued postdoctoral studies in "minorities and criminal justice education" at the State University of New York-Albany and completed the post-doctoral prescribing psychology program including the national exam. Professor emeritus of psychology from Western New Mexico University; life-member and Fellow of the American Psychological Association; Fellow of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues; Diplomate/Fellow of the College of Prescribing Psychologists (charter member); life-member of the American Society of Criminology. Served honorably in the U.S. Marine Corps and is a life-member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW Post 2860); the Third Marine Division Association; and Disabled American Veterans (DAV). He is a licensed clinical psychologist (Arizona); a Fulbright Scholar (University of Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina – 2009-2010); and was a Visiting Endowed Chair of Criminology and Criminal Justice at St. Thomas University, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada (fall semester 2010). Completed a Fulbright Specialist project (#6764) on "war crimes and missing persons," for Republika Srpska, Minister of Interior, Bosnia-Herzegovina at the Police College, University

of Banja Luka, February 22 - April 3, 2016. He won a 2014 McGraw Hill Distinguished Scholar Award and the 2014 Distinguished Career Contribution to Research Award from Division 45 (Society for the Psychological Study of Culture, Ethnicity and Race) of the American Psychological Association. In 2018, he won a Marquis Who's Who Lifetime Achievement Award. He has over 300 publications including 20 books—his latest books are Routledge Handbook on Native American Justice Issues (Routledge, 2019) Editor/author; The History of Policing America: From Militias and Military to the Law Enforcement of Today (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018); North American Border Conflicts: Race, Politics, and Ethics (CRC Press, 2016); Policing American Indians: A Unique Chapter in American Jurisprudence (CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015); Frog Town: Portrait of a French Canadian Parish in New England (University Press of America, 2014); and War Trauma and its Aftermath: An International Perspective on the Balkan and Gulf Wars (University Press of America, 2012). His major areas of research interest are international and comparative social, human and criminal justice; Native American and minority issues; police and criminal psychology and neuro-, clinical, and forensic psychology.

GIUSEPPE ZACCARIA

Giuseppe Zaccaria was born on 18th of November 1950 in Bari, Italy. He is a professional journalist from 1975. He worked in "Il giornale" (1976-78), "ll Messaggero" (1979-80) and "la Stampa" (1981-2009). From 2010 - 2012 worked as Chief of communication in Fiat Srbija. From 2012 – 2017 was a publisher and editor of "Italintermedia" news agency in Belgrade. As a foreign correspondent for "La Stampa" he covered for more than twenty years main events in Europe and Middle East starting from the end of Ceausescu regime in Romania; the post-communist process in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia; politics in Greece; major events in Israel, Lebanon, Siria, Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia; Nelson Mandela's election in South Africa; end of Suharto's regime in Indonesia; East Timor crisis. As a war correspondent he covered all the Balkans's conflicts; the first and the second Gulf War; the Afghanistan crisis; the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006. He took many interviews from presidents and leaders like Slobodan Milosević (in 2000, the only interview to a foreign journalist in a more than a decade), Muammar Gaddafi, Mandela, and all the main politicians in Balkans. He covered also the Yugoslav crisis in Croatia, Serbia Bosnia and Kosovo; the NATO campaign in 1999. He

is the author of the book "Noi, criminali di Guerra", published by Baldini & Castoldi in 1996 about war crimes in Bosnia. Acted as a witness in Hague tribunal. He published the biography of Mira Markovic under the title "Memories of Red Witch" in Italian, German, Spanish, Serbian and Slovenian language. He is a winner of the "Hemingway Prize" and the "Saint Vincent" special prize for journalism in Italy. In 1999 he published an article dedicated to Serbian people being published in "Aspenia", the monthly review of Aspen Institute. From 2019 to 2020 he served as a member of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Suffering of Serbs between 1991 to 1995. He died in April 2020 at age 69.

PATRICK BARRIOT

Patrick Barriot, MD, is specialist in anesthesiology, intensive care and disaster medicine. He has participated in and completed the international training course of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team. He had a career in the French army where he was successively assigned to the emergency medical service of the Paris Fire Brigade, to the 11th Paratrooper Division, to the Civil Security Intervention Unit N°1, to the Forward Surgical Unit N°7 (war in former Yugoslavia). He was then chief medical officer of Civil Security Intervention Units and medical advisor to the prefect in charge of Civil Security. He left the army with the rank of colonel. He was afterwards hospital practitioner of civilian hospitals with the specialty of surgical intensive care. He participated in numerous relief and humanitarian aid operations during armed conflicts (wars in the former Yugoslavia, in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Congo-Brazzaville…) and natural disasters (earthquakes, epidemics…). In July 1990, during the popular uprising in Tirana (Albania), he was the only doctor in the foreign embassies (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey…) to provide medical care for the thousands of Albanians who had taken refuge in the precincts of these embassies. He is the author of many medical and scientific publications in the major international peer-reviewed journals and many emergency medicine books. He is currently Medical Director of the European Institute of Health Training (Institut Européen de Formation en santé), Director of medical operations of the RAPID consortium charged with ensuring the safety of expatriates in very high-risk areas (Mogadishu, Somalia), lecturer at the Faculty of Medicine (Montpellier, France) and at the Mohammed VI University of Health Sciences (Casablanca, Morocco).